T A L C O n PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY

CONSTRUCTION
JUERGEN H A B ERM A S
ABSTRACT
According to Professor Habermas, Parsons's later system para-
digm is in conflict, to some extent, with his earlier action paradigm, as
Menzies contended; but Parsons concealed the conflicts from himself,
Habermas thinks, and retained his "cultural determinism" and "secret
idealism." According to Habermas, Parsons lacked any adequate equiv-
alent of the concept of a "life world" built up on the basis of inter-
subjective communication. Parsons's unrealistic assumption of harmony
between actors' orientations on the one hand and functional require-
ments of systems on the other prevented him, according to Habermas,
from seeing what Marx for example saw, namely that in modem society-
the symbolic life worlds of actors suffer distortion because of their sub-
ordination to the rationalizing tendencies of money and power. (Pro-
fessor Habermas did not provide an abstract for this translation of his
address on Parsons, which he delivered to the German Sociological
Association in 1980. Readers are urged to regard this abstract as only
suggestive and as inadequately reflecting a complex argument.^Editor.)
Talcott Parsons died on the 8th of May last year [1979] in Munich.
His death came a few days after a cedle)quium in Heidelberg (Schluchter,
1980), given em the exxasion erf the reissuance erf his dex;toral degree. The
German Sociole>gical Association Council has asked me to talk abenit Parsons.
It serves a discipline well to honor one erf its members who even while still
living had attained the status of a classic.
No one of his contemporaries developed a theory of se>dety erf com-
parable complexity. An intellectual autobiography, published by Parsons in
1974 (Parsons, 1977:22ff), gives us a first impression erf the perseverance
and the cumulative results of efforts that this scientist devoted to the con-
struction of eme theory over the course erf more than fifty years. With regard
to its level of abstraction, its complexity, theoretical sce)pe, systematicity, and
groimeling in the literature of relevant branches erf research his published
work simply has no competitor to this time. Furthermore, no one else ame>tig
the prexiuctive theorists of sex:iety has conducted a continuing eiebate with
the classics erf our eiiscipline with equal intensity and persistence in eirder
to build on received tradition. One need not share Parsons's (1937) con-
viction that cemvergence among the great theoretical traditions itself consti-
tutes prexrf of the validity of his own approach to building theewy. But his
173
174 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY
very ability to work through and incorporate the best traditions into his own
approach remains eloquent testimony of the power of theories of society
which are aimed at the establishment of one particular paradigm grounded
in the collective everyday consciousness erf society itself. Throughout his
life. Parsons relied on the theoretical work of Durkheim, Weber, and Freud
as one frame of reference that controlled his own efforts. But that meant not
only that he continuemsly distinguished his own approach from empiricism,
it also amounted to maintaining his distance from Marx and Mead, from a
materialist as well as a pragmatic mode of theory construction inspired by
the critical tradition erf Kant and Hegel.' In addition, one fact remains
rather puzzling: the influence of Whitehead on the early work and rather
vague references to Kant in the last writings (Parsons, 1978) aside,' this
theorist and ecumenical intellectual par excellence remained rather alexrf from
philosophy. Nonetheless, any theoretical work in sociology today that failed
to take account erf Talcott Parsons could not be taken seriously.
But we also face a danger about this man, one who became "a classic
even during his lifetime." I refer to the danger of a premature judgment,
one that rejects Parsons before even coming to know his work, to say noth-
ing erf comprehending it. Interest in Parsons's theory has declined since the
middle 1960s, both in the United States and in our country. His more
anthropologically oriented later writings have been pushed to the sidelines
erf prerfessional effort due to an interest in phenomenological, ethnomethodev-
logical, and critical approaches to research and theory building. Only four
years ago the impressive twe)-volume Parsons Festschrift appeared (Loubser
et al, 1976). But already at that time the inner circle of students who had
accompanied the master to his speculations abenit the foundations of the
human condition had shrunk to a sect. Merre recently we witness a return
of very serious interest in his work. Let us he)pe that this is more than just
a reaction to his death.
If I understand the intentions of those who planned this cemvention
correctly, the plenary sessions are to serve eme main purpose: to work
against a widespread weariness with theory, to turn around jaded minds by
rekindling interest in questions about the theory of society. That is why I
should like to address one pre)blem in Parsons's theory, and one that displays
well the inner dynamics oi his theewetical development over time. That pr<^
lem is the paradigm-tension between actiem theory and system theory in his
work. The most important problem erf theory ce>nstruction for Parsons was
the further development erf action thee>ry towards a conceptual system
modeled on a thee>ry erf boundary-maintaining systems. He had already
devel(^d a ccmceptual scheme for the description of e)bject-oriented social
action befe'e he encountered the cybernetic mexiel in the later 1940s, a
model which invited a reformulation of social science functionalism. In
contrast to many system theorists of the younger generatimi, Parsems could
never fall prey to tiie seduction of simply confusing the entities that consti-
tute "action" or "society" with the application erf the system mcxlel to these
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 175
entities. Interesting, indeed, is the tension that remains between the two
paradigms to the later writing (Menzies, 1976). The more errthodea erf his
students simply deny the existence of a tension. The less orthodox seek to
resolve it, either in "a forward direction," as it were, toward the development
of an independent system functionalism, or "backward" by a recoupling erf
the theory to petitions of neevKantianism (Alexander, forthcenning). To
begin with, permit me to explain why I regard this tensiem between the two
paradigms as highly instructive.
Parsons's basic question is the classic eme: How is sexiety as an
ordered set of related actions pe)ssible at all? The answer must be fenmd
through coming to understand the problem erf the coordination erf actiems.
What kind of mechanisms relate alter's actions to the>se of ego in such a
manner that conflicts that might threaten the relatedness of their actions are
either avoided or at least sufficiently cemtrolled to maintain that relateelness?
In general, we elistinguish two kinds of such mechanisms erf integratiem. One
kind, the mechanisms of social integratiem, are based on action orientations;
another, the mechanisms erf system integration, operate with orientations to
action but achieve their effects through the consequences of actiem. In the
former case, action is integrated through conscienis mutuality in the actiem
orientations of the parties concerned. In the latter case, action is integrated
threnigh a fimctional coupling of the consequences erf action to each e>ther,
consequences that may remain latent or beyemd the conscious horizon of
the actiem orientations of the acte^rs involved. In short, Parsems postulates
two kineis of integrative mechanisms. Sexial integration results from norma-
tive consensus among the participants. System integratiem is based on the
non-normative regulatiem erf the action prexess that serves system mainte-
nance. The orientatiem of the acting subject to values and norms is cemsti-
tutive of the social-integrative production of order but not erf its system-
integrative aspect.
The "invisible hand of the market" could serve as a mexld erf system
integration. It was an anemymous mechanism prexiucing order. Our knowl-
edge erf this integrative mechanism dates from the 18th century when pe^tical
economists made "the econemiy," an entity that had differentiated out ol
the larger political order, the e>bject of scientific scrutiny. Since that time
we face a pre)blem imknown to natural law philee^hy and its doctrines.
How are the two mechanisms erf the integratiem erf action related to each
other? What is the relatiemship between sex;ial integration, based as that is
cm the cemsciousness erf acte>rs who share a commem "life-world" {Lebens-
welt), and system integration, that other kind erf mechanism, denng its we^rk
silently, e>ver and above the conscieMis orientatiem erf the actors inverfved? In
his phile)se)phy of law Hegel gave us one answer, eme that pexited an idealist
transformation of subjective to objective spirit Marx with his value theory
erf labor gave us ane>dter answer, one that tried to cemnee^t the anemymenis
self-regulating mechanisms of a market yielded by ecemomic analysis with
the results erf a historical sode^ogy dealing with "life-world" structured
17( QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY
relations of actions em the part of historical actors of an individual or col-
lective kind. By now both of these strategies to solve the problem have lost
their plausibility. In Parsons's opus, we are confronted with system theory
and action theory as disjointed members of a Hegel-Marx theoretical legacy.
An older German sociolopcal tradition, one inspired by Dilthey, Husserl,
and (through Max Weber) one directly connected to Southwest German
neo-Kantianism (Habermas, 1970:7Iff.) provides a catalogue of basic con-
cepts developed in action-theoretical perspective. But at the same time the
foundations of an economic theory were developed, which adopted a con-
ception of an instrumental order from Hobbes and the Utilitarians. And this
perspective was elaborated further into a conception of a system regulated
by the monetary medium.
Since that time, the theory of sexriety is burdened with a certain compe-
tition between the two paradigms. And both paradigms have their particular
methodological consequences. On the one hand, the action-theoretical para-
digm is based on the intuitive social knowledge of the actors involved. It
presents us with an internal perspective of a symbolically structured, and so
inherently meaningful "life-world." The system-theoretical paradigm, on the
other hand, presents us with an external perspective, one that seeks to com-
prehend the counter-intuitive regularities of action prcxxsses productive oi
social order in their own ways. These methodole>gical orientations also
prejudice the very questions ihe theorist raises abcnit his subject matter
(Bernstein, 1976). Since Max Weber we have accustwned ourselves to
Uiink about pre>cesses of me)demization in terms erf the rationalization of
action. But a theory of modem society loses immediately its normative
implications and, indeed, any kind of relevance for the self-understanding oi
modem men and wemien as soon as questions of the rationality of action
orientations and "life-worid" structures are transformed into, and thereby
sacrificed to, quite different questions, namely those regarding the self-
steering capacity of rationalized action systems.
It is possible to regard the histe>ry of social theeny since Marx as a
process of the bifurcation of two paradigms. These two, systems and "life-
world," cannot be integrated any me:e into a two-step conception of society.
Instruments for critical normative reflection, as fe>r example the concept erf
ideology, Ie>se their power because we cannot devele>p a metatheoretical frame
of reference of sufficient complexity within the lhnits erf one oi the now
divided paradigms. And that is why it remains highly instructive for us to
learn how the two historical lines of theory development re-converge in
Parsons's work. Given the perspective just presented, I should like to trace
Pars(is's theoretical development and {H-esent and defend three theses:
Vint, the acticm-theoretical frame of reference is too namm to permit
the development of the concept "society" in action-theoretical perspec-
tive; and that is why Paixms is forced to represent action rtlatlons
directly as systems d action and why he has to retocrf his theory of
TALCOTTPARSWIS: PROBLEMS OT THEORY CONnKUCTION 177
society from a primary reliance on the basic concepts of action to those
of system theory.
Second, in connection with his turning to system theory. Parsons had to
reinterpret action theory, though not without reservations. The Par-
sonian variant of system functionalism remained tied to a theory ol
culture emerging from the work of Durkheim, Freud, and, above all.
Max Weber.
^Third, the theory oi modem society that Parsons developed within this
framework suggests, in general outline, an image of harmony because
it lacks the tools for plausible explanations of pathological patterns of
development.
In the following, I shall comment only briefly on the last two of these
theses (see 4 and 5). My main effort is geared to establish the first thesis.
In pursuit of this I shall (1) consider the action theoretical design of 1937
and its particular problem of theory construction that forces one to recast
the theory; then (2) I shall comment on the significance of the pattern
variables in the 1951 version of the theory; and this in turn will show (3)
why Parsons had to abandon this second version of action theory in favor
of system functionalism.
(1) In his first major work. The Structure of Social Action, Parsons
(1937) developed the foundations of a normativist theory of action in a
debate with empiricist traditions. He criticized the latter from two directions.
On the one hand, he analyzed the concept means-end rational action in
order to show that the UtUitarians could not ground the actor's freedom of
choice; and on the other, he concentrated on the concept of an instrumental
order in order to demonstrate that the question of how social order is pos-
sible at all could not be sdv&d with the use of empiricist presuppositions
(Hobbes's problem of order). Focusing on the two central concepts, the
unit act and the action system. Parsons showed how the two perspectives
turn into warring factions that both miss the boat: If you work mih
rationalist and empiricist conceptions of action, you cannot account for the
autonomy oi the actor; if you work with materialist OT idealist conceptions
of order, you cannot account for the legitimacy of an order based ultimately
on the pursuit of interests. In light of these considerations Parsons devel*
oped his concepts of voluntarist action (a) and normatively grounded
order (b).
(a) Following Weber, Parsons used the structure of the means'Cnd
rational act as a guide for the tmalysis of the concept action. He focused
on the general characteristics of the smallest possible unit act. This teleo-
lo^cal model of action includes an actor who selects goals as "future states,"
some state in the future towards which the actor strives. The "situaticm" is
made up of elements some of which the actor regards as under his control;
others be regards as beyond his control. The former are means to the actOT;
tile latter are conditions. The choice among alternative means rests oa cer-
tain ground rules of action. The chdce among alternative goals that (ire pot
178 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THE<tY
just contingent is possible by virtue e>f orientati( to values and oorms.
Both of these are treated by Parsems in terms of "normative standards."
Thus Parsems analyzed the elementary unit act wiih the concept action
orientation, which he ascribed to an actor in a situation.
This action theoretical frame of reference has a number oi in^xntant
implicaties. The mexiel implies not only that an acteyr possesses certain
cognitive abilities. It also implies that an actor can make normatively
oriented decisions (che>osing among alternatives). Further, the concept
"situaticm" implies that means and cemditions can be meaningfully interpreted
not only from the perspective erf the actor himself but also from the point
ot view erf the e>bserver, who studies the actor. This excludes that kind tA
e>bjectivism inherent iti behavioristic ex natural-science-inspired cemceptions
erf action. Finally, the fact that actiem takes time is used by Parsems to
assign to it two meanings. With respect to both, action is a process <rf goal
attainment relative to normative standards. Seen from the perspective erf
goal attainment, action calls for the expenditure of effort, an expenditure
rewarded by satisfactiem, intrinsic or extrinsic (the me)tivatioQaI dimensiem:
instrumental/consummatory). Seen from the perspective erf ementation to
normative standards and their observance, action diminishes the gap between
the "is" and the "ought," between the realms of facticity and those of values,
ot between the conditions erf a ^ven situation and the value and newm-
structured orientatiems of the acte>r (the ontological elimensiem: conditions/
nemos), ^parently, this last menticmed implicatiem, the idea that action
calls tot the expenditure erf moral effort, derives fremi the "ve)iuntarism" of
the actiem frame of reference. But Parsems cannert ex^dain this feature as
lemg as he sticks to the analysis <rf the unit act.
(b) Let me turn now to the pre>blem of order. Parsems answered the
questiem how sexiety is pe>ssiUe at all with reference to the normative regu-
lation erf interpersonal relations. Such normative integration demands
reverence fen: ttiat men'al authority upcm which the binding character erf
collectively shared norms for action rests. Critical here remained Durkheim's
distinction between external, causal, and internal, moral constraint. As le-
gards the actor, he has made that constraint so much a part e>f his per-
semality that it no longer amfremts him as an external feyrce but guides him
through his motives. Parsons endeavored to recast Kant's idea ci freedemi
as ohcditDce to self-impe)sed laws in sexiedogical format. CMtical in that
formulation are the symmetrical relatiems between the authority oS acknowl-
edged norms that confront the actor and the self-directiem anchored in his
personality, or the correspondence between the institutiemalizatiem and the
intemallzatiem of values. This femnulatiem reveals the two-sided character
of the idea ot freedemi, a hetdom. ccmstituted in the persand acknowledge-
ment of commitment to impersonal laws.
What Durkheim designated as the matal authenity erf an enxler, Max
Weber refened to as its legitimacy. But legitimate orders not emly r^re-
sent vahies; they also int^rate values with positioa-related interests. Paisons
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 179
conceives of normatively guided action as a process of the implementation
of values under conditions of a factud nature; in any legitimate order values
are already selectively related to extant position-related interests.
Now in retrospect, it would appear inviting to relate the concept ol
acticm, on the one hand, and that of order, on the other, in ccHnplementary
fashion to each other. A concept normative consensual mutuality could have
served as a bridge between the concept value-oriented rational umt act and
that of an order constituted of values integrated with position-related inter-
ests. Then Parsons's binary interpretations erf yes/no responses among the
interaction partners, which involve value consensus and the acknowledge-
ment of norms, would have become the focal point (A analysis. Instead oi
concentrating on the means-goals structure of the unit act, primary attention
would have been given to language-contingent consensus formation as that
mechanism which coordinates or makes mentally compatible the goals of a
plurality ol actors, thereby making social interacticm possible in the first
place. However, Parsons did not take this route of analysis. While he did
wage a valiant war against the empiricist traditions. Parsons also remamed
their prisoner. The individualist pdnt of departure (working off the imit
act) in a theory dt action explicitly oriented to the teledogic^ character oi.
action gave the whde a highly individualist cast. Parsons did ccmceive of
goal-oriented action as constrained by value standards and their correspcmd-
ing value orientation. But in the last analysis the single unit act of an iso-
lated actor remains the critical building block. I should like to comment a
littie more on this, his first critical decision for theory construction, in light
of the alternative just mentioned.
Proceeding from the monadic actor, Pars(is sought the conceptual
bridge connecting the imit act with the relations between acts in a fashion
that thought of elementary interaction as con^posed of two acton and their
originally independentiy constructed imit acts. The single action-cmentaticm
remains the point of departure for the analysis of interaction. That single
action-orientation is the result of contingent decisions between alternatives.
Relevant value orientations express the fact that correqxmding preferences
for values related to one of the given alternatives already exist Now, since
the regulative power of cultural values does not alter the contingency of
decisions, any interaction entered into by any two actors is characterized by
"double contingency" (Parsons, 1951a:36). This double contingency i^ays
a role in theory construction. It produces a proUem, and one with the si2e
oi a functional in^rative. Double contingency means that effort must be
expended to create order. This is so because dout^ conting^Ky is a man
elementary building block in the logical constructimi of interacti( than are
the action-coordinating elements ot order. Analytically, value standards are
treated as a property of the unit act in the sense of an actor who is subjec-
tively committed to observe them. Consequentiy, in interaction value stan-
dards need to be made con^t i Ue in an intersubjectivdy understood way.
180 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY
This way of approaching the problem contrasts sharply with the concept
of vahies as already intersubjectively shared culture. And it is the contrast
between the two approaches that produces our problem for theory construc-
tion here. How can Parsons connect his monadic unit act with the concept
erf shared and intersubjectively understoexl culture, which he borrowed from
Durkheim? Had Parsons put ihost interpretation efforts of his two inter-
acting actors that make the construction of consensus possible at the core
of his concept of serial action, the pre)blem may well have lent itself to an
adequate solution. After all, language-contingent prex:esses of arriving at
some understanding do requireand with the force of conceptual necessity
some intersubjectively shared traditions, above all else conmionly shared
value-commitments. The context to which any text pewnts can then serve
in the mexiel as the that that creates ordet. The problem of order that
results from the postulate of a denibly contingent relation between two actors
both of whom are capable of decision making [with respect to selecting goals
and means (translator)] could then be solved in this model via orientations
to the bindingness of norms that in turn are designed in terms of intersub-
jective validity.
Yes/no responses to the imposition of nemnative claims on actors do
not originate from some contingent freedom e>f choice. They have their
origin in the moral-practical convictions e>f the actors involved. At least
implicitly, such responses are based on the compelling power of sound
reason [having gexxl reasems to agree or elisagree (translator)]. However,
if one first treats action-oriented decisions as an emergent of the private
arbitrariness of isolated actors, as Parsons did, then one deprives oneself of
a mechanism that cenild explain the emergence ot a system of action out of
unit acts.' It is this embarrassment that sheds some light on the rearrange-
ments of action theory, as evident in the two 1951 publications. The Social
System, and Toward a General Theory of Action.
(2) During this time, the early middle perie>d e>f his work. Parsons no
longer confined himself to conceiving erf the unit act in terms of cemcepts
describing the orientations of a s i n ^ actor in his situation. Instead, he
attempted to treat the concept action ementation as a joint interactive prod-
uct of culture, society, and personality (Parsons, 195la:3-23; 1951b:
53-109). He prex;eeded to analyze the concept action orientation fremi a
perspective that asked what these three could contribute to the pre>duction
of a concrete actiem. As a result, the acten' becomes an agency, an agency
propelled by me>tivational forces and controlled by values at the same time.
The personality system participates in actiem orientations bringing to bear
the forice of me>tives; the se>cial system participates in action orientatiems
bringing into play normative orientatiems.
In the interim Parsons had been influenced by Freud's theory of per-
sonality and Malinowski's cultural anthre^logy. These also altered his
theoretical perspectives. Under their influence Parsons began to construct
his theory with the concept culture. Patterns of value-orientations now
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTTRUCTION 181
became that part of culture of direct relevance for the constituents of action
systems. These value patterns make up the raw material. InsUtutionalization
transforms this material into legitimate role expectations, and intemalization
transforms it into personal motives or character-formed dispositions to act.
In this fashion Parsons conceptualized the two action systems [personality
and society (translator)] as mutually complementary channels through which
cultural values become transformed into motivated action.
This procedure alone raises an interesting question: How can one Iitik
up these three concepts of orderculture, social, and personality system
with the concept action, a concept from which in turn these three could not
be developed? It is important to realize that the three orders culture, society,
and personality were first introduced simply as "systems" in a quite unspe-
cific sense of that term. Without that realization one catmot adequately
grasp the problem for theory construction inherent in the question just
raised. Parsons's work under consideration here is still one where he stuck
to the notion that the action frame of reference made it possible to view
society as a whole as made up of ordered sets of related tinit acts.
Thus, permit me once again to use the concept "action oriented to a
mutual understanding" as a contrast to the unit act. We can use here a
concept current in phenomenological and hermeneutic schoc^s of thought.
I refer to the conceptualization of society as a "life-world" (Lebenswelt) /
We can use this concept in complementary fashion to another, namely ihe
concept oi communicative action. Proceeding along this path, we can come
to conceive of culture, society, and personality as resources for action-
coordinated processes that produce understandings. After all, the certainties
of the "life-world" do not have only the status of taken-for-granted context
presuppositions. The competence of societalized individuals and the sdi-
darity of groups integrated by values and norms constitute that very context
of the "life-world" in a fashion quite similar to received cultural traditions
that one knows without noticing that one knows them. The concept "life-
world" has two strategically important advantages. On the one hand, it is
a promising tocA to answer the question oi the determinants of action oriea-
tations. If we analyze the formal properties of the accomplishments of inter-
pretation on the part of actors who orient their actiotis toward each other by
means of communicative action, it should be possible to show how ctilturid
traditions, institutional orders, and the competencies c^ personalities bring
about commtmicative integration and stabilization of action systems in the
form of diffuse taken-for-granted understandings of their "life-world." On
the other hand, the notion that the symbolic structures of the "life-worldf'
are only reproduced through communicative action is also a useful totd. It
can serve us as a guide for a probably fniitftil analysis of the relations fre-
tween culture, society, and personality. If we find out just how the same
mechanism of accomplishing understandings is used in different ways in the
reproduction of culture, in social integration, and in socialization, the nature
of the interdependencies between the three components of the "life-world"
should become clear to us.
182 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACnON THEORY
Since Parsons neglected the mechanism of accomplishing understandings
in the architecture of his action theory, he had to seek an equivalent iot
the cemcept "life-world" on the basis of different premises. Following up
on his first decision in theory construction, which gave primacy of place to
the actor's value-oriented decision to choose among action alternatives, he
had to develop cemceptual tools that could elucidate how action orientations
emerge from the interrelations between culture, society, and personality. And
it is for this purpose that he introduced the so-called "pattern variables of
value orientation" (Parsons, 1951a:58ff.; 1951b:78). With that Parsons
made a second important decision for theory construction. Cultural values
function as templates for the choice between actioa orientatiems. They de-
termine the orientations of an actor in that they prescribe preferences with-
out touching on the contingency of the decision. Parsons claimed that five
problems must be faced in any action situation. And he claimed that any
actor is inevitably confronted with these problems in a manner that compels
him to cope with them by making a binary, schematized, general, and
abstract choice between alternatives. In a certain sense, then. Parsons
ascribed some transcendental "power" to the pattern variables. Any action
orientation should be conceived as the resultant of simultaneous decisions
between exactiy five general and inevitable alternatives. You will not dis-
cover even a trace of deduction from more general principles in this enter-
prise. The catalogue of problems and the corresponding table of alternatives
derives a certain evidence instead from the Gemeinschajt-Gesellschaft con-
trast intre>duced by Toennies. The pattern variables are posited on dimen-
sions of the processes of the rationalizatiem of society upon which an older
sociole>gy conceptualized the transition from traditional to modem societies.
Parsons (1977:41ff.) himself draws our attention to i t
At any rate, use of the pattem-variaUes is suppe>sed to help us examine
how any kind of cultural values structure the actor's freedom of choice
through a priori determined possible combinations of fundamental decisions.
Further, the preference pattems described in terms erf the pattem variables
serve as the structural common core that connects the action orientation ne>t
only with a received cultural tradition but also with society and personality.
For example, the complex of instrumental activism illustrates the point.
Parsons (1938) observed this complex on the part erf American businessmen
and i^ysidans. It is a value complex based on fundamental decisions for
affective neutrality, universalism, achievement orientation, and a specific
ce>gnitive style that works for or transcends different subject matters. The
complex is present on three levels simultaneously. One finds it in struc-
turaUy analogous motives for action, occupatiemal roles, and cultural values.
But such a description hardly solves the problem at hand; we still do not
knew herw to aHiceive of the relationships between culture, society, and
personality.
If pattem variables describe a structural core common to all three
[of action, viz. culture, society, and personality (translator)],
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 183
then they cannot serve at the same time to exi^ain specific differences in
the ways in which personality, society, and culture affect acticm orientations.
A very general notion that contingent decisions are regulated by preferences
does not by itself give us perspectives from which to examine the differen-
tiation of the motivational base of action, its commitment to norms, and its
orientation to cultural values. We can use the pattern variables to identify
the area oi overlap or mutual interpenetration of the three systems. But the
very metaphor here gains meaning for theory construction only after <me has
discovered one's failure of developing a concept society that is adequately
compatible with a concept of action as value-regulated teleological action.
And returning to my first thesis, let me state: Parsons's concept of action
does not yield a concept oi society.
What is missing is a concept analogous to the mechanism of acc(Hn-
plishing understandings. Parsons's actor sits there in his free space of
decision-making regulated by preference patterns. But he does not respond
to the latitude for choice left him with the achievement of interpretations.
The model does not permit initiatives that we could study in order to dis-
cover how the various resources oi the "life-world"such as achieved
competencies, shared and respected norms, and received cultural knowl-
edgeare brought tc^ether to form a reservoir that the participants in inter-
action use to build up shared action orientations. Without the conceptual
bridge of a "life-world" centered in communicative action culture, society,
and personality simply fall apart. And it is precisely for this reas<i that
Parsons proceeded to postulate that these three orders are systems in their
own right, and systems that affect each other in unmediated fashion by
partial interpenetration. In other words. Parsons abandoned trying to explain
in action-theoretical terms the notion that cultural values enter society and
personality via institutionalization and intemalization, respectively. Instead
a model of mutually interpenetrating but analytically separate systems gains
a central position on his theoretical stage.
(3) Giving greater precision to the concept system, a term used hitherto
rather loosely, constituted Parsons's third important decision in theory con-
struction. Until the early 19S0s the term system did not denote much more
than some ordered set of elements with a tendency to preserve what structure
it had. In his contribution to The General Theory of Action he introduced
the first and hardly noticeable revisions in his structural functionaiism. He
began to characterize action systems with the basic conceptual tools at
general systems theory. Special importance is given to the idea that systems
have to secure their existence under conditions of a variable and over-
complex envircMiment which they only partially control. In system func-
tionaiism the ccmcepts "functicm" and "structure" can no longer be handled
on the same level. The functional imperatives of a boundary-maintaining
system have to be managed with structure and process. Under certain coo-
diticMis structure and process may serve as functional equivalents for each
other (Parsons, 1970:35).
184 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY
To begin with, this more strict conceptualization of the term system
is applied only to sex;iety and personality. In contrast, the curiously free-
floating "system" of transferable cultural meanings forms a coherent entity
only in the widest i>ossible sense of the term "grammatical." At best, this
is a "system" in terms of the structuralism of a Saussure or L6vi-Strauss.
When Parsons referred to "the structure" of a value system, what he had in
mind was the order erf the internal relations among its meaning components.
But he did not have in mind that order manifest in external relations, as for
example functional relations between the empirical components of an action
system identifiable in time and space (Parsons, 1951b: 176).
This twe>-fold meaning of the term system characterized Paisons's
ambivalent way of connecting Weber's concept of value implementation or
value realization with the concept of a boundary-maintaining system adopted
from cybernetics. The special place of culture vis-a-vis the empirical action
systems made it possible for Parsons to introduce the neevKantian dualism
of values and facts into his system functionalism. This value-theoretical
barrier separates Parsons's from Luhmann's system functionalism. An extant
system is always defined by a set of cultural values, manifest in the institu-
tional orders of sexiety, or in the motivational bases of personality. Since
such values come from the cultural system and, to fe>rmulate it sharply, since
the latter belongs to a sphere other than the struggle for survival, such values
generate some identity-defining power that counteracts the highest system
imperative: to abandon any particular kind of arrangement in the service
of survival.
This is evident in the two basic problems that se>cieties and personalities
have to solve once they are conceived as culturally structured boundary-
maintaining systems. On the eme hand, they have to manage the functiemal
imperatives that arise from limitations in their environment. On the e>ther
hand, they have to integrate and maintain their identity-conferring patterns
that result from the institutionalization and intemalization of values. Par-
sons deals with the two tasks separately. An action system has to maintain
its identity or integrity of meaning in two directions, externally and intemal-
ly. The analogous functions are identified in terms erf "allocation" and
"integratiem" (Parsems, 1951a:114ff.; 1951b: 108ff.). Allocation refers to
aelaptatiem and goal-attainment functioning and hence to the creation, me>bi-
lizatiem, distribution, and effective use erf scarce resenirces. In this cemnec-
tion Parsons emphasized over and over again the restrictions ot time, of
space, erf nature, and erf the organic basis erf human nature. Solving such
alle)cation |e>blenis serves the "functional integratiem" erf the action system
in the widest sense, a matter that Parsems (1951b:107ff.) carefully distin-
guished from "se>cial integration." Sexnal integration refers to functions that
maintain and integrate the cultural values built into the action system. This
type of integration is ne>t to be measured in terms ot functional imperatives
resulting from the relations between system and enviremment, but rather in
terms erf the demands for consistency that are a function of the internal rela-
TALCOIT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF TBEORY CONSTRUCTION lSS
tions of a cultural value system. In their role as boundary-maintaining
systems, society and personality have to cope with imperatives that result
from system-environment relations. But at the same time, and in their n^e
as culturally structured action systems, society and personality are also ex-
posed to consistency demands resulting from their dependency on institu-
tionalized and internalized value patterns of unique cultural configurations.
A simple diagram may help in describing the two-fold relations of
action systems to environment and culture. Let us use arrows to denote
the complexity differential which characterizes all system environment rela-
tions. And let us use a broken line to identify the internal relations that
constitute structural similarities. Then we have:
^^ Culture^^
Social System
Environment
Personality System
Environment
This picture reveals a weakness of the scheme. The schema suffers from a
fusion of basic concepts, and one that lacks clarity. The concepts come from
different paradigms. The cultural system occupies the space, as it were, of
a missing concept. The missing one is the concept of "life-world." And
because culture serves as a substitute here, it has to have this dubious posi-
tion of an entity supraordirtate to the action system but at the same time
also composing its internal environment, one that ncMietheless lacks aU the
empirical character of the environment of a system. How is one to ascribe
to culture actual efficacy in its impact on acticm systems when such culture
transcends in certain ways those very action systems without serving as their
environment? Parsons's intention is quite clear. The identity of a given
action system is supposed to be tied to the value sphere via the Iatter's own
organization, and in such a manner that the system can resist the pressures
to adapt to an overly complex environment through its own imperatives.
Culture should be manifest in making demands that call for obedience to
standards other than the criteria of successful adaptation to the system's
environment. "A cultural system does not 'function,' except as part of a
concrete action system, it just is" (Parsons, 19Sla:17). But what internal
barriers against some change in values, a value change indttced by changp
in system-environment relations, could Parsons identify?
Presumably, the pattern variables simply serve dassificatory purposes.
They enable us to conceive of cultures as variant ccnnbinations of a finite
number of decision patterns. Presumably, the pattern variables do not
describe a structure that restricts change ol such decision patterns in terau
of a developmental logic. If both my presumptions are correct, then Parsons
lacks the theoretical tools to explain the resistance of distinctive or uniqdc
culture patterns to functional imperatives. Parsons has no equivalent for the
IK QinssmoNS ABOUT ACTION THEORY
concept "life-world," which provides the contextual background for commu-
nicative action. If it were otherwise, the sphere of the integrity demands that
Parsons located in a transcendence oi free-floating cultural contents would
have been treated, from the onset, in terms of empirical, time and space-
bound, and identifiable relations between unit acts.
Only with the just indicated alternative strategy for ccmcept formation
could one avoid the paradigm confusion that the second version of Parsons's
theory, one developed during the early 1950s, falls prey to. A "life-world"
with its material substructure is exposed to chance vadaticms in its condi-
tions. From its perspective, though, such chance variations appear more as
barriers to the realization of action projects than as restrictions on its self-
steering capacity. The substructure has to be maintained with the use of
scarce resources through socially organized work. This is the task for which
Parsons chose the catchword allocation problems. Insofar as the net effects
of collective action satisfy the imperative (^ maintaining the material sub-
structure, we have a situation that permits the functional stabilization of
action rdations. It is a functional stabilization by virtue ot feedback con-
cerning the consequences erf action. That is what Parscms meant by "func-
tional" in contrast to "social" integration.
This is a consideration we can still afford to make within the paradigm
ot the "life-world." But it also suggests an alteration of the perspective in
which that paradigm has been used. We should regard the "life-world" as
an objectivating system. With respect to material reproducticm, the processes
ol exchange between life-world and its environment are alone critical, not
the symbc^c structures of the life-world itself. The maintenance (tf the mate-
rial substructure depends entirely on the former. Looking at these in analogy
to "metabolic i'ocesses" (Marx), it seems advisable to reify the life-world
as a boundary-maintaining system. Then functional relations become rele-
vant for its treatment, a matter for which intuitive knowledge about life-
world contexts is not an adequate substitute. The imperatives of survival
reqiiire a functional integration <A the life-world. That kind of integraticm
operates across the symbdic structure of the life-world and that is why it
cannot be comprehended frcnn the perspective of a participant. Compre-
hending that integration requires a contra-intuitive analysis and is to be done
from the perspective ol an observer who objectifies the life-world. Social
integration is a part oi the symbolic reproducticm (^ the lif&-world, involving
not only the reproduction of memberships and sdidarities, but also that of
cultural traditions and socialization process. Let us concq>tualize functicxial
integraticMi, in contrast, as referring to the material rej^oduction of the life-
worid, and treat it as system maintenance.
Study df each of these problems calls for the adopticm of distinctive
methodolopcal orientations and the use of different ccmcepts. One cannot
study functional integration frcnn the internal perspective cl the life-wcwld.
Functional integration beccMnes accessible to the eyes of an observer only
when the life-wcHid has been reified and only when he takes an objectivat-
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 1V7
ing stance toward it as a boundary-maintaining system. l a this procedure
the system model does not just serve as a conventional tod. The latent
functions of action require analysis with a concept of system integration that
transcends the integration of action orientations attributable to communi-
cative action.
The basis of Parsons's action theory is too narrow to develop the
required concept, which has to link up system and life-world in a two-step
methoddogical procedure. The perspective of action theory does not allow
one to develop the required concept of society. That is why ParscMis pro-
ceeded to represent the relations between acticms directly as systems without
realizing the change in perspective which produces the concept action system
through the methodological reification of the life-world in the first place.
Parsons did proceed from the primacy of action theory. But he did not
follow through its implications consistently enough. That is why the metho-
dological significance of the basic system-theoretical concepts retnained
hidden.
Parsons removed the difficulties arising from his dualist conception by
simply removing the special status of culture; and that gave primacy ot place
to the basic ccmcepts of system theory. This remains also the only occasion
where he admitted a revision important for the overall design of his theory.
Hitherto he had reserved for culture a sort of extramundane position as a
sphere of values and legitimacy standards. But then he placed culture cm
the same level of empirical action systems where society and personality had
come to rest. And these three systems, supplemented by a fourth, the
organism or behavioral system, are set subordinate to a general action system
only now gaining postulation in its own right. The general action system is
the reification of the action frame c^ reference.
But this procedure did not, <^ course, permit assimilating the relation
between actw and action situation to that of acticm system and environment;
an action system does not act, it functions. The relations between the already
analyzed components of action orientations are constitutive of the action
system. An action system consists of the relations between values, n(ms,
goals, and resources. Luhmann (1980:8) made the point when asserting:
"Action is a system by virtue of its internal analytical structure." The pro-
cedure also determines the four system references. The action system is
composed of subsystems specialized for the production and maintenance of
one of the compcments of action: culture for values, society tot nonns, per-
sonality for goals, and behaviwal system for means or resources. Actors as
acting subjects disappear in this conceptualization. The actors are now
abstract units, units to which one ascribes dedsimis and the effects of action.
However put, actors stand for aspects of an organism capable of learning,
of the motivaticMial econcMny of personality, erf roles and memberships in
social systems, and of the acticm determining cultural traditicMis.
(4) If my first thesis, the one I developed here at some length, is
correct, thm it is not possible to understand how Parsons himself and his
18S QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY
orthcxlox students can deny a change from action to system theory and assert
an unbroken continuity in theoretical development and the history of the
opus. My second thesis asserts that the appearance of such continuity which
effectively hides the change is attributable to a very characteristic reservation
under which Parsons developed his system theory of society. The four-
function schema, a model for inter-system exchanges, the theory of the media
of interchange, and the move toward the anthropolo^cal level of system
formation (Human Condition), all this is evidence of one line of theory
building in the form of system construction conducted with utter consistency
since the Working Papers (Parsons, 1953), and so over the course of a
quarter century. But this ccmstruction of a theoretical system is synchronized
with a reinterpretation and assimilation of action theory on the one side, and
the ever more abstract and consequently ever more hidden preservation of
neo-Kantian intentions on the other. Within the constraints c^ a system
paradigm Parsons still could not let go of a conception of action systems as
incorporations of cultural value patterns, a ccmception he had learned from
the history of social theory. My second thesis requires technical evidence in
its own right, of course. But I shall have to confine myself to four examples
(a-<l); and these are examples on the basis of which one could prove that
action theory has been fundamentally reinterpreted.
(a) As already shown, during his early middle period Parsons described
the functions of action systems with reference to two sets of imperatives.
One concerned the relations between system and environment; the other the
relations to culture. The tasks of functional integration were analyzed in
terms <rf allocation problems. They involve the provisioning, the mobiliza-
tion, and the goal-effective application c^ resources. On the other hand, the
tasks of "social integration" invcdve the maintenance of the structure of value
patterns. While the former covers the material reproduction of the life-
world, the latter covers the reproduction of its symbolic structures. In light
of the history of theory this was a plausible two-fold classification of basic
problems. But the four-function view, the famous AGIL-schema took its
place from 1953 on (Parsons, 1953). The allocative functions were dif-
ferentiated into those of adaptation and those of goal-attainment, while the
new pattern-maintenance function covered both cultural reproduction and
socialization. What is of primary interest in our present context, however,
is the simultaneously accomplished reduction of what was before a critically
important distinction, the distinction between functional and social integra-
tion. Both simply become the new "integrative functicm." And this covered
up the stitch-line that connected the action and system paradigms in his work.
(b) Until 1953 it was quite sufficient for Parsons to illustrate the basic
functions with the model of a functionally differentiated societal system. The
economy served the function of adaptation; the polity the function of goal-
attainment; the legally organized community served the integration funcdcm;
and the cultural subsystem served the culture-transmissicm and socialization
functicms. But this proved no longer sufficient once the AOIL-schema was
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCnON 189
posited as applicable to any subsystem. Now a more general foundatiem ot
the idea of system function had to be found, one that wemld be independent
of the previous conception of society, which had been informed by action
theory. Parsons took account of this by starting the analysis below the level
of action systems. He focused attention on the process of system formation
and the more general problems of maintenance that any living system faces
under the constraints of time and space. And so, the internal/external axis
yields the boundary-maintenance preAlem of system and enviromnent. The
tempewal axis, present/future, in turn yields the problem of relating means
to ends. And tihe combination of the two problems yields the desired four
functions. Since these have been uproe>ted enit of their action-theoretical
fenindations and apply to any living system of whatever kinel, the analytical
compements of actiem in turn have to be made deducible from sdving system
probletns (Parsons, 1970:30ff.).
(c) And indeed Parsons decided to a]le)cate the analytical components
of action^values, norms, goals, and resourcesto one of the basic functions
each. This decision erf theory construction made the reinterpretation of the
hitherto central pattern variables inevitable. Parsons (1960) accomplished
that revision in the course erf his debate with Dubin. These abstract dedsiem
alternatives had been introduced in order to explain how cultural valuei
could be reduced to a finite number of preference patterns from a universal
perspective. After Parsons abandoned the perspective of action theory, the
pattern variables Ie>st this particular meaning. Now the question was no
lemger eme of the cultural determination of actiem orientations. Now the
question was how the actor's decisions cenild be derived directly from system
formation processes. If one was to carry along the pattern variables at all,
they could now serve at best as lenses prismatically breaking system problems
and so eiisplaying how actions appear in the light of system dynamics. Par-
sons simply eliminated one of the five pairs of basic alternatives facing the
actor. He then uncoupled the pattern variables from the value orientations
(rf acting subjects and used the remaining two times four variables in order
to describe the four basic functions in terms of pretty arbitrary combinations
of decisiem alematives. But this effort never attained much significance for
his thee>retical development.
(d) An even more teUing example erf the mixing in of residues ot an
already abandemed paraeligm can be found in the theory erf the media of
cemununication appearing in the 1960s. Leaning em cemceptualizations in
nee>-classic ecemomic theory. Parsons and Smeker developed the cemcept
meeiium of interchange. Money, for example, transfers ne)t emly infemnatlon
within the economy, it also facilitates exchange processes between the ecem-
emiy and the e>ther subsystems. In certain situadems and in certain respects
money substitutes for a context-dqwnelent everyday language as a mechanism
for the cex>rdination of acticm. Inserfar as interaction can be based on such
a medium, a means-end, ratiemal, success-emented manifnilatiem of general-
ized values retraces that communicative everyday practice which C(iMnes a
190 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY
higih level of interpretation and its attendant risks of dissensus with very
limited rcxnn for maneuvering. Money is not a specialized language; it is
instead a cost-saving substitute for special fimctions of language, one that
makes action orientations independent of a life-world context of shared
cultural knowledge, norms acknowledged as binding, and accessible motives.
This uncoupling requires a recoupling of the medium to the life-world. Thus
the circulation of mcmey requires the institutions of civil law, like the law
of property and contract. With certain reservations one can also conceive
of power as a medium. And so conceived, one may view it as playing a role
in the pditical system which is analogous to the rde of money in the eco-
nomic one. However, as soon as Parsons yielded to his compulsi(i for
theory construction here and proceeded to invent other media, such as
influence for the integrative and commitments for the cultural subsystems, he
"had to liquidate," as it were, the very core of his action-theoretical legacy
for the sake of system theory (Habermas, 1980). From the perspective of
action theory, the influence c^ an expert and the binding power of a moral
authority are nonmanipulable goods which can function only as long as one
refrains from subjecting them to strate^c uses. As scx>n as one redefines
them as media, however, they become objects of an objectivating orienta-
tion; and then they have to be treated just like some deposit of money or
power. The concept medium "levels" a distinction between mechanisms
that is critical in action-theoretical perspective. The distinction distinguishes
mechanisms that substitute for consensus accomplished with language and
neutralize the life-world context on the one hand, from those forms of gen-
eralized communication, on the other, that specialize and simplify consensus
formation with respect to truth or correctness criteria but otherwise still rely
cm life-world contexts.
(e) The last example refers to the assimilation of the concept "legiti-
mating force of cultural values" to the control function of the ought-functions
in self-steering systems. This example can also serve as a first illustration of
tendencies in Parsons's work that counteract the liquidation of action-
theoretical traces in the later writings. Even here ParscMis tries to save the
substance of the neo-Kantian dualism of values and factidty, of values and
interests. The differential between the sphere of values and norms to which
one appeals and the realm of the factual conditions of life became signifi-
cantly reduced when culture was degraded to cme sub-system next to others.
Pars(H)s translated the logical tension between the "is" and the "ought" into
a cybernetic analogy in order to minimize this consequence. He equated
cultural values with the critical values (d some guidance mechanism; and he
proceeded to treat the organic bases of action systems as a source of energy.
And then he imposed a hierarchy of organization on the behavicH'al system,
personality, scxnety, and culture in such a way that the lower oat is always
superior in energy to the higher one, while any higher cme is always the
supedcH' in information and steering capacity to the lower. This linear ar-
rangement ot the four subsystems in form of a contrcd hierarchy preserves
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 191
the pewition of a sovereign for the cultural subsystem. It is a sovereign erf
steering, one simultaneously dependent on the erther subsystems for energy
supplies (Parsons, 1961:352ff.).
This idea is subjected to an additional step erf hierarchization, one
pertaining to an order amemg the basic functions. And this step guarantees
in a priori fashion that the functionally specialized subsystems cannot impact
on each e>ther in arbitrary fashion but only in the LIGA-direction ot a
cultural determinism. This remains a prejuelice une>btnisively built into the
technique of cross-tabulation. The latent meaning of this formalism consists
in two things. On the one hand, eme reinterprets the validity erf symbolic
order in an empirical eiirection; and on the other, eme immunizes value
change from materialist assumptions."
The cemstruction of the cultural system itself tells us how the technique
of cross-tabulation secured the secret idealism inherent in Parsonian system
functionalism. To begin with. Parsons followed Weber's trilejgy of cognitive,
moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive types erf sytnbolic structures. The
fourth, constitutive symbolism, in fact denotes relipon. And this despite the
fact that modem science and technology, law and morals, as well as an
autonomems art have all been differentiated ewt from religienis-metaphysical
traditions and now e>ccupy a petition neither structurally nor historically em
the same level as such traditiems. The formalism of cross-tabulatiem reveals
its secret at last completely in Parsons's "late philose)phy." There we find
the general action system subordinated to a reified trancendentalism in the
form of the "telic system" (Parsons, 1978). And this versiem reveals the
clue to something that Parsons had already smuggled into the contred hier-
archy of his theory of sexiiety. At the lewer pe)le erf the contred hierarchy
the actiem system has to maintain its bewndary vis-a-vis a natural and emr
pirical environment; at the upper pole, it faces a nonempirical environment
of a supernatural kind. For the latter. Parsons selected the expressiem
"ultimate reality" from the early thedogy erf Tlllich.
(5) According to my analysis, Parsons's theory of society emerges from
the ambiguous assimilatiem erf action theory to system theory. His work has
the character erf a theoretical compromise between two competing para-
digmatic cemceptualizations. The compromise covers up their conflicts; but
it does not resolve them. If this assertion is correct, it shemld be possible to
prove this compremiise formation systematically in the subtheories that
Parsems devele>ped with this framework. As a brief illustratiem, let me use
his theory erf modernity (Parsems, 1971), one to which my third and last
thesis abewt his work refers.
Had Parsons adopted a system-theoretical framewenk without any
reservations, he could have analyzed modem societies simply from the per-
spective of increased complexity in their ejrganization. Then the fe>Ilowing
bird's-eye view ot mexiemity wenild hold: there is a continual "differen-
tiating cHit" erf subsystems. Each is relatively indepradent of the others.
All femn enviremments to each other. All engage in media-regulated ex-
192 Q UESn ONS ABOUT ACn ON THEORY
changes with each other and in a manner that yields zones of mutual inter-
penetration. Roughly, that kind of image emerges from Luhmann's evolu-
ticmary theory, which definitively abandons the neo-Kantian idea ol value
implementation, which deserts tiie heaven oi cultural values, loosens the
corset of the four-function schema, and so lends more dynamics to a theory
of modernity than Parsons did. This theory does not foreclose any possi-
bilities. At any rate, Luhmann aims only at historical explanaticm where
Parsons aspires to theoretical prediction. The point is illustrated by the
development of modem societies through exactiy three revolutions. If you
proceed in Parscmian fashion, you start the analysis with the integrative sub-
system. Then only three revolutions are possible. The industrial, the demo-
cratic, and, finally, the educational each appear as structural-differentiation
products of the societal ccnnmunity into the economic, the political, and the
cultural subsystems (Parsons, 1971:101; Parsons and Platt, 1974[intro-
duction]).*
Granted, differentiation is only one of four evdutionary mechanisms.
The other three invdve a gain in adaptive capacities, inclusion or generali-
zation of rights to membership, and the generalization cA values (Parsons,
1966). A deductive determination of just what is to be understood by
growth in complexity of organization and steering capacity of this kind also
produces advantages for Parsons that cannot be found in a stricter yet less
specified system functionalism. Inclusion and value generalization have been
ascribed to those functions by means oi which the ccmcept value-implemen-
tation, the institutionalization of values, has been both preserved and trans-
formed. That is why Parsons was able to translate and transmute the
externally observed growth in system complexity into the self-understanding
of the members of such societies within the internal ccmtext of their life-
world. Thus Parsons could synthesize growth ol system autonomy with
increased autonomy ot moral-practical reason. Increased inclusion and value
generalizaticm lend themselves to interpretation as steps toward a greater
realization of ideals of justice from a perspective of ethical universalism
(Parsons and Platt, 1974).
Similar results emerge from an internal perspective of the differentiation
process, once you focus on the analytical level of the general action system.
Modernity signals a greater differentiation ol society from culture on the one
hand, and from personality on the other. And both have c(MisiderabIe phe-
nomenological validity, a matter characterized by ParscMis (1978:233ff.)
with such catch-words as "secularizaticn" and the emergence c^ "institutirai-
alized individualism."
One may conclude therefore that the very compromise between his neo-
Kantianism and his system functionalism made it possible for Pars(is to
construct his functional theory of modernity in continuity with Max Weber's
abiding concern with the ccHirse of Occidental rationalism. Parsons could
afford to conceive of societal modernization not cMily in terms ol system
raticmalization but also in terms of the rationalizaticm of action. But one
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 193
must also note that his work lacks an action-theoretically derived concept
of sexiiety. And that is why Parsons cannot describe the rationalization of
the life-world, on the one hand, and the growth of complexity erf action
systems, on the other, as separatethough of course interacting^but fre-
quentiy also confiicting prewesses. With respect to modem sexiiety. Parsons
can link up new levels erf system eiifferentiation and their corresponding
growth in system autonomy with self-understaneling of modem culture. But
he can do so only by means of catchwords like secularization, institu-
tionalized individu^ism, instrumental activism, and the like. Thus he can
interpret continuing system development in line with Weber's ideas as the
enhanced institutionalization of value, norm, and means-end rational action
orientations.'
Parsons elid not resolve the paradigm cemipetition in his work through
development erf a two-step concept of society, one which could relate life-
world and system to each erther. All he did was to tone down the compe-
tition by fusing the conflicting meanings of the two sets of basic concepts.
And this compromise prevented his full comprehension of a fundamental
alteration that characterizes modem societies. The symbolic structures erf the
mexiem life-world are certainly highly rationalized. But the life-world
remains as dependent on social integration as it always was. Yet the life-
world has not only been separated from the economic and pditical sub-
systems, eiifferentiated out via media as they are, the life-world has also
been subordinated to the imperatives of these subsystems. Basing his obser-
vation on the emerging industrial proletariat, Marx showed us what hides
behind the categories wage labor and monetized labor power. It means no
less than a profound transformation erf a hitherto sex:ially integrated life-
world and its subjugation to the imperatives erf a legally and formally or-
ganized ecemomic system steered witii a medium of exchange values. And
that system can stabilize itself through functiemal interrelations, and, with a
hidden hand and in silence, steer itself right through all actiem euientations.
Texlay, the operation erf the media erf money and organizational power e)r
administrative decision provides us with further realms erf action that have
attained a systemic life of their own. And they also absorb and deform those
realms of life that depend for their very existence em the integratiem ot values
and norms through the cemimunicative accemiplishment erf understandings,
and remain therefore forms of life that canne>t be retooled tor system inte-
gration without pathole)gical side effects.
The theenies of Durkheim and Weber were still sensitive to the kinds
of pathedogies that Marx had analyzed with his paradigmatic case (rf
alienated labor. But Parsexis cemceived erf the rationalization erf the life-
world and the growth erf system complexity in the same basic conceptual
terms to such an extent that he tiiily could not discem the dialectic (rf the
costs of modernization, costs that arise from the growth of system complexity,
for the intemal structure of the life-world. At best he could cope with sudi
ceMts in terms erf certain malfunctiems, like patterns erf monetaiy inflation
194 QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION THEORY
or deflation. The rather metaphorical use, after all, of this over-generalized
concept "media of commimication" aside, such media dynamics pertain only
to contingent disequilibria c^ intersystem exchange prcx^esses. Media dy-
namics can hardly explain the kind of pathologies that Marx, Durkheim,
and Max Weber were concerned with. These have to do with deformations
that result from the dominance of forms of eccmomic and administrative
rationality over areas of life that because c^ their communicative internal
structures simply cannot be rationalized in terms of such standards.
Parsonian functionalists appreciate this defect. That is why R. C. Baum
(1976) endeavored to relate the just mentioned pathcdo^es to a certain
underdevelopment in the operation ot media. He proceeded from the asser-
tion that even highly economically developed societies have not yet developed
all four media to a sufficient degree of institutionalization to actually accom-
plish the regulation of product and factor exchanges across six markets pre-
scribed by the interchange paradigm. Only one of these media, namely
money, has been sufficiently institutionalized to serve as an adequate measure
of account and a store oi value. And because of the unequal development
of the media to date, there are tendencies to use the best developed and
therefore most manipulable for problems of steering regardless of their
functional nature. For exan^le, the destruction of an urban environment
as a consequence of unchecked capitalist economic growth or the over-
bureaucratization oi the system of higher educaticm could be explained CMi
the basis of the "misuse" of the media money and power. Such misuse in
turn can be related to a fal^ perception on the part of participants in decision
making who believe erroneously that any kind c^ rational steering is possible
only with a calculated disposal of money and power. According to Baum,
media theory can be used as a critic;al instrument, leading to reform. Misper-
ceptions can be identified. One may call for a more careful use of the most
developed media available, and engage in a kind of consciousness raising
that alerts those concerned that influence and value-commitments need more
development in order to catch up with money.
But such an argument is possible only if one is prepared to assign direct
normative significance to well defined equilibria. That is why others show
little hesitation in trying to recover the normative core of action theory frcn
the bondage of system functionalism. If I understand correctly, that is R.
MUnch's (1980b) intention in introducing "interpenetration" as a nonna-
tively structured idea for the measurement of the pathc^ogies d modernity.'
Miinch derives the idea from the philosc^ical content of the theory that
Parsons built into the hierarchy of coDtrcd vdiile also making it invisible in
that procedure. The very hierarchization of the four functions and their
corresponding subsystems made sense only with the premise that action
systems im^dement or realize values under empirical C(MiditiCHis. Processes
of value implementation can be normatively understcx)d frcMn the perspective
cl the participants: Values ought to be imidemented. And that can only
be accomplished to the extent that the ordering and CMientation achievements
TALCOTT PARSONS: PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONSTRUCnON 19S
of culture fit in seamlessly with the conditional limitations and resources of
nature (MUnch, 1978).
Whoever starts on this kind of road should not hesitate to take Mpon
himself the task c^ constructing a theory of value imjdementation or value
realization. It remains highly doubtful that the normative im^^caticHis of
such an endeavor could be compatible with the character of Parsons's theory.
Let us not forget either that the philosophical tools once used for such an
endeavor by Lask or Rickert, for example, are quite outmoded today.
NOTES
1. Parsons (1^68) found an unproblematicAl rriationship between symbolic inter-
actionism and bis own tbeoretical potrition only in 1968. lii contrast, be reviitted Durk-
beim repeatedly (Parsons, 1967, 1973).
2. References d so global a nature to Kant's Critiques baldly jnstify qieaking of
a "Kantian core" in Parsons's work as does MUncb (1979).
3. I sball not try bere to justify the point with conceptualizations of learning
theory. Tbe so<alled sanctions paradigm can explain at best bow non-noimative
orientation expectations are conditionally related to eacb other.
4. Parsons, in contnut, remained aloof from tbe phenomenological concept 1if-
world" (Schutz, 1978).
5. Cf. also MUncb (1980a) on the technique of cross-tabulation.
6. Sometimes Parsons seems to conceive of these three revolutions also as proc-
esses through which each one at tbe subsystems differentiated from all remaining sub-
systems. So, if one classifies the three named revolutions functionally as belonging to
tbe economic, tbe p<rfitical, and the cultural subsystems, one could expect one addi-
tional revolution for tbe integrative subsystem. Possibly, Parsons (1974) bad tbe
"exiHessive rev<dution" in mind.
7. Tbrougb his aflirmative conception of secularization Parsons's views on tbe
development of moral consciousness in modernity are different from Weber's and less
skeptical (Parsons, 1978:240 ff).
8. MUnch (1980b) distinguishes mutually balanced "interpenetration" from patho-
logical instances of adaptation (dominance of tbe energizing over tbe steering s u b ^
tems), the reverie, "over-constraint" (dominance of the steering over the energizkg
subsystems), and mutual isolation.
9. Tbe desirability of justifying nonnative axkmata becomes very apparent in
Mflnch (1978).
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