G.R. No.

181970 August 3, 2010

BERNARDO DE LEON, Petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY substituted by the CITY OF
PARAAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO, JR., RICARDO PENA and
REYMUNDO ORPILLA, Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Bernardo De Leon (De Leon) filed a Complaint for
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial
Court [RTC] of Makati City, raffled to Branch 135, against respondent
Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned corporation, as well
as its officers, herein private respondents Ramon Arellano, Jr., Ricardo
Pena and Reymundo Orpilla. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged
unlawful destruction of De Leons fence and houses constructed on Lot
5155 containing an area of 11,997 square meters, situated in San Dionisio,
Paraaque, which De Leon claimed has been in the possession of his
family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De Leon prayed that one,
lawful possession of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA be
ordered to pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on
Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from
committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful possession of
the subject premises.

The court a quo found merit in De Leons application for writ of
preliminary injunction and issued an order finding that plaintiff (De Leon)
has duly established by preponderance of evidence that he has a legal
right over the subject matter of the instant case and is entitled to the
injunctive relief demanded for and may suffer irreparable damage or injury
if such right is not protected by Law. It then issues a writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining respondents from disturbing the peaceful possession
of plaintiff (De Leon) and his co-owners over Lot 5155 and further, from
destroying and/or removing whatever other improvements thereon
constructed, until further orders of this Court. PEA sought recourse before
the Supreme Court through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a
Restraining Order, ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the court a
quo for issuing injunctive relief.

The Petition was later referred to the CA for proper determination
and disposition. The CA rendered a Decision discerning that the court a
quo did not act in a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against PEA. The Ninth Division
ruled that the court a quo was precisely careful to state in its Order that it
was without going into the actual merits of the case and that the words
plaintiff (De Leon) and his co-owners were used by the court a quo rather
loosely and did not intend it to be an adjudication of ownership.
Unfazed, PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a Petition for
Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage zone until it was reclaimed
through government efforts in 1982. However, the Supreme Court declared
that Lot 5155 was a public land so that De Leons occupation thereof, no
matter how long ago, could not confer ownership or possessory rights.
Prescinding therefrom, no writ of injunction may lie to protect De Leons
nebulous right of possession.

The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no motion
for reconsideration was filed. In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of
a writ of execution praying that De Leon and persons claiming rights under
him be ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession of Lot 5155.
Acting on its motion, the trial court issued a writ of execution, but
De Leon moved for reconsideration thereof and quashal of the writ of
execution. He adamantly insisted that the court a quos Order for the
issuance of the writ of execution completely deviated from the dispositive
portion of the Supreme Courts Decision dated 20 November 2000 as it did
not categorically direct him to surrender possession ofLot 5155 in favor of
PEA. However, the motion was denied. Dissatisfied, De Leon filed another
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.

De Leon then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the orders of the RTC of Makati City. In the same proceeding,
De Leon filed an Urgent-Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction but the same
was denied by the CA. Subsequently, De Leon filed a second special civil
action for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul and set aside the same
RTC Orders, including is order on the denial of its urgent motion.

PEA filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Demolition
[5]
praying that the RTC issue a Special Order directing De Leon
and persons claiming under him to remove all improvements erected inside
the premises of the subject property and, in case of failure to remove the
said structures, that a Special Order and Writ of Demolition be issued
directing the sheriff to remove and demolish the said improvements.

The RTC issued an Order
[6]
holding in abeyance the Resolution of
PEAs Motion. PEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[7]
but it was denied
by the RTC.


In its Decision
[10]
, the CA dismissed both De Leons petitions, on
the ground of forum shopping, and holding that an earlier decision
promulgated by the Supreme Court, finding the subject property to be
public and that De Leon has no title and no clear legal right over the
disputed lot, has already attained finality.
[11]
DeLeon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA denied it. Thereafter, PEA filed an Urgent
Motion to Resolve (Re: Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Demolition).
[13]
The RTC issued an Order
[14]
holding in abeyance the
resolution of PEAs Motion pending receipt by the trial court of the entry of
judgment. PEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[15]
but it was denied by
the RTC.

De Leon filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assailing
the decision of the CA. Subsequently, on May 15, 2008, PEA, on the other
hand, filed the instant special civil action for certiorari questioning the
Orders of the RTC of Makati City.

In G.R. No. 181970, De Leon questions the Decision of the CA on
the following grounds: (a) he can only be removed from the subject land
through ejectment proceedings; (b) the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
112172 merely ordered the dismissal of De Leons complaint for damages
in Civil Case No. 93-143; and (c) even though petitioner is not the owner
and has no title to the subject land, mere prior possession is only required
for the establishment of his right.

In G.R. No. 182678, the sole issue raised is whether respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
which held in abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Demolition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not PEA is entitled to the ownership of the land.
2. Whether or not the RTC of Makati acted with grave abuse of discretion in
holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs motion for a writ of execution.

HELD:
1. YES. As a general rule, a writ of execution
should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or
award.
[21]
The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must
conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment
promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed.
[22]


However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute
of ownership.
[23]
Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in
the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be
considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated partys
claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of
ownership.
[24]
Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the
delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to
possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was
rejected.
[25]
This is precisely what happened in the present case. This Court
had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that
De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independent of his
claim of ownership.

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is
essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the
property.
[26]
If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the
property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should
oust him.
[27]
No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the
decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such
event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove
the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a
reasonable period of time.
[28]
The removal of the improvements on the land
under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only
to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the
improvements.
[29]


It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears
upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
[30]
In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to
go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to
possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leons claims, the issuance of
the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted
modification of this Courts decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a
necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential
consequence of this Courts ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel
of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leons claims of
ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit
to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect,
amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.

2. YES. The Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition also appears to be a
circumvention of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
which limit the period of effectivity of restraining orders issued by the
courts. In fact, the assailed Orders of the RTC have even become more
potent than a TRO issued by the CA because, under the Rules of Court, a
TRO issued by the CA is effective only for sixty days. In the present case,
even in the absence of a TRO issued by a higher court, the RTC, in effect,
directed the maintenance of the status quo by issuing its assailed Orders.
Worse, the effectivity of the said Orders was made to last for an indefinite
period because the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Demolition was made to depend upon the finality of the judgment in G.R.
No. 181970. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders.

PETITION of De Leon DENIED
PETITION of PEA GRANTED

SPOUSES RODOLFO A. NOCEDA and ERNA T. NOCEDA vs. AURORA
ARBIZO-DIRECTO

FACTS:
Respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo filed a complaint against her
nephew, herein petitioner Rodolfo Noceda, for Recovery of Possession
and Ownership and Rescission/Annulment of Donation with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales. Respondent alleged that she and her
co-heirs have extra-judicially settled the property they inherited from their
late father on August 19, 1981, consisting of a parcel of land, described as
Lot No. 1121, situated in Bitoong, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales. She
donated a portion of her hereditary share to her nephew, but the latter
occupied a bigger area, claiming ownership thereof since September 1985.

Judgment was rendered in favor of respondent where the RTC (a)
declared the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated August 19, 1981
valid; (b) declared the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 revoked; (c)
ordered defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion of Lot 2,
Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 to the plaintiff
or her heirs or assigns; (d) ordered the defendant to remove the house built
inside the donated portion at the defendants expense or pay a monthly
rental of P300.00 Philippine Currency; and (e) ordered the defendant to pay
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
[2]
This decision was appealed
to the CA.

On January 5, 1995, spouses Rodolfo Dahipon and Cecilia Obispo-
Dahipon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, and
annulment of sale and damages against spouses Antonio and Dominga
Arbizo, spouses Rodolfo and Erna Noceda, and Aurora Arbizo-Directo with
the RTC, Iba, Zambales. In the complaint, spouses Dahipon alleged that
they were the registered owners of a parcel of land, consisting of 127,298
square meters, situated in Barangay San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales,
designated as Lot 1121-A. The Original Certificate of Title No. P-9036 over
the land was issued in the name of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon, pursuant to
Free Patent No. 548781. Spouses Dahipon claimed that the defendants
therein purchased portions of the land from them without paying the full
amount. Except for Aurora, a compromise agreement was entered into by
the parties, as a result of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed,
and TCT No. T-50730 was issued in the name of spouses Noceda for their
portion of the land. For her part, Aurora questioned Dahipons alleged
ownership over the same parcel of land by filing an adverse claim.

Meanwhile, the CA rendered a decision affirming the RTCs
decision and ordering petitioner to vacate the portion of the lot allotted to
respondent. Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court,
and this Court found no reversible error, much less grave abuse of
discretion, with the factual findings of the two courts below, and thus denied
the petition. The decision became final and executory, and a writ of
execution was duly issued by the RTC.

Petitioners instituted an action for quieting of title against
respondent. In the complaint, petitioners admitted that the case was
decided in favor of respondent and a writ of execution had been issued,
ordering them to vacate the property. However, petitioners claimed that the
land was the same parcel of land owned by spouses Dahipon from whom
they purchased a portion; and that a title (TCT No. T-37468) was, in fact,
issued in their name. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Execution,
and that a declaration be made that the property bought, occupied and
now titled in the name of [petitioners] was formerly part and subdivision of
Lot No. 1121 Pls-468-D, covered by OCT No. P-9036 in the name of Cecilia
Obispo-Dahipon.
[5]


Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res
judicata. Respondent averred that petitioners, aware of their defeat in the
case, surreptitiously negotiated with Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon for the sale of
the land and filed the present suit in order to subvert the execution thereof,
but the RTC denied the motion. After petitioners presented their evidence,
respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, stating that the claim of ownership
and possession of petitioners on the basis of the title emanating from that of
Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon was already raised in the previous case. The trial
court issued a resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The CA
affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata, or the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment applies in the present case.

HELD:
NO. The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely:
(1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes
a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either
before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered
on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the
claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the
same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles
governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as
evidence.
[8]
The first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to
the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule,
which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known
as "conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a
fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially
passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again
litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the
same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same
or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by
proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action
can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the
same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will
be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issue.

The foregoing disquisition finds application in the case at
bar. Undeniably, the present case is closely related to the previous case
(Civil Case No. RTC-354-I),where petitioners raised the issue of ownership
and possession of Lot No. 1121 and the annulment of the donation of said
lot to them. The RTC found for respondent, declaring the deed of donation
she executed in favor of petitioners revoked; and ordered petitioners to
vacate and reconvey the donated portion to respondent. The decision of
the RTC was affirmed by the CA, and became final with the denial of the
petition for review by this Court in G.R. No. 119730. In that case, the Court
noted the established fact that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the
portion donated to him by respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo, but he also
fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent
Directo, thus, petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining to private
respondent Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of
usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and
considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the
donor.
[12]
Clearly, therefore, petitioners have no right of ownership or
possession over the land in question.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material
fact becomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them.
[13]
Thus, petitioners can no longer question respondents ownership
over Lot No. 1121 in the instant suit for quieting of title. Simply
put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or
issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or
cause of action.

DECISION AFFIRMED.

ADELAIDA INFANTE vs. ARAN BUILDERS, INC.

FACTS:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (or
Muntinlupa RTC) was an action for revival of judgment filed on June 6,
2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. (or private respondent)
against Adelaida Infante (or petitioner). The judgment sought to be
revived was rendered bythe Regional Trial Court of Makati City (or
Makati RTC; Branch 60) in an action for specific performance and
damages.

The Makati RTC judgment, which became final
and executory on November 16, 1994, ordered petitioner to execute a deed
of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein
private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in connection with said sale;
register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala
Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of private
respondent. The same judgment ordered private respondent to pay
petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon petitioner's compliance with the
aforementioned order. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for
revival of judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was improperly
laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.

On September 4, 2001, the Muntinlupa RTC issued an order
denying the motion, contending that the case at bar is a revival of a
judgment which declared the plaintiff as the owner of a parcel of land
located in Muntinlupa City. It is this judgment which is sought to be
enforced thru this action which necessarily involves the interest,
possession, title, and ownership of the parcel of land located
in Muntinlupa city and adjudged to Plaintiff. It goes without saying that the
complaint should be filed in the latter City where the property is located, as
there are now Regional Trial Courts.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari. She ascribes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of respondent judge for erroneously holding that the case is a revival
of judgment which declared private respondent as the owner of a parcel of
land located in Muntinlupa City and (that) the judgment rendered by the
(Makati RTC) in Civil Case No. 15563 sought to be enforced necessarily
involves the interest, possession, title and ownership of the parcel of land
located in Muntinlupa City.

Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific performance and
damages before the Makati RTC is a personal action and, therefore, the
suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that,
consequently, the venue of the action for revival of judgment is
either Makati City or Paraaque City where private respondent and
petitioner respectively reside, at the election of private respondent.

The CA ruled in favor of respondent. It held that since the judgment
sought to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of
judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the place where the real property is located. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision but the motion was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue of the present action should be filed in
Muntinlupa City.

HELD:
YES. The proper venue depends on the determination of whether
the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal
action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the action for revival
of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place
where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the
category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with
the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

The previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to
it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondent has an established
interest over the lot in question; and to protect such right or interest, private
respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason
for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's
adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the
category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real
property.

The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the
complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place
where the realty is located-in Muntinlupa City.

PETITION DENIED.

ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR
and EDNA C. LINDO

FACTS:
Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner)
amounting to P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3%
compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment.
To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
4
(the
Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and her
husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also
signed a Promissory Note
5
and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his
attorney-in-fact.Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan.
All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner
to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against
respondents. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

The RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure
of the mortgage, because it was constituted without the consent and
authority of Enrico. The RTC, Branch 33 noted that the Deed was executed
on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed
by Enrico was only dated 4 November 1995. The RTC further ruled that
petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he
could file a personal action against her. However, the RTC ruled that it had
no jurisdiction over the personal action which should be filed in the place
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages
against respondents. Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative
Defenses and Counterclaims where they admitted the loan but stated that it
only amounted to P340,000. Respondents further alleged that Enrico was
not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna
without Enricos signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
case on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping.
Respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of
res judicata and lack of cause of action.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, holding that res judicata will
not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of the
same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action and
were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.

The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that a party may not
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on
a judgment upon the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal
of the others. The Court of Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a note
secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against
the debtor, that is recovery of the credit with execution of the suit. Thus, the
creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for
the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not
both. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of
action against Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he could not
split the single cause of action by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding
and a collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his
personal action to recover the amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of
multiplicity of suits.

HELD:
YES. The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of
action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt.
10
The
mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for
collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the
mortgage security.
11
An election of the first bars recourse to the second,
otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be
tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the
mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.
12


The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by
itself.
13
If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he
waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice versa.
Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed without Enricos consent.
Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the loan.
She claimed, however, that her husband did not give his consent and that
he was not aware of the transaction.
18
Hence, the RTC, Branch 33 held
that petitioner could still recover the amount due from Edna through a
personal action over which it had no jurisdiction.
The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Ednas liability is not affected by the
illegality of the real estate mortgage.

Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing
such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)

Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of
the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was
executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the
acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as
a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of
the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become final
and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court
of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these
courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to
observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing
petitioners avenue for recovery of the loan.

Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.

In Chieng v. Santos,
20
this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may
institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies
are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit
or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt.
21
In that case, however, this
Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held liable for the
balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.
22

The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent
one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or
consideration.
25
The principle is applicable in this case considering that
Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not
been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously
at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the
RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief
before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the
RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals
ruled that he should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already
stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner
might have against Edna.

Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust
enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural
rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision,
found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only
amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich
herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she
questioned the validity of the Deed.

DECISION SET ASIDE.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION (Now BPI/MS INSURANCE
CORPORATION), vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFMAKATI CITY,
BRANCH 66, and G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION,

FACTS:
GPS agreed to transport thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white
refrigerators in one of its Isuzu trucks, driven by Lambert Eroles (Eroles),
from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc. (CII) in Alabang, to the
Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. On its way to its destination,
however, the Isuzu truck collided with another truck resulting in the damage
of said appliances. FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), the insurer of the
damaged refrigerators, paid CII, the insured, the value of the covered
shipment in the sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, as subrogee of the
insureds rights and interests, sought reimbursement of the amount it paid
from GPS.

The failure of the GPS to heed FGUs claim for reimbursement, led
the latter to file a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage
against the former and its driver, Eroles, with the RTC. During the hearing
of the case, FGU presented evidence establishing its claim against
GPS. For its part, GPS filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to
evidence, which was granted by the RTC.

The RTC ruled, among others, that FGU failed to adduce evidence
that GPS was a common carrier and that its driver was negligent, thus,
GPS could not be made liable for the damages of the subject cargoes. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The case
was then elevated to this Court. OnAugust 6, 2002, the Court rendered a
decision
[3]
agreeing with the lower courts that GPS was not a common
carrier but nevertheless held it liable under the doctrine of culpa
contractual.

This Court denied GPS motion for reconsideration with finality.
[4]
In
due course, an entry of judgment
[5]
was issued certifying that theAugust 6,
2002 decision of this Court became final and executory on October 3,
2002. On October 14, 2002, FGU filed a motion for execution
[6]
with the
RTC praying that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the August 6,
2002 judgment award of this Court in the amount of P204,450.00.

On November 5, 2002, GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for
Execution
[7]
praying that FGUs motion for execution be denied on the
ground that the latters claim was unlawful, illegal, against public policy
and good morals, and constituted unjust enrichment. GPS alleged that it
discovered, upon verification from the insured, that after the insureds claim
was compensated in full, the insured transferred the ownership of the
subject appliances to FGU. In turn, FGU sold the same to third parties
thereby receiving and appropriating the consideration and proceeds of the
sale. GPS believed that FGU should not be allowed to doubly recover the
losses it suffered. GPS filed its Comment with Motion to Set Case for
Hearing on the Merits, which was granted by the RTC. Upon denial of its
motion for reconsideration, FGU filed this petition for mandamus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC neglected the performance of its duty
when it reopened the case, the decision of which has already attained
finality.

HELD:
NO. Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher
court has become final and executory and has been returned to the lower
court, the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the
decision and issuing the writ of execution.
[11]
In addition, a final and
executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief
not originally included. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the winning
party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a
court's ministerial duty. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the
superior court or reexamine it for any other purpose other than execution;
much less may it review the same upon any matter decided on appeal or
error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has
been demanded.
[12]


Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down.

But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
[13]
The exception to
the doctrine of immutability of judgment has been applied in several
cases in order to serve substantial justice.

In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there is
indeed a need to find out the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators. For
this purpose, a hearing is necessary to determine the issue of whether or
not there was an actual turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the
assured CII. If there was an actual turnover, it is very important to find out
whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third parties and profited from
such sale. These questions were brought about by the contention of GPS
in its Opposition to Motion for Execution
[19]
that after the assured, CII, was
fully compensated for its claim on the damaged refrigerators, it delivered
the possession of the subject refrigerators to FGU as shown in the
certification of the Accounting/Administrative Manager of CII. Thereafter,
the subject refrigerators were sold by FGU to third parties and FGU
received and appropriated the consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS
claims that it verified the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators from the
CII because it wanted to repair and sell them to compensate FGU.

If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU
profited from the sale after the delivery, there would be an unjust
enrichment if the realized profit would not be deducted from the judgment
amount. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if
blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.

PETITION DISMISSED.