LAND VALUATION

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land,
the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by government to the property as well as the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may
be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as just
compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage isconcerned - Twenty-five percent (25%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares - Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be
paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below - Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or
other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall
mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose
to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his successors-in-interest or his
assigns, up to the amount of their face value for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the Assets Privatization
Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institution in the same province or region where the
lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares or stock owned by the
government in private corporations;chan robles virtual law library
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested
in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium-scale industry, in the same province or region as the
land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to the government: Provided, That the use of these bonds for these purposes
will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instrument: Provided, further, That
the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government universities, colleges,
trade schools and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
In case of extraordinary inflation, the PARC shall take appropriate measures to protect the economy.

SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.- For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following
procedures shall be followed:
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine
the compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to summit evidence as
to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the
above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days
after it is submitted for decision.

CASES
[G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005.]
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R.
CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO
MANGALINDAN, respondents.
TINGA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review 1 dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court 3 dated
July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
(Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the State's
acquisition of private respondents' properties under the land reform program.
The facts follow.
On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation
for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of
court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents,
ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land
Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of
acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00)
per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners
located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorney's Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 4
DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in its Order 5
dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period
for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision
became final and executory. CDTHSI
Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996, 6 citing excusable negligence as its ground
for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the moti on
for reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake. 7 The affidavit of Land Bank's counsel of
record notably states that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005,
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" 8 due to his
heavy workload.
The trial court, in its Order 9 of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in
law due to its own negligence.
In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to
pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma
considering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was
erroneous.
According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation of their
properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the
determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in
declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just
compensation, and in relying on private respondents' evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of
possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank's evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.
Private respondents filed a Comment 10 dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Bank's failure to include a
notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsel's heavy workload, which resulted in the
motion being declared pro forma, does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of
Land Bank's counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has "mastered the intricate art and technique of
pleading."
Land Bank filed a Reply 11 dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand that it be heard on
substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 12 Both
parties complied. 13
The petition is unmeritorious.
At issue is whether counsel's failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land
Bank to a relief from judgment.
Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 1.Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on
grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. 14
Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Bank's counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload
prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means
excusable. DaIACS
Indeed, counsel's admission that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case
No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing"
speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence.
The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer
who claims to have "mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading." 15
Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk
of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. 16 The
trial court therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for
denying Land Bank's motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.
It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts
and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural
rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice. 17
Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank,
specifically as regards private respondents' alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just
compensation.
Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation instead of
filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.
The records reveal that Land Bank's contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter 18 to
the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and
requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered
prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, 19 we declared that there is nothing contradictory
between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of
questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to
judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such
determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function. 20

Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice. EHIcaT
Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time
of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and
not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court
of Appeals, 21 we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but
would take effect on the payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation
to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) 22
before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche. 23
Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just
compensation, reads as follows:
Sec. 17.Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO
228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative
considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 24
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into
account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessor's value and the volume and
value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation
due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. DHSACT
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 170220. November 20, 2006.]
JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA
SUNTAY TAEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a)
the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court,
in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBP's motion for reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order
requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBP's Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003
Order.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee 2 of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located
at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326) 3 of the Registry of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said
property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27 (1972) 4 and Executive Order No. 228 (1987). 5 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to
farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at
P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica. IHCacT
On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a
parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128 6 of the
Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and
Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage
of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation. On January 29,
2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-
31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128). 7
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate petitions 8 for judicial determination of
just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian
Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128,
and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.
Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657 (1988) 9 and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP deposit the preliminary compensation
determined by the PARAD.
On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order 10 granting petitioners' motion, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I (LCD I), Land
Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to
Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as
determined by the PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:
1.In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by
the Landowner;
2.In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of P
1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.
Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within five (5) days
from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her compliance within such period.
Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.
SO ORDERED. 11
LBP's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 12 dated May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27,
2003, the trial court issued an Order 13 directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBP's Land Compensation Department
Manager, to deposit the amounts.
Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530. 14
On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order 15 and on October 6, 2003, a writ
of preliminary injunction. 16
On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 17 in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated March 31, 2003,
Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. The
preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED. 18
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined
by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just
compensation. It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR
already took possession of the properties and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.
LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed
Amended Decision, 19 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin which We hold
as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our judgment
herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our
May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving
way to and acting in harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of
Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to
compute and fix the just compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in
accordance with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the
case of Gabatin.
SO ORDERED. 20
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the
expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed. Citing Gabatin v.Land Bank of the
Philippines, 21 it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average
Gross Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for
the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the
subject agricultural land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over
their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts
of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of
payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in 1972.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
A.THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16,
2005; and 22
B.THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,
DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF
THE POWER OF SUPERVISION. 23
Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated
properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the value of the realties should be
computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 24 the Court ruled thus:
Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on
October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based
on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise
erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take
effect on the payment of just compensation. STcADa
The Natividad case reiterated the Court's ruling in Office of the President v. Court of Appeals 25
that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on
October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially
determined.

Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 26 we held that expropriation
of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the
payment of just compensation.
In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation
therefor. The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately
depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners
to compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the
payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land
although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties
without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away
from its owners. 27 The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. 28
Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 29 is
instructive, thus:
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmer's
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to
be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement. cDACST
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of
the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of
full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. . . .
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. EaSCAH
We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law,
with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect. 30
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 31 we held that:
RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute
to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of
the Act should be adhered to.
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be
agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as the just
compensation for the land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value
of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation. 32
Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada 33 that the above provision was converted into a
formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:
Land Value (LV)=(Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax
Declaration x 0.1)
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just
compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable
length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227
or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26,
2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD;
(b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order
directing Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31,
2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as
Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340,
and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the aforementioned formula. aEcSIH
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.]
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP,
HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., respondents.
[G.R. No. 118745. October 6, 1995.]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.
Gonzales, Aquino & Associates for petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines.
Fernando A. Santiago for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for respondents. aisadc
SYLLABUS
1.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW; LAND ACQUISITION;
SECTION 16(e) THEREOF; CONSTRUED. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: "Sec. 16. Procedure for
Acquisition of Private Lands . . . (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the
land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. . . ." It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In
sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BASIC LAW AND AN IMPLEMENTING
RULE OR REGULATION; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The conclusive effect of administrative construction
is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with
either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of
promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of
the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into
effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for
settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there
is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. In the
present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner
as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and
void.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; FAIR AND IMMEDIATE COMPENSATION MANDATED. The ruling in the "Association" case merely
recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a
deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did
not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to
the expropriated property is transferred. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation
under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To
withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for
their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been
deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible
expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the
more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority
(the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the
Court must rectify. Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section
16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 of purposes of exercising the landowner's right to appropriate the
same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of
his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that:
". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss."
FRANCISCO, J p:
It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to
such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. 1 As eloquently
stated by Justice Isagani Cruz: cdasia
". . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a
millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we
are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends
its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are
poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for
poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law." 2
In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and
Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated. 3
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private
respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled as follows: cdtai
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby
GRANTED:
a)DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and void insofar as it
provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;
b)Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit not merely 'earmark',
'reserve' or 'deposit in trust' with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR
in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in
government financial instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:
cdt
P 1,455,207.31Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P15,914,127.77AMADCOR;
c)The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to withdraw the above-
deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by
the proper authorities; and
d)Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving
the petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the
cases within 30 days after they are submitted for decision." 4 aisadc
Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995, 5 denying their motion for
reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer
schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the
validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7
and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the
just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the
same. cdta
Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition.

As found by respondent court, the following are undisputed:
"Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that '(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred
in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a
certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been
earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and
6283 respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of
listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES 'C' & 'D') without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying
with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and
Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.' (Rollo, p. 6).
"The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.
"Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the
owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares
covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of
the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice to the
petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of
Undertaking (ANNEX 'B') to pay rentals to the Landbank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to
at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an
order directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust
fund in the amount of P135,482.12; that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust
P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX 'E'; Rollo, p. 7); that the beneficiaries
stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of
Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the Landbank (Rollo, p. 133).
"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank
claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of Actual
Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although
armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries
(Rollo, p. 99). cdasia
"Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity)
alleges with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon that the properties
of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314
with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of
163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the
property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice
to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX 'F') fixing the
compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215
hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said
amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34
fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account
established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX 'G'). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property
in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by
TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares; that
emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered
on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for
said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in
the amount of P12,247,217.83, three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by
AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank
claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case)
despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100)." 8
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank,
in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the
land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9 Private
respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked," "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10 cdtai
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-
making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. 11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the
"Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the
ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). 12
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in
consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words
"reserved/deposited" were also used. 13
On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private
respondents. 14 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same. 15
Hence, the instant petitions. cdt
On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745
alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision. 16 The
Court, however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments. 17
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in
bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and
provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just
compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657
referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit.
Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular
No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate
rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657. aisadc
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
"SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. . . .
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear
nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought
to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity
in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit." cdta
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies
is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations
cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule that administrative regulations
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner
as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and
void.

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited
in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties,
petitioners assert the negative. cdasia
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 21 of the same law.
According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only
to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It
has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the
landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the
property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in
the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform." 22
"The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle of
eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
"The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. cdtai
xxx xxx xxx
"Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring
title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected."
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found
that:
". . . despite the 'revolutionary' character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which
led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that 'payments of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in money' even as the Supreme Court
admits in the same case 'that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other' the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the 'recognized rule . . .
that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied.) aisadc
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely
recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a
deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It
did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the
title to the expropriated property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties
simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of
the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible
expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all
the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an
authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private
respondents, which the Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e)
and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the
same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession
of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal
rule that: cdta
". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation
means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss." 24 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the
farmer. 25 But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets.
Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be
attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of
the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property
owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. 26
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. cdasia
SO ORDERED.

LAND REDISTRIBUTION
SEC. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to
landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the
following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farm workers;
(c) seasonal farm workers;
(d) other farm workers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collective or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this Act shall be given
preference in the distribution of the land of their parents; and: Provided, further, that actual tenant -tillers in the
landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are
disqualified to become beneficiaries under their program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make land as
productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary,
so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right
to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the
PARC.
If, due to landowner's retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or workers on the land, there is not
enough land to accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted ownership of other lands available for
distribution under this Act, at the option of the beneficiaries.
Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of privately-owned lands will be given
preferential rights in the distribution of lands from the public domain.
SEC. 23. Distribution Limit. - No qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land.
SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the
DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from
the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided for in this Act, and
shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title.
SEC. 25. Award Ceilings for Beneficiaries. - Beneficiaries shall be awarded an area not exceeding three (3) hectares,
which may cover a contiguous tract of land or several parcels of land cumulated up to the prescribed award limits.
For purposes of this Act, a landless beneficiary is one who owns less than three (3) hectares of agricultural land. The
beneficiaries may opt for collective ownership, such as co-workers or farmers' cooperative or some other form of
collective organization: Provided, That the total area that may be awarded shall not exceed the total number of co-
workers or members of the cooperative or collective organization multiplied by the award limit above prescribed,
except in meritorious cases as determined by the PARC. Title to the property shall be issued in the name of the co-
owners or the cooperative or collective organization as the case may be.
SEC. 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. - Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the
LBP in thirty (30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The payments for the firs three (3)
years after the award may be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC : Provided, That the first five (5)
annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of the value of the annual gross production is paid as
established by the DAR. Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten percent (10) of the
annual gross production and the failure to produce accordingly is not due to the beneficiary's fault, the LBP may
reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal obligation to make the payment affordable.
The LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded to beneficiary and this mortgage may be
foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of three (3) annual amortizations. The LBP shall advise the
DAR of such proceedings and the latter shall subsequently award the forfeited landholding to other qualified
beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land as provided herein has been foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently
disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under this Act.
SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. - Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other
qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the
transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due
notice of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of
the barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein
provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the right to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with
prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such
transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to
the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding
paragraph.
In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts
the latter has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the land.

INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE (CASE):
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006
SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR, ARTEMIO
G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA,
EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ,
TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIO, ROBERTO T.
PATIO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and
JOEMARIE VIBO, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC., Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of the
Resolutions
1
of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land
located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and
EP numbers presented below:
Petitioners TCT/EP Nos.
Areas
(has.)
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 1.7833
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
2.0000
0.1565
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 3.1441
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 4.2405
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 3.3082
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 3.1437
7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 4.0128
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 2.3087
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 2.0950
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 1.5737
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 2.2670
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
4.5526
0.4579
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 4.4939
14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 2.2140
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 3.9291
16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 2.7491
17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 1.7954
18. ROBERTO T.PATIO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 6.4266
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 2.2143
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 4.5322
21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 4.3223
22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 3.7151
23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 1.3185
2

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs
over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and
EP numbers identified as follows:
(Deceased) Registered Owners TCT/EP Nos.
Areas
(has.)
1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 4.1953
2. RAFAEL PATIO TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 3.0078
3

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which
have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners,
together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never
disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.
HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by
virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of
527.8308 hectares, to wit:
Lot No.
Area
(in hectares)
Lot No. 1620, Pls 4 28.52
Lot No. 1621, Pls 4 11.64
Lot No. 1622, Pls 4 487.47
TOTAL 527.83
4

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27
5
was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be
brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.
HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other
occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.
In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of
527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map
Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.
HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the determination of the
Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an
undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was
submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.
Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which was
registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the
OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.
In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding
TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17
petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its
former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or
corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later
consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been
awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree
No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.
On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring
as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and
neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27
took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda
Maria Action Team. Petitioners TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.
After the DARAB denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with
their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:
A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by
Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by
the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.
6

Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals
denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:
Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition
for certiorari.
We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed to
show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal
requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on
non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at bar.
More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Courts ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman,
338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the
rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party
who executed the same.
Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper authorization from
all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby rendering the petition fatally
defective.
Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x"
It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be dismissed forthwith.
Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petitions defect, the
requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the other petitioners
failed to sign the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
7

Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become
indefeasible one year after their registration.
The petition is impressed with merit.1awphil.net
Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the
Certification Against Forum shopping
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of multiple
petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals
and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies
would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall
be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the
goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."
8
Technical rules
of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.
9
The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting
what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the
phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v.
Cabantog
10
and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio
11
that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,
12
we likewise held that:
The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification
of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed
with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for the
dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,
13
where
this Court ruled that:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in
the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly
provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action
involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur,
signed the certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to
sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether
his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will
not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-
forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)
Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman
charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at the outset" was made
together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition.
14
There being only five
petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.s four co-
accused is immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable cause for
failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-beneficiaries
who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly
have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of
transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is
scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members of
a non-government organization engaged in development work) are based in Quezon City who started assisting them
at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level.
The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to
Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers organization, the
Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition
a quo was dismissed, petitioners counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all the signatures for
the SPA. In fact, when the SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to
sign for various reasons some could not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in other
towns, while some already died because of old age.
15
Be that as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did not
participate, and are not parties to this petition.
The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation of
the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar,
16
without discussing the
circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of
argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the
suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as those
which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.
In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
17
the appeal to the Court of Appeals had a
certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a board resolution authorizing the
signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but
the Court of Appeals, as in this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:
[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board resolution or a
secretarys certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. It
would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution
attached to petitioners motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at
least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements.
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial
justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation
from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA
Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,
18
the authority of petitioners resident manager to sign the certification
against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned
out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition.
We ratiocinated therein that:
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof
after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the
petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against
forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against
forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory
is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the
filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of
the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uys petition for lack of verification and certification
against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit
certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling
reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons
that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola,
Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on
non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner
subsequently submitted a secretarys certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of
petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory,
nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an
even more urgent ideal.
In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
19
we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the
case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to
suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those
cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits
of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the
reinstatement of the petition. x x x
There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against
forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De Guia,
20
petitioners raised in
their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against forum
shopping. We held therein that:
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with the
disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of respondents counsel, but we simply
cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to
suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice."
In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,
21
the non-compliance was disregarded because of the principle
of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:
We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certifications in
their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping
must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners
could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.
But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice involving
labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of
procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.
The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling
reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.
Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration
proceedings.
Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its
issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the
government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a
Torrens title."
The DARAB is grossly mistaken.
Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
22
provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as
indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead
patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding,
provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land
Law.
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act
496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open to review on the
ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a
public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited
cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by
implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural
Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of
the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the
decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director
of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in
consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and to encourage the
settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant
in favor of the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the
Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise
uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the governments system of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant to
the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless
would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of
title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of
titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:
Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such
silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into the possession of his
homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be
interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of
Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.
23

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after
granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27),
24
the TCTs issued to
petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order
for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."
25

As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.
26
:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued
by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent
therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought
within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX
27
on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with
the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised before the RARAD.
28

The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the
Republic Act No. 6657,
29
with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with CLOAs, would only delay the
application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and
resources of the government.
The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful
annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten years after the issuance of the
TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a substantially higher valuation and just
compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of
Presidential Decree No. 27.
30
This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:
(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they were
cultivating;
(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never protested
petitioners act of declaring the same for realty taxation;
(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or
the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn lands;
(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby
declared VALID and SUBSISTING:
Original Grantees TCT/EP Nos.
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840
14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829
16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826
17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
18. ROBERTO T.PATIO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880
23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827
24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832
25. RAFAEL PATIO TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861
Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.
SO ORDERED.

RESOLUTION OF AGRARIAN DISPUTES
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agricultural (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases,
disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of
every case in accordance with equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of
procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports,
compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena,
and subpoenaduces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise
have the power to punish direct and indirect contempt in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as
provided in the Rules of Court
Representatives of farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their
organizations in any proceedings before the DAR:Provided, however, that when there are two or more
representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to
represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.chan robles virtual law library
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory.
SEC. 51. Finality of Determination. - Any case or controversy before it shall be decided within thirty (30) days after it
is submitted for resolution. Only one (1) motion for consideration shall be allowed. Any order, ruling or decision shall
be final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
SEC. 52. Frivolous Appeals. - To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals from the decisions or orders on the local or
provincial levels, the DAR may impose reasonable penalties, including but not limited to, fines or censures upon
erring parties.
SEC. 53. Certification of BARC. - The DAR shall not take cognizance of any agrarian dispute or controversy unless a
certification from the BARC that the dispute has been submitted to it for mediation and conciliation without any
success of settlement is presented: Provided, however, that if no certification is issued by the BARC within thirty (30)
days after a matter or issue is submitted to it for mediation or conciliation, the case or dispute may be brought before
the PARC.

CASES
[UDK No. 9864. December 3, 1990.]

RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC,
Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL, respondents.

Dulcesimo P. Tampus for petitioner.
Alan L. Flores for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION, ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE; OVER CASES INVOLVING
AGRARIAN LAWS; VESTED IN THE AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATORY BOARD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM. The jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian
Reform, i.e.: (a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (b) resolution of
agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and (c) approval or disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses, is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by
Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and
use of agricultural land, and other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-
cultivators, farms' cooperatives or organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules
and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program. Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been
eliminated by its being subsumed in the broad jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition
stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive
orders just quoted. (Rules of the DAR Adjudication Board, which took effect on March 8, 1988) The rules
included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory
functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of ". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order No. 229,
Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." The implementing rules
also declare that "(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to . . . (that theretofore
vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and
other agrarian laws . . . "
2. ID.; ID.; OVER TWO GROUPS OF CASES; RESTORED TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AS
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS. Republic Act No. 6657, was signed into law by President Aquino on June
10, 1988 and became effective immediately after its "publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation" on June 15, 1988. The Act makes references to and explicitly recognizes the effectivity and
applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of
Presidential Decree No. 229, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally,
over all cases involving agrarian laws, although it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over
two groups of cases. The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction
over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on
"Special Agrarian Court," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court at least one
(1) branch within each province to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts
have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: 1) "all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to land-owners," and 2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . .
(the) Act." In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act."
3. ID.; APPEAL; CASES INVOLVING AGRARIAN DISPUTES; PROCEDURE, FOLLOWED. It is
relevant to mention in this connection that - (1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be
taken by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of
the decision, . . ." (Sec. 60) and (2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any
agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation
of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari
(This mode of appeal is sui generis. It is only instance when an appeal by certiorari may be taken to the Court
of Appeals. Heretofore, appeals by certiorari were authorized only when taken to the Supreme Court) except
as otherwise provided . . . within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the
DAR . . . (being) final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence." (Sec. 54)

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, J p:
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, in the light of Executive Orders
Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic Act No. 6657, is what is at issue in the proceeding at bar.
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte
in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession . . .was tenants from the
landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil.
1
Several persons were also impleaded as
defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a
mortgage on the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by the bank
as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to
the other persons named as its co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed
that mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided.
2

In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint.
3
He
opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987" Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26,
1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, docketed as UDK-8867, assigned to the
Second Division. Discerning however no special and important reason for taking cognizance of the action, this Court
referred the same to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction to act tereon.
The Court of Appeals, by Decision promulgated on October 23, 1989,
4
dismissed the petition, finding that the
jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, adverted to a case earlier
decided by it, on August 30, 1989,Estanislao Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in which it was
"emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under
the jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board."
5
The ruling was grounded on the provisions of Executive Orders
Numbered 229, approved on July 22, 1987, and 129-A, issued on July 26, 1987, in relation to Republic Act No. 6657,
effective on June 15, 1988. Said executive orders, it was pointed out, were issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
undoubtedly in the exercise of her revolutionary powers in accordance with Section 6, Article XVIII [Transitory
Provisions] of the 1986 Constitution providing that the "incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative
powers until the first Congress is convened."
The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before this Court, contending that the Trial
Court's "order of dismissal of August 26, 1988, and the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are
patently illegal and unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts and directly violate R.A.
6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129."
The petition is without merit.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). It states that the program
". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural land as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, including whenever applicable in accordance with law, other
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture."
Section 17 thereof.
1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters," and
2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture [DA], as well as
"powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders
or decisions."
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A made the Department of Agrarian Reform "responsible for implementing
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and, for such purpose," authorized it, among others, to
"(g) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure
problems; . . (and)
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural
uses: . ."
And Section 5 of the same Executive Order No. 129-A specified the powers and functions of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, including the following:
"(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces
tecum, writ of execution of its decision, and other legal processes to ensure successful and expeditious program
implementation; the decisions of the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but
shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal;
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Provide free legal service to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure related
problems as may be provided for by laws;
(i) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses as may be provided . . ."
The jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform, i.e.:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into
residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses,
is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No.
946, which extended to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land, and
other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms' cooperatives or
organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the
agrarian reform program.
6
Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its being subsumed in
the broad jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to transfer
original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and
promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive orders just quoted.
7
The rules included
the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the
Department, and the allocation to it of
". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes,
controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under Executive Order No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No.
6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations."
The implementing rules also declare that "(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to . .
(that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of persons
engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) and other agrarian laws . . ."
The matter has since been further and definitively clarified by Republic Act No. 6657, which was signed into law
by President Aquino on June 10, 1988 and became effective immediately after its "publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation" on June 15, 1988. The Act makes references to and explicitly recognizes the
effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229.
8
More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of
Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original
jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to
the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over two groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all
cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it
shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports,
compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and
issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized
officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same manner and
subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding an appeal to the court of appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory."
9

The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform
matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which
are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court at least one (1) branch within each province to act
as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act."
It is relevant to mention in this connection that
(1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the decision, . ."
10
and
(2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent
laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari
11
except as otherwise provided .
. . within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR [being] final and
conclusive if based on substantial evidence."
12

The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a
case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of
said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely
to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.
The petitioner had not bothered to substantiate her contention that she has been denied access to the courts,
which is just as well. The contention is on its face utterly without merit. It may profit her and her counsel to realize that
apart from granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the Adjudication Board of the Department
of Agrarian Reform), the law strives to make resolution of controversies therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by
providing not only that the Board "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence," supra, but also
that, as explicitly stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act:
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in
any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are two or more representatives for any
individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group
before any DAR proceedings."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 16725 dated October 23, 1989, AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 112526. October 12, 2001.]

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B. AMANTE,
FRANCISCO L. ANDAL, LUCIA ANDAL, ANDREA P. AYENDE, LETICIA P. BALAT, FILOMENA B. BATINO,
ANICETO A. BURGOS, JAIME A. BURGOS, FLORENCIA CANUBAS, LORETO A. CANUBAS, MAXIMO A.
CANUBAS, REYNALDO CARINGAL, QUIRINO C. CASALME, BENIGNO A. CRUZAT, ELINO A. CRUZAT,
GREGORIO F. CRUZAT, RUFINO C. CRUZAT, SERGIO CRUZAT, SEVERINO F. CRUZAT, VICTORIA DE
SAGUN, SEVERINO DE SAGUN, FELICISIMO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO A. GONZALES, GREGORIO
GONZALES, LEODEGARIO N. GONZALES, PASCUAL P. GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO
A. JUANGCO, GERVACIO A. JUANGCO, LOURDES U. LUNA, ANSELMO M. MANDANAS, CRISANTO
MANDANAS, EMILIO M. MANDANAS, GREGORIO A. MANDANAS, MARIO G. MANDANAS, TEODORO
MANDANAS, CONSTANCIO B. MARQUEZ, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, ARMANDO P. MATIENZO, DANIEL D.
MATIENZO, MAXIMINO MATIENZO, PACENCIA P. MATIENZO, DOROTEA L. PANGANIBAN, JUANITO T.
PEREZ, MARIANITO T. PEREZ, SEVERO M. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PASQUIZA, BIENVENIDO F. PETATE,
IGNACIO F. PETATE, JUANITO PETATE, PABLO A. PLATON, PRECILLO V. PLATON, AQUILINO B. SUBOL,
CASIANO T. VILLA, DOMINGO VILLA, JUAN T. VILLA, MARIO C. VILLA, NATIVIDAD A. VILLA, JACINTA S.
ALVARADO, RODOLFO ANGELES, DOMINGO A. CANUBAS, EDGARDO L. CASALME, QUIRINO DE LEON,
LEONILO M. ENRIQUEZ, CLAUDIA P. GONZALES, FELISA R. LANGUE, QUINTILLANO LANGUE, REYNALDO
LANGUE, ROMEO S. LANGUE, BONIFACIO VILLA, ROGELIO AYENDE, ANTONIO B. FERNANDEZ, ZACARIAS
HERRERA, ZACARIAS HERRERA, REYNARIO U. LAZO, AGAPITO MATIENZO, DIONISIO F. PETATE, LITO G.
REYES, JOSE M. SUBOL, CELESTINO G. TOPI NO, ROSA C. AMANTE, SOTERA CASALME, REMIGIO M.
SILVERIO, THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
REGION IV, and REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER FOR REGION IV, respondents.
PARDO, J p:
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
1
affirming
the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
2
(hereafter, DARAB) ordering the compulsory
acquisition of petitioner's property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered owner of two
parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total
area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water
to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area.
3

Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem.
Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case
4
with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an
easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the
ejectment of private respondents.
In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate
complaints for forcible entry against respondents.
5

After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the
compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.
On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of
coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a conference on August 18, 1989.
6
During the
meeting, the following were present: representatives of petitioner, the Land Bank of the Philippines, PARCCOM,
PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna, the BARC Chairman of Barangay Casile and some potential farmer
beneficiaries, who are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the consensus and recommendation of
the assembly that the landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition.
On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a
"Protest and Objection" to the compulsory acquisition of the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate
for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the
land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.
7

On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and
objection stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically
viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of
Cabuyao, Laguna.
8

On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary investigation report and forwarded the
Compulsory Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO).
9

On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Development, DAR forwarded two (2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC,
covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to the President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further review and
evaluation.
10

On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of
acquisition
11
to petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an
area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters
12
separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad
and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount
of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders previously referred for review and evaluation to
the Director of BLAD mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to
forward the two (2) claim folders involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary
proceedings to determine the just compensation for the land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the
aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and
were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two (2) claim folders (CACF's) to the
Executive Director of the DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on the CACF's, on
September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
to first resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.
13

The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the
coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the
parcels of land may be granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant
Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two issues
raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice
of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly, Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property.
During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically
concerning the parcels of land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties interested, setting the hearing for the
administrative valuation of the subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma.
Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction
of the records of the case because the records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who
originally handled the case for SRRDC and had possession of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and
could not be contacted. The Board granted counsel's request and moved the hearing to April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC, submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC's petition for
exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently, different dates of hearing
were set without objection from counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of subject
property at Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as Exhibit "5" for SRRDC. At the hearing on April
23, 1991, the Land Bank asked for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator Generoso B. Opina was
presented. The certification issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were
classified as "Industrial Park" per Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989.
14

To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991,
petitioner filed a petition
15
with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused
to address the issue of beneficiaries.
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a
decision,
16
finding that private respondents illegally entered the SRRDC property, and ordered them evicted.
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank of the
Philippines to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:
"1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766
hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
"2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of
Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos
(P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should
there be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for said amount in
the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation;
"3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and
encumbrances;
"4. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the
Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer certificate of Title
Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the Register of Deeds to the name of the Republic of the
Philippines;
"5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office to take immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents
to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna."
17

On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. B-
2333
18
ruling that respondents were builders in bad faith.
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the DARAB decision.
19
On
November 5, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal
portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated September 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court
on the issue of just compensation."
20

Hence, this petition.
21

On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:
"G.R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) Considering the
compliance, dated December 13, 1993, filed by counsel for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8, 1993 which
required petitioner to post a cash bond or surety bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 Pesos before issuing a
temporary restraining order prayed for, manifesting that it has posted a CASH BOND in the same amount with the
Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the attached official receipt no. 315519, the Court resolved to ISSUE the
Temporary Retraining Order prayed for.
"The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing
its decision dated December 19, 1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG- 0001, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which ordered, among others, the Regional Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate possession of
the landholding in dispute after title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines and to
distribute the same through the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as
determined by the Municipal Agrarian Officer of Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons acting for and in their behalf and under their
authority from entering the properties involved in this case and from introducing permanent infrastructures thereon;
and (c) the private respondents from further clearing the said properties of their green cover by the cutting or burning
of trees and other vegetation, effective today until further orders from this Court."
22

The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire
property was formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6657.
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. In
the case at bar, the Department of Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property under R. A.
No. 6657, Section 16, to wit:
"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following
procedures shall be followed:
a.) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire
the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in
the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer
of the DAR to pay corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other
pertinent provisions hereof.
b.) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c.) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land
within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and other
muniments of title.
d.) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted
for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
e.) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this act, the DAR shall make immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
23
of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be
identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative
shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders
the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the
deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects
the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just
compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence
on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the
case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the
latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall
immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question
the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts (provisionally the Supreme Court designated branches of the
regional trial court as special agrarian courts) for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory
acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on
how the identification process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order
No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as
follows:
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with the assistance of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area of responsibility; the
masterlist should include such information as required under the attached CARP masterlist form which shall include
the name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered
under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which the landowners have already filed applications to avail of
other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1 MARO investigation report
b) CARP CA Form No 2 Summary investigation report findings and evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3 Applicant's Information sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned forms have been examined and
verified by him and that the same are true and correct.
3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the
Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference meeting shall also be sent to the prospective
farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representatives, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and the other
interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property.
He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of
the participants thereon. The landowner shall also ask to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall
be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6,
series of 1988. The valuation worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the
PARO and all the personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular inspection and verification of the
property. This ocular inspection and verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds P500,000 per
estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with the duly accomplished valuation
forms and his recommendations, to the Central Office.
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final
land valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared
and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized representative, a notice of acquisition
(CARP Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the notice to the landowner personally or through registered mail
within three days from its approval. The notice shall include among others, the area subject of compulsory
acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for
approval the order of acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
shall conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with the procedures
provided under Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on
just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the required order of acquisition.
4. Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the
designated bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of
Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Once the property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the land for redistribution to
qualified beneficiaries."
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep
an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required
information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The
MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over
the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives
of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested
parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements
of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete
the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the
computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all
papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject property. From this point, the provisions of Section 16
of R. A. No. 6657 shall apply.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter
of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer-
beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of
acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and
its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent
domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking
under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation on the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just
compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP
bonds, not by trust accounts as was done by DAR.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that "The CARP
Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either."
24

Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals DARAB's decision ordering the compulsory
acquisition of petitioner's property.
25
Here, petitioner pressed the question of whether the property was a watershed,
not covered by CARP.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be
declared by the Department of Natural resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by
such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area
which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation,
use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters."
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or
divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so
why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not the declared the property as watershed area. The parcels
of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao
in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution
26
voiding the Zoning classification of the lands at Barangay Casile as Park
and declaring that the land was now classified as agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police
power, not the power of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which
logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present
and future projection of needs."
27

In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform,
28
we held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior
to the effectivity of the CARL, may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and
survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area.
29

Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a "watershed or part of the protected area for
watershed purposes." Ecological balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be
interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land must be aware of this deadly combination. In the case at
bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory acquisition simply because the land was allegedly
devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable land that may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore the
fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. In
a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the
environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they concluded that:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the
barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil
and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have
double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which
drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest
covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs.
Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matang Tubig structures they
couldn't care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of
inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious
resource water. . . . . .
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction
of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds
would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and
program be immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and program be formulated and implemented by
the Canlubang Estate in coordination with pertinent government agencies."
30

The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team headed by Dr. Emilio Rosario, the ERDB Director, who
holds a doctorate degree in water resources from U.P. Los Baos in 1987; Dr. Medel Limsuan, who obtained his
doctorate degree in watershed management from Colorado University (US) in 1989; and Dr. Antonio M. Dano, who
obtained his doctorate degree in Soil and Water Management Conservation from U.P. Los Baos in 1993.
Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the President dated September 7, 1993
(Subject: PFVR HWI Ref.: 933103 Presidential Instructions on the Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang
Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna) which reads:
"It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and
environmental considerations, among others. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP beneficiaries will
be affected, it is important that a larger view of the situation be taken as one should also consider the adverse effect
on thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for watershed purposes.
"The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate area be allocated for the affected farmers,
and that the Canlubang Estates be mandated to protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent watershed
reserved."
31

The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a
watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but
cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational responsibility" that needs to be answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof
that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No.
6657, Section 10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary
for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves,
national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and
convents appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually
worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent
(18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may be
excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the
DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of
the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to
be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final
decision on the case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
AUTHORITY OF THE DAR SECRETARY TO NULLIFY TITLES UNDER THE CARP
RA 6657
SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the
DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from
the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided for in this Act, and
shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title.
AS AMENDED BY RA 9700
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING
THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY
REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiaries shall commence from
their receipt of a duly registered emancipation patent or certificate of land ownership award and their actual
physical possession of the awarded land. Such award shall be completed in not more than one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date of registration of the title in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines:Provided, That the emancipation patents, the certificates of land ownership award, and other
titles issued under any agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one (1) year
from its registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, subject to the conditions, limitations and
qualifications of this Act, the property registration decree, and other pertinent laws. The emancipation
patents or the certificates of land ownership award being titles brought under the operation of the torrens
system, are conferred with the same indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles under the said system,
as provided for by Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended by Republic Act No. 6732.
"It is the ministerial duty of the Registry of Deeds to register the title of the land in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines, after the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) has certified that the necessary deposit in the
name of the landowner constituting full payment in cash or in bond with due notice to the landowner and the
registration of the certificate of land ownership award issued to the beneficiaries, and to cancel previous
titles pertaining thereto.
"Identified and qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, based on Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, as,
amended, shall have usufructuary rights over the awarded land as soon as the DAR takes possession of
such land, and such right shall not be diminished even pending the awarding of the emancipation patent or
the certificate of land ownership award.
"All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership
award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR."