Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1
Where, d = 1 if the item di is disclosed
0 if the item di is not disclosed
n = number of items
Finally, the selected banking company attributes such as size (total assets), profitability
(return on equity, audit firms international affiliations, institutional shareholding,
whether the bank has an audit committee have been extracted from corresponding annual
reports. A multivariate analysis was carried out to examine the association between the
extent of disclosure and 3 corporate governance variables and four control variables.
5.3 Hypothesis of the Study
The primary aim of the study, as mentioned earlier, is to examine the role of corporate
governance financial reporting transparency of banks in Bangladesh. The expected role
is examined by testing the following hypothesis:
H0: There is no significant association between a number of corporate governance
attributes (viz. audit committee, institutional ownership and Big 4 affiliation of audit
firms) and the extent of disclosure in published annual reports.
The multiple linear regression technique is used to test the hypothesis.
22
5.4 The Dependent and Explanatory Variables
5.4.1 Dependent Variable
Disclosure scores are calculated for each bank and used as the dependent variables in the
regression. The overall disclosure index (ODI) for each bank is obtained by using a
dichotomous procedure whereby the total score received by a bank is equal to the number
of items disclosed in its annual report divided by the total number of items in the
disclosure index. The normality of the distribution of the index scores was tested using
the normality plot and histogram and both were found to be normally distributed.
5.4.2 Explanatory Variables:
Three corporate governance variables are used as test variables. They are: (i) the
institution of an audit committee; (ii) institutional shareholding; and (iii) auditor
reputation. Besides, four control variables wee used. They are: (i) bank size measured
by natural log of tital assets; (ii) profitability measured by return on equity (ROE); (iii)
complexity measured by loans and advances as a proportion of total assets; and (iv)
leverage measured as debt to book value (market value for negative equity firms) of
equity. The procedure for operationalising the variables in the regression analysis and the
rationale for expecting them to explain cross-sectional disclosure variability are outlined
in the following paragraphs.
Audit Committee: Audit committees are increasingly being seen as one of the more
effective corporate governance levers used in both the Anglo-Saxon and Japan-German
models of corporate governance. Since Cadbury (1992) Committee recommendations, all
the so-called corporate governance best practice codes recommend institution of audit
committees in order to improve monitoring quality of both internal and external audits.
Recent corporate governance pronouncements emphasize not just having audit
committees but how independent the said committee is? That means in major
industrialized economies it is no longer sufficient to have an audit committee per se,
increased attention is being paid on the composition of audit committees. The question
23
being asked more frequently in recent times focuses on the proportion of audit committee
members are represented by independent directors. Institution of audit committees has
been made mandatory for banks in Bangladesh in 2003 via Bangladesh Bnaks circular
no. 12 and 16 issued on June 10, 2003 and July 24, 2003, respectively. As of 31
December 2003, 16 of the 27 banks in our sample have instituted audit committees. We
expect these 16 banks to demonstrate greater transparency in their financial reporting.
We expect so because either these are banks that are more eager to embrace corporate
governance best practice and hence are more likely to be more transparent or the audit
committee would act as a positive influence on their disclosure behavior. A dummy
variable, labelled AUDCOM, is used whereby a value of 1 is awarded to firms having
audit committees and zero otherwise.
Institutional Shareholding: Institutional shareholding is considered an important
corporate governance mechanism whereby institutional shareholders exert their influence
and expertise in providing leadership in the boardroom. They also act as a safety valve in
preventing management or other dominant shareholders to engage in value destructive
behavior. Institutional investors have incentives to care about the quality of financial
reporting including its comprehensiveness. The presence of one or more significant
institutional shareholder(s) is therefore expected to enhance the level of disclosure in firm
financial statements. We use the actual percentage of institutional shareholding to
capture this variable. The variable is labeled INSTTSHLD.
Auditor Reputation: The size of a firms audit firm and/or its international link is
believed to influence both the quality and the quantity of information disclosed by the
firm. It is expected that in countries where the Big-Four audit firms operate, financial
statements certified by any Big-Four firm carry more credibility than those audited by
non-Big-Four firms. DeAngelo (1981) argued that larger audit firms invest more to
maintain the reputation of their audit quality. Haque (1984) suggested that in
Bangladesh, only large audit firms enjoy the privilege of choosing the clients and the
audit job. Many disclosure studies examined the potential association between the
auditor size and extent of disclosure. Among them Singhvi and Desai (1971) and Ahmed
24
and Nicholls (1994) found positive association between audit firm size and the extent of
disclosure.
In Bangladesh, none of the Big-Four audit firms have a named branch. However, some
of the larger Bangladeshi firms claim affiliations with the international Big-Four. These
few big firms are responsible for auditing most of the big companies in the private sector
and almost all the multinational companies operating in Bangladesh. In the present study,
the international link of audit firms were considered for use as explanatory variables.
Audit firms having an affiliation with an international Big-Four were distinguished from
those that do not. In order to see if the auditor's international link had any impact on
disclosure comprehensiveness, this was considered for being used as an explanatory
variable labelled AUDITOR. A dichotomous procedure was used to operationalise the
variable awarding one if the banks audit firm was big and zero if it was not.
Size: The size of the firm has been a major variable in most studies examining disclosure
variability. With the exception of Spero (1979) and Stanga (1976), all the studies found
that corporate size significantly explains disclosure levels and variability.
The size of a firm can be measured in a number of different ways and there is no
overriding reason to prefer one to the other(s) (Cooke, 1991). Several measures of size
were available in this study including: total deposits, total loans and advances, total
assets, total capital, shareholders equity, and the market value of the bank. After a
primary examination based on the correlation between the dependent variable and the
available size variables, we decided to drop all but total assets as our size measure. The
chosen size variable was not normally distributed as expected. This problem was averted
by computing the natural log of the size variable which produced normality of the
distributions. The log of total assets (LOGASSETS) is used in the study as the size
variable.
Profitability: Bank profitability affects disclosure in many ways. Studies on the
understandability of financial statement messages found that narrative disclosures in
25
corporate annual reports are deliberately made complex to communicate bad news and
made more lucid and easily understandable to communicate good news (Adelberg, 1979).
Banks are likely to feel more comfortable when disclosing favourable rather than
unfavourable information, because one of the objectives of information disclosure is to
increase share prices.
Profitability was used as an explanatory variable by Cerf (1961), Singhvi (1967), Singhvi
and Desai (1971), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Spero (1979) and Wallace (1987). Cerf
(1961), Singhvi (1967), Singhvi and Desai (1971) found positive association between
profitability and disclosure while Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) found a negative association
between them. A number of profitability measures were used by previous researchers.
They include net profit to sales, earnings growth, dividend growth and dividend stability
(Cerf, 1961), rate of return and earnings margin (Singhvi, 1967 and Singhvi and Desai,
1971), and return on assets (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978). In this study, a number of
profitability measures were computed from the annual report data, but the return on
equity was selected for the analysis. The variable was labeled ROE.
Complexity: Complexity is likely to have a bearing on disclosure comprehensiveness.
As operations become more and more complex, it usually warrants more disclosure.
Several measures of complexity has been used in the literature. They include diversity of
product and customers, number of branches, number of subsidiaries or associates, number
of overseas subsidiaries, number of industries in which the client operates, the absolute
amount of inventory and receivables, and the proportion of assets in inventory and
receivables. We use the proportion of loans and advances to total assets as our measure
of complexity. The use of a relative measure of audit complexity meant that the size
effect was not affected by the inclusion of the variable. The variable was labelled
COMPLEX.
Leverage: The degree to which a firm's financial structure is geared has been used in a
few disclosure studies to examine if there exists any association between gearing ratio
and disclosure levels. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Ahmed and Nicholls (1994)
26
found no significant association between leverage ratio and the extent of voluntary
disclosure in Mexico and Bangladesh respectively while Belkaoui and Kahl (1978)
observed a significant negative relationship between the two variables. On the other
hand, Robbins and Austin (1986) found a significant positive association between debt
and municipal disclosure. The debt-equity ratio is used in the present study as the
measure of leverage. For banks with negative equity, their book value of equity was
replaced by market value of equity before applying the leverage formula. The variable is
labelled LEVERAGE.
6. Test of Hypothesis
The descriptive statistics for the explanatory and dependent variables are presented in
Table 2. The descriptive statistics shows that the mean disclosure level of the sample
banks is 39.01 percent, which is equivalent to 174 items (out of 446 items examined).
The minimum number of items disclosed by a sample bank was 110 items while the
maximum number of items disclosed was 232. Fifty-nine percent, (i.e., 16 out of 27) of
the banks in our sample had an audit committee while 44 percent (i.e., 12) had a Big 4
auditor. Of the 16 banks that had audit committees, 7 had Big 4 auditors. Average
institutional shareholding was 13.31 percent with a minimum of zero and a maximum of
70 percent. Average total assets of the sample banks was Tk21,896 million (US$377
million) with a minimum and maximum of Tk301 million and Tk81,705 million
respectively. Average ROE was 14.43 percent while average complexity measure was
59.47 percent. Average leverage was 2.748 with a minimum of 0.40 and a maximum of
8.56.
A correlation matrix of all the above explanatory variables along with the dependent
variables was constructed which is shown in Table 3.
27
6.1 The multivariate model
The model developed in this paper is as follows:
ODI = o + |
1
Auditcomm + |
2
Insttholding + |
3
Big4 +|
4
Complex + |
5
Leverage+ |
6
ROE + |
7
Assets +
The above model, developed in this paper is based on 27 banks. A summary of the
regression output is provided in Table 4. The results show that audit committee, auditor
reputation, and leverage have significant bearing on the extent of disclosure made by
banks in Bangladesh. Banks that have constituted audit committees by 2003 disclose
significantly more items of information than those that have not. A comparison of the
average number of items disclosed by the two categories of banks shows that banks with
audit committees disclose 188.37 items on average while those without audit committees
disclose only 153.09 items on average. A non-parametric t-test also shows the above
difference to be statistically significant (t value of 3.541). The results also show that
banks who have employed Big 4 affiliated audit firms disclose significantly more
information than those who do not. This finding is particularly important given the fact
that only 12 of our sample banks have a Big 4 affiliated auditor of which only 7 have
audit committees. Therefore, the influence of a Big 4 affiliated auditor does not
necessarily overlap with that of an audit committee. The average number of items
disclosed by Big 4 affiliated banks in our sample is 181.17 while the average for non-Big
4 affiliated banks is only 168.27. The third variable that emerged significant in
explaining cross-sectional variations in disclosure levels is leverage. As expected,
leverage has an inverse relationship with disclosure levels. It shows that banks that have
higher levels of borrowing from other financial institutions and the central bank are more
conservative in disclosing information.
Our results also show that institutional shareholding, complexity, profitability, and size
do not have significant influence on disclosure levels. Although insignificant, each of
these variables have expected positive signs of their beta co-efficients. The results may
28
be driven by the highly regulated nature of the banking industry, relative uniformity in
disclosure and the relatively large size of each of these banks that make them
economically visible. As a result, their relative size, profitability, leverage, and
complexity do not appear to make significant differences in their disclosure levels.
Results reported in Table 4 provide evidence of the important role corporate governance
in general and audit committees and Big 4 affiliated auditors are playing in enhancing
financial reporting transparency in the banking sector in Bangladesh.
7. Conclusion and Limitations
This paper reports the results of a multiple linear regression analysis of the role of 3
corporate governance variables audit committee, auditor reputation, and institutional
ownership on the extent of disclosure in bank annual reports. The extent of disclosure
was measured using a comprehensive disclosure index comprising 446 items including
both mandatory and voluntary items.
The results show that disclosure levels are associated with two corporate governance
attributes whether the bank has instituted an audit committee and the reputation of its
audit firm. Disclosure levels are also associated with the level of financial leverage
employed by the bank. The results also show that institutional ownership does not have a
significant influence on financial reporting transparency of banks. However, it has a
positive, albeit insignificant, influence. It is interesting to see that size, profitability and
complexity do not have significant influence on bank disclosure either. Again, each of
these variables has the expected positive sign.
Findings of this study have important policy implications. First, audit committee
constitution was not mandatory until 2003. By the end of the year only 16 banks have
constituted audit committees. Our finding of a positive association between audit
committees and disclosure levels is encouraging if audit committees are pushing for
greater transparency. It could also be interpreted as banks that are more transparent are
29
swift in constituting audit committees. The significance of the Big 4 variable is
significant in the backdrop of a lack of Big 4 dominance in the countrys banking sector.
The share of the Big 4 affiliated firms in the banking sector is only 44 percent! By
international standards, this is extremely low given the size of banks as economic
institutions compared with average firms in other industries. The evidence of a positive
role played by Big 4 auditors can be expected to be helpful in enhancing disclosure
comprehensiveness in the banking sector in Bangladesh.
The study has several limitations: First, although it covered all but 2 banks operating in
Bangladesh in 2003, the size of the sample remains small only 27. This poses a threat
to the validity of our findings as a bigger sample size is warranted for running multiple
linear regressions. Second, the index used to capture disclosure levels included both
voluntary and mandatory items. Our Overall Disclosure Index (ODI) measure does not
distinguish between the two. It is therefore possible to have a trade-off between the two
groups of items voluntary and mandatory making it difficult to interpret disclosure
levels with greater mandatory compliance or voluntary disclosure or both. Finally, the
dichotomous scoring procedure employed in the study, while consistent with the tradition
of most disclosure studies, has some fundamental flaws such as its failure to distinguish
quality of disclosure from its quantity and its inability to reward or penalize firms for the
depth or breadth of such disclosure.
Notes:
1 In Bangladesh, the Companies Act 1913 that was enacted by the British
legislators in the sub-continent has been repealed by the enactment of the
Companies Act 1994.
30
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Variable
N Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard
Deviation
Overall disclosure index 27 .25 .52 .3901 .07059
Audit committee 27 0 1 .59 .501
institutions' share 27 0 70 13.31 15.781
Big four and other firms 27 0 1 .44 .506
Natural log of total assets 27 2.48 4.91 4.1060 .56837
Return on equity 27 -30.39 31.03 14.4285 11.76349
Audit complexity 27 .20 .86 .5947 .14874
Leverage 27 0.40 8.56 2.748 2.0116
Table 2: Independent Variables, Proxy and Expected Sign
Independent Variable Proxy Expected
Sign
Test Variables:
AUDCOM Corporate Governance Link
If the companies have Audit
committee =1 otherwise 0
+
INSTTSHLD Institutional shareholding Percentage of shares held by
institutional investors
+
BIG4 Auditor Reputation Whether the company is audited
by a Big 4 affiliated audit firm
+
Control variables:
LNASSETS Size
Natural log of total assets +
ROE Profitability Return on Equity =
Net Profit/Total Shareholders
Equity
+
COMPLEX Audit complexity Proportion of loans and advances
to total assets
+
LVG Leverage Debt-to-equity ratio -
36
Table 3: Correlation Matrix
Overall disclosure
index
Overall
disclosure
index
Audit
committee
institutions'
share
Big four
and other
firms
Natural log
of total
assets
Return on
equity
Audit
complexity
Audit committee .561
**
institutions' share .006 -.232
Big four and other
firms
.207 -.017 -.004
Natural log of total
assets
.376 .412
*
-.220 .009
Return on equity .170 .161 .154 .224 -.266
Audit complexity .485
*
.476
*
-.242 -.128 .627
**
-.069
Leverage -.215 -.028 .215 .343 -.263 .505** -.354
Table 4: Summary of the regression output for the whole sample
ODI = o + |
1
Auditcomm + |
2
Insttholding + |
3
Big4 +|
4
Complex + |
5
Leverage+ |
6
ROE + |
7
Assets +
Dependent Variable Coefficients t-statistic Sig.
(Constant) .226 2.406 .026
Audit committee .063 2.412 .026
institutions' share .001 1.386 .182
Big four and other firms .045 1.958 .065
Natural log of total assets .008 .315 .756
Return on equity .001 1.106 .282
Audit complexity .097 .927 .365
Leverage -.009 -1.921 .070
F Statistic 3.492
Model Significance 0.014
Adjusted R
2
0.402
N 27
37
Appendix-1: Relevant Regulation for Banking Industry in Bangladesh
Bangladesh Bank Order No. 127, 1972
Bangladesh Bank (Amendment) Act, 2003
Banking Companies Act No. 14, 1991
Bank Company (Amendment) Act No. 13, 1993
Banking Companies (Amendment) Act No. 25, 1995
Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 2003
Companies Act No. 18, 1994
Money Laundering Prevention Act No. 7, 2002
Bangladesh Bank Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking
Organizations
Bangladesh Bank Guidelines for Merger/Amalgamation of
Banks/Financial Institutions
Bangladesh Bank Prudential Regulations for Banks, 2007
Bangladesh Bank Guidance Notes on Prevention of Money Laundering
Bank Regulation and Policy Division Circular No. 5, 2006
Bank Regulation and Policy Division Circular No. 14, 2007
Appendix-2: Relevant Institutions for issuing regulation and monitoring Banking
Industry in Bangladesh
Bangladesh Bank (BB): Issuing regulation and monitoring the banks
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB): Assist on
Issuing regulation
Ministry of Finance (MOF): Issuing regulation through Bangladesh Bank
(BB)
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MOLJPA): Issuing
regulation
Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh (SEC): Issuing
regulation and monitoring the banks
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE):
Monitoring the banks
38
Annexure-1: Mandatory Disclosure Provisions under Banking Companies Act, 1991
Section of
Banking
Companies
Act, 1991
Disclosure Provisions
Section 2 The provisions bearing of this Act shall be in addition to and not, save
as hereinafter express by provided, in derogation of, the Companies Act,
1994 and any other laws for the time being in force. In addition, as the
banking companies are registered with the registered joint stock
companies, the banking companies should comply with the provisions of
the Companies Act 1994 if otherwise expressed in the Banking
Companies Act, 1991
Section 24
Every bank shall make a reserve fund and if the amount in that fund
together with amount in the share premium account is below the amount
than its paid up capital. Bank will transfer to the reserve fund not less
than 20 on profit before tax and it should be disclosed in the profit and
loss account made under section 38 of this Act.
Section 25 Every bank shall maintain a cash reserve fund not less than 5% with
Bangladesh Bank or its agent bank and that should disclosed in the
financial statements.
Section 33 The detailed disclosure provisions with regard to the liquid assets of the
banking companies in Bangladesh.
Section 36 Every Bank company shall submit reports to the Bangladesh Bank on
the 31
st
day of December and 30
th
day of June of each year showing its
assets and liabilities in the prescribed form and manner.
Section 37 For the purpose of benefit of public, Bangladesh Bank may publish in
consolidated form or otherwise any information contained by it under
this Act relating to overdue loans and advances of more than thirty days.
Section 38 The Accounts and Balance Sheet: should prepared as per BRPD circular
3/2000 and also the provision of the Companies Act, 1994 (Schedule XI
of this Act). As per section 39, financial statement should be audited by
a person who is qualified according to the Bangladesh Chartered Order,
1973.
Section 39
(3)
An auditor is required to state whether or not adequate provisions have
been made, financial reports has been made in accordance with the
standard issued by the Bangladesh Bank.
Section 40
The accounts and balance sheet shall be submitted to Bangladesh Bank
within the three months of the close of the period to which they relate.
Section 41
The bank is required, if it is a private company, to submit the accounts
and balance sheet to registrar.
Section 42
Every banking company incorporated outside Bangladesh shall not later
than the 1
st
Monday in February of the year when it runs the business,
39
display a copy of the last balance sheet and profit and loss account made
under section 38 in a conspicuous place in its principal office and every
branch office in Bangladesh until submitted by a copy of the subsequent
balance sheet and accounts are displayed in the same way.
Annexure 2: Mandatory Disclosure Provisions under IAS 30 (BAS 30)
Para Mandatory Disclosure Provisions
Para 8 Like other business entity, banks may use different methods for
recognition and measurement of items in their financials. So, for better
understanding of the users of financial statements, banks should disclose
the accounting policies that are followed for preparing financial
statements. Banks should disclose the following; Policy regarding the
recognition of the principal types of income; policy regarding the valuation
of investment and dealing securities; the distinction between those
transactions and other events that result in the recognition of assets and
liabilities on the balance sheet and those transactions and other events that
only give rise to contingencies and commitments; the basis for the
determination of losses on loans and advances and for writing off
uncollectible loans and advances; the basis for the determination of
charges for general banking risks and the accounting treatment of such
charges.
Para 9 In the income statement, income and expenses should be presented as
grouped by nature and principal types of income and expenses should be
disclosed separately.
Para 10 It has provided some prescribed items of income statement that includes
interest and similar income; Interest expense and similar charges; Dividend
income; Fee and commission income; Fee and commission expense; Gain
less loss arising from dealing securities; Gain less loss arising from
investment securities; Gain less arising from dealing in foreign currencies;
Other operating income; Losses on loans and advances; and Other
operating expenses.
Para 11 The principal types of income, interest, fees for services, commission and
dealing results should be separately disclosed.
Para 12 The principal types of expense, interest, commissions, losses on loans and
advances, charges relating to the reduction in the carrying amount of
investments and general administrative expenses should be disclosed
separately.
Para 13 Income and expense items should not be offset except for those relating to
hedges and to assets and liabilities which have been offset in accordance
with paragraph 23.
Para 15 The gain and losses arising from each of the following are normally
reported on a net basis: Disposal and changes in the carrying amount of
dealing securities; Disposal of investment securities and Dealing in foreign
40
currencies.
Para 16 It prescribes that interest income and interest expense should be disclosed
separately.
Para 17 Governments assistance to bank by making deposits and other credit
facilities should be disclosed.
Para 18 It favored that assets and liabilities should be grouped as their nature and
presented as their liquidity. Regarding the classification and disclosure of
Balance sheet items.
Para 19 The following items should be disclosed in the balance sheet of a bank:
Cash and balance with the central bank; Treasury bills and other bills
eligible for rediscounting with the central bank; Government and other
securities held for dealing purposes; Placements with, and loans and
advances to, other banks; Other money market placements; Loans and
advances to customers; Investment securities; Deposits from other banks;
Other money market deposits; Amounts owed to other depositors;
Certificates of deposits; Promissory notes and other liabilities evidenced
by paper; and Other borrowed funds.
Para 20 It is no longer required to group the assets and liabilities as currents and
non-currents.
Para 21 The balance with the central bank, placement with other banks and other
money market placements should be shown separately. Bank also should
separately present deposits from other banks, other money market deposits
and other deposits.
Para 23 The bank should not offset any asset or liability with other liability or asset
unless a legal right of set-off exists and the offsetting represents the
expectation as to the realization or settlement of the asset or liability.
Para 24 The bank should disclose the fair values of each class of its financial assets
and liabilities regarding the presentation the classification of financial
assets.
Para 25 The classification should be made under the following heads: Loans and
receivables originated by the enterprise; held to maturity investments; held
for trading; and available-for-sale.
Para 26,
27, 28 &
29
The bank should disclose the contingent liabilities and commitments
because these are significant in amount and risk and may be revocable or
irrevocable.
Para 30,
31 & 32
The maturity grouping of assets and liabilities should be disclosed by the
bank.
Para 34 In the maturity grouping, maturity period of assets and liabilities should be
same.
Para 35 The maturity could be expressed in terms of the remaining period to the
repayment date; the original period to the repayment date; or the remaining
period to the next date at which interest rates may be changed.
Para 36 The bank should disclose an analysis expressed in terms of contractual
41
maturities. In case if there is no contractual maturity date.
Para 37 The bank should assume the expected date on which the assets will be
realized.
Para 39 The management may provide, in its commentary on the financial
statements, information about the effective periods and about the way in
manages and controls the risks and exposures associated with different
maturity and interest rate profiles.
Para 40 The bank should disclose any significant concentrations of its assets,
liabilities and off balance sheet items. Such disclosures should be made in
terms of: Geographical areas; Customer or industry group or other
concentration of risk. In addition, a bank should also disclose the amount
of significant net foreign currency exposures.
Para 43 The bank should disclose about the provision for losses on loans and
advances.
Para 44 Any amount set aside in respect of losses on loans and advances in
addition to those losses that have been specifically identified or potential
losses which experience indicates are present in the portfolio of loans and
advances should be accounted for as appropriation of such retained
earnings.
Para 47 The movements in the provision, including the amounts previously written
off that have been recovered during the period, are shown separately.
Para 50 Any amount set aside for banking risks should be separately disclosed as
appropriation of retained earnings.
Para 53 A bank should disclose the aggregate amount of secured liabilities and the
nature and carrying amount of the assets pledged as security.
Para 56 The disclosure of related party transactions.
Para 57 The accounting polices regarding uncollectible loans and advances.
Para 59 Any amount set aside in respect of general banking risk should be
separately disclosed as appropriation of retained earnings.
Para 60 Secured liabilities and assets pledged as security.