Wills Cases

WILLS AND SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS 2013
CHAN, Hobart H.
1
I.CONCEPTS OF SUCCESSION
1. BONILLA v. BARCENA
71 SCRA 490
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 FortunataBarcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of
Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On August 4, 1975, the defendant Leon Barcena et al. filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that FortunataBarcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to
sue. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of FortunataBarcena and
asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the
court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot
be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
Counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration to set aside the
order of dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such motion
was denied. A written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court also denied the counsel's
prayer for lack of merit.
Hence; this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Wether the substitution of the minor children for their deceased mother is proper.
RULING:
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent,
the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided
for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right
to the inheritance whether such right is pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property
of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate
or intestate proceedings. When FortunataBarcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the
parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted
to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation
and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent
Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

2. ESTATE OF HERMADY V. LUZON SURETY
100 PHIL. 388
FACTS:
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the
deceased K. H. Hemady, who was a surety solidary guarantor, in consideration of the Luzon
Surety Co.'s of having guaranteed the various principals in favor of different creditors.
The administratrix of Hemady's estate moved to dismiss the claim that on the ground
that: "whatever losses may occur after Hemady's death, are not chargeable to his estate,
because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor." The lower court granted the dismissal of
the claims of Luzon Surety Co.
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the
twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for
CHAN, Hobart H.
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judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per
cent interest thereon.
ISSUE:
Wether the obligations of a deceased is transmissible to his heirs and can be charged
against his estate.

RULING:
Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code of 1889
(Article 1257), the rule is that -
"Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law."
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their
decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle
remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his
obligations.
In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:
"Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the
rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and can not be regarded as third parties
with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the
deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
The Supreme Court proceeded to enumerate the exceptions to transmissibility of
obligations as follows:
1.) Peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the
contract.
2.) Intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties.
3.) Not transmissible by operation of law.
The Supreme court concluded that the solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished
by his death, and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the
estate a contingent claim for reimbursement.

3. BORJA V. BORJA
46 SCRA 577

FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died,
JosefaTangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He wasappointed executor and administrator, until he died;
his son Josebecame the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a second wife Tasiana before
he died; she instituted testate proceedings with theCFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was
appointed speciladministatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromiseagreement, but
Tasiana opposed the approval of the said agreement. She argues that it was not valid, because
the heirscannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probatingthe will of Francisco,
and at the time the agreement was made, thewill was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva
Ecija.

CHAN, Hobart H.
3
ISSUE:
Wether the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been
probated.
RULING:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid. The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will
receive P800, 000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Franciscoand Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estateof Francisco de Borja among the
heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyancebyTasianaOngsingco of any and all her individual share andinterest, actual or
eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and JosefaTangco. There is no stipulation as to
any other claimant,creditor or legatee.And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate
istransmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the deathof such causante or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of thePhilippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a
successor (withrequisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditaryshare
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent o

4. BUTTE V. MANUEL UY & SONS
4 SCRA 526

FACTS:
Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta.
Cruz, Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in the name of the
following co-owners: MarieGarnierVda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E.
Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6. In his last will and testament,
Jose bequeathed his estate which included his 1/6undivided portion in the said property to his
children and grandchildren and 1/3 of the free portion to Mrs. Angela Butte. Eight years after
Joses death, and while the estate proceeding was still pendingon account of the claims of
creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was
appointed judicial administrator, and during such pendency, One of the co-owners sold her 1/6
share in the property to ManuelUy and Sons. After being informed of said sale, Mrs. Butte
offered to redeem said 1/6 share sold to ManuelUy and Sons and filed the corresponding legal
action for legal redemption.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. ResplandorSobretodo, sent a
letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel
Uy& Sons, Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez.
This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and
filed the corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by
the court of the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be
grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and
exemplary damages
ISSUE:
WhetherMrs. Angela M. Butte can exercise the right of legal redemption despite the
presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final distribution of shares in the testate
proceedings
RULING:
By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased person are transmitted to his heirs
from the moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property, rights and
obligations that survive the decedent so from the instant of Jose Ramirez death, his heirs
became co-owners of an undivided share and co-owner of the whole property thus they became
CHAN, Hobart H.
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entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption as soon as another co-owner has sold his
undivided share to a stranger. The presence of the judicial administrator is of no moment
because the rights of the administrator of possession and administration of the real and
personal estate of the deceased do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided
share sold to Manuel Uy and Sons because the right to redeem only came into existence when
the sale was perfected 8 years from the death of Jose Ramirez. The administrator cannot
exercise the right of redemption since the land was sold AFTER the death of Ramirez. The
administrator may exercise the right to redeem only if the right pertains to the estate and this
can only happen if the sale of said portion to Uy was done before the death of Ramirez.

5. USON v. DEL ROSARIO
92 PHIL 530

FACTS:
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson,
the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land
occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As
a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and
Uson containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and
the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are
illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any
successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of
natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter
(article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new
Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

RULING:
No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at
the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. AlarasFrondosa, 17 Phil.,
321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband
may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be
given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do
not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early
CHAN, Hobart H.
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part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative
provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code
in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

6. BONILLA v. BARCENA
71 SCRA 490

FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 FortunataBarcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of
Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On August 4, 1975, the defendant Leon Barcena et al. filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that FortunataBarcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to
sue. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of FortunataBarcena and
asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the
court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot
be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
Counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration to set aside the
order of dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such motion
was denied. A written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court also denied the counsel's
prayer for lack of merit.
Hence; this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Wether the substitution of the minor children for their deceased mother is proper.
RULING:
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent,
the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided
for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right
to the inheritance whether such right is pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property
of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate
or intestate proceedings. When FortunataBarcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the
parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted
to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation
and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent
Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

7. GO ONG V. COURT OF APPEALS
154 SCRA 270

CHAN, Hobart H.
6
FACTS:
Two parcels of land under 1 TCT are owned by alfredo and when he died, his wife julita
go ong was appointed administratrix of his estate. Julita thereafter mortgaged one lot to Allied
Banking Corp. to secure a loan obtained by JK Exports, annotated as a lien on the original TCT,
with the following notation: mortgagees consent necessary in case of subsequent alienation or
encumbrance of the property
On the loan there was due a sum and Allied tried to collect it from Julita. Hence; the
complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had
allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it was
Julita who promised to secure the courts approval.
Trial court ruled forJulita, stating that the contract is valid. CA affirmed with modification
the lower courts decision

ISSUE:
Wether the mortgage over the parcel of is void for want of judicial approval.
RULING:
Contract is valid
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court . The CA aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity
and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil
Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for instance,
the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt,
and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite
judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no
prejudice is caused others, including the government.
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the CA cannot be faulted in ruling
that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority of
the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal
share and to her hereditary rights.

Petitioner cited cases arguing that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the
deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage is under
administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate
the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner.. Under similar
circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs
as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even effect of the alienation
or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted
to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot
adversely affect the substantive rights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not
inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husbands death, and her hereditary rights
accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-
heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493,
Civil Code)

8. REGANON VS. IMPERIAL
CHAN, Hobart H.
7
22 SCRA 80

FACTS:
The heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession
of about one-hectare portion of a parcel of land , with damages, against Rufino Imperial.
In an ex-parte preocceding the plaintiffs were declared lawful owners of the land and
ordered the plaintiff to vacate the portion occupied by the defendant and restore the possession
to the plaintiffs. a writ of execution was then issued.
The Philippine National Bank deposited the residuary estate of its former ward, Eulogio
Imperial, in the sum of P10,303.80. The heirs of Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is defendant,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the residuary estate, wherein was apportioned
P1,471.97 as defendant Rufino Imperial's share.
Informed of this development, the plaintiffs filed on an ex parte motion for issuance of
an alias writ of execution and of an order directing the manager, or the representative, of the
bank, to hold the share of defendant and deliver the same to the provincial sheriff of the
province to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance of the money judgment which was
granted by the trial court.
The defendant then filed a motion to quash the alias writ of execution on the ground that
upon the death of a ward, is the money accumulated in his guardianship proceedings and
deposited in a bank, still considered in custodialegis and therefore cannot be attached. the
motion was denied, hence; this appeal.

ISSUE:
Wether the money accumulated in a guardianship proceedings and deposited in bank is
considered custodial egis abd cannot be attached.

RULING:
When Eulogio Imperial died on September 13, 1962, the rights to his succession
from the moment of his death were transmitted to his heirs, one of whom is his son and heir,
defendant-appellant herein. This automatic transmission cannot but proceed with greater ease
and certainty than in this case where the parties agree that the residuary estate is not burdened
with any debt. For,

The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death, and
where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts,
said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of
the properties of his predecessor and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter.
That the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for
purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement before the courts, is
already a settled matter in this jurisdiction.
It is admitted that the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, including herein defendant-appellant,
have on May 25, 1964 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. This instrument suffices to
settle the entire estate of the decedent provided all the requisites for its validity are fulfilled
even without the approval of the court. Therefore, the estate for all practical purposes has been
settled. The heirs are at full liberty to withdraw the residuary estate from the Philippine National
Bank-Dipolog Branch and divide it among themselves. This appeal, however, does not detract
any from the fact that the guardianship proceedings is closed and terminated and the residuary
estate no longer under custodia legis.
CHAN, Hobart H.
8

9. RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
22 SCRA 918

FACTS:
Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this
case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition
for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and
Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did
not qualify so that ArtemioDiawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The
mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan
failed to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was
bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued
for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the
judicial administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no
legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.

ISSUE:
Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

RULING:
Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to
the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration
or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under
special circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before
the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal
standing in court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits
of an exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may
act in his place."
10. CONTI v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 118464, December 21, 1998

Facts:
Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, and Lourdes Sampayo were co-owners of the
539- square meter lot with improvements. On March 1986, Sampayo died intestate. On April
1987, the private respondents, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Sampayo,
filed an action for partition and damages before the RTC of Lucena. Sps.Conti refused partition
because of failure by the respondents to produce documents that will prove that they were the
rightful heirs of the deceased. On August 30, 1987, Conti died and was substituted by his
children as party defendant.
At the trial, private respondents presented evidence to prove that they were the collateral
heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner of the
subject lot. On the other hand, petitioner Rosario alleged that the subject property was co-
owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family
had been staying in the property in question since 1937. She also testified that her late husband
paid for the real estate taxes and spent for the necessary repairs and improvements thereon
because there had been an agreement that Lourdes would leave her share of property to them.
Since no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented by the petitioners, the trial
court declared that private respondents were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and ordered
both parties to submit a project partition of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the
court. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred
CHAN, Hobart H.
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in finding the private respondents were the heirs of Sampayo and that they were entitled to the
partition of the lot and improvements in question.

Issue:
Whether the complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner
should not prosper without prior settlement of the latter s estate and compliance with all legal
requirements, especially publication.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that a prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the
heirs can commence any action pertaining to the deceased. As it was ruled in Quison v. Salud:
x xx As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned
by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the
present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the
heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some
showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of
Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.
It was further elucidated:
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Art. 777 and 494 of the
Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo, her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is
the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her
rightful heirs. In so demanding partition, private respondents merely exercised the right originally
pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners theory as to the
requirement of publication would have been correct had the action been for the partition of the
estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small value. But what private
respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes one-half share which they
inherited from her through intestate succession.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Legal or intestate succession
takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost
its validity. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. It was established
during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and without issue. Private respondents as sister,
nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.

11. NOCEDA v. CA
313 SCRA 504

Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter,
grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late CelestinoArbizoextrajudicially settled a parcel of
land which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directos share was
11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810
square meters went to Maria Arbizo. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share
to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina.
However, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo,
defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while
plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-
partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late
CelestinoArbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters.
Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him
by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial
settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985,
defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three
huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo
demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused.
CHAN, Hobart H.
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Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession and
ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the lower
court.
Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff Directo ordering the revocation of the donation.

Issue:
Whether petitioner Nocedas acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude sufficient
to grant the revocation of the donation?

Ruling:
YES. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to
him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C
which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioners act of occupying the portion
pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of
usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is
enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

12. BLAS v. SANTOS
1 SCRA 899 (1961)

Facts:
Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three
children. He also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died.
In 1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and
his former wife acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing his properties in favor of Maxima after
payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima
executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that
she promises that shell be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties shell be acquiring
to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of
them depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said
legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became
administratrix of her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his
first marriage, together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas),
learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not
even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas property precisely
because Maxima promised that theyll be receiving properties upon her death.

ISSUE:
Whether the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.

Ruling:
Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it
lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually
executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas estate) hence it is a compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the
reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an
obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal
properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal
properties in the will of the husband.

13. SICAD v. COURT OF APPEALS
294 SCRA 183

Facts:
In 1979, Montinoladrew up a Deed in favor of her grandchildrenCatalino, Judy and
Jesus- all of them Valderramas. The deed bore the title Deed of Donation Intervivos.
Thereafter, Auroras secretary presented the Deed to the Registrar for the purpose of canceling
the original title and obtaining a transfer certificate of title in favor of the three donees. However,
CHAN, Hobart H.
11
the duplicate title never reached the donees. Aurora retained the document and maintained
possession of the property for ten years after the transfer.
Aurora then alienated the land to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Simultaneously
with alienation, Aurora issued a Deed of Revocation of Donation. She asserted that the donation
took the nature of mortis causa and was therefore revocable anytime. She further averred that
the same failed to follow the formality of wills, and therefore was nullity.Auroras grandchildren
found their grandmas reversal vexing. They insisted that the Deed was one intervivos and
therefore irrevocable.

Issue:
Whether the Donation took the nature of one inter vivos.

Ruling:
No. The donation is mortis causa.The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora
never intended the donation to take effect within her lifetime. First, she expressed that the
donation take effect 10 years after her death. Second, she inserted a prohibition on the sale of
the property during the 10 year period. Third, she continued to possess the property as well as
the fruits and authorized such enjoyment in the deed of donation. Fourth, she retained the
certificate of title and subsequently alienated it in favor of the Sicads. All these are indisputable
acts of ownership.
The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its
language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon
its execution.
The deed subject of litigation is one mortis causa because it stipulated that all rents,
proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of
the donor, during her lifetime; and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the
donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in
any other way possible.
A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee that right
to dispose of the donated property during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a
donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor
is still alive.
Because of Auroras actions, nothing was transferred by the deed of donation in
question to her grandchildren. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did
not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More
importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them
only after ten years from Auroras death.

14. NERI v. AKUTIN
74 PHIL 185

Facts:
AgripinoNeri in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the petitioners. The
omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had
already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had
abandoned was occupied his children over which registration was denied for it turned out to be
a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which they were indebted to their father.

Issue:
Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the
ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief
that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by
his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall
annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a
case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

CHAN, Hobart H.
12
II. INTRODUCTION TO WILLS:
1. DIZON-RIVERAv.DIZON
33 SCRA 554

Facts:
This is an appeal from the orders of the CFI of Pampanga approving the Executrix Dizon- Riveras
project of partition which is in accordance in the will instead of the oppositors counter-project of partition. The
petitioners argue that their project shall be implemented in the partition of the estate as it pertains to their legitime
as compulsory heirs.

Issue:
Whether the partition project as proposed by the compulsory heirs shall be implemented.
Ruling:
While compulsory heirs have a right to the legitime, they cannot insists that they be paid in the form of
property, whether real or personal, when they are not available, as when the will itself contains a partition of the
estate, specifically assigning the property to various heirs. In the case like this, the legitimes may be satisfied by
paying cash. In the case at bar, the project of the executrix must be given weight.

2. BELLIS v. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358

Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills,
his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the
ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.

Issue:
Whether the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of
the illegitimate children.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under
the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order
of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.

3. TORRES V. LOPEZ
48 PHIL 772

Facts:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez,
decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next
of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accretion
CHAN, Hobart H.
13
and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of
controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924,
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which he
declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez
and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente
F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the
time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and
no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margarita Lopez was a
cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after having been
contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de
Buenovs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).

Issue:
Who is entitled to the estate of Tomas Rodriguez.

Ruling:
There is partial intestacy in the case at bar. Margarita Lopez, being the next kin of the
deceased, is entitled to half of the estate notwithstanding the designation of the heirs in the will.
Luz de Bueno, on the other hand gets the remainder of the estate including Vicentes share by
right of accretion as she is a instituted co-heir.

III. FORMAL REQUIREMENT OF WILLS:
1. SUROZA V. HONRADO
110 SCRA 381

Facts:
In 1973, MarcelinaSuroza supposedly executed a notarial will bequeathing her house
and lot to a certain Marilyn Suroza. In 1974, Marcelina died. Marina Paje was named as the
executrix in the said will and she petitioned before CFI Rizal that the will be admitted to probate.
The presiding judge, Honrado admitted the will to probate and assigned Paje as the
administratrix. Honrado also issued an ejectment order against the occupants of the house and
lot subject of the will.
NenitaSuroza, daughter in law of Marcelina (her husband, son of Marcelina was
confined in the Veterans Hospital), learned of the probate proceeding when she received the
ejectment order (as she was residing in said house and lot).
Nenita opposed the probate proceeding. She alleged that the said notarial will is void
because (a) the instituted heir therein Marilyn Suroza is actually Marilyn Sy and she is a
stranger to Marcelina, (b) the only son of Marcelina, AgapitoSuroza, is still alive and is the
compulsory heir, (c) the notarial will is written in English a language not known to Marcelina
because the latter was illiterate so much so that she merely thumbmarked the will, (d) the notary
public who notarized will admitted that Marcelina never appeared before him and that he
notarized the said will merely to accommodate the request of a lawyer friend but with the
understanding that Marcelina should later appear before him but that never happened.Honrado
still continued with the probate despite the opposition until testamentary proceeding closed and
the property transferred to Marilyn Sy.Nenita then filed this administrative case against Honrado
on the ground of misconduct.

Issue:
WhetherHonrado is guilty of misconduct for admitting into probate a void will.

Ruling:
Yes. Despite the valid claim raised by Nenita, he still continued with the testamentary
proceeding, this showed his wrongful intent. He may even be criminally liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or
interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
The will is written in English and was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate Marcelina.
This could have readily been perceived by Honrado that that the will is void. In the opening
CHAN, Hobart H.
14
paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language understood and known to the
testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix and
translated into Filipino language. That could only mean that the will was written in a language
not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision
of Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known
to the testator. Had Honrado been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the
anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting to
Marilyn Sy as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to Agapito who was still alive.
Honrado was fined by the Supreme Court.

2. LOPEZ v. LIBORO
81 PHIL 429

Facts:

In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir. Agustin Liboro
questioned the validity of the said will based on the following ground, among others: a.) The first
sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals; b.) That
the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements; c.) That Don Sixto used his thumb
mark to sign the will; c.) There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is
known by Don Sixto Lopez.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid.

Ruling:

Yes, the will is valid.

The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other
forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters. The
unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents
considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the
first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of
the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
Further, the first pages is captioned Testamento.

The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in Liboros
appelants brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to
have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.

Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for
this was that he was suffering from partial paralysis. There is nothing curious or suspicious in
the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a
matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good.

There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly placed in the will
that the testator knows the language being used therein. It is a matter that may be established
by proof aliunde.

3. GARCIA v. LACUESTA
CHAN, Hobart H.
15
90 Phil 189

Facts:

Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed by Atty.
Florentino Javier as he wrote the name of Antero Mercado and his name for the testatior on the
will. HOWEVER, immediately after Antero Mercados will, Mercado himself placed an X mark.
The attestation clause was signed by three instrumental witnesses. Said attestation clause
states that all pages of the will were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and
the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.
The attestation clause however did not indicate that Javier wrote Antero Mercados name.
Issue:


RULING:

No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused
Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testators name under his express direction, as required by
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

But is there really a need for such to be included in the attestation clause considering that even
though Javier signed for Antero, Antero himself placed his signature by virtue of the X mark,
and by that, Javiers signature is merely a surplusage? That the placing of the X mark is the
same as placing Anteros thumb mark.

No. Its not the same as placing the testators thumb mark. It would have been different had it
been proven that the X mark was Anteros usual signature or was even one of the ways by
which he signs his name. If this were so, failure to state the writing by somebody else would
have been immaterial, since he would be considered to have signed the will himself.

4. BALONAN VS. ABELLANA
109 Phil 359

Facts:

Anacleta Abellana left a will. In said will, she let a certain Juan Bello sign the will for her. The will
consists of two pages. The first page is signed by Juan Abello and under his name appears
typewritten Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana. On the second page, appears the signature of
Juan Bello under whose name appears the phrase, Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana this
time, the phrase is handwritten.
Issue:

Whether or not the signature of Bello appearing above the typewritten phrase Por la testadora
Anacleta Abellana comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a
will shall be executed.
CHAN, Hobart H.
16

RULING:

No. Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under
the will by said Abellana herself, or by Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with
the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name
be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction.
Note that the phrase Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana was typewritten and above it was the
signature of Abello so in effect, when Abello only signed his name without writing that he is
doing so for Anacleta, he actually omitted the name of the testatrix. This is a substantial
violation of the law and would render the will invalid.
5. NERA V. RIMANDO
18 Phil 450

Facts:
When a certain will was being signed, it was alleged that the testator and some subscribing
witnesses were in the inner room while the other subscribing witnesses were in the outer room.
What separates the inner room from the outer room was a curtain. The trial court ignored this
fact in its determination of the case as it ruled that the determination of this specific fact will not
affect the outcome of the case.
Issue:

What is the true test of the testators or the witness presence in the signing of a will?

RULING:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses
in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they
might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.

The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each
signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.
The Supreme Court, in this case, determined that all the parties were in the same small room
when each other signed. Hence, they were in each others presence (though the facts of the
case didnt elaborate the SC just ruled so). The SC ruled that if some of the witnesses were
CHAN, Hobart H.
17
really in the outer room (a fact which was not established according to the SC) separated by a
curtain, then the will is invalid, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being
done in the presence of the witness in the outer room.
6.TABOADAS v. ROSAL
118 SCRA 195

Facts:
Dorotea Perez left a will. The will has two pages. On the first page, which contains the entire
testamentary dispositions, were the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses and that of
Dorotea Perez. The signatures of the three instrumental witnesses were on the left margin while
Perez signature was on the bottom. On the second page, which contains the attestation clause
and the acknowledgement, were the signatures of the three attesting witnesses and that of
Dorotea Perez. The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will.
Taboada petitioned for the admission to probate of the said will. The judge who handled the
petition was Judge Ramon Pamatian. He denied the petition. Taboada filed a motion for
reconsideration but Pamatian was not able to act on it because he was transferred to another
jurisdiction. The case was inherited by Judge Rosal who also denied the MFR on the grounds
that a) that the testator and the instrumental witnesses did not all sign on the left margin of the
page as prescribed by law; that the testator and the witnesses should have placed their
signature in the same place b) that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
used in writing the will this, according to Judge Rosal violated the requirement that the
attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which
requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of
interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom
the property is intended to be bequeathed.
Issue:

Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate.

RULING:

Yes. The law must be interpreted liberally. Further, there is substantial compliance with the law.
It would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or
particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular
location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith.

The failure to include in the attestation clause of the number of pages used in writing the will
would have been a fatal defect. But then again, the matter should be approached liberally.
There were only two pages in the will left by Perez. The first page contains the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions and signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as Pagina
dos comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. Further, the acknowledgment
itself states that This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page.

7. CAGRO v. CAGRO
92 Phil 1032
CHAN, Hobart H.
18

Facts:
The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI of Samar which
admitted to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar
on Feb. 14, 1949. The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was
not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed by
the witnesses on the left hand margin. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3
witnesses on the left hand margin conform substantially to law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid
Ruling:
Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of
the will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear
their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation.
Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not substantial conformance to the
law. The said signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be
signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3
witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion
and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
8.GARCIA v. LACUESTA
90 Phil 189

Facts:

A will was executed by Antero Mercado wherein it appears that it was signed by Atty. Florentino
Javiwe who wrote the name of Antero. The testator was alleged to have written a cross
immediately after his name. The Court of First Instance found that the will was valid but the
Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision holding that the attestation clause failed: 1)
to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the
will by Atty. Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each
and every one of the witnesses; 2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by
Atty. Javier at the formers request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and
on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof 3) to certify
that the witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
Issue:
Whether or not the attestation clause is valid.
Ruling:
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Javier to write the testators name under his express direction, as required by section 168 of the
CHAN, Hobart H.
19
Code of Civil Procedure. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual
signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After
mature reflection, the SC is not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark and
the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
9. VDA. DE RAMOS v. COURT OF APPEALS
81 SCRA 393

Facts:

The late Eugenia Danila left a will wherein she instituted among others Adelaida Nista as one of
the instituted heirs. Nista petitioned before the court to admit the will to probate. The petition
was opposed by Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina Guerra. The two oppositors claimed that
they were the legally adopted children of Danila; that the said will sought to be probated by
Nista was obtained through fraud.

The two parties talked and they came up with a compromise agreement which essentially stated
that Nista is admitting the invalidity of the will. The compromise agreement was approved by the
trial court BUT Rosario de Ramos et al the other instituted heirs and devisees intervened.
The trial court allowed the intervention and set aside the compromise agreement. Rosario de
Ramos et al alleged that the Guerras repudiated their shares when they abandoned Danila and
committed acts of ingratitude against her.
Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to probate. The decision was appealed by the
Guerras. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court. The CA ruled that
there was a failure to prove that Danila was in the presence of the instrumental witnesses when
she signed the will this was because two of the instrumental witnesses (Sarmiento and Paz)
testified in court that the will was already signed by Danila when they affixed their signatures.
HOWEVER, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public before whom the will was executed and
who assisted in the execution, vehemently assailed the testimony of the two witnesses. He
affirmed Danila and the three instrumental witnesses were in each others presence when the
will was signed by them. Another lawyer, who was also present during the execution of the will,
corroborated the testimony of Atty. Barcenas.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in not allowing the will to probate.

Ruling:

No. The attestation clause was signed by the instrumental witnesses. This serves as their
admissions of the due execution of the will and thus preventing them from prevaricating later on
by testifying against the wills due execution.

The execution of the same was evidently supervised by Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before
whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is
attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The
object is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and
testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. There is a presumption in the regularity
of the performance of a lawyer with his duty as a notary public. There has been no evidence to
CHAN, Hobart H.
20
show that Barcenas has been remiss in his duty nor were there any allegations of fraud against
him. In fact, the authenticity of Danilas and the witnesses signature was never questioned.
The attestation clauses, far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting
witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in
the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a
Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they
may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the
prejudice of the others. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the
due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful
credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of
other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in
the manner required by law.
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the
instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to
participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the
attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant of the
instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to
retain those incidents in his memory.
10. Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Facts:
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz.
However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument
was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was
not executed in accordance with law.
One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was
acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground
that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses
even if the notary public was one of them.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC
Ruling:
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness
since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging
officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.
To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before'
means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into
two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of
the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.
CHAN, Hobart H.
21
Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental
witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves
himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the
very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud
III. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF WILLS

11. GARCIA v. GATCHALIAN
21 SCRA 1056

Facts:

Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. Appellant filed a petition with the court for the probate of said
alleged will wherein he was instituted as sole heir. Appellees herein, opposed the petition on the
ground, among others, that the will was procured by fraud; that the deceased did not intend the
instrument signed by him to be as his will; and that the deceased was physically and mentally
incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged execution of said will. After due trial, the
court rendered the appealed decision finding the document to be the authentic last will of the
deceased but disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Article 806 of
the New Civil Code that the will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. An examination of the document shows that the same was acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator but not by the instrumental witnesses.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure to acknowledge the will before a notary public renders the will void.

Ruling:

Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:

Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the
Clerk of Court.

Compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal provision to the effect that a will
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is
indispensable for its validity. As the document under consideration does not comply with this
requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be probated.

12. GARCIA v. VASQUEZ
32 SCRA 498

Facts:

Gliceria Avelino del Rosario owned an estate consisting mostly of real properties. During her
lifetime, she executed two wills. The first was done on June 9, 1956 consisting of 12 pages and
written in Spanish, a language that she knew and spoke and the second on December 29,
1960, consisting of 1 page written in Tagalog. During the execution of the latter will, the three
witnesses testified that Gliceria was apparently of clear and sound mind and that the will, which
was already prepared, was first read by Gliceria silently before she signed it in the presence of
the three witnesses and the notary public.

On August 8, 2010, Gliceria had her left eye operated because it is infected with cataract. In
spite the operation and her being fitted with aphakic lens, her vision remained mainly for viewing
distant objects and not for reading print.

On September 2, 1965 Gliceria died unmarried leaving no descendents, ascendants, brothers
or sisters. Her niece, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. De Precilla, then petitioned the Court of First
CHAN, Hobart H.
22
Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last will and testament or the second will of
Gliceria. This petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs.

Issue:

Whether or not Gliceria be qualified as blind within the meaning of the law.

Ruling:

Yes, Gliceria is qualified as blind within the meaning of the law. According to the testimony of
the ophthalmologist, when she said that Gliceria had apparently good vision, it does not
necessarily mean that she can read but that she is able to go around, take care of herself and
see. Thus, since Gliceria was incapable of reading, she could not have read the provisions of
the will supposedly signed by her. It is worth noting the instrumental witnesses stated that she
read the instrument silently which is a conclusion and not a fact.

Furthermore, the contents of the instruments were crammed in a single sheet of paper and it
contains allot of spelling errors. As such, Gliceria could have notice said glaring errors if she had
actually retained the ability to read the purported will and had done so.

With regards to private respondents contention that she was able to greet her guests on her
birthday, arrange flowers and attend to kitchen tasks, these does not prove that she was able to
read a closely typed page, since the act shown do not require vision at close range.

In conclusion, since Gliceria is qualified as blind within the meaning of the law, the observance
of the provisions of the Article 808 of the Civil Code should have been strictly followed in the
execution of the second will. Thus, the second will is invalid.

13. GIL v. MURCIANO
87 Phil 260

Facts:

Carlos Gil executed a last will and testament. After his death, it was presented for probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. This was opposed by his nephew, Roberto Toledo y Gil and
sister, Pilar Vda. de Murciano. Toledo was eliminated from the case since he has no legal right
to intervene.

The will was initially destroy and was reconstituted. The parties all agree that the reconstituted
will is a copy of the original will. In the said will, the attestation clause does not state that the
testator signed the will. It only declares that it was signed by the witnesses. Despite this defect,
the Court of First Instance admitted to probate the will. Pilar opposed such probate and
appealed the decision of CFI to the Supreme Court. The latter, reversed the decision of the CFI.
Not contended with the decision, Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, the administrator, filed a motion
for reconsideration to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid despite its defective attestation clause?

Ruling:

The will is valid. It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left out from the copy. The
problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law of wills which require
certain formalities to be fulfilled in the execution but by the rules of construction applicable to
statutes and documents in general. The court may and should correct the error by supplying the
omitted word or words.

It has been said, and experience has shown, that the mechanical system of construction has
operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That would be the effect in
CHAN, Hobart H.
23
this case if the will under consideration were rejected for the adverse party now concedes the
genuineness of the document. The genuineness is super obvious, and there is not the slightest
insinuation of undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator or fraud.

Coming to the execution of wills, the Supreme Court saw no legitimate, practical reason for
objecting to the testator instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the
presence of the latter. The will is of the testators own making, the intervention of attesting
witnesses being designed merely to protect his interest.

14. SEBASTIAN v. PANGANIBAN
59 Phil 653

Facts:

The probate of the will of Pedro Paganiban was denied upon the ground that the attestation
clause was fatally defective in that it did not strictly comply with the law. The attestation clause
in question and the will are in the Tagalog dialect.

The appellees make no objection to the translation of the trial court while the appellant contends
that a more liberal translation could have been made. From an examination of several Tagalog-
English dictionaries it is quite possible that this could have been done. However this court
accepts the translation made by the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the will must be admitted to probate.

Ruling:

In view of the facts in this case and the decisions cited above, this court is of the opinion that the
error assigned by the petitioner-appellant should be sustained and the judgment of this court will
be that the will of the deceased Pedro Paganiban y Jacob be ordered admitted to probate, and
accordingly the judgment of the trial court is reversed without special pronouncement as to
costs.

15. CANEDA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103554

Facts:

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, already in the twilight
years of his life executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses and he was
duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declared therein that, among other things
that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself
filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and testament but the
scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could
finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will,
sought his appointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his death, he
was succeeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate
court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective
such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.

2. Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant to
Article 809 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:
CHAN, Hobart H.
24

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses
certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of
the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of
execution and once signed by the witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with
the essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article
805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should
state:

1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written;

2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and

3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its
pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the
will in the presence of the testator and of one another.

Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of sense, while
subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that while it recites
that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly
state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking is the
statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot
be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which
would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809
of the Civil Code:

In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the
language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should
it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These
considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause
but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since
there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause
statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the
signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

16. GAN v. YAP
104 Phil 509

Facts:

Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap allegedly executed a holographic will dated November 5, 1951. She
showed this wills to her niece Felina Esguerra and three other relatives who visited her.Few
CHAN, Hobart H.
25
days after the said execution of the will, Felicidad was confined at the hospital. Accordingly, she
entrusted the said will, which was contained in a purse, to Felina. Before Felina gave the purse
to

Felicidads husband, Ildefonso, she had the chance to read again the will for the last time. After
the death of Felicidad, Fausto E. Gan, one of the beneficiaries of the will, initiated a petition for
its probate. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the
deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself
was not presented. Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements of
allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of the alleged will. After hearing the parties and
considering their evidence, the court refused to probate the alleged will. Due to the denial of
motion for reconsideration, Gan appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not a holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.

Ruling:

In the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since
as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at any
time, be demonstrated to be - or not to be - in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate
of a holographic will" New Civil Code provides, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such
witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's
handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."

The difference between holographic wills and ordinary will lies in the nature of the wills. In the
first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself, in the second, the testimony of
the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary). The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only medium of proof, if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses
are available to authenticate.

In the given case, the evidence presented by the petitioner was not convincing that such
holographic will was indeed executed. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and
probate a lost holographic will, the evidence submitted by the petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof
required.

17. ROXAS v. DE JESUS,JR.
134 SCRA 245

Facts:

After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, her family found a notebook
containing a holographic will. The letter-will was addressed to her children, entirely written and
signed in her handwriting and dated FEB./61. . A special proceeding was instituted by Simeon,
brother of Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the estate and consequently, he
delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana which
was then set for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the compulsory heirs filed an opposition to
probate assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana was not executed in accordance with
law. However, the lower court issued an order allowing the probate which was found to have
been duly executed in accordance with law. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz
assailing that the alleged holographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil
Code and contending that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year
of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with. The court then reconsidered its
earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on the ground that the word
dated has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.
CHAN, Hobart H.
26

Issue:

Whether or not the date (FEB/61) appearing on the holographic will of the deceased Bibian
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

Yes the date FEB./61 appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased

Bibiana Roxas de Jesus complies with the requirement of Article 810 of the Civil Code which
states:

ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date

FEB/61 appearing on the holographic will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial
compliance.

18. CODOY v. CALUGAY
312 SCRA 333

Facts:

On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition
for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30
August 1978.

Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a
forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated
appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was
in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.

Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the
records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voters
affidavit, but failed to as the same was already destroyed and no longer available.

The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceaseds
signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various
tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also
testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said
deceased.

The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late
husband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he
can not be sure.

The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of
the deceased which appeared in the latters application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent
Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had
become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.

CHAN, Hobart H.
27
Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on
appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly
declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory
or directory.

2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceaseds holographic will.

Ruling:

1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when
used in a statute, is mandatory.

In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for
their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the
deceased.

2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic will was that of the deceased.

The election registrar was not able to produce the voters affidavit for verification as it was no
longer available.

The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not
declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.

The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of
the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in
issue her motive.

Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a
document.

The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in
the holographic will.

(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)

A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator.

The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their
opposition.

The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.

CHAN, Hobart H.
28
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of
the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary
that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.

19. AZAOLA v. SINGSON
109 Phil 102

Facts:

On September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to
be the last residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the
holographic will, submitted the said holographic will whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made
the sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; that witness Francisco
Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of
the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his wife; that the witness testified also that he
recognized all the signatures appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix
and to reinforce said statement, witness presented the mortgage, the special power of the
attorney the general power of attorney besides the deeds of sale including an affidavit, and that
there were further exhibited in court two residence certificates to show the signatures of the
testatrix, for comparison purposes; that said witness, Azaola, testified that the penmanship
appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as
the signatures appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the
testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix; that said
witness, in answer to a question of his counsel admitted that the holographic will was handed to
him by the testatrix. "apparently it must have been written by her". However, on page 16 on the
same transcript of the stenographic notes, when the same witness was asked by counsel if he
was familiar with the penmanship and handwriting of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de Yance, he
answered positively in the affirmative and when he was asked again whether the penmanship
referred to in the previous answer as appearing in the holographic will was hers (testatrix'), he
answered, "I would definitely say it is hers"; that it was also established in the proceedings that
the assessed value of the property of the deceased in Luskot, Quezon City, is in the amount of
P7,000.00.

The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2)
that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same
was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956
as appears on the will.

The probate of was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent
must present 3 witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of
the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the
proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of
the testatrix."

Issue:

Whether or not Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be
denied by the adverse party.
CHAN, Hobart H.
29

Ruling:

Yes, since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not required to produce more
than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811
can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of 3 witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may
have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law, the
existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of
the proponent. The 3 witnesses must "know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and
can declare "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be
no available witness acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the
witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1
of Article 811 may thus become impossible.

IV. FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS ON WILLS

KALAW v. RELOVA
132 SCRA 237

Facts:
Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad,
filed a petition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained two
alterations:
a) Rosa's name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written
above it. Such was not initialled;
b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's name was written above it.
This alteration was initialled by the testator.
Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she would be
the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and
additions.
Issue:
Ruling:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined. However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the
effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains
in the will after that which could remain valid. That change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.

IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON
39 Phil 156
CHAN, Hobart H.
30

Facts:
After three months from the time the will was allowed probate, the decedents daughter
from the first marriage, claiming to be the sole legitimate heir, noted an exception to the order
admitting the will to probate. No petition was filed but her attorneys merely entered an
appearance on her behalf. Seven months after the probate order was issued, the same
attorneys moved the court to vacate the order admitting the will to probate.
Issue:
Whether or not the application for probate is allowed.
Ruling:
The application to set aside must be denied because it was filed out of time. Under the
Code of Civil Procedure, the application for relief must be made within a reasonable time, but in
no case exceeding 6 months after such judgment, order or other proceeding was taken. Such
judgment, order or other proceedings extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings like probate
proceedings. Although the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently
short, the remedy existed and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance
that on June 12, 1916, she in fact appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order
admitting the will to probate.

DELA CERNA v. REBABCA-POTOT
12 SCRA 675

Facts:
The spouses Bernabe Dela Cerna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where
they gave two parcels of land to Manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child.
When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939. Another petition for probate of the
same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the failure of the
petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954. The CFI held the petition
(Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate
jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that once a decree of probate
becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. The final decree of
probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite
the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an
error on the court but the decree has now become final.) The probate court committed an error
of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which did not affect the jurisdiction of
the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, a decision which is binding upon
the whole world. Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and
could not include the disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties
were still not within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her,
must be on her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered
a separate will of each testator.

GONZALES v. CA
CHAN, Hobart H.
31
90 SCRA 187

Facts:
Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces
of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate.
The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or
two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of five (5) pages including the attestation
and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the
pages. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the
probate. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and
attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a
will.
Ruling:
No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC)
and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good
standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order
that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not
mandatory that evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the
community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art.
820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the
convincing weight of his testimony in court.

GAGO v. MAMUYAC
49 Phil 902

Facts:
Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament. Francisco Gago petitioned for the
probation of Mamuyacs will, which was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa,
Feliciana Bauzon and Catalina Mamuyac. Court of First Instance denied the petition for
probation on the ground that the deceased executed a new will and testament on April 1929.
Cornelio Mamuyac,Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon and Catalina Mamuyac opposed. Said
will is a copy of the 2 will and testament executed by Miguel Mamuyac were cancelled and
revoked during the lifetime of Miguel, not the last will and testament of Miguel. CFI denied the
probation on the ground that it had been cancelled and revoked in 1920. Witnessed by Fenoy
who typed the will and Bejar who saw it actually cancelled by Miguel, because Miguel sold to
Bejar a house and the land where the house was built, he had to cancel the 1919 will.
Issue:
Whether or not the will in question had been cancelled.
Ruling:
Yes. Lower court accepted positive proof of the cancellation that was not denied. The
law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult to prove the revocation. Cancellation or revocation must either
remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search, the original will
cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession
of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence,
that the same was cancelled or destroyed, same presumption where it is shown that the testator
had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that
CHAN, Hobart H.
32
such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the
testator. The presumption of cancellation is never conclusive but may be overcome by proof that
the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. Since the original will of 1919
could not be found after the death of the testator and in view of the positive proof that it had
been cancelled, the conclusion is that it had been cancelled and revoked. In a proceeding to
probate a will, the burden of proof is upon the proponent to establish its execution and
existence. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of
revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its
cancellation perish with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great
caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate
with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in
evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or
destroyed by the testator.

AUSTRIA v. REYES
31 SCRA 754

Facts:
Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the
respondents, all have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children. During her
lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who
are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed. In 1954,
the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin
of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance
with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.4. The lower court
held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held that the testator
was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence.
Issue:
Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid
Ruling:
Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary
institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that
the falsity will set aside the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the
heirs will be annulled under Art.850 the following requisites must concur;
1) the cause must be stated in the will,
2) the cause is shown to be false, and
3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution
if he had known the falsity.
Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will
shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in
this case.

V. PROBATE OF WILLS

HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY v. HON. ROY S.DEL
ROSARIO
CHAN, Hobart H.
33
304 SCRA 18

Facts:
Petitioners, claiming that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Then, petitioners discovered that a portion of the properties were titled in the name of
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation. With the discovery of what
happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of TCTs; and its Derivatives; as Alternative Reconveyance of Realty with a
prayer of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with damages. On August 12, 1995, the
private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they have not
established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the
defendants, and that plaintiffs claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was
granted by the respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners
have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except the allegations that they are the
legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple.Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. Hence the
petitioners filled a petition for certiorari under rule 65.Petitioners contend that the respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be
determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners submission that the
respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of
heirship in the same case.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue of heirship should be simultaneously resolved in the same case
filed by the petitioners (Reconveyance of Property).
Ruling:
No. The issue of heirship can only be made in a special proceeding. The plaintiffs who
claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof
or even a semblance of it, except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays and that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of
property. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status
or right.

GALANOSA v. ARCHANGEL
83 SCRA 676

Facts:
Florentino Histosis executed a will covering 61 parcels of land in Sorsogon. His second
wife Dollentas was also twice married and had a son, Pedro, by her first marriage. Florentino
was childless and a widower whose only surviving relative was Leon, his brother. Florentino
died in 1939. His will provided 1/2 share be bequeathed to Pedro and 3 other parcels were
given to Fortajada, a minor and his protg. When the will was submitted to probate, Leon
opposed it. A project of partition was submitted by said testamentary heirs and was approved by
CHAN, Hobart H.
34
the court in 1943. In 1952, Leon filed a case against Pedro for the recovery of the 61 parcels of
land, alleging that they and their predecessors in interest have been in open and continuous
possession of the property in the concept of an owner. Pedro moved to dismiss the action and
the trial court dismissed the action on ground of res judicata for Leon never appealed the decree
of probate. In 1967, Leon filed another case against Pedro for annulment of Florentinos will
alleging that the will was procured through fraud and deceit. While in the 1952 case they alleged
that they were in possession of the land, in this complaint they had not been in possession since
Florentinos death in 1939. Leon contends that the decree for probate was done without
jurisdiction and that the order for dismissal was done with great abuse of discretion. The lower
court, applying Art 1410 reconsidered its dismissal order and ignored the 1943 decree of
probate and the 1952 dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not Leon have a cause of action.
Ruling:
Leon does not have any cause of action. The procedural law does not sanction an action
for annulment of a will. In order to take effect, a will has to be probated, legalized or allowed in a
proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of a will is mandatory. The1943 decree of probate
was conclusive as to the formal validity and due execution of the will. This means that the
testator was of sound mind at the time of execution and was not acting under fraud, duress or
undue influence. Further, the 1943 decree was a proceeding in rem and binding on the whole
world. Res judicata applies as there has been no appeal to the decree of probate, and the
absence of an appeal confirmed the succession of the testamentary heirs. Thus, the lack of an
appeal resolved the issue of ownership and such cannot be questioned in another action for the
recovery of ownership. The lower courts reliance on Art 1410 (the non-prescriptibility of an
action to declare the inexistence of a contract) is a mistake for it cannot apply to wills. The lower
court also never verified the misrepresentation of the parties when the parties cited a CA ruling
regarding the application of Art 1410.

PASTOR v. The COURT OF APPEALS
122 SCRA 883

Facts:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate
children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Sofia Pastor, and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor
Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter,
the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr.
whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted
against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which
included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr.
and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The
probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on
petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court
after denying reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all
pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the
hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the
ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court
required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was
still pending in another court, the probatecourt issued Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that
the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit
directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which Quemada was
authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his
CHAN, Hobart H.
35
assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being
immediately executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and
Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate
court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until
after resolution of oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his
wife filed with the CA a petition for Certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However,
said petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for
review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity.
Ruling:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The Order
sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly
resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the
dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is
manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator.
Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same
having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It
declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of
the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties. The
Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate
inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the
reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing
Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of
the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive
portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

V. PROBATE OF WILLS

4. JIMENEZ v IAC
184 SCRA 367

Facts:
Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez married Consolacion Ungson with whom he begot four (4) children,
namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During such marriage, Lino acquired
five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. When Consolacion died, Lino
contracted a second marriage with Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot the seven
petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginial, all
surnamed Jimenez. After Lino and Genovevas death, Virginia filed a petition before CFI praying
to be appointed as administratix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva
upon which Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. filed a motion for exclusion of his fathers name and those of
his uncle and aunts contending that they have already received their inheritance consisting of
five (f) parcels of land. However, the petition of Virginia wherein she included the said five (5)
parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of spouses Lino and Genoveva. Consequently,
CHAN, Hobart H.
36
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory
contending that such parcels of land were already adjudicated to his father and to his uncle and
aunts. The probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land and denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Virginia. The latter went to CA on a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking the annulment of the orders of the probate court, of which the CA dismissed.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed an amended complained before the RTC to recover
possession/ownership of the five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action
was barred by prior judgments and by prescription and laches. Thereafter, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. A motion for reconsideration was denied
as well as the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed before the appellate court. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not in a probate proceeding the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of
ownership.
RULING:
Petitioners present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.
The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action. It has been held that in a special proceeding for the probate
of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to intestate
proceedings as in the case at bar.
5. OZAETA vs. CUARTERO
9 phil 1041
Facts:
Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to Carlos Palanca
Taguinlay in 1929 and 1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had been duly
established by testimonial and documentary evidence. One of the pieces of evidence presented
was the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that he married Rosa Gonzales in
which marriage they had eight children.
Issue:
Whether or not the declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as
conclusive evidence of an existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator.
RULING:
Declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence of an
existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator of the said Will. Palanca executed his will
and he made the solemn declaration in said document that since 1923 and for some years
thereafter he maintained amorous relations with Maria Cuartero and had by her six natural
children whom, according to him, he had liberally fed and supported. He said nothing about
having married Maria; on the contrary, he declared that for grave reasons he regarded her
unworthy of being the guardian of the persons and property of his children by her and so
appointed Felisa Joson de Fernandez and the Philippine National Bank as guardians of their
persons, and property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will he spoke of his marriage
to Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him were
legitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage. Said declaration in the will may not be
taken lightly, as a statement of little significance. When he made said statement he was about
76 years old and must have felt that he had not many years left to live.

CHAN, Hobart H.
37
6. Coso v Fernandez-Deza
42 phil 596
Facts:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations
with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de
libre disposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred
Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was
set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the
testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the
testator.
Issue:
Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.
RULING:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have
that effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has
been variously stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to
avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind
of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather
than his own.
Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of
the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still
operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the
making of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.
And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying
an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised
by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the
influence destroys the testators free agency.
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the
time of its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario
Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to
destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or
fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust
disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered
to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.

VI. INSTITUTION, PRETERITION AND SUBSTITUTION
1. Austria v. Reyes
31 SCRA 754

Facts:

Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll
have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children. During her lifetime, Basilia
filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews
and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed. In 1954, the petitioners
CHAN, Hobart H.
38
filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and
that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law,
hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs. The lower court held that the
validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held that the testator was
possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud,
trickery or undue influence.

Issue:

Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

held:

Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does
not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will
set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be
annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the
will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is
favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on
the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.
2. Aznar v. Duncan
17 SCRA 590
Facts:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen
Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the
properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly
recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen
Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and
the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate.
Issue:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the
inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover
the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to of the entire estate.
RULING:
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share
to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the
legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest
of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

VI. institution, preterition, and substitution
NUGUID vs. NUGUID
17 SCRA 448
Facts:
CHAN, Hobart H.
39
Rosario Nuguid died in 1962, Survived by her legitimate parents, Felix and Paz Salonga, and
six (6) brothers and sisters: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto.In
1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the CFI a holographic will for probate, allegedly
executed by Rosario in 1951, some 11 years before her demise which state:
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a
certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may
have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga,
Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen
hundred and fifty-one.
Felix and Paz, the legitimate parents who are also the compulsory heirs in the direct ascending
line, opposed the probate on the ground that they were illegally preterited, thus annulling the
institution of Remedios. Petitioner insists that the parents as compulsory heirs are only
ineffectively disinherited and are entitled to receive their legitimes, that the institution of heir "is
not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said
legitimes.
Issue:
Whether it is a case of ineffective disinheritance, not preterition.
Ruling:
No. It is a a case of preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious. ...
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will
here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their
names altogether. They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of
their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition and
Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Analyzing the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will.
Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an
expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.

ACAIN vs. IAC
155 SCRA 100 GR 72706, 27 OCTOBER 1987
Facts:
Constantino filed for probate of the will of his deceased brother Nemesio. The spouse and
adopted child of the decedent opposed the probate of will because of them being preterited in
CHAN, Hobart H.
40
the will. RTC dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether there was preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line resulting to the annulment of
the institution of heirs.
Ruling:
Yes. Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned
therein, or though mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
As for the widow there is no preterition because she is not an heir in the direct line. However,
the same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not been questioned by
the petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he was a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear
case of preterition.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will,
the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers
and sisters.

RODRIGUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
27 SCRA 546 (1969)
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

VII. CONDITIONS, TERMS, MODES
NATIVIDAD vs. GABINO
36 PHIL 663
Facts:
Tiburcio Salvador executed a notarial will and instituted his grandchildren Emilio and
Purificacion as sole heirs. However, clause six is as follows: I bequeath to Doa Basilia
Gabino, the ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of a house and lot in
Calle Lavezares If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver
the same to my grandson Emilio, upon payment of the latter to the former P4,000.00. Executor
Emilio presented a project of partition stating that the clause six should be interpreted as giving
the right of usufruct only to Basilia, and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of P4,000
whenever Basilia should die, but that the ownership belongs to Emilio. Basilica opposed the
partition and claims ownership over the legacy. CFI ruled that ownership and dominion should
be given to Basilia, subject to reservation made in behalf of Lorenzo and Emilio.
Issue:
CHAN, Hobart H.
41
Whether the double condition imposed by the testator is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided
the testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose
conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and,
when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of
those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules
therein prescribed for conditional obligations.
In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he
bequeathed to Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the property, on condition that if
the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the
testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the latter.
It cannot be understood that the legacy covered on the usufruct because the plain and literal
meaning of the words employed by the testator clearly shows beyond all doubt the express
wishes that the legatees right of dominion should end at her death.

RABADILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
29 June 2000
Facts:
In a Codicil appended to the Will of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-
interest of the petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square
meters of land in Bacolod. The Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to
deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation
is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The
Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected,
Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of
the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Dr. Rabadilla died in
1983 and was survived by his wife and children (the petioner) .In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a
complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to
the heirs of the testator. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court.
Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution
and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.
Issue:
Whether Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because what
the testatrix intended was a substitution.
Ruling:
No. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by
reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, thetestatrix's near descendants would substitute him.
What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions
CHAN, Hobart H.
42
imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's
near descendants.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at thetime of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. In the said Codicil,
testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that
the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the
death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said
property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the
testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction
imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent
over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter
through the institution of the case at bar.

VIII. Legitime, Compulsory Heirs and Collation
VIZCONDE vs. CA
G.R. No. 118449, 11 February 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, Carmela
and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas
and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas.
Estrellita purchased from his father, Rafael, a parcel of land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan and
then sold such to Spouses Chiu, for P3,405,612.00. Using a portion of the proceeds of sale of
the Valenzuela property, she bought a new parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon
St., BF Homes, Paraaque. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car
while the balance was deposited in a bank. The following year the unfortunate "Vizconde
Massacre" came about.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition and
averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his
children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner, Mr. Vizconde, is one
of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter
of Estrellita."
Ramon also alleged that the transfer of the Valenzuela property in favor of Estrellita by her
father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the
proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of
Estrellita, is subject to collation.
The Probate Court nullified the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita, and
declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation, which was sustained by the Court of
Appeals.
CHAN, Hobart H.
43
Issue:
Whether the said properties are subject to collation.
Ruling:
NO. The attendant facts do not make a case of collation.
FIRST, the probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article
887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point.
SECOND, the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to
determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and
ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous.
The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction.
THIRD, the order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is
premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage.
Nothing indicates that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant
collation.
FOURTH, the order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was
gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque
property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00.37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to
Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is
now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Moreover,
Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heir" in the Paraaque property.
FIFTH, Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited
from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even
assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may still not be allowed as the
value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any
determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

IX. Reserva Troncal
SIENES vs. ESPARCIA
1 SCRA 750
Facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan,
Saturnino upon his death left Lot3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral
proceedings, OCT No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because
Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother Andrea Gutang administered the property for him.
When Francisco died, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed
the public instrument entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby P800.00
she sold the property in question to appellants for P800. - When thereafter said vendees
demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of OCT No.
CHAN, Hobart H.
44
10275 which was in their possession, the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the
corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507 which was denied.
Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, declared the
property in their name, executed a deed of sale in favor of the appellee-spouses Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes. Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring
null and void the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; and (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey
to appellants Lot 3368; Appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale
allegedly made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was
made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the
property.
Issue:
Whether the property is reservable, rendering the sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of
appellants is void.
Ruling:
Yes, as held by the trial court, the land in question is reservable property. Francisco Yaeso
inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried
and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter
was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses
in this connection that Andrea Gutang died, the lone reserve surviving her being Cipriana
Yaeso. In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates
two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2)
the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came.
The Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable propery but subject to a resolutory condition; that
heis like a usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to
reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition
that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the
vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch
much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaesowas still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became
of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in
exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar
resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the
reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation
shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person
obliged to reserve. In thepresent case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still
alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the
absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death.
CHAN, Hobart H.
45
While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became
effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to
reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to
the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal
therefrom.

EDROSO vs. SABLAN
25 Phil 295 (1913) G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
Facts:
Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son Pedro who inherited two parcels of
land upon the death of his father. Subsequently when Pedro died, unmarried and without issue,
the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother. The two uncles of Pedro,
Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming
that either the registration be denied, or, if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be
recorded in the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the
registration to Marcelina holding that the land in question partake of the nature of reservable
property and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles.
Issue:
1.Whether the property in question is in the nature of a reservable property.
2.Whether Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to cause its registration.
Ruling:
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without available
consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he
who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite
conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired
without a valuable consideration from another descendant, or forma brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within
the third degree and belong to the line where the property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land which
he had acquired without a valuable consideration, that is, by inheritance from another
ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is obligated to
relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The property is reservable.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any
doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion,
although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express provision of the law
the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should
possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by
law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do. On the
other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually or constructively or formally, in
CHAN, Hobart H.
46
their possession; and moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple
which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it.

CHUA vs. CFI
78 SCRA 414
Facts:
Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First with Patricia, he had 3 children: Ignacio, Manuel and
Lorenzo. When Patricia died, he married Consolacion de la Torre and had one child, Juanito
Frias Chua. Jose Frias Chua died intestate. After the intestate proceeding the court adjudicated
half of lot in question to Consolacion and the other half to their only son, Juanito. The two sons
in the first marriage, Lorenzo and Ignacio, received P3k and P1550 respectively (Manuel
already died received nothing). Juanito also died intestate without issue. Consolacion de
la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her
son Juanito in the lot in question. When dela Torre died, Ignacio and the heirs of Lorenzo filed a
complaint praying that the one-half portion of the Lot be declared as a reservable propertyfor the
reason that the lot in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 NCC.
Lower court dismissed complaint.
Issue:
Whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias
Chua gratuitously.
Ruling:
Yes. In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the
following requisites must exist:
(1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or
sisterby gratuitous title;
(2) that said descendant died without an issue;
(3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) that there are relatives within the third degree belongingto the line from which said property
came.
All of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito Frias
Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-
indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre
died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These
relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and DominadorChua and Remidios Chua, the suppose
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
According to Manresa, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or
by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part
of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return.
"The essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure
generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record
CHAN, Hobart H.
47
that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage
upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and
therefore gratuitous.
As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by
the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous.

IX. RESERVA TRONCAL
5. Larcerna v. vda de corcino
1 SCRA 1226

Facts:
Valentine Marbebe begot a daughter, Jacoba Marbebe, before his marriage with Bonifacia
Lacerna. Valentine and Bonificia had an only son, Juan.
Valentine and Bonifacia died leaving three parcels of land to their only son Juan. Juan, then,
executed a power of attorney authorizing the sister of his mother or his aunt, Agatona Vda. de
Corcino take care of the disputed land. Eventually, Juan died intestate and without any issue.
The Court of First Instance declared that the land is property of Jacoba being the half sister of
Juan. Agatona Vda. de Corcino and the nephews and nieces of Bonifacia questioned the
decision of the court. According to them, the case should be based upon Article 891 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which establishes what is known as "reserva troncal." According to
them, under this principle, the properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased
within the third degree, who belong to the line from which said properties came. Thus, since
Juan Marbebe inherited the land from his mother, they should go to his nearest relative within
the third degree on the maternal line or to his aunt and cousins and not to Jacoba Marbebe for
she belongs to the paternal line. This, however, was protested by Jacoba Marbebe. She
contends that pursuant to Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, brothers
and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in the order of intestate succession, and that, as
Juan Marbebe's half-sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit his
properties.
Issue:
Whether or not there is reserva troncal?
Held:
The provision on reserve troncal cannot be applied in this case. In reserve troncal, the
ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied.) This
article applies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an
ascendant from a descendant, and this is not the scenario in the given case, for the lands in
dispute were inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother,
Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not applicable in this case.
Furthermore, the Trial Judge, correctly awarded the land to Jacoba Marbebe. The said
decision is in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles
1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a sister, even if only a half-
sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes
all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line from which
the property of the deceased came.
Based on the foregoing, Jacoba Marbebe has the better right to succeed Juan.

CHAN, Hobart H.
48

6. Chua v. Court of First Instance
78 SCRA 406

Facts:
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he
sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua
contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the
name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel died without leaving any issue.
Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanito of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage. In the Intestate
Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating, among others, the one-half portion of
Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose's widow, Consolacion, the other half of
Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio.
By virtue of said adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion and Juanito.
On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time, Consolacion
executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son
Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the whole lot was issued in her name. Then on
March 5, 1966, Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or
ascending line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the first
marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint before the respondent CFI
of Negros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged
to Juanito but which passed to Consolacion upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable
property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article
981 of the NCC.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father
Jose Frias Chua gratuitously or not. (In relation to the first requisite of reserva troncal)
RULING:
YES.in Cabardo v. Villanueva, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or
be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does
nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that
the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from
the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property
CHAN, Hobart H.
49
in question to Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of
a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed
upon Consolacion and Juanito not personally by the deceased Jose in his last will and
testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding. As long as the transmission of
the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. It does not matter if later the court
orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito, to pay the Standard Oil Co. This does not change
the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in
question is subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891.

7. FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO
40 PHIL 480

Facts:
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, during his lifetime, married twice. The 1
st
time, with Antonia Faz
de Leon, with whom he begot 9 children: Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita,
Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena.
On becoming a widower, he married the 2
nd
time with Severina Faz de Leon, with whom he had
2 children: Mercedes and Apolonio III.
On January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio II executed a will instituting as his universal
heirs his 10 children, the posthumous Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz; he declared that
all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
Apolonio III died in 1891; his mother, Severina Faz, succeeded to all his property.
Severina Faz died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her
only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino. As such heir, said daughter took possession of all
the property left at the death of her mother, among those is that property inherited from Apolonio
II.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is reservable property

RULING;
At the death of Apolonio II, under a will, his 11 children succeeded to the inheritance he left. In
1891, Apolonio III died; he was succeeded by his mother Severina Faz (included in the
inheritance is the property in question).
That Apolonio III acquired the property in question by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his
father is without any doubt. Thus, when, on the death of Apolonio III, without issue, the same
passed by operation of law into the hands of his mother, it became reservable property, with the
object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the source of
said property.
When Severina Faz died in 1908, she left in her will said property, together with her own, to her
only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes. However, the reservable nature of such property
was not lost.
The law so provides that ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but only its
enjoyment, use or trust. The law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve the same for
CHAN, Hobart H.
50
certain designated persons who, upon the death of the said ascendants-reservists, (taking into
consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of
said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs.
These designated persons (reservatarios) are the relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant from whom the reservable property came.

8. Gonzales v Court of First Instance
104 SCRA 481

Facts:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died. He was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda
y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races.
Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.

Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y
Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la
Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. The decree of probate
was affirmed by the CA.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion
to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties
which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F.
Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties. Lower court dismissed the action
of Beatriz.

Issue:

whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal under art.

Held:

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or
is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant
should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from
the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property
came.

CHAN, Hobart H.
51
The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
She was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given
and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.

9. PADURA VS. BALDOVINO
G.R. No. L-11960

FACTS:

Agustin Padura married twice. He died leaving a last will and testament duly probated wherein
he bequeathed his properties among his children, Manuel (child with first wife), Candelaria and
Fortunato, and his surviving spouse Benita (2
nd
wife). Fortunato was adjudicated 4 parcels of
land wholater died unmarried and without having executed a will.The 4 parcels of land were
inherited exclusively by Benita. Benita applied for an later was issued a Torrens Certificate of
Title in her name, BUT subject to the condition that the properties were reservable in favor of
relatives within the 3
rd
degree belonging to the line from which the property came. Candelaria
died leaving as her heirs her 4 legitimate children (the appellants) Melania, Anicia and Pablo all
surnamed Baldovino. Manuel also died. His heirs were his legitimate children (the appellees)
Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana and Severino, all surnamed Padura.

Benita Garing (the reservista) died. The children of Candelaria and Fortunato took possession
of the 4 parcels of land (the reservable properties). CFI Laguna issued a resolution declaring the
legitimate children of Manuel and Candelaria are the rightful reserves and as such entitled to the
4 parcels of land.

The Baldovinos filed this present petition wherein they seek to have the properties partitioned
such that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, the other half to the Paduras on the
basis that they inherited by right of representation from their respective parents, the original
reservees. The Paduras opposed, arguing that they should all (all 11 of them) be deemed
inheriting in their own right hence, they should have equal shares.

ISSUE:

Should the properties be apportioned among the nephews of the whole blood and nephews of
the half-blood equally?

RULING:

CHAN, Hobart H.
52
No. Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of intestate succession
so is the rules that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of
brothers and nephews of half-blood. In determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply; the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.

Reserva Troncal merely determines the group of relatives to whom the property should be
returned. Within the group, the individual right to the property should be decided by applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession (since art. 891 is silent on the matter).

If the nephews of whole and half-blood inherited the propositus directly, the whole bloods would
receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood. Why then should the half-bloods
inherit equally just because of the delay in the transmission of the property (when it was with the
reservista)? The hereditary portions should not change.

10. DE PAPA vs CAMACHO
G.R. No. L-28032

FACTS:

Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs). Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4)
parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. Faustino
Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the
seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate
heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal. Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died
intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by
her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

Meanwhile, Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the
said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon
upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs,
also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-
half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon
from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also
third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not uncles and aunts, together with niece who survived the reservista would be
considered reservatorios.

RULING:

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the
specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its
application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree there is
no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this
spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class
but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
CHAN, Hobart H.
53
those reservatarios of more remote. And within the third degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews.

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the
one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

X. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
1. RODRIGUEZ VS BORJA
G.R. No. L-21993

FACTS:

Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila. On March 4, 1963,
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.On March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and
Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine
the alleged will but on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was
withdrawn.On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging that he died without
leaving a will.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco
Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.

Petitioners appealed relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court that the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

ISSUE:

Was the petitioners contention tenable?

RULING:

No.The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery
thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its
allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to
relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was
CHAN, Hobart H.
54
submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

2. DE LOS SANTOS VS DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-29192

FACTS:

Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named Marciana who is
the mother of herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several
co-heirs including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition Agreement purposely for the
distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to Maximo, in addition to
his share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the
estate which was the subject matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with
his obligation, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos answer, he
stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void
with respect to her, for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included in the
agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to the extrajudicial
partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from
Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. Maximo filed a Motion for New
Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the decedent, is an heir of the latter.

RULING:

Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit from the latter
by right of representation.

Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the full or half blood.

Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and
nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is
excluded by law from the inheritance.

3. ABELLANA-BACAYO VS FERRARIS-BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-19382

FACTS:

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt
Rosa Ferraris. Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was
declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate
among heirs. Hence, a petition for the summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left
CHAN, Hobart H.
55
no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives: 1)
an aunt and half-sister of decedents father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were children
of Melodias only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the settlement proceeding,
Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, who is the decedents half-sister, was excluded as an heir
pursuant to a resolution issued by the lower court. A motion for reconsideration was denied
hence this action.

ISSUE:

Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by
collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him?

RULING:

As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three
degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted
by first ascending to the common ancestor and descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code).
Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right
of representation unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided
expressly by Art. 975.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code.

4.DEL PRADO vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-20946

FACTS:

Eugenio del Prado is a legitimate brother of Anastacio del Prado, who died single and intestate.
Anastacio cohabited with Aurea Santos (who was legally married) without the benefit of
matrimony and they begot a son named Jesus del Prado whom Anastacio admitted as his son
in Jesus birth certificate. At the time of Anastacios death, a parcel of land in his name was
adjudicated to Jesus del Prado. Eugenio then filed a complaint before CFI to annul the deed
executed by Aurea adjudicating to her son a parcel of land left by Anastacio alleging that he
(Eugenio) was deprived of his rightful share in the estate of his brother. The lower court
dismissed the petition, and upon appeal to CA, the appellate court certified the case to Supreme
Court that such involved purely legal questions.

ISSUE:

Who has the better right to the parcel of land? Is it the minor left by Anastacio or the latters
brother?

RULING:

Since Anastacio del Prado died in 1958, the new Civil Code applies (Article 2263). Illegitimate
children other than natural are entitled to successional rights (Article 287). Where, as in this
case, the deceased died intestate, without legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his
illegitimate child shall succeed to his entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant
who is only a collateral relative.

CHAN, Hobart H.
56
5. CACHO vs.UDAN
G.R. No. L-19996

FACTS:

Silvina Udan, single, died leaving a will naming her son Francisco and one Wencesla Cacho as
her sole heirs, share and share alike. Cacho then filed a petition to probate the said Will which
was opposed by the testators legitimate brother, Rustico. Therafter, Francisco filed his
opposition to the probate of the Will while Rustico withdrew his opposition. After Franciscos
death, another legitimate brother of the testator, John, together with Rustico, filed their
respective oppositions. Consequently, Cacho filed a Motion to Dismiss the Oppositions filed by
John and Rustico. CFI issued an order disallowing the two oppositions for lack of interest in the
estate. The subsequent Motions for Reconsiderations were denied hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not John and Rustico Udan may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister,
Silvina.

RULING:

It is clear from Article 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at the
time of the death of the testatrix that the oppositor brothers may not claim to be heirs intestate of
their legitimate sister, Silvina.

These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in
the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sister
can concur with the widow or widower, they do not concur, but are excluded by the surviving
children, legitimate or illegitimate.

Further, the death of Francisco does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired
by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who
are legitimate brothers of his mother, pursuant to Article 992.

6. GREY VS FABIE
G.R. No. L-45160

FACTS:

Jose Fabie y Gutierrez, Ramon Fabie y Gutierrez, Miguel Fabie y Gutierrez, and Vicenta Fabie
y Gutierrez were legitimate brothers and sister; that the first, or Jose Fabie y Gutierrez, had a
daughter called Rosario Fabie Grey, who is the testatrix, and Ramon Fabie Gutierrez also had
two acknowledged natural children named Jose Fabie and Serafin Fabie, who are the
oppositors in these proceedings; and that Rosario Fabie in her will instituted as heirs her
maternal cousins Jose, Juan and Francisco, surnamed Grey.
Oppositors contend that they do not attempt to succeed their cousin by their own right but by the
right of representation. If Ramon Fabie were living, so they say, he would undeniably be entitled
to succeed his niece Rosario Fabie y Grey, in which case, upon the death of Ramon Fabie, his
natural children, the herein oppositors would succeed him, because Ramon Fabie had no
legitimate children. They cite article 924 of the Civil Code which defines.They also cite 925 of
the same Code reading:

ART. 925. The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but
never in the ascending.
CHAN, Hobart H.
57

ISSUE:

May natural cousins inherit by way of representation?

RULING:

No.The oppositors have omitted and put out of view the second paragraph of the said article
925 to this effect:

In the collateral line it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether
they be of the whole or half-blood.

The oppositors-appellants are not children of brothers or sisters of the deceased Rosario Fabie
y Grey, but of the latter's uncle, Ramon Fabie, hence, it is unnecessary to state that the right of
representation does not lie in this case. From this it inevitably follows that the oppositors have
no interest whatsoever in the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, wherefore, they are not
entitled to intervene in the proceedings for the probate of the said will.

7.CORPUS VS CORPUS
85 SCRA 567

FACTS:

Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus were married with 5 children: Pablo Corpus, Jose
Corpus and 3 others. When Tomas died, Ramona wed Luis Rafael Yangco and had 4
recognized acknowledged natural children, one of them was the decedent Teodoro Yangco.

Teodoro died on April 20, 1939. His will was dated August 29, 1934 and was probated 1941. At
the time of his death, he had no forced heirs. He only had his half brother Luis, half sister Paz,
wife of Miguel Ossorio (Amalia Corpus), the children of his half brother Pablo (Jose and Ramon)
and the daughter of his half brother Jose (Juana/Juanita). Juanita died in 1944.

On order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by
the administrator and the legatees named in the will.

Pursuant to a compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus (Juanitas son) signed a receipt
acknowledging that he received from the Yangco estate P2k as settlement in full of my share of
the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this
case. The legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the
Yangco estate which was approved by the probate court in 1949.

Tomas however still filed action to recover Juanitas supposed share in Yangcos intestate
estate, alleging that the dispositions in Yangcos will signal perpetual prohibitions upon
alienation which rendered it void under A785, OCC and that 1949 partition is invalid. The
decedents estate should have been distributed according to the rules on intestacy.

ISSUE:

WON Juanita was a legal heir of Teodoro so that she would have a cause of action to recover a
supposed intestate share in the estate

RULING:
CHAN, Hobart H.
58

No. Juanita, the petitioners mother, was NOT A LEGAL HEIR of Yangco because there is NO
RECIPROCAL SUCCESSION between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

Under Article 992, NCC An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child. A992 is based on the theory that the
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family
is, in turn, hated by the legitimate child. The law does not recognize blood tie and seeks to avoid
further grounds of resentment.

LEONARDO v CA
G.R. No. L-51263DE CASTRO; February 28, 1983

FACTS:
Francisca Reyes died intestate. She was survived by 2 daughters, Maria and Silvestra,and a
grandson,Sotero Leonardo (Sotero), the son of her daughter,Pascuala, who predeceased her.
Sotero and Silvestra both died.Cresenciano Leonardo (Cresenciano), claiming to be the son of
the late SoteroLeonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties seeking judgment,
amongothers, to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes,entitled to
one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with the otherremaining heir Maria-Maria
asserted exclusive ownership saying that Cresenciano is an illegitimate child who CANT
succeed by right of representation. TC ruled in his favor. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON Cresenciano is an heir in the inheritance in question
RULING:
NO. Other than his bare allegation, Cresenciano did not submit any durable evidence showing
that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. SC
safely concluded that Cresenciano failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in
this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. Even if its true
that Cresenciano is the child of Sotero, still he cannot, by right of representation,claim a share of
the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the CA, he
was born outside wedlock and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, Cresenciano would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca
Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code)
Anselma Diaz v. IAC
GR No L-66574 (150 SCRA 645)

Facts:
Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla. Juliana married Simon and out of their union were
born Felisa and another child who died during infancy. Simona is the widow of Pascual and
mother of Pablo .Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona.
Pascual died in 1970. Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976. Pablo at the time of his death was
CHAN, Hobart H.
59
survived by his mother Simona and sixminor natural children: four minor children with Anselma
Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta. On 1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the
sole legitimate heir of Simona. Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their minor
childrenfile for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part or intervening in
the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona. And on 1980 Judge Bleza issued an order
excluding Felisa from further takingpart or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of
Simona Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to theIntermediate
Appellate Court declaring her as the sole heir of Simona
Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren?
Ruling:
The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simonabecause of the barrier provided for under Art.
992 of the Civil Code:
Art 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child. Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are
illegitimate. Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992..
DIAZ v IAC
183 SCRA 427PARAS; February 21, 1990

NATURE
Second Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS:
It is undisputed 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. deSantero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe
Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were
born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero andthe mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero
was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in
1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona
Santero and hissix minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
ISSUE:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero ? her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or
her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? Could petitionersas illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,by right of representation
of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero?
RULING:
CHAN, Hobart H.
60
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin is the legal heir of Simona.
Ratio
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. The determining factor is the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate
child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if
the person to be represented islegitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him
because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of
representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.

DELA MERCED vs. DELA MERCED
February 25, 1999
FACTS:
Evarista M. de la Merced died intestate, without issue and left (5) parcels of land. At the time of
her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs. On April 20 , 1989, the three sets of
heirs of the decedent ,executed an extrajudicial settlement, adjudicating the properties of
Evarista to them, each set with a share of (1/3)pro indiviso. Joselito P. Dela Merced ,
illegitimate son of the late Francisco, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extra judicial and
prayed that he be included to share in the (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of corresponding
to the heirs of Francisco.
ISSUE: WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from Evaristas estate.
RULING:
No. Article 992 of the NCC is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an
illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is
prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child
inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from
the deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present
case is Article 777 of the NCC, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the
latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when
Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent,
Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Franciscos) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears
stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but
participates in his own right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in the latters share (or portion
thereof) in the estate of Evarista.

Eufracia VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. L-44051, June 27, 1985

FACTS:
Julia Capiao had an extra-marital affair with Victoriano Taccad, with one child and/or forced heir,
named Lutgarda Capiao, who then married Raymundo Zipagan. Raymundo and Lutgarda were
childless. Raymundo and Lutgarda died, the latter leaving no will. The plaintiffs herein
CHAN, Hobart H.
61
(relatives within the fifth degree) were consequently instituted as Lutgardas legal heir s to
inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extra-judicial partition.
Issues:
Whether or not the relatives of Julia may inherit from her illegitimate child Lutgarda?
RULING:
Relatives on the legitimate line have no right to inherit from all illegitimate daughters. It is clear
from the records that the petitioners cannot inherit from the properties in question because of
the Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on the legitimate child of Julia Capiao, they
cannot inherit from her illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao predeceased the
daughter, Lutgarda.

EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO vs CA
G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985

Facts: This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the CA now the Intermediate
Appellate Court which dismissed the petitioners' special civil action for mandamus for lack of
appellate jurisdiction over it. In said special civil action, the petitioners prayed that the trial court
be ordered to approve their record on appeal which was dismissed for having been filed out of
time.
The private respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on the following grounds:
1. THAT LEOGUARDA(ALIAS LUTGARDA)WAS THE ILLEGITIMATE DAUGHTER OF THE
LATE JULIA CAPIAO CONSEQUENTLY PLAINTIFFS ARE COMPLETE STRANGERS TO
HER LEOGUARDA AND THEY (PLAINTIFFS) ARE NOT THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
AND HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION, MUCH LESS PERSONALITY
TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS; and
2. THAT INSEPARABLY CONNECTED WITH THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE
STRANGERS TO THE LATE LEOGUARDA CAPIAO AND HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION OR
PERSONALITY TO PURSUE THE PRESENT PROCEEDING, IT FOLLOWS AS A
COROLLARY THAT DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS PRAYER FOR RELIEF ISSUE AS TO
MATERIAL FACT.
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of sale,
and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and
damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of
sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda
Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin. The latter filed a motion to dismiss which was however
denied for not being indubitable at that stage of the proceedings. The private respondent,
therefore, filed his answer.
Issue: WON the petitioners are correct in claiming the properties of the deceased.
RULING:The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda Leogarda is
undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad, retaining the
CHAN, Hobart H.
62
surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao Article 992 of the Civil Code, cited by the
movant, the defendant, provides:
Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.'

Santillon vs. Miranda,
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

Facts:This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying
the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon.On
November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence,
leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired
several parcels of land located in that province. Opposition to said petition was entered by the
widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the
following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except
three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta
Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the
properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration
of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if
administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was
better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
Issue: WON the petitioners claim is tenable.
RULING: If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... . One child surviving. If
there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of
the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law
refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be
understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996
speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently
Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b)
Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-
fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.

XI. COMMON TESTATE AND INTESTATE PROVISIONS
Baritua vs CA
183 SCRA 565

CHAN, Hobart H.
63
Facts: In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido
Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur,
figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and
operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger
died and the tricycle was damaged. No criminal case arising from the incident was ever
instituted. On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the
accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido
Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners. The petitioners, however,
reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-
estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners
herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son
Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary
damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. After trial, the court a quo
dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the
widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased
Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents),
extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners).
Issue: WON the surving spouse and her child are the rightful successors in interest.
RULING: Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the
successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil
Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2.
Neither do they exclude one another. Article 985. In default of legitimate children and
descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the
exclusion of collateral relatives
People vs Reyes
175 SCRA 597

Facts:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa City
registered in their names under TCT No. T-7471. Both are deceased, the husband died on
September 6, 1970 and his wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the following
children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R.
Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds
of Lipa City that the abovementioned property had already been transferred in the name of
Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa, Philippines" under
CHAN, Hobart H.
64
TCT No. T-9885. They further allegedly discovered that the conveyance was affected through a
notarized deed of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and
Patricia Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May
26, 1961. Upon examination of the document, they found that the signatures of their parents
were allegedly falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single
although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950.
Issue: WON the will of the deceased be admitted to probate.
RULING: The motion having been denied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA) which ruled that "the judgment admitting the will to probate is binding
upon the whole world as to the due execution and genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights
and liabilities are concerned, but not for the purpose of punishment of a crime." But the
Supreme Court reversed the CA decision by ruling that, in accordance with See. 625 of the then
Code of Civil Procedure which provides that "the allowance by the court of a will of real and
personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution," *** a criminal action will not lie in
this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
LEGARDA AND PRIETO V. SALEEBY
31 Phil. 590
FACTS:
A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and
the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda
in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby
applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in
favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.
ISSUE:
Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered
under the name of two persons?

RULING:
For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy.
However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered
land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the
time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of
losing his land.
GARCIA v. CA
95 SCRA 380

Facts;

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different persons
for the same lots, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was allegedly not
CHAN, Hobart H.
65
cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace the original title. On
August 9, 1918, a deed of sale for two parcels of land was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus
a bona fide occupant thereof. As a result of the registration of that deed of sale, TCT No. 4910
was issued to Lapus for the two parcels of land, E and G, and I TCT No. 4911 was issued for
the remaining five lots covered by OCT No. 983 However, the deed of sale was not annotated,
consequently, that title was apparently not cancelled. Consequently, OCT No. 983 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 112236 was issued to the Riveras. Later, Lots E and G of
the said title were assigned by Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia and TCTs
were issued to Cruz and Garcia. Thus, two sets of transfer certificates of title for Lots E and G
originally covered by OCT No. 983, were issued, one to the heir of Ismael Lapus and another
set to the successors-in-interest of the Riveras Garcia contends that his title is valid and that
the titles of Ismael Lapus and his successors-in-interest lost their right to the disputed lots due
to their negligence or inaction. Moreover, it was not annotated by the register of deeds on the
anterior or parent title which was not cancelled before 1963. It was that non cancellation which
led to the issuance of the duplicative title to the Riveras and eventually to the execution of the
controversial mortgages and foreclosure sales to the two banks

Issue:

Whether the 1920 title issued to Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should prevail over
the 1963 title issued to the Riveras and the subsequent titles derived from it.

Ruling:

The title of Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should be given effect. The title of the Riveras
and the titles springing from it are void.

A Transfer Certificate of Title cannot be nullified by the issuance 43 years later of another
Transfer Certificate of Title over the same lot to another person due to failure of the Register of
Deeds to cancel the Original Certificate of Title preceding the title previously issued
There can be no doubt that Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value. He validly transmitted
to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the disputed lots or parcels
of land. That title could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance forty-three Years later to
other persons of another title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to
cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapuz. This must be so considering that Lapus and
his interest remained in possession of the disputed successors in lots and the rival claimants
never possessed the same.
"The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevail, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or
only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate" (Hogg, Australian Torrens System 823, citing
cases and cited in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595).

VIADO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 137287

Facts:

Petitioners contended that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian
to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca averred that her brother Nilo employed
fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the
exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the
latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.

Issue:
CHAN, Hobart H.
66

Whether or not the preterited heir is entitled to her share in the estate.

Ruling:

When Virginia died intestate, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property included, was
transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children. The inheritance, which vested
from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the
heirs until partition.

Petitioners are vague on how and in what manner fraud, forgery and undue influence occurred.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the TCT issued.
The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is
not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir
shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation
of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

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