CASE FACTS ISSUE PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS RULING RATIO

People
VS
Mateo





On October 30, 1996,
10 informations, one
for each count of (ten)
rape (of Imelda Mateo
who is the daughter of
Private Respondents
live-in partner
Rosemarie Capulong.
which all happened at
times Imelda's mother
is not around, were
filed against appellant
Efren Mateo. Imelda
did not report any of
the incidents because
Efren Mateo had
threatened to kill her
and her mother if she
will disclose the
matter to anyone.
Despite all the serious
charges against him,
appellant denied each.
The lower court found
Mateo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt,
imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

Hence, this petition is
elevated to the
Supreme Court for
review.
W/N the case
should
directly be
forwarded to
the Supreme
Court by
virtue of the
express
provision in
the
constitution
on automatic
appeal where
the penalty
imposed is
reclusion
perpetua, life
imprisonment
or death?
(Automatic
review)

The Solicitor
General, however,
assails the factual
findings of the trial
court and
recommends an
acquittal of the
appellant due to the
instances wherein
all the factual basis
presented by the
complainant are
incoherent and
incongruent. The
evidences
presented as well as
the witnesses
cannot be
considered a proof
beyond resonable
doubt.
Petition
REMANDED.
Court held
that all the
facts of the
case be
forwarded.

Allowing an
intermediate review
by the Court of
Appeals before the
case is elevated to the
Supreme Court on
automatic review is a
procedural matter
within the rule-
making prerogative of
the SC than the law-
making power of the
Congress.
Nonetheless, it has
been held that the
Supreme Court has
assumed the direct
appellate review over
all criminal cases in
which the penalty
imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment (or
lower but involving
offenses committed
on the same occasion
or arising out of the
same occurrence that
gave rise to the more
serious offense for
which the penalty of
death, reclusion
perpetua, or life
imprisonment is
imposed).

People
VS
Gutierrez
In the morning of
May 22, 1970, a
group of armed
persons set fire to
various inhabited
houses in barrio Ora
Centro, Bantay, Ilocos
Sur. On the afternoon
of the same day,
several residential
houses were likewise
burned in barrio Ora
Este of the same
municipality and
province, which
resulted to the
destruction of
various houses and
resulted in the death
of an old woman.
Two informations
were filed in the
Court of First
Instance (one for
arson with homicide
and the other for
arson), charging the
17 private
respondents,
together with 82
other unidentified
persons,
confederating,
conspiring,
constabulating and
helping one another,
did then and there
willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously burn
or caused to be
W/N the
respondent
judge
committed
grave abuse
discretion
when he
failed to act
upon the
contention
that cases
should be
transferred
to Criminal
Circuit court
of 2nd Justice
District due
to the
impending
miscarriage
of justice?

Respondents in
their answer
denied any abuse
of discretion in
view of the fact
that the
Administrative
Order merely
authorized the
court below, but
did not require or
command.

YES THERE
WAS GRAVE
ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
Respondent Judge, in
construing
Administrative
Order No. 226 as
permissive and not
mandatory, acted
within the limits of
his discretion and
violated neither the
law nor the EOs
mentioned.
HOWEVER, in
refusing to consider
Department AO No.
226 of the Secretary
of Justice as
mandatory,
respondent Judge
failed to act upon the
contention of the
prosecuting officers
that the cases should
be transferred to the
Criminal Circuit
Court of the Second
Judicial District
because a
miscarriage of
justice was
impending, in view
of the prosecution
witnesses to testify
in the court where
they felt their lives
would be
endangered

Thus, the SC held:
That RA No. 5179
creating the Circuit
burned several
residential houses,
knowing the said
houses to be
occupied. Two of the
accused furnished
bail and voluntarily
appeared before
respondent Judge,
were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty.
The Secretary of
Justice issued
Administrative Order
No. 221, authorizing
the Judge of the
Circuit Criminal Court
of the Second Judicial
District to hold a
special in Ilocos Sur.
Three days after, the
Secretary of Justice
further issued
Administrative Order
No. 226, authorizing
respondent Judge to
transfer the criminal
cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court. The
prosecution moved
the respondent Judge
for a transfer of said
cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court,
invoking the above-
mentioned
administrative
Orders and calling
attention to the
Criminal Courts did
not, and does not,
authorize the
Secretary of Justice
to transfer thereto
specified and
individual cases;
That the SC, in the
exercise of the
Judicial Power
vested by the
Constitution upon it
and other statutory
Courts, possesses
inherent power and
jurisdiction to
decree that the trial
and disposition of a
case pending in a CFI
be transferred to
another CFI within
the same district
whenever the
interest of justice
and truth so
demand, and there
are serious and
weighty reasons to
believe that a trial by
the court that
originally had
jurisdiction over the
case would not
result in a fair and
impartial trial and
lead to a miscarriage
of justice.
That in the present
case there are
circumstance that
they were issued at
the instance of the
witnesses for reason
of security and
personal safety. The
accused opposed
such transfer and the
respondent Judge
declined the transfer
sought on the ground
that said
Administrative Order
only provided for
transfer of cases to
the Circuit Criminal
Court where the
interest of justice
required it for more
expeditious disposal
of the cases; and in
the cases involved the
accused had already
pleaded; that if the
objective of the
proposed transfer
was to subsequently
obtain a change of
venue from the
Supreme Court under
Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179
the same should have
been done right at the
very inception of
these cases. RA 5179
created the Criminal
Circuit Courts for the
purpose of alleviating
the burden of the CFI,
sufficient and
adequate reasons for
the transfer of the
hearing of th.e said
criminal cases of the
CFI of Ilocos Sur to
the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second
Judicial District, in
the interest of truth
and justice.

and to accelerate the
disposition of
criminal cases
pending or to be filed
therein, but nowhere
indicates an intent to
permit the transfer of
preselected
individual cases to
the circuit courts. In
view of the lower
courts denial of the
motion to transfer
the cases to the
Criminal Court, the
prosecution resorted
to the SC for writs of
certiorari and
mandamus, charging
abuse of discretion
and praying to set
aside the order of
denial of transfer and
to compel the CFI to
remand the cases to
the Circuit Criminal
Court of the
Secondary Judicial
District.
First
Lepanto
VS
CA (power
to
promulgate
rules;
enforcement
of consti
rights,
Briefly, this question
of law arose when
Board of Investment,
in its decision dated
December 10, 1992 in
BOI Case No. 92-005
granted petitioner
First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc.'s
application to amend
W/N The
appellate
jurisdiction
conferred by
statute
(Article 82 of
E.O. 226)
upon the
Supreme
Court cannot
Petitioner's
contention is that
Circular No. 1-91
cannot be deemed
to have
superseded art.
82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code
of 1987 (E.O. No.
226)
It can be
Supersede by
Circular No.
1-91.2.

Clearly, Circular 1-
91 effectively
repealed or
superseded Article
82 of E.O. 226
insofar as the
manner and method
of enforcing the right
to appeal from
decisions of the BOI
pleading,
practice and
procedure
in all courts
its BOI certificate of
registration by
changing the scope of
its registered product
from "glazed floor
tiles" to "ceramic
tiles."

Eventually, oppositor
Mariwasa filed a
motion for
reconsideration of
the said BOI decision
while oppositor Fil-
Hispano Ceramics,
Inc. did not move to
reconsider the same
nor appeal therefrom.
Soon rebuffed in its
bid for
reconsideration,
Mariwasa filed a
petition for review
with respondent
Court of Appeals
pursuant to Circular
1-91.

The Code, which
President Aquino
promulgated in the
exercise of legislative
authority, is in the
nature of a
substantive act of
Congress defining the
jurisdiction of courts
pursuant to Art. VIII,
Sec. 2 of the
be amended
or
superseded
by Circular
No. 1-91. 2.

Petitioner
questions the
holding of the
Second Division
that although the
right to appeal
granted by art. 82
of the Code is a
substantive right
which cannot be
modified by a rule
of procedure,
nonetheless,
questions
concerning where
and in what
manner the
appeal can be
brought are only
matters of
procedure which
this Court has the
power to regulate.

are concerned.
Appeals from
decisions of the BOI,
which by statute was
previously allowed
to be filed directly
with the Supreme
Court, should now be
brought to the Court
of Appeals.

The argument that
Article 82 of E.O. 226
cannot be validly
repealed by Circular
1-91 because the
former grants a
substantive right
which, under the
Constitution cannot
be modified,
diminished or
increased by this
Court in the exercise
of its rule-making
powers is not
entirely defensible
as it seems.
Respondent
correctly argued that
Article 82 of E.O. 226
grants the right of
appeal from
decisions or final
orders of the BOI
and in granting such
right, it also
provided where and
in what manner such
Constitution, while
the circular is a rule
of procedure which
this Court
promulgated
pursuant to its rule-
making power
under Art. VIII Sec
5(5).


appeal can be
brought. These latter
portions simply deal
with procedural
aspects which this
Court has the power
to regulate by virtue
of its constitutional
rule-making powers.

Lina
VS
Purisma
(power of
SC to
disregard its
own rules)
Lualhati Lina was a
bookkeeper at
Philippine Veterans
Bank (PVB).
Petitioner files for
mandamus to compel
Cabanos (President of
Phil. Veterans Bank)
to restore Lina to her
position. Lina claims
she was removed
from office by
Cabanos who acted in
grave abuse of
discretion amounting
to lack or excess in
Jurisdiction. It
appeared from the
annexes of the
amended petition
that Lina was
dismissed by Cabanos
pursuant to LOI# 13 /
LOI # 19 for being
notoriously
undesirable.

The RTC dismissed
Whether or
not the SC
has power to
disregard its
own rules.

YES. In the
light of our
view that RTC
committed a
grave error in
declaring itself
jurisdictionally
impotent in
the premises.

SC reinstated
Lina to work.

*The obvious
reason for
such an
extension in
the exercise of
the Court's
pervasive
power is that
any other
procedure
would amount
to an
unnecessary
rigmarole
which can only
What remains for SC
to do is only to direct
that petitioner's case
be tried and decided
by RTC judge on the
merits. But this is the
Supreme Court
whose power and
duty to do
substantial justice in
every case before it
are inherent, plenary
and imperative,
hence extensive to
all instances where it
appears that final
resolution of the
controversy before it
is feasible without
denying any of the
parties involved full
opportunity to be
heard. Stated
differently, if in any
case elevated to this
Court for the
correction of any
supposed procedural
the petition. The RTC
dismissed the
petition because the
removal of Lina was
pursuant to LOI
issued by the
President pursuant to
Proclamation 1081,
the validity or legality
of said act is beyond
the power of the
courts to review,
much less modify, or
reverse. This is one of
the express
limitations upon the
power of the Courts
in GENERAL ORDER
# 3 by President
Marcos.The General
Order provides that
the courts cannot rule
upon the validity or
legality of any decree
order or act issued by
President Marcos,
pursuant to
Proclamation 1081.

augment the
expenses,
efforts and
anxieties of
the parties and
uselessly delay
the
administration
of justice, no
other result
for all
concerned
being anyway
perceptible.

error of any lower
court, it should be
found that indeed
there has been a
mistake, and it
further appears that
all the facts needed
for a complete
determination of the
whole controversy
are already before
the Court
undisputed or
uncontroverted by
the parties, the
Supreme Court
may at its option,
whenever it feels
the best interests
of justice would be
thereby subserved,
dispense with the
usual procedure of
remanding the case
to the court of
origin for its own
judgment, and
instead, the
Supreme Court
may already
resolve the
pertinent
determinative
issues and render
the final judgment
on the merits.
Santero
VS CFI Cavite
Pablo Santero was
had 2 sets of children
from 2 different
wives. He died. The
respondents were the
Santero Children, the
children by the 2nd
wife, although she
was not married to
the father. A motion
for allowance was
filed by the Santero
children, through
their guardian/
mother Diaz. The
filed the motion for
support, education,
clothing, and medical
allowance. This was
granted by the court.
This was opposed by
the other set of
Santero Children
(petitioners), the
children by the 1st
wife, who was also
not married to the
father.


W/N the
controlling
law is the
civil code or
the rules of
court
PET claim that the
wards are no
longer schooling
and have already
attained the age
of majority.



Such request for
allowance by Diaz
was opposed by
the other Santero
Children
(petitioners),
claiming that the
children are
employed and
married, and that
there is
insufficient funds.
They claim that
under the Rules of
Court, they are no
longer entitled to
allowance.


Diaz countered
that the reason
why the children
were not enrolled
was due to lack of
funds. She cited Art
290/188 of the
Civil Code (on
support), as well as
Rule 83 of the
Rules of Court
(allowance to the
widow and family
in estate
proceedings.

The allowance
requested by Diaz
was granted by the
court. Another
motion for
allowance was
filed by Diaz for 3
additional
children. These 3
additional children
were already of
age, but Diaz
claims that all of
her children have
the right to receive
allowance, as
advance of the
shares in their
inheritance.

The
controlling
provision
should be Art
290/188 of
the Civil Code
(support) and
not Rule 83 of
the Rules of
Court
(allowance to
widow and
family) Since
the provision
of the Civil
Code, a
substantive
law, gives the
surviving
spouse and the
children the
right to
receive
support
during the
liquidation of
the estate of
the deceased,
such right
cannot be
impaired by
Rule 83 of the
Rules of Court
which is a
procedural
rule.

The fact that
respondents are of
age, and are
gainfully employed,
or married is of no
moment and should
not be regarded as
the determining
factor of their right
to allowance
under Art 290/188.

While the Rules of
Court limits
allowances to the
widow and only the
minor children, the
New Civil Code gives
the surviving spouse
and his/her children
without distinction.
Hence, even the
children who are no
longer minors are
entitled to
allowances as
advances from their
shares in the
inheritance from
their father.
Damasco
VS
Laqui
(prescription
of crimes vs
rules of
court)
Filed with the
Municipal Trial Court of
Mandaluyong, Branch
59, presided over by
respondent
Judge Hilario L. Laqui,
petitioner Atty. Eugenio
S. Damasco was
charged with the
crime of grave
threats. He threatened
one Rafael K.
Sumadohat with the
infliction upon his
person.
Upon arraignment,
petitioner pleaded not
guilty. After trial,
respondent judge found
that the evidence
presented did not
establish the crime of
grave threats but only
of light threats. As a
result, petitioner was
convicted of the latter
crime and was
sentenced to pay a fine
of P100.00 and the
costs. The affidavit
complaint was filed
with the Fiscal's after
the lapse of 61 days
from 8 July 1987. Upon
the other hand, the
crime of light threats,
which is a light offense,
prescribes in two (2)
Months.
Whether or
not it was
proper for
respondent
Judge to still
convict
petitioner
after finding
him guilty of
the lesser
offense of
light threats
but which
has already
prescribed.
Subsequently,
petitioner filed a
Motion to Rectify
and Set Aside the
dispositive part of
respondent
Judge's decision,
contending that
he cannot be
convicted of light
threats,
necessarily
included in grave
threats charged in
the information,
as the lighter
offense had
already
prescribed when
the information
was filed.
Petitioner states
that the crime
was committed
on 8 July 1987
and the
information was
filed only on 17
September 1987
or after the lapse
of 71 days.
ACCORDINGLY, the
petition is GRANTED
and the questioned
decision is SET
ASIDE.

Philippine
jurisprudence
considers
prescription of a
crime or offense as a
loss or waiver by the
State of its right to
prosecute an act
prohibited and
punished by law.
Hence, while it is the
rule that an accused
who fails to move to
quash before
pleading, is deemed
to waive all
objections which are
grounds of a motion
to quash, yet, this
rule cannot apply to
the defense of
prescription, which
under Art. 69 of the
Revised Penal Code
extinguishes
criminal liability.
Thus, as suggested
by the cited
memorandum, a
departure from the
ruling in Francisco
vs. CA, can be done
only "through an
overhaul of some
existing rules on
criminal procedure
to give prescription
a limited meaning,
i.e., a mere bar to the

commencement of a
criminal action and
therefore, waivable.
But this will have to
contend with the
Constitutional
provision that while
the Supreme Court
has the power to
promulgate rules
concerning the
protection and
enforcement of
constitutional rights,
pleadings, practice
and procedure in all
courts, the
admission to the
practice of law, the
integrated bar, and
the legal assistance
to the
underprivileged,
such rules shall not
however diminish,
increase or modify
substantive rights.

Baguio
Market
Vendors
VS
Hon. Cortes
(Congress
cannot
repeal SC
rules)

Petitioner Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-
Purpose Cooperative
(petitioner) is a credit
cooperative organized
under Republic Act No.
6938 (RA 6938), or the
Cooperative Code of
the Philippines. Article
62(6) of RA 6938
exempts cooperatives:
The question
is whether
petitioners
application
for
extrajudicial
foreclosure is
exempt from
legal fees
under Article
62(6) of RA
In 2004,
petitioner, as
mortgagee, filed
with the Clerk of
Court of the
Regional Trial
Court of Baguio
City (trial court) a
petition to
extrajudicially
foreclose a
WHEREFORE, we
DENY the petition.
We AFFIRM the
Orders dated 30
August 2004 and 6
October 2004 of the
Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City.

The 1987 Consti
textually altered the
power-sharing
scheme under the
previous charters by
deleting in Section
5(5) of Article VIII.
Congress subsidiary
and corrective
power.

from the payment of all
court and sheriff's fees
payable to the
Philippine Government
for and in connection
with all actions brought
under this Code, or
where such action is
brought by the
Cooperative
Development Authority
before the court, to
enforce the payment
of obligations
contracted in favor of
the cooperative.

In an Order dated 30
August 2004, Judge
Iluminada Cabato-
Cortes (respondent),
Executive Judge of the
trial court, denied the
request for exemption.

6938. mortgage under
Act 3135, as
amended. Under
Section 7(c) of
Rule 141, as
amended,
petitions for
extrajudicial
foreclosure are
subject to legal
fees based on the
value of the
mortgagees
claim. Invoking
Article 62 (6) of
RA 6938,
petitioner sought
exemption from
payment of the
fees.

Among
others, i1987 Consti
enhanced the rule
making power of
this Court [under]
Section 5(5), Article
VIII.

The payment of legal
fees is a vital
component of the
rules promulgated
by this Court
concerning pleading,
practice and
procedure, it cannot
be validly annulled,
changed or
modified by
Congress. As one of
the safeguards of
this Courts
institutional
independence, the
power to
promulgate rules of
pleading, practice
and procedure is
now the Courts
exclusive domain.
In re: Matter
of
Clarification
of
Exemption
from
Payment of
all court and
sheriffs fees
The petitioners,
through counsel,
requests for the
issuance of a writ to
clarify and implement
the exemption of
cooperatives from the
payment of court and
sheriffs fees pursuant
W/N
cooperatives
are exempt
from the
payment of
court and
sheriffs fees
Petition DENIED. The exemptions
granted to
cooperatives under
R.A 6938; R.A9520
and OCA 44-2007
clearly do not cover
the amount
required to defray
the actual travel
to Republic Act No.
6938, as amended by
R.A. 9520 known as the
Philippine Cooperative
Act of 2008. They
contend that as a
cooperative, they are
exempted under
Section 6, Art. 61 of R.A.
9520.

PHCCI claims that
despite the exemptions
granted by the
aforementioned laws
and issuances, they
have been continuously
assessed and were
obliged to pay legal and
other fees whenever it
files cases in court.

expenses of the
sheriff, process
server or other
court-authorized
person in the service
of summons,
subpoena and other
court processes
relative to the case.

2). 1 September
2009 Resolution
exempted the
cooperatives from
court fees but not
from sheriffs
fees/expenses.

3). Since the
payment of legal fees
is a vital component
of the rules
promulgated by this
Court concerning
pleading, practice
and procedure, it
cannot be validly
annulled, changed
or modified by
Congress. As one of
the safeguards of
this Courts
institutional
independence, the
power to
promulgate rules of
pleading, practice
and procedure is
now the Courts
exclusive domain.
That power is no
longer shared by
this Court with
Congress, much less
with the Executive.

4). The separation of
powers keeps the
power to
promulgate rules of
pleading, practice
and procedure
within the sole
province of this
Court. The other
branches trespass
upon this
prerogative if they
enact laws or issue
orders that
effectively repeal,
alter or modify any
of the procedural
rules promulgated
by this Court.
Viewed from this
perspective, the
claim of a legislative
grant of exemption
from the payment of
legal fees under
Section 39 of R.A.
8291 necessarily
fails.

5). In many other
cases, the Supreme
Court held its
position that
cooperatives are not
exempt from paying
court and sheriffs
fees. Hence, the
exemption no longer
exists. The Office of
the Court
Administrator is
DIRECTED to issue a
circular clarifying
that cooperatives
are not exempt from
the payment of the
legal fees provided
for under Rule 141
of the Rules of Court.

Sto. Tomas
VS
Paneda
(rules on
crim pro
allows
exception by
law to rules
on venue)


* wala ako
mahanap na
ok na digest
I will edit
this
These consolidated
cases pertain to the
constitutionality of
certain provisions of
Republic Act 8042,
otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995. On June 7,
1995 Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.)
8042 or the Migrant
Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995
that, for among other
purposes, sets the
Governments policies
on overseas
employment and
establishes a higher
standard of protection

and promotion of the
welfare of migrant
workers, their families,
and overseas Filipinos
in distress.

In re
Cunanan
- Controversies arose
when Republic Act No.
972 Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953 was enacted.

- Under the Rules of
Court governing
admission to the bar,
in order that a
candidate (for
admission to the Bar)
may be deemed to have
passed his
examinations
successfully, he must
have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent
in all subjects, without
falling below 50 per
cent in any subject.
(Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court).

- Believing themselves
as fully qualified to
practice law as those
reconsidered and
passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of
having been
discriminated against,
unsuccessful

Whether or
not Republic
Act No. 972 is
constitutional
UNCONSTITUTIONAL In the judicial
system from which
ours has been
evolved, the
admission,
suspension,
disbarment and
reinstatement of
attorneys at law in
the practice of the
profession and their
supervision have
been indisputably a
judicial function and
responsibility. We
have said that in the
judicial system from
which ours has been
derived, the
admission,
suspension,
disbarment or
reinstatement of
attorneys at law in
the practice of the
profession is
concededly judicial.

On this matter, there
is certainly a clear
distinction between
the functions of the
judicial and
candidates who
obtained averages of a
few percentage lower
than those admitted to
the Bar agitated in
Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill
No. 12 which, among
others, reduced the
passing general
average in bar
examinations to 70 per
cent effective since
1946.

- The court expressed
their unfavorable
opinion about the bill
passed by the Senate.

- On June 21, 1953, the
President allowed R.A.
972 to become a law
without his signature.
legislative
departments of the
government.

It is obvious,
therefore, that the
ultimate power to
grant license for the
practice of law
belongs exclusively
to this Court, and the
law passed by
Congress on the
matter is of
permissive
character, or as
other authorities
may say, merely to
fix the minimum
conditions for the
license.
In Re UP
Law Faculty
On April 28, 2010, the
ponencia of Associate
Justice Mariano del
Castillo (Justice Del
Castillo) in Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No.
162230) was
promulgated. On May
31, 2010, the
counselfor Vinuya, et al.
(the "Malaya Lolas"),
filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the
W/N there
was
plagiarism
involved
Petition was
DISMISSED. The
petitoner law
professors and
practictioners were
refrained from
questioning the
credibility of the
verdict made by
Judge Castello.
These cases clearly
show that the
absence of any
formal charge
against and/or
formal investigation
of an errant lawyer
do not preclude the
Court from
immediately
exercising its
disciplining
authority, as long as
the errant lawyer or
Vinuya decision, raising
solely the following
grounds:
I. Our own
constitutional and
jurisprudential
histories reject this
Honorable Courts (sic)
assertion that the
Executives foreign
policy prerogatives are
virtually unlimited;
precisely, under the
relevant jurisprudence
and constitutional
provisions, such
prerogatives are
proscribed by
international human
rights and
humanitarian
standards, including
those provided for in
the relevant
international
conventions of which
the Philippines is a
party.
II. This Honorable
Court has confused
diplomatic protection
with the broader, if
fundamental,
responsibility of states
to protect the human
rights of its citizens
especially where the
rights asserted are
subject of erga omnes
judge has been given
the opportunity to
be heard. As we
stated earlier, Atty.
Buffe has been
afforded the
opportunity to be
heard on the present
matter through her
letter-query and
Manifestation filed
before this Court.
(Emphases
supplied.)
Under the rules and
jurisprudence,
respondents clearly
had no right to a
hearing and their
reservation of a
right they do not
have has no effect on
these proceedings.
Neither have they
shown in their
pleadings any
justification for this
Court to call for a
hearing in this
instance. They have
not specifically
stated what relevant
evidence,
documentary or
testimonial, they
intend to present in
their defense that
will necessitate a
formal hearing.
obligations and pertain
to jus cogens norms
According to Attys.
Roque and Bagares, the
works allegedly
plagiarized in the
Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-
Decents article "A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens;" (2) Christian J.
Tams book Enforcing
Erga Omnes
Obligations in
International Law; and
(3) Mark Ellis article
"Breaking the Silence:
On Rape as an
International Crime."
On July 22, 2010, Atty.
Roques column,
entitled "Plagiarized
and Twisted," appeared
in the Manila Standard
Today. In the said
column, Atty. Roque
claimed that Prof. Evan
Criddle, one of the
authors purportedly
not properly
acknowledged in the
Vinuya decision,
confirmed that his
work, co-authored with
Prof. Evan Fox-Decent,
had been plagiarized.
Atty. Roque quoted
Prof. Criddles response
Instead, it would
appear that they
intend to present
records, evidence,
and witnesses
bearing on the
plagiarism and
misrepresentation
issues in the Vinuya
case and in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC on the
assumption that the
findings of this Court
which were the
bases of the Show
Cause Resolution
were made in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC, or
were related to the
conclusions of the
Court in the Decision
in that case.
to the post by Julian Ku
regarding the news
report on the alleged
plagiarism in the
international law blog,
Opinio Juris.

In Re IBP
elections
At the helm of the IBP
is the IBP National
President (IBP-
President), who is
automatically
succeeded by the EVP.
When the Philippine
Bar was first
integrated, both the
IBP-President and the
EVP were elected by
the IBP-BOG from
among themselves or
from other members of
the Integrated Bar, with
the right of automatic
succession by the EVP
to the presidency for
the next succeeding full
term. The presidency
rotated among all the
nine regions in such
order as the IBP-BOG
had prescribed. Both
the IBP-President and
the EVP held a term of
one (1) year, with the
presidency rotating
from year to year
among the regions.
On November 1, 1974,
the IBP By-Laws took
To further avoid
conflicting and
confusing rulings in
the various IBP
cases like what
happened to this
one, the December
14,2010 Resolution
and Velez, it is
recommended that
the Court create a
committee for IBP
affairs to primarily
attend to the
problems and needs
of a very important
professional body
and to make
recommendation for
its improvement and
strengthening.

effect, providing that
the IBP-President and
the EVP be chosen by
the Board of Governors
from among nine (9)
regional governors, as
much as practicable, on
a rotation basis. It was
also provided that the
IBP-President and the
EVP hold office for a
term of two (2) years
from July 1 following
their election until June
30 of their second year
in office and until their
successors shall have
been duly chosen and
qualified.
Later, several
amendments in the IBP
By-Laws were
introduced, among
which were the
provisions relating to
the election of its
national officers. In Bar
Matter No. 287, dated
July 9, 1985, the Court
approved the
recommendation
allowing the IBP-
President, the EVP and
the officers of the
House of Delegates to
be directly elected by
the House of Delegates.

Bustos
VS
Lucero
Petitioner who was
accused in a criminal
case, filed a motion
with CFI of Pampanga ,
praying that record of
case be remanded to
justice of peace court of
Masantol, so petitioner
may cross-examine
complainant and
witnesses with their
testimony. It was
denied.
(started with Justice of
Peace Court, now in CFI,
then want to bring it
back to Justice of Peace
for re-examination)

1. Petitioners attorney
memorandum
submitted to CFI said
that the accused
appeared at the
preliminary
investigation. He
pleaded not guilty
before the Justice of
Peace.

2. Counsel moved that
complainant present
her evidence so that
she and witnesses
could be examined and
cross-examined. Fiscal
and private prosecutor
objected, invoking sec
11 of Rule 108. It was
sustained.
NO. SEC. 11, RULE
108 DOES NOT
CURTAIL THE
JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE'S SOUND
DISCRETION ON THE
MATTER

Dissenting: The right
of the accused to
examine and cross-
examine evidence
and witnesses
against him is a
Substantive Right! It
is a substantive right
because by exercising
it, an accused person
may show, even if he
has no evidence in
his favor, that the
testimonies of the
witnesses for the
prosecution are not
sufficient to indicate
that there is a
probability that a
crime has been
committed and he is
guilty thereof, and
therefore the accused
is entitled to be
released and not
committed to prison,
and thus avoid an
open and public
accusation of crime,
the trouble, expense,
and anxiety of a
public trial, and the
Furthermore, the
defendant cannot, as
a matter of right,
compel the
witnesses to repeat
in his presence what
they had said at the
preliminary
examination before
the issuance of the
arrest. The
constitutional right
of the accused to
confront/be
confronted by
witnesses against
him does not apply
to preliminary
hearings. [Petition
Dismissed. Costs
against PET.]
Substantive law
creates substantive
rights and the two
terms in this respect
may be said to be
synonymous.
Substantive rights is
a term which
includes those rights
which one enjoys
under the legal
system prior to the
disturbance of
normal relations.
Substantive law is
that part of the law
which creates,
defines and
3. Accuseds council
announced intention to
renounce right to
present evidence.
Justice of Peace then
forwarded it to CFI.


corresponding
anxiety or moral
suffering which a
criminal prosecution
always entails. Sec
11, Rule 108
diminishes this
substantive right and
therefore must be
declared null and
void..
regulates rights, or
which regulates the
rights and duties
which give rise to a
cause of action; that
part of the law
which courts are
established to
administer; as
opposed to adjective
or remedial law,
which prescribes the
method of enforcing
rights or obtains
redress for their
invasion.

As applied to
criminal law,
substantive law is
that which declares
what acts are crimes
and prescribes the
punishment for
committing them, as
distinguished from
the procedural law
which provides or
regulates the steps
by which one who
commits a crime is
to be punished.