THE 1947-48 Kashmir War

The war of lost opportunities

(Part I)
a! ("et#) $%H$ H&$'&( $I(
ar)h 1999
$ *hapter from Pa+istan $rm, till 19-.
$lso pu/lishe# in 0efen)e 1ournal $pril an# a, 2333 Issue
History is made by those who seize fleeting opportunities in the critical time
span in any particular situation and relentlessly execute their plans without
second thoughts, subduing inner fears, overcoming procrastination and
vacillation, and above all by those who are propelled by the burning desire to
defeat the enemy rather than any half hearted judiciousness and timidity.
Ninety years of loyalism and too much of constitutionalism had however made
the Muslims of 19! slow in ta"ing the initiative and too much obsessed with
conse#uences of every situation.$his attitude was excellent as long as the
%ritish were the rulers, but not for a crisis situation, in which geography, time
and space, alignment of communications and weather temporarily favoured
&a"istan, in case initiative and boldness was exercised and simple but
audacious plans were executed in the shortest possible time'
$oday, it is fashionable to blame the (ndians, Mountbatten, )racey etc as far as
the 19!*+ ,ar is concerned. - dispassionate study of the events of 19!*+
clearly proves that victory was closer in 19! than ever again as far as the
&a"istan -rmy was concerned. .pportunities were lost because very few
people who mattered at any level apart from Mr /innah, %rigadier -"bar 0han
and some others were really interested in doing anything'
$he 19+ war was fought over the Muslim majority state of 0ashmir ruled by a
1indu ruler, who did not want to accede to &a"istan. $he specific sole and
immediate aim of this chapter is to briefly analyse the 19+ war and to explain
why &a"istan failed to achieve, what was within its grasp and why the (ndians
despite their overall material superiority could not achieve as much as they
should have done.
$he morality of 0ashmir dispute and who is morally right is beyond the scope
of this boo", except the simple point that as far as the broad mechanics of the
philosophy governing the partition of (ndia was concerned2 i.e. division of
(ndia on a communal basis and as Non*Muslim and Muslim (ndia, 0ashmir
should have been a part of &a"istan.
$here are detailed accounts of the 0ashmir 3ispute and whole boo"s have been
dedicated to it, a reader interested in this dispute should study those boo"s. 4o
we shall directly move on to the exact discussion of military mechanics of the
19+ war.
$heoretically, a &rincely state could join any state i.e. (ndia or &a"istan or stay
independent. $he %ritish policy in this regard was not precise.
- &rincely 4tate could join one of the two states i.e. (ndia or &a"istan, with
regard off course to physical propin#uity. $he choice of country was left
entirely to the rulers of the princely states. -s far as physical propin#uity was
concerned the state of 0ashmir had all road rail and river communications
with &a"istan and none with (ndia.
-s far as the sentiments of the population were concerned, everything indicated
that they did not certainly want to join 1indu majority (ndia. $he ruler 1ari
4ingh was not inclined to joining &a"istan. (n the third wee" of -ugust 19!
the 0ashmir 4tate 5orce opened fire on a political meeting at a village
near 3hir"ot in &oonch district. .n 6 -ugust 19! the Muslims of the area
started a small rebellion under 7ayyum 0han an ex sepoy from the army. .ther
similar rebellions of small scale bro"e out in various parts of the state and the
state forces were soon dispersed all over the state in internal security duties. (t
may be noted that the 0ashmir 4tate 5orces consisted of nine infantry
battalions out of which had the communal ratio of 66.6 8 Muslim, 9.9 8 4i"h
and 99.99 8 3ogra 1.
-s the rebellion spread the principal anti*(ndia leader 4ardar (brahim fled
to &a"istan and started considerable efforts to mobilise &a"istani public opinion
and military support in sustaining the rebellion, which had little chance of
success at least in the valley in case the 1indu ruler was able to secure (ndian
-rmy:s assistance by virtue of acceding to (ndia6. -s true or exaggerated
reports of anti*Muslim atrocities reached the $rans*(ndus &athan tribal area the
&athans who have been historically famous for a multi* faceted motivation
combining thirst for glory, (slamic zeal and lust for loot started movement
towards -bbottabad and Murree on their own initiative.
,hile all this was going on 1ari 4ingh the ruler of 0ashmir "ept sitting on the
fence, inclined to joining (ndia, but unable to arrive at a firm resolve to do so
for fear of the bac"lash against this decision from the Muslims, who constituted
the !9 8 majority. $he situation was getting very swiftly out of control of the
Maharaja:s forces.
$here were more than ;<,<<< demobilised Muslim ex* servicemen who were
,orld ,ar (( veterans, and many of these men formed militias and started
harassing the dispersed state forces and harassing the various roads and bridges
in the state.
%y 19th .ctober these militias forced the 4tate 5orces to abandon 5ort .wen,
around the same time the 3ogra communication between 0otli and &oonch was
severed and the state forces Muslim troops had almost deserted and joined the
rebels while the non* Muslim units were besieged at %himbar, Mirpur and
Mangla=. (t must be remembered that at this moment the &a"istani )17 was
not involved in the operations.
$he Muslim >eague:s high command had tas"ed Mian (fti"har ud 3in
Minister for ?efugees to prepare a plan aimed at ensuring that the Muslim
majority state of 0ashmir should join &a"istan. %rigadier -"bar 0han then
serving in the &a"istani )17 wrote an appreciation @armed revolt
inside 0ashmir @ on Mian (fti"har ud 3in:s re#uest. (t appears that Mr /innah
had tas"ed >ia#uat to handle the 0ashmir business.
>ia#uat in turn earmar"ed Mian (fti"har ud 3in. (fti"har re#uested 4ardar
4hau"at 1ayat and %rigadier -"bar 0han for advice. - conference presided
by >ia#uat was held at >ahore in 4eptember 19!. $his was attended by
-"bar whose appreciation had already been shown to >ia#uat by (fti"har ud
3in earlier. )hulam Mohammad the 5inance Minister who was a contemporary
of >ia#uat at M-. Aollege -ligarh and at this time was foremost in playing
sycophant par excellence with >ia#uat also attended the conference.
%rigadier -"bar recalls that everyone was enthusiastic but no one including
the &rime Minister had any concrete idea about the tangible and concrete
aspects of the actual plan of operations, specially as far as the logistic and
armament aspect was concerned. 4hau"at was appointed as overall incharge
with Major 0hurshid -nwar B?etiredC commanding the northern tribal force
which was as per -"bar:s appreciation to attac" on Muzaffarabad*4rinagar axis
and Major Daman 0iani of the (N- to command the southern force tas"ed to
operate against the 0athua area in the south.
4ri5a#ier $+/ar Khan 06768 /riefs Prime inister 9ia:uat $li Khan60is5uste#
with 9ia:uats )on#u)t in Kashmir war $+/ar later planne# a )oup a5ainst him in
19.3
4hau"at 1ayat was not in favour of appointing 0hurshid -nwar since he was a
non*fighting arm soldier. 4hau"at states in his boo" that >ia#uat under )hulam
Mohammad:s influence appointed 0hurshid -nwar, then commander of the
Muslim >eague:s semi*military national guard to command the main northern
invasion force. -"bar was to provide logistic support to the tribesmen which
were to be employed for the invasion. $here were three principal parties in the
whole invasion affair.
.n one side was the Muslim >eague leaders li"e 4hau"at 1ayat Ban ex*majorC
(fti"har ud 3in and 0hurshid -nwar who had been ordered by Mr /innah to do
something to help the 0ashmiri Muslims. $hen there were the tribesmen who
were concentrating at %atrasi opposite the 0ashmir border and there was
%rigadier -"bar 0han a %urma 34. who was 3irector of the newly
formed ,eapon -nd E#uipment 3irectorate at the )eneral 1ead#uarters,
tas"ed unofficially to support the tribal raiders logistically, using all resources
at his disposal in )17 as 3irector ,eapons and E#uipment without letting the
%ritishers controlling the &a"istan -rmy "now'
%rigadier -"bar 0han , 34. chats with the tribal raiders
$he tribesmen were brought from the N,5& tribal areas on truc"s
re#uisitioned by )overnment of &a"istan and concentrated in %atrasi north*east
of -bbottabad. $he invasion was to commence from 6<th .ctober 19!2 the
main northern tribal force invading 0ashmir under 0hurshid -nwar on
-bbottabad*)arhi 1abibullah*Muzaffarabad*4rinagar axis with a smaller
auxiliary force advancing along Murree*0ohala*Muzaffarabad axis.
$he official history does not mention the >ahore conference presided by
>ia#uat but merely states that @Major 0hurshid -nwar Bas a result of some
divine revelation'C undertoo" to organise and lead Bwhether voluntarily or on
someone else:s orders is left to the readers: imagination'C the tribesmen
into 0ashmir when the opportunity arose: ' (n addition Major -slam 0han an
ex* 0ashmir 4tate 5orce .fficer and a MA of ,, $wo also joined the
>ash"ar. -slam was son of %rigadier $or )ul who was a loyal subject of the
1indu 3ogra ruler of 0ashmir before 19!' $he >ash"ar of tribesmen had been
assembled by the efforts of 0han 0hushdil 0han of Mardan. .n the night of
6<F61 .ctober 6,<<< tribesmen captured the bridge spanning the Neelam river
on the 1azara $run" ?oad lin"ing Muzaffarabad with -bbottabad without a
fight, since the all Muslim guard platoon of /ammu and 0ashmir (nfantry
joined the tribesmen.
$he Muslim companies of his state forces /ammu and 0ashmir %attalion in
Muzaffarabad area rebelled and joined the tribesmen. %y morning of 61
.ctober the 6,<<< raiders assisted by the Muslim Aompanies of the /ammu
and 0ashmir 4tate (nfantry %attalion had captured the first major border town
Muzaffarabad. 5ighting continued till 6= .ctober since other 3ogra troops of
the /ammu and 0ashmir infantry fought on till 6= .ctober in the localities of
3omel and 0ohala.$he 19!*+ 0ashmir ,ar had formally started.9
)eography, weather, sentiments of the bul" of the population,
initial comparative location of regular army troops available for action in
0ashmir and the layoutFalignment of communication2 all favoured
&a"istan. ?awalpindi was not more than ! miles from -bbottabad, 91 miles
from Murree and 9< miles from ?awalpindi the three major garrison towns
of &a"istan.
-ll the major road and rail lin"s to the state ran through &a"istan. $he li"ely
direction through which the (ndians could rush in the reinforcements ran
through a dirt road from &athan"ot to /ammu and from here to ?iasi across
the %annihal &ass Bsnowbound from November to MarchC to 4rinagar which
was more than 69! miles long. ,hereas Muzaffarabad was lin"ed
to 4rinagar by an all weather tarmac road without any major water obstacle or
any serious gradient.
$he distance between 4rinagar and Muzaffarabad was less than 1<< miles. $he
only rail lin" of the state was the one connecting the town
of /ammu with 4ial"ot in &a"istan. $he only way (ndians could reinforce the
4tate and save its capital 4rinagar was by airlifting troops to 4rinagar.
(f 4rinagar was captured the whole 0ashmir vale and the entire northern areas
including >ada"h could no longer be held by the (ndians. $here were no
subtleties or complexities of operational strategy in the whole situation
except following one simple straightforward plan ie2 a bold and swift advance
to 4rinagar assisted by a troop or s#uadron of armoured cars. ,e will discuss in
brief in the following paragraphs what actually happened and the major reasons
which led to failure.
$he entire 0ashmir ,ar of 19!*+ was fought over a large area comprising
more than +9,<<< s#uare miles and over the highest mountain barriers in the
world. 1owever the innumerable actions of the war studied in detail are
confusing and do not provide the layman reader with a clear picture, thus the
result is a situation in which the trees become more important than the whole
forest. (n brief the 0ashmir ,ar was fought in four areas, one of which was
most important and the centre of gravity for the other three. $hese four areas
were the /helum Galley or the Muzaffarabad*4rinagar ?oad, the Northern
-reas comprising the )ilgit*>eh axis in the (ndus Galley and
the Dojila &ass area, the &oonch ?iver Galley and fourthly the area
between /ammu and Mirpur. $he centre of gravity of the whole war was the
/helum Galley, which was the only place where an advantageous decision
could have been achieved at the earliest and in the relatively shortest time and
space as far as the &a"istan -rmy was concerned2 had the &a"istani political
and military leadership possessed greater strength of resolution and
independent spirit2 than they actually did'
$he fate of the war in (ndus valley depended on the degree of success in
the /helum Galley since the (ndian line of communication to this theatre lay
through the /helum Galley. $he fighting in &oonch river valley also depended
on the success of the struggle for /helum Galley, since a &a"istani success in
/helum Galley in terms of capture of 4rinagar would have freed all &a"istani
troops for a concentration against &oonch town from the north and would have
definitely led to the capture of &oonch.$he fourth sector of the war i.e. the area
south of %annihal &ass and between -"hnur $awi river was the only area that
the (ndians could have held with a certain degree of success in terms of relative
forces available, geographical location and the terrain factor.
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
5irst of all we shall deal with the battles in /helum Galley on the Muzaffarabad*
4rinagar -xis, the most decisive part of the whole war where the (ndian
position was most critical and hung on the razors edge.,e have already seen
that the tribesmen assisted by the Muslim elements of the 0ashmir 4tate 5orces
had successfully cleared Muzaffarabad*3omel area by 6= .ctober. (n terms of
odds and comparative forces this was a predictable affair since the 1indu
3ogra elements of the /ammu and 0ashmir %attalion, approximately two
companies or about =9< men were dispersed in penny pac"ets over an area of
thirty miles, and were further internally wea"ened by having a 9<8 Muslim
strength or two companies. -dded to these the 6,<<< tribesmen who attac"ed
Muzaffarabad on 61 .ctober achieved complete surprise since the crucial
bridge over the otherwise impassable river Neelum B0ishangangaC was handed
over to them by the Muslim guard of the /ammu and 0ashmir infantry, and
all that they had to deal were isolated 3ogra platoons dispersed in various
localities separated by many miles.
-fter capturing 3omel the last 3ogra held locality on the main road to 4rinagar
on 6= .ctober in lorries and truc"s. $here was practically nothing between
Muzaffarabad and 4rinagar to stop the tribesmen. %rigadier ?ajinder 4ingh the
chief of staff of the 0ashmir 4tate 5orces was a brave man.
1e rushed to Iri ;= miles west of 4rinagar on the main Muzaffarabad*
4rinagar road with 6<< soldiers and blew a bridge spanning a nullah Bwater
course smaller than a riverC on the main road on 6= .ctober 19!;. $his
delayed the advance of the tribesmen and other volunteers who now numbered
about 9,<<< by one day. %rigadier ?ajinder 4ingh who believed in leading
from the front was "illed in action on 6th .ctober.
$he tribesmen resumed advance and captured %aramula which was =9 miles
west of 4rinagar on 6;th .ctober 19!. - very respectable (ndian military
historian has fran"ly admitted that @had the lash"ar gone on,there was nothing
between %aramula and 4rinagar to stop it!: $he tribesmen sole motive was not
liberation of 0ashmir, and they started looting the town. 4rinagar was just a
few hours lorry drive away from %aramula.
-ccording to 4ardar 4hau"at 1ayat who was one of the Muslim >eague men
tas"ed to oversee the invasion the issue was ?s =<<,<<< found in the 0ashmir
4tate $reasury. 0hurshid -nwar foolishly argued that this money belonged to
&a"istan )overnment Bas if the tribesmen were fighting just for two nation
theory, while no Muslim >eague leader was sixty miles near %aramula'C while
the tribesmen correctly asserted that it belonged to them+. .nce this issue was
settled the tribesmen who had no conception of $ime and 4pace factor insisted
that they will not move before the three day Eid festival was over9. (n the
meantime the (ndian )17 was acting real fast. $he Maharaja of 0ashmir had
been re#uesting the (ndian government for military aid since 6th .ctober and
on 6;th .ctober signed the (nstrument of -ccession joining (ndia. Meanwhile
the (ndians had already sent a staff officer from their military operations
department on 69th .ctober to study the military situation.
$he (ndians collected =< 3a"otas for the airlift and flew two companies of 1
4i"h to 4rinagar on 6!th .ctober from ,illingdon airport near New 3elhi. -t
this moment the (ndian situation was highly critical2 only < men were holding
a wea" defensive position 9 "ilometres east of %aramula. (t was (ndian good
luc" that all commanding officers during this situation believed in leading
from the front, >ieutenant Aolonel 3ewan ?anjit ?ai the Aommanding .fficer
of 1 4i"h being another such man.
3ewan on landing at 4rinagar immediately rushed in lorries to %aramula
hoping to stop the >ash"ar at the mouth of the funnel which opens east of
%aramula into a wide valley as one advances from %aramula towards 4rinagar.
1 4i"h joined the state troops 9 "ilometres east of %aramula, but could not hold
the >ash"ar of 9,<<< men. 3ewan was "illed in the fighting and the remaining
elements of 1 4i"h withdrew eastwards losing 6 men B"illedC to ta"e another
defensive position at &atan 69 "ilometres west of 4rinagar1<. .n 6+th more
(ndian troops flew into 4rinagar and the balance of strength started tilting in
(ndian favour.
$he tribesmen who were used to fighting based on hit and run tactics could not
use weight of numbers in the open valley and resorted to bypassing tactics
instead of the conventional infantry attac". $hey bypassed 1 4i"h:s position at
&atan from the flan"s but was forced to stay close to the main road since
manoeuvrability in the whole area was restricted by marshes and small la"es
and the lash"ar &athans were by and large non swimmers11' %y 6nd
November the (ndians had flown in a very strong infantry brigade B1;1
%rigadeC consisting of approximately four battalions into 4rinagar.
(n addition the overall command of (ndian -rmy operations in 0ashmir was
entrusted to 1ead#uarters /ammu and 0ashmir 5orce based at 4rinagar and
headed by Major )eneral 0alwant 4ingh. $he commander of 1;1 (ndian
(nfantry %rigadeBfrom 6nd NovemberC was %rigadier >.& 4en a %engali 1indu
with an excellent 4econd ,orld ,ar record Bunli"e the first Muslim A*in*A of
&a"istan -rmy as we shall discuss laterC in %urma where he had won a
3istinguished 4ervice .rder16.
$he tribesmen had lost the really golden opportunity to capture 4rinagar on
6!th .ctober. $here is no doubt that &a"istan had lost its first decisive battle
without the &a"istan -rmy:s direct involvement. -ll was not over still2 and
another major opportunity to capture 4rinagar was yet to be lost. ,e will
discuss this in a subse#uent paragraph.
(t may be noted that Mr /innah had ordered )eneral )racey the %ritish
-cting A*in*A BMesservy being on leaveC of the &a"istan -rmy to
attac" 0ashmir. )racey who had been handpic"ed by Mr /innah on the grounds
that 5ield Marshal -uchinlec" the 4upreme Aommander of both the armies did
not allow it'1= -uchinlec" flew to >ahore the next day and convinced Mr
/innah to retract his order. -uchinlec":s threat that all %ritish officers would be
withdrawn in case such an order was pressed further convinced Mr /innah into
retracting this order1. Mr /innah was unluc"y unli"e Nehru in having no &atel
by his side. ,hen %ucher the %ritish A*in*A of the (ndian -rmy advised the
(ndian government not to attac" 1yderabad till the 0ashmir ,ar was over,and
&atel insisted otherwise, %ucher threatened to resign.
&atel simply told him on the spot that he could resign and then ordered 4ardar
%aldev 4ingh,the 3efence Minister @$he -rmy will march into 1yderabad as
planned tomorrow morning:19. Mr /innah was undoubtedly2 by virtue of
having ta"en an iron and most resolute stand on the division of the (ndian
-rmy2 the father of &a"istan -rmy.
(t was remar"able that as a very sic" !1*year*old man in 19!, Mr /innah
possessed the tremendous Aoup d .eil Bunusual strategic insightC and
resolution to order )racey in .ctober 19! to employ two brigades of &a"istan
-rmy to attac" 0ashmir2 one from 4ial"ot going for /ammu and one from
?awalpindi going for 4rinagar '1; (t was indeed a pity that he did not possess
any adviser, who could be called a @Man: B- M-N >(0E &-$E>C of sufficient
ability and independent judgement to convince him to override )racey who
was behaving little better than a glorified headcler" and mouthpiece of
-uchinlec"'
(t was yet another tragedy that this glorified headcler" was retained and
succeeded Messervy as the second A*in*A of &a"istan -rmy' (t is strange that
4hau"at ?iza who wrote his boo" in the 199<s did not even mention this
incident. - reflection on the roundabout way in which the boo" was written
and on the analytical ability and grasp of military history of all the brilliant
&rincipal 4taff .fficers of &a"istan:s )eneral 1ead#uarters whose name are so
proudly mentioned in the -c"nowledgement section of his boo"1!.
$he (ndian )17 ordered !th >ight Aavalry to be ready to move
into 0ashmir in the end of .ctober. (ts 1indu /at 4#uadron e#uipped with
armoured cars Bthis was from ; >ancers which went to &a"istanC started
movement from -mbala on 1st November and after a tough march
reached 4rinagar on the evening of 9th November. (t has to be noted that
although the (ndians starting reinforcing 4rinagar from 6!th .ctober onwards,
the (ndian superiority till the end of the first wee" of November was not as
formidable as to ensure that 4rinagar could not be threatened again, in case the
&a"istan -rmy joined the tribesmen.
$his was so because the (ndians were forced to defend simultaneously various
locations which if lost could seriously jeopardise the whole (ndian
position in 0ashmir. $heir communication from &athan"ot to /ammu ran
parallel and very close to the &a"istan border. /ammu the main town on their
north*south communications was a few miles from &a"istan. (n addition several
3ogra garrisons at %agh, Mirpur, Mendhar &oonch, 4"ardu, >eh etc were
besieged by the various local militias and their fall could further exacerbate the
(ndian position in 0ashmir.
,e had left the battle at &atan where 1 4i"h had ta"en a defensive position
after being forced to withdraw from 9 "ilometres east of %aramula. $he
tribesmen launched an attac" on the reinforced (ndian position at &atan on =<th
.ctober but failed to capture it due to intense strafing by (ndian -ir 5orce and
the inherent defensive strength of the (ndian defensive position which was well
sited and dominated the area around. $he tribesmen now decided to infiltrate,
bypass the (ndian position from both north and south and capture
the 4rinagar airfield, which was the centre of gravity of the whole battle. $he
tribesmen who were masters of guerrilla warfare successfully went into the rear
of the (ndian position from its south by infiltration Bsee definitionC and
managed to reach %adgam a village just a few "ilometres away from
the 4rinagar airfield on =rd November. 1ere they successfully raided and
dispersed an (ndian infantry company inflicting in the process an extremely
heavy loss on the (ndians in terms of men "illed including the (ndian Aompany
commander Major 4omnath 4harma1+.
$he tribesmen were very close to establishing a roadbloc"
between 4rinagar airfield and town, but their paucity in numbers restrained
them from doing so. -t this critical juncture when no &a"istani politician ever
dared to cross the ?iver /helum Bit may be noted that till ceasefire in 3ec +, no
major Muslim >eague leader including the &rime Minister ever visited
0ashmir'C in order to inspire and pat the indomitable tribesmen. $he (ndian
political leadership was more energetic and on hearing about our indomitable
tribesmen:s action at %adgam 4ardar &atel the second most important (ndian
leader after Nehru visited 4rinagar on th November19. &atel stressed the
importance of holding 4rinagar and assured the soldiers that reinforcements
were on the way.
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
$here is one extremely important event which has generally been ignored by
most &a"istani military historians including 4hau"at ?iza.$his was a
conference held between =<th .ctober and th November. %rigadier -"bar
0han the military man incharge of the raiders operations had returned to &indi
after a visit to the frontline at 4rinagar. $he tribesmen had not yet been
repulsed and were planning infiltration operations with the aim of
capturing 4rinagar airfield. -"bar 0han:s analysis about the operational
solution to the problem of tribesmen:s inability to attac" well entrenched (ndian
infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery was to provide the tribesmen with
armoured cars.
Major Masud from 11 Aavalry stationed at ?awalpindi volunteered to ta"e his
own s#uadron:s armoured cars to 4rinagar, on his own initiative, without
informing any superior head#uarter. -"bar 0han states in his boo" @?aiders
in 0ashmir: that Major Masud said that the armoured cars would go without
official permission, at his own ris" and that the men would be in civilian
clothes. $his fact is proved by two independent authorities who were not from
armoured corps and thus had no ulterior motivation or desire to project 11
Aavalry.
.ne was )eneral -"bar who was present at the conference and the other was
%rigadier -mjad -li 0han Ahaudhry who was a gunner, and was also present
at the same conference6<. -"bar states that as the conference was coming to an
end ?aja )hazanfar -li 0han a Muslim >eague leader and Aentral
)overnment Minister entered the room. %rigadier 4her 0han who was the
3irector Military .perations had also joined the discussion. $his, ?aja
)hazanfar Bdespite being from a so*called martial areaC was horrified about the
armoured cars proposal, and according to both -"bar 0han and -mjad
Ahaudhry opposed the idea. 1e was supported by %rigadier 4her B>ionC 0han'
%oth the Minister and the >ion 1earted brigadier feared that such a step would
lead to an open war between &a"istan and (ndia61.
-mjad Ahaudhry states that one of the participants at this conference a Muslim
>eague minister ?aja )hazanfar -li 0han even voiced an apprehension that
the unruly tribesmen may get unruly and damage the Maharajas palace at
4rinagar66'
$hus in the end -"bar 0han who was not directly in charge of the operations of
tribesmen was overruled by a pacifist Minister more "een to enjoy ministerial
per"s and a paper tiger brigadier wearing the mas" of the high*sounding
appointment of 3irector Military .perations'
Major General Akbar Khan ,the real hero of the
1947-48 War.A DSO of Bura an! the ar"h#te"t of
$h#lo%o$h& of are! #n%urre"t#on b& a#!#n' non
%tate a"tor% a% %tate $ro(#e%.)#% #!ea% of u%e of non
%tate a"tor% a% a!*an"e! #n h#% +r#t#n'% +ere $#"ke!
u$ u"h later an! $ra"t#%e! #n Af'han#%tn,,-.A an!
Ka%h#r
$he only difference between (ndia and &a"istan was not whether one side
possessed armoured cars or not, but the simple fact that while Mr /innah did
not have any able Muslim deputy to advise him about military affairs Bwhether
&unjabi, 1industani or &athanC
Nehru was assisted by a much larger team of more resolute, more intellectually
capable 1indu deputies li"e &atel who ensured that armoured cars of !th >ight
Aavalry2 under command >ieutenant N.) 3avid2 did reach 4rinagar area on
!th November and inflicted on the poorly armed tribesmen e#uipped with bolt
action rifles a defeat at what the (ndians themselves call the decisive battle of
4halateng'
(t may be noted that on the night of 6F= November the tribesmen had
successfully infiltrated north of the (ndian main position at &attan and had
reached 4halateng in the rear of &attan and a little to the north of 4rinagar. 4en
the (ndian brigade commander countered this move by ordering 1 4i"h to pull
bac" from &atan and to ta"e a position at milestone four astride the 4rinagar*
%aramula road. %y ;th November a large number of tribesmen who had been
slowly infiltrating since =rd November had gathered at 4halateng.
Major -slam and Major 0hurshid -nwar the &a"istani officers in charge of
these tribesmen decided to launch their main attac" on 4rinagar on the night of
;F! November. $he (ndian %rigade Aommander %rigadier 4en was also
simultaneously analysing this threat and had decided to launch a
deliberate attac" on this force supported by !th >ight Aavalry:s s#uadron on
!th November. 4en:s plan was to launch a frontal attac" supported
by aircraft while one troop of !th >ight Aavalry under >ieutenant 3avid
which had already been sent towards %andipura on a recce mission and was
already in the tribesmen:s positions rear was ordered by wireless to attac" the
tribesmen from the rear6=. $he result was the battle of 4halateng on the
morning of !th November.
$he tribesman had started their main attac" by infiltration on the night of ;th
November and were fighting on the northern outs"irts of 4rinagar when the
(ndians launched their main attac" at first light. 3avid:s troop had already got
into the rear of the tribesmen as planned2 thus while the tribesmen were
attac"ed frontally by (ndian infantry supported by armoured cars and aircraft,
armoured cars were attac"ing them from the rear. $his was too much for men
armed with bolt action rifles. $he tribesmen were routed and it was with great
difficulty that the situation was finally stabilised at least temporarily at
?ampura a narrow defile halfway between %aramula and Iri6.
$he abandonment of the conduct of war to tribesmen armed with bolt action
rifles2 while the (ndians attac"ed them with 4pitfires, $empests, 1arvards and
3aimlerF1umberF)MA -rmoured cars was without any doubt one of the most
disgraceful acts in &a"istani military history. Even in the whole of 19!*
+ ,ar in all probability no regular &a"istan -rmy officer beyond the ran" of
captain was "illed' -n indicator that officers were not leading from the front.
)eneral -"bar 0han:s views about the whole affair at 4halateng are more
controversial. -"bar is of the opinion that, no battle ever too" place at
4halateng, since the bul" of tribesmen had already withdrawn to %aramula on
9th November69.
-"bar was not present at 4halateng and there is no doubt that a battle did ta"e
place at 4halateng2 however it is possible that after appearance of the (ndian
regular army units supported by aircraft2 and no similar counteraction from
&a"istani side in shape of a similar commitment in terms of armyFairforce
involvement2 it is li"ely that many tribesmen may have withdrawn from
4rinagar area between 6!th .ctober and 9th November. -"bar who was a man
of much greater integrity than one thousand -slam 0hans etc was more
accurate once he said in his boo"2 @ $hey felt themselves let down by &a"istan.
$hey had, of their own free will, agreed to come and fight in 0ashmir but only
against the 4tate -rmy. (n this they had done more than what was expected of
them. %ut no one had arranged with them. %ut no one had arranged with them
to fight also against the regular (ndian -rmy, with artillery tan"s and aircraft6;.
(t must be noted that there was one very major difference between the
tribesmen and the vast majority of Muslim >eague leaders li"e )hazanfar -li
and men li"e -slam 0han, 0hurshid -nwar etc, i.e.2 these men and their
ancestors since 1+9 had been serving the %ritish and even the 3ogras Bas far
as -slam 0han was concernedC and suddenly in 19< or 19! these men had
become leaders of &a"istan or officers of the &a"istan -rmy2 in contrast the
tribesmen and their ancestors had been fighting the %ritish with une#ual
intervals since 1+9'
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
%aramula was recaptured by (ndians on +th November and the (ndians aided by
their airforce which was attac"ing the entire tract of road between %aramula
and Muzaffarabad6! continued their advance towards Iri. $he (ndian &rime
Minister Nehru visited 0ashmir on 11th November and travelled in an
armoured car of !th >ight Aavalry till %aramula6+. Aompare this with the
attitude of the &a"istani politicians. Neither >ia#uat the &rime Minister nor any
single of his ministers2 1industani, &unjabi, 4indhi, %engali or &athan crossed
river /helum69. $he attitude of )racey in not agreeing to commit the army
to 0ashmir, however disgraceful and negative can be explained by saying that
he was a foreigner'
While (ehru /ol#l, ;isite# frontlines in Kashmir #urin5 the
war <Pa+istans prime minister 9ia:uat $li Khan #are# not
;isit Kashmir till after )ease fire6E=treme left 4ri5a#ier
$+/ar Khan <the onl, Pa+istani o/ser;er who note# this fa)t
in his monumental /oo+ >"ai#ers in Kashmir>
,hat "ept the &a"istani political leadership from visiting the tribesmen who
had won a territory that to this day has been ruled by &a"istan is hard to
explain. -"bar 0han was not wrong once he said that fear prevented these
leaders from visiting 0ashmir while the war was on=<' >ia#uat eventually fell
victim of an assassin in 1991.
1ad he died because of enemy action while visiting 0ashmir, posterity would
have remembered him as a much greater man. -ccording to -"bar, Messervy
was the main culprit for spreading a fear of (ndian reaction in &a"istan -rmy.
@Messervy addressing a meeting of ).1.7 officers warned us against hostilities
with (ndia. 1e said that, in his opinion, in case of war (ndia would
overrun &a"istan within ten days: =1. Aompare this negative attitude with the
(sraeli -rmy which defeated far better armed and well organised -rab armies
in the 19+ ,ar. /ust =<,<<< /ews had served in the %ritish -rmy in the
second world war=6. More than ;<<,<<< Muslims, more than half of them from
areas which constituted
&a"istan had fought in the 4econd ,orld ,ar and yet the &a"istani leadership
was unwilling to stand on its own feet preferring the two unreliable %ritish
crutches i.e. Messervy and )racey' Mr /innah had already done too much for
the army by insisting on the division of (ndian -rmy, against tremendous
opposition on part of the %ritishers. $he great tragedy was that Mr /innah was
surrounded by men of zero military insight and devoid of all independent
judgement. $he 4ecretary of 3efence, Mirza being a man who had never fought
in actual war and the Muslim >eague politicians who were only good
followers'
)eneral -"bar 0han Bthen >ieutenant AolonelC met the tribals at Iri on +th
November .$he tribals #uestioned -"bar about why &a"istan )overnment was
behaving so spinelessly and not assisting them with artilleryFregular troop
support etc.-"bar 0han had no answer and tried to explain the legal position or
simply lac" of guts in the &a"istani political leadership and lac" of guts
in most the &a"istan -rmy:s Muslim officers, except few indomitable men li"e
Major $ommy Masud to ris" their commissions by disobeying orders of the
%ritish A*in*A and showing some initiative Bauthors opinion in italicsC ==.
-ccording to )eneral -"bar 0han the tribesmen were so demoralised and
disappointed by lac" of &a"istan -rmy support that they withdrew from the
frontline opposite %aramula on =1st .ctober and 1<th November, and
withdrew to Iri area, contemplating about returning to the tribal area=. 1ad
the (ndians possesses sufficient resolution or a commander with coup d oeil
there was nothing stopping them from capturing Muzaffarabad between =1st
.ctober and 1<th November. $he same viewpoint is advanced by the official
history=9.
$he probability that -"bar 0han who wrote the famous boo" @?aiders in
0ashmir: or Major -slam, whose personal account was one of the many
personal accounts used by the official historians who compiled the official
history dealing with operations in 0ashmir, were exaggerating their own role
cannot be ruled out. $here is one fact, however, that stands out as the crux of
the issue, and which still raises the stature of the tribesmen higher than both
-"bar or -slam2 i.e. the fact that the initial shoc" of the tribal onslaught
on 4rinagar was so traumatic that it imposed a @once bitten twice shy approach:
on the mind of the (ndian Aommanders. $his ensured that the (ndians despite
the absence of any tribals in front of them2 Bas Messrs -"bar and -slam allegeC
were in no mood to advance hurriedly towards Muzaffarabad after having
captured %aramula.
-fter 1<th November according to -"bar 0han the Mahsud and other
tribesmen returned and played a major role in stabilising the front between Iri
and Muzaffarabad=;.
-s one advances westwards from %aramula to Iri the /helum )orge becomes
narrower and the defenders tas" becomes easier while the attac"ers tas"
becomes more difficult. $he (ndian -rmy although supported by aircraft
artillery and armoured cars was too psychologically shattered to advance
rapidly westwards, despite the fact that most tribesmen were not fighting the
battle, at least temporarily few demolitions and a few snipers who were too
motivated to withdraw stopped the (ndian advance approximately = miles west
of Iri=!.
$he official &a"istani history is hell bent upon giving the credit for this to
-slam 0han, while -"bar 0han also claims the credit for having stopped the
(ndians. $he tribesmen who did the actual dirty wor" of fighting were never
consulted by the authors of the official account' $he start of snowfall from first
wee" of 3ecember ensured that no major fighting too" place between
3ecember 19! and -pril 19+.
,e must also remember that the tribals did the actual fighting between 6<th
.ctober and in November 19!,while boo"s were written by &a"istan -rmy
officers from 19!< onwards, some 6= years after the war. $he (ndian behaviour
after capture of Iri showed that their higher commanders lac"ed the initiative,
which was the only commodity re#uired to capture Muzafarabad as far as the
(ndians were concerned. (nstead the (ndians wasted three infantry
battalions,two artillery batteries and a s#uadron of armoured cars in passively
defending Iri=+.
$he (ndian problem li"e &a"istan -rmy as we shall see later, was not lac" of
valour, for there was plenty of valour at the lower level2 but lac" of
resolute leadership at the higher level. (n the same Iri area there was a living
legend of the pre*199 %ritish (ndian -rmy2 i.e. /emadar Nand 4ingh a
&unjabi 4i"h who Bas a Nai" in 1F11 4i"hsC had won the Gictoria Aross in
%urma at the %attle of %uthidang in -ra"an on 16th March 19 for having
cleared three /apanese foxholes singlehandedly=9. %ut there were no ?ommels
or Nicholsons or %luchers. $himaya who came to Iri area later was a little
better than other (ndian commanders, but his initiative was limited and "ept in
chec", by the higher military (ndian commanders.
$he battles around 4rinagar, although small in terms of size of forces
involved were the most crucial battles of the 0ashmir ,ar. %y 1=th
November when the (ndians captured Iri the remotest chance of any future
threat developing ever again to 4rinagar was removed. $he 4rinagar Galley was
the heartland of 0ashmir. &ossession of it meant that the (ndians could
reinforce and relieve its besieged garrisons at >eh, 4"ardu, &oonch. -ttac"
Muzaffarabad, $ithwal, 0argil and mount air attac"s on all supply routes
on Murree*Muzaffarabad*Iri ?oad, 0aghan*%abusar*Ahilas trac", all trac"s
and roads around &oonch etc.
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
$he next logical (ndian operational objective should have been to straight thrust
westwards from Iri to 3omel*Muzaffarabad and close the main raider point of
entry into 0ashmir. ,e have already seen that the (ndians were too
psychologically shattered to do so. (nstead they wasted their strength in various
relief operations which we will discuss in brief. 4ince 4eptember*.ctober
various 0ashmir 4tate 5orces garrisons consisting of 1indu 3ogra troops were
besieged all over the state by the tribals who had entered various parts
of 0ashmir and by local 0ashmiri Muslim militias of ex*,orld ,ar ((
veterans.
$he besieged garrisons were defended by numerically small forces and started
surrendering one by one2 %himbhar and Mendhar on =rd November, %agh was
abandoned by its non*Muslim garrison on 9th November which bro"e out to
join &oonch )arrison. ?ajauri was captured by the MilitiaF$ribals on 16th
November and ?awala"ot whose defenders managed to brea"out and join
&oonch around the same time<. (n various &a"istani and (ndian accounts both
sides accuse each other of atrocities against prisoner women and other non*
combatants.
( have deliberately avoided discussing these, since2 the subject of this boo" is
not ethics or human rights violation. ( am of the firm conviction that both sides
were guilty of this charge and both i.e. the $ribalsFMilitia and the
3ograsF(ndian -rmy were not angels or philanthropists by any definition2 the
best course being to accept the fact there were villains in higher proportion on
both sides as far as the Non*?egular 5orces i.e. 0ashmir 4tate 5orce and
$ribalsF0ashmiri Militia were concerned. (n mid*November the (ndians
brought another regular army brigade i.e. 6;+ (nfantry %rigade in 0ashmir.
$his brigade relieved 9< &ara %rigade which had been earlier located in
)urdaspur area and had entered 0ashmir in end .ctober of the defence of
/ammu -"hnur area. $he (ndians now planned a relief operation aimed at
relieving Mirpur &oonch and 0otli garrisons, two battalion size force Bfrom
1;1 %rigadeC was to move from Iri southwards to &oonch while a brigade size
force B9< &ara %rigadeC supported by a s#uadron of armoured cars of !th >ight
Aavalry which had joined it at /ammu on 9th November1, was to move from
/ammu northwards on axis /ammu*-"hnur*Nowshera*/hangar*0otli*Mirpur
relieving Mirpur right on the 0ashmir &a"istan border by 6<th November
19!.
$he (ndians were not wholly successful in executing this plan. $ribalFMilitia
resistance was tough and the terrain difficult, and the Iri force could not
relieve &oonch but managed to brea"through to it and reinforcing it with one
battalion. $he force attac"ing northwards from /ammu i.e. 9< &ara %rigade
succeeded in capturing Nowshera /hangar and relieving 0otli garrison on 6;th
November. 1owever, news of fall of Mirpur which had been captured by the
tribalsFmilitia on 69th November forced the (ndians to abandon 0otli, which
could not be defended, while Mirpur was in hostile hands. -round the end of
3ecember the (ndians inducted another regular army brigade in 0ashmir i.e.
the +< (nfantry %rigade in area Ahamb*-"hnur.
$his brigade captured Ahamb on 1<th 3ecember and had been captured by the
militia soon after the rebellion started in .ctober. (t may be noted that the 9<
&ara %rigade was commanded since end of November by %rigadier Isman an
(ndian Muslim officer who had decided to opt for the (ndian -rmy6. (ntense
fighting involving small size forces too" place in area %himbhar*/hangar*
Mirpur etc2 we will not discuss these minor actions since they did not have any
major impact on the overall strategic situation in 0ashmir.
Most important of these actions but of limited tactical conse#uence was
recapture of /hangar by the MilitiaF$ribals on 6 3ecember. (n mid*5ebruary
19+ the (ndians inducted 19 %rigade Bthree infantry battalionsC in Nowshera
area=.
(t may be noted that the (ndians were extra sensitive about the security
of /ammu and had deployed two s#uadrons of 4tuart >ight $an"s Bone from !th
>ight Aavalry and one from Aentral (ndia 1orseC at /ammu from 3ecember
onwards. (n addition a s#uadron of 4herman $an"s B3eccan 1orseC was
stationed first at 4amba on the &athan"ot*/ammu road from /anuary 19+ and
later moved to /ammu .
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
(t may be noted that the overall incharge of all (ndian -rmy operations
in 0ashmir was >ieutenant )eneral ?ussell in the capacity of )eneral .fficer
Aommanding in Ahief, 3elhi and &unjab Aommand. $his ?ussell performed
his tas" most religiously and ably in mar"ed contrast with the two inefficient
%ritish crutches employed by &a"istan i.e. Messervy and )racey. %ritish
government however had imposed a ban on ?ussell:s entry in 0ashmir, and
?ussell who was a brave man and a good soldier as"ed the (ndians to either lift
this ban or relieve him of his command. .nce the ban was not lifted the (ndians
replaced ?ussell by >ieutenant )eneral Aariappa on 6<th /anuary 19+9.
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
,e will now briefly deal with the )ilgit ?ebellion which led to the liberation
or capture of Northern -reas of 0ashmir 4tate by anti*Maharaja Muslim forces.
$he Northern areas comprised the areas of %altistan, )ilgit ,azarat and
>ada"h. )ilgit was leased to the %ritish in 19<1. $he %ritish had raised an all
Muslim para military force "nown as )ilgit 4couts under %ritish officers to
garrison the area and to act as a scout and early warning force against an
invasion from Azarist Aentral -sia. (n 19! once the %ritishers were
withdrawing from (ndia they returned the area to the 0ashmir 4tate.
$he area was all Muslim and 3ogra rule was unpopular. $he Maharaja sent a
new )overnor and some 0ashmir 4tate troops to ta"e over the area. .nce the
)ilgit 4couts realised that the 3ogras B0ashmir 4tateC were planning to disband
them;, they planned a rebellion against the 3ogra rule in which their two
%ritish officers i.e. Major %rown and Aaptain Mathieson who were dedicated
enough to identify themselves with their Muslim ran" and file also joined. $he
total strength of the )ilgit 4couts was 9+6 men!. $here were no 0ashmir
4tate 5orce troops at )ilgit the capital of the )ilgit -gency where the 3ogra
)overnor %rigadier )hansara 4ingh was housed.
$he nearest 0ashmir 4tate 5orce Init i.e. ;th /ammu and 0ashmir (nfantry
%attalion was at %unji =; miles south of )ilgit. $his unit had two companies
of &unjabi B0ashmiri Muslims from &oonch areaC Muslims and two of non*
Muslims. Bone 1indu 3ogra and one 4i"hC+. ,hen the 4couts received news
of accession of 0ashmir 4tate on 6+th .ctober, they planned a revolt and
executed their plans on th November capturing )ilgit and placing the 3ogra
)overnor )hansara 4ingh under arrest.
$he scouts also seized %unji without much effort since the non*Muslim troops,
who were overwhelmingly outnumbered, were too demoralised to put up a
fight. 4ome of them too" the great ris" of attempting to escape towards
4"ardu in 0ashmir 4tate territory or -stor on the )ilgit*%unji*4rinagar route,
however few of these reached 4"ardu. $he )ilgit 4couts initially proclaimed
an independent ?epublic, but later, probably "eeping in view the more
dangerous regular (ndian -rmy intervention threat2 decided to join &a"istan in
mid November.
(n order to understand accurately the nature of Northern -reas terrain, the
reader may note that within ;9 miles radius of )ilgit there are eight mountain
pea"s above 6,<<< feet including ?a"aposhi B6;,<9< feetC, and Nanga &arbat
B6;,;9< feetC and a large number of glaciers etc. )ilgit was about 6=1 miles
from 4rinagar the 0ashmir 4tate capital and a mountain trac"
connected 4rinagar*)ilgit, with the 1=,!+< high %urzil &ass, which was
snowbound from November to March in the middle.
$he other route to 0ashmir territory was the )ilgit*4"ardu trac" in
the (ndus valley which was little more than a mule trac" and was about 11+
miles long. -ll the rivers in the area were extremely swift, unfordable and
unnavigable except by ferry rafts made of inflated buffalo s"in and these also
re#uired great expertise and s"ill in order to be employed successfully part of
the non*Muslim garrison at %unji surrendered while some elements tried to
withdraw to 4"ardu in the 0ashmir 4tate territory or towards -stor on the
)ilgit*4rinagar route, but most were "illed or captured.
$he &a"istani )overnment sent >ieutenant Aolonel -slam 0han Bthe same
Major -slam of the 4rinagar operationC as overall commander of military
operations in Northern -reas. -slam 0han reached )ilgit in 3ecember 19!.
(t may be noted that in most &a"istani accounts written by either non*Northern
-reaF&unjabi etc officers all credit for the success of operations in the Northern
-rea is heaped on -slam 0han. 5rom 19!9 onwards when my father was
commanding a brigade group in Northern -reas and on various other occasions
when ( visited Northern -reas during the period 19!9*9! ( met various veterans
of 19+ war and #uestioned them about -slam:s role.
$he general consensus of opinion was that -slam had limited role in planning
or executing these operations and that the most active part in the planning and
execution was played by Major Ehsan B0ashmir 4tate 5orcesC and >ieutenant
4hah 0han B)ilgit 4coutsC but -slam being a regular army officer, having
excellent contacts, and because he was the overall commander robbed both of
all the credit. -slam had lobbied for the appointment and got it on the basis that
his father had served the 3ogras before 19! and that he "new the area.
-slam was by casteForigin a &athan2 but &unjabi spea"ing and was closer in
ethnic terms to the men who were associated with compilation of the official
history and 4hau"at ?iza2 who in his boo"s was subconsciously trying to
project the &unjabi Muslims as the only fighting race as far as &a"istan -rmy
was concerned. 5oreign readers are advised to treat -slam:s projection in the
official history and in 4hau"at ?iza:s account with a pinch of salt'
$he )ilgit 4couts and the Muslim companies of ;th /ammu and
0ashmir conducted their operations after the capture of )ilgitF%unji on three
axis. (t may be noted that following the fall of )ilgit, a large number of locals
of )ilgit and 1unza had volunteered for military service and the total strength
of the 4couts reached the figure of approximately 6,<<< men9.
$he (bex 5orce Bapprox. << menC was given the objective of advancing
on axis )ilgit*4"ardu under the indomitable Major Ehsan 0han2 with a view to
capturing 4"ardu which was held by a 3ogra battalion. $he $iger 5orce under
Aaptain 1assan 0han B<< menC was tas"ed to advance on axis %unji*0amri*
)urais*%andipura2 the axis which the (ndians were li"ely to adopt2 after the
snow melted in early 19+ to capture the Northern -reas. $he Es"imo 5orce
B<< menC under >ieutenant 4hah 0han was to move from -stor through the
snow bound and uninhabited 3eosai &lain above 1<,<<< feet and attac" 3ras*
0argil and Dojila &ass area from the rear severing the communications of the
3ogra garrisons holding 3ras*4"ardu and >eh with the 0ashmir
valleyF4rinagar area.
$he operations of the )ilgit 4couts in the Northern -reas are the most
fascinating and inspiring part of the entire 19!*+ ,ar, however, for lac" of
space we will discuss them in a very brief manner. $he (bex
5orce commenced its advance along northern ban" of (ndus river in end
/anuary 19+ and besieged the 3ogras at 4"ardu from 16 5ebruary. $he
3ogras were vastly outnumbered and their defeat2 "eeping in view numerical
disparity, limited supplies and distance from 4rinagar2 was a foregone
conclusion.
3espite all their tangible inferiority the 3ogras led by >ieutenant Aolonel 4her
/ang $hapa2 an extremely resolute commander and a very chivalrous human
being as far as treatment of non*combatants was concerned9< held on till 1th
-ugust 19+2 when 6<< of his garrison bro"e out towards 0argil, while 4her
/ang with the remainder 69< of his troops surrendered91. $he (ndians had
made many attempts to relieve 4"ardu, but these were foiled by the
4coutsFGolunteers who defeated the various (ndian relieving columns by
laying some very unconventional and brilliant ambushes on the 4"ardu*0argil
?oad.
3ras on the 0argil*4"ardu road was captured by the )ilgit 4couts on ;th /une
19!. (n /une the 4couts finally advanced towards Dojila &ass the gateway
to 4rinagar Galley from the east. Dojila &ass B11,9!+ ftC was captured by the
)ilgit 4couts under the leadership of >ieutenant 4hah 0han on !th /uly 19+.
$he )ilgit 4couts also advanced towards >eh about 1;< miles east of 4"ardu in
the (ndus valley, but could not capture it since, their relative numerical
inferiority, lac" of ade#uate logistic support and a majority of non*Muslim
population in the area, made the success of their operation doubtful.
%y mid*/uly the 4couts, without any regular army troops had liberated the
entire Northern -reas and had reached the administrative boundary of 4rinagar
district holding an area stretching in the west from outs"irts of %andipura <
miles north of 4rinagar, holding Dojila &ass ;6 miles east of 4rinagar and at
Nimu few miles west of >eh.
$he 4couts had achieved more than their actual potential warranted and could
only be praised for doing what they did. (t was not possible for the 4couts any
further, since an advance west south or east of the line they were holding
would have brought them into open territory, where high mountains and steep
cliffs and high altitude were no longer present to act as force multipliers and
where the (ndians could effectively employ their regular army supported by
modern artillery, aircraft, armoured cars and tan"s.
(To /e )ontinue# in part II in our a, issue6)
"eferen)e
1. &ages*6!1 J 6!6*4hau"at ?iza*$he &a"istan -rmy*19!*9*.p Ait.
6. &age*19* ?aiders in 0ashmir* Major )eneral -"bar 0han*5irst &ublished*19!<*?eprinted by /ang &ublishers*
>ahore*1996.
=. &age*= *Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
. &ages*699 , 69; J 69!* 1istory of the M-. Aollege -ligarh*4. 0 %hatnagar* 5irst &ublished*19;9*?eprintedK
19!9*%oo" $raders*&.. %ox 1+9*>ahore. >ia#uat and )hulam Bie )hulam MohammadC Da"ir 1ussain Blater (ndia:s
&residentC, Imar 1ayat Mali" Blater an ambassadorC authors paternal grandfather Bfrom (ndian 4ecretariat
4erviceFMinistry of 3efenceC were contemporaries at the M-. Aollege -ligarh during 191;*1919. )hulam
Mohammad excelled in academics and was awarded the Morison Medal for being the best student in M-
Economics.Imar 1ayat Mali" again excelled in academics and was awarded the Arosthwaite Medal for being the best
student in %- Mathematics. Da"ir 1ussain was awarded the (#bal Medal for being the best Muslim student in
the -llahabad Iniversity examinations. Da"ir 1ussain was the Gice &resident of the M-. Aollege 4tudents Inion
B4iddon:s InionC 191+ while the author:s grandfather Mohammad -min was also an office*bearer in the same body
with the appointment of >ibrarian B?efers )roup &hotograph of 4tudents Inion 191+ facing page* =61C. Nawabzada
>ia#uat was noted for hospitality in throwing parties B&age*696C. (t appears that )hulam Mohammad later made good
use of the M-. Aollege old boy net with >ia#uat in the &a"istani cabinet. %y 1991 later however as per >ia#uat:s
4ecretary2 >ia#uat was planning to sac" )hulam. )hulam was a 0a""ezai from /ullundhur born in >ahore. $he readers
may note that the M-. Aollege at this time was a meeting place of all Muslim Alasses. >ia#uat being a rich
Nawabzada from 0arnal. $he authors grandfather being from a ruralFservice bac"ground Bson of an official of the
&unjab &oliceC was born at 3inga in 1+9; and received his basic education from )ujrat, /helum Ahauntra )ujar 0han
and 4atiana and finally joined the M-. Aollege in 191= coming all the way from a remote village of >yallpur near
4atiana. Imar 1ayat was from a &unjabi feudal bac"ground and )hulam from a &unjabi urban bac"ground.
9. 5actsF (nformation given in this paragraph is based on the details given in the following accountsFboo"sLK &age*
61 ,619 and 61; $he Nation that >ost (ts 4oul KMajor 4ardar 4hau"at 1ayat 0han B?etiredC*/ang &ublishers*
>ahore*1999 , &ages* 19, 6<, 61, 66, 6=, 6 and 69* ?aiders in 0ashmir*.p Ait and pages K9+, 99 and ;< * $he
0ashmir Aampaign*19!*+ K1istorical 4ection*)eneral 4taff %ranch*)eneral 1ead#uarters*?awalpindi*3ecember
19!<. $he reader must note that the 0ashmir Aampaign was a very meticulously written boo", not in terms of analysis,
because of being an official history, but in layout, presentation of facts and in terms of continuity and clarity. 4hau"at
?iza simply reproduced a large number of maps from this boo" without bothering to improve them' Aompare this boo"
with 4hau"at ?iza:s relatively substandard triology on &a"istan -rmy history, and one can safely conclude that the
#uality of intellect and efficiency as far as producing military history wor"s was higher in the &a"istani )17 in 19!<
than in 19+;*9< when 4hau"at ?iza assisted by a whole team of staff officers and with the blessings of Dia and of two
of Dia:s Gice Ahiefs of -rmy 4taffs produced his monumental three boo"s on what the &a"istan -rmy did, or did not
do' (t is important to note that both the official history and -"bar:s boo" were published in 19!<. -"bar wrote his boo"
after reading the official history which disgusted him' &ublication of -"bar:s boo" was made possible only because of
-yub:s exit from power. 3uring -yub:s government an unofficial ban was imposed on all boo"s .
;. &age*=9*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
!. &age*=;*(bid.
+. &age*61;*4ardar 4hau"at 1ayat*.p Ait.
9. (bid.
1<. &ages*=9, < J 1*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
11. &age*6*(bid and &age*6*-"bar 0han*.p Ait.
16. &ages*< J 1*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
1=. &age*==* ?eport of November !, 19!* Mountbatten:s @$op 4ecret: &ersonal ?eports as Giceroy of (ndiaK(ndia
.ffice >ibrary*>F&.F==. &age*19* >oo"ing %ac"* Mehr Ahand Mahajan* -sia &ublishing 1ouse >ondon*19;=* and
&ages*91 J 96*5azal ( Mu#ueem*.p Ait.
1. &age*==*Mountbatten $op 4ecret ?eport*.p Ait.
19. &age*119*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
1;. &age*19*Mehr Ahand Mahajan*.p Ait.
1!. &age*= of @-c"nowledgementM 4ection where 4hau"at ?iza than"ed all those who assisted him in writing the boo"
and read the draft of the boo"'*4hau"at ?iza*.p Ait. $hese are )enerals 0.M -rif, Mirza -slam %eg, Dia ul 1a# etc.
1+. &ages*6 , = J *Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait and &ages*;; J ;!*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
19. &age**0.A &raval*.p Ait.
6<. &age**Major )eneral -"bar 0han*.p Ait and &age*; * 4eptember ;9 K%efore and -fter K%rigadier -mjad -li
0han Ahaudhry*5erozesons >ahore*19!!. -"bar 0han was born in 3ecember 1916 and joined the ?oyal Military
-cademy 4andhurst after studying at (slamia Aollege &eshawar. Aommissioned in 19=, he joined 1st 1ampshire
?egiment and subse#uently the 55 ?ifles. 4aw active service in ,aziristan operations B19=!*=+C and in ,, $wo
in %urma in the 6<th (ndian 3ivision where he was awarded the 34.. - man of immense drive -"bar while a
lieutenant colonel served as one of the members of @-rmy 4ub*Aommittee: which supervised the process of division
of the (ndian -rmy. -fter partition -"bar too" over as 3eputy 3irector ,eapon and E#uipment 3irectorate till 19+
when he was posted full time in 0ashmir. 1e was unofficially associated as a volunteer with the 0ashmir ,ar right
from .ctober 19!. 1e was described by 4hau"at ?iza as @an impatient man with an almost uncomfortable drive and
initiative: B4ee * page*19+*4hau"at ?iza*19!*199*.p AitC something which most &a"istani senior officers of that
time as well as till to date terribly lac"' -"bar commanded the 1<1 %rigade in the 0ashmir ,ar where he conceived
and executed the &andu operation which was described in &a"istani .fficial history published in 19!<, nineteen years
after -"bar had been dismissed and sentenced to /ail2 asL one of the most humiliating (ndian defeat in which one
complete (ndian battalion was wiped out B4eeKpage*6<!*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p AitC. -"bar was anti* %ritish and
thus disli"ed by %ritish officers who held the highest posts in the army of the so*called independent (slamic state till
199<' -"bar was, however, promoted to the ran" of Major )eneral and Ahief of )eneral 4taff of the &a"istan -rmy in
3ecember 199<. -"bar was disgusted with the timid policies of the &a"istani political leadership and planned a coup
but was arrested in March 199<. -"bar:s arrest led to reduction of the &a"istani officer:s status in legal terms to that of
a cler"2 ma"ing him vulnerable to dismissal from service without any reason2 as a result of the new laws instituted by
&rime Minister >ia#uat. -"bar and a large number of officers and some civilians were tried by a secret court and
sentenced to fourteen years jail. -"bar served his jail term for four years till 1999 on bail by the high court on a habeas
corpus petition. -"bar #ualified as a lawyer in 19; and practised law from 19;+ at 0arachi. 1e became %hutto:s
National 4ecurity -dvisor in 19!6 and played an instrumental role in sac"ing )eneral )ul 1assan and the -ir Ahief.
%hutto later became aprehensive about -"bar and sent him abroad to Azechoslova"ia as an ambassador. -"bar died
in 0arachi in 199<. -"bar was a thorough bred &athan but married in >ahore:s famous %aghbanpura -rain family of
4ir Mohammad 4hafi. -s a result he came in contact with various &unjabi intellectuals li"e the great poet 5aiz, Mazhar
-li 0han etc. .ne of -"bar:s associates was the indomitable Major (sha# who fought against the NA type stin"ing
hypocrite /ullundhuri usurper Dia and spent a great part of his life in jail .
61. &age**Major )eneral -"bar 0han*.p Ait.
66. &age*;*%rigadier -mjad Ahaudhry*.p Ait.
6=. &age*9*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait and &age*6!;* $he (ndian -rmour*1istory of the (ndian -rmoured Aorps*191*
19!1KMajor )eneral )urcharan 4ingh 4andhu*Gision %oo"s*3elhi*199.
6. &age*;+*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
69. &age*96*Major )eneral -"bar 0han*.p Ait.
6;. (bid.
6!. &age*;*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
6+. &age*!*(bid.
69. &ages*1!9 J 1!;*?aiders in 0ashmir*.riginal Edition*&a" &ublishers >imited*0arachi*19!<.
=<. &ages*1! J 1!9*(bid.
=1. &ages*9< J 91*(bid.
=6. &age*1+* $he -rab (sraeli ,ars K Ahaim 1erzog*Gintage %oo"s*?andom 1ouse*New Nor"*19+.
==. &ages*9; J 9!*Major )eneral -"bar 0han*?aiders in 0ashmir* 1996 Edition*.p Ait.
=. &ages*96 J 9= to ;;*(bid.
=9. &ages*;+ J ;9*(bid.
=;. &ages*;! J ;+*(bid.
=!. &age*;9*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
=+. &age*6!+*$he (ndian -rmour*.p Ait.
=9. &age*9<=*&hilip Mason*.p Ait.
<. &ages* !; ,!! , !+ J !9*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait and &ages*! J +*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
1. &age*6+1*$he (ndian -rmour*.p Ait.
6. &age*9;*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
=. &ages*6+ J 6+9*$he (ndian -rmour*.p Ait and &age*;*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
. &age*6+6*$he (ndian -rmour*.p Ait.
9. &ages*9+ J 99*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
;. &ages* J 9*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
!. &age*9*(bid.
+. &age*691*4hau"at ?iza*.p Ait*
9. &age*1<*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
9<. &age*=<*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
91. (bid
P$"T TW8
?rom November onwards when %rigadier -"bar 0han was tas"ed to organise militias in 0ashmir,
greater reliance was placed on recruiting ex servicemen from &oonch and %agh area. %efore the
4econd ,orld ,ar a large number of troops in the &unjabi Muslim class in the (ndian -rmy were
from &oonch and %agh areas of 0ashmir 4tate.3uring the 4econd ,orld ,ar ;9,=;6 men were
recruited for the (ndian -rmy.%ased on the fact that total 3ogra recruitment in the war Bincluding
those from 0angraFNurpur in &unjabC was 69,996 one can safely conclude that more than !9 8 of
these were 0ashmiri Muslims B4udhansF0ianis etcC from &oonch, %agh, %himbhar, ?ajauri
etc.,hile tribesmen already in 0ashmir since .ctober 19! and fresh volunteers from tribal
area once again started returning to the frontline from end November,more 0ashmiri ex servicemen
were recruited and armed with old rifles issued by the &a"istani )17. $he ex (N- officers led all the
officers in fighting and proved that the (N- was not as bad a lot as 4hau"at ?iza was to paint in his
boo" much later 9=.
/hangar was captured by the -zad MilitiaF$ribesmen on 6th 3ecember 19!9 . %y evening of 69th
3ecember the same men who had captured /hangar besieged the (ndian force at Nowshera, but failed
to capture it. Nowshera was of crucial strategic significance and the (ndians gave it very high priority
as a strategic point. >oss of it could deny the (ndians with a southern approach to relieve &oonch at a
future stage. $he militias bypassed Nowshera but lac" of artillery and air support ensured that
Nowshera remained in (ndian hands.>ater failure of the Militia to capture and hold Nowshera proved
to be the first (ndian stepping stone to the final relief of &oonch. $he fighting in /hangar* Nowshera
area was of little significance in strategic terms.$he mountains here were lower than !,<<< ft unli"e
4rinagar*Iri and Northern areas and the local militias had more difficulty in contesting advance of
regular (ndian -rmy troops supported by artillery aircrafts and armour.
$hus by 1!th March the (ndians launched a two brigade attac" and recaptured /hangar. (t may be
noted that (ndians made much greater progress in area /ammu*/hangar*?ajauri because unli"e the
area in the north which restricted effective employment of armour and regular units by virtue of
mountains above ;,<<< feet the terrain in the south consisted of mountains which were below 9,<<<
feet and where few odd snipers sitting on the mountain tops could not stop whole brigades.(t still
spea"s very poorly of the (ndian -rmy that despite having aircrafts tan"s armoured cars and modern
artillery and no regular troops to oppose them, their progress in the south was not as fast as should
have been.
$he next logical (ndian objective was ?ajauri, a town of strategic importance on the road from
/ammu to &oonch and of vital importance for any future operation to relieve the (ndian garrison at
&oonch.?ajauri had been liberated by the 0ashmiri Militia under one Major ?ahmatullah in
November 19!99. $wo battalions of the Militia Bcalled -zadsC had been raised from the many ex
soldiers in the area.
>oss of /hangar and withdrawal of -zad forces besieging Nowshera meant that the Militia at ?ajauri
could not be effectively reinforced or replenishedFsupplied by the main Militia forces in %himbhar*
/hangar area.$hus the (ndians were successful in capturing ?ajauri, which was captured by a tan"
s#uadron of Aentral (ndia 1orse entirely on its own on 16 -pril 9;. $he culprit for this serious
strategic loss was not the militia but the &a"istani government who had left the Militia to fight the
(ndian tan"s with bolt action rifles' >ater ?ajauri proved (ndian -rmy:s springboard for the final
relief of &oonch. -bsence of &a"istan -rmy support between .ctober 19! and May 19+ ensured
that (ndians occupied the entire area between Nowshera and &oonch.
(t may be noted that by -pril 19+ the (ndians had two complete armoured regiments and one
s#uadron of a third regiment in 0ashmir. $he !th >ight Aavalry had two s#uadrons of armoured cars
in 4rinagar*Iri area and its third s#uadron of 4tuart $an"s at -"hnur. $he Aentral (ndia 1orse had a
s#uadron each at /hangar and Nowshera and a third s#uadron near /ammu.$he 3eccan 1orse had a
s#uadron minus of 4hermans at /ammu and one troop at Ahamb9!. ?ajauri and /hangar were not
captured by valour alone but by tan"s against men armed with bolt action rifles,while &a"istani
armour was doing nothing across the border'
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
(n -pril 19+ the (ndians launched an attac" which at last forced &a"istan:s unassertive civilian
leadership to finally convince the %ritish crutch that they had employed to finally commit the
&a"istan -rmy into 0ashmir. %y this time Nehru had already sac"ed the first %ritish Ahief of the
(ndian -rmy i.e. )eneral 4ir ?ob >oc"hart,0.A.%,A.(..E ,M.A for inefficiency in conducting the
(ndian -rmy operations in 0ashmir9+.
Mr /innah possessed an iron will imprisoned in a very wea" body2unfortunately to balance this
deficiency his prime minister and the entire cabinet possessed stronger bodies but much wea"er
spirits. (n 191! after the %olshevi"s were successful in ?ussia,$rots"y a total civilian organised the
?ed -rmy from a scratch employing communist party members as commissars and ex Azarist
officers at gunpoint to fight a civil war against more experienced armies led by generals and assisted
by the entire might of the victors of the first world war i.e. %ritain and 5rance.
$hus the ?ed -rmy the brainchild of a civilian defeated far more experienced troops of the ,hite
-rmy who enjoyed the full military and economic support of %ritain in a savage civil war lasting over
four years B191+*66C.
Mr /innah the founder of &a"istan was as great a man as >enin or Mao,but was not assisted by a
capable and motivated team.$he &a"istan -rmy had fought no crippling war li"e the ?ussian -rmy in
191+ i.e. one in which the ?ussian -rmy had lost more than 91,9<,<<< casualties
including 1!,<<,<<< "illed99. &a"istan was not the result of a revolution but a constitutional transfer
of power. %ut Mr /innah was li"e a piece of roc" in empty space,a lone lighthouse in a sea of
mediocrity.
Mr /innah:s advisers, all his handpic"ed colleagues including the &rime Minister lac"ed independent
judgement and resolution to advise him successfully into committing the regular &a"istan -rmy
in 0ashmir' -part from Mr /innah no other &a"istani politician possessed the courage to spur,
prod or overrule the %ritish A*in*A the way men li"e Nehru and &atel did in (ndia. 998
of Muslim politicians who constituted the Aabinet including the &rime Minister had never
participated in any serious anti*%ritish political movement before independence and had never been
to jail unli"e 9<8 of Aongress leaders'
998 of them except Mr /innah had not even openly and directly criticised the %ritish government
inside the relative safety of the floors of pre 19! (ndian >egislative -ssembly' $he situation was an
exact reflection of the total net bac"wardness and passiveness of (ndian Muslims in terms of overall
leadership. Mr /innah was the only exception 2but there was no one in his lieutenants who possessed
even 98 of /innah:s ability or strength of character. $hus political genius was not institutionalised in
the (ndian Muslims.(n contrast Nehru relatively spea"ing had a much better team.
$here was no full time 3efence Minister and the 4ecretary 3efence, the seniormost
&a"istani Muslim who could have correctly advised Mr /innah was apology of a fighting soldier'
4i"andar Mirza had never fought any war or commanded even a company, and was more of an
authority on arranging coc"tail parties moonlight picnics;< or in tribal area double cross and
factional intrigue than the art of war' $hus the &a"istan -rmy lost half of 0ashmir without ever
having entered it'
,hile /hangar, ?ajauri and Iri was lost,the &a"istani )overnment was not stirred to move an inch.
$he (ndian capture of ?ajauri 9 "ilometre north of Nowshera finally forced )racey to conclude that
unless &a"istan -rmy intervened in 0ashmir, &a"istan:s security would be endangered and
additionally &a"istan could face a serious refugee problem and a major loss of morale as far as the
army:s ran" and file were concerned;1. %ut even here )racey played the double game,ie in ordering
the !th division commanded by a %ritisher i.e. Major )eneral >oftus $ottenham into 0ashmir
.$he first &a"istan -rmy formation to go into 0ashmir was the 1<1 %rigade;6. $he 1<1 &a"istani
%rigade was the first regular army formation to enter 0ashmir.$his act of singular decisiveness too"
place in May 19+. .ne battalion each from this brigade went to Iri and Muzaffarabad*0ohala*%agh
area,while one company Blater replaced by a battalionC went to $ithwal;=.
(n early May 19+ the (ndian -rmy in 0ashmir was reorganised.$wo 3ivisional head#uarters were
created,the northern being 4ri 3ivision Blater 19 (nfantry 3ivisionC under Major )eneral $himaya
B34. of %urma and the only (ndian to command an infantry brigade in actual operations in the 6nd
,orld ,arC2 and the southern with head#uarters at /ammu and "nown as /- 3ivision Blater 6;
(nfantry 3ivisionC.&ir &anjals crest was the inter division boundary, but &oonch though south of &ir
&anjal for sometime stayed under command 4ri 3ivision.
$he /-0 5orce head#uarters was abolished;. $himaya the 19 3ivision Aommander planned an
offensive against Muzafarabad employing two brigades2ie 1;1 %rigade on Iri 3omel axis B
battalions and one armoured car s#uadronC and the newly formed 1;= %rigade on axis 0upwara*
Ahow"ibal*$ithwal Bthree battalions and one s#uadronC.
$he !! &ara %rigade which had reached 4rinagar in first wee" of May was tas"ed to defend Iri*
Mahura area.$he (ndian plan was ambitious and extremely difficult terrain dictated that both the
thrusts ,despite numerical superiority and support of armour Bwhich had almost zero room for
manoeuvreC would not succeed.
$he Iri*3omel approach is very narrow with mountains above !,<<< ft on both sides,while the
supply route to $ithwal ran across the =,<+ metre high Nastachun &ass.(t is human that both (ndian
and &a"istani accounts reduced the influence of situational factors li"e terrain and numerical
superiority when they succeeded and increased it when they failed,success being ascribed by
historians on both side to superior ideology or martial fervour'
,hile $himaya was busy finalising his plans for a summer offensive the &a"istani )17 had finally
ta"en a decision to commit !th 3ivision in 0ashmir.$he !th 3ivision had three brigades i.e. 1<
%rigadeB-bbottabad areaC,1<1 %rigade B0ohatC and the 69 %rigade B?awalpindiC. 69 %rigade was
inducted in area Mirpur in May 19+;9. ,hile 1< %rigade and 1<1 %rigade entered the war in
$ithwal and Iri 4ectors as we shall see in the following paragaraph.
(nitially 1<1 %rigade was loo"ing after both $ithwal and Iri sectors but soon 1< %rigade too" over
$ithwal 4ector while 1<1 %rigade area of responsibility was confined to %agh*Iri sector ;;.
-dvance of the 1;= %rigade which commenced from 1+F19 May was rapid since the militia were not
expecting a brigade across a 9,<<< ft high mountain, however, the advance made no progress after
having reached $ithwal which was captured on 6= May.$he only troops in front of the 1;= %rigades
leading battalion was a regular company of &a"istan -rmy which had finally decided to enter
0ashmir.$his was, however, soon reinforced by two more companies and finally by the whole 1<
%rigade by =<th May;! .
$hus the chances of any further (ndian advance on this axis were frustrated.$he other (ndian thrust
on Iri*3omel axis made limited progress.
1ere they were opposed by a regular &a"istan -rmy formation i.e. the 1<1 %rigade.$he (ndians
succeeded in capturing &andu which was 91!+ ft high on 69 May, however, beyond &andu the
(ndian advance petered out and nothing of any strategic conse#uence was gained as far as the 19
3ivision offensive was concerned. $himaya inducted the second brigade i.e. the !! &ara %rigade also
but little was accomplished.$he (ndians were to claim later that they were capable;+ of advancing till
Muzaffarabad but were restrained from doing so by their government';9 4uch claims are a typical
reflection of the character of (ndo*&a" people regardless of religion or race and should be treated with
a pinch of salt specially by foreigners .
4imilar claims were made by &a"istani authors about &oonch!< and .peration Genus!1. $he
supposed facts that victory was so close and yet these noble commanders2 as (ndians and &a"istani
authors have claimed mee"ly obeyed their governments2merely prove how timid and orders oriented
these military commanders were.
4arrail the 5rench )eneral had disobeyed an order to abandon Gerdun in ,, .ne!6 and history
vindicated his act of disobedience, so did >yautuey when ordered to abandon 5rench -lgeria in ,,
.ne!= and 5rancois a similar order to attac" in a wrong direction at $annenberg!'
$he history of warfare is full of examples where military commanders disobeyed orders and won
battles !9, but if one wants to study how victory Bthat is if there is a grain of truth in what &a"istani
and (ndian authors assertC was not gained by obeying orders,it is (ndian and &a"istan -rmies that
provide classic examples of such cases. $hese officers had joined the army as mercenaries of a
subject race. Many were ex ran"ers and had achieved the ultimate aim of their life 2ie attaining officer
ran"'
$his narrative would not be complete in case we do not briefly discuss the battle of &andu which
though of negligible strategic significance, tactically greatly improved the defence of the &a"istani
position west of Iri.&andu was as we have already seen a 9<<< ft plus high feature which dominated
the &a"istani held position at Aha"othi on the main Iri 3omel road.
$he 1<1 %rigade executed a brilliant attac" by infiltration in which two &a"istani infantry units
completed infiltration in two days and recaptured &andu on 6 /uly!;.
.n the strategic level this battle is of no conse#uence,but at a much more crucial level i.e. in terms of
morale of troops this battle had tremendous significance for &a"istan -rmy.
$he &a"istan -rmy had fought its first major battle against (ndians in a situation where one brigade
was pitched against two as far as the overall situation in the sector was concerned2 a case of success
in face of considerable numerical and tremendous terrain odds.
$he &andu -ttac" by infilitration operation
$he position was held by an (ndian battalion of %ihar ?egiment.$he %iharis were not considered
good soldier material by the %ritish after 1+9! since the 1indu ?ajputs and %rahmans of %ihar who
were widely recruited in the old %engal -rmy had ta"en a very prominent part in the 4epoy
?ebellion'
$he %iharis were recruited once again after a long time as infantry soldiers only in the 4econd ,orld
,ar, because the manpower reserves of &unjab etc could not "eep pace with the extremely heavy
demands of the %urma 5ront. $he historian of the (ndian -rmoured Aorps, a thoroughbred 4i"h, /at,
&unjabi without naming the %ihar regiment just drily noted that &andu was lost because it was held
by an inexperienced battalion!!. $he battle served as a good morale booster for the troops and
younger officers and imposed caution on the (ndian -rmy.$he plan to capture &andu !+ and
overseeing its execution in all stages was the achievement of %rigadier -"bar 0han one of the very
few Muslim officers of the &a"istan -rmy to get the 34. in ,, $wo and probably the only 34.
holder who reached the ran" of %rigadier!9 as far as &a"istan -rmy was concerned.
$he &a"istan -rmy:s appearance in 0ashmir did not lead to any spectacular results.$he fatal state of
indecision which had plagued &a"istani political leadership during the period .ctober 19!*May
19+ had ensured that &a"istan -rmy:s introduction could at best stabilise the frontier and little else
at best and still lose some more territory which had been captured by the )ilgit
4coutsFMilitiaF$ribals.5rom May 19+ till 3ecember 19+ two major strategic victories were won by
the (ndian -rmy. $hese were strategic in the sense that although 0ashmir was not entirely captured
but (ndian hold on two major portions of 0ashmir i.e. the >ada"h and &oonch areas which was in
doubt till November 19+ was at last ensured. .n the other hand &a"istani political leadership
conducted the war half*heartedly and did not spur or goad )racey into launching any major offensive.
$he !th 3ivision which was responsible for the only sector where a decision could have been
favourably achieved was under a %ritisher who was not really "een to do anything. $he &a"istani
political leadership did not convey any interest in the war and neither the &rime Minister nor any of
his ministers ever visited the battlefront at any time during the entire war from .ctober 19! till
the last bullet had been fired on =1 3ecember 19+' -"bar 0han who had proved his mettle was not
promoted to 3ivisional command since the %ritish officers disli"ed him.
$oday it is fashionable in &a"istan to hold that (ndians were in any case superior and &a"istan could
not have captured 0ashmir.$his is merely a distortion of facts.$he simple point to be "ept in mind is
that had the &a"istani political leadership been courageous enough to override )racey. .ne &a"istani
%rigade supported by a s#uadron of armoured cars could have accomplished in .ctober 19!, what
two 3ivisions in /uly 19+ failed to do.
$he initial situation was extremely fluid and favoured &a"istan,but the golden opportunities were
missed and every minute of inaction on &a"istan:s part enabled (ndia to augment its strength in the
valley. $he #uestion was not of material or numerical superiority in .ctober 19!, but of greater
resolution and OAoup d .eilP to seize the critical time span by the foreloc". Mr /innah saw the
opportunity but was not supported by his team and what was lost in a moment was lost to eternity.
$hree &a"istani 3ivisions were committed to permanent )uard 3uty in 0ashmir for five more
decades and the (ndian threat factor was rationalised as an excuse by Messrs -yub and Ao to
ma"e &a"istan a beautiful girl which was ready to sell herself to the highest bidder at a very low
price during the period 199*;9.
$he (ndians launched a lin" up operation with &oonch from the south between 1 and 66 /une and
made a temporary lin" up,carrying some supplies but were forced to fall bac" on 69F=< /une because
of inade#uate troops to guard their communications+< .
5ighting in $ithwal and Iri sectors became stabilised after /une and no side made any significant
gains till cease fire in 3ecember 19+. %y the end of May &a"istan inducted 1<< %rigade in area
Mendhar*Ahamb. $his %rigade relieved the 69 %rigade which was previously loo"ing after this
sector+1.
69 %rigade was freed from this additional burden and tas"ed only with the &oonch sector. ; -zad
%rigade Bcomposed of militia battalionsC was also deployed in &oonch sector.&a"istan also inducted
1<6 %rigade in %agh area from 1! /uly+6. $his brigade relieved 1<1 %rigade of the defence of this
area freeing 1<1 %rigade to ta"e care of only the crucial Iri 4ector.%y November 19+ the &a"istan
-rmy in 0ashmir was organised as follows +=LK
9 0I@I7I8(AB1ead#uarters at -bbottabad and 1< %rigade B1< %rigade earlier holding $ithwal
4ector had been redeployed at ?awalpindi as strategic reserveC holding $ithwal 4ector,1<1 %rigade
Iri 4ector,1<6 %rigade in %agh 4ector,69 %rigade in 1ajira B&oonchC 4ector.
7 0I@I7I8(AB1ead#uarters at ?awalpindi and 1<< %rigade in /hangar 4ector,1 &ara %rigade
Bmoved forward from >ahoreC in %himbhar area and =rd -rmoured %rigade in )ujrat -rea.
$he remaining borders of &a"istan south of 0ashmir were held by the + 3ivision which was
responsible for the entire border from %ahawalpur to 4indhF%alochistan and the 1< 3ivision which
was responsible for the border from 4ial"ot till >ahoreFMultan+.
$he 1< 3ivision had one brigade each at >ahore and 4ial"ot +9.
$he (ndians also reorganised their command structure in the beginning of 4eptember 19+.
&reviously the 4ri and /ammu 3ivisions had been operating independently of each other.Now a co*
ordinating corps head#uarters was established and designated as the 9th Aorps Bsubse#uently as 19th
AorpsC under >ieut )eneral 4hrinagesh+;. Aariappa as we have earlier discussed was the overall
commander as ).A ,estern Aommand.
$he first (ndian major strategic success in 19+ was the final relief of &oonch.,e have already seen
that &oonch since November 19! had been besieged by -zad militiaF$ribals and later since May
19+ these forces had been joined by &a"istan -rmy:s 69 %rigade.$wo 0ashmir 4tate 5orce
battalions and one regular (ndian -rmy battalion which had managed to brea" through the siege from
Iri &oonch axis constituted the 1<1 (ndian %rigade holding &oonch.
$he (ndians regularly replenished &oonch by air till 4eptember 19+ since they could land 3a"otas at
the airstrip or airdrop supplies while &a"istan -irforce which had only 16 fighter aircrafts+! could
not contest (ndian air superiority.$he (ndians gradually increased their numerical superiority in the
area and brought in one more brigade i.e. 6;+ (nfantry %rigade which had ta"en over part of frontage
held the 9< &ara %rigade in /hangar area in /uly.++
Effective utilisation of artillery by &a"istani forces surrounding rendered the &oonch airstrip
inoperational and forced the (ndians to finally go for a relief operation +9. ,e will discuss this in a
little more detail since it illustrates how very few guns or armoured cars influenced the conduct of
war in 0ashmir and how an odd artillery gun or two or a s#uadron of armour could completely alter
an operational situation in 0ashmir./ust two 69 &ounder )uns9< influenced the conduct of (ndian
operations in 19+ in a decisive manner.
$hese guns one 69 &ounder and one ; &ounder according to 4hau"at ?iza91 and two 69 &ounders
according to -mjad Ahoudhry which fired for the first time on ;th 4eptember 19+96 and rendered
use of &oonch airstrip impossible for the (ndian supply aircrafts were cited by (ndians9= as the
principal reason for the (ndian decision to underta"e the final relief of &oonch and extension
of (ndian control over the entire area between ?ajauri and &oonch.
$he incident illustrates that in mountain warfare even few artillery guns anti tan" guns tan"s or
armoured cars could decisively tilt the whole outcome of an operation into success or failure. -bove
all it proves that it was possible for the &a"istani )17 to prevent the final relief of &oonch by
shifting few more guns or units armed with anti tan" guns and supported by artillery while the (ndians
had not yet captured ?ajauri.
$he &a"istani )17 on the other hand was sent repeated reports by Aommander 69 %rigade about
(ndian intentions against &oonch9 but too" no counteraction either to reinforce 69 %rigade or to
embar" on any operation planned to reduce the chances of the expected (ndian attempt to relieve
&oonch.
4omehow )racey sitting in &indi assumed that somehow (ndians would never be able to relieve
&oonch and that was it. No effort was made to economise troops in one sector and shift them to
reinforce &oonch or to ma"e any threatening posture to force the (ndians to abandon their planned
attac" on &oonch.
$he official history is silent about this aspect but merely comments that a plan was made in
4eptember to launch an attac" in 3ecember 19+ or /anuary 199 to capture &oonch99. $he sentence
provides an indication about the relaxed manner in which )racey and Ao were conducting the war in
0ashmir.(t also shows that the political leadership i.e. the &rime Minister, his cabinet Bwhether
&unjabi or any other ethnic groupC and his defence secretary were in no hurry to prod the %ritisher
they had hired to do nothing.$he lac" of energy perception and independent judgement on part of the
political leadership as far as higher direction of war doomed the &a"istani military cause in 0ashmir.
1ow could a brigadier or colonel or a soldier who had the drive determination and the potential to
fight well do so while the the -rmy A in A and the 3ivisional Aommander were two non*interested
foreigners who "new that no one in the &a"istani political leadership possessed the moral courage or
the assertiveness to spur and prod them,or to sac" them despite proven lethargy in the conduct of
operations' -t one place between the lines the official historian did ma"e an attempt to show this
lethargic attitude when he said that two companies of the 69 brigade which were available for an
attac" on &oonch were at /helum and 0ohatB more than ;< and 19< miles west and south of &oonchC'
9;
$here were three alternative routes from which &oonch could be relieved i.e. the Iri*1aji &ir*&oonch
approach from the north,the /hangar*0otli*&oonch approach from the south west and the Nowshera*
?ajauri*&oonch approach from the south east. 9 (nfantry %rigade which reached ?ajauri on 6<th
.ctober 9! was specially brought into 0ashmir for ta"ing part in the final relief of &oonch$he (ndian
plan to relieve &oonch envisaged employment of two brigades attac"ing from general area ?ajauri*
Nowshera and was based on a deception plan to deceive the MilitiaF&a"istan -rmy troops about the
direction of main attac".&ir %adesar a 9=< ft high feature dominating both /hangar*Nowshera Galley
to its east and 4eri Galley to its west was to be attac"ed and captured by 6;+ (nfantry %rigade
about three wee"s before the main attac" was to be launched.
$he objective of this preliminary manoeuvre apart from securing the subse#uent advance by
capturing a dominating objective was also to deceive the &a"istanis into thin"ing that the main attac"
would come on axis Nowshera*0otli*&oonch.$he main attac" towards &oonch involved an advance
on two axis by the 19 and 9 (nfantry %rigades along axis ?ajauri*%himbhar )ali*Mendhar*$opa with
19 %rigade on the left and 9 %rigade on the right. $he deception plan envisaged a feint
attac" towards 0otli from &ir %adesar by 6;+ (nfantry %rigade,and another from 0ailash towards
$hana MandiB the route of (ndian lin" up with &oonch in /une 19+C by one unit of 9 %rigade. -n
adhoc %rigade formed from three units at ?ajauri and the tas" of this adhoc brigade was to secure
the left flan" of the main (ndian attac" by capturing ?amgarh 5ort before the main attac" commenced
on +th November. -ccording to their plan the 6;+ (ndian (nfantry %rigade duly attac"ed &ir %adesar
held by one militia company9+ and captured it on 1F19 .ctober 19+. $his was followed
by capture of &ir 0alewa a ;,;9< high feature which was held by just one militia company99 by the
9 %rigade on 6+ .ctober as a preliminary tas". $he adhoc %rigade commenced its attac"
against NaghunF?amgarh from th November and captured Naghun on 9th November and ?amgarh
on 9th November.Main attac" was commenced by the 19 and 9 %rigade from +th November
supported by aircrafts and tan"s .&oint ;=<! was captured by the 19 %rigade by a night attac" on +th
November and %himbhar )ali and &ir 4ayyid 5azal 4hah B&oint ;99C were captured on 9th
November.
Meanwhile %rigadier -zam 0han B69 %rigade AommanderC had reached Mendhar on !th
November and after having observed the ongoing battles from the top of &oint ;99 sent an urgent
message to 1ead#uarters ! 3ivision re#uesting for despatch of regular troops and artillery for
defence of Mendhar1<< as a result of which two infantry companiesBcoming from /helumC and one
section of =.! inch mountain guns finally reached Mendhar on 9th November1<1. (t is ironic to note
that while this life and death struggle in face of an overwhelming (ndian attac" was going on
%rigadier -zam was called by ! 3ivisions ).A >oftus $ottenham to ! 3ivision 1ead#uarters at
1ajira on 9th November for discussing with him the planned attac" on &oonch which was to be
launched in 3ecember 19+ or /anuary 199'1<6. 5inally by 11th November -zam succeeded in
convincing >oftus to re#uest )17 to send another infantry battalion from -bbottabad to Mendhar
4ector1<=. $he (ndians resumed their advance but on 1<F11 November but their left %rigade i.e. the
19 %rigade was held at &oint 9!=6. $he (ndian commander %rigadier Nadunath 4ingh exhibited
operational insight and leaving one battalion of 19 %rigade to watch &oint 9!=6 switched the
remaining battalions of this brigade under towards the right to join the 9 %rigade and continued the
advance,bypassing Mendhar from the east and capturing &oint 9<!= Northwest of Mendhar
on 1+h November. $hereafter the (ndian tas" was simple,ie they bypassed $opa from the north and
lin"ed up with &oonch garrison which had attac"ed from &oonch towards &oint ;!9= on 6<th
November 19+.
&oonch which should never have been relieved was irrevocably lost on 6<th November 19+, than"s
to )racey and an unassertive political leadership. (n all fairness we can confidently assert that &oonch
was not lost by the militia who faced tan"s and regular army for so long. $he (ndian plan was
reasonable and well executed,but numerical odds were heavily in their favour and they could ta"e the
liberty of bypassing every position which gave them tough resistance,because unli"e on the Iri*
3omel axis the terrain was more open and there was plenty of room for bypassingF manoeuvre.
$he other important (ndian strategic success of the 19+ ,ar was the capture of Dojila &ass and the
relief of >eh.,e have earlier seen that Dojila &ass commanding the land lin" to 0argil*>eh etc in
>ada"h region had been captured by the )ilgit 4couts under >ieutenant 4hah 0han on !th /uly 19+.
$he 4couts crossed Dojila and exploited till 4onamarg and till the outs"irts of >eh but could not
either capture >eh or seriously threaten 4rinagar as they were numerically too few and could not
fight against regular army troops aided by artillery and airpower.$he (ndians continued to air supply
their garrison at >eh,while the 4couts remained too wea" to attac" >eh and no regular &a"istan -rmy
unit was sent to >eh or Dojila area.$himaya the ).A 4rinagar 3ivision was a determined and able
military commander and had firmly resolved to capture Dojila and relieve the >eh )arrison.
$o improve command and co*ordination he brought 1ead#uarters !! &ara %rigade from Iri area to
%altal area and placed the three infantry battalions Bincluding one )ur"ha battalionC under command
of this briagde1< .$he Dojila &ass B 11,9!+ ftC was held by approximately a company plus of )ilgit
4couts and had withstood various determined (ndian assaults supported by artillery, $empest aircrafts
and launched by regular (ndian -rmy units of %rigade size1<9.
$he strength of the &a"istani position at Dojila lay in immense natural defensive strength,unusually
high altitude and extreme toughness and determination of the indomitable )ilgit 4couts to defend
their fatherland against the (ndians. $himaya appreciated that tan"s alone could achieve a
brea"through and too" the brilliant decision of employing tan"s at the highest altitude in the history
of warfare till that time.
$his record was bro"en by the (ndians again during the 4ino*(ndian Aonflict of 19;6 once the
(ndians bro"e the record and again by !th >ight Aavalry when 4tuart $an"s were employed at 1,<<<
feet only1<;. - s#uadron of 4tuart >ight $an"s of !th >ight Aavalry was brought all the way from
-"hnur a distance of 9 0ilometres,in about a fortnight, in conditions of absolute secrecy1<! . $he
tan"s reached %altal ;< miles east of 4rinagar on 19th .ctober where there turrets which had been
ta"en separately were refixed1<+.
$he (ndians were luc"y in having $himaya Ba 4outh (ndianC who believed in leading from the
front.$himaya personally flew an air recce mission over the &ass on 19th .ctober1<9. Meanwhile
snow fall had started and this resulted in postponing date of attac" from 69 .ctober to 1st November.
5inally on <1 November the tan"s, $himaya in the leading tan"11< attac"ed the &ass leading two
infantry battalions in the attac" on the Dojila. No army in the world could have stopped these
juggernauts without anti tan" guns and the )ilgit 4couts were forced to abandon the &ass which they
had successfully held since /uly 19+. 5ollowing this great technological success nothing could stop
the !! &ara %rigade.
$hus 3ras was captured on 19th November and 0argil on 6=rd November111. $he small )ilgit
4couts force bloc"ing >eh was forced to withdraw and >eh was relieved.$here is no doubt that
employment of tan"s at Dojila was the wars greatest strategic surprise, and a non armour officer was
its architect.$he (ndian -rmy owes its possession of >ada"h through which it later infiltrated into
4iachen )lacier to $himaya:s genius and to !th >ight Aavalry. $here were tan"s and armoured cars
on the other side also,but were not used because the extremely naive and miserly political leadership
trusted a %ritisher who had no interest in the war.
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
%y 6=rd November the (ndians were firmly in possession of >ada"h,had secured &oonch for eternity
and were no longer in a state of imbalance which had plagued them since .ctober 19!.
$he &a"istani political leadership at last realised that an effort must be made to at least assume a
more threatening posture,failing which the (ndians emboldened by their success at &oonch and Dojila
may attempt an offensive operation which may bring them yet closer to the 0ashmir*&a"istan
international border116. (t may be noted that area south of &oonch is mostly below 9,<<< ft and
operations in this area are not severely restricted unli"e the higher area in the north because of heavy
snowfall.0eeping this fact in view the &a"istani )17 felt that an (ndian advance towards Mirpur and
%himbhar was li"ely unless the &a"istan -rmy now at last assumed a more responsible and offensive
posture. ,e will now deal with the famous @.peration Genus: which was given the shape of a
political controversy by two gentlemen,one an army officer and the other a civil servant' %y mid
November the &a"istani political leadership at last realised that a more active military policy must be
adopted in 0ashmir. 5inally the civilian political leadership was moved from its state of supreme
lethargy and indecision and gave the army its first responsible political directive 2 @$he &a"istan
)overnment therefore, directed the A*in*A that, subject only to the defence of ,est &a"istan
frontiers with (ndia,the &a"istan -rmy was to prevent at all costs, the (ndians from extending the area
of their occupation in the /ammu and 0ashmir 4tate:11=. $his directive was issued in mid
November 19+ and following this the )17 decided to move sizeable forces for offensive action in
%himbhar 4ector in 0ashmir. (n addition the &a"istani Aabinet as"ed the A*in*A to @examine in detail
the military implications of the proposed counterstro"e:11. )racey proposed a counterstro"e
involving an armoured brigade and infantry brigade originating from %himbhar area and directed at
%eri &attan on the main (ndian supply route from -"hnur to Nowshera*?ajauri and &oonch119. $he
aim of the projected .peration Genus as the counterstro"e was code named was not to recapture
0ashmir or even to recapture &oonch but in words of the official history of the 0ashmir ,ar toLK
@5.?AE $1E (N3(-N4 $. 4IE 5.? -N (MME3(-$E AE-4E5(?E .N $1E %-4(4 .5 $1E
4$-$I4 7I. -4 $1E(? ?EAEN$ .&E?-$(.N4 1-3 (NG.>GE3 $1E M-Q(MIM
E55.?$ $1EN ,E?E A-&-%>E .5 &I$$(N) 5.?$1 -$ $1-$ $(ME.$1E M-N.EIG?E4
N., A.N$EM&>-$E3 ,.I>3 (N4$E-3 .5 &?.>.N)(N) $1E 5()1$ (N
0-41M(?,5.?AE $1E (N3(-N4 $. $E?M(N-$E $1E A.N5>(A$:11;.
$he preliminary plan of .peration Genus involved launching a subsidiary offensive manoeuvre
nic"named @.peration >ittle Genus:11!, involving capturing two insignificant hill features called
?eech and Mainda" hills few miles west of %eri &attan2 and this was scheduled to be
launched on +th 3ecember 11+. 4ometime before +th 3ecember the cabinet decided not to launch
@>ittle Genus: but wait and see if (ndians did not underta"e any offensive action in 0ashmir,in case of
which @the planned counteroffensive was to be launched:119
.n 1th 3ecember when the (ndians resorted to some offensive moves in %himbhar area a @Modified
>ittle Genus: involving heavy artillery shelling on %eri &attan area without any physical infantry
attac" was executed16<. $he shelling continued for two days and temporarily disrupted movement of
(ndian supply convoys on road -"hnur*Nowshera161. $he (ndians stopped offensive raids after this
cannonade166. .n =<th 3ecember the &a"istani )17 received a signal from the (ndian
)17 re#uesting for ceasefire16= and finally on the midnight of =1 3ecember 19+F<1 /anuary 199
ceasefire came into formal effect.
$hus ended the 19+ ,ar as it is now remembered. $he .fficial &a"istani history did not give any
figure of &a"istan -rmy casualties. $he approximate (ndian casualties according to an author thus
were16L*
a6 KI99E0 B1<.33
/6 W8&(0E0 BC<.33
)6 I77I(% B1<333
(I(*9&0I(% P"I78(E"7)
Gery few participants of the 0ashmir ,ar have left any written accounts of their war experiences.
)eneral (#bal who participated in the war and later on rose to the ran" of full general and Ahairman
/oint Ahiefs of 4taff Aommittee, long after the 0ashmir ,ar made one very thought provo"ing
remar" about the 0ashmir ,ar in an article in the &a"istan -rmy )reen %oo" 1996. $his particular
publication was sub titled @Near of the 4enior 5ield Aommanders:. (#bal wrote2 @3uring 19+
0ashmir .perations ( saw one senior officer sitting miles behind the frontline and counting
availability of mules and rations. 1e had relegated the fighting to a senior battalion commander 169:.
(n 19;= once Major )eneral 5azal ( Mu#ueem 0han B&unjabi spea"ing although by caste a &athan
from East &unjabC wrote @$1E 4$.?N .5 $1E &-0(4$-N -?MN: as a serving officer and with
blessings of -yub 0han Bbeing dedicated to -yub,with a foreword written by Musa the -rmy A*in*AC
5azal ( Mu#ueem made a veiled remar" criticising the political government and particularly the &rime
Minister >ia#uat -li 0han Ba 1industani Muslim who was not forgiven for having been chosen by Mr
/innah as &a"istan:s first &rime Minister, by &unjabi Muslim leaders of that period in particularC
without naming >ia#uat.5azal thus wrote2 @$o the -rmy:s horror, &a"istan during her greatest hour of
triumph in 0ashmir agreed to accept the ceasefire...it was difficult to understand why &a"istan let that
opportunity pass. ,as it assumed wea"ness2 or as a result of pressing advice2 or from misplaced
chivalry towards an unfriendly neighbour in distressR ,hatever the reason,&a"istan:s reluctance to
accept the ris"s of continuing the war,cost her 0ashmir at that time. (t was a ris" worth ta"ing16; (n
other words 5azal ( Mu#ueem was saying that &a"istan lost 0ashmir because that accursed
1industani was &a"istan:s &rime Minister'(t may be noted that >ia#uat bashing has been a favourite
pastime of &unjabi Muslim historians in &a"istan,and is a favourite conversation topics in many
&unjabi and 4indhi Muslim households.$he 1industani Muslims on the other hand have been
projecting >ia#uat as &a"istan:s greatest politician.-s a matter of fact both these extreme positions
are ridiculous and a great distortion of history' Ising 5azal:s criticism as an authority and a factual
basis2 another historian mildly criticised >ia#uat:s handling of 0ashmir issue once he said,:$he
decision of >ia#at:s government to accept the cease*fire in 0ashmir at the time it did @to the army:s
horror: B7I.$(N) 5-D-> ( MI7IEEMC also has been criticised16!. (t is worth examining
5azal:s ridiculous allegations levelled li"e an old pre 19! one anna witness in a little more detail'
>ess than five lines will suffice to prove the absence of any foundation of 5azal:s allegation.$he
&a"istani attac" force collected for .peration Genus consisted of about six infantry battalions and two
armoured regiments16+. $o oppose this the (ndians had two infantry brigades B9< &ara %rigade and
+< (nfantry %rigadeC .(n addition there were two armoured regiments in the same area i.e. Aentral
(ndia 1orse and the 3eccan 1orse169 . (n addition the (ndians also possessed 1 other armoured
regiments which were not in 0ashmir but in &unjab or ,estern I& and could move to 0ashmir. ,e
shall see in 19;9 how &a"istani armour functioned and the reader can "eep that as a yardstic" in order
to appreciate how &a"istani armour and infantry would have behaved in .peration Genus2 had it been
ever launched'5azal does not explain how capture .f %eri &attan bridge would have led to complete
collapse of (ndian hold over 0ashmir,apart from temporary severing of the line of communication to
&oonch.)reater part of the Aentral (ndia 1orse was at Nowshera close to %eri &attan while 3eccan
1orse in Ahamb*-"hnur area was also within stri"ing range and the battle would have been a hotly
contested affair'4hau"at ?iza did not ta"e the extreme viewpoint similar to 5azal:s when he wrote his
boo" on &a"istan -rmy.1e merely said that @.n 3ecember =< both sides saw the wisdom of cease*
fire:.1=< $here is another aspect in 4hau"at ?iza:s case i.e. the fact that once his boo" was being
finalised and published in 19+9 a 1industani Muslim i.e. )eneral -slam %eg was the -rmy Ahief and
the boo":s final draft was vetted and approved by the )17. -n officer who wor"ed with 4hau"at
?iza while serving as a staff officer in )17 confided to the author in 199= that 4hau"at ?iza
despised %eg,due to some incident in East &a"istan in 19!1, and felt that the )17 was not giving him
a free hand in writing the boo". $here is no doubt that 4hau"at:s triology was heavily doctored and
modified by too many coo"s'
(n any case history writing in &a"istan has remained an extremely dicey affair in which ulterior
motives of authors, based largely on ethnic biases play an instrumental role. >ately in an article
)eneral 0.M -rif adopted a more rational viewpoint, when he stated that the 0ashmir ,ar of 19+
was mismanaged simply because &a"istan was not in a position to fight it successfully summing it
up by stating 2 @(t is too hazardous a ris" to fight a war on ad hoc basis:1=1
$here is no doubt that &a"istan was in a favourable position to win the 0ashmir ,ar at least till the
first wee" of November. Mr /innah exhibited great Aoup de .eil when he ordered )racey to employ
two brigades and advance with one brigade each towards /ammu and 4rinagar. %ut Mr /innah was
unluc"y in possessing no one li"e &atel and his &rime Minister and his entire Aabinet proved to be an
undoubted failure at least as a war cabinet' Mr /innah:s decision not to have a &a"istani A in A
although ta"en in the best interest of the country and the -rmy as Mr /innah saw it ensured that the
%ritish acting A in A procedurally bloc"ed the execution of Mr /innah:s orders in .ctober to
attac" 0ashmir. &a"istan was unluc"y in having a man li"e (s"andar Mirza at the Ministry of
3efence.Mirza did not advise Mr /innah correctly and the fact that he had hardly served in the -rmy
and did not understand military affairs further ensured that Mr /innah and the &rime Minister
remained as ignorant as they were about military affairs as they were when they were in high school.
(t is incorrect to criticise >ia#at for .peration Genus since in 3ecember 19+ the (ndian position was
much more secure than in 19!.
>ia#at can be criticised for not ever visiting 0ashmir while the war was on and for not standing by
Mr /innah in pressurising )racey in .ctober 19! to order the -rmy to attac" 0ashmir.1ad a
&a"istani A in A been appointed even in 3ecember or in March 19+ the (ndians may not have held
on to &oonch*Nowshera area at least. 1ad Major Masud been allowed with his armoured cars
on 3omel*%aramula ?oad despite )hazanfar -li and 4her 0han:s objections24rinagar may have been
captured by the $ribesmen by first wee" of November 19!. $he (ndians were luc"y in having
comparatively more regular army officers who led from the front and is evident from higher officer
casualties among (ndian -rmy officers above the ran" of captain vis a vis the &a"istan -rmy.$he
subse#uent &indi Aonspiracy of 199< was a logical result of disgust of the army officers with
the irresolute civilian political leadership as exhibited during the 19+ war. ,e can say with the
benefit of hindsight that if the army did have to rule &a"istan as it later did from 199+2it would have
been far better had real soldiers and patriots ta"en over in 199<' $hese men after all were men of
crisis 2 highly patriotic and outloo"2and possessed an independent mind' (ronically paper tiger
soldiers with poor war record and naive intellect 2 more interested in improving their personal
fortunes too" over.- seal of essential mediocrity despite an outwardly impressive form , was thus
firmly stamped 2 as far as higher military leadership,doctrine and organisation was concerned2 on the
&a"istan -rmy. %ut this was proved only fourteen years later in 19;9'
BA.NA>I3E3C
"E?E"E(*E7
96 -ppendix $hirteen*Expansion of the -rmed 5orces and 3efence .rganisation*19=9*199* .p Ait.
9= &ages*1<< to 1<;*4hau"at ?iza*.p Ait.
9 &age*9!*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
99 &age*1<!*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
9; &age*69!*$he (ndian -rmour*.p Ait.
9! &age*6+9*(bid.
9+ &age*9*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
99 I4 4tate 3epartment ?eport of 5ebruary 196 #uoted on &age*=!6*- Aoncise 1istory of ,orld ,ar .ne*%rigadier
G./ Esposito*.p Ait.
;< &age*;+9* 4hahab Nama*7udrat Illah 4hahab*4ang ( Meel &ublications*>ahore*199!.4hahab was staff officer with
Mirza.
;1 &ages*9+ ,99 J1<<*Major )eneral 5azal ( Mu#ueem*.p Ait.
;6 &age*6!;*4hau"at ?iza*.p Ait.
;= (bid.
; &age*!<*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
;9 &ages*1<= J 1<*5azal ( Mu#ueem*.p Ait.
;; &ages*6!; , 6!!, 6!+ J 6+<*4hau"at ?iza*.p Ait.
;! &ages*1= J 1*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
;+ &age*!9*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
;9 &ages*!9 J !;*(bid.
!< &age* 9*%rigadier -mjad -li 0han Ahaudhry*.p Ait.
!1 &age*119*5azal ( Mu#ueem*.p Ait and &ages*1; J 1!*%rigadier -mjad -li 0han Ahaudhry*.p Ait.
!6 &ages*6<1 J 6<6* 3ecisive %attles of the ,estern ,orld*Golume*$hree K Major )eneral /.5.A 5uller*Eyre and
4pottiswoode*>ondon*19;=.
!= &age*;6* Areative $hin"ing in ,arfare*%rigadier Nazareth*>ancer %oo"s*3elhi*19+!.
! &ages*6<9 J 6<;* $he ,orld Arisis*$he Eastern 5ront* $he ?t 1on ,inston.4. Ahurchill K $hornton %utterworth
>imited K 19 %edford 4treet K >ondon*19=1.
!9 %ut most of these commanders who were mission oriented and of an independent judgement were not ran"ers and
from races with a leadership tradition2whereas in (ndo &a" a large number of commanders were ex ran"ers or ran"ers
sons and above all there was no leadership tradition in the (ndo &a",as we shall discuss in the chapter analysing the 19;9
war in a later part of this boo".
!; &ages*6<; and 6<!*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
!! &age*69<*$he (ndian -rmour*.p Ait.
!+ &ages*19< ,191 J 196*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
!9 &age*1*-ppendix*.neK$he 5rontier 5orce ?ifles*Aompiled by ,.E.1 Aondon*-ldershot*)ale J &olden >td*
199=. -"bar 0han got the 34. while serving in the 1th %attalion of the 5rontier 5orce ?ifles at the %attle of 0wanlan
Nwathit in %urma.$he 34. it may be noted is given for outstanding military leadership and gallantry,normally above or
at battalion level. (t was &a"istan -rmy:s misfortune that -"bar was dismissed for involvement in the &indi Aonspiracy
case and the &a"istan -rmy lost one of its very few officers who possessed real potential and resolution as far as higher
military leadership was concerned. -yub and company who dominated the scene between 199< and 19;9 were not men
who had done anything commendable during the 4econd ,orld ,ar, but essentially show case soldiers,who were masters
in the art of getting extensions from politicians'-"bar 0han was not a ran"er and thus not li"ed by -yub who found
4andhurst Aommissioned officer more difficult to handle'
+< &ages*91 J 96*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
+1 &age*66+*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.
+6 &age*66<*(bid.
+= &age*6;9*(bid.
+ &age*6;*(bid.
+9 &age*6;!*(bid.
+; &age*+!*Major 0.A &raval*.p Ait.
+! &age*6;!*$he 0ashmir Aampaign*.p Ait.