Cristobal v.

Labrador
Facts:
In 1930, Teofilo Santos was found guilty of the crime of estafa and
was sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories
provided by law. On appeal, the decision was affirmed. Accordingly,
he was confined to the provincial jail of Rizal. Notwithstanding
his conviction, he continued to be a registered elector in
the Municipality of Malabon, Rizal and was for the period
comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal
president of that municipality.

In 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was passed and Section 94,
paragraph (b) of which disqualifies Mr. Santos from voting on
the ground that he has been declared by final judgment
guilty of a crime against property.

He applied with his Excellency an absolute pardon, which he was
granted. He was thus, restored to full civil and political rights,
except that with respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible only to positions which are
clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or
property responsibility.

In 1940, Mr. Cristobal filed a petition for exclusion of Mr. Santos
name in the list of voters on the ground that the latter is disqualified
under C.A. No. 357. His name was excluded by the court. Thus, this
petition for certiorari contending that by reason of his pardon, his
name should not be excluded.

Issue:
Whether or not the pardon extended had the effect of restoring him
to his political rights.

Ratio:
Yes. There are only two limitations to the exercise of the pardoning
power of the Chief Executive namely:

1. That the power be exercised after conviction;
2. That such power does not extend in cases of impeachment.

Such pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. It has the effect of blotting out the crime
committed as well as all disabilities resulting from the convictions.
Here, the disability is the result of conviction without which there
would be no basis for disqualifying him from voting. The argument
that he has already served the imprisonment sentence hence there is
nothing else left to pardon cannot be sustained since there are
accessory penalties imposed and the pardon extended applies
likewise to such disabilities.

When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In
the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is
conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only
to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no
money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores
the respondent to full civil and political rights.

Gonzales v. Hechanova
Facts:
After entering into a contract with the government of Burma and
Vietnam through the president via an executive agreement, the
respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of
67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.
Thereupon, Mr. Gonzales, a rice planter, filed the petition herein
averring that in making or attempting to make said
importation, the respondents acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction because RA 3452 explicitly
prohibits the importation of rice and corn.

Respondent in this case questions the cause of action of Mr. Gonzales
upon the theory that the proposed importation in question is not
governed by RA 3452 but was authorized by the president as
the commander in chief for military stock pile purposes. He
anchors his argument on the fact that the president is duty bound to
prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without
waiting for any special authority. Moreover, he alleges that the
provisions of RA 3452 prohibiting importation of rice only apply if
the importer is a government agency. It does not apply when the
importer is the government itself.

More importantly, it was contended that the contracts executed
between Burma and Vietnam are valid executive agreements under
international law and that such agreements are binding. In case of
conflict between the republic act and the aforementioned contracts,
the latter should prevail.

Issue:
Whether or not the contract executed for importation is valid.
Whether or not the international agreements may be invalidated by
our courts.

Ratio:
No. First and foremost, the importation herein violates the general
policy of the government that preference shall be given to materials
produced in the Philippines. To attempt to justify this behind the
commander in chief powers of the president overlooks the
protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner
that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local
production of said commodities.

Furthermore, the court is not satisfied that the contracts are
executive agreements. The parties to the contracts do not
appear to have regarded the same as such. Even assuming
they did, they are unlawful since from a constitutional
viewpoint, the agreements are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Republic Act 3542. It should be noted that the
President may not enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes acted prior thereto. Under the
Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the
very act prohibited by said laws.

Yes. Note that under Article VIII of the Constitution, the SC ha the
power to review, revise, reverse, modify, and affirmall
cases in which constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation in
question. As such, the constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also
when it runs counter to an act of congress.

China National Machinery v. Santa Maria
Facts:
In 2002, China National Machinery (CNMEG) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with North Luzon Railways
Corporation (Northrail) for the conduct of feasibility study on a
possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, Pampanga. The
Chinese Ambassador thereafter wrote a letter to the DOF Secretary
then informing him of CNMEGs designation as the prime contractor
for the Northrail project.

On 2006, however, respondents herein filed a complaint for
annulment of contract alleging that the contract agreement and the
loan agreement (obtained from EXIM BANK extending a Preferential
Buyers credit of $ 400,000,000) were void for being contrary to the
constitution, RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform
Act, PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) and E.O. No. 292
(Administrative Code).

CNMEG filed its Motion to Dismiss the case but was denied. On
Petition for certiorari it prayed for the dismissal of the case
for lack of jurisdiction. It claims that CNMEG is entitled to
immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local
court and that the contract agreement was an executive
agreement and thus, cannot be questioned before a local
court.

Issue:
Whether or not CNMEG is entitled to immunity.
Whether or not the agreement is an executive agreement which
cannot be questioned before local courts.

Ratio:
No. According to jurisprudence, there are 2 concepts of sovereign
immunity:

1. The Absolute theory - a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made respondent in the courts of another
sovereign;
2. The restrictive theory the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts (jure imperii) of a
state, but not with regard to acts which are private (jure
gestionis).

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to
ascertain the legal nature of the act involved whether the entity
claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. Here, the SC found that it did engage in
proprietary activity based on the following considerations:

1. It did not isolate the determination to looking at the MOU
itself, but also to the documents executed in relation to the
project;
2. It found that CNMEG initiated the contract and not the
Chinese government;
3. A feasibility study was conducted as a business strategy with
a view to securing this commercial enterprise;
4. The loan agreement executed pursuant to the contract
contained an express waiver of immunity;

Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the
legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking,
nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail
Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in
character.

Even assuming that CNMEG performs governmental
functions, such does not automatically vest it with
immunity since immunity from suit is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was organized.
CNMEG failed to prove before the court that it was indeed immuned
from suit. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can
only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the
foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.

No. Under the VCLT, a treaty is an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation is. An
executive agreement is similar to a treaty except that an
executive agreement does not require legislative
concurrence, is usually less formal and deals with a
narrower range of subject matters. Despite these differences,
three requisites must concur:

1. Agreement must be between states;
2. Must be written
3. Governed by international law.

CNMEG is not a government nor is it a government agency. By the
terms of the Contract Agreement, Northrail is a government-owned
or -controlled corporation, while CNMEG is a corporation duly
organized and created under the laws of the Peoples Republic of
China.

Thus, both Northrail and CNMEG entered into the Contract
Agreement as entities with personalities distinct and separate from
the Philippine and Chinese governments, respectively. Neither can it
be said that CNMEG was an agent of the Chinese government since it
was merely designated as primary contractor (such did not mean that
it was to perform sovereign functions in behalf of China).

Likewise, the contract agreement was stipulated to be governed by
Philippine law under Article 1.1 of the Contract Agreement.

Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
Facts:
PGMA issued E.O. No. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate of
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and
corruption against presidential appointees and to submit its report to
the president. In the E.O., it was stated that the Commission, acting
as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential
appointees in the government and any of its agencies or
instrumentalities.

On 2010, PNOY issued E.O. No. 13 abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

Pursuant to the latest E.O. Finance Secretary Purisima filed before
the ODESLA-IAD a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct
against Pichay (chairman of the board of trustees of the
LWUA) as well as its other incumbent members arising from
the purchase by LQUA of 400,000+ shares of stocks of Express
Savings Bank. Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss manifesting that a
case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct
is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. Not having
obtained a favorable decision, he files this petition alleging that E.O.
No. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of congress to
delegate quasi-judicial powers to administrative agencies and for
encroaching on the powers of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not E. O. No. 13 is unconstitutional on the ground that it
usurped the power of Congress.
Whether or not E. O. No. 13 is unconstitutional on the ground that it
encroached on the power of the Ombudsman.
Whether or not E.O. No 13 has the power to try and decide cases
(which is properly lodged with the judiciary, as claimed by
petitioner)

Ratio:
Constitutional. The act done by PNOY herein is a mere
reorganization which did not entail the creation of a new, separate
and distinct office. The reorganization required no more than a mere
alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division through which ODESLA could take on the additional
functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.

Furthermore, there is not specific amount earmarked for ODESLA
from the total budget allocated by Congress. The necessary funds
may be properly sourced from the Presidents own budget without
committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation
when the President simply allocated existing funds previously
appropriated by Congress for his office.

Constitutional. Contrary to petitioners contention, ODESLA did
not encroach on the Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction. The primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman refers to criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may
take over the investigation being conducted by another. Here, the
case filed was administrative for grave misconduct. Petitioner
herein may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to prevent ODESLA from proceeding with the
investigation. The ODESLA only has investigative authority
limited to fact-finding whose determinations and recommendations
remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, there is no
usurpation.

ODESLA has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers. While
adjudicatory appears as part of its appellation, they cannot try
and resolve cases since its authority is limited to the
conduct of investigations, reporting and recommendations.
E.O. 13 defined its functions as similar to that of the PAGC. Under
E.O. 12, PAGC was merely given the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential
appointees in the government and thereafter submit its report.

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be
considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law.

The creation of the ODESLA was a mere exercise of the
presidents power of control over executive departments to
ensure the enforcement of laws.