1AC

Advantage 1: Manufacturing
U.S.-Mexico trade is outpacing current border infrastructure, making the relationship
unsustainable plan bolsters efficiency, relations, and rescues manufacturing
Wilson 9/13
*Christopher Wilson, Associate, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 13, 2013, Ad-
Hoc Hearing: Redefining Border Security: Border Communities Demand to be Heard in the Comprehensive Immigration
Debate, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Border%20Trade%20Testimony_0.pdf] AS

In addition to being immense, U.S. trade with Mexico is unique. We not only trade finished goods, we actually work
together to build products, sending parts back and forth across the border several times during the manufacturing
process. Because of this phenomenon, imports of final goods from Mexico contain, on average, 40 percent U.S. content. This
means that even imports from Mexico, unlike imports from any country except Canada, strongly promote U.S. exports,
industry, and jobs. For each dollar spent buying imports from Mexico, 40 cents of it stays right here in the United States. As a
point of comparison, imports from China contain just 4 percent U.S. parts. The unique nature of U.S.-Mexico trade means that
our nations are best understood as partners working together on the global stage, not competitors where a gain in one country
represents a loss in the other. In addition to profoundly linking together the U.S. and Mexican economies, this system of
production sharing, with parts often going back and forth across the border multiple times as products are being
manufactured, creates a multiplier effect for any inefficiencies at the border . Having trucks full of goods wait in
line for hours at the border before being able to cross is expensive once, but manufacturers involved in co-manufacturing with
Mexico often have to pay what is essentially a border tax multiple times. Trade Benefits Border States and Many More Seventy-
seven percent of all U.S. trade with Mexico comes across the land border, the majority by truck, making the efficient
operation of our land ports of entry crucial to maintaining and building on the six million American jobs sustained by
bilateral trade. Three border statesTexas, California, and Arizonacount Mexico as their top export market, but states
throughout the nation rely heavily on trade with Mexico. In fact, Mexico is either the first or second largest market for exports
from twenty three states. The range of industries involved in trade with Mexico is similarly large and diverse, ranging from
high-value manufacturing in the automotive and aerospace sectors to agriculture and processed foods. (See
Table 1 in the Appendix.) Creating a Secure and Competitive Border The infrastructure and capacity of the ports of
entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of
bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly,
long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and individual crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the
competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Several studies have attempted to
quantify the costs of border area congestion to the economies of the United States and Mexico (See Table 2 in the Appendix).
The specific results of the studies are varied, and too much value should not be placed on any single number. Nonetheless, one
message comes through quite clearlylong and unpredictable wait times at the POEs are costing the United States
and Mexican economies many billions of dollars each year. Recognizing the costs of congestion and the need for additional
CBP staff to reduce long lines at the border crossings, the CREATE Homeland Security Center at the University of Southern
California performed a study, finding each additional CBP officer staffed to our ports of entry would lead to a two million dollar
increase in U.S. GDP and would create thirty-three American jobs.1 Given the importance of our nation's security and economic
needs, solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time. The
development of the 21
st
Century Border initiative, which was recently reaffirmed by Presidents Obama and Pea Nieto, has
yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled. Moderate investments to update
infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed , as long lines and overworked
staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, more resources cannot be the
only answer. Strategic efforts to maximize existing resources, improving throughput and reducing congestion, are also needed.
For the past two decades, border security efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border have focused on the areas between official
crossing points. As a result the Border Patrol is now five times larger than it was in the early Nineteen Nineties; yet much less
attention has been paid to the staffing, infrastructure and technology needs of ports of entry
themselves, both leaving them less secure and undermining Americas economic competitiveness . In
the context of immigration reform, a continued focus on the areas between the ports of entry and inattention to the security
and efficiency needs of the official ports of entry could exacerbate this issue.
Absent the plan delays threaten production shut-downs kills manufacturing sector
and disrupts global supply chains
Wilson 13
[Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, where he develops the Institutes research and programming on regional economic
integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. He is the author of Working Together: Economic Ties
between the United States and Mexico (Wilson Center, 2011), and an editor and author of the Institutes
forthcoming State of the Border ReportWilson Center Mexico Institute, January 2013, New Ideas for
a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_us_mexico_relations.pdf]

The United States and Mexico have become profoundly integrated, and the two countries are now
partners, rather than competitors, in the global economy. The North American Free Trade Agreement,
geographic proximity, and the complementary nature of the two economies have fostered an integrated
manufacturing platform. The United States and Mexico do not only trade finished products; they build
them together. Indeed, roughly 40 percent of all content in Mexican exports to the United States
originates in the United States, much more than the comparable figures with China, Brazil, and India, at
four, three, and two percent respectively. Only Canada, at 25 percent, is similar. As a result,
improvements in productivity in either country, as well as advances that lower the costs of moving
goods across the border (i.e.: long wait times, inefficient customs procedures), strengthen the
competitiveness of manufacturers throughout the whole region. While manufacturing wages in China
were four times less than Mexico in 2000, they are now nearly equal and are expected to be 25 percent
higher than Mexican labor costs by 2015.1 The simple math of wage differentials drove the past
decades movement of factories from the U.S. and Mexico to China, but companies are taking an
increasingly holistic approach in deciding where to locate factories, considering transportation costs
and shipping times; exchange rate and political risks; language, culture, and time zone differences;
contract and intellectual property law enforcement; security; production flexibility; the supply and cost
of materials and energy; and the availability of skilled and educated workers. In most of these
categories, Mexico is gaining ground or maintains a distinct advantage over other regions of the world,
particularly in terms of serving markets throughout the Americas. For example, between 2007 and
December 2012, the value of the Mexican Peso fell by 17 percent compared to the U.S. Dollar and by a
full 33 percent compared to the Chinese Yuan, improving the competitiveness of regional exports vis--
vis Chinese goods.2 Crude oil prices rose 231 percent between 2002 and 2012, thus raising shipping
costs and incentivizing the use of shorter, regional rather than longer, transcontinental supply chains.3
New drilling techniques, however, are changing the outlook for oil and especially natural gas, opening
access to new reserves, increasing production, and therefore lowering some energy costs. While this
may eventually lower long range shipping costs, the more immediate effect is proving to be a major
decline in natural gas prices, which has already lowered electricity costs in some parts of the United
States and has the potential to do so throughout both the region. Such a decline in prices provides a
major boost to energy intensive industries, such as steel, and petrochemical producers. The United
States is on the forefront of the technological advances in the energy industry and stands to gain the
most from them, but Mexico could reap the benefits as well should it either reform its energy industry
to take advantage of its significant shale gas reserves or develop the pipeline infrastructure to support
increased gas imports from the United States. Technological advances and improvements in the
manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly
change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider near-
shoring in Mexico or re-shoring their production back to the United States. Robots and the high-tech
sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that
traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers
is on the decline, and the need for high skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex
machines and robots of todays factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of
total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone
goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like
the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing, especially if the complementary nature
of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in
Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor. The widespread
implementation of lean manufacturing principles has improved the efficiency and agility of factories
around the world. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in
warehousing. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and
products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a
robust network of nearby suppliers. It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait
times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production
until the needed parts arrive at their destination.
Manufacturing is key to defense technology thats the foundation of military primacy
O'Hanlon 12
[Michael O'Hanlon, January 2012, The Brookings Institution, The Arsenal of Democracy and How to
Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20bas
e/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon]

The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely
industrial impact, as the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past.
Defense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in
congressional districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces
utilize does have national security resonance. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key
military technology has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era
not only for winning wars but for deterring them. That requires world-class scientific and
manufacturing capabilitieswhich in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities
for the United States in a globalized marketplace.
The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war
Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13
[*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, **John Ikenberry is
Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global
Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, **William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor
of Government at Dartmouth College (Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement,
January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-
brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward]

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth
bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk
of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from
contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their
own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't
necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries
can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional
multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would
likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during
the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which
used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East,
the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would
intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard
to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to
pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent
incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help,
and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous
competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be
sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were
states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets,
arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead
in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek
nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union
and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear
powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The
case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively
managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the
emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need
look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A
percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the
world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top
of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of
retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work
of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for
regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is
already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia
and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military
presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC
PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open
global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States
a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic
leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-
lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of
securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to
cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets
the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its
overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for
example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example,
when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a
means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and
environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the
political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global
economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the
World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor
this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name
one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region,
less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen
Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's
reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with
Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the
euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership
for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes
for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but
disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate
change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially
when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier
for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by
in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they
also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example,
has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another
and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel
to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United
States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are
especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as
terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance
cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather
information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated
surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan,
since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region.
The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the
first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial
resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the
linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW
Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the
wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the
United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy
self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself
into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the
strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global
economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would
threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and
challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in
response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the
United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war
by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its
policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the
United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the
devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose
retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an
engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

Well isolate two scenarios
U.S.-Mexican trade sustains integrated joint-production thats key to U.S.
aerospace and auto industry
NAFTA Works 13
(NAFTA Works, a monthly newsletter on NAFTA and related issues March 2013, US - Mexico Trade
Reached New Highs, Volume 18, Issue 3, http://www.naftamexico.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/mar13.pdf, Accessed 07-30-2013 | AK)

Since the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico has become a major market for a wide range of U.S.
exports. Mexico now accounts for 13% of U.S. agricultural exports worldwide, 33% of U.S. auto parts,
18% of fabricated metal products, 28% of audio and video equipment, 29% of computer equipment,
20% of semiconductors and other electronic components, and 25% of electrical equipment and
components. Similarly, Mexico is also one of the largest suppliers of goods to the United States. Last
year, Mexico held a 16% share in total U.S. beverage imports, 34% in auto parts, 21% in vehicles, 36% in
audio and video equipment, 15% in communications equipment, 33% in electrical equipment, 23% in
household appliances, and 18% in agricultural and livestock products. Industries in Mexico and the U.S.
are increasingly becoming more globally competitive through joint production efforts. Together, both
countries produce flat-screen TV sets, airplanes, refrigerators, cars, trucks, and jeans to meet both
domestic and global demand. In 2012, the fast-growing Mexican aerospace industry exported about
$5.4 billion mainly to its NAFTA partners, an increase of 20% over the year, according to the Mexican
Federation of Aerospace Industries. Mexican aerospace components help to make U.S. airplane
exports more competitive worldwide, which reached $105 billion last year. The automotive industry in
Mexico has reached such high levels of competitiveness, spurred by co-production, that it has become
the U.S. second-largest trading partner and its second-largest supplier of vehicles. In 2012, the U.S.
purchased over $35 billion worth of Mexican made cars to meet the domestic demand. As a result of
highly integrated production lines where the materials and parts chains zigzag back and forth along the
border, a full 50% of the content of Mexican cars is originated in the U.S. further strengthening the
North American auto industry. By promoting a highly integrated trade, each partner benefits from both
direct exports and returned imports. The content of the U.S. exports are used to further manufacture
and finalize products that are imported back to the U.S. from Mexico. U.S. value-added in Mexican
manufacturing exports is about 37%, which is ten times higher than the 3.7% of U.S. value-added in
Chinese manufacturing exports. This synergy has created a win-win relationship, solidifying a
reciprocal exchange cycle between Mexican and U.S. exports.

Aerospace key to airpower decline risks global instability and conflict
Pfaltzgraff 10
[Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-
Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the
21st-Century, p. xiii-9]

Deterrence Strategy In stark contrast to the bipolar Cold War nuclear setting, todays security environment includes multiple,
independent nuclear actors. Some of these independent nuclear weapons states are potential adversaries, some are rivals, and
some are friends, but the initial decision for action by any one of them may lie beyond U.S. control. The United States may need
to influence, signal, and restrain enemies, and it may need to continue to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear friends
and allies. America may also face catalytic warfare, where, for example, a U.S. ally such as Israel or a third party such as
China could initiate action that might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Although the United States would not be a party
to the nuclear escalation decision process, it could be drawn into the conflict. Compared to a bipolar world, very little is
known about strategic nuclear interaction and escalation in a multipolar world. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must restrain a wider
variety of actors today than during the Cold War. This requires a range of capabilities and the capacity to address specific
challenges. The deterrent must provide security guarantees and assurance sufficient to prevent the initiation of catalytic
warfare by an ally, while deterring an adversary from resorting to nuclear escalation. America may also need simultaneously to
deter more than one other nuclear state. Deterrence requirements include four critical elements: early warning, C2, delivery
systems, and weapons. The Air Force plays an indispensable role in furnishing the U.S. early warning system in its entirety
through satellites and radar networks. In commynd and control, infrastructure is provided by the Air Force, including Milstar
satellites and, in the future, advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) satellites. In the area of delivery systems and weapons,
two-thirds of the strategic triad intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers is furnished by the Air Force and its
Global Strike Commynd. U.S. Overseas Basing and the Anti-Access/Area-Denial Threat The increased availability of anti-
access/area-denial assets coupled with growing threats to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace commons are challenging
the power projection capabilities of the United States. These threats, in the form of aircraft and long-range missiles carrying
conventional or nuclear munitions, present problems for our overseas bases. States such as North Korea, China, and Iran
jeopardize the notion that forward-deployed U.S. forces and bases will be safe from enemy attack. Consequently, the United
States must create a more flexible basing structure encompassing a passive and active defense posture that includes these
features: dispersal, hardening, increased warning time of attack, and air defenses. Simultaneously, the United States must
continue to develop long-range, offensive systems such as low-observable mynned and remotely piloted strike aircraft,
precision missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to penetrate heavily defended
A2/AD environments. This approach will increase the survivability of U.S. forward-deployed assets and power
projection capabilities and thus bolster deterrence and U.S. guarantees to Americas allies and friends. Asymmetric
Challenges The increasing number of actors gaining access to advanced and dual-use technologies augments the potential for
asymmetric attacks against the United States and its allies by those who are unable to match U.S. military capabilities. Those
actors pose increasing challenges to the ability of the United States to project power through the global commons. Such attacks
could target specific U.S. vulnerabilities, ranging from space assets to the financial, transportation, communications, and/or
energy infrastructures, and to the food and water supply, to mention only the most obvious. Asymmetric attacks denying
access to critical networks and capabilities may be the most cost-effective approach to circumventing traditional U.S. force
advantages. The USAF and DoD must develop systems and technologies that can offset and defend against asymmetric
capabilities. This will require a robust R&D program and enhanced USAF cooperation with its sister services and international
partners and allies. Space Dominance Space is increasingly a contested domain where U.S. dominance is no longer assured
given the growing number of actors in space and the potential for kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, including ASAT
weapons, EMP, and jamming. As a result, the United States must protect vital space-based platforms and networks by
reducing their vulnerability to attack or disruption and increasing the countrys resilience if an attack does occur. Required steps
include hardening and incorporating stealth into next generation space systems and developing rapid replenishment capacity
(including micro-satellite technologies and systems and new launch capabilities). At the same time, America must reduce its
dependence on space capabilities with air-based substitutes such as high altitude, long endurance, and penetrating ISR
platforms. Increased cooperation among the services and with U.S. allies to develop such capabilities will also be paramount.
Cyber Security Cyber operations are vital to conducting USAF and joint land, sea, air, and space missions. Given the significance
of the cyber threat (private, public, and DoD cyber and information networks are routinely under attack), the United States is
attempting to construct a layered and robust capability to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions and attacks. The USAFs cyber
operations must be capable of operating in a contested cyber domain to support vital land, sea, air, and space missions. USAF
cyberspace priorities include developing capabilities to protect essential military cyber systems and to speed their recovery if an
attack does occur; enhancing the Air Forces capacity to provide USAF personnel with the resolution of technical questions; and
training/recruitment of personnel with cyber skills. In addition, the USAF and DoD need to develop technologies that quickly
and precisely attribute attacks in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can spread quickly among networks, making it extremely
difficult to attribute their perpetrator, and therefore to develop a deterrence strategy based on retaliation. In addition, some
cyber issues are in the legal arena, including questions about civil liberties. It is likely that the trend of increased military
support to civil authorities (for example, in disaster relief operations) will develop in the cyber arena as well. These efforts will
entail greater service, interagency, international, and private-sector collaboration. Organizational Change and Joint Force
Operations To address growing national security challenges and increasing fiscal constraints, and to become more effective, the
joint force needs to adapt its organizations and processes to the exigencies of the information age and the security setting of
the second decade of the twenty-first century. This entails developing a strategy that places increased emphasis on joint
operations in which each service acts in greater concert with the others, leverages capacities across the services (two land
services, three naval services, and five air services) without duplicating efforts, and encourages interoperability. This would
provide combatant commynders (CCDRs) with a greater range of capabilities, allowing heightened flexibility to use force. A
good example of this approach is the Air-Sea Battle concept being developed jointly by the Air Force and Navy, which envisions
heightened cooperation between the two services and potentially with allies and coalition partners. Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance Capabilities There is an increasing demand for ISR capabilities able to access and persist in contested
airspace in order to track a range of high-value mobile and hard-to-find targets, such as missile launchers and underground
bunkers. This increases the need for stealthy, survivable systems and the development of next-generation unmynned
platforms. The USAF must continue to emphasize precision targeting, both for strike and close-air-support missions. High-
fidelity target identification and discrimination enabled by advanced radars and directed-energy systems, including the ability
to find, track, and target individuals within a crowd, will provide battlefield commynders with improved options and new
opportunities for leveraging joint assets. Engagement and International Security Cooperation Allies and coalition partners bring
important capabilities from which the USAF and other services have long benefited. For example, allies and coalition partners
can provide enhanced situational awareness and early warning of impending crises as well as assist in understanding the
interests, motivations, traditions, and cultures of potential adversaries and prospective coalition partners. Moreover, foreign
partner engagement and outreach are an avenue to influence partner and adversary perspectives, thus shaping the
environment in ways favorable to U.S. national security interests. Engagement also may be a key to realizing another Air Force
and joint priority: to sustain or gain access to forward operating bases and logistical infrastructure. This is particularly important
given the growing availability of A2/AD assets and their ability to impede U.S. power projection capabilities. Procurement
Choices and Affordability The USAF needs to field capabilities to support current operations and pressing missions while at the
same time pursuing promising technologies to build the force of the future. Affordability, effectiveness, time urgency, and
industrial base issues inevitably shape procurement choices and reform. The Air Force must maintain todays critical assets
while also allocating resources to meet future needs. Given the long lifespan anticipated for many weapon systems, planners
need to make the most reliable cost estimates and identify problems at the outset of a weapons systems development phase
so that they can be corrected as early and cost-effectively as possible. Support to Civil Authorities As evidenced in the
aftermath of the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile (the Chile earthquake hit after this conference), the USAF has a vital
role to play in the U.S. response to international relief operations and support to civil authorities. In Haiti, the USAF
reopened the airport and deployed contingency response elements, while also providing ISR support for the joint forces in the
theater. In Chile, USAF satellite communication capabilities were critical to the recovery and relief efforts. USAF civil support
roles are likely to grow to include greater use of the Reserve Components. Consequently, USAF planners should reassess the
active and reserve component mix of forces and capabilities to identify potential mobilization and requirement shortfalls.
CLOSING CONFERENCE THOUGHTS A recurring conference theme was the need for the USAF to continue to examine specific
issues of opportunity and vulnerability more closely. For example, a future initiative could include focused working groups that
would examine such questions and issues as: How can air, space, and cyberspace capabilities best support deterrence,
preserve U.S. freedom of action, and support national objectives? How should the USAF leadership reconceptualize its vision,
institutional identity, and force posture to align as closely as possible with the future national security setting? What is the
appropriate balance between high-end and low-end air and space capabilities that will maximize military options for national
decision makers, given emerging threats and fiscal constraints? What are the opportunities, options, and tradeoffs for
investment and divestment in science and technology, infrastructure, and programmed capabilities? What are additional
interdependent concepts, similar to Air-Sea Battle, that leverage cross-service investments to identify and foster the
development of new joint capabilities? What are alternative approaches to officer accessions and development to support
shifting and emerging Air Force missions, operations, and force structure, including cyber warfare? How can the USAF best
interact with Congress to help preserve or refocus the defense-industrial base as well as to minimize myndates and restrictions
that weigh on future Air Force investments? Finally, the USAF must continue to be an organization that views debate, as the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force put it in his opening conference address, as the whetstone upon which we sharpen our
strategic thinking. This debate must also be used in pursuit of political support and to ensure that the USAF maintains and
develops critical capabilities to support U.S. national security priorities. The 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security
Strategy and Policy was conceived as a contribution to that debate. Almost a century has passed since the advent of airpower
and Billy Mitchells demonstration of its operational potential with the sinking of the Ostfriesland on July 21, 1921. For most of
that time, the United States has benefitted from the rapid development of air and space power projection capabilities, and, as a
result, it has prevailed in successive conflicts, contributed to war deterrence and crisis management, and provided essential
humynitarian relief to allies and friends around the world. As we move into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the
U.S. Air Force (USAF), like its service counterparts, is re-assessing strategies, operational concepts, and force structure. Across
the conflict spectrum, security challenges are evolving, and potential adversariesstate and non-state actorsare developing
anti-access and other asymmetric capabilities, and irregular warfare challenges are becoming more prevalent. The potential
exists for hybrid warfare in which state adversaries and/or non-state actors use a mix of conventional and unconventional
capabilities against the United States, a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of
actors. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emynate from highly adaptive adversaries who
ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority. As it
develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts constraints that will have important
implications for budget and procurement programs, basic research and development (R&D), and the maintenance of critical
skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming
defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The
imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government
and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). THE UNITED
STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES In his address opening the conference, General Norton
A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and
flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air,
thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control of the air has become indispensable to national security
because it allows the United States and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the
air the United States can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the
Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations
among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent. General Schwartz
stated that the Air Forces challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and
irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision
and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the
twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics.
Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can
use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the United States faces the prospect of the
proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and
artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American
leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airmyn who have the creativity to
anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with
innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment. System Versatility In
meeting the broad range of contingencies high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid the Air Force must maintain and develop
systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as
mynned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able
to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in,
contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and
difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a
family of systems that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few
systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility
into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this
effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will
continue to be a strategic necessity. Space Access and Control Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential
to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its
unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons maritime, air, space, and cyberspace
will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is
endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is
vital to Americas ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is
exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to
jamming. Promising new technologies, such as cold atoms, pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser
radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability. Cyber Capabilities The USAF continues to develop cyber
capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national
security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining
critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater
interagency, international, and private sector collaboration. Challenges for the Air Force General Schwartz set forth a series of
challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included: How can the Air Force better
address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and
unmatched situational awareness? How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nations nuclear
forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century? What is the way ahead for the next generation of
long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between mynned and unmynned platforms, should the USAF
consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-
observables? How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which
communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure commynd and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained
environments? In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral
damage situations? How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical
considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats? How can the Air Force reduce
its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment? How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to
petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges? How can the Air Force enhance
partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition
partners to improve support of national security interests? These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions.
The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the
years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge acceptable risks.
Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support
operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to
respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for
U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular
warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is
engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored
capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the
case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort. The 2010 QDR highlights important
trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a
conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that
would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an
impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology
proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the
massed effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue
areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for
resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states.
TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing
multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain
access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to
be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced
weapons systems and as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more
common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target
state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its
partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing
additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and
cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from
irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States
develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive
environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were
discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School,
Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions. First, the number of actorsstates and armed non-state groupsis growing,
together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional
weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-
state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats. Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies
and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of
twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. Third, given the sheer numbers of
actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric
operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of
vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water
supply, and its space assets. Fourth, the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This
includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition,
China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commynder of U.S. Pacific Commynd stated in congressional
testimony, appears designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce Chinas influence over
its neighbors including our regional allies and partners weaponry.2 These threats include ballistic missiles, aircraft, naval
forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the
twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist
organizations. Fifth, the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state
actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical projection of
present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-
state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will
increasingly have the capabilities to do so. Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious
dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to
destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in
recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor. Taken
together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States;
the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and
other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales. Another way to think about the twenty-first-century
security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than
comprehensive: A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy
An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists A Taiwan
Straits crisis that escalates to war A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula
What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and
crisis management.
The auto industry is key to military readiness
Thoma 9
*Mark Thoma, economics professor @ University of Oregon, New York Times, April 30, 2009, Does the
U.S. Need an Auto Industry?, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/does-the-us-need-
an-auto-industry/?_r=0]

Does America need an auto industry? I believe that specialization and trade generally makes us all better
off, so there is no reason to oppose industry moving outside our borders. But the costs and benefits of
specialization sometimes hit different groups of people, so there can be winners and losers. People
losing jobs in the auto industry generally do worse when they find new jobs, and that has been a big
reason for the opposition to letting manufacturing of autos and other goods go into decline. But there is
another rationale for policies preserving certain kinds of production: protecting industries vital to
national defense. If you are an island nation vulnerable to blockades or trade embargoes intended to
prevent food and other goods from being imported, it may be in your interest to protect domestic
agriculture, for example. The question is the degree to which a country can outsource the
manufacturing of goods needed for national defense. If we do not have the capacity to produce
engines, cars, tractors, and other goods that can be quickly converted to building military vehicles and
aircraft, and war breaks out and those supplies are cut off, where does that leave us? Some goods can
be safely outsourced since they arent vital to national defense, or because the barriers to restarting
production are small. But assembly lines used to produce automobiles cannot be constructed in an
instant, so losing this industry would make us more vulnerable. (Foreign ownership of factories located
here is not a problem, since we could easily take those over if necessary, so we should be happy with
the announcement of the alliance of Chrysler with Fiat.) Of course, a counterargument is that vital for
national defense can be used as a cover for broad protectionist policies. Every supplier to the auto
industry, for example, could claim that they are just as essential as the factory itself. Still, I think its
important to ask if eliminating domestic auto production crosses the safety line, and I worry that it
would.
Readiness is key to credible deterrence absence risks great power wars
Spencer 2K
[Jack Spencer, Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security, September 15, 2000, Heritage
Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/09/bg1394-the-facts-about-military-readiness]

America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat
groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies.
Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these
enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over
any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to
support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat
groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S.
official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the
capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant
theaters in overlapping time frames."4According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials,
however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James
Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General
Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a
two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and
George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater
war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military
readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests.
Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and
interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more
likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest,
thereby preserving peace.

Advantage 2: Border Security
Land POEs cant keep pace with screening wait times lead to flushing traffic
undermining border enforcement
Meissner et al. 13
[Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow and Director, MPI US Immigration Policy Program Muzaffar Chishti,
Director, MPI Office at NYU School of Law Donald M. Kerwin, Executive Director, Center for Migration
Studies Claire Bergeron Research Assistant with the US Immigration Policy Program at MPI,
Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery, Migration Policy
Institute, 2013, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf]

Meeting the physical infrastructure needs at POEs has not kept pace with advances in documentation
and screening developments. Communities such as Nogales, AZ, for example, have two ports that
typically handle 15,000 pedestrian and 20,000 vehicle crossings daily (3.5 million pedestrians and 4.7
million vehicles annually). The POEs are equipped with technology that permits 100 percent license
plate reading and document scanning. However, when traffic wait times exceed 60 minutes, inspectors
typically flush traffic through, pulling aside only obvious high-risk crossers, in an effort to reconcile
their facilitation and enforcement missions under trying conditions. Despite significant advances, land
ports have not experienced improvements on par with those realized between ports. As a result, the
potential for land POE inspections to be a weak link remains a critical enforcement challenge.
This makes the border a welcome mat for terrorists even the DHS concedes they
slip through
Murdock 13
[Deroy Murdock, Columnist @ Scripps Howard News Service, Media Fellow @ Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution, and Peace @ Stanford University, April 25, 2013, National Review, The Southern
Border: Our Welcome Mat for Terrorists http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346591/southern-
border-our-welcome-mat-terrorists]

There are at least 7,518 reasons to get the U.S./Mexican border under control. That equals the number
of aliens apprehended in fiscal year 2011 from the four nations the U.S. government labels state
sponsors of terrorism and ten additional countries of interest. Since January 2010, those flying into
America via these 14 nations face enhanced screening; as the Transportation Security Administration
announced, Effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders. U.S. national security merits at
least that much vigilance on our borders. The roaring immigration-reform debate this year largely
addresses Hispanic aliens who illegally cross the border. Far more worrisome, however, are the
thousands who break into America from countries where we have concerns, particularly about al-
Qaeda affiliates, a top State Department official told CNN. These include Cubans, Iranians, Sudanese,
and Syrians whose governments are federally designated state sponsors of terrorism. As indicated
by the latest information in Table 34 of Customs and Border Protections Immigration Yearbook 2011,
198 Sudanese were nabbed while penetrating the USA. Between FY 2002 and 2011, there were 1,207
such arrests. (These figures cover all U.S. borders, although, as Table 35 confirms, 96.3 percent of the
overall detainee population intruded from Mexico.) Like other immigrants, most Sudanese seek better
lives here. But some may be vectors for the same militant Islam that literally tore Sudan in two. In FY
2011, 108 Syrians were stopped at our borders; over ten years, the number is 1,353. Syria is a key
supporter of Hezbollah, and Bashar Assads unstable regime reportedly has attacked its domestic
opponents with chemical weapons. As for Iranians, 276 were caught in FY 2011, while 2,310 were
captured over the previous ten years. Iran also backs Hezbollah, hates the Great Satan, and craves
atomic weapons. The other ten countries of interest are Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and:
Afghanistan: The Talibans stronghold and current theater of Americas longest war. Afghans halted in FY
2011: 106. Prior ten fiscal years: 681. Nigeria: The land of underwear bomber Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab suffers under sharia law in its northern provinces. Respective data: 591, 4,525. Pakistan:
Hideaway of the Pakistani Taliban and the late Osama bin Laden. 525, 10,682. Saudi Arabia: Generous
benefactor of radical imams and militant mosques worldwide; birthplace of 15 of the 19 September 11
hijackers. 123, 986. Somalia: Home of Indian Ocean pirates and al-Qaedas al-Shabaab franchise. In
October 1993, Islamic terrorists there shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, killed 18 U.S. soldiers, and
dragged several of their bodies through Mogadishus streets. 323, 1,524. At a Capitol Hill hearing last
July, Homeland Security secretary Janet Napolitano conceded that terrorists enter the U.S. via the
U.S./Mexican border from time to time. The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight
last November published A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest
Border. As this study explained: The Congressional Research Service reports that between September
2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United
States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced
ability of Middle East terrorist organizations , aided by their relationships and growing presence in the
Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. A Line in
the Sand offers chilling portraits of some who treat the southern border as Americas welcome mat.
On January 11, 2011, U.S. agents discovered Said Jaziri in a car trunk trying to enter near San Diego. Said
said that he had traveled from his native Tunisia to Tijuana and paid smugglers $5,000 to sneak him
across the border. The French government previously convicted and deported Jaziri for assaulting a
Muslim whom he considered insufficiently devout. In 2006, Jaziri advocated killing Danish cartoonist
Kurt Westergaard for creating what Jaziri called sacrilegious drawings of the Prophet Mohammed.
Somalias Ahmed Muhammed Dhakane told authorities in 2011 that he earned up to $75,000 per day
smuggling East Africans into America. His clients included three al-Shabaab terrorists. As the House
report states: Dhakane cautioned that each of these individuals is ready to die for their cause and
would fight against the United States if the jihad moved from overseas to the U.S. mainland. On June
4, 2010, Anthony Joseph Tracy (a.k.a. Yusuf Noor) was convicted of conspiring to slip aliens into America.
Tracy told federal investigators that Cuban diplomats used his travel agency in Kenya Noor Services
Ltd. to transfer 272 Somalis to Havana. They proceeded to Belize, through Mexico, and then
trespassed into the U.S. Tracy, who converted to Islam in prison in the 1990s, claims he refused to assist
al-Shabaab. But officials discovered an e-mail in which he casually wrote: i helped a lot of Somalis and
most are good but there are some who are bad and i leave them to ALLAH . . . And remember: These
anecdotes and statistics involve individuals whom authorities intercepted. No details exist about aliens
from these countries who successfully have infiltrated America.


The plan facilitates the perception of a strong border and bolsters intelligence
networks that deters terrorists
Willis et al. 10
Henry H. Willis, the Director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, and professor at
the Pardee RAND Graduate School, Ph.D. in engineering and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University,
M.A. in environmental engineering and science at University of Cincinnati, B.A. in chemistry and
environmental sciences at University of Pennsylvania; Joel B. Predd, engineer at the RAND Corporation,
Ph.D. in electrical engineering at Princeton University, B.S. in electrical engineering at Purdue University;
Paul K. Davis, senior principal researcher at the RAND Corporation and a professor of policy analysis in
the Pardee RAND Graduate School, Ph.D. in chemical physics at MIT, B.S. at University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor; Wayne P. Brown, 2010 (Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry,
Sponsored by the DHS, Technical Report, RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, Available Online
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR837.pdf]

4.2.2 Contributions of Border Interdiction, Deterrence, and Networked Intelligence The principal
contributions that border security makes to counterterrorism relate to preventing certain kinds of
terrorist attacks dependent on ows into the country of people or materials. These contributions can be
illustrated by considering what opportunities exist to disrupt terrorist attacks while they are being
planned and orchestrated. Through a number of planning eorts, DHS and its components have
developed detailed planning scenarios of terrorist events (DHS, 2006). Each of these scenarios has been
deconstructed into attack trees that are useful for considering how DHS border-security programs
contribute to terrorism security eorts. In their most generic form, these attack trees specify
dimensions of attack scenarios with respect to building the terrorist team, identifying a target, and
acquiring a weapon (see Figure 4.1). This decomposition of attack planning provides a structure around
which to consider how interdiction, deterrence, and networked intelligence contribute to preventing
terrorist attacks and, thus, why it is relevant to measure these functions. DHS border-security eorts
focus on interdiction of terrorist team members and weapons or weapon components when they cross
U.S. borders. Examples of initiatives that are intended to enhance these capabilities include the Secure
Border Initiative, the acquisition of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals for nuclear detection, the Secure
Communities Initiative, and US-VISIT. In addition, it is often pointed out that, when border-security
measures are perceived to be effective, terrorists groups may be deterred from attacking in particular
ways, or possibly from attacking at all. This could result from awareness of what type of surveillance is
occurring or the capability of interdiction systems. In either case, deterrence refers to the judgment of
terrorists that they will not be successful, leading them to choose another course of action. Finally,
many border-security initiatives also contribute information to the national networked-intelligence
picture. For example, the Secure Communities Initiative has implemented new capabilities to allow a
single submission of ngerprints as part of the normal criminal arrest and booking process to be queried
against both the FBI and DHS immigration and terrorism databases. This eort makes it easier for
federal and local law enforcement to share actionable intelligence and makes it more dicult for
terrorists to evade border-security eorts. 4.2.3 Non-DHS Factors on Which Border-Security Outcomes
Depend The terrorist threat that border-security eorts must counter will be signicantly inuenced
by the effectiveness of security, economic policy, military, diplomatic, and intelligence eorts targeting
other aspects of terrorism. If terrorists overseas are able to acquire signicant quantities of weapon
material or establish advanced counterintelligence capabilities, attack plans may easily overwhelm
border-security eorts. If terrorists are successful at recruiting and building networks within the United
States, border-security eorts may never get the chance to interdict attacks. Similarly, the perceptions
that terrorists have about the diculty of entering the country could inuence decisions of how to
organize and plan attacks. If borders are viewed as porous and open, terrorist groups can be expected
to take advantage of this vulnerability. To the extent that border security is seen as presenting barriers
to terrorist planning (especially barriers that include substantial operational uncertainty), eorts will
create a deterrent effect that could lead terrorists to shift to attacking interests outside the United
States or attacking in dierent ways. The extent to which border security will be eective at both
interdicting and deterring terrorists will itself depend on a number of contextual factors, including the
following: material being smuggled: Is it possible to detect the material using noninvasive means (e.g.,
with nuclear detectors)? mode of travel: Will crossings be via air, land, or sea? environment and
terrain: Will crossings occur during times when and at places where border security benets from good
visibility or poor visibility? U.S. intelligence capabilities: Do expenditures on intelligence collection and
analysis aord border security the ability to anticipate terrorist incursion attempts? terrorist
counterintelligence capabilities: Do terrorists have enough understanding of border-security tactics and
techniques to be able to avoid them and to do so with considerable condence? The answer to this, of
course, will depend on the visibility and predictability of border-security systems and procedures. The
measures used for evaluation of border-security e orts must be able to reect some of these
dependencies and factors that moderate the effectiveness of border security.
Scenario One: Nuclear Terror
High risk of nuclear terrorism they can smuggle materials piece by piece
McCaul 12
[Michael T. McCaul, November 2012, Sr., U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district,
serving since 2005. A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND TERROR AT THE
SOUTHWEST BORDER
http://mccaul.house.gov/uploads/Final%20PDF%20Line%20in%20the%20Sand.pdf]

Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research
Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown
violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat
to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their
relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to
enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes Americas ever-present threat from
Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship
with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July
2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most
with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the
suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors
of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam
Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists
around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood
gunman; underwear bomber Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted
of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al
Awlaki moved his followers to commit jihad against the United States. These instances, combined with
recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and
Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist
organizations and their associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence
gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Ladens compound indicated the worlds most wanted
terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United
States to conduct terror operations.3 The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of
al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then
attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle
materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass
d estruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether
Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran
or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Confronting the
threat at the Southwest border has a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. As this report
explains, the United States tightened security at airports and land ports of entry in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link in the chain.
Criminal elements could migrate down this path of least resistance, and with them the terrorists who
continue to seek our destruction. The federal government must meet the challenge to secure
Americas unlocked back door from the dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are
lined up, and working together, to enter.
Nuclear attack results in retaliation escalates to nuclear war
Ayson 10
[Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at
the Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions,
InformaWorld]

But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear
exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and
especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive
exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context,
todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War
years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic
nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late
1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may
require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of
nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a
terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China
could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the
most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to
be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.
Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States
react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had
come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear
laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of
science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear
explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable,
identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency
of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear
material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and
American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all)
suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United
Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with
a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan.
But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear
Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in
Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded
between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst?
Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already
involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting
each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present
time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during
a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing
resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator
or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil
might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or
China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear
attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear
arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against
the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign
of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the
temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption
would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear
terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear)
retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to
support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia
and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an
infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps
not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and
abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what
Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American
pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a
degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to
provide.

Escalation likely terror attacks flip decision-making causing violent backlash
Bostrom, Ackerman, and Potter 8
(Nick-Director of the future of humanity institute at oxford university, specializes in probability theory, scientific method, and
risk analysis- former expert consultant for european commission in Brussels and the CIA, Gary- research director of the national
consortium for START and Director of the center for terrorism and intelligence studies, and William- Institute professor and
director of the center for nonproliferation studies on numerous committees of the national academy of science, Global
Catastrophic Risks, Oxford University Press, p.430-31) *We dont affirm the ableist discourse*

Unlike the more tangible physical and economic effects of nuclear terrorism, it is almost impossible to model the possible
psychological, social, and political consequences of nuclear terrorism, especially in the long term and following multiple
incidents. One is therefore forced to rely on proxy data from the effects of previous cases of large-scale terrorism, a variety of
natural disasters and past nuclear accidents such as the Chernobyl meltdown. The psychological, social and political effects of
nuclear terrorism are likely to extend far beyond the areas affected by blast or radiation, although many of these effects are
likely to be more severe closer to ground zero. It can be expected that the initial event will induce a number of
psychological symptoms in victims, responders, and onlookers. In an age of instantaneous global communication, the
last category might rapidly encompass most of the planet. The constellation of possible symptoms might include
anxiety, grief, helplessness, initial denial, anger, confusion, impaired memory, sleep disturbance and withdrawal (Alexander and
Klein, 2006). Based on past experience with terrorism and natural disasters, these symptoms will resolve naturally in the
majority of people, with only a fraction going on to develop persistent psychiatric illness such as post-traumatic stress disorder.
However, the intangible, potentially irreversible, contaminating, invasive and doubt provoking nature of
radiation brings with it a singular aura of dread and high levels of stress and anxiety. Indeed, this fear
factor is one of the key reasons why some terrorists might select weapons emitting radiation. In addition to significant physical
casualties, a nuclear terrorism event would most likely result in substantially greater numbers of unexposed individuals seeking
treatment, thereby complicating medical responses. In the 1987, radiological incident in Goiania, Brazil, up to 140,000
unexposed people flooded the health care system seeking treatment (department of homeland security, 2003, p.26). Although
genuine panic in the sense of maladaptive responses such as freezing is extremely rare (jones , 1995), a nuclear terrorism
incident might provoke a mass exodus from cities as individuals make subjective decisions to minimize their anxiety. Following
the three mile island nuclear accident in the United states in 1979, 150,000 people took to the highways 45 people evacuated
for every person advised to leave (becker, 2003). Were nuclear terrorism to become a repeating occurrence, the question
would arise regarding whether people would eventually be able to habituate to such events, much as the Israeli public currently
manages to maintain a functional society despite continual terrorist attacks. While desensitization to extremely high levels of
violence is possible, multiple cases of nuclear terrorism over an extended period of time might prove to be beyond the
threshold of human tolerance. Even a single incidence of nuclear terrorism could augur negative social
changes. While greater social cohesion is likely in the immediate aftermath of an attack (department of homeland security,
2003, p.38), over time feelings of fear, anger and frustration could lead to widespread anti-social behavior, including the
stigmatization of those exposed to radiation and the scapegoating of population groups associated with the
perceived perpetrators of the attack. This reaction could reach the level of large-scale xenophobia and
vigilantism. Repeated attacks on major cities might even lead to behaviors encouraging social reversion and the general
deterioration of civil society , for example, if many people adopt a survivalist attitude and abandon populated areas. There is, of
course, also the possibility that higher mortality salience might lead to positive social effects, including more constructive
approaches to problem-solving (Calhoun and Tedeschi, 1998). Yet higher morality could just as easily lead to more pathological
behaviors. For instance, during outbreaks of the black death plague in the middle ages, some groups lost all hope and
descended into a self-destructive epicureanism. A nuclear terrorist attack, or series of attacks, would almost certainly
alter the fabric of politics (Becker, 2003). The use of a nuclear weapon might trigger a backlash against current
political or scientific establishments for creating and failing to prevent the threat. Such attacks might
paralyze an open or free society by causing the government to adopt draconian methods (Stern, 1999,
pp.2-3), or massively restrict movement and trade until all nuclear material can be accounted for, an effort that would take
years and which could never be totally complete. The concomitant loss of faith in governing authorities might eventually
culminate in the fulfillment of John Herzs initial vision of the atomic age, resulting in the demise of the nation-state as
we know it (1957).
Scenario Two: Bioterror
Al Qaeda seeks to exploit undeveloped borders and unleash bioweapons
The Washington Times 9
*The Washington Times, Al Qaeda eyes bio attack from Mexico June 3, 2009
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/3/al-qaeda-eyes-bio-attack-via-mexico-
border/?page=all]

U.S. counterterrorism officials have authenticated a video by an al Qaeda recruiter threatening to
smuggle a biological weapon into the United States via tunnels under the Mexico border, the latest sign
of the terrorist groups determination to stage another mass-casualty attack on the U.S. homeland. The
video aired earlier this year as a recruitment tool makes clear that al Qaeda is looking to exploit
weaknesses in U.S. border security and also is willing to ally itself with white militia groups or other
anti-government entities interested in carrying out an attack inside the United States, according to
counterterrorism officials interviewed by The Washington Times. The officials, who spoke only on the
condition they not be named because of the sensitive nature of their work, stressed that there is no
credible information that al Qaeda has acquired the capabilities to carry out a mass biological attack
although its members have clearly sought the expertise. The video first aired by the Arabic news
network Al Jazeera in February and later posted to several Web sites shows Kuwaiti dissident Abdullah
al-Nafisi telling a room full of supporters in Bahrain that al Qaeda is casing the U.S. border with Mexico
to assess how to send terrorists and weapons into the U.S. It shouldnt be a surprise to anyone that
terrorist organizations would utilize the border to enter the U.S., said a DEA official who also asked
not to be named because of his involvement in ongoing intelligence operations. We cant ignore any
threat or detail when it comes to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations bent on attacking the U.S.
The Americans are afraid that the *weapons of mass destruction+ might fall into the hands of terrorist
organizations like al Qaeda and others, he told followers. There is good reason for the Americans
fears. *Al Qaeda+ had laboratories in north Afghanistan. They have scientists, chemists and nuclear
physicists. They are nothing like they are portrayed by these mercenary journalists - backward Bedouins
living in caves. No, no, by no means. This kind of talk can fool only naive people. People who follow such
things know that al Qaeda has laboratories, just like Hezbollah.
Extinction
Matheny 07
[Jason G. Matheny, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg
School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction, Risk
Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007]

Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a
virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and
materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can
have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense
efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor
biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to
respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

Thus the plan: The United States federal government ought to implement the Cross-
Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2013
Solvency
The Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act is key facilitates public-private
partnerships, bolsters staffing, and integrates security Squo measures are not
enough
Cornyn 9/13 9/26/13
[John Cornyn, U.S. Senator (R-TX) since 2002, September 26, 2013, Statesman.com, Long wait times at
border hurt economy, http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/long-wait-times-at-border-hurt-
economy/nZ725/] AS

A component of comprehensive immigration reform that too often is overlooked in Washington is the
tremendous amount of legal trade flowing across our southern border. Since NAFTA went into effect in
1994, American commerce with Mexico has exploded. Exports to our southern neighbor have increased
by over 300 percent, while imports have grown by a remarkable 460 percent. Today, there are more
than 6 million American jobs that rely on trade with Mexico, including over 460,000 in Texas.
Unfortunately, our ports of entry that span the Rio Grande have not kept pace with this swell in
commerce. After meeting with stakeholders and local officials in communities all along the border I,
along with then-U.S. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, asked the Government Accountability Office to conduct
a review of our ports of entry.
The report was released in July and confirms what local leaders, businesses and residents on the border
already know: Our ports of entry (POEs) have been neglected for too long. Border wait times are
under-reported, infrastructure and staff are mismanaged and stretched too thin, and it is becoming
harder to ensure safe and efficient trade and travel.
Highways are the arteries of commerce, and our ports of entry are the valves that regulate its flow.
Currently, they are clogged, and this is needlessly harming the economy while effectively making it
easier to smuggle contraband into the country. A Bloomberg government study found that border
delays cost the U.S. economy $7.8 billion in 2011. If corrective action is not taken, the annual damage is
projected to rise to $14.7 billion by 2020.
We must fix this.
I authored an amendment to the immigration bill that passed the Senate earlier this summer that aimed
to achieve a reduction in wait times by 50 percent at our ports of entry. Unfortunately, it did not muster
the 60 votes needed for adoption. But with renewed attention to the issue generated by the GAO
report, I remain hopeful that a fix will be an integral part of the immigration debate.
Nevertheless, a fix need not be tied to the fate of immigration reform. Cities, counties and private bridge
owners want their bridges to stay open longer and accommodate more traffic. Unfortunately, Customs
and Border Protection doesnt have the resources, and Washington lacks the will to offer much help.
In response, organizations such as the Border Trade Alliance, Texas Border Coalition and other local
stakeholders are exploring an innovative funding option: public-private partnerships. These would
combine the resources of CBP with local governments and private companies or associations to improve
services and conditions at ports of entry.
On the heels of the GAO report, CBP announced that it would initiate five such partnerships four of
which are in Texas on a limited, provisional basis. This is commendable, but more needs to be done.
CBP currently lacks the legal authority to enter into the long-term, robust agreements that are needed.
Earlier this year, I authored legislation, the Cross Border Trade Enhancement Act, which would give CBP
the authority it needs. If signed into law, we would see such partnerships established in the Valley in
short order.
Looking forward, I see reason for optimism. CBP is aware of the problem and seems willing to act.
Communities along the border are eager to participate, and the GAO report will draw the attention of
lawmakers as the immigration debate continues. I hope that the Obama administration will work with
local leaders and with me to bring about these much needed upgrades to our ports of entry.
Until we do so, however, we cannot harness our full economic potential.
Fed key ensures coordination, resources, and cross-border dialogue
Lee et al. 13
[Erik Lee, Christopher E. Wilson, Francisco Lara-Valencia, Carlos A. de la Parra,
Rick Van Schoik, Kristofer Patron-Soberano, Eric L. Olson, Andrew Selee, May 2013, Wilson Center, The
State of The Border Report A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border,+

Managing the U.S.-Mexico border is made particularly difficult by the large number of federal, state,
and local government entities that manage and protect the border and surrounding transportation
infrastructure. While the State Department and Mexicos Foreign Ministry manage most bilateral issues,
in the case of the border they must work alongside a number of federal stakeholders, such as
Commerce/Economa, DHS/Gobernacin, DOT/SCT, and EPA/SEMARNAT, to name but a few. In light of
border region complaints over the slowdown in crossborder commerce due to increased concerns
regarding terrorism and drug-trafficking related violence, in 2010 the U.S. and Mexican governments
reconfigured their interagency processes and created the bilateral Executive Steering Committee on
21st Century Border Management (ESC) in an effort to improve both interagency and binational
coordination. Officials on both sides of the border cite the ESC as a major advance in federal-level
coordination of border management. For the United States, the National Security Staff Interagency
Policy Committee sits at the nexus of the new Executive Steering Committee and three major
components, Infrastructure Planning, Port Operations, and Corridor Security. The increased involvement
of the White House in border affairs reflects an understanding that only top-level leadership can
manage the many departments and agencies with interests in the border. A key component of how
the U.S.-Mexico border functions to facilitate trade has to do with transportation planning. In the
absence of strong and coordinated planning, infrastructure investments on one side of the border or in
one region can simply feed traffic into a bottleneck in another area. This process is largely managed by
the Joint Working Committee on Transportation Planning (JWC), a binational entity chaired by the two
countries transportation agencies but including representatives from many federal agencies and state
departments of transportation. As border communities felt themselves increasingly affected by
decisions made in Washington and Mexico City, their insistence on being included in these discussions
led to the regional border master plan process, in which state DOTs lead stakeholder discussions on
border infrastructure priorities. While this process makes sense from a U.S. perspective (in the absence
of a national transportation plan, state DOTs essentially manage and spend federal transportation
dollars), this process is somewhat of a mismatch for Mexicos more centralized political system. The
system seems to work better in certain cross-border communities than others, as is seen with California
and Baja Californias award-winning master plan. There is no simple answer to the complex challenge of
coordinating border planning and management, but a few key ingredients for success can be identified.
First, border stakeholders need to be at the tableborder experts in Washington and Mexico City are
no substitute for those living the implications of policy on a daily basis. Nonetheless, a strong federal
role is important. Border communities often work together, but they also compete to attract federal
resources and trade flows. The federal agencies are well placed to analyze and balance competing
needs, especially in dialogue with border communities. Finally, and hopefully obviously, cross-border
collaboration is vital. To strengthen regional competitiveness and security, we need regional
coordination.
A certain and coordinated investment is necessary that solves growth, trade, and
manufacturing
Figueroa et al. 12 Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst at the North American Center
for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University, and Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North
American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University, and Rick Van Schoik, Director of
the North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University (Alejandro Figueroa, Erik
Lee, Rick Van Schoik, North American Center for Transborder Studies Arizona State University, 01-04-
12, Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico,
http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossborder-trade-with-
mexico2.pdf, Accessed 07-16-2013 | AK)

The U.S. and Mexico will be successful at enhancing a prosperous bilateral relationship to the extent
that both federal governments and stakeholders are capable of coordinating the development of their
border management and infrastructure. The massive and highly complex U.S. and Mexican economies
interact and even create value at our shared border. According to a study conducted by Accenture for
the U.S. Department of Commerce, todays level of demand exceeds the physical infrastructure and
operating capacity of our ports of entry. Wait times are projected to increase across the five busiest
U.S.-Mexico border crossings if volumes continue to grow as expected and if infrastructure and
operations remain the same. By 2017, it is estimated that the average wait time will be nearly 100
minutes an increase of 60%. Sharing a 2,000-mile long border needs to be recognized as both a
challenge and an opportunity. While land ports of entry between the two nations were first envisioned
to process the legitimate crossing of people, goods and services across the border, security has taking a
dominant role in recent years, hampering the ability of federal agencies to efficiently manage border
traffic. Advances in border infrastructure simply did not happen during the last decade, which is
astounding given the greatly expanded post-NAFTA binational commercial relationship. Our borders
infrastructure and capacity today reflects the needs of a bygone era. This became evident as never
before when on September 14, 2011, the San Ysidro, California port of entry the busiest land port of
entry in the worldhad to shut down its 24 northbound lanes due to the collapse of part of its roof,
injuring several people and damaging vehicles trying to cross into the U.S. from Tijuana, Mexico.
According to a report by the San Diego Association of Governments, inadequate infrastructure capacity
just at the border crossings between San Diego County and the state of Baja California creates traffic
congestion and delays that cost both the U.S. and Mexican economies on average an estimated $7.2
billion in forgone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs on an annual basis. These border delays could
cause $86 billion in output losses over the next ten years. These delays are significant for a number of
reasons, not the least of which is that American firms are constantly attempting to reduce their
inventory costs in an attempt to remain competitive. While importing from China to the U.S. may
require a company to hold more than 100 days of inventory, if efficiently managed, our proximity to
Mexico can provide American firms with a constant and predictable flow of goods that may reduce
inventory costs and provide firms the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to sudden market
changes. With this fundamental fact in mind, in May of 2010 the U.S. and Mexico signed the 21st
Century Border Management Joint Declaration. Recognizing the importance of fostering the commercial
relationship, both countries have agreed to coordinate efforts to enhance the economic
competitiveness by expediting lawful trade. The idea is that development of modern and secure border
infrastructure will give an added boost to our regions competitiveness in the world and at the same
time increase our access to a wider, more affordable and ever improving quality set of goods. Today
more than 75,000 trucks (carrying close to 80 % of our two-way trade) cross our border on a daily basis.
That this much traffic is able to cross our congested borders is due in part to important advances in
border infrastructure in the last couple of years as new ports of entry have been opened. One important
policy development is master planning processes for regional border infrastructure, which have been
initiated in conjunction with local border communities and state governments. It is hoped that these
regional processes will eventually make the overall binational infrastructure-building process more
transparent, more robust and ultimately a better fit for two such powerful economies and next door
neighbors. Much Opportunity, but the Real Work Has Only Just Begun Total trade between the United
States and Mexico has expanded by more than 600% since 1990. Yet we need further commitment and
investment in the infrastructure needed to sustain such growth, which is critical for both economies.
The question now is whether our current border management system will be able to sustain that
growth, and if so, for how much longer. A strong trade/joint production relationship with Mexico can
help create high-quality jobs within our borders. For reasons of geography and history, Mexicos fate is
intertwined with that of the United States. And despite the current global economic environment, and
transnational organized crime affecting Mexico and the United States, the two countries need to
implement a 21st Century border that not only re-invigorates crossborder trade and economic
integration but which will also lead to increased safety and quality of life for the residents of both
countries. Both countries need to remain committed to promoting the global competitiveness of our
region and to ensuring that the benefits of expanding trade flows keep reaching businesses, workers
and consumers on both sides of our shared border. We will be able to accomplish this if leaders can
explain the critical nature of our commercial relationships in ways that are more concrete and easier for
citizens to understand. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet tomorrows demands,
acting as a facilitator and conductor of the lawful flows of goods, services and people between our
nations, so that we may capitalize on the full potential of our partnership. If a billion dollars worth of
trade crosses the U.S.-Mexico border on a daily basis and sustains six million jobs in the U.S., imagine
what could be accomplished with a truly 21st century border.

Extra Cards
Yes nuke terror studies prove
Jaspal 12
[Zafar Nawaz, Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad,
Pakistan, Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111]

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national
security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse
nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of
terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the
same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion
that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should
not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish of acquiring
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the
published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it
is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1).
The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to
be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been
discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire
fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear
weapons was areligious duty (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that al-Qaeda was actively seeking an
atomic bomb. Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had revealed his extensive but unsuccessful
efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed
that we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use
them (Mir, 2001, November 10). On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that
he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek
funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29). He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive
interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did
not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was
in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also
authenticates bin Ladens Deputy Ayman Zawahiris claim which he made in December 2001: If you have $30 million, go to the
black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are
available (Allison, 2010, January: 2). The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members
could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The
33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the
thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2). Indeed, the
nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel
Whiteneck pointed out: Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the
magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if
it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless
of the consequences cannot be deterred (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been
reiterating that nuclear weapons represent the gravest threat to United States and international security. While realizing
that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to
convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009:
Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has
spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on
a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the
point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). He added: One terrorist
with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no
problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe (Remarks by President Barack
Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security
Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear
terrorism (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obamas nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding the threat
of nuclear terrorism. It also recognized the need for all States to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or
technical assistance becoming available to terrorists. The UNSC Resolution called for universal adherence to the Convention
on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism. (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6,
2010 declared that terrorism and proliferation are far greater threats to the United States and
international stability. (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right tohold
fully accountable any state or group that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction,
whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010,
April: 12). This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states.

Bioterrorism coming now no impediments to deployment
Glassman 12
*James, We're Letting Our Bioterrorism Defenses Down, April 4
th
, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesglassman/2012/04/04/were-letting-our-bioterrorism-defenses-down/print/]

A little over three years ago, a commission of experts, established by Congress, concluded that the chances were better than
50-50 that a weapon of mass destruction would be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by 2013. And, said the
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, that weapon is more likely to be biological than nuclear.
Both Michael Chertoff, former secretary of Homeland Security, and Admiral Mike McConnell, former director of national
intelligence, have said that bioterror not a nuclear weapon was their greatest fear when they were in office. In terms of
catastrophic attacks, bio was at the top of the list, said Chertoff, who served from 2005 to 2009 Bacillus
anthracis, via Wikipedia But we havent heard much about bioterrorism since the anthrax incidents that closely followed 9/11,
a little over a decade ago. The truth is that America remains vulnerable to an attack that could kill hundreds of
thousands. Terrorists could spray Bacillus anthracis from crop-dusters over football stadiums. Or they could
send intentionally infected fanatics out to spread the smallpox virus through a crowded city, doing far more damage than a
brigade of suicide bombers. While biological warfare dates back centuries (cadavers were used to contaminate the water
supplies of enemies), the United States was paying scant attention to bio-defense until a few years before the airplane attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Despite a relatively swift mobilization after 9/11, severe problems remain. A
Bio-Response Report Card study, issued last October by the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, concluded, The
nation does not yet have adequate bio-response capability to meet fundamental expectations during a large-scale
biological event. The study gives grades of D to detection and diagnosis and medical counter-measure availability for a
major bioterror attack. Biological weapons have been called the poor mans atom bomb. They are nowhere near as
difficult to manufacture as nuclear weapons, and their return address is hard to assess, making them ideal for non-
state actors like Al Qaeda, which, in fact, has been seeking to acquire biological WMD since at least 1999. A report 12 years
ago concluded, Individuals, with no background in the development and production of bioweapons and no access to
the classified information from the former U.S. bio-weapons program, were able to produce a significant quantity of
high-quality weaponized Bacillus globigii a close cousin to the well-known threat, Anthrax. Colonies of Baccilus subtilis,
via Wikipedia In the spring of 2001, a Defense Science Board report, co-authored by Nobel Prize winner Joshua Lederberg and
George Whiteside, former chair of the Harvard chemistry department, concluded that major impediments to the
development of biological weaponshave largely been eliminated in the last decade by the rapid spread of
biotechnology. Later that year, five Americans were killed by anthrax powder, carried in letters. The FBI is convinced that the letters came from a civilian
employee of the U.S. Army. If so, then a single employee with no work experience in the weaponization of pathogens, using equipment that could be readily
purchased over the Internet, was able to produce very high-quality, dry-powdered anthrax, said the Bio-Response Report Card.