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An Appeal for Reasonable Implementation of Academic Policies

Petition for Review of the College of Law’s Policies


With Respect to New Rules on Scholastic Delinquency
and the Recent Decision to Dismiss Certain Graduating Students
STATEMENT OF FACTS

At least two students have recently been dropped from the rolls of the College of Law in
the last semester of their senior year in Malcolm Hall. During the registration period for the
current semester, Petitioner Robin Bryan F. Concepcion [hereinafter, Robin] was told that
because he had been previously placed on probationary status during the first semester of his
freshman year (AY 2006-2007) and because he failed a five-unit elective during the first
semester of his fourth year (AY 2009-2010), he would not be allowed to enroll because his
situation fell under what is called the ―double probation‖ dismissal rule. Petitioner Mario
Vincent N. Diaz [hereinafter, Mario] had already finished enrolling when he was contacted
through his cellular phone and told that he should not have been allowed to enroll for the second
semester. Like Robin, Mario was placed on probationary status during the first semester of his
freshman year and failed the same five-unit elective in his senior year.

The ―double probation‖ rule according to the Handbook issued to Robin and Mario and to
the other members of U.P. Law Batch 2010 reads as follows:

Dismissal
A Student of the College shall be dropped from the rolls without the
benefit of readmission if:

xxx

3. having been placed on probation, he/she fails in more than 25


percent of the units he/she is taking in any subsequent semester.

These rules do not apply to students who are enrolling for the last
semester of their senior year, or for the last semester of their fifth year, in the
case of students enrolled in the evening program.

However, for AY 2009-2010, the last year of Robin and Mario in the college, the last
paragraph was repealed, implying that the seniors’ exemption was removed. Thus, when Robin
and Mario failed a five-unit elective in their senior year—which was more than 25 percent of the
units they were taking at the time—the exemption was deemed inoperative, and they were
dismissed from the college.

The two petitioned with the Dean of the College of Law to allow them to stay in the
College but the latter denied their petition. The two appealed to the faculty, and in a full faculty
meeting last November 6, their appeals were denied and the Dean’s decision was affirmed.

Seeing that there are meritorious reasons, both substantive and procedural, to seek the
reversal of the decision of the Dean, Robin and Mario have resolved to avail of the remedy of
appeal to the University Council.
ISSUES

I. Whether or not the U.P. College of Law [hereinafter College] has authority to unilaterally
amend the University Code provisions on scholastic delinquency.

II. Granting that the College has such authority, whether or not the College rules on scholastic
delinquency have been properly amended.

III. Assuming that the new rules meet Due Process standards, whether or not the rules should be
applied retroactively.

IV. Whether or not the Petitioners were wrongfully dismissed from the College.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. THE COLLEGE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE ―DOUBLE


PROBATION‖ DISMISSAL RULE

A. THE COLLEGE HAS BUT LIMITED AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ACADEMIC RULES

B. THE COLLEGE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PRESCRIBED DISMISSAL IN CASE
OF ―DOUBLE PROBATION‖

C. THE COLLEGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO AMEND THE UNIVERSITY CODE PROVISION ON


DISMISSAL AS A CONSEQUENCE OF PROBATION

II. THE COLLEGE DID NOT OBSERVE THE ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF DUE
PROCESS IN AMENDING THE COLLEGE RULES

A. THE COLLEGE DID NOT PUBLISH THE AMENDED COLLEGE RULES

B. THERE BEING NO PROPER OR EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO THE STUDENTS, THE SUPPOSED ―NEW
RULES‖ SHOULD BE DEEMED INEFFECTUAL

III. ASSUMING BUT NOT CONCEDING THAT IT OBSERVED DUE PROCESS,


NONETHELESS THE COLLEGE CANNOT APPLY THE ―NEW RULES‖
RETROACTIVELY

A. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF RULES APPLIES TO THE ―NEW RULES‖ OF


THE COLLEGE

B. THE APPLICATION OF THE ―NEW RULES‖ TO PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE OF


PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OR OF NON-RETROACTIVITY

IV. THE COLLEGE WRONGFULLY DROPPED THE PETITIONERS FROM ITS ROLLS

A. THE COLLEGE CANNOT DISMISS PETITIONERS ON ACCOUNT OF ―DOUBLE PROBATION‖

B. THE APPLICATION OF THE NEW RULES TO THE PETITIONERS VIOLATES THE RECIPROCAL
CONTRACT OF EDUCATION BETWEEN THE COLLEGE AND THE PETITIONERS

C. DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS FROM ITS ROLLS IS HIGHLY UNREASONABLE AND ARBITRARY
ARGUMENTS

An educational institution’s power to prescribe rules regarding academic delinquency and


retention is not without limits. Students have an interest in their continued stay in school that
constitutes property within the ambit of protection of the Due Process Clause. Article III, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or
property without due process of law. As will be shown, the ground and the manner by which
Petitioners herein were dismissed from the College of Law are contrary to law, principles and
reason.

I. THE COLLEGE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE


“DOUBLE PROBATION” DISMISSAL RULE.

A. THE COLLEGE’S AUTHORITY TO


PRESCRIBE ACADEMIC RULES IS
LIMITED.

An educational institution’s academic freedom allows it to decide for itself its aims and
objectives, including how best to attain them. Be that as it may, such freedom is not a license that
justifies any and all acts done allegedly in its name. Academic freedom is qualified by (1)
principles of fairness and reasonableness, and (2) by specific rules the academic institution has
agreed to observe in conducting its business.1 No less than the Supreme Court of the Philippines
has enunciated, in a long line of cases, that educational institutions may not renege from and
must ―meticulously observe‖ the very academic standards it endeavored to uphold.2

In this regard, Article 85 of the University of the Philippines System Code [hereinafter
―University Code‖] categorically mandates that each faculty has the power to ―administer the
educational and internal life of the college within the limits prescribed by the rules of the
University System‖ [Emphasis added].

B. THE COLLEGE GRAVELY ABUSED


ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
PRESCRIBED DISMISSAL IN CASE OF
“DOUBLE PROBATION”.

―Probation,‖ by its very term, implies a ―test‖3 and, corollarily, an opportunity to prove or
redeem oneself.4 Thus, for a person placed on probation, such is not simply a test but, more
importantly, also a chance for redemption.

1
Isabelo v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, G.R. No. 103142, Nov. 8, 1993
2
Villar v. TIP, 220 Phil. 379
3
Black’s Law Dictionary
4
Mariwasa Manufacturing v. Leogardo (1989)
While the College of Law’s Student Handbook is silent as to the purpose of probation,
other relevant references affirm the above interpretation. The Office of the Guidance Counselor
of the University of the Philippines notes that, based on practice, a student is placed on probation
in order to give him the opportunity to make up for his poor performance on a given semester.
The same meaning and purpose of probation is followed by other Universities in other counries:
it is a period to help and address the concern of a student who is unable to perform well,
academically.5 It is implemented as a restorative measure, rather than a punitive one. Thus, most
schools have a probation and/or assistance program that helps the students ―recover‖ and succeed
academically. These measures include, among others, advisement, referral, and other mediation
methods.

Where restrictions are imposed upon a student, they are geared towards helping the
student improve his/her academic standing. In the Harvard University, for instance, being placed
on probation entails:

―A student on probation must attend all classes and be especially


conscientious about all academic responsibilities. If the unsatisfactory
academic record is related to participation in extracurricular activity, the
Administrative Board may at its discretion restrict participation . . . It is
the hope of the Administrative Board that the structure imposed by
probation will help the student resume satisfactory progress toward the
degree [Emphasis added].‖6

While it is admitted that the College has discretionary powers to define the consequences
of probation, it certainly may not go beyond its very term. Practices worldwide have shown that
such measures are instituted to benefit – not punish – the student.

The College of Law’s rule on double probation goes against the very grain of its term.
Accordingly, once a student in the College of Law is placed on probation, he/she can no longer
afford to be placed on probation at any time thereafter. Otherwise, the student shall be dismissed
– even where such student had already made good his academic standing. Thus, in the College of
Law, a student placed on probation is placed at a position of prejudice for the rest of his/her stay
at the College. This rule is highly unreasonable in view of the meaning and purpose of probation,
as observed by the different Universities worldwide.

5
Mount Aloysius College, Iowa Lakes Community College
6
Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Student Handbook.
<http://webdocs.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/ugrad_handbook/current/chapter5/actionsad.html>
C. THE COLLEGE HAS NO AUTHORITY
TO AMEND THE UNIVERSITY CODE
PROVISION ON DISMISSAL DUE TO
VIOLATION OF PROBATION
CONDITION.

Article 390 of the University Code provides that a student who was placed on probation
pursuant to Article 389 shall be dropped from the rolls of his college if the student again fails in
fifty percent (50%) or more of the total number of units he received final grades in. Unlike
Article 3897 respecting the number of units required to place a student on probation, Article 3908
does not include the phrase, ―[t]he faculty of each college or school shall approve suitable and
effective provisions governing undergraduate delinquent students, subject to the following
minimum standards‖; thereby implying that while the faculty of the college has the power to
provide for rules over and above the standards set by Art. 389, it does not have the same power
with respect to the standards set by Art. 390 on the extent and breadth of delinquency allowed
when a student is already under probation.

In other words, the University did not grant the constituent colleges the liberty to alter
this rule; otherwise, Article 390 would have been drafted with the same chapeau as Article 389.
Considering, however, that the double probation rule of the College imposes a more onerous
consequence of probation than what is provided by Article 390 and that, aside from being highly
unreasonable, it goes against the very standard that the University has set, it is respectfully
submitted that the College’s double probation rule is being imposed without authority or basis in
law. Being an act done ultra vires, this rule must be declared null and void.

Assuming that the College does have authority to set double probation standards over and
above the University standards, another ground for the new rule not to apply to Mario and Robin
is that the College rules were amended without observing the principles of due process.

7
Article 389. The faculty of each college or school shall approve suitable and effective provisions governing
undergraduate delinquent students, subject to the following minimum standards [Emphasis added]:
a. Warning. – Any student who obtains final grades at the end of the semester below ―3‖ in 25 per cent to 49
per cent of the total number of academic units in which he is registered shall be warned by the Dean or
Director to improve his work;
b. Probation. – Any student who, at the end of the semester obtains final grades below ―3‖ in 50 per cent to 75
per cent of the total number of academic units in which he has final grades shall be placed on probation for
the succeeding semester and his load shall be limited to the extent to be determined by the Dean or
Director;
c. Dismissal. – Any student who, at the end of the semester obtains final grades below ―3‖ in at least 76 per
cent of the total number of academic units in which he receives final grades shall be dropped from the rolls
of his college or school.
8
Article 390. Any student on probation in accordance with the preceding article who again fails in 50 per cent or
more of the total number of units which he receives final grades shall be dropped from the rolls of his college or
school subject to the provisions of the following article.
II. THE COLLEGE DID NOT OBSERVE THE ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF DUE
PROCESS IN AMENDING THE COLLEGE RULES.

A. THE COLLEGE DID NOT PUBLISH


THE AMENDED COLLEGE RULES.

A Memorandum9 dated 16 November 2009 from the Office of the Dean inacurrately
stipulates that the revised rules on academic delinquency were: ―a) presented to the Law Student
Government [hereinafter LSG] and other student representatives during the Student-Faculty
Conference on 21-22 March 2009; b) approved by the full Faculty with the LSG President
present on 8 April 2009; c) circulated by the LSG to students through e-mail on May 2009; d)
explained by the Dean to each batch at the start of the 1st Semester AY 2009-2010; and e) given
to all freshmen students during the orientation.‖

These stipulations are inaccurate and misleading.

During the said Student-Faculty Conference where student representatives were present,
the removal of the exception of the application of the rules on dismissal was clearly just a
proposal and was not yet decided upon. A copy of the PowerPoint file (herein attached as
―Annex A‖) which was presented in the said Conference reveals the following:

Dismissal
 A student of the College shall be dropped from the rolls without the benefit of
readmission if:
1. He/she is unable to pass at least 50 percent of the academic units taken
in any semester;
2. Being on probation, he/she fails in any one of the courses he/she is
taking;
3. Having been placed on probation, he/she fails in more than 25 percent
of the units he/she is taking in any subsequent semester.
 These rules do not apply to students, who are enrolling for the last semester of
their senior year, or for the last semester of their fifth year, in the case of
students enrolled in the evening program.
 PROPOSAL: TO DELETE THIS PARAGRAPH [Emphasis added]

During the same Conference, the removal of the exception for seniors was not deliberated
upon, much less was a vote on the proposal conducted. The LSG was not given sufficient
opportunity to conduct consultations with the students as the full faculty meeting was held only
17 days after the proposal was presented in the student-faculty conference.

The LSG president was not present during the said 8 April 2009 faculty meeting. The
stipulation in the Memorandum stating otherwise is not correct.

9
Memorandum No. MVFL 2009-1301.
The email circulated by the LSG (herein attached as ―Annex B‖) clearly shows that it was
drafted by the LSG and did not come from the College. It should therefore not be considered as
an official notice from the College. The LSG came out with the email precisely because the
College refused to issue an official memo of the changes despite the LSG’s repeated requests.
The email does not purport to be a comprehensive list of the new rules on delinquency but only
an attempt to answer frequently posed questions to the LSG at the time. The College should not
be allowed to use as a convenient excuse the email of the LSG which was sent out because the
College did not perform its duty of officially notifying students of the changes to the academic
rules and rules on dismissal.

It is admitted that the Dean did hold a convocation with the students during the
registration week. However, the rule regarding the removal of the exceptions for seniors was not
mentioned much less was it made clear. During the convocation, the issues discussed revolved
around the concerns of the students regarding the newly imposed deblocking system and another
new rule providing for another ground for dismissal.10 Even if the Dean mentioned the
amendments during the convocation, it would have been too late because prior to the registration
day, students have already made bids for the subjects that they wanted. 11 Moreover, by the time
the Dean held the convocation at 12 noon, almost half of the seniors had already validated their
enrollment, while others had already paid their tuition. Further still, the students could not be
expected to rely solely on their memory when it comes to the new delinquency rules.

Finally, that the new rules were given to the incoming freshmen of AY 2009-2010 during
their orientation is irrelevant. The fact still remains that the seniors, including Mario and Robin,
were not given any sufficient notice of the said changes on or before their registration. The fact
that only freshmen were given ―written copies‖ of the new rules is an indication that it was
intended to apply prospectively only to their batch.

All of these circumstances point to only one conclusion: the College did not officially
publish the new rules on scholastic delinquency.

10
This is the ―Three-Strike Rule‖ which states that any student who incurs a grade of ―5.0‖ for any three subjects
during her/his entire stay in the College, no matter what the units of those subjects are, will be dropped from the
rolls.
11
The College of Law employs the ―Point Allocation System‖ or the ―Bidding System‖ wherein students are given a
certain number of points which they can distribute according to their preference among the classes they wish to take
the coming semester. This bidding is done online, a few days before the actual registration.
B. THERE BEING NO PROPER OR
EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO THE
STUDENTS, THE SUPPOSED “NEW
RULES” SHOULD BE DEEMED
INEFFECTUAL.

The College cannot fairly argue that the students had constructive notice of the new rules.
Such a claim would presuppose proper and effective publication and dissemination of the new
rules on the part of the College. As has been shown above, there simply was no such official
notice. Without such official notice, Petitioners Mario and Robin had no opportunity to make
informed decisions regarding which subjects to take or to plan their academic strategy in light of
the supposed new rules.

The confusion caused by the non-publication of the ―New Rules‖, compounded by the
chaotic interpretation and implementation thereof, prejudiced not only the Petitioners but many
other students of the College. Since there was no proper or effective notice, the new rules should
be deemed ineffective and not be allowed to operate against the students, pending their formal
publication.

III. ASSUMING BUT NOT CONCEDING THAT IT OBSERVED DUE PROCESS,


NONETHELESS THE COLLEGE CANNOT APPLY THE “NEW RULES”
RETROACTIVELY.

The LSG, on its own initiative, sent out a message via email on 06 May 2009 outlining
the amendments made by the Dean in the rules. It is worthy to note that the said mail was pre-
approved by the Dean. The message contained the following provision:

―6. Non-retroactivity of the Amendments

The amendments mentioned shall not take effect retroactively.‖


[Emphasis supplied]

This was circulated among the student body who interpreted the same to manifest that it was the
intention of the administration to apply the amendments prospectively. Despite this, the College
implemented a contrary interpretation of this provision, applying the said amended rules
immediately to current graduating students and to students currently enrolling for their last
semester.
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION OF RULES APPLIES TO
THE “NEW RULES” OF THE
COLLEGE.

The principle of prospectivity provides that statutes, rules, guidelines, including


administrative rulings and circulars, shall be presumed as having only a prospective operation.12
This principle recognizes the inherent injustice that results from applying rules to facts that have
already occurred prior to the rules’ effectivity. Rules serve to act as guides for future conduct.
Thus, rules should not be made to apply retroactively, especially if, by doing so, they would
prejudice those who are governed.

The only exception to the general principle of prospective application of rules is when
retroactive application is expressly mandated in the rules, or when it can be reasonably inferred
from the text of the rules that retroactive application is implied.13

There is nothing in the ―New Rules‖ of the College that suggests retroactive application
thereof. In the first place, the rules were not published and as such, there could not possibly have
been an express provision for retroactivity. Secondly, the Dean himself, by approving the LSG’s
email on the ―New Rules‖, affirmed the students’ interpretation that such rules are non-
retroactive. Clearly then, the rules cannot be given retroactive application.

On 16 November 2009, the Dean held a meeting of representatives from different


organizations in the college. On 18 November 2009, the Dean met with the students in a forum
to discuss the new academic policies. In both of these meetings, the Dean recognized that a
miscommunication concerning the term ―prospectively‖ occurred during the faculty meeting
wherein the ―New Rules‖ were approved. According to the Dean, some members of the faculty
interpreted it to mean that the amended rules would not affect the graduating students, while
others thought that it would precisely apply even to graduating students. The Dean conceded that
the ―Prospectivity‖ provision of the amendments can be viewed in several ways. In light of this
admission, it is respectfully submitted that doubts in the interpretation of these rules should be
resolved in favor of the students, and strictly against the author of these changes, especially
considering that the students were not empowered to participate in the formulation of these

12
Montilla vs. Agustinia Corp., 24 Phil. 220 (1913); Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 (1925); Iburan vs. Labes. 87
Phil. 234 (1950); Napiza vs. Milicio, 100 Phil. 284 (1956); De Garcia vs. San Jose, 94 Phil. 623 (1954);
Nepomuceno vs. Ocampo, 95 Phil. 292 (1954); Universal Corn Products, Inc. vs. Rice and Corn Board, G.R. No.
21013, August 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1048; Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 34586, April 2, 1984.
13
Buyco vs. Philippine National Bank, 112 Phil. 588 (1961); Pacia vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR.,
99 Phil. 45 (1956).
amendments. Those who made the ambiguous rules possible should therefore take responsibility
for this ambiguity. Doubts should be resolved against the retroactive effect of an amendment.14

B. THE APPLICATION OF THE “NEW


RULES” TO PETITIONERS VIOLATED
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION.

The application of the ―New Rules‖ to Petitioners Mario and Robin is a clear violation of
the principle of prospectivity and has caused them grave prejudice. The principle was violated in
two ways: 1) by expanding the consequences of past behavior; and 2) by applying the new rule
to petitioners when they were already classified as ―graduating students.‖

Firstly, the repeal of the exceptions granted to seniors in effect expanded the
consequences attached to their past behavior. Before the new rule, being on probationary status
entailed the following consequences: (a) the student will be forced to underload the following
semester; (b) the student should not get a grade of 5.0 in any subject the following semester
otherwise s/he will be dropped from the rolls; (c) the student will no longer be eligible for
honors; and (d) the student should not fail more than 25 percent of the units s/he is taking in any
semester until s/he finishes her/his junior, otherwise s/he will be dropped from the rolls.

With the repeal of the exceptions for seniors, however, an additional and more onerous
consequence to Petitioners Mario and Robin’s first probation was placed. The ―new rule‖ in
effect expanded the last consequence to state that a student who had previously been placed on
probationary status should not fail more than 25 percent of the units s/he is taking in any
semester even until her/his senior year, otherwise s/he would be dropped from the rolls. The
application of the new rule to Petitioners Mario and Robin clearly expanded and made more
onerous the consequences of their past behavior. This, in essence, is the very definition of
retroactivity.

Secondly, the new rule was made to apply to students who were already within the scope
of the exemption.

The administration argues that a prospective application of the rules was followed in
Mario and Robin’s cases. They submit that the deletion of the proviso that exempts graduating
students from the rule on double probation were proposed some time in March 2009 and was
subsequently approved by the faculty in April 2009. The administration concludes that since the
second probation occurred after the approval by the faculty of the amendments, the rules on
scholastic delinquency should apply to the petitioners herein. The administration further insists
14
Montilla vs. Agustinian Corp., 24 Phil 220 (1913)
that the Double Probation Rule is not an innovation but rather an old rule that was consistently
applied to previous graduates of the college. Hence, they argue that this rule should apply to the
present case.

The administration’s first contention that the rule is indeed being applied prospectively
does not consider several material acts and events that have already transpired even prior to the
passage of the amendments. Foremost of these is that when the students were notified of the
deletion of the immunity of graduating students, petitioners Robin and Mario were already
―graduating students‖ which exempts them from the application of the amended rule. In this
instance, the provision on probation is instructive. It states:

Probation

―...For purposes of this rule, a student is considered a candidate for


graduation if he/she has passed at least 75 percent of the total number of
units for graduation.‖

Although found under the provisions concerning ―probation,‖ neither the College Handbook nor
the University Code provides any other working definition of the said term. It is thus only
reasonable that the above-cited definition be adopted in ascertaining who are ―graduating
students.‖ With this definition in mind, petitioners Robin and Mario were already ―graduating
students‖ as of April 2009, both having completed more than 75% of the required units to
complete the course.

More than this, when they were notified of the deletion of the graduating students’
exemption15 from these rules, they have already enlisted in the subjects for the second semester
of their senior year and have almost completed the registration process. Petitioners Robin and
Mario were wrongfully dismissed precisely on the last semester of their senior year, based on a
rule that was not properly published, and which was made to apply retroactively by factoring in
their past acts.

Taken collectively, what these facts reveal is that, even before the changes in the rules
were made, and even before students were effectively apprised of such changes in the rules, both
petitioners already attained the status of graduating students enrolling for their last semester, and
consequently, attained the concomitant right to be exempted from the application of the
scholastic delinquency rules.

15
Again, the exemption that was deleted is worded as follows: ―These rules do not apply to students who are
enrolling for the last semester of their senior year . . .‖
Upholding the interpretation of the administration would cause manifest injustice. The
first probation that petitioners Robin and Mario incurred happened during the first semester of
their first year in college, three years ago. In subsequent semesters, they have re-taken and
successfully passed the particular subject that they failed. Even considering that the second
probation occurred after the rules were changed, the fact remains that as graduating students,
petitioners were not misplaced to presume that the changes would only take into account
circumstances occurring after the amendments were made. To reiterate, the first probation
occurred three years before the amendments were made operative.

In addition, during the batch convocation held in June 2009, the Dean stated that in
implementing the new ―Three Strike Rule,‖ it would only consider failing marks incurred in the
semesters following the amendments. The same treatment must be made in the application of the
rule removing the immunity of graduating students. The administration cannot arbitrarily use
different interpretations of prospectivity and expect the students to hew to their technical
interpretation when it does not conform to the common understanding of the students, upon
whom the rule is applied. If they do, a substantial distinction between the Three Strike Rule and
Double Probation Rule must be made. This, the administration failed to do. There are no
substantial distinctions between the two rules; both pertain to the dismissal of delinquent
students. Therefore, if a true prospective application of both rules is to be implemented, only the
subsequent semesters after the rules were made applicable to graduating students should be
considered.

As to the second contention, it is of no moment that the Double Probation Rule has
existed and has been applied in the past. The fact remains that this rule was not applied to
graduating students. Again, Mario and Robin are considered graduating students even prior to
the effectivity of the new rules. As such, the immunity accorded to them has vested and could
not be unilaterally taken away. These rules should be rightfully and reasonably applied so as not
to prejudice the rights of the students. This means nothing more than to follow the general
principle on prospectivity of rules.

IV. THE COLLEGE WRONGFULLY DROPPED THE PETITIONERS FROM ITS


ROLLS.

A. THE COLLEGE CANNOT DISMISS


PETITIONERS ON ACCOUNT OF
“DOUBLE PROBATION”.

Article 390 of the University Code provides for the only instance under the University
System where probationary status can lead to dismissal. The ordinary and plain meaning of
Article 390 is simple: a student on probation cannot be dismissed unless he or she incurs a failing
grade in fifty percent (50%) or more of his total number of units.

Article 390 should be the only rule to be applied if a student were to be dismissed on
account of probationary status. The College’s double probation dismissal rule is clearly invalid
and cannot be invoked as ground to dismiss the Petitioners.

By applying Article 390, it becomes clear that Petitioners were wrongfully dismissed
from the College. Petitioners were not on probation when they failed their 5 unit elective class.
Even assuming that they were on probation, said class amounts to less than fifty percent (50%) of
their units in that semester as they both took seventeen (17) units. Thus, by express provision of
Article 390, Petitioners may not be dropped from the roll of the College.

B. THE APPLICATION OF THE “NEW


RULES” TO THE PETITIONERS
VIOLATES THE RECIPROCAL
CONTRACT OF EDUCATION
BETWEEN THE COLLEGE AND THE
PETITIONERS.

In Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology16, the Supreme Court held
that:

Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal


contract. The students agree to abide by the standards of academic
performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in the form of manuals
that are distributed to the enrollees at the start of the school term.
Further, the school informs them of the itemized fees they are expected
to pay. Consequently, it cannot, after the enrolment of a student,
vary the terms of the contract. x x x (Emphasis ours)

This contractual relationship between the school and the student is not only semestral in
duration, but subsists ―for the entire period the [student] is expected to complete it.‖17 Thus, the
College’s decision to remove the exception in favor of graduating students – exempting them
from the application of the double probation rule – constitutes a violation of the College’s
covenant with its students.

Upon entering the College of Law in June 2006, Petitioners and their batchmates were
given and made to read a handbook that contained the following provision on dismissal:

16
G.R. No. 156109, Nov. 18, 2004
17
Non v. Dames II, 185 SCRA 253 (1990)
Dismissal

A student of the College shall be dropped from the rolls without the
benefit of readmission if:

1. he/she is unable to pass at least 50 percent of the academic units


taken in any semester;

2. being on probation, he/she fails in any one of the courses he/she is


taking; or

3. having been placed on probation, he/she fails in more than 25


percent of the units he/she is taking in any subsequent semester.

These rules do not apply to students who are enrolling for the last
semester of their senior year, or for the last semester of their fifth
year, in the case of students enrolled in the evening program.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The contract the petitioners had with the College included, among others, an assurance that
students who are enrolling for the last semester of their senior year shall no longer be dismissed
upon the abovementioned grounds. The said assurance was never changed during the first,
second and third year of the petitioners’ stay in the College. Upon enrolment for their fourth
year, second and final semester in the College, Petitioners are thus already vested with the right
not to be dismissed from the College.

In the case brought for consideration, the administration unilaterally varied a reciprocal
contract in force between the students and the college. Due to the retroactive application of these
rules, petitioners Robin and Mario stand to suffer the gravest penalty imposed on student
delinquency: dismissal on their last semester in law school.

The University of the Philippines is not a private entity but a public institution. It is
bound not only by its contract with its students, but more importantly by the higher standards of
due process required of public institutions. The due process clause is quintessentially a guarantee
of fairness and justice. This is a constitutional duty that U.P. is bound to observe. Dismissal from
U.P. is not an issue de minimis, and must therefore call for a higher level of scrutiny in favor of
its students. Education is a constitutional right in the 1987 Constitution, which states that:
"Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements.18" Thus ―students do not lose their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door.19"

18
Article XIV, Sec. 5(3).
19
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
C. NOT DROPPING THE PETITIONERS
FROM THE ROLL OF THE COLLEGE
IS BUT JUST AND EQUITABLE, UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

The two key considerations in this regard are: (1) the fact that petitioners Robin and
Mario, along with their classmates in their Commercial Law Review class, were not afforded the
opportunity to drop the said subject in time; and (2) the circumstances surrounding the subjects
they failed.

First, petitioners would not be in this predicament had they been afforded the opportunity
to drop their class. Commercial Law (Review) is an area of law that is considered by many
students of law as being particularly difficult. It is, in fact, why this elective is purposely avoided
by many students. Professor Catindig’s reputation of giving 5.0’s to graduating students is no
less encouraging. Despite their knowledge of this, petitioners enlisted for the class as they
genuinely desired to learn this bar subject. If they were to find the class not helpful or if they
were to perform poorly therein, the rules afford them the option to ―drop‖ the said subject within
a specified period.

During the first semester of AY 2009-2010, the deadline for dropping a subject was set
on 16 September 2009. Before said deadline, the Petitioners and their classmates inquired with
Professor Catindig regarding the result of their midterm exam, which was administered to them
on August 2009. In response, Professor Catindig instructed the class to ―assume [they] passed‖
it, which constituted forty-five percent (45%) of their final grade. The professor further
expressed his low opinion of students who drop a subject by reason of low grades, as if to
discourage students from dropping in his class.

It was not until October 2009 – approximately a week before the scheduled final exams –
that Professor Catindig released the result of the midterm exams, which, it turned out, only three
members of the class passed. As it was already well past the deadline for dropping, the vast
majority of the students were reduced to having to do impeccably well in the final exam and
hope for a passing mark.

Petitioners Robin and Mario certainly could have done better in the said final exam.
However, their inability to do so under the surrounding circumstances does not merit dismissal.
Not having been informed of their grade in time deprived Petitioners Robin and Mario of making
an informed decision. Had they been informed of their low marks for their midterm exam in
time, they could have asked Professor Catindig to allow them to drop the subject. Dropping the
subject might have prevented them from graduating on time, but they would not have been
dismissed.

Second, having reached their final year in law school, petitioners Robin and Mario have
already proven that they are sufficiently competent, and therefore do not merit dismissal from the
College. As noted above, the two were placed on probation by reason of a subject that they failed
during the first semester of their first year in law school. This same period could be taken as a
period where students are still adjusting to the rigors of law school, making such failure—
although unfortunate—rather understandable. The fact that they had failed a subject does not
make them inept. It simply means that they were unable to adjust quickly. It is noteworthy that
Petitioners had not encountered a similar problem thereafter.

Further, the fact that they failed in Commercial Law Review ought not to be taken as an
indication of incompetence. Thirteen out of the nineteen students who had enlisted for the
subject failed the elective. Two of the thirteen who failed the subject were even members of the
College of Law’s honor society, the Order of the Purple Feather.

Like Mario and Robin, all the other graduating seniors were specifically exempted from
the application of the dismissal and probation rules. It is highly unfair that such rules be repealed
on the very last year of their stay in the College. The rationale behind the exemption is that so
much of the taxpayers’ money had already been invested in the petitioners; their dismissal in the
last semester of their legal education without the exhaustion of all possible means to salvage the
situation would amount to a blatant disregard of such an investment.

As well, petitioners Mario and Robin have already invested so much time, money, and
effort in the College of Law. Mario and Robin have always been diligent and hardworking
students—a fact to which their classmates would willingly attest. A substantial amount of
Mario’s parents’ retirement funds were put into his legal education. Robin, on the other hand,
commutes daily to and from Cavite where his family lives, using his time on the bus to study for
class. Both have never been the subject of any disciplinary actions in the College or in the
University. In fact, both have been active in many school activities and have significantly
contributed to many of the school’s programs.

Considering, therefore, the circumstances of the present case, it simply cannot be deemed
just, nor humane, to dismiss Petitioners Mario and Robin from the College when they are only
one semester away from finishing their degree.
PRAYER

Upon the foregoing facts and points of law, Petitioners respectfully pray that this
Honorable Council declare and adjudge that:

1. The College has exceeded its authority in imposing the ―New Rules‖ on scholastic
delinquency and academic load;

2. That in amending existing rules, the College violated the elementary principles of due
process, and that therefore the new rules are void;

3. That the ―New Rules‖, granting that they are valid, should not be given retroactive
application;

4. That the Petitioners’ dismissal from the college is wrongful and, under the circumstances,
inequitable; and

5. That Petitioners should be allowed to enrol for the 2nd semester of the Academic Year
2009-2010 to finish their law degree.

All other just and equitable reliefs are also prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

25 November 2009.

ROBIN BRYAN F. CONCEPCION MARIO VINCENT N. DIAZ


2002-50418 2002-11073

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