ARTICLE 22

Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425

FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan,
who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial
Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso
Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were
naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and
Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo
including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual
and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in
the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal,
acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee
Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965,
all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the
partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife
and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore
business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore
for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co.
sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its
business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale
and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law
wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child,
Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the
company of the latters share.
HELD: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they
take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties
as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage
may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be
satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a
marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of
any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case
at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine
Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely
no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of
the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal
not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch
as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for
her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and
promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in the
position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her
relation was that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment
of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent
court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are
hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte proceedings against petitioners and the
decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order
extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein
petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And
respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil
case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.

Vda de Chua vs. CA GR No. 70909, January 5, 1994
FACTS: Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent
Florita A. Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson
Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on
May 28, 1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of
guardianship of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.
Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true
wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but
a pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and
died a bachelor.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.
HELD: The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the
decedent. She could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage
certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no
such marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them,
attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage,
that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.
Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to
produce.
ARTICLE 25
Republic vs. CA and Castro GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994
FACTS: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that
she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for
only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her
brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to
put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration
for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license
issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
HELD: The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro
is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the
peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
ARTICLE 26
Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an
Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of
Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with
Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD: The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was
valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by
the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.




Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,
1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under
the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Van Dorn vs Romillo 139 SCRA 139
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in
Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila is
their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and
that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari
proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named
Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a
divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition
for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.



ARTICLE 27-34
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to
Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5
years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February
19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for
at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can
be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.

Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been
married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children.
On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous.
He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit
that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses
due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both
have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years
under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their
marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents
are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court
II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a
marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta
Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater &
Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts
of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon
did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning
out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the
Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave
strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract
and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The
other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their
marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that
copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and
that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due
to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not
sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD: Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with
the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs
taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya
declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and
bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and
wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that
it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that
there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage
certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano
& Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was
dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have
been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in
the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin
had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the
joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together
which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order
to avoid the marriage license requirement.

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal
requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.



Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his
first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and
Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand,
Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got
married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The
spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment
of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa.
The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute
or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.