Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30817 September 29, 1972
DOMN!DOR D"ON, #o$%& b'($%e(( '%#er t)e *$rm %+me ,P+-%()op o*
Dom$%+#or D$.o%,, petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES G. SUNT!/, respondent.
Andres T. Velarde for petitioner.
Rafael G. Suntay for respondent.

0ERN!NDO, J.:p
In essence there is nothing novel in this petition for review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals affiring a lower court !udgent sustaining the right of an owner of a diaond
ring, respondent "ourdes #. $unta%, as against the clai of petitioner &oinador
&i'on, who owns and operates a pawnshop. (he diaond ring was turned over to a
certain Clarita R. $ison, for sale on coission, along with other pieces of !ewelr% of
respondent $unta%. It was then pledged to petitioner. $ince what was done was
violative of the ters of the agenc%, there was an attept on her part to recover
possession thereof fro petitioner, who refused. $he had to file an action then for its
recover%. $he was successful, as noted above, both in the lower court and thereafter in
the Court of Appeals. $he prevailed as she had in her favor the protection accorded b%
Article ))* of the Civil
Code.
1
(he atter was then elevated to us b% petitioner. +rdinaril%, our discretion
would have been e,ercised against giving due course to such petition for review. (he
vigorous plea however, grounded on estoppel, b% his counsel, Att%. Andres (. -elarde,
persuaded us to act otherwise. After a careful perusal of the respective contentions of
the parties, we fail to perceive an% sufficient !ustification for a departure fro the literal
language of the applicable codal provision as uniforl% interpreted b% this Court in a
nuber of decisions. (he invocation of estoppel is therefore unavailing. .e affir.
(he stateent of the case as well as the controlling facts a% be found in the Court of
Appeals decision penned b% /ustice Pere'. (hus0 1Plaintiff is the owner of a three2carat
diaond ring valued at P),)33.33. +n /une 45, 4*67, the plaintiff and Clarita R. $ison
entered into a transaction wherein the plaintiff8s ring was delivered to Clarita R. $ison
for sale on coission. 9pon receiving the ring, Clarita R. $ison e,ecuted and
delivered to the plaintiff the receipt ... . (he plaintiff had alread% previousl% :nown
Clarita R. $ison as the latter is a close friend of the plaintiff8s cousin and the% had
fre;uentl% et each other at the place of the plaintiff8s said cousin. In fact, about one
%ear before their transaction of /une 45, 4*67 too: place, Clarita R. $ison received a
piece of !ewelr% fro the plaintiff to be sold for P)33.33, and when it was sold, Clarita
R. $ison gave the price to the plaintiff. After the lapse of a considerable tie without
Clarita R. $ison having returned to the plaintiff the latter8s ring, the plaintiff ade
deands on Clarita R. $ison for the return of her ring but the latter could not copl%
with the deands because, without the :nowledge of the plaintiff, on /une 4), 4*67 or
three da%s after the ring above2entioned was received b% Clarita R. $ison fro the
plaintiff, said ring was pledged b% Melia $ison, niece of the husband of Clarita R.
$ison, evidentl% in connivance with the latter, with the defendant8s pawnshop for
P7,633.33 ... .1
2
(hen cae this portion of the decision under review0 1$ince the
plaintiff insistentl% deanded fro Clarita R. $ison the return of her ring, the latter
finall% delivered to the forer the pawnshop tic:et ... which is the receipt of the pledge
with the defendant8s pawnshop of the plaintiff8s ring. .hen the plaintiff found out that
Clarita R. $ison pledged, she too: steps to file a case of estafa against the latter with
the fiscal8s office. $ubse;uentl% thereafter, the plaintiff, through her law%er, wrote a
letter ... dated $epteber 77, 4*67, to the defendant as:ing for the deliver% to the
plaintiff of her ring pledged with defendant8s pawnshop under pawnshop receipt serial2
B No. 6)636, dated /une 4), 4*67 ... . $ince the defendant refused to return the ring,
the plaintiff filed the present action with the Court of <irst Instance of Manila for the
recover% of said ring, with P)33.33 as attorne%8s fees and costs. (he plaintiff as:ed for
the provisional reed% of replevin b% the deliver% of the ring to her, upon her filing the
re;uisite bond, pending the final deterination of the action. (he lower court issued
the writ of replevin pra%ed for b% plaintiff and the latter was able to ta:e possession of
the ring during the pendenc% of the action upon her filing the re;uisite bond.1
3
It was
then noted that the lower court rendered !udgent declaring that plaintiff, now
respondent $unta%, had the right to the possession of the ring in ;uestion. Petitioner
&i'on, as defendant, sought to have the !udgent reversed b% the Court of Appeals. It
did hi no good. (he decision of Ma% 4*, 4*6*, now on review, affired the decision
of the lower court.
In the light of the facts as thus found b% the Court of Appeals, well2nigh conclusive on
use, with the applicable law being what it is, this petition for review cannot prosper. (o
repeat, the decision of the Court of Appeals stands.
4. (here is a fairl% recent restateent of the force and effect of the governing codal
nor in De Gracia v. Court of Appeals.
1
(hus0 1(he controlling provision is Article ))*
of the Civil Code. It reads thus0 8(he possession of ovable propert% ac;uired in good
faith is e;uivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost an% ovable or has been
unlawfull% deprived thereof a% recover it fro the person in possession of the sae.
If the possessor of a ovable lost of which the owner has been unlawfull% deprived,
has ac;uired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reibursing the price paid therefor.8 Respondent Angelina &. #uevara, having been
unlawfull% deprived of the diaond ring in ;uestion, was entitled to recover it fro
petitioner Consuelo $. de #arcia who was found in possession of the sae. (he onl%
e,ception the law allows is when there is ac;uisition in good faith of the possessor at a
1
public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reibursing the
price. As authoritativel% interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be
defeated even b% proof that there was good faith in the ac;uisition b% the possessor.
(here is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco. (hus0 8$uffice it to sa% in
this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal propert% ac;uired in good
faith b% another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. (he coon
law principle that were one of two innocent persons ust suffer b% a fraud perpetrated
b% another, the law iposes the loss upon the part% who, b% his isplaced confidence,
has enabled the fraud to be coitted, cannot be applied in a case which is covered
b% an e,press provision of the new Civil Code, specificall% Article ))*. Between a
coon law principle and a statutor% provision, the latter ust prevail in this
!urisdiction.1 1
2

7. It ust have been a recognition of the copulsion e,erted b% the above
authoritative precedents that ust have caused petitioner to invo:e the principle of
estoppel. (here is clearl% a isapprehension. $uch a contention is devoid of an%
persuasive force.
Estoppel as :nown to the Rules of Court
3
and prior to that to the Court of Civil
Procedure,
7
has its roots in e;uit%. #ood faith is its basis.
8
It is a response to the
deands of oral right and natural !ustice.
9
<or estoppel to e,ist though, it is
indispensable that there be a declaration, act or oission b% the part% who is sought to
be bound. Nor is this all. It is e;uall% a re;uisite that he, who would clai the benefits
of such a principle, ust have altered his position, having been so intentionall% and
deliberatel% led to coport hiself thus, b% what was declared or what was done or
failed to be done. If thereafter a litigation arises, the forer would not be allowed to
disown such act, declaration or oission. (he principle coes into full pla%. It a%
successfull% be relied upon. A court is to see to it then that there is no turning bac: on
one8s word or a repudiation of one8s act. $o it has been fro our earliest decisions. As
/ustice Mapa pointed out in the first case, a 4*3) decision, Rodriguez v. artinez,
10
a
part% should not be peritted 1to go against his own acts to the pre!udice of =another>.
$uch a holding would be contrar% to the ost rudientar% principles of !ustice and
law.1
11
?e is not, in the language of /ustice (orres, in !rlanda v. Pitargue,
12

proulgated in 4*47, 1allowed to gainsa% =his> own acts or den% rights which =he had>
previousl% recogni'ed.1
13
$oe of the later cases are to the effect that an un;ualified
and unconditional acceptance of an agreeent forecloses a clai for interest not
therein provided.
11
E;uall% so the circustance that about a onth after the date of
the conve%ance, one of the parties infored the other of his being a inor, according
to Chief /ustice Paras, 1is of no oent, because =the forer8s> previous
isrepresentation had alread% estopped hi fro disavowing the contract.
12
It is
easil% understandable wh%, under the circustances disclosed, estoppel is a frail reed
to hang on to. (here was clearl% the absence of an act or oission, as a result of
which a position had been assued b% petitioner, who if such eleents were not
lac:ing, could not thereafter in law be pre!udiced b% his belief in what had been
isrepresented to hi.
13
As was put b% /ustice "abrador, 1a person claied to be
estopped ust have :nowledge of the fact that his voluntar% acts would deprive hi of
soe rights because said voluntar% acts are inconsistent with said rights.1
17
(o
recapitulate, there is this pronounceent not so long ago, fro the pen of /ustice
Ma:alintal, who reaffired that estoppel 1has its origin in e;uit% and, being based on
oral right and natural !ustice, finds applicabilit% wherever and whenever the special
circustances of a case so deand.1
18
?ow then can petitioner in all seriousness assert that his appeal finds support in the
doctrine of estoppel@ Neither the proptings of e;uit% nor the andates of oral right
and natural !ustice coe to his rescue. ?e is engaged in a business where presuabl%
ordinar% prudence would anifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is
offering a !ewelr% b% wa% of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be ta:en,
perhaps because of the difficult% of resisting opportunit% for profit, he should be the last
to coplain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such !ewelr% should be
recogni'ed. (he law for this sound reason accords the latter protection. $o it has
alwa%s been since Varela v.
"innic#,
19
a 4*3A decision. According to /ustice (orres0 1In the present case not onl%
has the ownership and the origin of the !ewels isappropriated been un;uestionabl%
proven but also that the accused, acting fraudulentl% and in bad faith, disposed of the
and pledged the contrar% to agreeent, with no right of ownership, and to the
pre!udice of the in!ured part%, who was thereb% illegall% deprived of said !ewelsB
therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article C6C, the owner has an absolute
right to recover the !ewels fro the possession of whosoever holds the, ... .1
20
(here
have been an% other decisions to the sae effect since then. At least nine a% be
cited.
21
Nor could an% other outcoe be e,pected, considering the civil code
provisions both in the forer $panish legislation
22
and in the present Code.
23

Petitioner ought to have been on his guard before accepting the pledge in ;uestion.
Evidentl% there was no such precaution availed of. ?e therefore, has onl% hiself to
blae for the fi, he is now in. It would be to stretch the concept of estoppel to the
brea:ing point if his contention were to prevail. Moreover, there should have been a
reali'ation on his part that courts are not li:el% to be ipressed with a cr% of distress
eanating fro one who is in a business authori'ed to ipose a higher rate of interest
precisel% due to the greater ris: assued b% hi. A predicaent of this nature then
does not suffice to call for less than undeviating adherence to the literal ters of a
codal provision. Moreover, while the activit% he is engaged in is no doubt legal, it is not
to be lost sight of that it thrives on ta:ing advantage of the necessities precisel% of that
eleent of our population whose lives are blighted b% e,tree povert%. <ro whatever
angle the ;uestion is viewed then, estoppel certainl% cannot be !ustl% invo:ed.
.?ERE<+RE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of Ma% 4*, 4*6* is affired, with
costs against petitioner.
2