CASE DIGESTS

(Of Landmark Supreme Court Decisions

In Constitutional Law)
July 2013 Edition

Prepared by:

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN
Professor
College of Law
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Baguio City
(POLITICAL LAW REVIEW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II )


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(Political Law & Constitutional Law)


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2

The right to Due Process of law on the part of
Mayor Maliksi was violated when he was not
notified of the dates when the COMELEC
conducted the decryption and printing of the
ballot images from the CF Cards by the First
Division of the COMELEC in an appealed case.


MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC and HOMER
T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, April 13, 2013

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan
the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered
precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the
revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease
and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC.
In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi
was then installed as Mayor.

In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties,
decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF
cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the
amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs decision
and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor . Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of
the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images,
which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the
integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.

On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksis motion for
reconsideration.Maliksi went to the Supreme Court reiterating his objections to the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him in violation of his
constitutional right to due process of law, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in
the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.

In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 8-7,
dismissed Maliksis petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied
due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination
of the ballot images by the First Division referring to the orders of the First Division directing
Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for
reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in
deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the
ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same
evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First
Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully
established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.
3

In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi again raised the alleged
violation of his right to due process.

Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings
and to be present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such rights when he was
not informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First
Division; (c) that the March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did not
sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the date, time, and venue of the
decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (d) that he was thus completely deprived of the
opportunity to participate in the decryption proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court granted Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and
reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of
the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.

It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the
assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which
no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount
proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as
amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their
exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the
autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.

We should not ignore that the parties participation during the revision and recount
proceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for the
COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the COMELECs proceedings attain
credibility as to the result. The parties presence would have ensured that the requisite
procedures have been followed, including the required authentication and certification that the
images to be printed are genuine. In this regard, the COMELEC was less than candid, and was
even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing of the picture images of the ballots
and the recount proceedings. The COMELEC was merely content with listing the guidelines that
the First Division had followed in the appreciation of the ballots and the results of the recount. In
short, there was vagueness as to what rule had been followed in the decryption and printing
proceeding.

The Supreme Court held that the Resolution does not intend to validate the victory of
any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court
simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a
cornerstone of our legal system.

Dismissal of a criminal case based on a
Demurrer to Evidence results in double
jeopardy and that no appeal, Motion for
Reconsideration nor petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 may be entertained, as a general
rule. Private complainant may not, without the
participation of the Solicitor General, question
said dismissal before the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court.
4

LITO BAUTISTA vs. SHARON CUNETA-PANGILINAN, G. R.
No. 189754, October 24, 2012

The petitioners who are editor and assistant editor of the tabloid Bandera were charged
of two (2) counts of Libel before the RTC of Mandaluyong City based on the complaint of
actress Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan.

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with x x x with deliberate intent to bring
SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame
and contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in
Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which among
others have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:

MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!

Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, Id like
to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo yata yung
sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.

Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito
totoo. xxx Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are
those purportedly biting commentaries about her katabaan
and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to
acknowledge the good reviews weve done on her.

x x x

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City
of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officers of Bandera Publishing x x x with deliberate
intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public
dishonor, shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to
publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila,
which, among others, have the following insulting and slanderous
remarks, to wit:


She doesnt want kasi her husband to win as a senator
because when that happens, mawawalan siya ng hold sa
kanya, our caller opines. Pettizou is really sad that Sharon
is treating her husband like a wimp.
5

In public, our source goes on tartly, pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa
embrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa [na] lang
parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko. My
God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. Hes really intelligent
as compared to Sharon who appears to be brain dead
most of the time.

Upon arraignment, petitioners each entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-
trial and trial of the cases ensued.

On November 14, 2006, after the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. In their Demurrer to Evidence,
which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's
evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the
publication Bandera; that that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio were not libelous due
to absence of malice.

On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence and dismissed the above criminal cases. On August 19, 2008, respondent Sharon
Cuneta-Pangilinan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC Order
dated April 25, 2008 which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the dismissal
of the cases against them.

In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby
reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008 and ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated September 28, 2009.

Hence, petitioners filed this petition claiming that the petition for Certiorari filed by
Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan violated their right against double jeopardy.

Held:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer
to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer interpose
an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that
respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the
allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other
words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered,
which was not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA.

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view
she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly
provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals
6
in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his
official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government.

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The
private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar
as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the
civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only
by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
undertake such appeal.

In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially
questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case.
Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the
petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have
been outrightly dismissed by the CA.

Finally, although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside
the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners constitutionally-enshrined
right against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have
seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the
Order of the RTC.

The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution,
taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private
offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the
accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such
instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right
against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in mind that their
decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals who come to the courts to seek
redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis
for the filing of the appropriate actions against them.


May an accused charged of selling marijuana
in the criminal information be convicted of
possession of marijuana without violating his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHAD MANANANSALA,
G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013

The information filed on October 20, 1994 against the accused alleges:

That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October,
1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the
7
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling,
delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or
less 750 grams or kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a
small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited
drugs, found in his possession and control.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed that on October 18, 1994 the
Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy operation against
Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP
applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search
Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansalas
residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City.

SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay
Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of
Manansalas house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered
from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of P655.00 that
included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747
used during the test buy.

After trial, accused was convicted of possession of marijuana only under Section 8 of
RA No. 6425 instead of Section 4. The said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Was his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him violated when he was charged of sale of marijuana under Section 4 of RA No. 6425 but
was convicted of possession under Section 8 of the same law--- which entitles him to
acquittal?

Held:

The crime charged in the information was clearly for violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425 or sale of prohibited drugs, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Arraigned
under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty of
the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for violation of Section 8, of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

The accused now questions said conviction based on the alleged violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the
present circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in
the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another
quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are
probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In this case , it has been
satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were
the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in convicting the accused-appellant of illegal
8
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended.

To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the
conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege, instead
of for a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against
him. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the
rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.

Non-compliance of Section 21 of RA No. 9165
entitles the accused to acquittal based on his
constitutional presumption of innocence.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAMMY UMIPANG,
G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling drugs
along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the
[Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City
Police was dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2]
Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a 500.00 marked money. The
operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the length
of the street while the other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. The
confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential informant
and PO2 Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said Sam, pa-
iskor kami. Sam replied Magkano ang iiskorin nyo? The confidential informant said Five
hundred pesos. Sam took out three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
with various price tags500, 300, and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the
marked 500.00 to Sam who received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and
arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team joined them. PO1 Ragos
handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance
were recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials SAU [which stood for
Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant].
Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where he was booked, investigated and
identified as accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the
confiscated items to the crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
THERE WAS NO INVENTORY NOR PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BEFORE THE
CONFISCATED ITEMS WERE BROUGHT TO THE CRIME LABORATORY FOR TESTING.
9
Despite the above lapses, accused was convicted by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Before the Supreme Court, accused moves for his acquittal because said non-
compliance of Section 21, RA No. 9165 is fatal and in furtherance of his constitutional
presumption of innocence.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of the RTC Joint
Decision in all respects because there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witness to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full
faith and credence.
Held:
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation
conducted by the SAID-SOTF.
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official
duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential
police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment.
Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly
against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. Otherwise, the procedure set out
in the law will be mere lip service. The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with
defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items from accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items.
According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the complete name, including
the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order to mark the confiscated sachets. The
marking was done immediately after Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful
perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal that his prior knowledge of
the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the latters full name, was not
clearly established.
Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge of
the complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which enabled the
former to mark the seized items with the latters complete initials. This suspicious,
material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises questions as to how PO2 Gasid
came to know about the initials of Umipang prior to the latters statements at the police
precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of where the marking really took
place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who asked accused-
appellant about the latters personal circumstances, including his true identity, and that
the questioning happened when accused-appellant was already at the police station.
Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek the
third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the
10
law, the inventory and photographing of seized items must be conducted in the
presence of a representative from the media, from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and from any elected public official.
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the
marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in
evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to
contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication
that they contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police
officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any
justifiable reason for failing to do so especially considering that it had sufficient time from the
moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending
police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A
sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much
Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take
photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed out by the
defense during trial, the Certificate of Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of
PO2 Gasid the arresting officer who prepared the certificate thus making the certificate
defective. Also, the prosecution neither submitted any photograph of the seized items nor
offered any reason for failing to do so. We reiterate that these requirements are specifically
outlined in and required to be implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted especially true when
the lapses in procedure were recognized and explained in terms of justifiable grounds.

There
must also be a showing that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were
thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason. However, when there is gross disregard
of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty
is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence. This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the
procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.
As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the
crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused which entitles
him to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence.

When the evidence is susceptible to two (2)
interpretations, one consistent with the guilt of the
accused and the other, his innocence, the
presumption of innocence was not ove4rcome and
the accused is entitled to acquittal as a matter of
right.

PEOPLE VS. ZAFRA MARAORAO, G.R. NO. 174369, June 20,
2012

Appellant was charged under an Information dated January 4, 2001 filed before the RTC of
Manila for illegal possession of shabu.
11
On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged against him. Thereafter, trial ensued.
For the prosecution, PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, they
received reliable information at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that an
undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early
morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2
Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit went to the Islamic Center.
While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each other. Upon
noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to
apprehend him.
Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the pavement. He
was about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The
man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the
contents of the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance,
which they suspected to be shabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic
sachet ZM-1 in the presence of the policeofficers.
The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory chemical
analysis. When examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the 1,280.081
grams of white crystalline substance gave a positive result to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-1121-00
.
In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he
was going to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a letter from his
mother. He went there early because he had to report for work at the Port Area in Manila at 8:00
a.m. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house number which
he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed his bag down. When they
turned around, they saw four men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only found out that they
were police officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran away, the
man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware of what
was inside the bag .
He was convicted by the RTC of illegal possession of shabu which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Held:
Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with
the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, or
the shabu in this case, the prosecution evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the
following elements: (1) the appellant was in possession of an item or object that is identified to
be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the
appellant freely and consciously possessed the drug. In this case, the fact of possession by
appellant of the bag containing the shabu was not established in the first place.

The testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a glaring discrepancy which both the trial and the
appellate courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit, arresting officers PO3 Vigilla, PO2 Abella,
12
PO1 dela Cruz and SPO1 Gamit stated that they spotted two unidentified persons standing and
seemingly conversing a few meters ahead of them. However, when one of them noticed our
presence, he hastily r[a]n away heading towards the Muslim Center leaving behind the other
person and a maroon colored bag with Adidas marking in the pavement. In other words, the
maroon bag was left behind by the man who ran away. But at the trial, PO3 Vigilla testified
during direct examination that they spotted two persons talking to each other, and upon noticing
them, one of them scampered away and was chased by my companions while the other one
dropped a bag, sir . Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by the one who
did not run away referring to the accused-appellant. Later, in another part of his testimony, he
again changed this material fact. When he was asked by Prosecutor Senados as to who
between the two persons they saw talking to each other ran away, PO3 Vigilla categorically
answered, [t]he one who is holding a bag, sir .
Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about the credibility of
the prosecutions principal witness and casts reasonable doubt as to appellants guilt for it
renders questionable whether he in fact held the bag with intention to possess it and its
contents.
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused. While a lone
witness testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must be
clear, consistent, and crediblequalities we cannot ascribe to this case. Jurisprudence is
consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must both come from a credible
witness and be credible in itself tested by human experience, observation, common
knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years. Clearly from the
foregoing, the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
was indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional
principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving
that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
evidence is susceptible to two (2) interpretations, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other his innocence, the prosecutions evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have
been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy
of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted
as a matter of right .
There is violation of the right to due process if
the court grants a litigant more than the relief
he prayed for in his pleadings---even if the
defendant was declared in default.

DIONA VS. BALANGUE,
G.R. No. I 73559, January 7, 2013


On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in
six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property
13
located in Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296.7
When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, on
September 17, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint8 praying that respondents be
ordered:

(a) To pay [petitioner] the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum, from 02 March 1991 until the full obligation is paid.

(b) To pay [petitioner] actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no
case be less than P10,000.00; P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fee, plus P2,000.00 per
hearing as appearance fee.

(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned
parcel of land, and for the disposition of the proceeds [thereof] in accordance with law,
upon failure of the [respondents] to fully pay [petitioner] within the period set by law the
sums set forth in this complaint.

(d) Costs of this suit.

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny).
On October 15, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public
Attorneys Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested
extension, however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence
ex parte.

In a Decision11 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioners Complaint. The
dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner], ordering the
[respondents] to pay the [petitioner] as follows: a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan obligation plus interest at 5% per
month [sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the same is fully paid; b) P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees plus cost of suit;

Held:

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to
due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in
excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first
ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations
require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence
presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded
that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter
an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect
to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that
allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent
surprise to the defendant.
14

It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in
their Comment, it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid obligation.
Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver to contest
patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as
applicable jurisprudence.
What is the reckoning point in the computation
of just compensation in cases of expropriation
under the Agrarian Reform Law? At the time the
land was placed under the agrarian reform
program or at the time just compensation is
paid by the government?
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. MANOLO
GODUCO, G.R. No. 174007, June 27, 2012

Manolo Goduco (Goduco) is the only heir of Illuminada Villanueva Vda. De Goduco, the
registered owner of several parcels of land located at Pambuan, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija
covered by TCT Nos. NT-119140 and NT-119143 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the
province.

LBP is the financial intermediary for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) as designated under Section 64 of R.A. 6657. DAR is the lead implementing agency of
the CARP. It undertakes land tenure improvement and development of program beneficiaries.

Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program of the government under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27, the mentioned parcels of land were placed under the program and were
distributed by DAR to the qualified farmer-beneficiaries upon issuance of their respective
Emancipation Patents on 29 December 1994 and 13 June 1996 . Farmer Edilberto R. Mendoza
was issued TCT No. E.P. 79440 with an area of 17,890 square meters and TCT No. E.P.79442
with an area of 8,588 square meters, while farmer Ernesto Carriaga was issued with TCT No.
E.P. 84260 with an area of 10, 956 square meters, TCT No. E.P. 86567 with an area of 2,844
square meters and TCT No. E.P. 86568 with an area of 9,336 square meters.

Thereafter, LBP fixed the value of the land as payment of just compensation as follows:

For TCT No. EP 79440 - P14,871.06
For TCT No. E.P.79442 - P 7,138.77
For TCT No. E.P. 84260 - P 4,709.66
For TCT No. E.P. 86567 - P3,902.33
For TCT No. E.P. 86568 - P4,133.00

Dissatisfied with the valuation, Goduco filed a Petition for Determination of Just
Compensation of the subject lands before the RTC of Cabanatuan City acting as Special
Agrarian Court on 7 March 2000 In his petition before the court, he alleged that LBP fixed the
valuation of the parcels of land without his or his mothers knowledge. He contended that the
valuation amounting to a measely aggregate of P34,754.82 is highly inadequate and is
confiscatory of their properties for the fair market value of the land can be pegged at
least P400,000.00 per hectare. Finally, he added that the selling price of agricultural lands is
at P1,000,000.00 per hectare.

15
LBP, in its Answer, justified its valuation of the land by asserting that it was in strict
adherence with P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228 and maintained that these
provisions continue to be valid and constitutional.

The special agrarian court did not follow the price assessment of DAR. The dispositive
portion of its 12 January 2005 decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant Department of Agrarian Reform through the defendant
Land Bank of the Philippines to pay petitioner Manolo Goduco the total amount of
Four Hundred Ninety Six Thousand One Hundred Forty (P496,140.00) Philippine
Currency, representing the just compensation of the property with a total area of
4.9614 hectares, situated in Pambuan, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No.
NT-119140 and TCT No. NT-119143 with 6% legal interest per annum from the
date of taking on May 24, 1995 until fully paid.

The trial court explained that the P100,000.00 per hectare valuation of the land followed
the provisions of Section 17 of R.A. 6657. It also considered the condition and the location of
the land which is irrigated and accessible to the municipal road. The notarized documents
indicating the selling price of the neighboring parcels were also given weight by the court. Even
if not put in issue before it, the trial court imposed interest computed from the date of taking of
the land.

Both the DAR and the LBP filed appeals before the CA.

DAR in its Petition for Review before the Tenth Division of the CA raised as its sole
assignment of error that the agrarian court erred when it ruled that the date of taking of subject
property was 24 May 1995. Similarly, the arguments of LBP before the Third Division pertain to
the alleged error of the lower court in fixing the value of the land based on the factors under
R.A. 6657 even if the land was acquired under P.D. No. 27. It likewise argued that it was an
error to grant 6% legal interest from the date of taking until full payment of the just
compensation.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 89542, the Tenth Division of the CA ruled that the lands were
acquired under R.A. 6657. Hence, the valuation factors under this law determine the just
compensation.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 89429, the Third Division of the CA affirmed the trial court. The
appellate court reasoned out that while the just compensation remains undetermined and
unpaid, the agrarian process is not yet complete. Therefore, what will apply in determining just
compensation is R.A. 6657; not P.D. No. 27 or E.O. No. 228. It ruled however, that the trial
court erred in the imposition of 6% interest, which as provided by Administrative No. 13, is
granted only under P.D. No. 27.

In its petition before this Court, DAR repeats the arguments that the applicable law
is P.D. No. 27 and not R.A. 6657 and that the date of taking of the land was on 21 October 1972
and not in 1995. The DAR insists that the lands were covered by the Operation Land Transfer
Program under P.D. No. 27, therefore, the date of the taking of the land must be 21 October
1972.

LBP, in its petition, also insists that the formula that should apply is the one prescribed
under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. It argues against the application of R.A. 6657 on
properties acquired under the Operation Land Transfer Program of P.D. No. 27.

LBP and DAR raise as issues the following:
16

First, which law will govern the valuation of land covered by the emancipation patents,
P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 or R.A. 6657?
Second, what is the reckoning date for determining just compensation?

Third and last, should interest be imposed from the date of taking?

HELD:

Both the LBP and DAR are adamant in their contention that the agrarian reform process
is complete even if there is no payment yet of just compensation. It is further posited that to
apply R.A. 6657 to the P.D. No. 27-acquired properties is improper for it will result in the
retroactive application of R.A. 6657.

We disagree.

The CARP statute of 10 June 1998. R.A. 6657
[28]
provides:

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors
shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

The determination of just compensation for land covered by the Reform Program which
spawned the issues about the covering law and the process of coverage has been discussed
amply enough for present guidance.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad it was ruled that the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete if the just compensation to be paid has yet to be settled. In
that case, Land Bank argued that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian
reform on 21 October 1972, the time of the effectivity of P.D. No. 27, ergo just
compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the
time of possession in 1993. However, the Court ruled otherwise. It held that the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled.

This ruling on the completion of the reform process was reiterated in the case of Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Ferrer where the Court upheld the position of the appellate court
that the land shall be considered taken only upon payment of just compensation because
it would complete the agrarian reform process.

Evidently in this case where the conflict is exactly on just compensation, the agrarian
reform process has yet to be completed.

17
Clearly, by law and jurisprudence, R.A. 6657, upon its effectivity, became the primary
law in agrarian reform covering all the then pending and uncompleted processes; and P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 are only suppletory to the said law.

Finally, the issue regarding interest is also jurisprudentially settled. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Chico, the Court ruled that when just compensation is determined under R.A.
6657, no incremental, compounded interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be assessed.
The interest applies only to lands taken under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 (A.O. No. 13) [as amended by A.O. No. 06, Series
of 1998], and not Sec. 26 of R.A. 6657.

There are Decisions where the SC granted interest at 12% on the award. To clarify, this
incremental interest is not granted on the computed just compensation. Rather, it is a penalty
imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in payment of just
compensation. Thus, did the Court say:

In some expropriation cases, the Court allowed the imposition of said interest [12%], the
same was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation
on the part of the government one of forbearance.

In the computation of the just
compensation in the expropriation of Hacienda
Luisita (HLI), what date is the reckoning point?
November 21, 1989 when Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council approved HLIs stock option
plan or J anuary 2, 2006 when the Department of
Agrarian Reform issued a Notice of Coverage
of said Hacienda Luisita to the agrarian reform
program of the government?

HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. VS. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL, G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of Hacienda Luisita of the earlier Decision
of the Supreme Court on just compensation. The fact that Hacienda Luisita is subject to
agrarian reform is no longer a question. The main issue now is:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ITS EARLIER DECISION
THAT IN DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION, THE DATE OF TAKING IS
NOVEMBER 21, 1989, WHEN PARC APPROVED HLIs SDP [STOCK DISPTRIBUTION PLAN]
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE TIME THAT THE (FWBs Farm Worker
Beneficiaries) WERE CONSIDERED TO OWN AND POSSESS THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS
IN HACIENDA LUISITA OR JANUARY 2, 2006 WHEN THE NOTICE OF COVERAGE WAS
ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM.

HELD:

HLI contends that since the SDP is a modality which the agrarian reform law gives the
landowner as alternative to compulsory coverage, then the FWBs cannot be considered as
owners and possessors of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita at the time the SDP was
approved by PARC. It further claims that the approval of the SDP is not akin to a Notice of
Coverage in compulsory coverage situations because stock distribution option and compulsory
18
acquisition are two (2) different modalities with independent and separate rules and
mechanisms. Concomitantly, HLI maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2,
2006 may, at the very least, be considered as the date of taking as this was the only time that
the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of
its failure to perform certain obligations under the SDP.

Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss . In
determining just compensation, the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from
the owner and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the government takes
possession of the land before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be
fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that the time of taking is
the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as
when title is transferred to the Republic.

It should be noted, however, that taking does not
only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Taking also occurs when
agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP
coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, HLIs submitting
its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered
as the effective date of taking as it was only during this time that the government officially
confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.

Corollarily, it is the official act by the government, that is, the PARCs approval of the
SDP, which should be considered as the reckoning point for the taking of the agricultural lands
of Hacienda Luisita.

Even though the just compensation due to HLI will still be preliminarily determined by
DAR and LBP, subject to review by the RTC acting as a SAC, the fact that the reckoning point
of taking is already fixed at a certain date should already hasten the proceedings and not
further cause undue hardship on the parties, especially the qualified FWBs.

By a vote of 8-6, the Court affirmed its ruling that the date of taking in determining just
compensation is November 21, 1989 when PARC approved HLIs stock option plan.

Private complainant could not file a Motion for
Recosndieration of the Supreme Court Decision
acquitting the accused based on
misappreciation of facts without violating the
right of the accused against double jeopardy.


PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No. 176864, January
18, 2011 and LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, G. R. No. 176389, January
18, 2011
On December 14, 2010 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and RTC of Paranaque and acquitted the accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada,
19
and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the
victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it denied the prosecution due
process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted
in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses.
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the
accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being
punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this
provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the
accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he
has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated
litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to
fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign
freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense
would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The
provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a
criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But
the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of
such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and
assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private
complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based
on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to
secure Webb, et als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer
be disturbed. Double jeopardy has set in.

20
States right to due process of law; when the
State may validly question by Certiorari under
Rule 65 a decision acquitting and accused or to
increase the penalty without violating the rule
against Double jeopardy

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
IMELDA MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and GILBERT
DULAY, G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012


The private respondents were the accused in two criminal informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan, charging them with the crime of malversation of public funds, defined and
penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The charges
arose from the transactions that the respondents participated in, in their official capacities as
Minister and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) under the MHS
Kabisig Program.

After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The
prosecutions chief evidence was based on the lone testimony of Commission of Audit (COA)
Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the documentary evidence used in the audit examination of the
subject funds.

COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not conduct a physical inventory of
these motor vehicles; it based its report on the information given by the Presidential Task
Force. She emphasized that the audit team found it highly irregular that the motor vehicles
were registered in the name of University of Life (UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for this
reason, she believed that no proper liquidation was made of these vehicles by MHS.

After COA Auditor Cortez testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer of
evidence and rested its case.

Subsequently, separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by way of demurrers to
evidence, were filed by Zagala and the respondents on November 15, 1997, January 5, 1998
and January 28, 1998; on January 27, 1998, the prosecution filed a Manifestation stating
that it was not opposing the demurrers to evidence.

The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted the
respondents in its assailed decision dated March 22, 2002. In dismissing these criminal
cases, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds in the two
criminal cases considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report.

The Issues

1. Whether the prosecutors actions and/or omissions (of not presenting other
witnesses and for not opposing the Demurrer to Evidence of the accused) in these
cases effectively deprived the State of its right to due process; and

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the demurrers
to evidence of the respondents [and as such, double jeopardy has not set in] for a
review by the Supreme Court of the guilt or innocence of the private respondents.

Held:
21

The petitioner claims that the State was denied due process because of the
nonfeasance committed by the special prosecutor in failing to present sufficient evidence to
prove its case. It claims that the prosecutor failed to protect the States interest in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. To support its position, petitioner cites the case
of Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 345, where the Court nullified the dismissal of
the criminal cases due to the serious nonfeasance committed by the public prosecutor.

The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that resulted in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to
the States interest when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the
presentation of additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds
involved and the special prosecutors failure to oppose the demurrers to evidence.

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal;
any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy (PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 559 SCRA 449). Notably, the
proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but
not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not
attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 491 SCRA 185, June 16, 2000;
and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a partys due process rights, PEOPLE VS. VELASCO,
340 SCRA 207, SEPTEMBER 13, 2000.

A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process
implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the
judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not
have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case.

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accuseds
demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based
on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In the present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring the presentation of
additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant traceable to the special
prosecutors conduct. The special prosecutors conduct allegedly also violated the States due
process rights.

The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give effective legal
representation to enable the State to fully present its case against the respondents,
citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals where we considered the following factual circumstances -
(1) the public prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was
insufficient; (2) the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take
the stand; (3) the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence
when the demurrer to evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial courts failure to require the
presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer to evidence. All these
circumstances effectively resulted in the denial of the States right to due process, attributable
to the inaction of the public prosecutor and/or the trial court.

In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor
22
deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that other evidence could be
secured.

We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this Court is as much a judge in
behalf of an accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of the
State, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society. Therefore, unless the petitioner
demonstrates, through evidence and records, that its case falls within the narrow exceptions
from the criminal protection of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the
finality-of-acquittal rule.

Double jeopardy when not applicable in a
petition under Rule 65 to increase the penalty
as a result of grave abuse of discretion by the
trial court.

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 AND people of the
Philippines vs. THE HOMORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et
al., G.R. No. 154954, February 1, 2012

[THE LENNY VILLA HAZING CASE]

FACTS
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III,
Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny
Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites.
These rites included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two
parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express,
which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which
the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged
with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were
being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the
fraternity principles.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) arrived and demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
23
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans
After trial, the court held that:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,
Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.)
were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto
menor.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The People of the Philippines filed a Petition under Rule 65 questioning the acquittal and
the lower penalty on the four (4) accused and also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is
inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy
and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
Held:
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot
again be charged with the same or an identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law
of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found
in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the State from appealing the judgment
in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a
regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on
pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. The requisites for invoking double
jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a
competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted
or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendants express consent.
24
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where
there is a finding of mistrial, People vs. COURT OF APPEALS & GALICIA, 516 SCRA
383 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. The third instance refers to this
Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence
of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority
to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In
such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy. The Solicitor
General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of
Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. The Solicitor General also
assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as
the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing. In our view, what the Petition seeks is that
we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties. In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a
court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere errors of
judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double
jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted
fraternity members.
The assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the four
fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries has to be modified.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug,
the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion
of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries
sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on
him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity
or the medical attendance required. xxx And when proof of the said period
is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical
injuries.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only
logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been
proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
The CA Decision was therefore MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson were found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
25
homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
The Decision of acquittal could not be reviewed for it would violate the accuseds right
against double jeopardy since it was not done with grave abused of discretion nor violated the
States right to due process of law.

Double jeopardy after acquittal on the merits;
exceptions when no double jeopardy has set in
and that the Decision of acquittal may be
questioned under Rule 65.

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO vs. HON. TERESITA DE
CASTRO, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FIRST DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 190963, February 6, 2012

.
The Facts:

Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan,
for violation of RA No. 3019 for and failing to give to Nierna S. Doller, Municipal Social Welfare
and Development Officer (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, without any legal basis, her RATA for the
months of August, September, October, November and December, all in the year 2000. and
her Productivity Pay in the year 2000 and despite demands made upon

In a decision dated October 1, 2009, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and held
that the second element of the offense that there be malice, ill-motive or bad faith was not
present. The Sandiganbayan pronounced:

This Court acknowledges the fact that Doller was entitled to RATA.
However, the antecedent facts and circumstances did not show any indicia of
bad faith on the part of [Ysidoro] in withholding the release of Dollers RATA.

In fact, this Court believes that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith and in
honest belief that Doller was not entitled to her RATA based on the opinion of
the COA resident Auditor and Section 317 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual.

It may be an erroneous interpretation of the law, nonetheless,
[Ysidoros] reliance to the same was a clear basis of good faith on his part in
withholding Dollers RATA.

The People filed a Petition under Rule 65 to reverse the decision of acquittal insisting
that Ysidoro was in bad faith and therefore, the second element of the offense was present.

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and
exceeded its, or acted without, jurisdiction in not finding Ysidoro in bad faith when he withheld
Dollers RATA and deprived her of her productivity bonus.

26
In his Comment, Ysidoro prays for the dismissal of the petition for procedural and
substantive infirmities. He insists that he can no longer be prosecuted for the same criminal
charge without violating the rule against double jeopardy.

Held:

Generally, the Rules provides three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to
appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal case before the Supreme Court. The first is by
ordinary appeal under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The second is by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. And the third is
by filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is unique
and provides for a different mode of review. In addition, each procedural remedy may only be
availed of depending on the nature of the judgment sought to be reviewed.

A review by ordinary appeal resolves factual and legal issues. Issues which have not
been properly raised by the parties but are, nevertheless, material in the resolution of the case
are also resolved in this mode of review. In contrast, a review on certiorari under a Rule 45
petition is generally limited to the review of legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of law
which have been properly raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition. Under this
mode, the Court determines whether a proper application of the law was made in a given set of
facts. A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the
propriety of the trial courts jurisdiction whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so,
whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

While an assailed judgment elevated by way of ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition is
considered an intrinsically valid, albeit erroneous, judgment, a judgment assailed under Rule
65 is characterized as an invalid judgment because of defect in the trial courts authority
to rule. Also, an ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition tackle errors committed by the trial court
in the appreciation of the evidence and/or the application of law. In contrast, a Rule 65 petition
resolves jurisdictional errors committed in the proceedings in the principal case. In other words,
errors of judgment are the proper subjects of an ordinary appeal and in a Rule 45 petition; errors
of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65 petition.

As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65
petition, only judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45
petition. As we explained in People v. Nazareno, the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal through the remedies of ordinary
appeal and a Rule 45 petition.

However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65
petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal
rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had
been deprived of due process. The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these
instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in
the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and
assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does not
include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65
only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question
of whether the decision is legally correct. In other words, the focus of the review is to determine
whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.

Applying these legal concepts to this case, we find that while the People was In the
case at bar, the imputed errors fails to establish grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
27
excess of jurisdiction committed by the Sandiganbayan. As a rule, misapplication of facts and
evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors
were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. The Court cannot review a
verdict of acquittal which does not impute or show any jurisdictional error committed by the
Sandiganbayan. Double jeopardy has set in.


A A c ca as se e f fo or r r re ec ck kl le es ss s i im mp pr ru ud de en nc ce e r re es su ul lt ti in ng g t to o
h ho om mi ic ci id de e, , s sl li ig gh ht t p ph hy ys si ic ca al l i in nj ju ur ri ie es s a an nd d d da am ma ag ge e
t to o p pr ro op pe er rt ty y m ma ay y n no ot t b be e t th he e s su ub bj je ec ct t o of f m mo or re e t th ha an n
o on ne e i in nf fo or rm ma at ti io on n. . A Ac cq qu ui it tt ta al l o or r c co on nv vi ic ct ti io on n i in n
e ei it th he er r b ba ar rs s p pr ro os se ec cu ut ti io on n i in n t th he e o ot th he er r b ba as se ed d o on n
t th he e r ri ig gh ht t a ag ga ai in ns st t d do ou ub bl le e j je eo op pa ar rd dy y. .
J ASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA
MODESTOSAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, G.R. No.
172716, November 17, 2010

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Deputy Executive Secretary Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
Issue: Is the right against double jeopardy violated?
Held:
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his
Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366 . Double jeopardy
has set in.
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal
Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus,
the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the same offense. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
28
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property as the [latter] requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on
Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the
Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
As held by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent
prosecution for serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence
because of the accuseds prior acquittal of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,
with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted
of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of
an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine
the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can
not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x
x x, a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Equal protection clause was violated when the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 singled
out only the officials and employees of the
previous administration to be investigated for
graft and corruption and other crimes
committed by public officers.
29
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 192935 : December 7, 2010
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent
provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth
on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption
of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.
The Philippine Truth Commissions (PTC) primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION, and thereafter to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
The petitioner claims that Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional for violative of the
equal protection clause as it discriminates the public officials under the administration of former
President Gloria Arroyo even though there are reports of corruptions also in the administrations
before that of Pres. Arroyo.
Held:
Executive Order No. 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality
of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection
of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however,
to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is
to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
30
the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration of former
President Gloria Arroyo is plain, patent and manifest.
That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can
be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive
order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act,
event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. The
equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.
Whether the grant of COLA to military and
police personnel to the exclusion of other
government employees violates the equal
protection clause.
VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ, et al vs. DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, G.R. No. 153266, March
18, 2010
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, to rationalize the compensation of government employees.
Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already
being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain
additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation
particularly those in the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police
personnel to the exclusion of other government employees
violates the equal protection clause.
Held:
Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police to the
exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
The continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other
national government officials does run afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification
must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the
same class.
To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1)
it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.
Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other
national government officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the State and the
31
maintenance of internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere
in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas.
Since their basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended
to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas.
Is the provision of the Omnibus Election
Code declaring appointive officials deemed
resigned from their positions upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy while elected
officials are not violative of the equal protection
clause?
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO TOLENTINO, JR. VS.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010
The main issue in this case is whether or not the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, providing that appointive officials are deemed
automatically resigned from their jobs upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy (while the
elected officials are not) violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court through Justice Antonio Nachura held that
the questioned provisions of the above-mentioned laws are unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause. The COMELEC moved for a reconsideration of the said Decision.
Held:
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority.


Accused are entitled to acquittal despite the
positive identification of a witness who is not
credible and whose testimony is full of
inconsistencies and contrary to common
human experience

PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No. 176864,
December 14, 2010 and LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, G. R. No.
176389, December 14, 2010

32
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old,
and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it
had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who
claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Tony Boy Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged
accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact.
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge
Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart
remained at large. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others
corroborating her testimony.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying
they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed
that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the
testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition,
the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible
nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it,
the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court
remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995
affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend,
accused Estrada and convicted all the accused..
Held:
Since Jessica Alfaros testimony is contrary to common human experience and full of
inconsistencies, her positive identification could not prevail over the documented alibis of Hubert
Webb. Positive identification to be superior over denial and alibi, it should come from a credible
witness.
Inconsistent testimonies of prosecutions
witnesses on material points entitles the
accused of acquittal based on his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent.

ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008

On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of spouses George
and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several
valuables, including cash amounting to P600,000.00 . The Cabugao Police applied for a search warrant
which was granted by the MTC One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as
one of the several suspects in the crime.

On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's
house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery
33
of a firearm and ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and,
consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No.
1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.

The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search
warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house. In particular, SPO1
Cabaya testified that while poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the lower
shelf. The gun is a .38 caliber revolver with five live ammunitions which he immediately turned over to his
superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.

Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his wife Lorna assert
that petitioner does not own a gun Lorna testified that she saw a military man planting the gun.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision

dated July 7, 1999, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.

Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error in giving little credence to
his defense that the firearm found in his residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which amounted to
failure by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and therefore entitled to acquittal
based on his constitutional presumption of innocence.

HELD:

The accused should be acquitted.

In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of SPO1 Cabaya, who testified that
he discovered the subject firearm in a closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed
aside petitioner's defense of denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC justified giving full credence to
Cabaya's testimony on the principles that the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties
regularly; that he had no ill motive to frame-up petitioner; and that his affirmative testimony is stronger than
petitioner's negative testimony.

The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and
conducted the search, who discovered the gun, and who witnessed the discovery are material matters
because they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the
house of petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the
existence or non-existence of a fact in issue.

The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies of
its witnesses. Especially damaged is the credibility of SPO1 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on
material points jibes with those of the other prosecution witnesses. The inconsistencies are material as
they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not SPO1 Cabaya really found a firearm in the
house of petitioner.

SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other policemen, among whom were
SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he
does not remember. While searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near
the door. He said that SPO1 Jara was standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when he
(Cabaya) saw the firearm and that he picked up the gun, held it and showed it to SPO1 Jara. He asserted
that SPO2 Renon was not one of those who went inside the house.

However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's testimony,
related a different story as to the circumstances of the firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he
34
merely conducted perimeter security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the
house. SPO1 Jara testified that he remained outside the house throughout the search, and when SPO1
Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was seven to eight meters away from him. He could not see the
inside of the house and could see Cabaya only from his chest up. He did not see the firearm at the place
where it was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to show the gun, which was a revolver. He
is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the latter discovered the firearm. He further
testified that SPO3 Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of those near him when he
(Cabaya) discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.

While the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated,
this claim assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is
well to remember that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather
on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves
to be punished. The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if his defense
is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court held that where there was material
and unexplained inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not
to inconsequential details but to the alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent
improbable character of the testimony given by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the
effect of vitiating the testimony given by the other principal prosecution witness. The Court ruled that it
cannot just discard the improbable testimony of one officer and adopt the testimony of the other that is
more plausible. In such a situation, both testimonies lose their probative value.

Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of the same sale
transaction, which allegedly took place before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the
same occasion?

In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
generate serious doubt as to whether a firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The
prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of
firearms beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been
demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he was with.

Accused in a rape case is entitled to acquittal
based on his constitutional presumption of
innocence when the rape victim failed to
immediately or spontaneously identify the
alleged attacker when presented to her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY TUMAMBING, G.R.
No. 191261, March 2, 2011
THE FACTS:
The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in
Criminal Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
DK, the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to
sleep, leaving the lights on, at her cousins rented room. She was startled when somebody
entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK
and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DKs clothes and undressed
35
himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was about to leave, DK turned
the light on and she saw his face. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her
rapist.
On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any
sign of resistance on her body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals.
Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept at
the house of his employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke up at
6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that he never left his employers house that night. Ledesma
corroborated his story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and he went, thinking that it
had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked, however, when he learned
that he had been suspected of having committed rape.
When the accused was summoned by the Barangay Captain, the complainant did not
spontaneously identify the former.
HELD:
A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the
identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof
that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove
the offenders identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is
not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties.
DKs identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. A
reading of her testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually
pointed to him when it was suggested that it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested
to DKs uncertainties regarding the rapists identity when the barangay chairman arranged for
her to meet Tumambing.
DKs above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the
Court no confidence that, as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the looks of her
rapist because she saw him on the previous day as he passed by her cousins rented room
many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing would have been
one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in pointing to him despite the
barangay chairmans assurance that he would protect her if she identified him. In assessing the
testimony of a wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged assault is
of critical value.
There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt. But this is
inconsistent with her testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, bigla na
lang po siyang lumabas x x x sinundan ko siya ng tingin. Since DK did not say that the man
put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his clothes and carried this out
when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for the first time, she had a chance to
see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked, why was she so certain that he
wore a yellow shirt?
With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DKs rapist, the Court cannot affirm
the conviction of accused Tumambing as a result of the accuseds constitutional presumption of
innocence.

36
Delay in complaining of the alleged rape
coupled with the fact that the alleged rape
victim visited the accused in jail six (6) times
entitles the accused to an acquittal based on
the constitutional presumption of innocence.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERWIN QUINTAL y
BEO, VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN, FELIPE QUINTAL y
ABARQUEZ and LARRY PANTI y JIMENEZ, G.R. No. 184170,
February 2, 2011
PEREZ, J .:
On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin Quintal y Beo
(Jerwin), 16-year old Felipe Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were
charged in an Information for Rape allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about August 29, 2002, at around 9:30 oclock in the evening, in
barangay [XXX], municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines,
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another for a common purpose, with
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of [AAA], a minor 16 years of age,
against her will and without her consent.

That the crime of rape was committed with an aggravating circumstance
of minority, the fact that [AAA] is a minor 16 years of age when she was raped by
the herein-named four (4) accused.
On Appeal, the Supreme Court based on the accuseds constitutional presumption of
innocence, brought about by doubts as to the credibility of the testimony of the alleged rape
victim, the accused are acquitted.
This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the credibility of AAAs
testimony, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the barangay tanod and barangay kagawad,
the purported confession put into writing and signed by all the accused; and the subsequent
incidents relating to the case.
First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when
the two allegedly invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and in
fact, went with them. Moreover, AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the
wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico.
Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was
very dark. And yet, AAA readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who
raped her.
Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a round-
the-clock abrasion in the labia minora. This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support
the charge of rape. At most, this indicates that AAA had sexual intercourse, not raped.
37
Fourth, AAAs belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially
when it appears that she really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter
actually asked her why she was walking in an unusual manner.
x x x
Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin in
jail for at least six (6) times. These incidents are documented in a logbook presented in
court by the defense and which was not refuted by the prosecution.

The right to speedy trial or speedy disposition
of cases is violated if the delay is capricious,
vexatious and oppressive.

MONICO JACOB VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 162206,
November 17, 2010

The delay in the trial for almost 1 and years while the Ombudsman is resolving the
Motion for Re-investigation may not be a valid ground to dismiss the criminal cases based on
speedy trial. Further, the verbal Order of dismissal by Justice Nario as the Presiding Justice of
the 4
th
Division is not valid since no written copy of the order signed by the other justices.

THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE DELAYS ARE OF SAID NATURE IS
RELATIVE AND CANNOT BE BASED ON MERE MATHEMATICAL RECKONING OF TIME.
PARTICULAR REGARD TO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL ALSO BE
CONSIDERED

The delay must be VEXATIOUS, CAPRICIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE and this is so if
the following are satisfied:

a. Length of the delay;
b. Reasons for the delay;
c. Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
d. Prejudiced caused by the delay.
Right to assembly and power of the City Mayor
to change the venue of the rally; requisites.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANILA
MAYOR JOSE LITO ATIENZA, G.R. No. 175241, February 24,
2010
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and
Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006 Decision and the October 26, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose Lito
Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one
applied for by the IBP.
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz
(Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at
38
the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in
by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on
given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006 allegedly due to his findings that there is clear and
present danger for the rally to take place in Mendiola.
ISSUE:
Was the Mayor correct in denying the application for a rally permit based on his claim
that there is evidence of clear and present danger if the rally will push through in Mendiola?
Held:
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within
two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and
shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic]
within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in
an appropriate court of law.

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,
since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would,
39
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion.
Right to cross examine; effect of the death of a
witness before she could be cross-examined
through no fault of the adverse party
SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ AND MINERVA DELA
CRUZ vs. RAMON PAPA IV, G.R. No. 185899, December 8,
2010
ABAD, J .
This case is about the plaintiffs lone witness who passed away due to illness before the
adverse party could cross-examine him.
In 1994, the Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for
cancellation of titles, recovery of properties worth millions of pesos, and damages against
several defendants, including petitioner spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the Dela
Cruzes) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City in Civil Cases 94-3447 and 95-
3816. On October 21, 1999 the Estate presented Myron C. Papa , its executor, to testify on the
substance of the complaint. At the conclusion of Myrons testimony on that day, the RTC
required the Estate and the latter agreed to present Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing
to identify the originals of certain exhibits, after which counsels for the defendants, would begin
to cross-examine him.
But the Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand. He was taken ill
and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting respondent
Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the Estates co-administrator, to seek repeated postponements of
hearings in the case to allow Myron undergo intensive treatment. Later, the Estate filed a
motion for leave to have the defendants cross-examine Myron by deposition at the hospital
where he was confined. The RTC granted the motion on February 22, 2001 and eventually set
the deposition-taking on September 7, 2001 but Myron passed away on August 16, 2001.
On November 15, 2001 one of the defendants moved to expunge Myrons direct
testimony which the RTC granted.
The Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myrons testimony after the RTC ordered the
same stricken off the record for depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine
him.
Held:
But having their turn to cross-examine Myron is different from their being accorded an
opportunity to cross-examine him. The RTC set the deposition taking on September 7, 2001 but
Myron died before that date, on August 16, 2001. Consequently, it was not the defendants fault
that they were unable to cross-examine him.
40
Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated
through Myrons testimony, it stands to reason that the striking out of the latters testimony
altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They become inadmissible
unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the Estate to
rectify its mistakes.
No double jeopardy if the dismissal was made
after arraignment with the express consent of
the accused and the motion to dismiss was not
based on speedy trial or insufficiency of
evidence after trial.
JOSEPH CEREZO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULIET
YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and VICENTE
AFULUGENCIA, G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011
The Facts
On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against
respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well
as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).
Finding probable cause to indict respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-
QC) filed the corresponding Information against them on February 18, 2003 before the RTC.
Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-
evaluate Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-QC.
In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and
recommended the withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening
period, specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents were arraigned. All of them
entered a not guilty plea.
In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case
dismissed in its Order dated March 17, 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the
November 20, 2003 OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same
was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC
deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ.
On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and
setting aside the OP-QCs November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter to refile the
earlier Information for libel.
On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioners
motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary,
reinstated the case.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTCs second
assailed Order dated February 26, 2007.
41
Relentless, respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the RTC Orders violated
their constitutional right against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals agreed and stopped the
RTC from proceeding with the case since double jeopardy had allegedly set in.
The Issues
Petitioner raised the following issues:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was Double
Jeopardy, specifically on the alleged existence of the requisites to constitute
Double Jeopardy;

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider the fact that there was
NO refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one in arriving [at] its
conclusion that Double Jeopardy sets in to the picture;
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was 1.) a valid
termination of the case on the basis of the Order of the Trial Court dated 17
March 2004, and allegedly 2.) without the express consent of the
respondents.
HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit.
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it
rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to
withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written
order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the
Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. In this case, it is obvious from the
March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to
make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents
for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.
The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when
he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided,
and irresolute on whether to indict respondents.
The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the
case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of
the DOJ Secretary.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the
DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated
the complainants right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no
effect whatsoever.
This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the
merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion
to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.
42
It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when
the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as
in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was
committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a
valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the
conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the
accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
Constitutional presumption of innocence
prevails over presumption of regularity in the
performance of oficial functions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL PALOMA, G.R.
No. 178544, February 23, 2011
ABAD, J .
The Facts:
The public prosecutor charged the accused Manuel Paloma (Paloma) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-03-116898 with violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
At the trial, PO2 Bernard Amigo testified that at about 1:00 p.m. on April 23, 2003 the
Batasan Police Station got a tip from an informant that accused Paloma was selling illegal drugs
at Pacomara Street in Commonwealth, Quezon City. The station chief directed PO2 Amigo and
PO1 Arnold Pealosa to conduct a buy-bust operation involving Paloma. The police officers
went to Pacomara Street with the informant and brought with them a P100.00 bill marked with
the initials AP.
When the buy-bust team arrived at Pacomara Street at around 3:15 p.m., they saw
Paloma standing beside a man and a woman. PO1 Pealosa and the informant approached
them; PO2 Amigo, the witness, stood as back-up some 15 meters away. From where he stood,
he saw PO1 Pealosa talking to Paloma. Momentarily, PO1 Pealosa waved his hand,
signifying that he had made the purchase. On seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Amigo
approached and arrested Paloma; PO1 Pealosa for his part arrested Palomas companions,
later on identified as Noriel Bamba (Bamba) and Angie Grotel (Grotel). PO2 Amigo recovered
from Palomas pants pocket a plastic sachet with a white crystalline substance and the marked
P100.00 bill.
After the police officers informed Paloma, Bamba, and Grotel of their rights during
custodial investigation, they brought them to the police station and turned them over to the desk
officer. The arresting officers also turned over the three sachets of suspected shabu that they
43
seized. According to PO2 Amigo, two of these sachets were those that PO1 Pealosa bought
from Paloma. The police eventually let Bamba and Grotel go for the reason that the police
officers found no illegal drugs in their possession.
In his defense, Paloma denied that such a buy-bust operation took place. He claimed
that at the time of the alleged buy-bust, he was with his 80-year-old mother at their house on
Pacomara Street, taking a nap. Suddenly, five armed men in civilian clothes barged into the
house and woke him up. Two of them held him by the arms while the others searched the
house. Although the men found nothing, they handcuffed him and brought him to the police
station.
On June 10, 2005 the RTC found Paloma guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case Q-03-116898 of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
On February 13, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. HC CR 01289 affirmed the
RTCs ruling in toto.
The Issue:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the prosecution
succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that Paloma sold prohibited drugs to PO1
Pealosa.
HELD:
To prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the
prosecution is required to prove
(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller as well as the object and consideration of the
sale; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment given for the same. Further, the
prosecution must present in court evidence of corpus delicti.
Here, the proof of the sale of illegal drugs is wanting.
One. Under the objective test set by the Court in People v. Doria, the prosecution
must clearly and adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely,
a. the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher,
b. the offer to purchase,
c. the promise or payment of the consideration, and, finally,
d. the accuseds delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer, whether the latter be the
informant alone or the police officer.
This proof is essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit the offense.
All that PO2 Amigo could say was that PO1 Pealosa and the informant approached
Paloma, talked to him, and then PO1 Pealosa made the pre-arranged signal that the sale had
been consummated. Since he was standing at a great distance during the purported buy-bust,
44
PO2 Amigo could not provide the details of the offer to buy the drug and the acceptance of that
offer. Indeed, he did not see Paloma take money from PO1 Pealosa nor Pealosa take
delivery of the prohibited substance from Paloma.
While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties, this presumption is disputable by contrary proof and cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. The totality of the evidence
presented in this case does not support Palomas conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the offense.
Right to information; right of an examinee in the
CPA Board examination to look at her answer
sheet, questionnaire and answer sheets
HAZEL MA. ANTOLIN VS. ABELARDO DOMONDON, ET AL., G.R.
No. 165036 & 175705, July 5, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA]
Board Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in October 1997. The examination
results were released on October 29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately,
petitioner did not make it. When the results were released, she received failing grades in four out of the
seven subjects.
Subject Petitioners Grade
Theory of Accounts 65 %
Business Law 66 %
Management Services 69 %
Auditing Theory 82 %
Auditing Problems 70 %
Practical Accounting I 68 %
Practical Accounting II 77 %
Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T.
Domondon (Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer
sheets be re-corrected. On November 3, 1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these
consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam. Thus, on
November 10, 1997, she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each
of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an
explanation of the grading system used in each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers).
Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioners request on two grounds: first, that Section 36,
Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as
amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only
permitted access to the petitioners answer sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that
reconsideration of her examination result was only proper under the grounds stated therein:
Sec. 36 An examinee shall be allowed to have access or to go over his/her
test papers or answer sheets on a date not later than thirty (30) days from the official
release of the results of the examination. Within ten (10) days from such date, he/she
45
may file his/her request for reconsideration of ratings. Reconsideration of rating shall be
effected only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of his/her test papers or
answer sheets, or malfeasance.
Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the
Examination Papers (other than petitioners answer sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution
No. 338, series of 1994, which provides:
Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprofessional Acts The hereunder
acts shall constitute prejudicial, illegal, grossly immoral, dishonorable, or unprofessional
conduct:
A. Providing, getting, receiving, holding, using or reproducing questions

x x x x

3. that have been given in the examination except if the test bank for the
subject has on deposit at least two thousand (2,000) questions.
After a further exchange of correspondence, the Board informed petitioner that an investigation
was conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers.
Undeterred, on January 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages
against the Board of Accountancy and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The case was raffled to Branch 33, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-86881. The Petition included a
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Board of Accountancy and its
members (the respondents) to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers. Petitioner also
prayed that final judgment be issued ordering respondents to furnish petitioner with all documents and
other materials as would enable her to determine whether respondents fairly administered the
examinations and correctly graded petitioners performance therein, and, if warranted, to issue to her a
certificate of registration as a CPA.
On February 5, 1998, respondents filed their Opposition to the Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and argued, inter alia, that petitioner was not entitled to the relief
sought, that the respondents did not have the duty to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination
Papers, and that petitioner had other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
namely, recourse to the PRC. Respondents also filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the
main case, which asked that the Petition for Mandamus with Damages be dismissed for lack of merit on
the following grounds: (1) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the petition stated no
cause of action because there was no ministerial duty to release the information demanded; and (3) the
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is subject to limitations provided by law,
including Section 20, Article IV, of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Petition (which was admitted by the RTC), where
she included the following allegation in the body of her petition:
The allegations in this amended petition are meant only to plead a cause of
action for access to the documents requested, not for re-correction which petitioner shall
assert in the proper forum depending on, among others, whether she finds sufficient
error in the documents to warrant such or any other relief. None of the allegations in this
amended petition, including those in the following paragraphs, is made to assert a cause
of action for re-correction.
46
If only to underscore the fact that she was not asking for a re-checking of her exam, the following
prayer for relief was deleted from the Amended Petition: and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as a CPA.
On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Application for Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had taken and passed the May 1998
CPA Licensure Examination and had taken her oath as a CPA. Petitioner filed her Opposition on July 8,
1998. Subsequently, on October 29, 1998, respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim to the
amended petition. They reiterated their original allegations and further alleged that there was no cause of
action because at the time the Amended Petition was admitted, they had ceased to be members of the
Board of Accountancy and they were not in possession of the documents sought by the petitioner.
Issues
The petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers so she can
determine for herself why and how she failed and to ensure that the Board properly performed its duties.
She argues that the Constitution as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees support her right to demand access to the Examination Papers. Furthermore,
she claims that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies, since no recourse to the PRC
was available, and only a pure question of law is involved in this case. Finally, she claims that her
demand for access to documents was not rendered moot by her passing of the 1998 CPA Board
Exams.
Held:
At the very outset let us be clear of our ruling. Any claim for re-correction or revision of
her 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. This much was made evident by our
ruling in Agustin-Ramos v. Sandoval, where we stated:
After deliberating on the petition in relation to the other pleadings filed in the
proceedings at bar, the Court resolved to DENY said petition for lack of merit. The
petition at bar prays for the setting aside of the Order of respondent Judge dismissing
petitioners mandamus action to compel the other respondents (Medical Board of
Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission) to reconsider, recorrect
and/or rectify the board ratings of the petitioners from their present failing grades to
higher or passing marks. The function of reviewing and re-assessing the
petitioners answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and
arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of the Medical
Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the
writ of mandamus. The obvious remedy of the petitioners from the adverse judgment
by the Medical Board of Examiners was an appeal to the Professional Regulation
Commission itself, and thence to the Court of Appeals.
We now turn to the question of whether the petition has become moot in view of petitioners
having passed the 1998 CPA examination. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.
In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his
or her right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen
possesses the inherent right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship, we find that petitioners
belated passing of the CPA Board Exams does not automatically mean that her interest in the
Examination Papers has become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional question presented,
in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case will be repeated, warrants review.
47
The crux of this case is whether petitioner may compel access to the Examination
Documents through mandamus. As always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section 7,
Article III provides:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.


Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes full
disclosure and transparency in government, viz:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.

Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public
interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law". The Court has always grappled
with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern." As observed in Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission:
In determining whether x x x a particular information is of public concern there
is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that
eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters,
such as national security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential
matters.
We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams
are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure
that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters
pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also
means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.
On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the
examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding,
administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers
remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They
have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications
of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that
48
all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Valid exercise of the freedom of expression
DIONISIO LOPEZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
172203, February 14, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of constitutional rights. Free
expression however, is not absolute for it may be so regulated that [its exercise shall neither] be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community
or society. Libel stands as an exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right.
On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31, 2003, the
accusatory portion of which reads in full as follows:
That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to impeach the integrity,
reputation and putting to public ridicule and dishonor the offended party MAYOR
SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with malice and intent
to injure and expose the said offended party to public hatred, contempt and ridicule put
up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz City and at
Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows:

CADIZ FOREVER
______________ NEVER

thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from the
residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word
NEVER. Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein
private complainant BADING and the name of the City of SAGAY before the word
NEVER thus making the billboard appear as follows

CADIZ FOREVER
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER

For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce the
readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was going on,
therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor Salvador
G. Escalante, Jr., and hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good
name, character and reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said
billboards/signboards were read by thousands if not hundred[s] of thousands of persons,
which caused damage and prejudice to the offended party by way of moral damages in
the amount [of]:

P5,000,000.00 as moral damages.
Upon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of not guilty. During
the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused, that the private
complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the nickname Bading
49
and that the petitioner calls the private complainant Bading. Thenceforth, trial on the merits
commenced in due course.
Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in the early part of November 2002, while
exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private respondent saw billboards with the printed
phrase CADIZ FOREVER with a blank space before the word NEVER directly under said phrase.
Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and
beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and wondered on what the
message conveyed since it was incomplete.
Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating that
the blank space preceding the word NEVER was filled up with the added words BADING AND
SAGAY. The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored with
the printed phrase and of being a tuta of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation with the City
Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident
resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for damages.
Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things
happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned BADING because he was not in conformity with the
many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention whatsoever of
referring to Bading as the Tuta of Sagay. He contended that it was private respondent who referred
to Bading as Tuta of Sagay. He further maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he
will never love Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a wake-up
call for Cadiz City.
On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner of libel. The trial
court ruled that from the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution vs-a-vs that of the
defense, all the elements of libel are present. The fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused DIONISIO
LOPEZ y ABERASTURI (bonded) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Libel defined and penalized under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant
thereto hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
FOUR MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Arresto Mayor maximum as the minimum to
TWO YEARS, ELEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium as
the maximum and a FINE of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of
P5,000,000.00 by way of moral damages.
Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA which, as stated earlier, rendered
judgment on August 31, 2005, affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC. Like the trial court,
the appellate court found the presence of all the elements of the crime of libel. It reduced however, the
amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which
the appellate court denied in its Resolution dated April 7, 2006.
Disgruntled, petitioner is now before us via the instant petition. Per our directive, private
respondent filed his Comment on August 29, 2006 while the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
representing public respondent People of the Philippines, submitted a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu
of Comment on even date.
50
Issues
Petitioner raised the following arguments in support of his petition:
I

WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE WORDS CADIZ FOREVER[,] BADING AND SAGAY NEVER CONTAINED IN
THE BILLBOARDS/SIGNBOARDS SHOW THE INJURIOUS NATURE OF THE
IMPUTATIONS MADE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND TENDS TO
INDUCE SUSPICION ON HIS CHARACTER, INTEGRITY AND REPUTATION AS
MAYOR OF CADIZ CITY.

II

ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE WORDS CADIZ
FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS
ERECTED BY PETITIONER ARE DEFAMATORY, DID THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THEY COMPRISE FAIR COMMENTARY ON
MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST WHICH ARE THEREFORE PRIVILEGED?

III

WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IN THE CASE AT BAR HAS NOT BEEN
OVERTHROWN.

IV

WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER OF THE CHARGE OF LIBEL AND IN HOLDING HIM LIABLE FOR
MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P500,000.

IN SHORT, THE MAIN ISSUES ARE:
1) whether the printed phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER is
libelous; and
2) whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication.
HELD:
We ought to reverse the CA ruling.
Indeed, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC that all the elements of the crime of libel
are present in this case. Thus, following the general rule, we are precluded from making further
evaluation of the factual antecedents of the case. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that both
lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their unanimous conclusion.
Hence, we are constrained to apply one of the exceptions specifically paragraph 4 above, instead of the
general rule.
Petitioner takes exception to the CAs ruling that the controversial phrase CADIZ FOREVER,
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity
51
and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. He avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to
defame and induce suspicion on the character, integrity and reputation of private respondent.
The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, asserts that there is nothing in the
phrase CADIZ FOREVER and BADING AND SAGAY NEVER which ascribe to private respondent
any crime, vice or defect, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which will either
dishonor, discredit, or put him into contempt.
The prosecution maintains that the appellate court correctly sustained the trial courts finding of
guilt on petitioner. Citing well-established jurisprudence holding that [w]ords calculated to induce
suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made and that
[i]ronical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander, it argued that the words printed on
the billboards somehow bordered on the incomprehensible and the ludicrous yet they were so
deliberately crafted solely to induce suspicion and cast aspersion against private respondents honor and
reputation.
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit
or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. For an
imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be
malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable. Absent one of these
elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase must
be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words imputed not defamatory
in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one
who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in
their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another
sense. Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose
and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain
offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up
to public ridicule.
Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts finding
that the phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on
private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory
imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending,
directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any
unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondents
integrity. Obviously, the controversial word NEVER used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its
ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents integrity and reputation much
less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of
corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as
mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely
designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.
Indeed, the prosecution witnesses were able to read the message printed in the billboards and
gave a negative impression on what it says. They imply that the message conveys something as if the
52
private respondent was being rejected as city mayor of Cadiz. But the trustworthiness of these
witnesses is doubtful considering the moral ascendancy exercised over them by the private respondent
such that it is quite easy for them to draw such negative impression. As observed by the OSG, at the
time the billboards were erected and during the incumbency of private respondent as mayor of Cadiz
City, these witnesses were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or active in the project of the city
government. Bernardita was a member of the Clean and Green Program of Cadiz City; Jude was
employed as a licensing officer under the Permit and License Division of the Cadiz City Hall and Nenita
held the position of Utility Worker II of the General Services Office of Cadiz City. These witnesses,
according to the OSG, would naturally testify in his favor. They could have verbicide the meaning of the
word NEVER. Prudently, at the least, the prosecution could have presented witnesses within the
community with more independent disposition than these witnesses who are beholden to private
respondent.
According to the private respondent, the message in the billboards would like to convey to the
people of Cadiz that he is a tuta of Sagay City.
We disagree. Strangely, the OSG adopted a position contrary to the interest of the People. In
its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, instead of contesting the arguments of the petitioner,
the OSG surprisingly joined stance with him, vehemently praying for his acquittal. We quote with
approval the OSGs analysis of the issue which was the basis for its observation, thus:
During the proceedings in the trial court, private respondent testified that the subject
billboards maligned his character and portrayed him as a puppet of Sagay City, Thus:

Q: You do not know of course the intention of putting those billboards
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER?

A: Definitely, I know the intention because to answer your question, it
will not only require those BADING AND SAGAY NEVER billboard[s], it was
after which additional billboards were put up. That strengthen, that I am being a
Tuta of Sagay. I am being maligned because of those billboards that states and
I repeat: Ang Tubig san Cadiz, ginkuha sang Sagay, Welcome to Brgy. Cadiz
and there is a small word under it, Zone 2, very small, very very small, you
cannot see it in [sic] a glance.

x x x x

A: That is the meaning of the signboard[s]. The message that the
signboards would like to convey to the people of Cadiz, that the Mayor of Cadiz
City is a Tuta or Puppet of Sagay City.

x x x x

Contrary to private respondents assertion, there is nothing in the subject billboards which state,
either directly or indirectly, that he is, in his words, a tuta or puppet of Sagay City. Except for private
respondent, not a single prosecution witness testified that the billboards portray Mayor Bading
Escalante, Jr. as a tuta or puppet of Sagay City. The billboards erected by petitioner simply say
CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER
Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the controversial printed
matter. But that is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by itself. [P]ersonal hurt or embarrassment
or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation, words which are merely insulting
are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-
53
natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for defamation in
the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself, as the Court ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v.
Islamic Da Wah Council of the Phils., Inc.
Our in-depth scrutiny of his testimony, however, reveals that the reasons elicited by the
prosecution mainly relate to the discharge of private respondents official duties as City Mayor of Cadiz
City. For that matter, granting that the controversial phrase is considered defamatory, still, no liability
attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is
made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the
truth of the allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not
prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. As the Court held in
United States v. Bustos, the policy of a public official may be attacked, rightly or wrongly with every
argument which ability can find or ingenuity invent. The public officer may suffer under a hostile and an
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public [official]
must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts.
Right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation; Civil liability imposed despite
acquittal of the accused-when it is proper and
when it is not.
FELIXBERTO ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 174654, August 17, 2011
Facts:
The petitioner was charged before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 13, of Estafa through
falsification of a public document but was convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by a
private individual. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ACQUITTED the accused for he was convicted of a
crime he was not charged of in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. However, the Court of Appeals SUSTAINED the RTC Decision imposing civil
liability on the petitioner despite his acquittal.
Issue:
The only issue therefore is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly
liable notwithstanding his acquittal.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor
of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not
exist.
54
Here, the CA set aside the trial courts Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense
different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged
with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto
actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary public for its
notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. On appeal,
the CA held that petitioners conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The CA, however, found no reversible
error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.
In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in
this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is
really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to
spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did
not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses
Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject
properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties respective evidence, the trial court
found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that
their signatures were genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary
public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or render
void ab initio the parties transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. To overcome the presumption,
there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to
the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld. And since the
defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said
properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of
Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alontos title and the issuance of new ones
under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses
Alonto.
T Th he e r ri ig gh ht t t to o b be e i in nf fo or rm me ed d o of f t th he e n na at tu ur re e a an nd d
c ca au us se ed d o of f a ac cc cu us sa at ti io on n a ag ga ai in ns st t t th he e a ac cc cu us se ed d. .
MARK SOLEDAD VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
184274, February 23, 2011
NACHURA, J .:
55
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution
dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Pias City, finding petitioner Mark C. Soledad guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484, or the Access
Devices Regulations Act of 1998; while the assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call
on his mobile phone from a certain Tess or Juliet Villar (later identified as
Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent, who offered a Citifinancing loan
assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the offer, private complainant invited
Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his office in Quezon City. While in his office, Rochelle
Bagaporo indorsed private complainant to her immediate boss, a certain Arthur
[later identified as petitioner]. In their telephone conversation, [petitioner] told
private complainant to submit documents to a certain Carlo (later identified as
Ronald Gobenchiong). Private complainant submitted various documents, such
as his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card, identification cards and
statements of accounts. Subsequently, private complainant followed up his loan
status but he failed to get in touch with either [petitioner] or Ronald Gobenchiong.

During the first week of August 2004, private complainant received his
Globe handyphone statement of account wherein he was charged for two (2)
mobile phone numbers which were not his. Upon verification with the phone
company, private complainant learned that he had additional five (5) mobile
numbers in his name, and the application for said cellular phone lines bore the
picture of [petitioner] and his forged signature. Private complainant also checked
with credit card companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card database
information was altered and he had a credit card application with Metrobank Card
Corporation (Metrobank).

Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobanks junior assistant
manager Jefferson Devilleres lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which conducted an entrapment operation.

During the entrapment operation, NBIs Special Investigator (SI) Salvador
Arteche [Arteche], together with some other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Pias
around 5:00 P.M. [Arteche] posed as the delivery boy of the Metrobank credit
card. Upon reaching the address written on the delivery receipt, [Arteche] asked
for Henry Yu. [Petitioner] responded that he was Henry Yu and presented to
[Arteche] two (2) identification cards which bore the name and signature of
private complainant, while the picture showed the face of [petitioner]. [Petitioner]
signed the delivery receipt. Thereupon, [Arteche] introduced himself as an NBI
operative and apprehended [petitioner]. [Arteche] recovered from [petitioner] the
two (2) identification cards he presented to [Arteche] earlier.
Petitioner was thus charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for possessing
a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for. The accusatory portion
of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13
th
day of August 2004, or prior thereto, in
the City of Las Pias, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with certain
56
Rochelle Bagaporo a.k.a. Juliet Villar/Tess and a certain Ronald
Gobenciong a.k.a. Carlo and all of them mutually helping and aiding each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
complainant HENRY YU by applying a credit card, an access device
defined under R.A. 8484, from METROBANK CARD CORPORATION,
using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal documents
fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the name of
Henry Yu was successfully issued and delivered to said accused using a
fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice
of the real Henry Yu.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. After the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
alleging that he was not in physical and legal possession of the credit card presented and
marked in evidence by the prosecution. In an Order dated May 2, 2006, the RTC denied the
Demurrer to Evidence as it preferred to rule on the merits of the case.
On September 27, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Mark Soledad y
Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu, Arthur GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act 8484 (Access Device Regulation Act of
1998). Accordingly, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act 8484 and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to not
more than ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Further, accused is also
ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the offense
committed.
On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction, but modified the penalty imposed by the
RTC by deleting the terms prision correccional and prision mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Information is valid or Whether or not petitioner was
sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations against him;
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner was charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically Section 9(e), which
reads as follows:
Section 9. Prohibited Acts. The following acts shall constitute access
device fraud and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access
devices fraudulently applied for.
57
Petitioner assails the validity of the Information and claims that he was not
informed of the accusation against him. He explains that though he was charged with
possession of an access device fraudulently applied for, the act of possession,
which is the gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
We do not agree.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the guidelines in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information. It states:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly stated that the accused is petitioner
Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur. It was also specified in the preamble of the
Information that he was being charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e) for
possessing a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for. In the
accusatory portion thereof, the acts constituting the offense were clearly narrated in that
[petitioner], together with other persons[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded private
complainant by applying [for] a credit card, an access device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484,
from Metrobank Card Corporation, using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal
documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the name of Henry Yu was
successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of
Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu. Moreover, it was identified that
the offended party was private complainant Henry Yu and the crime was committed on or about
the 13
th
day of August 2004 in the City of Las Pias. Undoubtedly, the Information contained all
the necessary details of the offense committed, sufficient to apprise petitioner of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. As aptly argued by respondent People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, although the word possession was not used in the
accusatory portion of the Information, the word possessing appeared in its preamble or the
first paragraph thereof. Thus, contrary to petitioners contention, he was apprised that he was
being charged with violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically section 9(e) thereof, for possession of
the credit card fraudulently applied for.
The Courts discussion in People v. Villanueva on the relationship between the preamble
and the accusatory portion of the Information is noteworthy, and we quote:
The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere
aggroupment of descriptive words and phrases. It is as much an essential part
[of] the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself. The preamble in fact
complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its strength from the
preamble. It lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms; while the
accusatory portion only provides the necessary details. The preamble and the
accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete whole that gives sense and
meaning to the indictment. x x x.

x x x x

Moreover, the opening paragraph bears the operative word accuses,
which sets in motion the constitutional process of notification, and formally makes
58
the person being charged with the commission of the offense an accused. Verily,
without the opening paragraph, the accusatory portion would be nothing but a
useless and miserably incomplete narration of facts, and the entire Information
would be a functionally sterile charge sheet; thus making it impossible for the
state to prove its case.

The Information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but
as one whole document serving one purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the
full panoply of state authority is being marshaled against him. Our task is not to
determine whether allegations in an indictment could have been more artfully and
exactly written, but solely to ensure that the constitutional requirement of notice
has been fulfilled x x x.
Besides, even if the word possession was not repeated in the accusatory portion of the
Information, the acts constituting it were clearly described in the statement [that the] credit card
in the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a
fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.
Without a doubt, petitioner was given the necessary data as to why he was being prosecuted.
Equal protection clause; non-impairment clause
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR) VS. THE BUEAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR),
G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011
PERALTA, J .:
For resolution is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the declaration of
nullity of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9337 insofar as it amends Section 27 (c) of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, by excluding petitioner from exemption from corporate
income tax for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 10 of Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner
further seeks to prohibit the implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue
Regulations No. 16-2005 for being contrary to law.
THE FACTS:
PAGCOR was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A on January 1,
1977. Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-B (supplementing P.D. No. 1067-A) was
issued exempting PAGCOR from the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of
five percent (5%) of the gross revenue. Thereafter, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1399 was
issued expanding the scope of PAGCOR's exemption.
To consolidate the laws pertaining to the franchise and powers of PAGCOR, P.D. No.
1869 was issued. Section 13 thereof reads as follows:
Sec. 13. Exemptions. x x x
(1) Customs Duties, taxes and other imposts on importations. - All
importations of equipment, vehicles, automobiles, boats, ships, barges, aircraft
and such other gambling paraphernalia, including accessories or related
facilities, for the sole and exclusive use of the casinos, the proper and efficient
management and administration thereof and such other clubs, recreation or
59
amusement places to be established under and by virtue of this Franchise shall
be exempt from the payment of duties, taxes and other imposts, including all
kinds of fees, levies, or charges of any kind or nature.

Vessels and/or accessory ferry boats imported or to be imported by any
corporation having existing contractual arrangements with the Corporation, for
the sole and exclusive use of the casino or to be used to service the operations
and requirements of the casino, shall likewise be totally exempt from the
payment of all customs duties, taxes and other imposts, including all kinds of
fees, levies, assessments or charges of any kind or nature, whether National or
Local.

(2) Income and other taxes. - (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind
or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges, or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and
collected under this Franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of
tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a
Franchise Tax of five percent (5%)of the gross revenue or earnings derived
by the Corporation from its operation under this Franchise. Such tax shall
be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in
lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established, or collected by any municipal, provincial or
national government authority.

(b) Others: The exemption herein granted for earnings derived from the
operations conducted under the franchise, specifically from the payment of any
tax, income or otherwise, as well as any form of charges, fees or levies, shall
inure to the benefit of and extend to corporation(s), association(s), agency(ies),
or individual(s) with whom the Corporation or operator has any contractual
relationship in connection with the operations of the casino(s) authorized to be
conducted under this Franchise and to those receiving compensation or other
remuneration from the Corporation as a result of essential facilities furnished
and/or technical services rendered to the Corporation or operator.

The fee or remuneration of foreign entertainers contracted by the
Corporation or operator in pursuance of this provision shall be free of any tax.

(3) Dividend Income. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, in the event the Corporation should declare a cash dividend income
corresponding to the participation of the private sector shall, as an incentive to
the beneficiaries, be subject only to a final flat income rate of ten percent (10%)
of the regular income tax rates. The dividend income shall not in such case be
considered as part of the beneficiaries' taxable income; provided, however, that
such dividend income shall be totally exempted from income or other form of
taxes if invested within six (6) months from the date the dividend income is
received in the following:

(a) operation of the casino(s) or investments in any affiliate activity
that will ultimately redound to the benefit of the Corporation; or any other
corporation with whom the Corporation has any existing arrangements in
connection with or related to the operations of the casino(s);
(b) Government bonds, securities, treasury notes, or government
debentures; or
(c) BOI-registered or export-oriented corporation(s).
60
PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed in June 1984 through P.D. No. 1931, but it was
later restored by Letter of Instruction No. 1430, which was issued in September 1984.
On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 provides that government-owned
and controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall pay corporate income tax, except petitioner
PAGCOR, the Government Service and Insurance Corporation, the Social Security System, the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, thus:
(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or
Instrumentalities. - The provisions of existing special general laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies or instrumentalities owned and
controlled by the Government, except the Government Service and Insurance
Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PHIC), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), and the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are imposed
by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar business,
industry, or activity.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. The particular amendment that is at issue in
this case is Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs that are
exempt from payment of corporate income tax, thus:
(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or
Instrumentalities. - The provisions of existing special general laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies, or instrumentalities owned and
controlled by the Government, except the Government Service and Insurance
Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PHIC), and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are
imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar
business, industry, or activity.

Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the validity and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, in particular:
1) Section 4, which imposes a 10% Value Added Tax (VAT) on sale of goods and
properties; Section 5, which imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and Section 6, which
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties, all contain a uniform
proviso authorizing the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%. The said provisions were alleged to be violative of Section 28 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which section vests in Congress the exclusive authority to fix the
rate of taxes, and of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution on due process, as well as of
Section 26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which section provides for the "no amendment
rule" upon the last reading of a bill.
2) Sections 8 and 12 were alleged to be violative of Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, or the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and Section 28 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution; and
61
3) other technical aspects of the passage of the law, questioning the manner it was
passed.

On September 1, 2005, the Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.

On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-2005,
specifically identifying PAGCOR as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under
Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337.
The said revenue regulation, in part, reads:

Sec. 4. 108-3. Definitions and Specific Rules on Selected Services.
Gross Receipts of all other franchisees, other than those covered by Sec.
119 of the Tax Code, regardless of how their franchisees may have been
granted, shall be subject to the 10% VAT imposed under Sec.108 of the Tax
Code. This includes, among others, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), and its licensees or franchisees.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

PAGCOR raises the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
FOR BEING REPUGNANT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION [CLAUSE]
EMBODIED IN SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

II
WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
FOR BEING REPUGNANT TO THE NON-IMPAIRMENT [CLAUSE] EMBODIED
IN SECTION 10, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

III
WHETHER OR NOT RR 16-2005, SECTION 4.108-3, PARAGRAPH (H) IS
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE
BASIC LAW, RA 8424, SECTION 108, INSOFAR AS THE SAID REGULATION
IMPOSED VAT ON THE SERVICES OF THE PETITIONER AS WELL AS
PETITIONERS LICENSEES OR FRANCHISEES WHEN THE BASIC LAW, AS
INTERPRETED BY APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, DOES NOT IMPOSE
VAT ON PETITIONER OR ON PETITIONERS LICENSEES OR
FRANCHISEES.
The BIR, in its Comment dated December 29, 2006, counters:

I

SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 9337 AND SECTION 13 (2) OF P.D. 1869 ARE BOTH
VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF LAWS THAT SHOULD BE
HARMONIOUSLY CONSTRUED TOGETHER SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT TO
ALL OF THEIR PROVISIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
62
II
SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 9337 IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 1 AND
SECTION 10, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III
BIR REVENUE REGULATIONS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND
CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL STRICKEN DOWN BY LAWFUL AUTHORITIES.
The main issue is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax and
VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337
After a careful study of the positions presented by the parties, this Court finds the
petition partly meritorious.
Under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it has
been effectively omitted from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. Petitioner argues that
such omission is unconstitutional, as it is violative of its right to equal protection of the laws
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., this Court expounded the meaning and scope of equal
protection, thus:
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as
to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The
guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.

x x x x

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the
classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the
people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

It is not contested that before the enactment of R.A. No. 9337, petitioner was one
of the five GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate income tax as shown in R.A.
No. 8424, Section 27 (c) of which, reads:
63

(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or Instrumentalities.
- The provisions of existing special or general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all
corporations, agencies or instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government,
except the Government Service and Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security
System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are
imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar business,
industry, or activity.
A perusal of the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting of the
Committee on Ways on Means dated October 27, 1997 would show that the exemption of
PAGCOR from the payment of corporate income tax was due to the acquiescence of the
Committee on Ways on Means to the request of PAGCOR that it be exempt from such
tax.
The exemption of PAGCOR from paying corporate income tax was not based on a
classification showing substantial distinctions which make for real differences, but to reiterate,
the exemption was granted upon the request of PAGCOR that it be exempt from the payment of
corporate income tax.
With the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 9337, amending R.A. No. 8424,
PAGCOR has been excluded from the enumeration of GOCCs that are exempt
from paying corporate income tax.
Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The burden of proof rests upon the
party claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. As a
rule, tax exemptions are construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be shown to
exist clearly and categorically, and supported by clear legal provision.
In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate
income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. The legislative
intent, as shown by the discussions in the Bicameral Conference Meeting, is to require
PAGCOR to pay corporate income tax; hence, the omission or removal of PAGCOR from
exemption from the payment of corporate income tax. It is a basic precept of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Thus, the
express mention of the GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate income tax excludes all
others. Not being excepted, petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as coming within the
purview of the general rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate income tax, expressed in the
maxim: exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.
PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the
legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the
Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCORs exemption from payment of corporate
income tax, as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions
and the other requirements of a reasonable classification by legislative bodies, so that the law
may operate only on some, and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The
legislative records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate
income tax was PAGCORs own request to be exempted.
64
Petitioner further contends that Section 1 (c) of R.A. No. 9337 is null and void ab initio
for violating the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Petitioner avers that laws form part
of, and is read into, the contract even without the parties expressly saying so. Petitioner states
that the private parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions, which inure
to their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement for their decision to transact/invest
with it. Petitioner argues that the withdrawal of its exemption from corporate income tax by R.A.
No. 9337 has the effect of changing the main consideration and inducement for the transactions
of private parties with it; thus, the amendatory provision is violative of the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners contention lacks merit.
The non-impairment clause is contained in Section 10, Article III of the Constitution,
which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. The non-
impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment
if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the
rights of the parties.
As regards franchises, Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution provides that no
franchise or right shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.
In Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna, the Court held that a franchise
partakes the nature of a grant, which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. The pertinent portion of the case states:
While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions
contained in special franchises as being in the nature of contracts and a part of
the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless,
are far from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in
the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in
contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully
entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its
private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental
immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing
the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not
to be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise
partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11, of the
1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilege shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when
the common good so requires.
In this case, PAGCOR was granted a franchise to operate and maintain gambling
casinos, clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball,
football, lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of
the Philippines. Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCORs franchise is
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under Section
65
1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27
(c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax,
which may affect any benefits to PAGCORs transactions with private parties, is not violative of
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting
PAGCOR to 10% VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337. Nowhere in R.A. No. 9337
is it provided that petitioner can be subjected to VAT. R.A. No. 9337 is clear only as to the
removal of petitioner's exemption from the payment of corporate income tax, which was already
addressed above by this Court.
As pointed out by the OSG, R.A. No. 9337 itself exempts petitioner from VAT pursuant
to Section 7 (k) thereof, which reads:
Sec. 7. Section 109 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

Section 109. Exempt Transactions. - (1) Subject to the
provisions of Subsection (2) hereof, the following transactions shall
be exempt from the value-added tax:

x x x x

(k) Transactions which are exempt under international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory or under
special laws, except Presidential Decree No. 529.
Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCORs charter, P.D. No.
1869, is a special law that grants petitioner exemption from taxes.
Moreover, the exemption of PAGCOR from VAT is supported by Section 6 of R.A. No.
9337, which retained Section 108 (B) (3) of R.A. No. 8424, thus:
[R.A. No. 9337], SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code (R.A. No. 8424),
as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 108. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Services and Use
or Lease of Properties.

(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied,
assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange
of services, including the use or lease of properties: x x x

x x x x

(B) Transactions Subject to Zero Percent (0%) Rate.
The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-
registered persons shall be subject to zero percent (0%) rate;
(3) Services rendered to persons or entities whose
exemption under special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the
supply of such services to zero percent (0%) rate;
66
x xx x
As pointed out by petitioner, although R.A. No. 9337 introduced amendments to Section
108 of R.A. No. 8424 by imposing VAT on other services not previously covered, it did not
amend the portion of Section 108 (B) (3) that subjects to zero percent rate services performed
by VAT-registered persons to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply of
such services to 0% rate.
Petitioner's exemption from VAT under Section 108 (B) (3) of R.A. No. 8424 has been
thoroughly and extensively discussed in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite
(Philippines) Hotel Corporation. Acesite was the owner and operator of the Holiday Inn Manila
Pavilion Hotel. It leased a portion of the hotels premises to PAGCOR. It incurred VAT
amounting to P30,152,892.02 from its rental income and sale of food and beverages to
PAGCOR from January 1996 to April 1997. Acesite tried to shift the said taxes to PAGCOR by
incorporating it in the amount assessed to PAGCOR. However, PAGCOR refused to pay the
taxes because of its tax-exempt status. PAGCOR paid only the amount due to Acesite minus
VAT in the sum of P30,152,892.02. Acesite paid VAT in the amount of P30,152,892.02 to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, fearing the legal consequences of its non-payment. In May
1998, Acesite sought the refund of the amount it paid as VAT on the ground that its transaction
with PAGCOR was subject to zero rate as it was rendered to a tax-exempt entity. The Court
ruled that PAGCOR and Acesite were both exempt from paying VAT, thus:
x x x x
PAGCOR is exempt from payment of indirect taxes
It is undisputed that P.D. 1869, the charter creating PAGCOR, grants the
latter an exemption from the payment of taxes. Section 13 of P.D. 1869
pertinently provides:

Sec. 13. Exemptions.
(2) Income and other taxes. - (a) Franchise Holder: No tax
of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges
or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be
assessed and collected under this Franchise from the
Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way
to the earnings of the Corporation, except a Franchise Tax of five
(5%) percent of the gross revenue or earnings derived by the
Corporation from its operation under this Franchise. Such tax shall
be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and
shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of
any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by
any municipal, provincial, or national government authority.

(b) Others: The exemptions herein granted for earnings
derived from the operations conducted under the franchise
specifically from the payment of any tax, income or otherwise, as
well as any form of charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the
benefit of and extend to corporation(s), association(s),
agency(ies), or individual(s) with whom the Corporation or
operator has any contractual relationship in connection with the
operations of the casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this
67
Franchise and to those receiving compensation or other
remuneration from the Corporation or operator as a result of
essential facilities furnished and/or technical services rendered to
the Corporation or operator.

Petitioner contends that the above tax exemption refers only to
PAGCOR's direct tax liability and not to indirect taxes, like the VAT.

We disagree.
A close scrutiny of the above provisos clearly gives PAGCOR a
blanket exemption to taxes with no distinction on whether the taxes are
direct or indirect. We are one with the CA ruling that PAGCOR is also exempt
from indirect taxes, like VAT, as follows:

Under the above provision [Section 13 (2) (b) of P.D.
1869], the term "Corporation" or operator refers to PAGCOR.
Although the law does not specifically mention PAGCOR's
exemption from indirect taxes, PAGCOR is undoubtedly exempt
from such taxes because the law exempts from taxes
persons or entities contracting with PAGCOR in casino
operations. Although, differently worded, the provision clearly
exempts PAGCOR from indirect taxes. In fact, it goes one step
further by granting tax exempt status to persons dealing with
PAGCOR in casino operations. The unmistakable conclusion is
that PAGCOR is not liable for the P30, 152,892.02 VAT and
neither is Acesite as the latter is effectively subject to zero percent
rate under Sec. 108 B (3), R.A. 8424. (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, by extending the exemption to entities or individuals dealing with
PAGCOR, the legislature clearly granted exemption also from indirect taxes. It
must be noted that the indirect tax of VAT, as in the instant case, can be shifted
or passed to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services
subject to VAT. Thus, by extending the tax exemption to entities or
individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations, it is exempting
PAGCOR from being liable to indirect taxes.

The manner of charging VAT does not make PAGCOR liable to said tax.

It is true that VAT can either be incorporated in the value of the goods,
properties, or services sold or leased, in which case it is computed as 1/11 of
such value, or charged as an additional 10% to the value. Verily, the seller or
lessor has the option to follow either way in charging its clients and customer. In
the instant case, Acesite followed the latter method, that is, charging an
additional 10% of the gross sales and rentals. Be that as it may, the use of either
method, and in particular, the first method, does not denigrate the fact that
PAGCOR is exempt from an indirect tax, like VAT.

VAT exemption extends to Acesite

Thus, while it was proper for PAGCOR not to pay the 10% VAT charged
by Acesite, the latter is not liable for the payment of it as it is exempt in this
particular transaction by operation of law to pay the indirect tax. Such exemption
68
falls within the former Section 102 (b) (3) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended
(now Sec. 108 [b] [3] of R.A. 8424), which provides:

Section 102. Value-added tax on sale of services.- (a) Rate
and base of tax - There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a
value-added tax equivalent to 10% of gross receipts derived by any
person engaged in the sale of services x x x; Provided, that the
following services performed in the Philippines by VAT registered
persons shall be subject to 0%.

x x x x
(3) Services rendered to persons or entities whose
exemption under special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply
of such services to zero (0%) rate (emphasis supplied).

The rationale for the exemption from indirect taxes provided for in P.D.
1869 and the extension of such exemption to entities or individuals dealing with
PAGCOR in casino operations are best elucidated from the 1987 case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco & Sons, Inc., where the
absolute tax exemption of the World Health Organization (WHO) upon an
international agreement was upheld. We held in said case that the exemption of
contractee WHO should be implemented to mean that the entity or person
exempt is the contractor itself who constructed the building owned by contractee
WHO, and such does not violate the rule that tax exemptions are personal
because the manifest intention of the agreement is to exempt the contractor so
that no contractor's tax may be shifted to the contractee WHO. Thus, the
proviso in P.D. 1869, extending the exemption to entities or individuals
dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations, is clearly to proscribe any
indirect tax, like VAT, that may be shifted to PAGCOR.
Although the basis of the exemption of PAGCOR and Acesite from VAT in the case of
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite (Philippines) Hotel Corporation was Section
102 (b) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended, which section was retained as Section 108 (B) (3)
in R.A. No. 8424, it is still applicable to this case, since the provision relied upon has been
retained in R.A. No. 9337.
It is settled rule that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails, because the said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. RR No. 16-2005,
therefore, cannot go beyond the provisions of R.A. No. 9337. Since PAGCOR is exempt from
VAT under R.A. No. 9337, the BIR exceeded its authority in subjecting PAGCOR to 10% VAT
under RR No. 16-2005; hence, the said regulatory provision is hereby nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 1 of Republic Act No.
9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, by excluding
petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation from the enumeration of government-
owned and controlled corporations exempted from corporate income tax is valid and
constitutional, while BIR Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 insofar as it subjects PAGCOR to
10% VAT is null and void for being contrary to the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9337.
69
Equal protection clause was violated when the
Philippine Truth Commission singled out only
the officials and employees of the previous
administration to be investigated for graft and
corruption and others.
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 192935 : December 7, 2010
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions
of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is
a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees,
who are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable
to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives;
x x x:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth
on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption
of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission
(PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the PREVIOUS
ADMINISTRATION, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an independent
collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to
his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one .
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the
Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A
perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the
same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:
70
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it
vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those
of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the
consistent and general international practice of four decades wherein States
constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations,
which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of
international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure
in partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere
populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty
will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other
major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged
is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual
question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a
statute.
In their Consolidated Comment, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the
assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office
because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and
that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292),
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,
and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there
is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
71
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders
and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as
Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay,
Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos
P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the
principal issues to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions
and question Executive Order No. 1. [Yes, insofar as the Members of Congress is
concerned because of the alleged usurpation of their powers. As to petitioner
Biraogo who is a private citizen, his personality is based on the issue involved
being of transcendental importance]
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions [No because there are no new appropriations but the
funds to be used will come from funds already appropriated for the Office of the
President];
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ. [No, because the Philippine Truth Commission it merely recommends]
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause. [Yes,
because it singles out only the officials and employees of the previous Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo Administration but not the other officials of previous
administrations who are similarly situated].
;and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief [Yes].
Held:
Executive Order No. 1 violated the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
72
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the previous administration as its sole object makes the PTC an
adventure in partisan hostility. Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and
corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former
President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the same magnitude of
controversies and anomalies were reported to have been committed against the Filipino
people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the
recognized exceptions because first, there is no substantial distinction between the group of
officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who
abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not
germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption. In order to attain
constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft
and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law
with equal force.
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous
administration as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC
will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said
administration. Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to
officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed
against the equal protection clause for the segregation of the transactions of public officers
during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification
based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks
to correct. To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the
following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public
institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure
to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to
deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is
warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current
administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the
previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for
investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence
that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be
learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily
established in the regime that immediately precede the current administration.
73
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to
investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a
routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration
like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late
President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies,
and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada under
Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens committee to
investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding Philippine Centennial projects
of his predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos. [Emphases supplied]
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality
of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection
of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however,
to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. The classification will be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry,
in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by
the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him.
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as
to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As
elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of
cases.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order
to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child
should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
74
It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based
on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases
of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a
law under the equal protection clause. Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is
not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach. It has been written that a
regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate
simply because it happens to be incomplete. In several instances, the underinclusiveness was
not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be
attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by step process.
With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil
that might conceivably have been attacked.
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the
fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must
be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or
report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. The
equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Illegality of arrest is deemed waived if accused
enters a plea. Such could not be raised for the
first time on Appeal; Non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA No. 9165
entitles the accused to acquittal based on
presumption of innocence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSELLE SANTIAGO,
G.R. No. 191061, February 9, 2011
75
ABAD, J .:
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor of Makati charged the accused Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas alias
Tisay (Roselle) with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal Case 05-792. Roselle was also charged with violation of
Section 15 of the same law in Criminal Case 05-1101.
Initially, Roselle pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case 05-1101 (violation of Section 15) but
she later changed her plea to guilty and was so found by the court. The latter, however,
deferred her sentencing until the termination of the case for violation of Section 5.
The parties stipulated at the pre-trial (1) that PO3 Leo Gabang investigated the case; (2)
that, although the latter prepared the investigation report, he had no personal knowledge of
what happened; (3) that the police made a request, through P/Supt. Marietto Mendoza, for
laboratory examination; (4) that P/Insp. Richard Allan Mangalip, a forensic chemist of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, examined the submitted specimen, not
knowing from whom the same was taken; (5) that the PNP Crime Laboratory Office issued
Physical Science Report D-090-05S; and (6) that the forensic chemist was qualified. With these
stipulations, the prosecution dispensed with Mangalips testimony.
PO1 Voltaire Esguerra (Esguerra) testified that on April 4, 2005, they received information
that Roselle was selling illegal drugs at her house at Pipit Extension, Barangay Rizal, Makati
City. Esguerra conducted a test buy and received from her one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet that presumably contained shabu. When he returned to his office, Esguerra marked the
sachet with @ Tisay then sent it to the laboratory for testing. Before receiving the results of
the test buy, an asset told the police that Roselle was going to leave her house, prompting
Esguerras team to conduct a buy-bust operation.
Esguerra met Roselle again and told her that it was he who bought shabu from her earlier
that day. She thus let him enter the front yard of her house where he told her that he wanted to
buy another pack for P300.00. Roselle took his marked money and entered the house. While
waiting and looking in, Esguerra spotted two women inside using shabu with the asset by their
side, apparently waiting for his turn. Subsequently, Roselle returned with one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet presumably containing shabu. Upon receipt of the sachet, Esguerra
signaled his team. They arrested Roselle and appraised her of her rights. Esguerra
immediately marked the sachet with RPS.
After returning to the station, he turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to the
investigator. When the contents of the first and second sachets (with @ Tisay and RPS
markings) were examined, these were confirmed to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu). A confirmatory test also found Roselle positive for the use of shabu.
For her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She claims that the
case was a product of a mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area but
Roselle. She narrated how she was forcibly taken from her house and into custody.
In its decision dated June 11, 2008, the RTC found Roselle guilty of violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. The RTC also sentenced her to undergo rehabilitation for not less than six
months at a government drug rehabilitation center subject to the provisions of R.A. 9165 for her
violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165.
76
Roselle appealed from both judgments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
03451 but the latter court affirmed the two convictions. She looks for her acquittal from this
Court.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the police conducted a valid arrest in Roselles case; and
(2) whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that the prosecution
evidence established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
One. Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since they
arrested her without proper warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person taken into
custody as the Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide. But Roselle raised this issue only during
appeal, not before she was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to have waived
any question as to the legality of her arrest.
Two. Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the
crime charged in the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of the
allegedly prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.
Esguerra testified that he seized a heat-sealed sachet of white substance from Roselle
and marked the sachet with RPS right in her presence. He claimed that he then immediately
submitted the specimen to the police crime laboratory for examination. But the request for
laboratory exam reveals that it was not Esguerra who delivered the specimen to the crime
laboratory. It appears that Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in turn forwarded it to
a certain PO2 Santos. No testimony covers the movement of the specimen among these other
persons. Consequently, the prosecution was unable to establish the chain of custody of the
seized item and its preservation from possible tampering.
Since the seized substance was heat-sealed in plastic sachet and properly marked by
the officer who seized the same, it would have also been sufficient, despite intervening changes
in its custody and possession, if the prosecution had presented the forensic chemist to attest to
the fact a) that the sachet of substance was handed to him for examination in the same
condition that Esguerra last held it: still heat-sealed, marked, and not tampered with; b) that he
(the chemist) opened the sachet and examined its content; c) that he afterwards resealed the
sachet and what is left of its content and placed his own marking on the cover; and d) that the
specimen remained in the same condition when it is being presented in court. In this way, the
court would have been assured of the integrity of the specimen as presented before it. If the
finding of the chemist is challenged, there may be opportunity for the court to require a retest so
long as sufficient remnants of the same are left.
What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the whereabouts of the seized
specimen after the crime laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of
custody should be established from the time the seized drugs were confiscated and eventually
marked until the same is presented during trial.
Taking into account the above reasons, the Court finds it difficult to sustain the
conviction of Roselle for violation of Section 5. The presumption of her innocence of the charge
must prevail.
77
As for the other offense, her violation of Section 15 (Use of Illegal Drugs), it is curious
that the CA still entertained her appeal from it despite the fact that she pleaded guilty to the
charge and did not ask the trial court to allow her to change her plea. At any rate, since she had
been under detention at the Correctional Institute for Women since 2005 and presumably
deprived of the use of illegal substance during her entire stay there, she should be deemed to
have served the mandatory rehabilitation period that the RTC imposed on her.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the alleged violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03451 dated October 30, 2009 and ACQUITS the accused
Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas of the charge against her for that crime.
The petitioners were deprived of their right to
due process when they were found guilty of
direct contempt by respondent judge himself
who is the complainant against them.
ALLEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ AND REGIDOR TULALI VS.
JUDGE BIENVINIDO BLANCAFLOR, G.R. No. 190171, March
14, 2011
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court filed by Alen Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and
Regidor Tulali (Tulali), Prosecutor I of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan,
seeking to annul and set aside the October 13, 2009 Decision of respondent Judge Bienvenido
Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor), Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court,
Palawan (RTC).
In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and
Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. In the
same decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding respondents PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN ROSS
B. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct
contempt and for violation of their oath of office as member of the bar and as
officer of the Court, and hereby sentence them to suffer the penalty of
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a fine of
P100,000.00.

Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court
for the above grave offenses and should they fail to do so after the finality of this
Sentence, a warrant for their arrest will be issued, and they will not be released
unless they comply with the order of this Court.

Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for
appropriate action.
The Facts
78
Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson
(arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial
prosecutor.
During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an
alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor
under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez
(Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the
arson case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson
case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to
prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a
copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his
superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan.
On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of
arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and
Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their
testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him
for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulalis
filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan, among
others.
On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of
Judge Blancaflors continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had
already been promulgated.
In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he
was proceeding against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis
of Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation.
As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners respective position papers, Judge
Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct
contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of
P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied in the
assailed November 6, 2009 Order.
Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special civil action before this Court
anchored on the following
GROUNDS
(A)
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
79
DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED
THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
(B)
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY VIOLATED THE
RULES ON CONTEMPT.
(C)
SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE VOID, A WRIT OF
PROHIBITION MUST BE ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENT.
HELD:
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their
rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their
own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflors disregard of due process constituted
grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of
simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.

Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in the direct contempt
proceeding is clearly oppressive and without basis.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve
order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges
are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the
end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and
not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in
contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the
corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary
in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.
In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflors order penalizing petitioners for
direct contempt on the basis of Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation.
Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct
or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte
Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within the purview of direct
contempt. It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulalis voluntary withdrawal
from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. Its filing
on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any
80
way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable
for his act which was done in good faith and without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or
participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by
Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint
against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.
Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the
petitioners. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the
RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both.
The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 each with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of
arrest, is evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting
the contempt proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and
punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and
opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners alleged vilification campaign against Judge Blancaflor
cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as
correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the
requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which
requires written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was
there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the
contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear
before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the
other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to
explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.
In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold
impartiality expected of a magistrate. He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the
questions propounded in his July 30, 2009 Order, as follows:
a. Your [petitioner Rodriguezs] participation, if any, in the filing of the ex-parte
manifestation by Prosecutor Tulali together with the attachment of your letter
to Gov. Joel T. Reyes dated May 8, 2009 filed on June 29, 2009 with the
Clerk of Court, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan;

b. Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Joel T. Reyes, if you
know, and if so what was the official action thereon;

81
c. Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30, 2009 was he allowed to
answer the charges against him, i.e., calling him bag man and facilitator and
Ernesto Fernandez, calling him extortionist.
Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other evidentiary basis for your
conclusion that Ernesto Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan was a
bag man and facilitator;

What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Rolly Ami from the
City Jail without permission from the Court on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 0clock in
the afternoon and having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (c/o Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was Rolly Ami interviewed?

d. Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was
made to sign affidavits in the absence of his lawyer on June 29, 2009 at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon, why?

e. Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren Guinto, a close
associate of yours, and directly went to the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn
expensive jewelry (watch and ring), why?

What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION
CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10, 2009.
Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court,
pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer, your
loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize this duty and
obligation?
Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality
required of judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of
his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be
moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should
always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges
as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
P Pr re es su um mp pt ti io on n o of f i in nn no oc ce en nc ce e; ; n no on n- -c co om mp pl li ia an nc ce e o of f
t th he e p po ol li ic ce e o of f s se ec ct ti io on n 2 21 1 o of f R RA A N No o. . 9 91 16 65 5 i in n d dr ru ug gs s
c ca as se es s
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN, G.R.
No. 184595, June 29, 2010
Accused was allegedly arrested in a buy-bus operation in Manila particularly in Abad
Santos Avenue along Bambang Street, a street with many people at that time, at around 7:50
p.m. of June 25, 2004. She allegedly sold shabu worth P500.00 for one (1) sachet containing
0.146 grams . No other sachet of shabu was confiscated on her person though she allegedly a
drug dealer.
HELD:
82

The chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not shown to have been
substantially complied with.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties could not prevail over
the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
For, among other things, it is incredible for an allegedly known drug-peddler to be
standing at a corner of a street at 7:50 in the evening instead of plying her trade secretly, and
with only a 0.146-gram sachet worth P500.00 of prohibited drugs in her possession the value of
which happens to be what a poseur-buyer wants to buy.
Whether the COMELEC was correct in denying
Ang Ladlad as a party-list group on moral
grounds; freedom of expression and right to
religion.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582,
April 7, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed
Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad
again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied
with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
83
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional
and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with,
individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one
gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs.

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as
indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated
as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit,
license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which
defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of
the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose
is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions
and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a
fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines
openly contrary to public morals;
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration to the COMELEC EN BANC, three commissioners
voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
84
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The
COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the
First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system.
Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization,
it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the
party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would
have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers
of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool
for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are
also the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the
nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is
able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is
elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and
females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of
Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
The COMELEC likewise used the Holy Bible and the Koran in denying Ladlads application.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad
also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which
had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by
January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG was ordered to file its Comment
on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. Instead of filing a Comment,
however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment. Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.
Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own
comment. The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, a temporary restraining order was issued
on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing
the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.
85
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene
or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention. The CHR opined that the
denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
HELD:
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any
of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each
province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be
a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following
LGBT networks:
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro
Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
86
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with
the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that
Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads
morality, or lack thereof.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in
public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies
upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and
morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to
religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it
would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the
reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family,
and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
87
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted
into the realm of law.
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups
members have committed or are committing immoral acts. The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to
immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full
of disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not
the intendment of the law.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral
fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate
matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will
and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an
argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In
this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy,
at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and
a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves
as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar
persons. The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and
in like circumstances.
88
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc.
v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of
equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there
is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the
petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such
belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the
COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an
unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis
review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that
would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike
for a disfavored group.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves
for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals
as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient
evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself
has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not
justified by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to
impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging
a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of
forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-
sex conduct. European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection
provisions in foreign and international texts. To the extent that there is much to learn from other
jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to
justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that
89
their actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in
Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the
constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political
ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means
must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population. A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to
publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
everyone concerned. Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the
other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that
relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this
Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of
the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It
well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional
analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public
opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and
we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
Validity of expulsion of Liberal Party members
without notice and hearing; whether their right
to due process of law was violated.

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR.,
RODOLFO G.VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON R.
CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN
CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G.MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO
vs. COMELEC, MANUEL ROXAS II, FRANKLIN DRILON and
J.R. NEREUS ACOSTA , G.R. No. 188920
ABAD, J .:
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon , then the president of the Liberal Party
(LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr., LP Chairman, and a number of party
members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement without
consulting his party.
90
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss
local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies,
the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not
properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party officers
were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.
On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO and
NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion
could be likened to people power, wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as
president by direct action. Atienza also said that the amendments to the original LP
Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not
been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on
July 24, 2006
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting respondent
Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new
election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the
others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the
Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been
properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP
president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.
Both sides of the dispute went to the Supreme Court to challenge the COMELEC
rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilons
petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the
COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution
had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP
president was to end only on November 30, 2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent
Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified
to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner
Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of
the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the
new LP president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia,
Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon,
Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory
injunction before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta,
the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the
presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly
convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition
ought to have been based on a list appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program.
Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed
that the NECO had 103 members.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman,
was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were
given the status of guests during the meeting. Atienzas allies allegedly raised these issues
91
but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and railroaded the proceedings. He
suspended the meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice
to Atienzas allies.
On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP
president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The partys
60
th
Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members
because supervening events changed the bodys number and composition. Some NECO
members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the
government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections,
making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public
office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became NECO
members upon respondent Drilons nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the
amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it
changed due to supervening circumstances.
Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza,
Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on
March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO
subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia,
and Suarez, forfeited their party membership when they ran under other political parties during
the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster of LP members.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners
Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the
composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent
senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors and mayors members of that
body. That some lost or won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO
membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president
was not properly convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC
observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political
party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to
resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners
Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
I S S U E
Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al.
violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s
constitutional right to due process by the
latters expulsion from the party.
HELD:
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of
party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to
due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned
them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al.,
proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and are,
92
therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations.
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative
bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions
are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority
to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state
function. The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the
states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in Article III
of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking
of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the
states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to
protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts
committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that
provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against
unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and
cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an
intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life,
liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested
right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only
rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to
those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is
a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have
been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a
due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere
in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to
conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In
Sinaca v. Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public
interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also
consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to
the free choice of the people.
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas
election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the
party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance
of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the
issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an
issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the
limited scope of its power over political parties.
No violation of the right to due process when a
party was notified but failed to file comment to
a motion of the other party.

93
SUSIE CHAN-TAN vs. JESSE TAN, G.R. No. 167139, February
25, 2010
ISSUE:
Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17
May 2004 resolution of the trial court giving custody to their children have attained
finality despite the alleged denial of due process since she was not present during the
hearing.
HELD:
Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file
pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondents omnibus motion to amend the
partial judgment as regards the custody of the children and the properties in her
possession. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying
solely on the testimony of respondent. Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her
counsel appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on
petitioners motion to dismiss.
We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon
the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of the latters right to appeal is not a ground for setting
aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may
have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel,
she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show petitioner, through
counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after motion.
Contrary to petitioners allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to
believe the negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioners end, as may be gleaned
from her counsels manifestation dated 3 May 2004:
Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity
proceedings, respectfully informs the Honorable Court that she has not
heard from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call petitioner have
failed.

Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an
intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.
Clearly, despite her counsels efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter
disinterest in the hearings on respondents omnibus motion seeking, among others,
custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed
with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by
respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process.
The right of an accused to due process of law
was violated when the judge issued a warrant
for her arrest even though she did not receive
94
any notice which was sent to the Chief of Police
of Quezon City.
NORYN S. TAN VS. J UDGE MARIA CLARITA CASUGA-
TABIN, A.M. No. MTJ -09-1729, J anuary 20, 2009
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
FACTS:
Noryn S. Tan (complainant) filed a Complaint dated April 2, 2007 against Judge Maria Clarita
Casuga-Tabin (respondent) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Baguio City for denial
of due process relative to Criminal Case No. 118628.
Complainant avers: On November 9, 2006, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Quezon City Police
District (QCPD) served her a warrant of arrest dated October 13, 2006, issued by the MTCC Baguio City,
Branch 4, presided by respondent, relative to Criminal Case No. 118628 for alleged violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. It was only then that she learned for the first time that a criminal case was filed against
her before the court. She was detained at the Quezon City Hall Complex Police Office and had to post bail
of P1,000.00 before the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for
her temporary release. Upon verification, she learned that respondent issued on August 8, 2006 an Order
directing her to appear before the court on October 10, 2006 for arraignment. It was sent by mail to PNP
Quezon City for service to her. However, she did not receive any copy of the Order and up to the present
has not seen the same; hence, she was not able to attend her arraignment. She also found out that there
was no proof of service of the Order or any notice to her of the arraignment. This notwithstanding,
respondent issued a warrant for her arrest. Complainant alleges that she was deeply aggrieved and
embarrassed by the issuance of the warrant for her arrest despite the fact that she was never notified of
her arraignment. Complainant prayed that the appropriate investigation be conducted as to the undue
issuance of a warrant for her arrest.
In her Comment dated July 5, 2007, respondent answered: She issued the warrant of arrest
because when the case was called for appearance, the complainant, as accused therein, failed to appear.
Prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, her staff sent by registered mail the court's Order dated
August 8, 2006 addressed to complainant through the Chief of Police, PNP, 1104, Quezon City directing
complainant to appear on October 10, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. for the arraignment and preliminary conference in
Criminal Case No. 118628, as proven by Registry Receipt No. 0310. It is true that the return on the court's
Order dated August 8, 2006 had not yet been made by the QC Police on or before October 10, 2006.
Nonetheless, she issued the warrant of arrest in good faith and upon the following grounds: (a) under Sec.
3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the court was entitled to presume that on October 10, 2006, after the
lapse of a little over two months, official duty had been regularly performed and a letter duly directed and
mailed had been received in the regular course of mail; and (b) Sec. 12 of the 1983 Rule on Summary
Procedure in Special Cases provides that bail may be required where the accused does not reside in the
place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. The warrant of arrest she issued was
meant to implement this provision, which was not repealed by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, since complainant is a resident of Quezon City and not of Baguio City. If her interpretation was
erroneous, she (respondent) believes that an administrative sanction for such error would be harsh and
unsympathetic. She has nothing personal against complainant and did not want to embarrass or humiliate
her. She issued the warrant in the honest belief that her act was in compliance with the rules. She prays
that the case against her be dismissed and that a ruling on the interpretation of Secs. 10 & 12, of the 1983
Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, in relation to Sec. 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure be made for the guidance of the bench and bar.
HELD:
95
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court
shall not order the arrest of the accused, unless the accused fails to appear whenever required. This is
clearly provided in Section 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which states:
Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. - The court shall not order the arrest of the
accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person
arrested shall either be in bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to
the court. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, respondent claims that the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of complainant was
justified, since complainant failed to appear during the arraignment in spite of an order requiring her to do
so. Respondent admits, however, that a copy of the Order dated August 8, 2006, was sent to complainant
through the Chief of Police, PNP, 1104, Quezon City.
While it is true that the Rules of Court provides for presumptions, one of which is that official duty
has been regularly performed, such presumption should not be the sole basis of a magistrate in concluding
that a person called to court has failed to appear as required, which in turn justifies the issuance of a
warrant for her arrest, when such notice was not actually addressed to her residence but to the police in
her city. So basic and fundamental is a person's right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or brushed
aside with the presumption that the police through which the notice had been sent, actually served the
same on complainant whose address was not even specified.
The Court has held that a judge commits grave abuse of authority when she hastily issues a
warrant of arrest against the accused in violation of the summary procedure rule that the accused should
first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and
countervailing evidence .
Hence, complainants right to due process was violated.
Considering that this is respondent's first administrative infraction in her more than 8 years of service
in the judiciary, which serves to mitigate her liability, the Court holds the imposition of a fine in the amount of
P10,000.00 to be proper in this case.
Right to assembly and power of the City Mayor
to change the venue of the rally; requisites.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANILA
MAYOR JOSE LITO ATIENZA, G.R. No. 175241, February 24,
2010
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and
Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006 Decision and the October 26, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose Lito
Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one
applied for by the IBP.
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz
(Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at
the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in
by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
96
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on
given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949. The petition having been unresolved within 24
hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve
the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006,
respectively, denied the petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition
be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, and denied the
motion for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed
with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier
barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily
dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action, docketed as I.S. No.
06I-12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first assailed
issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent filed
his Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited petitioners Reply of October 2, 2009.
ISSUE:
The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the
venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic
Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public
assembly.
HELD:
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.
Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became moot
upon the passing of the date of the rally on June 22, 2006.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. However, even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
97
principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.
In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will
arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades
review, owing to the limited time in processing the application where the shortest allowable
period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to
definitively resolve the issue at hand.
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within
two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and
shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic]
within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in
an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate
court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and
record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it
in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four
(24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in
rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
(underscoring supplied)
98
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court
reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state
has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had
occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican
institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion
of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in
Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom
of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case,
therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental
actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right,
so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the
danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
(emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing. In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the
Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as
follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections
to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at
the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority. (italics and underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,
since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion.
99
While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of
what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially
so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for
the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice
Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his
action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an
assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate
court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion.
The Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
modifying the rally permit issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue from Mendiola
Bridge to Plaza Miranda.
Custodial investigation conducted by Bantay
Bayan groups or Barangay tanods; whether
the right of the suspect to be informed of his
expanded Miranda Rights is already applicable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO LAUGA, G.R.
No. 186228, March 15, 2010
PEREZ, J .:
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the real name and the
personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or
compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are
not disclosed in this decision.
The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was accused of the crime of
QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay
xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father
of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own
daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial
conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the
findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA
was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is
the daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely:
victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay.
Their testimonies revealed the following:
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In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. AAAs father, the
appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave
because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother. Her only
brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; removed his pants, slid
inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear; warned her not to
shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he had a knife placed above
her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his penis inside
her vagina.
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. Appellant claimed he scolded her for
staying out late. BBB decided to take AAA with him. While on their way to their maternal
grandmothers house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. Upon
reaching their grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, after
which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He
invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he
admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. Dra. Josefa Arlita L.
Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+)
minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge
against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their
children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary
measure. He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in
finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the
assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-
motivated.
HELD
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a bantay
bayan and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession
before a Bantay Bayan
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay
bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer
and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.
101
The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine
provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant
questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and
a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When
accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January
2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed
several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation
and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been
observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay
Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter
admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under
the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as
the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.

[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional
safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited
through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar
when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x
x x [of the private complainant]. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain
whether or not a bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to mention the
nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a group of male residents living in [the] area
organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited
auxiliary of the x x x PNP.
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No.
309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each
barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and
Order Council at the Barangay level. The composition of the Committee includes, among
others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan;
(3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3)
Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a
Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations
in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by
the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises
Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan,
particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the
color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to
his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
102
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a
counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant
was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of
evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
When a confession is admissible.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMULO TUNIACO, ET
AL., G.R. No. 185710, January 10, 2010
ABAD, J .:
This case is about the requirements of a valid extrajudicial confession and the
establishment of the existence of corpus delicti in murder cases.
The Facts and the Case
The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco,
Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
General Santos City in Criminal Case 8370.
Based on the findings of the RTC, in the morning of June 13, 1992 some police officers
from the Lagao Police Sub-Station requested police officer Jaime Tabucon of the Central Police
Station of General Santos City homicide division to take the statement of accused Alex Aleman
regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon Cortez. On his arrival at the sub-station, Tabucon
noted the presence of Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was
conversing with those taken into custody for the offense. When queried if the suspects would
be willing to give their statements, Atty. Besinga said that they were.
Some other police officer first took the statement of accused Jeffrey Datulayta. Officer
Tabucon next took the statement of accused Aleman, whom he observed to be in good physical
shape.
Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked
him if he was willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative. When asked if
he had any complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he had
no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the suspects
in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he would say may be used against him later
in court. Afterwards, the police officer started taking down Alemans statement.
Accused Aleman said that in the course of a drinking bout with accused Datulayta and
Tuniaco at around 9 p.m. on June 6, 1992, Dondon Cortez threatened to report his drinking
companions illegal activities to the police unless they gave him money for his forthcoming
marriage. According to Aleman, Datulayta and Tuniaco had already planned to kill Cortez in
Tupi, South Cotabato, for making the same threats and now they decided to do it. They got
Cortez drunk then led him out supposedly to get the money he needed.
The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the dump site and, as they were
walking, accused Aleman turned on Cortez and stabbed him on the stomach. Accused
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Datulayta, on the other hand, drew out his single shot homemade M16 pistol and shot Cortez on
the head, causing him to fall. Datulayta handed over the gun to Aleman who fired another shot
on Cortezs head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun to pump some bullets into Cortezs
body. Then they covered him with rice husks.
After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the substance of it to accused
Aleman who then signed it in the presence of Atty. Besinga.
On June 15, 1992 the police brought Aleman to the City Prosecutors Office where he
swore to his statement before an assistant city prosecutor. In the afternoon, accused Datulayta
and Aleman led Tabucon, the city prosecutor, and a police inspector, to the dump site where
they left their victims body. After some search, the group found a spot covered with burnt rice
husks and a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot from the body, they found the shells of
a 5.56 caliber gun and an armalite rifle.
On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not guilty to
the murder charge. After the prosecution rested its case, accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer to
evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. On being
re-arraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide.
The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of six years and one day and to pay P50,000.00
to the victims family.
For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric examination at the
Davao Mental Hospital. But, shortly after, the hospital sent word that Aleman had escaped. He
was later recaptured. When trial in the case resumed, Alemans new PAO lawyer raised the
defense of insanity. This prompted the court to require the Provincial Jail Warden to issue a
certification regarding Alemans behavior and mental condition while in jail to determine if he
was fit to stand trial. The warden complied, stating that Aleman had been observed to have
good mental condition and did not commit any infraction while in jail.
Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty. Besinga assisted accused
Aleman during the taking of his extrajudicial confession, the latter, however, recanted what he
said to the police during the trial. He testified that sometime in 1992, some police officers took
him from his aunts house in Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos City, and brought him to
the Lagao police station. He was there asked to admit having taken part in the murder of
Cortez. When he refused, they tortured him until he agreed to sign a document admitting his
part in the crime.
Accused Aleman also testified that he could not remember having been assisted by Atty.
Besinga during the police investigation. He even denied ever knowing the lawyer. Aleman
further denied prior association with accused Tuniaco and Datulayta. He said that he met them
only at the city jail where they were detained for the death of Cortez.
On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The court also ordered him to pay death indemnity of P70,000.00 and moral
damages of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311, the court rendered
judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the decision of the RTC with the modification that
directed accused Aleman and Datulayta to indemnify the heirs of Cortez, jointly and severally, in
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as
temperate damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Aleman appealed to this Court.
104
The Issues Presented
Accused Aleman raises two issues: a) whether or not the prosecution was able to
present evidence of corpus delicti; and b) whether or not accused Alemans extrajudicial
confession is admissible in evidence.
The Rulings of the Court
1. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime.
The evidence of a dead body with a gunshot wound on its back would be evidence that murder
has been committed. Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain result has been
established, for example, that a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally responsible
for it. The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.
The defense claims that the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti since it did not
bother to present a medical certificate identifying the remains found at the dump site and an
autopsy report showing such remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds that resulted in
death; and the shells of the guns used in killing the victim.
But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victims body or
even by the testimony of the physician who examined such body. While such report or
testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim suffered, they are not
indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death. Nor is the presentation of the murder
weapons also indispensable since the physical existence of such weapons is not an element of
the crime of murder.
Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at the place pointed to by
accused Aleman. That physical confirmation, coming after his testimony of the gruesome
murder, sufficiently establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course, that statement must
be admissible in evidence.
2. There is no reason for it not to be. Confession to be admissible must be a)
voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; c)
express; and d) in writing. These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or
was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial
investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking of his
statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga did not dispute this
claim.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate
court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence
was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Here, although Aleman
claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the attention of his
counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath.
Accused Aleman claims, citing People v. Galit, that long questions followed by
monosyllabic answers do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is amply informed of his
rights. But this does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke to Aleman clearly in the
language he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that the
105
investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights and that he was still willing to
give his statement.
Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully realize
the consequences of a confession. But as the CA said, no law or jurisprudence requires the
police officer to ascertain the educational attainment of the accused. All that is needed is an
effective communication between the interrogator and the suspect to the end that the latter is
able to understand his rights. This appears to have been done in this case.
Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans
confession and just forced him to sign it. The confession has details that only the person who
committed the crime could have possibly known. What is more, accused Datulaytas confession
corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions,
such corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.
Voluntary and spontaneous confession of a
person arrested for the commission of a crime
even if made without counsel is admissible as
evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VICTOR VILLARINO, G.R.NO.
185012, MARCH 5, 2010
FACTS:
On April 28, 1995, BBB, together with her 10-year old daughter AAA and her younger son
CCC went to the house of their relative in Barangay D to attend the fiesta to be held the next day.
On even date, from 7:00 oclock to 9:00 oclock in the evening, SPO4 Jesus Genoguin (SPO4
Genoguin) was in his house in Barangay D entertaining his guests, one of whom was appellant. While
personally serving food and drinks to appellant, SP04 Genoguin noticed that the latter was wearing a
bracelet and a necklace with pendant. Appellant even allowed SPO4 Genoguin to put on the bracelet.
On April 29, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the morning, the appellant who was on his way to
Barangay D, passed by the house of Rodrigo Olaje (Rodrigo). At that time, Rodrigo noticed appellant
wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant. He was also wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt
(sando).
At 11:00 oclock in the morning, appellant was at the house of BBBs aunt. BBB offered him
food. BBB also noticed that he was dressed in a white sando and that he wore jewelry consisting of a
bracelet and a necklace with pendant. At 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, he was seen wearing the same
sando and jewelry while drinking at the basketball court in Barangay D.
At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, BBB told AAA to go home to Barangay D1 to get a t-
shirt for her brother. AAA obeyed. However, she no longer returned. While BBB was anxiously
waiting for AAA in the house of her aunt in Barangay D, she received information that a dead child
had been found in Barangay D1. She proceeded to the area where she identified the childs body as
that of her daughter, AAA.
At around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Rodrigo, who was the barangay captain of Barangay
D1 received information that a dead child was found in their barangay. He instructed a barangay tanod
106
to inform the police about the incident. Thereafter, Rodrigo proceeded to the specified area together with
other barangay tanods.
SPO4 Genoguin also went to the crime scene after being informed by his commander. Upon
arrival, he saw the corpse of a little girl behind a big boulder that was about 10 meters away from the trail
junction of the barangays. People had gathered seven to 10 meters away from the dead body, but no
one dared to approach.
AAAs lifeless body lay face up with her buttocks on top of a small rock. Her body was slanted
downward with her legs spread apart and dangling on the sides of the small boulder. She was no longer
wearing short pants and panty, and blood oozed from her vagina. Wrapped around her right hand,
which was positioned near her right ear, was a white sando.
AAAs panty was found a meter away from her body, while her short pants was about two
meters farther. A bracelet and a pendant were also recovered from the crime scene. Rodrigo and BBB
identified these pieces of jewelry as those seen on the appellant. They also identified the sando on
AAAs arm as the appellants. Thus, the hunt for appellant began.
On the same day, the appellant was found in the house of Aurelia Susmena near the seashore of
Barangay D1. He was drunk and violent. He resisted arrest and had to be bodily carried to the
motorboat that would take him to the municipal building in Almagro, Samar. The arresting team made
the appellant take off his clothes since they were wet. When he complied, his briefs revealed
bloodstains.
On May 2, 1995, the police brought appellant to Calbayog City for medical examination since he
had scratches and abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat ride at 4:00 oclock in the morning,
the police team took a coffee break. SPO4 Genoguin was momentarily left alone to guard the
appellant. During this short period, the appellant voluntarily admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he
committed the crime charged. He also told SPO4 Genoguin that he could keep the pendant and
bracelet if he would retrieve the t-shirt and throw it into the sea. SPO4 Genoguin rejected the
appellants offer and reminded him of his right to a counsel and that everything the appellant said could
be used against him in court. Unperturbed, the appellant reiterated his offer.
When they boarded the motorboat, the appellant repeatedly offered to give SPO4 Genoguin
P20,000.00 if he would throw the sando into the sea. However, the police officer ignored the offer and
instead reported the matter to the Chief of Police of Almagro, SPO4 Basilio M. Yabao. Later, the
appellants mother, Felicidad Mabute y Legaspi, asked him not to testify against her son.
At the Calbayog District Hospital, Senior Resident Physician Dr. Jose V. Ong, found that
appellants body had 10 healed abrasions and two linear abrasions or scratches, particularly, on his
breast, knees, as well as right and left ears, that could have been caused by fingernails.
On August 3, 1995, an Information was filed charging appellant Victor Villarino y Mabute with the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. The Information contained the following accusatory
allegations:

That on or about the 29
th
day of April, 1995, at about 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon, at Barangay D1, Municipality of Almagro, Province of Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd
design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge against a minor ten (10) years [sic],
AAA, without the latters consent and against her will, and thereafter, with deliberate
107
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict upon the said
AAA mortal wounds on x x x different parts of her body, which caused her untimely
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the termination of the pre-trial
conference, trial ensued.
The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced to Death.
ISSUE:
Is accused-appellants voluntary confession to SPO4 Genoguin admissible in evidence?
HELD:
In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping and killing AAA to SPO4
Genoguin. He even offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is thrown into the sea.
The appellant did not deny this accusation nor assail its truthfulness.
When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and no force or
intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously made and not elicited
through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding that compliance with the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
In People v. Dy, we held that:
Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession made by the Accused to
Pat. Padilla that he had shot a tourist and that the gun he had used in shooting the
victim was in his bar which he wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n., October
17, 1984, pp. 6-9), is competent evidence against him. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against him
(Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the
res gestae. The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard
and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such
a case it must be given in substance (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People v. Tawat, G.R. No.
62871, May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431).

What was told by the Accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not
elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession
was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation.
(People v. Taylaran, G.R. No. L-19149, October 31, 1981, 108 SCRA 373). The Trial
Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance with the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case,
as the defense alleges in its Error VII.
At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the complex crime of
rape with homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial
evidence which were credible and sufficient, and led to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant
committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. When considered together, the circumstances
point to the appellant as the culprit.
108
32

The judge is correct in granting bail to an
accused charged of Murder if after the
prosecution presented its evidence, only the
crime of Homicide was proven. There is no
need for the accused to file a petition for bail or
for the court to conduct a separate hearing for
the Petition for Bail filed by the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BONCALON G.R. No.
176933, October 2, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J .:

Raising only questions of law, the Peoples petition for review on certiorari assails the
January 31, 2007 Decision
]
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the November 12, 2002
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Br. 29 in Criminal Case No. 5144 (the
case) fixing bail for the temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza alias Loloy Plaza (respondent)
who was indicted for Murder.

The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC presided by Judge
Floripinas Buyser (Judge Buyser).

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to
Evidence.The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by Order of March 14, 2002, the pertinent
portion of which reads:

The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of homicide
and not for murder, as charged. This is because the qualifying circumstance of
treachery alleged in the information cannot be appreciated in this case.

The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which respondent filed a
Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge Buysers ruling that the
prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus
prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he claimed was
the usual bond for Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.

In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond the prosecution contended, in the
main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal to death; that it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
what crime the accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed a
motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the
accused had already waived his right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceedings; that
Judge Buysers March 14, 2002 Order, being a mere opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive
part thereof, produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter
outside the Demurrer; and that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence
of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested its case.

During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior State Prosecutor
Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buysers impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit himself
and to order the case transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC for further proceedings.
109

Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix
Amount of Bail Bond.

By Order

of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of Judge
Buyser that since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is punishable by
reclusion temporal and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent could no longer be denied
bail. He accordingly granted respondents Motion and fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge Tan was denied
for lack of merit .

Respondent was subsequently released

after he posted a P40,000 bond.

Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victims brother, impleading the People as co-petitioner,
assailed the trial courts orders via petition for certiorari

with the Court of Appeals.

Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having been
filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not
the prosecutions evidence is strong.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Robertos argument that the grant of
bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.

By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that the allegations in
respondents Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an application for bail, dismissed
Robertos petition and affirmed Judge Tans orders .
In its present petition, the People contends that

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED
THAT THE HEARING CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE
PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL
.
(Underscoring
supplied)

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all
persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.

The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Stressing this point, this Court held:

. . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise
in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence
of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make
an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. A summary
hearing is defined as such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering
the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing
110
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may
be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
examination and cross examination
.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution
evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that the evidence was
sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine
whether respondent was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief
was already presented by the prosecution.

The Peoples recourse to Section 5 ,
]
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said
Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of
conviction has already been handed down by the trial court.

Landowner may file for the reconveyance of his
lot from the government if the same was never
used for the purpose for which it was
expropriated; what are the obligations of the
landowner to the government to get back his
property?
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs. BERNARDO LOZADA,
JR., ET AL., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010
NACHURA, J .:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square
meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine
when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881.
As early as 1947, the lots were already occupied by the U.S. Army. They were turned
over to the Surplus Property Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the National Airport
Corporation and then to the CAA.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada,
Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
9045 was issued in Lozadas name.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and
ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per
square meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from November
16, 1947the time when the lot was first occupied by the airport. Lozada received the amount
of P3,018.00 by way of payment.
111
The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO),
formerly CAA, proposed a compromise settlement whereby the owners of the lots affected by
the expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their respective appeals in
consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were
expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport, pursuant to an
established policy involving similar cases. Because of this promise, Lozada did not pursue his
appeal. Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and registered in the name of the Republic
under TCT No. 25057.
The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was
not pursued.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr.,
requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement. The CAA replied that there might
still be a need for the Lahug Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3 airport. It reiterated,
however, the assurance that should this Office dispose and resell the properties which may be
found to be no longer necessary as an airport, then the policy of this Office is to give priority to
the former owners subject to the approval of the President.
On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to the
Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug
Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the
closure of the Lahug Airport.
Sometime in 1990, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958,
entitled An Act Creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, Transferring Existing
Assets of the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport to the Authority, Vesting the
Authority with Power to Administer and Operate the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug
Airport, and For Other Purposes.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the
public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated,
realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted into a commercial complex.
Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Complex, while a
portion thereof was occupied by squatters. The old airport was converted into what is now
known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area.
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession
and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
18823 and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Cebu City.
In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They
specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to
respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed for airport operations.
Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and
respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding
non-use or abandonment thereof.
After pretrial, but before trial on the merits, the parties stipulated on the following set of
facts:
112
(1) The lot involved is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 of the Banilad Estate, situated in
the City of Cebu, containing an area of One Thousand Seventeen (1,017)
square meters, more or less;

(2) The property was expropriated among several other properties in Lahug in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of a Decision dated
December 29, 1961 of the CFI of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-1881;

(3) The public purpose for which the property was expropriated was for the
purpose of the Lahug Airport;

(4) After the expansion, the property was transferred in the name of MCIAA;
[and]

(5) On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino directed the
Department of Transportation and Communication to transfer general
aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority and to close the Lahug Airport after such transfer.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr., and the heirs of
Rosario Mercado, namely, Vicente M. Lozada, Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L.
Flores, Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan, Socorro L. Cafaro and
Rosario M. Lozada, represented by their attorney-in-fact Marcia Lozada Godinez,
and against defendants Cebu-Mactan International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and
Air Transportation Office (ATO):

1. ordering MCIAA and ATO to restore to plaintiffs the possession and
ownership of their land, Lot No. 88 Psd-821 (SWO-23803), upon payment of the
expropriation price to plaintiffs; and

2. ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate
of Title from defendant[s] to plaintiffs on Lot No. [88], cancelling TCT No. 20357
in the name of defendant MCIAA and to issue a new title on the same lot in the
name of Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. and the heirs of Rosario Mercado, namely:
Vicente M. Lozada, Mario M. Lozada, Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L. Flores,
Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan, Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M.
Lozada.

No pronouncement as to costs.
Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA. After the filing of the necessary
appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying
petitioners appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in the questioned CA Resolution
dated February 7, 2007.
Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was
a repurchase agreement or compromise settlement between them and the Government; (2) the
judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to
113
the Republic; and (3) the respondents claim of verbal assurances from government officials
violates the Statute of Frauds.
The petition should be denied.
Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on the supposition that the
Decision in the pertinent expropriation proceedings did not provide for the condition that should
the intended use of Lot No. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug Airport be aborted or abandoned,
the property would revert to respondents, being its former owners. Petitioners cite, in support of
this position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, which declared that the Government acquires
only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title
over the properties
If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner,
then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. If x x x land is expropriated for a public
street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it
for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public
street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to
the contrary. x x x. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation
gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the
absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating
the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. x x x.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the
former owner retains no right in the land, and the public use may be abandoned,
or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the
estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. x x x.
Contrary to the stance of petitioners, this Court had ruled otherwise in Heirs of Timoteo
Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, thus
Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a significant
and telling portion in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 validating our
discernment that the expropriation by the predecessors of respondent was
ordered under the running impression that Lahug Airport would continue in
operation

As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding,
it cannot now be doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being
constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and
importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic both
civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas
and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no
evidence was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to
be placed in operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be
closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments of
the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot
substitute its judgment for those of the said departments or
agencies. In the absence of such showing, the Court will presume
114
that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation (emphasis
supplied).

While in the trial in Civil Case No. R-1881 [we] could have simply
acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain
regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not
to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding
that Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation. Verily, these meaningful
statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the
expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug
Airport was no longer in operation. This inference further implies two (2) things:
(a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated
lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis--vis the
expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former
owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and (b) the foregoing
unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and
become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly
inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as
contained in the body thereof.
Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it is
apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the
condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not having
materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner should then be
allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling in Fery, which involved an
expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a public market.
Instead of putting up a public market, respondent Cabanatuan constructed residential houses
for lease on the area. Claiming that the municipality lost its right to the property taken since it
did not pursue its public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots
expropriated, sought to recover his properties. However, as he had admitted that, in 1915,
respondent Cabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question, judgment was
rendered in favor of the municipality, following American jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort
Wayne v. Lake Shore & M.S. RY. Co., McConihay v. Theodore Wright, and Reichling v.
Covington Lumber Co., all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the expropriated
real property, which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for
which the property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its previous
owner, the title of the expropriating agency being one of fee simple.
Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well
settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is
subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that
just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of
implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon
the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire
the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack
115
one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the
property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property,
consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at
all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has
become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
On the matter of the repurchase price, while petitioners are obliged to reconvey Lot No.
88 to respondents, the latter [1] must return to the former what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of the property, [2] plus legal interest to be computed from
default, which in this case runs from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to
respondents. [3] Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary expenses they may
have incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, [4] as well as the monetary value of their services in
managing it to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby.
Date of filing of petition for expropriation is the
reckoning point in the computation of just
compensation.
CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LOLITA BESANA, RTC 32 and
ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
It is arbitrary and capricious for the government to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a
persons property, allow the order of expropriation to become final, but then fail to justly compensate the
owner for over 25 years. This is government at its most high-handed and irresponsible, and should be
condemned in the strongest possible terms. For its failure to properly compensate the landowner, the
City of Iloilo is liable for damages.
FACTS:
On September 18, 1981, petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against private
respondent Elpidio T. Javellana (Javellana) and Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as
mortgagee. The complaint sought to expropriate two parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 3497-CC and
3497-DD registered in Javellanas name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44894 (the
Subject Property) to be used as a school site for Lapaz High School. Petitioner alleged that the Subject
Property was declared for tax purposes in Tax Declaration No. 40080 to have a value of P60.00 per
square meter, or a total value of P43,560.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 14052 and
raffled to then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch 7.
On December 9, 1981, Javellana filed his Answer where he admitted ownership of the Subject
Property but denied the petitioners avowed public purpose of the sought-for expropriation, since the City
of Iloilo already had an existing school site for Lapaz High School. Javellana also claimed that the true
fair market value of his property was no less than P220.00 per square meter.
116
On May 11, 1982, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had
deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank-Iloilo Branch. Petitioner claimed
that it was entitled to the immediate possession of the Subject Property, citing Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1533, after it had deposited an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation.
Petitioner attached to its motion a Certification issued by Estefanio C. Libutan, then Officer-in-Charge of
the Iloilo City Treasurers Office, stating that said deposit was made.
On May 17, 1983, the trial court issued an Order which granted petitioners Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Possession and authorized the petitioner to take immediate possession of the Subject
Property.
Thereafter, a Writ of Possession was issued in petitioners favor, and petitioner was able to take
physical possession of the properties sometime in the middle of 1985. At no time has Javellana ever
denied that the Subject Property was actually used as the site of Lapaz National High School. Aside
from the filing by the private respondent of his Amended Answer on April 21, 1984, the expropriation
proceedings remained dormant.
Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation, where
he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the P40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner,
he discovered that no such deposit was ever made. In support of this contention, private respondent
presented a Certification from the Philippine National Bank stating that no deposit was ever made for the
expropriation of the Subject Property. Private respondent thus demanded his just compensation as well
as interest. Attempts at an amicable resolution and a negotiated sale were unsuccessful. It bears
emphasis that petitioner could not present any evidence whether documentary or testimonial to
prove that any payment was actually made to private respondent.
Thereafter, on April 2, 2003, private respondent filed a Complaint against petitioner for Recovery
of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
03-27571, and raffled to Branch 28 of the Iloilo City Regional Trial Court. Private respondent alleged that
since he had not been compensated for the Subject Property, petitioners possession was illegal, and he
was entitled to recovery of possession of his lots. He prayed that petitioner be ordered to vacate the
Subject Property and pay rentals amounting to P15,000.00 per month together with moral, exemplary,
and actual damages, as well as attorneys fees.
On May 15, 2003, petitioner filed its Answer, arguing that Javellana could no longer bring an
action for recovery since the Subject Property was already taken for public use. Rather, private
respondent could only demand for the payment of just compensation. Petitioner also maintained that the
legality or illegality of petitioners possession of the property should be determined in the eminent domain
case and not in a separate action for recovery of possession.
Both parties jointly moved to consolidate the expropriation case (Civil Case No. 14052) and the
case for recovery of possession (Civil Case No. 03-27571), which motion was granted by the trial court
in an Order dated August 26, 2003. On November 14, 2003, a commission was created to determine
the just compensation due to Javellana.
On November 20, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion/Manifestation dated November 19,
2003 claiming that before a commission is created, the trial court should first order the condemnation of
the property, in accordance with the Rules of Court. Javellana likewise insisted that the fair market value
of the Subject Property should be reckoned from the date when the court orders the condemnation of
the property, and not the date of actual taking, since petitioners possession of the property was
questionable. Before petitioner could file its Comment, the RTC issued an Order dated November 21,
2003 denying the Motion.
117
Undeterred, Javellana filed on November 25, 2003, an Omnibus Motion to Declare Null and
Void the Order of May 17, 1983 and to Require Plaintiff to Deposit 10% or P254,000.00. Javellana
claimed that the amount is equivalent to the 10% of the fair market value of the Subject Property, as
determined by the Iloilo City Appraisal Committee in 2001, at the time when the parties were trying to
negotiate a settlement.
On December 12, 2003, the RTC issued the First Assailed Order, which nullified the Order dated
May 17, 1983 (concerning the issuance of a writ of possession over the Subject Property). The trial court
ruled:
x x x the Order dated May 17, 1983 is hereby declared null and void and the plaintiff [is]
hereby ordered to immediately deposit with the PNB the 10% of the just compensation
after the Commission shall have rendered its report and have determined the
value of the property not at the time it was condemned but at the time the
complaint was filed in court. (Emphasis ours)
Neither party sought reconsideration of this Order. Nonetheless, about six months later, the
RTC issued the Second Assailed Order, which it denominated as an Amended Order. The Second
Assailed Order was identical to the first, except that the reckoning point for just compensation was now
the time this order was issued, which is June 15, 2004.
x x x the Order dated May 17, 1983 is hereby declared null and void and the plaintiff [is]
hereby ordered to immediately deposit with the PNB the 10% of the just compensation
after the Commission shall have rendered its report and have determined the value of
the property not at the time it was condemned but at the time this order was issued.
(Underscoring in original text)

This time, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that there was no legal basis for
the issuance of the Second Assailed Order. Javellana opposed, arguing that since the May 17, 1983
Order and the Second Assailed Order were interlocutory in character, they were always subject to
modification and revision by the court anytime.
After the parties were able to fully ventilate their respective positions, the public respondent
issued the Third Assailed Order, denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and ruling as follows:
The Order dated June 15, 2004 among other things stated that parties and
counsels must be bound by the Commissioners Report regarding the value of the
property not at the time it was condemned but at the time this order was issued.

This is true inasmuch as there was no deposit at the PNB and their taking
was illegal.

The plaintiff thru [sic] Atty. Laurea alleged that this Court had a change of
heart and issued an Amended Order with the same wordings as the order of
December 12, 2003 but this time stated not at the time it was condemned but at the
time the order was issued. Naturally, this Court in the interest of justice, can
amend its order because there was no deposit by plaintiff.

The jurisprudence cited by plaintiff that the just compensation must be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint is true if there was a deposit.
Because there was none the filing was not in accordance with law, hence, must be at
the time the order was issued.
118

The allegation of defendant thru [sic] counsel that the orders attacked by
plaintiff thru [sic] counsel saying it has become final and executory are interlocutory
orders subject to the control of the Judge until final judgment is correct. Furthermore, it
is in the interes[t] of justice to correct errors.
In the meantime, on April 15, 2004, the Commission submitted its Report, providing the following
estimates of value, but without making a proper recommendation:
Reckoning Point Value per square
meter
Fair Market Value Basis
1981 - at the time the
complaint was filed
P110.00/sqm P79,860.00 based on three or more
recorded sales of similar types
of land in the vicinity in the
same year
1981 at the time the
complaint was filed
P686.81/sqm P498,625.22 Appraisal by Southern Negros
Development Bank based on
market value, zonal value,
appraised value of other
banks, recent selling price of
neighboring lots
2002 P3,500.00/sqm P2,541,000.00 Appraisal by the City Appraisal
Committee, Office of the City
Assessor
2004 P4,200.00/sqm PhP3,049,200.00 Private Appraisal Report (Atty.
Roberto Cal Catolico dated
April 6, 2004)

Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner is claiming that (1) the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in overturning the Order dated May 17, 1983, which was already a final order; and
(2) just compensation for the expropriation should be based on the Subject Propertys fair market value
either at the time of taking or filing of the complaint.
Issues
There are only two questions we need answer, and they are not at all novel. First, does an order
of expropriation become final? Second, what is the correct reckoning point for the determination of just
compensation?
Held:
Expropriation proceedings have two stages. The first phase ends with an order of dismissal, or
a determination that the property is to be acquired for a public purpose. Either order will be a final order
that may be appealed by the aggrieved party. The second phase consists of the determination of just
compensation. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the landowner. Both orders, being
final, are appealable.
119
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of
whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent
domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority
to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.

Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from the May 17, 1983 Order which granted petitioners
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and which authorized petitioner to take immediate possession
of the Subject Property. Thus, it has become final, and the petitioners right to expropriate the property
for a public use is no longer subject to review. On the first question, therefore, we rule that the trial court
gravely erred in nullifying the May 17, 1983 Order.
We now turn to the reckoning date for the determination of just compensation. Petitioner claims
that the computation should be made as of September 18, 1981, the date when the expropriation
complaint was filed. We agree.
In a long line of cases, we have constantly affirmed that:
x x x just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for
expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. Here, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of reference for
assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
Private respondent claims that the reckoning date should be in 2004 because of the clear
injustice to the private respondent who all these years has been deprived of the beneficial use of his
properties.
We commiserate with the private respondent. The school was constructed and has been in
operation since 1985. Petitioner and the residents of Iloilo City have long reaped the benefits of the
property. However, non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to
recover possession of their expropriated lot.
Concededly, Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother to check with
the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the petitioner. Evidently, from his inaction in failing to withdraw
or even verify the amounts purportedly deposited, private respondent not only accepted the valuation
made by the petitioner, but also was not interested enough to pursue the expropriation case until the
end. As such, private respondent may not recover possession of the Subject Property, but is entitled to
just compensation. It is high time that private respondent be paid what was due him after almost 30
years.
We stress, however, that the City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking private
respondents property without payment of just compensation. In Manila International Airport Authority v.
Rodriguez, the Court held that a government agencys prolonged occupation of private property without
the benefit of expropriation proceedings undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages:
120
Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form
of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal
interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to
full payment by the MIAA. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter
of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as
money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking x x x.

x x x x

For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA occupied the subject lot without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings and without the MIAA exerting efforts to ascertain
ownership of the lot and negotiating with any of the owners of the property. To our mind,
these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and
corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in
order. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 14052 and Civil Case No. 03-27571 dated December 12, 2003, June 15,
2004, and March 9, 2005 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 is DIRECTED to immediately determine the
just compensation due to private respondent Elpidio T. Javellana based on the fair market value of the
Subject Property at the time Civil Case No. 14052 was filed, or on September 18, 1981 with interest at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of filing until full payment is made.
The City of Iloilo is ORDERED to pay private respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties cannot prevail over
presumption of innocence in drugs cases if
Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not complied
with.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RONALDO DE GUZMAN,
G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010
On June 10, 2003, a confidential informant reported De Guzmans drug pushing
activities to Alcala, Pangasinans Chief of Police, Sotero Soriano, Jr. Soriano immediately
formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. After a short briefing, the team proceeded to De
Guzmans house. Once there, the confidential informant introduced appellant to Senior Police
Officer (SPO)1 Daniel Llanillo, who was designated as poseur-buyer. Llanillo tried to buy P200
worth of shabu. He handed two marked P100 bills to De Guzman, and the latter, in turn, gave
him two heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing what was suspected as shabu.
Thereafter, Llanillo gave the prearranged signal to the rest of the team. Appellant was arrested
and frisked. The team recovered from De Guzman two packs of empty transparent sachets,
three disposable lighters, and P3,380.00 in cash, which included the marked money paid by
SPO1 Llanillo. The team then brought De Guzman to the police station in Alcala, Pangasinan.
At the police station, De Guzman and the items seized during the buy-bust operation
were turned over to the police investigator, SPO3 Eduardo Yadao. SPO3 Yadao entered the
incident in the police blotter. He then placed his initials on the packets of suspected shabu,
which were later submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in
121
Urdaneta City. Confirmatory tests revealed that the substance in the packets that appellant
handed to SPO1 Llanillo was indeed shabu.
At the trial, appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that, on the morning of
June 10, 2003, he was on the second floor of his house watching television when he was
informed by his wife that police officers were looking for him. He claimed that SPO1 Llanillo
informed him about a report that he (De Guzman) was repacking shabu, which he denied.
Thereafter, the police officers frisked him and took the P3,000.00 from his pocket. The police
officers also searched the cabinet, where his television was, and found a lighter. Then, he was
handcuffed and brought to the police station.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision, finding De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating R.A. No. 9165. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.
De Guzman elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on Petition for Review after the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that
the police officers complied with the mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In particular,
he points to the fact that the seized items were not marked immediately after his arrest; that the
police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized items in his presence or in the presence
of his counsel and of a representative from the media and from the Department of Justice
(DOJ); and that no photographs were taken of the seized items and of appellant. Appellant also
claims that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not established. Further,
appellant contends that the failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the
police blotter before the said operation, the lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the failure to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9165
have effectively overturned the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police
officers duties.
HELD:
A review of the records of this case reveals that circumstances warrant a reversal of the
trial courts decision.
The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden with the
burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required.
Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible
of a severe testing, and the constitutional right to presumption of innocence requires them to
take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of
the accused.
When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of
which is consistent with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of
innocence must prevail, and the court must acquit.
The duty to prove the guilt of an accused is reposed in the State. Law enforcers and
public officers have the duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. This
guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart
of his fundamental rights.
122
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. What is material
is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and the accused. The presentation in court of the corpus delicti the body or the
substance of the crime establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.
Contrary to De Guzmans contention, the trial court correctly found that the buy-bust
transaction took place. The buyer (SPO1 Llanillo) and seller (De Guzman) were both identified
and the circumstances of how the purported sale of the illegal drugs took place were clearly
demonstrated. Thus, the prosecution successfully established the first and third elements of the
crime. However, there is a problem in the prosecutions effort to establish the integrity of the
corpus delicti.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from
showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must
likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict. The corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines set
under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR.
SPO1 Llanillo himself admitted that the marking of the seized items was done in the
police station and not immediately after the buy-bust operation.
The failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be
adequately explained. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The
court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
123
Accordingly, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the
seizure and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance is attended by justifiable
grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team. There must be proof that these two (2) requirements
were met before such non-compliance may be said to fall within the scope of the proviso.
In this case, it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who marked the
seized items, and only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police station. Moreover,
there was no physical inventory made or photographs of the seized items taken under the
circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. There was also no mention that
representatives from the media and from the DOJ, and any elected official, were present during
this inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons for these lapses.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony of every witness who handled the
evidence that a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court and that
seized from the accused are one and the same.
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the
seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough
to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let
the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict a person charged with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent
doubt on the identity of the drug.
Indeed, the prosecutions failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly seized from appellant is fatal to the prosecutions
case.
Finally, the prosecution cannot find solace in its invocation of the presumption of
regularity in the apprehending officers performance of official duty.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the failure to observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the presumption
of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule, the testimonies of the police officers
who apprehended the accused are accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption
that they have performed their duties regularly. But when the performance of their duties is
tainted with failure to comply with the procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is
effectively destroyed.
124
Thus, even if the defense evidence is weak, the prosecutions whole case still falls. The
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.

Right to speedy disposition of cases applicable
in an administrative case where the prosecution
failed to submit its formal offer of evidence for
almost five (5) years.

CAPT. WILFREDO ROQUERO VS. THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-
MANILA, ET AL., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010
PEREZ, J .:
Petitioner Wildredo G. Roquero is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH) Security Division as Special Police Captain. Private respondent Imelda
O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency who was applying for a position in the
security force assigned at UP-PGH.

The instant controversy arose from a complaint by private respondent Abutal with then
Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against petitioner
Capt. Roquero. The formal charge filed on 1 October 1998 and docketed as ADM Case No.
UPM-AC 97-007 reads as follows:

After preliminary investigation duly conducted in accordance with
the Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and
Employees, a prima facie case has been found to exist against
you for GRAVE MISCONDUCT punishable under the University
Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and
Employees in relation to the Civil Service Law, committed as
follows:

That you, Capt. Wilfredo Roquero of the UP Manila
Police Force, sometime in April 1996, while conducting an
interview on MS. IMELDA ABUTAL who was then applying
for the position of Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security
Agency to be assigned at UP-PGH, proposed to her that if
she agreed to be your mistress, you would facilitate her
application and give her a permanent position; that despite
the fact the MS. ABUTAL rejected your proposal, you still
insisted on demanding said sexual favor from her; that you,
therefore, are liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT under
Section 22, paragraph (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 on Civil Rules.

On 1 October 1998, the petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for ninety
(90) days by Chancellor Santos-Ocampo, the material portion of said Order reads:

Considering the gravity of the offense charged and pursuant to
Section 19 of Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP
Faculty Members and Employees and Section 26 and 27 Rule XIV
125
of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Omnibus Rules, you
are hereby preventively suspended for ninety (90) days effective
upon receipt hereof.

While on preventive suspension, you are hereby required to
appear before the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT)
whenever your presence is necessary.

Thereafter, the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty. Zaldy B.
Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, was organized to hear the instant case. Atty. Paul A.
Flor, as University Prosecutor, represented the prosecution. He was later on replaced by Atty.
Asteria Felicen. Petitioner was represented by Atty. Leo G. Lee of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO) who was then replaced by Public Attorney Philger Inovejas.

The Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the
completion of the cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness, the prosecution agreed
to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or before 16 July 1999.

The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the period
agreed upon.

Thereafter, on 10 August 1999, when the case was called, only petitioner and his
counsel appeared. Atty. Flor merely called by telephone and requested Atty. Docena to reset
the case to another date. Atty. Docena then ordered the resetting of the hearing on the
following dates: 11 August and 21 August 1999. On 11 August 1999, only petitioner and his
counsel came. No representative from the prosecution appeared before the ADT. Atty. Flor
again called and asked for the postponement of the hearing. By reason thereof, Atty. Docena
issued an Order, which reads as follows:

The continuation of the hearing of this case is hereby set to
September 29, 1999 at 2:00 p.m., with the understanding that if
and when the parties fail to appear at said hearing date, this case
shall be deemed submitted for resolution based on the evidences
already obtaining in the record of the case.

On said date, the representative from the prosecution again failed to appear.

On 22 October 1999, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant
(private respondent herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her exhibits
since complainant was not able to file her Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15)
days from 1 July 1999 or up to 16 July 1999.

The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to the
unreasonable delay, petitioner, on 19 May 2004 filed another Motion asking for the dismissal of
the administrative case against him. The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following
reasons: that the prosecution had not formally offered its evidence; that the ADT had failed to
act on the motion filed on 22 October 1999; that the unfounded charges in the administrative
complaint were filed just to harass him; and that he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of
the case.

On 26 May 2004, the prosecution, represented by Atty. Felicen in view of the resignation
of Atty. Flor in August 1999, filed its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The
prosecution alleged that a Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits had been filed on 24
January 2004, of which a copy thereof was received by Atty. Lee, petitioners counsel, on 30
126
January 2004, per registry return receipt. However, petitioner has not filed his comment to the
said Formal Offer.

Furthermore, the prosecution explained in its Comment/Opposition that in view of the
resignation of Atty. Flor in August 1999 but who had been on leave by mid-July 1999, the
Formal Offer could not be prepared by another counsel until all the transcript of stenographic
notes have been furnished to the counsel that replaced Atty. Flor. Meanwhile, the
stenographer, Jamie Limbaga, had been in and out of the hospital due to a serious illness, thus
the delay in the filing of the prosecutors Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits.

On 8 June 2004, Atty. Docena issued the assailed Order denying petitioners motion to
dismiss, to wit:

Acting on respondents Motion to Dismiss, as well as the
University Prosecutors Comment and/or Opposition to said
Motion, and finding that said Motion to Dismiss to be bereft of
merit, the same is hereby DENIED.

In view of the failure of the respondent to file his comment
on the Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence, the Exhibits (A
to G-1) of the Prosecution are hereby ADMITTED for the
purpose for which the same have been offered.

The respondent is hereby directed to present his evidence
on June 22, 2004 at 10:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in an Order
dated 9 November 2004.
Petitioner Captain Wilfredo Roquero then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87776, alleging therein that the ADT
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss the administrative
case filed against him.
In a Decision dated 22 March 2007, the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the petition
with prayer for TRO of Roquero reasoning that the ADT did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
Hence, this Petition.
The core issue of this case is whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roqueros Motion
(to declare complainant Imelda Abutal to have waived her right to submit her Formal Offer of
Exhibit) which he seasonably filed on 22 October 1999 and the assailed Order of the ADT
dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of Exhibit of complainant Imelda Abutal despite
having filed after almost five years violated the constitutional right of Roquero to a speedy
disposition of cases.
HELD:
Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service
states that the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given period shall
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be considered as waiver thereof, the ADT in fact allowed the prosecution to present its formal
offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January 2004. Starting on that date, petitioner was
presented with the choice to either present his evidence or to, as he did, file a motion to dismiss
owing to the extraordinary length of time that ADT failed to rule on his motion.
We cannot accept the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the ADT because a formal offer of evidence was filed by the
prosecution, a copy of which was received by petitioners counsel. The admission by
ADT on 8 June 2004 of the formal offer of exhibits belatedly filed did not cure the 5-year delay in
the resolution of petitioners 1999 motion to deem as waived such formal offer of evidence.
Indeed, the delay of almost five (5) years cannot be justified.
The ADT admitted this explanation of the prosecutor hook, line and sinker without asking
why it took him almost five (5) years to make that explanation. If the excuses were true, the
prosecution could have easily manifested with the ADT of its predicament right after Roquero
filed his motion to declare the waiver of the formal offer. It is evident too that the prosecution
failed to explain why it took them so long a time to find a replacement for the original
prosecutor. And, the stenographer who had been in and out of the hospital due to serious
illness should have been replaced sooner.
While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence
to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, the same
however should not violate the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of
cases.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether
a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for
that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and
such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a
speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
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Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation of the
right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1)
the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which
resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense; (2) the
unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early
disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was
prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days,
and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him remained
stagnant at the prosecution stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by
our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an
orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be
promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases
renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations
inutile.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Administrative Disciplinary
Tribunal (ADT) of the University of the Philippines-Manila, Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido
and Isabella Lara, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the ADT respectively, are
hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the administrative case against Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero for
violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.