Del Campo v. C.A.

351 SCRA 1

DOCTRINE:
1. The co-owners undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract
of sale.

2. Also, undisturbed possession by a co-owner has the effect of a partial
partition of the co-owner property which entitles the possessor to the definite
portion which he occupies.

FACTS:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed
Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162 (27,179 sq.m.). It was divided in
aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-owners as follows:

Salome Bornales 4/16
Consorcia Bornales 4/16
Alfredo Bornales 2/16
Maria Bornales 2/16
Jose Bornales 1/16
Quirico Bornales 1/16
Rosalia Bornales 1/16
Julita Bornales 1/16

Sale by co-owner of her portion: Salome sold part of her 4/16 share to Soledad
Daynolo. The land was specified in the deed of sale. Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo
immediately took possession of the land and built a house thereon. Mortgage: A few
years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged this portion to
Jose Regalado. Soledad eventually died. The husband was able to redeem the
mortgage (portion of) land. The heirs subsequently sold this to herein petitioners, the
spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.

Another sale by the co-owners of the entire lot: Later on, three of the eight co-owners
(Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo) sold 24,993 sq. m. of said lot to Jose Regalado.
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado was able to obtain a title in his name of the whole lot
previously co-owned. The whole was subdivided and covered in further titles in his
name.

Hence, complaint by previous buyers: Thus, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del
Campo broug ht this complaint for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against
the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado. They claim that they owned an area
of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in
TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the
disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the
Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and
paid the corresponding taxes.

ISSUES:
1. Could Salome have validly sold her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162 by metes
and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their title?

2. May the ownership of the previous buyers be upheld against that of the
second buyer who has now a registered title?

HELD:
1. YES. Sale valid up to portion of entitlement.

Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his
own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.

Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was
made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have
sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado. Regalado merely became a new co-
owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and
Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could
validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951.

2. Previous buyers who only had uninterrupted possession prevails over the
second buyer despite the latters registered title. His purchase constitutes fraud
which defeats a purportedly indefeasible title.

The area subject matter of this petition had already been effectively segregated
from the mother lot even before title was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be
noted that 26 years had lapsed from the time petitioners bought and took
possession of the property in 1951 until Regalado procured the issuance of TCT
No. 14566. X x x. In the case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, we had
occasion to hold that where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land
allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had
not disturbed the same for a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a
better condition or right than said transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis).
Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-owner
property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he occupies.
Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed
uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49 years up to the present.

Although Regalados certificate of title became indefeasible after the lapse of one
year from the date of the decree of registration, the attendance of fraud in its
issuance created an implied trust in favor of petitioners and gave them the right to
seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully obtained by the former. Regalado
was aware of petitioners possession of the subject portion as well as the sale
between Salome and Soledad.

Adille v. C.A.
157 SCRA 455

DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have
been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject
to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.

FACTS:
Felisa Alzul owns a parcel of land in Legazpi City, Albay. In her lifetime, she married twice.
First,with Bernabe Adille which was Rustico Adille's father and second, with Prospero Asejo
from whom she had other children. In 1939, she entered in a pacto de retro sale with a period
of three years for repurchase. Unfortunately, she died in 1942 and was unable to settle her
affairs accordingly. Rustico, acted on his own and acquired the land along with a OCT, which
he was able to procure stating that he was the only child of Felisa and Bernabe. He has then
been in charge of the land in question and has kept his actions from his siblings. Although
there is one, namely, Emeteria who happens to live in the same land he resides in. He was
then deemed absolute owner of the land and through his actuations seek to keep the land for
himself not taking into account his other brothers nor his sister. It is because of this that
plaintiffs have come here and contend that trial court erred in:
I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the property
to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.

ISSUE:
May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common? -- NO

HELD:
Given that Rustico acquired the property individually, tends to it and is in possession together
with the corresponding OCT, it does not discount the fact that the perfection of such was
done through fraudulent means. His function of reacquisition only makes him a trustee in
place of his other siblings. In addition, a torrens title does not make for a mode of
extinguishment with regard to co-ownership. The court also refuses to recognize his claim of
ownership by way of prescription given that he registered said land in 1955 and has been in
his possession until 1974.

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded
by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain
conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive,
and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.

Rustico's claim falls short because he did not repudiate. In fact, he had been keeping
substantive information for himself leaving all other co-owners oblivious with concern to his
acts. So, the court finds it fit that although the span of time is indeed what prescription
necessitates, it is still not conclusive nor meritorious to its effect.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.





HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,
G.R. No. 153802

FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo,
took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership
thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises
and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents
null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject
of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the
car which was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED
BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF
THE FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivityunless vested rights have already been acquired under the
Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and
the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains
is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by
either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of
property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains)
or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent
and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code.
In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent
of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the
nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, *T+he conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other
to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show
the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit,
non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.