Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI; REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC, INC., respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:p
The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC, for brevity) filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon.
Zosimo Z. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. 92-
158 entitled Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, et. al. vs. Philippine Industrial Trading Corporation.
The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION (Remington, for brevity) and FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC. (Firestone, for brevity), and, in the
process, declared as null and void and unconstitutional, PITCs Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01 and its appurtenant regulations. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Petitioner and Intervenor and
against the Respondent, as follows:
1) Enjoining the further implementation by the respondent of the following issuances relative to the
applications for importation of products from the Peoples Republic of China, to wit:
a) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 dated August 30, 1989 (Annex A, Amended Petition);
b) Prescribed Export Undertaking Form (Annex B, Id.);
c) Prescribed Importer-Exporter Agreement Form for non-exporter-importer (Annex C,Id.);
d) Memorandum dated April 16, 1990 relative to amendments of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-
08-01 (Annex D, Id.);
e) Memorandum dated May 6, 1991 relative to Revised Schedule of Fees for the processing of import
applications (Annexes E, E-1., Ind.);
f) Rules and Regulations relative to liquidation of unfulfilled Undertakings and expired export credits
(Annex Z, Supplemental Petition),
the foregoing being all null and void and unconstitutional; and,
2) Commanding respondent to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all those that may
hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without the requirements prescribed
in the above-mentioned issuances.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01,
1
under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China (PROC, for
brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC
carried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount
equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Pertinent provisions of the questioned administrative order read:
3. COUNTERPART EXPORTS TO PROC
In addition to existing requirements for the processing of import application for goods and commodities
originating from PROC, it is declared that:
3.1 All applications covered by these rules must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed EXPORT
PROGRAM of Philippine products to PROC in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from
PROC being applied for. Such export program must be carried out and completed within six (6) months
from date of approval of the Import Application by PITC. PITC shall reject/deny any application for
importation from PROC without the accompanying export program mentioned above.
3.2 The EXPORT PROGRAM may be carried out by any of the following:
a. By the IMPORTER himself if he has the capabilities and facilities to carry out the export of Philippine
products to PROC in his own name; or
b. Through a tie-up between the IMPORTER and a legitimate exporter (of Philippine products) who is
willing to carry out the export commitments of the IMPORTER under these rules. The tie-up shall not make
the IMPORTER the exporter of the goods but shall merely ensure that the importation sought to be
approved is matched one-to-one (1:1) in value with a corresponding export of Philippine products to
PROC.
2

3.3 EXPORT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS which are to be submitted by the improper together with his Import
Application are as follows:
a) Firm Contract, Sales Invoice or Letter of Credit.
b) Export Performance Guarantee (See Article 4 hereof).
c) IMPORTER-EXPORTER AGREEMENT for non-exporter IMPORTER (PITC Form No. M-1006). This form
should be used if IMPORTER has tie-up with an exporter for the export of Philippine Products to PROC.
4. EXPORT GUARANTEE
To ensure that the export commitments of the IMPORTER are carried out in accordance with these rules,
all IMPORTERS concerned are required to submit an EXPORT PERFORMANCE GUARANTEE (the Guarantee)
at the time of filing of the Import Application. The amount of the guarantee shall be as follows:
For essential commodities: 15% of the value of the imports applied for.
For other commodities: 50% of the value of the imports applied for.
4.1 The guarantee may be in the form of (i) a non-interest bearing cash deposit; (ii) Bank hold-out in favor
of PITC (PITC Form No. M-1007) or (iii) a Domestic Letter of Credit (with all bank opening charges for
account of Importer) opened in favor of PITC as beneficiary.
4.2 The guarantee shall be made in favor of PITC and will be automatically forfeited in favor of PITC, fully
or partially, if the required export program is not completed by the importer within six (6) months from
date of approval of the Import Application.
4.3 Within the six (6) months period above stated, the IMPORTER is entitled to a (i) refund of the cash
deposited without interest; (ii) cancellation of the Bank holdout or (iii) Cancellation of the Domestic Letter
of Credit upon showing that he has completed the export commitment pertaining to his importation and
provided further that the following documents are submitted to PITC:
a) Final Sales Invoice
b) Bill of lading or Airway bill
c) Bank Certificate of Inward Remittance
d) PITC EXPORT APPLICATION FOR NO. M-1005
5. MISCELLANEOUS
5.1 All other requirements for importations of goods and commodities from PROC must be complied with
in addition to the above.
5.2 PITC shall have the right to disapprove any and all import applications not in accordance with the rules
and regulations herein prescribed.
5.3 Should the IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized representatives make any false statements or
fraudulent misrepresentations in the Import/Export Application, or falsify, forge or simulate any document
required under these rules and regulations, PITC is authorized to reject all pending and future
import/export applications of said IMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTER from doing any business
with SOCPEC through PITC.
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic
corporations, organized and existing under Philippine laws, individually applied for authority to import
from PROC with the petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for
importers, and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their importations from PROC with
corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.
Private respondent Remington was allowed to import tools, machineries and other similar goods.
Firestone, on the other hand, imported Calcine Vauxite, which it used for the manufacture of fire bricks,
one of its products.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the
value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private
respondents, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC.
3

Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on January 20, 1992, against PITC in
the RTC Makati Branch 58.
4
The court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 21, 1992,
ordering PITC to cease from exercising any power to process applications of goods from PROC.
5
Hearing
on the application for writ of preliminary injunction ensued.
Private respondent Firstone was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2, 1992,
6
thus joining
Remington in the latters charges against PITC. It specifically asserts that the questioned Administrative
Order is an undue restriction of trade, and hence, unconstitutional.
Upon trial, it was agreed that the evidence adduced upon the hearing on the Preliminary Injunction was
sufficient to completely adjudicate the case, thus, the parties deemed it proper that the entire case be
submitted for decision upon the evidence so far presented.
The court rendered its Decision
7
on January 4, 1992. The court ruled that PITCs authority to process and
approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and
P.D. No. 1071, has already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President
Aquino.
The court observed:
Given such obliteration and/or withdrawal of what used to be PITCs regulatory authority under the Special
provisions embodied in LOI 444 from the enumeration of power that it could exercise effective February
27, 1987 in virtue of Section 16 (d), EO No. 133, it may now be successfully argued that the PITC can no
longer exercise such specific regulatory power in question conformably with the legal precept expresio
unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991, has empowered the
PITC, expressly or impliedly to formulate or promulgate the assailed Administrative Order. This fact,
makes the continued exercise by PITC of the regulatory powers in question unworthy of judicial approval.
Otherwise, it would be sanctioning an undue exercise of legislative power vested solely in the Congress of
the Philippines by Section, 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The lower court stated that the subject Administrative Order and other similar issuances by PITC suffer
from serious constitutional infirmity, having been promulgated in pursuance of an international agreement
(the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippines and PROC), which has not been concurred in by
at least 2/3 of all the members of the Philippine Senate as required by Article VII, Section 21, of the 1987
Constitution, and therefore, null and void.
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued in restraint of trade, in violation of Sections 1
and 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of
the people; and, an expanding productivity as the key to raising the equality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combination in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Lastly, the court declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not published,
contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code which provides, that:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless the law otherwise provides. . . .
Petitioner now comes to use on a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
8
questioning the courts decision
particularly on the propriety of the lower courts declarations on the validity of Administrative Order No.
89-08-01. The Court directed the respondents to file their respective Comments.
Subsequent events transpired, however, which affect to some extent, the submissions of the parties to the
present petition.
Following President Fidel V. Ramos trip to Beijing, Peoples Republic of China (PROC), from April 25 to 30,
1993, a new trade agreement was entered into between the Philippines and PROC, encouraging
liberalization of trade between the two countries. In line therewith, on April 20, 1993, the President,
through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, directed the Department of Trade and
Industry and the PITC to cease implementing Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, as amended by
PITC Board Resolution Nos. 92-01-05 and 92-03-08.
9

In the implementation of such order, PITC President Jose Luis U. Yulo, Jr. issued a corporate
Memorandum
10
instructing that all import applications for the PROC filed with the PITC as of April 20,
1993 shall no longer be covered by the trade balancing program outlined in the Administrative Order.
Forthwith, the PITC allowed the private respondents to import anew from the PROC, without being
required to comply anymore with the lifted requirement of balancing its imports with exports of Philippine
products to PROC.
11
In its Constancia
12
filed with the Court on November 22, 1993, Remington expressed
its desire to have the present action declared moot and academic considering the new supervening
developments. For its part, respondent Firestone made a Manifestation
13
in lieu of its Memorandum,
informing the court of the aforesaid developments of the new trade program of the Philippines with China,
and prayed for the courts early resolution of the action.
To support its submission that the present action is now moot and academic, respondent Remington cites
Executive Order No. 244,
14
issued by President Ramos on May 12, 1995. The Executive Order states:
WHEREAS, continued coverage of the Peoples Republic of China by Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no
longer consistent with the countrys national interest, as coursing Republic of the Philippines-Peoples
Republic China Trade through the Philippine International Trading Corporations as provided for under
Letter of Instructions No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order;
The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Socialist Countries to delete the Peoples
Republic of China from the list of countries covered by Letter of Instructions No. 444.
Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of May in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-
Five.
PITC filed its own Manifestation
15
on December 15, 1993, wherein it adopted the arguments raised in its
Petition as its Memorandum. PITC disagrees with Remington on the latters submission that the case has
become moot and academic as a result of the abrogation of Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01,
since respondent Remington had incurred obligations to the petitioner consisting of charges for the 0.5%
Counter Export Development Service provided by PITC to Remington, which obligations remain
outstanding.
16
The propriety of such charges must still be resolved, petitioner argues, thereby
maintaining the issue of the validity of SOCPEC Order No. 89-08-01, before it was abrogated by Executive
fiat.
There is no question that from April 20, 1993, when trading balancing measures with PROC were lifted by
the President, Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01 no longer has force and effect, and
respondents are thus entitled anew to apply for authority to import from the PROC, without the trade
balancing requirements previously imposed on proposed importers. Indeed, it appears that since the
lifting of the trade balancing measures, Remington had been allowed to import anew from PROC.
There remains, however, the matter of the outstanding obligations of the respondent for the charges
relating to the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service in favor of PITC, for the period when the
questioned Administrative Order remained in effect. Is the obligation still subsisting, or are the
respondents freed from it?
To resolve this issue, we are tasked to consider the constitutionality of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01, based on the arguments set up by the parties in their Petition and Comment. In so doing, we
must inquire into the nature of the functions of the PITC, in the light of present realities.
The PITC is a government owned or controlled corporation created under P.D. No. 252
1
7 dated August 6,
1973. P.D. No. 1071,
18
issued on May 9, 1977 which revised the provisions of P.D. 252. The purposes and
powers of the said governmental entity were enumerated under Section 5 and 6 thereof.
19

On August 9, 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
444,
20
directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all commodities), whether direct or indirect,
between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC),
including the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed through the PITC. Under
the LOI, PITC was mandated to: 1) participate in all official trade and economic discussions between the
Philippines and SOCPEC; 2) adopt such measures and issue such rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective discharge of its functions under its instructions; and, 3) undertake the
processing and approval of all applications for export to or import from the SOCPEC.
Pertinent provisions of the Letter of Instruction are herein reproduced:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 444
xxx xxx xxx
II. CHANNELS OF TRADE
1. The trade, direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other centrally-
planned economy countries shall upon issuance hereof, be undertaken by or coursed through the
Philippine International Trading Corporation. This shall apply to the export and import of all commodities
of products including those specified for export or import by expressly authorized government agencies.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall participate in all official trade and economic
discussions between the Philippines and other centrally-planned economy countries.
xxx xxx xxx
V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall adopt such measures and issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions under these instructions. In
this connection, the processing and approval of applications for export to or import from the Socialist and
other centrally-planned economy countries shall, henceforth, be performed by the said Corporation.
(Emphasis ours)
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on February 27, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Executive Order (EO) No.
133
21
reorganizing the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) empowering the said department to be the
primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for the countrys
trade, industry and investment activities (Sec. 2, EO 133). The PITC was made one of DTIs line
agencies.
22

The Executive Order reads in part:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 16. Line Corporate Agencies and Government Entities.
The following line corporate agencies and government entities defined in Section 9 (c) of this Executive
Order that will perform their specific regulatory functions, particularly developmental responsibilities and
specialized business activities in a manner consonant with the Department mandate, objectives, policies,
plans and programs:
xxx xxx xxx
d) Philippine International Trading Corporation. This corporation, which shall be supervised by the
Undersecretary for International Trade, shall only engage in both export and trading on new or non-
traditional products and markets not normally pursued by the private business sector; provide a wide
range of export oriented auxiliary services to the private sector; arrange for or establish comprehensive
system and physical facilities for handling the collection, processing, and distribution of cargoes and other
commodities; monitor or coordinate risk insurance services for existing institutions; promote and
organize, whenever warranted, production enterprises and industrial establishments and collaborate or
associate in joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, in
the fields of production, marketing, procurement, and other relate businesses; and provide technical
advisory, investigatory, consultancy and management services with respect to any and all of the functions,
activities, and operations of the corporation.
Sometime in April, 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the PROC, the Philippines and
PROC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
23
(MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make
joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade to US $600 US $800 Million by 1992,
and to strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value of their imports and
exports during the period, agreeing for the purpose that upon the signing of the Memorandum, both sides
shall undertake to establish the necessary steps and procedures to be adopted within the framework of
the annual midyear review meeting under the Trade Protocol, in order to monitor and ensure the
implementation of the MOU.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989,
1990 and 1991,
24
under which was specified the commodities to be traded between them. The protocols
affirmed their agreement to jointly endeavor between them. The protocols affirmed their agreement to
jointly endeavor to achieve more or less a balance between the values of their imports and exports in their
bilateral trade.
It is allegedly in line with its powers under LOI 444 and in keeping with the MOU and Trade Protocols with
PROC that PITC issued its now assailed Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
25
on August 30, 1989
(amended in March, 1992).
Undoubtedly, President Aquino, in issuing EO 133, is empowered to modify and amend the provisions of
LOI 444, which was issued by then President Marcos, both issuances being executive directives. As
observed by us in Philippine Association of Services Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres,
26

there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the Letter of Instruction by
way of an Executive Order. This is notwithstanding the fact that the subject LOI 1190 was issued by
President Marcos, when he was extraordinarily empowered to exercise legislative powers, whereas EO 450
was issued by Pres. Aquino when her transitional legislative powers have already ceased, since it was
found that LOI 1190 was a mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered, or modified by
EO 450.
We do not agree, however, with the trial courts ruling PITCs authority to issue rules and regulations
pursuant to the Special Provision of LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, have already been repealed by EO 133.
While PITCs power to engage in commercial import and export activities is expressly recognized and
allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is not limited only to new or non-traditional products
and markets not normally pursued by the private business sector. There is not indication in the law of the
removal of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in the area of importations from
SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant of regulatory power, EO 133, as worded, is silent
as to the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC.
Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO 133 stating that all laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations,
or other parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly, cannot operate to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the PITC. There can be no repeal
of the said powers, absent any cogency of irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy between the
issuances, relating to the regulatory power of the PITC.
The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul the functions of the PITC. The DTI
was established, and was given powers and duties including those previously held by the PITC as an
independent government entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444. The PITC was thereby attached to the DTI
as an implementing arm of the said department.
EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of
government for the countrys trade, industry and investment activities, which shall act as a catalyst for
intensified private sector activity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth.
2
7 In furtherance of
this mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to plan, implement, and coordinate activities of the
government related to trade industry and investments; to formulate and administer policies and guidelines
for the investment priorities plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate country and
product export strategies which will guide the export promotion and development thrusts of the
government.
28
Corollarily, the Secretary of Trade and Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to carry out the departments objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to the said department as one of its line
agencies,
29
and given the focal task of implementing the departments programs.
30
The absence of the
regulatory power formerly enshrined in the Special Provision of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and
the limitation of its previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not mean, however, that PITC
has lost the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC still holds such
authority, and may legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under the supervision of, the
Department of Trade and Industry.
Furthermore, the lower courts ruling to the effect that the PITCs authority to process and approve
applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D.
1071 has been repealed by EO 133, is misplaced, and did not consider the import behind the issuance of
the later presidential edict.
The President could not have intended to deprive herself of the power to regulate the flow of trade
between the Philippines and PROC under the two countries Memorandum of Understanding, a power
which necessarily flows from her office as Chief Executive. In issuing Executive Order 133, the President
intended merely to reorganize the Department of Trade and Industry to cope with the need of a
streamlined bureaucracy.
31

Thus, there is not real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is, admittedly, a rearranging of
the administrative functions among the administrative bodies affective by the edict, but not an abolition of
executive power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the
absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is
possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile
them, and to adopt a construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other
statutory provisions.
32
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an
earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the law may be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
33

Similarly, the grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a
result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal within the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department
of the government.
34
Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust
of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our
regular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
L-50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).
With global trade and business becoming more intricate may even with new discoveries in technology and
electronics notwithstanding, the time has come to grapple with legislations and even judicial decisions
aimed at resolving issues affecting not only individual rights but also activities of which foreign
governments or entities may have interests. Thus, administrative policies and regulations must be devised
to suit these changing business needs in a faster rate than to resort to traditional acts of the legislature.
This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the subject, viz.:
Since legislatures had neither the time nor the knowledge to create detailed rules, however, it was soon
clear that new governmental arrangements would be needed to handle the job of rule-making. The courts,
moreover, many of them already congested, would have been swamped if they had to adjudicate all the
controversies that the new legislation was bound to create; and the judges, already obliged to handle a
great diversity of cases, would have been hard pressed to acquire the knowledge they needed to deal
intelligently with all the new types of controversy.
So the need to create a large number of specialized administrative agencies and to give them broader
powers than administrators had traditionally exercised. These included the power to issue regulations
having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide cases powers that had previously been
reserved to the legislatures and the courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by Administrative Agencies,
p. 166)
The respondents likewise argue that PITC is not empowered to issue the Administrative Order because no
grant of such power was made under the Trade Protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991. We do not agree. The
Trade Protocols aforesaid, are only the enumeration of the products and goods which signatory countries
have agreed to trade. They do not bestow any regulatory power, for executive power is vested in the
Executive Department,
35
and it is for the latter to delegate the exercise of such power among its
designated agencies.
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power
ancillary to legislation.
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-
legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is
invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. . . .
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and
published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to
the effectivity of the Administrative Order.
This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera 36 stated, thus:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules
and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V.
Ramos, the same were never legally effective, and private respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject
to them, because Administrative Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was never published, as mandated
by law, for its effectivity. It was only on March 30, 1992 when the amendments to the said Administrative
Order were filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the National Administrative Register as required
by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Finally, it is the declared Policy of the Government to develop and strengthen trade relations with the
Peoples Republic of China. As declared by the President in EO 244 issued on May 12, 1995, continued
coverage of the Peoples Republic of China by Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with
the countrys national interest, as coursing RP-PROC trade through the PITC as provided for under Letter
of Instructions No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade.
3
7
Conformably with such avowed policy, any remnant of the restrained atmosphere of trading between the
Philippines and PROC should be done away with, so as to allow economic growth and renewed trade
relations with our neighbors to flourish and may be encouraged.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED, to the effect that judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Enjoining the petitioner:
a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export Development Service fee of 0.5% of the total
value of the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the private respondents;
b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its
appurtenant rules; and,
2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all those that may
hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without complying with the
requirements prescribed in the above-stated issuances.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - Philippine
International Trading Corp. (PITC) v. Angeles [GR
108461, 21 October 1996]
Philippine International Trading Corp. (PITC) v. Angeles [GR 108461, 21 October 1996]
Second Division, Torres (J) : 4 concur
Facts: On 6 August 1973, the Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) was created as a
government owned or controlled corporation under Presidential Decree (PD) 252. On 9 May 1977, PD
1071 revised the provisions of PD 252, where the purposes and powers of the said governmental entity
were enumerated under Sections 5 and 6 thereof. On 9 August 1976, the late President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 444, directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all
commodities) between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy
Countries (SOCPEC), including the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed
through the PITC. After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on 27 February 1987, then President
Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) 133 reorganizing the DTI empowering the said
department to be the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government
for the countrys trade, industry and investment activities. The PITC was made one of DTIs line
agencies. Sometime in April 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the PROC, the
Philippines and PROC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) wherein the two countries
agreed to make joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade and to strive for a steady
progress towards achieving a balance between the value of their imports and exports during the period.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989,
1990 and 1991, under which was specified the commodities to be traded between them. On August
1989, PITC issued Administrative Order (AO) SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which, applications to the PITC for
importation from China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of
Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate
importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for or 1:1
ratio. Remington Industrial Sales Corp. and Firestone Ceramics, both domestic corporations, organized
and existing under Philippine-laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC with PITC. They
were granted such authority. Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by PITC
from Remington and Firestone, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC.
On 20 January 1992, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PITC in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC, Makati Branch 58). On 4 January 1993, Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles (Presiding Judge) upheld
the petition for prohibition and mandamus of Remington and Firestone (Civil Case 92-158), and declaring
PITC AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its regulations null, void, and unconstitutional. PITC filed the petition
seeking the reversal of Angeles decision.
Issue: Whether AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 binds Remington and Firestone.
Held: The PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power
ancillary to legislation. Administrative Order SOCPEC 89-08-01 is not, however, a valid exercise of such
quasi-legislative power. The original AO issued on 30 August 1989, under which the respondents filed
their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context
of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation, i.e., PD 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. It was only on 30 March 1992 when
the amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the
National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.The fact that the
amendments to AO SOCPEC 89 08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the
National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order. Further, the Administrative Order, without force and effect due to the lack of publication, thus
cannot exact any obligation from Remington and Firestone, specifically, charges for the 0.5% Counter
Export Development Service.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4349 September 24, 1908
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant.
Ortigas & Fisher for appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.
TRACEY, J .:
In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of
paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published in the
Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice.
1
After a demurrer to the
complaint of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden,
in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other
external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:
No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig
River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.
Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable
to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First
that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine
Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are
void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
The Attorney-General does not seek to sustain the conviction but joins with the counsel for the
defense in asking for the discharge of the prisoner on the first ground stated by the defense, that the
rule of the Collector cited was unauthorized and illegal, expressly passing over the other question of
the delegation of legislative power.
By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is
authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports
of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so
licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows:
SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized,
empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to
carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.
SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation
made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by
authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one
hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the
method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both.
Under this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or in the original briefs, there is no
difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of section 5.
Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was engaged, and when
heavily laden with hemp she was navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of
Manila. This spot is near the mouth of the river, the docks whereof are used for the purpose of taking
on and discharging freight, and we entertain no doubt that it was in right sense a part of the harbor,
without having recourse to the definition of paragraph 8 of Customs Administrative Circular No. 136,
which reads as follows:
The limits of a harbor for the purpose of licensing vessels as herein prescribed (for the
lighterage and harbor business) shall be considered to include its confluent navigable rivers
and lakes, which are navigable during any season of the year.
The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor
regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar
use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept
within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of
legislative power.
The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319
[19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos.
1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable
regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.
This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only
by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is
changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has
been intrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon
which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide
this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the
case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep. 402), an Act of Congress allowing the
Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect
improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a
misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the
delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to
him of power to prescribe rules for the use of canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a
law authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his
rules was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress
(U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a
commissioner of internal revenue to designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper
use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):
The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the
Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail.
The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself.
. . .
In Massachusetts it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and counsel
the power to make pilot regulations. (Martin vs. Witherspoon et al., 135 Mass. 175).
In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood
Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under
statues authorizing them to do so, the court saying:
Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and
regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of
such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.
Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned,
and is sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we should pass on the questions
discussed in the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the
complaint is not material, as we have frequently held that where an offense is correctly described in
the complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.
We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid
section Act No. 1136.
So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of
Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished
by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Willard, JJ., concur.
Carson, J., reserve his opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J .:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No.,
638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order
or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said
circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said
two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette,
presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the
Bureau of Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
(See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule,
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that
their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of
the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws"
include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de
Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el
poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de
sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su
publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion
al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words,
appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to
have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one
may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court).
But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20
had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was
no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or
committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
costs de oficio.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION


November 28, 1958

G.R. No. L-11019
QUE PO LAY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Jose F. Aguirre for appellant.
Nat. M. Balboa and F. E. Evangelista for appellee the Central Bank and its Governor.

, J.:



Articles consisting of three hundred twenty-nine (329) pieces of gold bars and one hundred seventy-four
(174) pieces of U.S. money bills, U. S. money orders, U.S. treasury warrants and traveler's cheeks worth
P271,895.02 were seized by the Collector of Customs of Manila on January 26, 1951 because of an attempt
to export them in violation of Section 1363, sub-paragraphs (f) and (m) 3 and 4 of the Revised
Administrative Code and of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 20 and 21, in relation to Republic Act No. 265. The
articles were found by customs secret service agents concealed in 50 bundles of salted dried fish while they
were examining an export cargo about to be loaded on board a ship bound for Hongkong. For this shipment,
one Chua Siy obtained an export entry from the Marine Division Bureau of Customs, for and in behalf of Que
Po Lay, and the same was consigned to one Tong Sing of 1st Cannon Road, Hongkong. As said articles were
neither declared in the export entry filed by the exporter nor were covered by a license from the Central
Bank, they were seized and made subject of a seizure proceeding under the authority of the Collector of
Customs (S. Iden. No. 1010).

The hearing of the seizure case was first set for May 19, 1951, but was finally postponed to June 19, 1951
with due notice served upon Atty. Prudencio de Guzman who appeared as counsel for Que Po Lay. At the
hearing, however, neither Atty. de Guzman, nor his client appeared, wherefore Que Po Lay was declared in
default, and thereupon the official in charge of the proceeding received the evidence. And on August 10,
1951, the Collector of Customs rendered decision declaring the forfeiture of the articles in favor of the
Government. This decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs on September 6, 1951.

On February 3, 1951, after the institution of the seizure proceedings, Que Po Lay and Chua Siy were
charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of Central Bank Circular No. 21, in
connection with Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, for alleged illegal exportation of 329 pieces of gold bars
(Criminal Case No. 14787), while Que Po Lay was likewise charged in two other criminal cases before the
same court with a violation of Central Bank Circular No. 20, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No.
265, for failure to sell foreign exchange to an agent of the Central Bank within one day from acquisition
(Criminal Cases Nos. 14788 and 14789). In the first case, Que Po Lay and Chua Siy were acquitted on the
ground that an attempted act to export gold without license is not punishable by law. In the other two
cases, Que Po Lay was found guilty, but on appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was reversed on the
ground that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank under which he was charged had no legal existence for not
having been published in the Official Gazette at the time of the Commission of the offense (94 Phil. 640;
50 O.G. [10] 4850).

On October 24, 1951, after the accused were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 14787, Que Po Lay, through
counsel, filed a motion in the same case praying that the Collector of Customs be directed to return to him
the 329 pieces of gold bars in view of his acquittal, to which the Collector of Customs opposed contending
that the pretended return cannot be ordered for the reason that the gold bars had already been the subject
of forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. The issue having
been heard, the court denied the motion ruling that since the Collector of Customs had exercised his
authority under the law in connection with the forfeiture of said articles, it has no right to encroach upon
such authority in the light of the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

On April 4, 1955, Que Po Lay filed a petition for reconsideration of the decision of the Collector of Customs
in the seizure proceedings (S. Iden. No. 1010) praying that the same be set aside in view of the decision of
the Supreme Court declaring inapplicable to him the pertinent circular of the Central Bank, but this petition
was denied for the reason that said decision had long become final and conclusive. In view of the adverse
ruling, Que Po Lay wrote a letter to the Governor of the Central Bank reiterating his request that the articles
be returned to him advancing the same reasons he set forth in his petition for reconsideration, but the
governor also denied his request on practically the same grounds and failing in this attempt, he appealed to
the Secretary of Justice reiterating the same arguments, but this official also turned down the request
invoking as reason the fact that the decision of forfeiture is now res judicata. As a last resort, he filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court seeking the same relief but this Court, in a
short resolution, dismissed the petition because "the decision of the Collector of Customs and the
Commissioner of Customs had become final since 1951" (G. R. No. L-10151).

It is because of these successive failures that Que Po Lay commenced the present action on March 24, 1956
in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking to recover possession of all the confiscated articles worth
P271,895.02. The action is based on the main ground that the decision of the Collector of Customs dated
August 10, 1951 in Seizure Identification No. 1010 is a nullity, it having been issued without jurisdiction and
without notice to the owner of the articles seized. Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss on the
following grounds: (1) that the trial court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action; (2) that the
complaint states no cause of action; and (3) that assuming that there is a cause of action, the same is
already barred by a prior judgment. These motions, after hearing, were sustained, whereupon plaintiff took
the present appeal.

The issues posed in this appeal are: (1) Is the decision of the Collector of Customs, which was affirmed by
the Commissioner of Customs in Seizure Identification No. 1010, valid and legal?; and (2) Are the notices
given to plaintiff's counsel of the hearing and of the decision as well as the approval thereof by the
Commissioner of Customs sufficient in law as to satisfy the requirement of due process?

It appears that the articles in question were seized by authority of the Collector of Customs on January 26,
1951 because some of his secret service agents, while inspecting 50 bundles of salted dried fish covered by
Export Entry No. 1 to be loaded on board a ship, found concealed among the dried fish said articles which
were neither declared in the export entry nor covered by an export license from the Central Bank, and in
declaring the seizure of said articles, the Collector of Customs said in part in his decision:

It appears that one Chua Siy filed an export entry with the Marine Division, for and in behalf of Que Po Lay,
covering 50 cases supposed to contain salted dried fish (see copy of Export Entry No. 1). The exporter paid
the amount of P4.00 as wharfage dues. Before the said 50 cases were loaded on board, the exporting
vessel, they were first examined by the Customs Secret Service Agents, but upon examination, however,
there were found in some of the cases gold bars, United States paper bills, money order, treasury warrants
and traveler's checks concealed among the dried fish, which were neither declared in the export entry filed
by the exporter, nor were they duly covered by the necessary license, in violation of Circulars Nos. 20 and
21, of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and therefore, subject to forfeiture in accordance with section
1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 454. On the basis of these
findings, they were seized and being made the subject of this seizure proceeding.

There is therefore enough justification for the Collector of Customs to order the seizure of the articles for the
same were not declared by plaintiff in the export entry issued to him and instead he concealed them in 50
bundles of salted dried fish in an attempt to smuggle them out of the country without complying with the
law 7hsdOxkY8.

But appellant contends that under the violation mentioned in the seizure report, which is Section 1363,
subsection (f) of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 454, the goods in
question cannot be the subject of forfeiture because they are not merchandise of prohibited exportation,
whereas Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, which requires the delivery of foreign exchange to an agent of
the Central Bank within one day from acquisition, does not apply to him as decreed by the Supreme Court
for the reason that the same has not been published in the Official Gazette as required by law.

There is indeed an error committed in the seizure report as regards the designation of the particular section
of the law which has been violated by appellant, but this is of no moment, for this Court has already decided
in a number of cases that what controls in a complaint or information is not the designation of the crime or
of the violation charged, but the description of the same given in the body of the complaint or information
(U. S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418).1 Here it was explained that only a mere error was committed thru
oversight in the designation of the law, but that the seizure report as well as the decision of the Collector of
Customs clearly state the facts which constitute the acts committed, which fall under Section 1363 (m) 3
and 4 of the Revised Administrative Code, which, for ready reference, are here quoted:

SEC. 1363. Property subject to forfeiture under customs laws. Vessels, cargo, merchandise, and other
objects and things shall, under the conditions hereinbelow specified, be subject to forfeiture:

xxx xxx xxx

(m) Any merchandise the importation or exportation of which is effected or attempted in any of the ways or
under any of the conditions hereinbelow described:

xxx xxx xxx

3. Upon the wrongful making by the owner, importer, exporter, or consignee of any merchandise, or by the
agent of either, of any false declaration or affidavit, touching such merchandise and in connection with the
importation or exportation of the same 15mNYREFVH.

4. Upon the wrongful making or delivery by the same person or persons, of any false invoice, letter or paper
touching such merchandise and in connection with the importation or exportation of the same.

The mistake in designating the offense, if any, was therefore due to a mere oversight and not to lack of
sufficient allegation of incriminatory facts. As a matter of fact, in the letter the Commissioner of Customs
sent to the legal counsel of the Central Bank on February 12, 1951 giving an account of the seizure in
question, he stated as follows:

. . . The above-described articles were seized by the Acting Chief, Customs Patrol Service, and the seizure
report was forwarded to the Collector of Customs for the port of Manila for the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings in accordance with Chapter 39 of the Revised Administrative Code. The cause for the seizure is
Section 1363 (f) and (m) 3 and 4 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, and Central Bank
Circular No. 21 in relation to Republic Act No. 265.

xxx xxx xxx

The gold bars and foreign exchange in question were properly seized under the above-quoted provisions of
the Customs Law because the owner made false declaration in his export entry filed with this Office by
stating therein that he was exporting to Hongkong dried salted fish but actually gold bars and foreign
exchange were hidden inside the cases containing dried fish. Therefore, the Collector of Customs for Manila
is clothed with the necessary power and authority to institute the seizure and forfeiture proceedings, not
only on the dried salted fish, but also on the gold bars and foreign exchange in the exercise of hisquasi-
judicial functions contrary to your allegation that the Central Bank has exclusive jurisdiction over, and full
responsibility for, the enforcement of Exchange and Gold Regulations and prosecution of violation thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)

There is therefore no point in the pretense that the seizure must fail because of the faulty designation of the
law under which the same was effected. And with regard to the claim that Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank was declared inapplicable to appellant by the Supreme Court, the same also deserves scant
consideration for the reason that said circular was mentioned in the seizure report merely as an additional
ground to justify the seizure of the articles.

The second issue refers to lack of notice of the hearing as well as the decision of the Collector of Customs to
appellant or his counsel for which reason, he claims, he was not able to protect his interest and was
adjudged without due process of law. On this point, suffice it to state what the trial court said in its order of
dismissal:

. . . With respect to the first ground just mentioned, which is factual in nature, defendants have met
plaintiff's naked allegation of lack of notice with the following decisive answer:

The records in the Bureau of Customs which counsel for plaintiff is very familiar will show that formal notice
of hearing was served by Atty. Pablo C. Mariano, then Chief of the Law Division of the Bureau of Customs, to
Atty. Prudencio de Guzman by registered mail to his address at 201 Yorktown Bldg., Manila. According to
the records Mr. de Guzman received the same on June 19, 1951. The transcript of the stenographic notes of
the hearing on June 19, 1951 states that altho the hearing could have been formally started at 9:30 a.m. on
June 19, 1951, the same was held in abeyance and actually started at 10:00 a.m. in order to wait for Mr. de
Guzman or his client, claimant Que Po Lay. When, however, they did not appear claimant Que Po Lay was
declared in default. Evidence for the prosecution was received and the hearing was terminated on July 2,
1951 at 10:00 a.m. when the last two witnesses, Secret Agents Aurelio Nalad and Primitivo de Jesus
testified J9SMvU.

The decision was promulgated on August 10, 1951. (Photostatic copy of the duplicate original of the decision
appearing on page 18 of the Records of the Bureau of Customs is hereto attached as Annex "2-Central
Bank"). It appears from said official copy that Atty. de Guzman was furnished with a copy of said decision on
August 13, 1951 and that after the decision has been approved by the Commissioner of Customs on
September 6, 1951, again Atty. de Guzman was furnished with a copy of the decision personally thru an
authorized representative from his law office on September 12, 1951. Not only that, copies of said decision
were published on the bulletin board of the Bureau of Customs. The then Commissioner Alfredo Jacinto sent
Mr. Que Po Lay a letter on September 12, 1951 addressed at 114 Elizondo St., Manila, enclosing a copy of
the decision and advising him that if he would elevate the case to the Court of First Instance he should do so
in fifteen (15) days after receipt of said letter in accordance with Secs. 1383 and 1385 of the Rev. Adm.
Code. The records show that said letter to Mr. Que Po Lay was returned with a post-office mark "unclaimed".
Apparently, Mr. Que Po Lay who has given his office address as "114 Elizondo St., Manila" has not filed a
change of address and for all legal purposes said given address was consider as the proper place to which all
writs, orders and processes for Mr. Que Po Lay should be addressed. Under our rules, service by registered
mail is complete after the expiration of five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster (Sec. 8,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Court). But even disregarding this, the notice to claimant Que Po Lay's lawyer, Atty.
Prudencio de Guzman, was considered notice to Que Po Lay."

We find the above finding supported by the evidence and we see no reason to rule otherwise. And
considering that the decision of the Collector of Customs, as affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs, has
long become final and conclusive, the same is now a bar to the present action.

In his answer, respondent Rodolfo Sadia tries to justify the disposition made of the articles by respondent
judge contending that the Commissioner of Customs had no jurisdiction to order their seizure and that all
the proceedings conducted him on the matter are null and void.

This claim cannot now be invoked by respondent, nor can he dispute the validity of the seizure decree, it
appearing that he failed to appeal from the decision of the Collector of Customs as approved by the
Commissioner of Customs, as by law. It appears that, following the seizure of the dutiable articles, a hearing
was held after giving due notice to respondent Sadia and other necessary parties, and after the hearing the
Collector of Customs, in a decision rendered on April 14, 1952, decreed the forfeiture of the articles in favor
of the Government. From this decision Sadia did not appeal. He cannot therefore dispute now the validity of
said decision which had long become final. (Section 1383, Revised Administrative Code.) (Commissioner of
Customs vs. Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 439; 50 O.G. [8] 3560) TSGvW5.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C.J. Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157870, November 03, 2008]

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), PETITIONER, VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 158633]

ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 161658]

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:

x x x x

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant
to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer
or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

x x x x

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government
shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use
shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the
May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as
follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x

x x x x

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of
candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate,
as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to
candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10,
2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government
forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices
and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first
list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall
consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who
complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to
comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.No person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and
filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10,
2004 elections,
[1]
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the
day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC,
by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first
be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another,
the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the
right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege
any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.
[2]


It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with abona fide controversy
which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.
[3]
But even with the presence of an actual case or
controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.
[4]
To have standing, one must establish
that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
[5]


The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
[6]
There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10,
2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of
the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to
relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public
interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal
protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose
an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art.
VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,
[7]
or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared
as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.
[8]
In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
[9]


Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in
the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of
the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under
delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four
walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against
which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.
[10]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.
[11]
The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights
[12]
and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a
citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
[13]


Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as
a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine
qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes
the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set
up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to
nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is
optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for
not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it
stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election
and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory
nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable,
for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates
running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review
and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements
for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students
and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The
objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy-
declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of
planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects."
[14]
The
primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result
of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal
liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear
on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A
drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her
parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order
that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification
that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

x x x x

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program.A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be
exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:

x x x x
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants
and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.
[15]


The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
[16]
under Sec. 2, Art. III
[17]
of the Constitution. But while
the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a
state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students
and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is
veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug
testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of VernoniaSchool District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia)
and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et
al. (Board of Education),
[18]
both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases involving the
constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their
respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation
with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a
high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the
urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated,inter alia,
the Fourth Amendment
[19]
of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following:
(1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their
constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than
non-athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the
sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and
regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a student need not undress
for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of
illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under
the Fourth
[20]
and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for
high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir,
marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing policy
made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes
who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes
are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non-
athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no
distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of
the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that
the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of
search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students
have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health
and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that
are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it
is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the
well-being of the people,
[21]
particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing
of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety
and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited
not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.
[22]
Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate
unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed
by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly
for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting
almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the
individual right to privacy,"
[23]
has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
[24]
Petitioner Laserna's lament is just
as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote
without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality
of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their
rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against
unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.
[25]

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.
[26]
In context, the right to privacy means the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.
[27]
And while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract
prohibition against `unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.
[28]
Authorities are agreed
though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's
exercise of police power.
[29]


As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.
[30]
And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.
[31]
In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that
matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable-cause standard is not required or
even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which
the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes.
In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office
is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if
any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to
maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced
to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v.
Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
[32]


The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be
a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that
the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as
possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in
the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored
by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain
of custody.
[33]
In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
"need to know" basis;
[34]
that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the
usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results."
[35]
Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to
the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug
testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law
intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national
drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.
[36]
To the Court, the need for drug
testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest
under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group,
and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of
illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral
components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to
this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an
effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of
detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a
reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth
in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged
drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.
[37]
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who,
by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with
utmost responsibility and efficiency.
[38]


Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of
power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so
extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall
undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing
shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed,
meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way.
And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and
Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA
9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine
how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.
[39]
In the
face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature
to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or
entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by
the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts
in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right
to privacy.
[40]
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this
case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse
still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 asUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the
petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL,
but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently
enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 157870, November 03, 2008]
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), PETITIONER, VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), RESPONDENTS.
Facts: In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered
political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power
when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass
a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

Issues:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Held: WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY
GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
Ratio/Doctrine: Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic
that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void
and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.[9 It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator. Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to
the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused
is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.

Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before
the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. -
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject
to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004
elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the
Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered pol itical party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provi sions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine
the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used
to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution? and

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator
need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken
the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
inGovernment v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from
the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive constitutional
limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing
the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate
of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as
senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little
value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state
that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy.
This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law,
without exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall
have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve
around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory
nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its
terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral
event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity
as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve
as senator.
Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3,
2003
Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it
mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with
certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is
a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.

Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of
additional qualification on candidates for Senator?


Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is
UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator
needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as
it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.