CHAUNCEY MAHAN, Petitioner, v. ROC NATION, LLC, ROC-A-FELLA RECORDS, LLC, SHAWN CARTER p/k/a JAY Z, Respondents. 14 Civ. 5075 (LGS) RESPONDENTS MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS Andrew H. Bart Lindsay W. Bowen JENNER & BLOCK LLP 919 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 891-1600 Attorneys for Respondents Roc-A- Fella Records, LLC and Shawn C. Carter Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 1 of 27 i TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 3 A. The Parties. ................................................................................................................... 3 B. Petitioners Work on Roc-A-Fella Albums in 1999 and 2000. .................................... 4 C. The Relevant SR Registrations Identify Roc-A-Fella as the Author and Copyright Owner of the Albums. ............................................................................................................. 6 D. Petitioners Work on Unpublished Roc-A-Fella Materials in 1999 and 2000. ............ 8 E. Petitioner Severs His Connection with Roc-A-Fella in Late 2000, and Retains Copies of the Album Tracks and Unpublished Roc-A-Fella Materials. ............................................. 9 F. Petitioner Attempts to Hold the Retained Materials for Ransom Before Bringing His Belated Ownership Claims. .................................................................................................... 9 G. The Instant Petition. ...................................................................................................... 9 ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 10 I. Motion to Dismiss Standard............................................................................................... 10 II. Petitioners Copyright Claims Should Be Dismissed as Time-Barred. ......................... 11 A. Roc-A-Fellas Copyright Registrations Triggered the Running of the Statute of Limitations. ........................................................................................................................... 13 B. The Copyright Notices on the Albums and the Accompanying Liner Notes Also Triggered the Running of the Statute of Limitations. ........................................................... 15 C. Petitioners Failure to Challenge Ownership in the Released Albums Bars His Claims for the Outtakes and Components. ........................................................................................ 16 D. Dismissal of the Petition Serves the Policy Underlying the Copyright Acts Statute of Limitations. ........................................................................................................................... 17 E. Petitioners Claim to Invalidate Roc-A-Fellas SR Registrations Is Barred by the Statute of Limitations. ........................................................................................................... 18 III. Petitioners Claims Should Be Dismissed Because They Raise No Plausible Facts Indicating Joint Authorship. ..................................................................................................... 19 IV. Petitioners Claims Against Mr. Carter, and Regarding the Album All Money Is Legal, Should Be Dismissed for Lack of an Actual Controversy Between the Parties. ......... 21 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 22 Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 2 of 27 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) ...............................................................................................................21 Aqua Creations USA Inc. v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., 487 Fed. Appx 627 (2d Cir. 2012) ..........................................................................................11 ATSI Commcns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007).......................................................................................................10 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .....................................................................................................10, 17, 19 Brand v. RMM, et al., No. 10 Civ. 0287(AJP), 2011 WL 1496344 (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 2011) ...............12, 13, 14, 15 Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Geisler Roberdeau, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9623(RWS), 2007 WL 1040809 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007)...................................13 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................................................17 Caffey v. Cook, 409 F. Supp. 2d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ......................................................................................16 Carell v. Shubert Org., 104 F. Supp. 2d. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).....................................................................................11 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991)...............................................................................................19, 20 Complex Systems, Inc. v. ABN Ambro Bank N.V., 979 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ......................................................................................13 DeCarlo v. Archie Comic Publcns, 11 Fed. Appx 26 (2d Cir. 2001) ........................................................................................12, 15 Dewan v. Blue Man Group Ltd. Pship, 73 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ........................................................................................11 Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207 (1985) ...................................................................................................................8 Fisher v. Klein, 86-cv-09522, 1990 WL 10072477 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1990) .................................................20 Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 3 of 27 iii Heckman v. Town of Hempstead, Fed. Appx , 2014 WL 2459725, No. 131379cv (2d Cir. Jun. 3, 2014) .....................11 In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., No. 87 Civ. 8397(KC), 1991 WL 84533 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1991)........................................13 Island Software & Computer Serv. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2005).....................................................................................................11 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) .................................................................................................................10 Jordan v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment Inc., 354 Fed. Appx 942 (5th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................14 Kwan v. Schlein, 634 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2011).........................................................................................12, 17, 18 Margo v. Weiss, No. 96 Civ. 3842(MBM), 1998 WL 2558 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1998), affd, 213 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2000) ...........................................................................................................................14 Mattel, Inc. v. Robarbs, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ......................................................................................16 Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ......................................................................................16 Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................................11, 12 Minder Music Ltd. v. Mellow Smoke Music Co., No. 98 Civ. 4496, 1999 WL 820575 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1999) ........................................17, 18 Ortiz v. Guitian Bros. Music Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3897, 2008 WL 4449314 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) ...........................................15 Parks v. ABC, 341 Fed. Appx 737 (2d Cir. 2009) ....................................................................................11, 22 Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2014).....................................................................................................12 Rico Records Distribs., Inc. v. Ithier, 04 Civ. 9782(JSR), 2005 WL 2174006 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005) .....................................11, 15 Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 1997) ......................................................................................................14 Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 4 of 27 iv Santa-Rosa, et al. v. Combo Records, et al., 471 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 2006) ....................................................................................................12 Seven Arts Filmed Entment Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................12 Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc. 351 F. Supp. 2d 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ....................................................................................4, 21 Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1992)...................................................................................................12 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).........................................................................................16, 19, 20 Tolliver v. McCants, 05 Civ. 10840(JFK), 2009 WL 804114 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009) ...................................12, 13 TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F.Supp.2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ........................................................................................14 Urbont v. Sony Music Entertainment, 863 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ......................................................................................10 Warrick v. Roberts, 13-cv-08326, Slip Op. (E.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014) ...........................................................12, 13, 18 Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ........................................................................................11 Willsea v. Theis, No. 98 Civ. 6773(BSJ), 1999 WL 595629 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1999) ......................................13 STATUTES 17 U.S.C. 101 ..............................................................................................................................19 17 U.S.C. 205(c) .........................................................................................................................13 17 U.S.C. 507(b) .........................................................................................................................11 28 U.S.C. 2201 ............................................................................................................................21 OTHER AUTHORITIES Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) ............................................................................................................21 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) ............................................................................................................10 Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 5 of 27 1 Respondents Roc-A-Fella Records, LLC (Roc-A-Fella) and Shawn C. Carter (Mr. Carter or Jay Z) (collectively, Respondents), by their attorneys, Jenner & Block LLP, respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss the instant Petition pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT While petitioner Chauncey Mahan (Petitioner) felt it necessary to file a 86-page complaint filled with irrelevant digressions and to attach hundreds of pages of extraneous exhibits, the claims asserted and the reasons they should be dismissed are simple and straightforward. Petitioner was hired as a sound engineer to work on several albums that were recorded and released by Roc-A-Fella between December 1999 and June 2001. Roc-A-Fella obtained federal copyright registrations for all of these recordings and placed copyright notices on each of the albums. At no time during the following 14 years did Petitioner register copyrights to the recordings in his own name or otherwise assert any ownership claims in any of those recordings. In April 2014, Petitioner contacted Respondents and attempted to wrongfully extract a large sum of money in exchange for the return of computer sound files and backup tapes relating to those albums, which he had kept in a mini-storage unit for years without Respondents knowledge or authorization. When that scheme failed, Petitioner decided to invoke Plan Ban equally misguided attempt to use the Copyright Act as the path to his desired windfall. Accordingly, in July 2014, he filed the instant Petition requesting a declaratory judgment that he is an author and copyright owner of the sound recordings embodied on the files and tapes he tried to hold for ransom. After Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 6 of 27 2 14 years of silence, Petitioners claims (and his attempt to use the federal courts as part of his shakedown scheme) are outrageous and wholly without merit. More significantly, for purposes of this Motion, the claims are plainly barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in the Copyright Act, and have been for more than a decade. As demonstrated within, the dispositive admissions contained in the allegations and documents attached to or referenced by the Petition provide an ample basis for the summary dismissal of the Petitioners claims. 1 These include the Copyright Office registration certificates for the albums at issue, the album covers, and the album liner notes. These indisputable facts establish that Petitioner knew, or clearly should have known, that Roc-A-Fella has been the sole owner of the copyrights in the relevant sound recordings since the original dates of registration between 2000 and 2001. 2 First, the copyright registrations, made in Roc-A-Fellas name and filed with the Copyright Office, constitute constructive notice of Roc-A-Fellas ownership claim sufficient to trigger the running of the limitations period as a matter of law. Second, during the same period, all of the albums at issue were distributed to the public bearing notices that unambiguously claimed copyright exclusively in Roc-A-Fellas name, and featuring liner notes with extensive artistic credits that credited others for the contributions that Petitioner contends support his newly-manufactured claims of authorship. These notices and credits also triggered the running of the limitations period. 1 A true and correct copy of Mahans Petition is attached as Exhibit A to the accompanying Declaration of Andrew H. Bart (the Bart Declaration). For the Courts convenience, all citations to the Petition are simply to Pet. 2 Contrary to Petitioners claims, one of the albums at issue, All Money Is Legal, by Amil, is owned by another record label, Sony Music Entertainment (Sony), which is a competitor to Roc-A-Fella, and a separate entity from all Respondents in this case. See infra at nn.8, 14, Part V. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 7 of 27 3 Moreover, as the Petition concedes, these were extremely popular recordings. Petitioner does not and cannot allege that he was unaware that the recordings had been released by Roc-A- Fella. Nonetheless, in the subsequent 14 years, he never objected to the exploitation of the albums, never alleged ownership of any of the recordings, was never paid or sought royalties, and never took any other action that would provide a basis for arguing that his untimely assertion of these claims is anything other than a recent fabrication. Given this extensive and dispositive record and Petitioners inexplicable silence as to his alleged authorship for over 14 years, it is clear that his claims are not bona fide attempts to adjudicate a legitimate copyright dispute. Rather, they are the second round of Mahans attempt to wrongfully extract money out of his brief association with one of the worlds most famous recording artists and to cash in on his unauthorized retention of copies of the commercially released sound recordings at issue, as well as work tapes and outtakes thereof. Since Petitioners claims are manifestly barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the Petition should be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 A. The Parties. Mr. Carter is an iconic American performer, composer, producer, and entrepreneur who has won 19 Grammy Awards for his music and sold over 75 million copies of his chart-topping albums, who is professionally known as Jay Z. Pet. 24, 25, 32-35, 47-49, 57-58. Aside from his undeniable stardom in the music world, he has also achieved phenomenal success in the fashion, sports and entertainment industries. See id. 24. Mr. Carter co-founded the Roc-A- Fella record label in New York City in 1995. Id. 17. According to Petitioner, during the 3 The Statement of Facts is premised on allegations from the Petition, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A to the Bart Declaration. For purposes of this Motion only, the referenced allegations are deemed to be true. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 8 of 27 4 period from 1999 to 2001, Mr. Carter was both a principal of the label, and signed to it as a recording artist. 4 Id. 25. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Petitioner was a sound engineer in New York City who had worked, inter alia, as sound engineer for LL Cool J, and as a sound engineer and programmer for Whitney Houston. 5 Id. 9, 13-14. B. Petitioners Work on Roc-A-Fella Albums in 1999 and 2000. According to the Petition, in July 1999, Roc-A-Fella engaged Petitioner, inter alia, to operate computerized Pro Tools recording technology to assist in the making of certain sound recordings created and released by Roc-A-Fella. Id. 30, 36-37, 270. Between July and August 1999, Petitioner provided engineering services that were used in making sound recordings that were included in the debut album of Roc-A-Fella recording artist Beanie Sigel (Sigel), entitled The Truth. 6 Id. 38, 63. From mid-August 1999 to mid-November 1999, Petitioner worked on the Jay Z album Vol. 3 . . . Life and Times of S. Carter (Vol. 3). Id. 42. Subsequently, Petitioner worked on Mr. Carters follow-up album as Jay Z, Roc La Familia: The Dynasty (Dynasty). Petitioner alleges that he never signed any written agreement for his engineering work on any of the three albums. Id. 55, 62, 68. 4 Insofar as Petitioner contends that Mr. Carter is still a principal of Roc-A-Fella or signed to the label as a recording artist, such assertions are both erroneous and irrelevant, as neither corporate interest nor artistic affiliation can create liability in this case. See Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc. 351 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 5 Notably, Petitioner makes no allegation that he was an author or copyright owner of the sound recordings by those artists. 6 While not germane to the legal issues mandating summary dismissal of the Petition, Respondents strenuously dispute Petitioners assertion, never made until 14 years after the fact, that his provision of engineering services qualifies him as a co-author or co-owner of the relevant recordings. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 9 of 27 5 Petitioner also worked on two additional albums for Roc-A-Fella in 1999 and 2000: Sigels The Reason and Memphis Bleeks The Understanding (together with Vol. 3, The Truth, and Dynasty, hereinafter called the Albums). 7 Id. 69, Schedule A. All told, Petitioner claims to have worked on 44 individual tracks that appeared on the five Albums. 8 Id. at Schedule A. The recording sessions for these Albums (the Recording Sessions) all took place in 1999 and 2000. See id 69-70. Lacking any documentary support for any of his ownership claims, Petitioner self- servingly alleges that because hip-hop music is an intrinsically collaborative musical form, the creators of the Albums had the collegial intent to collaborate with Petitioner to create works of joint authorship. Id. 264-65, 273-76. However, Petitioner admits that he never had a written agreement with Roc-A-Fella, and that he and Mr. Carter never discussed the issue of copyright ownership of the sound recordings or any contractual arrangements. Id. 55, 267. Further, the Petition fails to plausibly allege any verbal agreements between Petitioner and Roc-A-Fella. Moreover, there are no allegations that Petitioner made any effort to claim authorship prior to the failure of his scheme to extract a large sum of money for the return of the copies of the master recordings, outtakes and backup tapes in his possession in 2014. This failure is manifestly not a result of some oversight or unawareness that the Albums were being exploited. Indeed, Petitioner characterizes the Albums as some of the most valuable and significant in the history of the music industry. See, e.g., id. 49 (Big Pimpin included in Rolling Stones 500 Greatest Songs of All Time in 2010), 48 (Vol. 3 one of the 50 highest selling hip-hop albums of all time), 58 (Dynasty a top-selling album of the decade). Yet, despite Petitioners 7 The Petition does not allege whether Petitioner signed a contract for his work on The Reason or The Understanding. 8 The 45th track appears on the Sony Album, All Money is Legal. Bart Decl. Ex. M at 9, 19- 20. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 10 of 27 6 current claim that he is a co-owner of the Albums, he never alleges that he ever sought royalties from Roc-A-Fella, or otherwise tried to exploit the Albums himself at any point since the Albums were released almost 15 years ago. Indeed, Petitioner admits that he was not in contact with Mr. Carter or any of his agents between November 2000 and 2014. Id. 82, 84. C. The Relevant SR Registrations Identify Roc-A-Fella as the Author and Copyright Owner of the Albums. According to the Petition, the Albums on which Petitioner worked were released between December 1999 and November 2000. Id. at 23 (Schedule B). 9 Three separate forms of documentation provide proof that Roc-A-Fella claimed sole ownership of every relevant sound recording from the time of releaseand thus rejected the notion that Petitioner was an author or otherwise had any copyright interest of any of themthereby triggering the running of the statute of limitations. First, in connection with the release of each Album, Roc-A-Fella promptly filed Sound Recording (SR) copyright registrations with the Copyright Office. Bart Decl. Exs. B-F. None of the registrations listed Petitioner as an author or copyright claimant. Id. Exs. B-F. While Petitioner belatedly alleges that Roc-A-Fellas registrations contain misrepresentation[s], (because they are fatal to his claims of copyright authorship and ownership), see Pet. 284, no such allegations were made between 1999 and April 2014. Notably, that silence was not due to a lack of familiarity with the significance of copyright registration as Petitioner registered five works in his own name with the Copyright Office, all within a year of each works creation. Id. Ex. G. 9 As discussed above, for the purposes of this Motion, Petitioners assertions are accepted as true. However it appears that Sigels The Reason was released in June 2001, not 2000 as Petitioner claims. Compare id. 69 with Bart Decl. Ex. E (SR certificate for The Reason). Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 11 of 27 7 Second, when each of the Albums was released, the back cover of its packaging materials contained a clear and unequivocal copyright notice. 10 See, e.g., id., Ex. E (Dkt. # 2-2 at 9) (copyright notice for Dynasty), Ex. F (Dkt. # 2-2 at 27) (copyright notice for The Truth), Bart Decl. Exs. H at 14, 16; I at 12, 14; J at 14, 15, 17; K at 14, 15, 17; L at 18-19, 21 (copyright notices for Vol. 3, Dynasty, The Truth, The Reason, and The Understanding). The notices plainly display the proper phonorecord and copyright symbols, the release year, and the copyright claimanti.e., Respondent Roc-A-Fella Records, LLC. Petitioner is not listed on any of the copyright notices for the Albums. Third, each of the Albums was published with liner notes giving extensive artistic credits, none of which attribute to Petitioner the authorial role he claims to have played. Indeed, the Petition attaches the liner notes published with three of the Albums, and concedes they did not credit Petitioner for the work he purports to have done as a joint author. Compare id. 53, 194 (claims of contributions to Vol. 3), with id. Ex. D (Dkt. # 2-1) at 12-13 (tracks 1, 3-4, 8-10, 12, 14-15) (Mahans credits for Vol. 3); see also id. 59-61, 66-67 (alleging Petitioner was only credited with some of his work on Dynasty and The Truth), Ex. E (Dkt. # 2-2) at 2-11 (Dynasty credits), Ex. F (Dkt. # 2-2 at 19-38) (The Truth credits). Not only was Petitioner not listed as an author of any of the tracks at issue, Petitioner was not given a Produced by or Co-produced by credit on any of them. Id. 11 According to the Petition, the vast majority of 10 Packaging materials are included with each physical sale of an album, and include a front and back cover which include, among other information, track listings, and liner notes. Because the Petition clearly relied upon the packaging for all six Albums in creating Schedule B, see Pet. at 23 (Liner Note Credits column), Respondents attach the Album packaging as Exhibits to this Motion. See infra, nn.8, 11, 14. 11 Petitioner did not attach liner notes or specify billing deficiencies for the other two Albums. However, a comparison of Petitioners statement that he played a similar authorial role on each Album and the Liner Note Credit summary in Schedule B to the Petition, or the Album packaging materials attached hereto, shows a consistent pattern of discrepancies. Compare id. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 12 of 27 8 Petitioners credits were simply Recorded By, which he asserts, in hip-hop parlance, is limited to the recording of vocals. Id. 206. There is nothing in any of the 80-plus pages of the Petition alleging any action by the Petitioner over the course of the following 14 years to challenge the Copyright Office filings, the copyright notices, or the liner note credits that were inconsistent with his purported authorship and copyright ownership. There is not even an allegation that he ever raised the subject with Roc-A-Fella during that period. D. Petitioners Work on Unpublished Roc-A-Fella Materials in 1999 and 2000. As is usual in the record industry, the Recording Sessions did not immediately proceed to final commercial recordings. Rather, miscellaneous demos, preliminary takes, and work tapes were also created. Petitioner has no more right to these materials than he does to the recordings distributed to the public and, dispositively, Petitioner alleges no facts to suggest otherwise. Petitioner alleges that his computer hard drives contained recorded material from the Recording Sessions in 1999 and 2000, including original Pro Tools multi-track recordings, preliminary mixes, outtakes, alternative takes, rough drafts, freestyle sessions, dubs, extended versions and other unpublished materials (collectively, the Outtakes). Pet. 71-72. The Supreme Court defines outtakes as those portions of the tapes recorded in the studio but not included in the master, that is, the final edited version slated for release after transcription to phonorecords or commercial tapes. Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 211 n.3 (1985). Further, Petitioner alleges that he maintained Digital Audio Tapes containing isolated tracks that were component parts of the eventual master recordings, such as instrumental and vocal-only tracks (the Components). Pet. 74. Finally, Petitioner alleges that he also maintained Digital Audio 189, 218, 228-29, 233, 252, 258-59 with id. at 23 (Schedule B), Bart Decl. Exs. K at 2, 4, 7, 10, L at 6-7, 11, 13. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 13 of 27 9 Tape backup copies of master recordings (the Backups). Id. 73. Petitioner does not claim that his role as to the Outtakes, Components, and Backups differed in any substantive way from his role as to the Albums, and alleges no independent facts to support a claim for joint authorship over these recordings. E. Petitioner Severs His Connection with Roc-A-Fella in Late 2000, and Retains Copies of the Album Tracks and Unpublished Roc-A-Fella Materials. After November 2000, Petitioner no longer worked on Roc-A-Fella sound recordings. Id. 70. However, Petitioner admits that he retained copies of every track from the Albums, as well as the Outtakes, Components, and Backups (Retained Materials). Id. 71-73. Petitioner does not claim that he received permission to do so, nor does he claim that he ever asserted a claim of copyright authorship or ownership over these recordings prior to the filing of this action. F. Petitioner Attempts to Hold the Retained Materials for Ransom Before Bringing His Belated Ownership Claims. According to press accounts attached to the Petition, in April 2014, Petitioner advised Respondents that he was in possession of the Retained Materials. Id. Ex. U (Dkt. # 2-9) at 28- 29. Tellingly, he did not claim authorship or copyright ownership in them. Instead, he contacted Live Nation, a co-owner of Respondent Roc Nation, LLC (Roc Nation). Roc Nation is a sports and entertainment conglomerate, partially owned by Mr. Carter. Petitioner demanded $100,000 as a storage fee, (i.e. ransom), or else he would auction the recordings. Id. Pursuant to a complaint for criminal extortion, police in Los Angeles detained Petitioner and seized the Retained Materials. Id. G. The Instant Petition. On July 8, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. The Petition contains two counts, each basing the claim for relief on the Copyright Act. Id. at 71, 81. Count I of the Petition asks for a declaration of Petitioners ownership and authorship in the relevant sound recordings under Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 14 of 27 10 the Copyright Act. Id. at 71 (Count I). Specifically, Petitioner seeks a declaration that Petitioner is a joint author and copyright owner of the relevant sound recordings, id. at 74 (Count I, Section B), or in the alternative, to be named the sole copyright owner under the Copyright Act. Id. at 80 (Count I, Section C), 278(b). Although it does not appear that Count II of the Petition is substantively different from Count I, Count II purports to seek a declaratory judgment that Roc- A-Fellas SR Registrations of the Albums are invalid because they fail to list Petitioner as an author. Id. at 81, 283-86. ARGUMENT I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD. A petition or complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. If the allegations, for example, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Further, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court adopted a plausibility requirement, obligating a pleader to amplify a claim with factual allegations sufficient to render a claim plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A petitioner must provide more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. at 555 (citations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. (citations omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe all non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint (or petition) as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the [non- movants] favor. ATSI Commcns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007); Urbont v. Sony Music Entertainment, 863 F. Supp. 2d 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). However, the Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 15 of 27 11 Court is not bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions. Aqua Creations USA Inc. v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., 487 Fed. Appx 627 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In its review, the Court is entitled to consider facts alleged in the complaint (or petition) and documents attached to it or incorporated in it by reference, documents integral to the complaint and relied upon in it, and documents and facts of which judicial notice may properly be taken under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Heckman v. Town of Hempstead, Fed. Appx , 2014 WL 2459725, *1, No. 131379cv (2d Cir. Jun. 3, 2014). Documents of which judicial notice may be taken include Copyright Office registration certificates. Island Software & Computer Serv. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 2005). II. PETITIONERS COPYRIGHT CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS TIME- BARRED. The unambiguous three-year limitations period applicable to claims arising under the Copyright Act is fatal to Petitioners claims. Section 507 of the Copyright Act provides that [n]o civil action shall be maintained under the [Act] unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued. 17 U.S.C. 507(b). Accordingly, courts have held consistently that failure to assert a claim of copyright ownership within three years from its accrual requires dismissal of the claim and any rights or remedies that would flow from it, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996). Indeed, the Second Circuit, this Court, and other federal courts regularly dismiss time-barred claims of copyright ownership. See, e.g., Parks v. ABC, 341 Fed. Appx 737, 739 (2d Cir. 2009); Rico Records Distribs., Inc. v. Ithier, 04 Civ. 9782(JSR), 2005 WL 2174006, at *2 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005); Carell v. Shubert Org., 104 F. Supp. 2d. 236, 248-50, 271-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Dewan v. Blue Man Group Ltd. Pship, 73 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 16 of 27 12 Supp. 2d 458, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Santa-Rosa, et al. v. Combo Records, et al., 471 F.3d 224, 227-28 (1st Cir. 2006); Seven Arts Filmed Entment Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251, 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 2013); Warrick v. Roberts, 13-cv-08326, Slip Op. at 19 (E.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014) (Dkt. # 44). In the Second Circuit, a claim involving a dispute over copyright ownership accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff . . . would have been put on inquiry as to the existence of a right. Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming that Stone remains in force). Thus, an ownership claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is premised. Merchant, 92 F.3d at 56; Psihoyos, 748 F.3d 120 at 124 (affirming the reasoning in Merchant). As an initial matter, a co-author (as Petitioner claims to be) knows that he or she jointly created a work from the moment of its creation. Merchant, 92 F.3d at 56; accord DeCarlo v. Archie Comic Publcns, 11 Fed. Appx 26, 29 (2d Cir. 2001). Thereafter, [a]n express assertion of sole authorship or ownership by another party will trigger the accrual of an ownership claim. Kwan v. Schlein, 634 F.3d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Tolliver v. McCants, 05 Civ. 10840(JFK), 2009 WL 804114, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009) (same). 12 The allegations in the Petition and the documents annexed thereto conclusively establish that the claims asserted in this case accrued nearly a decade and a half ago. The Petition does not 12 The Merchant analysis is not modified whether Petitioner is claiming to be a co-author or sole author. See Pet. at 74 (Count I(B)), 80 (Count I(C)). Courts in this district have extended [the Merchant rule] to parties, such as [plaintiff], seeking a declaration of sole ownership as well as to those seeking a declaration of joint authorship. Brand v. RMM, et al., No. 10 Civ. 0287(AJP), 2011 WL 1496344, at *3, n.5 (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 2011) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 17 of 27 13 allege that at any time prior to the filing of this action, Petitioner filed a copyright registration in the sound recordings claiming an ownership interest, received or demanded a royalty from Roc- A-Fella, or asserted claims of authorship and ownership in any other manner. A. Roc-A-Fellas Copyright Registrations Triggered the Running of the Statute of Limitations. As a matter of law, when a party claims ownership by officially registering a copyright with the federal government, such [r]ecordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document. 17 U.S.C. 205(c). As a recent opinion dismissing a time-barred copyright claim held, [w]hen an entity files a copyright registration and lists only its own name as an owner . . . that serves as notice to the world that it considers itself the sole owner thereof. Warrick, 13-cv-08326, Slip Op. at 18-19 (Dkt. # 44). Thus, registering a copyright in ones own name triggers the three-year statute of limitations for all other potential claimants. Tolliver, 2009 WL 804114 at *11; see also Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Geisler Roberdeau, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9623(RWS), 2007 WL 1040809, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (recording ownership with copyright office gives constructive notice); In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., No. 87 Civ. 8397(KC), 1991 WL 84533, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1991) (same). Indeed, courts routinely rely on valid publicly-filed copyright registrations to bar stale copyright claims. See, e.g., Complex Systems, Inc. v. ABN Ambro Bank N.V., 979 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472, (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (copyright ownership claim barred, on statute of limitations grounds, because the party had constructive notice of defendants ownership rights); Brand, 2011 WL 1496344 at *4-5; Willsea v. Theis, No. 98 Civ. 6773(BSJ), 1999 WL 595629, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1999) ([O]nce an author registers his copyright, any [unlisted] co-author exercising reasonable diligence should be aware that another person has claimed authorship.) (citation Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 18 of 27 14 omitted) 13 ; Margo v. Weiss, No. 96 Civ. 3842(MBM), 1998 WL 2558, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1998), affd, 213 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2000); Jordan v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment Inc., 354 Fed. Appx 942, 945-46 (5th Cir. 2009); Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 55, 66 (1st Cir. 1997). In Brand, the defendant record labels predecessor-in-interest immediately registered the copyright to the sound recording in its own name when the albums at issue therein were released. Brand, 2011 WL 1496344 at *4. When a putative author of vocals and lyrics used in the sound recordings filed suit almost two decades later, the court found that he reasonably should have known of the injury upon which his claim is premised when each album was released and registered. Id. Similarly, in Margo, this Court found that [a]ny injury plaintiffs suffered by virtue of not receiving credit as co-authors of [the work at issue] first occurred in 1961, the year in which the song was written and the copyright certificate listing the lyricists [rather than the plaintiffs] as authors was filed. Margo, 1998 WL 2558 at *5. Here, Petitioner had constructive notice of Roc-A-Fellas ownership claim by virtue of the publicly-filed copyright registrations for the Albums claiming Roc-A-Fellas sole ownership without also crediting Petitioner (or anyone else). Bart Decl. Exs. B-F (copyright notices dated 2000 and 2001). 14 Indeed, given his own registration of copyrights, Petitioner cannot plausibly allege that he did not appreciate the meaning of Roc-A-Fellas registrations. Id. Ex. G. Accordingly, Petitioners claims are manifestly time-barred. 13 The Westlaw database erroneously lists Willsea as abrogated on other grounds. See TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F.Supp.2d 588, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing case that cites Willsea as abrogated on other grounds). 14 All Money is Legal was similarly registered by Sony, which owns the recording. Ex. M at 1-2; see also supra nn.2, 8 and infra Part V. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 19 of 27 15 B. The Copyright Notices on the Albums and the Accompanying Liner Notes Also Triggered the Running of the Statute of Limitations. Public release and distribution of copyrighted material bearing copyright notices in the name of defendants, and excluding other claimants, is also sufficient notice to commence the three-year statutory period. Rico Records, 2005 WL 2174006 at *2; see also DeCarlo, 11 Fed. Appx at 29 (receipt of comic book with copyright notice excluding claimant began statute of limitations period). This Court has also specifically held that the commercial release of DVDs and CDs with copyright notices on the back cover provide such notice. In Ortiz v. Guitian Bros. Music Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3897, 2008 WL 4449314, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008), the Court held that distribution of a DVD whose exterior packaging was stamped with a copyright symbol and the name of the defendants should have put [the plaintiff] on notice of his claim. Id. Likewise, the copyright notice on the back cover of the CD case in Brand meant that the plaintiff alleging copyright ownership reasonably should have know[n] of the injury upon which his claim [was] premised. Brand, 2011 WL 1496344 at *4. Here, the fact that Roc-A-Fella listed itself as the sole author on the copyright notices placed on the Albums in 2000 and 2001, was clearly an express assertion of sole ownership, as in Ortiz and Brand. As a matter of law, a reasonably diligent person in Petitioners position would have examined the notices on the released Albums and promptly raised any genuine concern with Respondents. Thus, the statute of limitations on Petitioners claims, based on the copyright notices alone, had run by no later than 2004. Moreover, the liner notes included with each Album were inconsistent with Petitioners purported role as author, and thus should have put him on notice that Roc-A-Fella did not consider him to be an author. In the context of determining joint authorship, the Second Circuit Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 20 of 27 16 has held that billing or credit is a window on the mind of the party who is responsible for giving the billing or the credit and that attribution of the work is prima facie proof that joint authorship was not meant to be shared by a person not credited. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation, quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted). Likewise, in Maxwood Music, Ltd. v. Malakian, an albums liner notes were held to be consistent with exclusive authorship that did not include the plaintiff. Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d 327, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Caffey v. Cook, 409 F. Supp. 2d 484, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 15 C. Petitioners Failure to Challenge Ownership in the Released Albums Bars His Claims for the Outtakes and Components. Petitioners claims regarding the Outtakes and Components are also time-barred. Because such interim files and work tapes are preliminary and intermediate versions of the Albums, the Albums SR Registrations provided the same constructive notice of Roc-A-Fellas rejection of Petitioners purported claims of ownership. First, as preliminary and interim versions of the ultimate sound recordings, made in the same Recording Sessions, there is no question that Roc-A-Fella intended that it would own the Outtakes and Components, just as it owned the final recordings, and Petitioner alleges no facts to the contrary. Thus, Roc-A-Fellas SR Registrations, copyright notices, and liner notes demonstrated its claims over the Outtakes and Components created incident to the Albums, and a reasonably diligent plaintiff should have known that Roc-A-Fellas assertion of sole ownership applied to those recordings as well. 16 15 For the reasons above, Petitioners claims as to the Backups of the tracks from the released Albums are also time-barred. 16 Moreover, the Components are included in the SR Registrations for the Albums under the effective registration doctrine, which states that when an underlying work is subsumed in a later work by the same owner, the latter works SR Registration covers them both. See Mattel, Inc. v. Robarbs, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 487, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 21 of 27 17 Second, Petitioner has not made a single allegation that he had a protectable interest in the Outtakes and Components separate from his putative interests in the final versions of the sound recordings, or alleged a single plausible fact supporting such a separate claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also infra Part III (discussing Twombly in the context of joint ownership). Thus, Petitioners failure to challenge ownership of the final recordings within the limitations period bars any claims he might assert over the Outtakes and Components. 17 D. Dismissal of the Petition Serves the Policy Underlying the Copyright Acts Statute of Limitations. Statutes of limitations are not arbitrary obstacles to the vindication of just claims, and therefore they should not be given a grudging application. They protect important social interests in certainty, accuracy, and repose. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1990). In a copyright ownership case, dismissal of an action pursuant to the statute of limitations promotes the principles of repose integral to a properly functioning copyright market and is also consistent with the Supreme Courts recognition that Congress paramount goal in revising the 1976 [Copyright Act was] enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership. Minder Music Ltd. v. Mellow Smoke Music Co., No. 98 Civ. 4496, 1999 WL 820575, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1999) (citations and quotations marks omitted). Petitioner notes that the Albums have continued to generate awards and interest. See, e.g., supra at 5. This commercial success is powerful evidence that Petitioner could not plausibly have been unaware of the release or commercial exploitation of the Albums, Roc-A- Fellas claims of sole ownership and, thus, the existence of his purported claims. Nonetheless, 17 To the extent that Petitioner pleads that he owns the physical media, i.e. the single copies of the sound recordings at issue that are encoded on them, that claim is also time-barred. Petitioner clearly states that each of his claims sounds in the Copyright Act. Pet. at 71 (Count I, heading), 80 (Section C, heading) & 278(b). As demonstrated above, where the essence of a claim is copyright ownership, and that threshold claim is time-barred, so are the attendant claims. See, e.g., Kwan, 634 F.3d at 229. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 22 of 27 18 while the ongoing critical approval and financial success of the Albums is undoubtedly motivation for the untimely assertion of the instant claims, continued commercial success is otherwise irrelevant to the computation of the applicable limitations period. Indeed, if the Petition is not dismissed, Respondents may well face other frivolous lawsuits regarding the most valuable portions of Roc-A-Fellas valuable catalog, leading to business uncertainty and the financial burden of litigating decades-old claims. On the other hand, dismissal would serve the expressed Congressional purpose of promoting a predictable marketplace for copyrighted works by discouraging similar stale and opportunistic claims from peripheral actors in the future. E. Petitioners Claim to Invalidate Roc-A-Fellas SR Registrations Is Barred by the Statute of Limitations. Count II of the Petition asks for a Declaratory Judgment that Roc-A-Fellas SR Registrations are invalid because they conflict with Petitioners claim of authorship. Pet. 283- 84. That Count must also be dismissed for the same reasons above. Where ownership forms the backbone of a secondary claim that depends on a threshold finding of ownership (such as a claim for copyright infringement) and the ownership claim is itself barred, the statute of limitations cannot be defeated by portraying an action as other than an ownership claim. See Kwan, 634 F.3d at 229 (dismissing infringement case based on ownership claims); Minder Music, 1999 WL 820575, at *2; Warrick, 13-cv-08326, Slip Op. at 17. Here, the reason Petitioner gives for invalidating Roc-A-Fellas SR Registrations is that his authorship was not reflected therein. Thus, the core of Count II is indistinguishable from that of Count I. Because Petitioners ownership claims may not themselves be brought, the SR invalidation claims are moot. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 23 of 27 19 III. PETITIONERS CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY RAISE NO PLAUSIBLE FACTS INDICATING JOINT AUTHORSHIP. Even if Petitioners claims were not time-barred, which they are, they would all fail to state a claim for the independent reason that they do not meet the Supreme Courts Twombly standard requiring a plaintiff to allege plausible facts supporting his claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Here, in order to state a claim that the sound recordings at issue were joint works under the Copyright Act, Petitioner must allege plausible facts to show that they were prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. 17 U.S.C. 101. Further, the Second Circuit has established a two-part test for joint authorship, whereby each putative co-author must have (1) fully intended, at the time of creation, to be a co-author, and (2) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 (denying claim of joint authorship under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6)); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507-508 (2d Cir. 1991). In examining whether Petitioner has adequately pled that Roc-A-Fella intended to become a joint author with Petitioner, Twombly itself is instructive. The relevant issue in Twombly was whether a plaintiff had sufficiently pled under Rule 12(b)(6) that defendants had entered into a certain agreement. The Supreme Court required plausible grounds to infer an agreement and established that Rule 12(b)(6) calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Here, Petitioner must allege enough plausible grounds to infer Roc-A-Fellas intent to create a work of joint authorship with Petitioner, or to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 24 of 27 20 reveal such evidence. But Petitioner has failed to allege any facts in this regard, and has in fact made allegations that demonstrate the opposite. Indeed, the actual allegations in the Petition are inconsistent with the facts that courts normally rely on to find intent for joint authorship. See, e.g., Childress, 945 F.2d 500 at 508 (billing can indicate intent for joint authorship); Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 (same); Fisher v. Klein, 86-cv-09522, 1990 WL 10072477, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1990) (copyright registrations in parties names indicate intent for co-authorship). Petitioner alleges that he had no contract with Roc-A-Fella, Pet. 55, that he and Mr. Carter never addressed the issue of legal ownership of the sound recordings or discussed any contractual arrangements or terms, id. 267. Thus, discovery is unlikely to find evidence of agreements that Petitioner alleges never took place. Petitioner further alleges that he was not included on Roc-A-Fellas copyright registrations, Pet. at 28 (Schedule C), and that he was not credited for his putative co-authorship in liner notes. See supra at 7-8. Since the only alleged facts are inconsistent with the requisite elements of joint authorship, the Petition ignores the Supreme Courts admonition in Twombly, and recites the formulaic magic words of the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Pet. 257 (Petitioner had the full intent that his [putative] contributions . . . would be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.), 265 (Mr. Carter had the full intention that his contributions . . . would be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole), 273-5 (same as to producers, rappers, and vocalists). However, Petitioner points to no facts demonstrating this purported intent, other than the self-serving assertion that hip-hop is an intrinsically collaborative musical form. See, e.g., id. 274. Such an allegation is manifestly inadequate to satisfy the Twombly standard. Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 25 of 27 21 Accordingly, all of Petitioners claims should be dismissed under the Supreme Courts Twombly standard. IV. PETITIONERS CLAIMS AGAINST MR. CARTER, AND REGARDING THE ALBUM ALL MONEY IS LEGAL, SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF AN ACTUAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. Finally, independently of the reasons above, the Petition should be dismissed, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, against Mr. Carter, who by Petitioners own admission, holds no current interest in the copyrights at issue. Likewise, the Petition should be dismissed as regards the album All Money is Legal, which is owned by Roc-A-Fellas competitor Sony. In order to bring a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. 2201, an actual controversy must exist between the parties when the case is filed. 28 U.S.C. 2201. Without such a controversy, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1); Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (We have repeatedly held that an actual controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through all stages of the litigation.) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, there is no actual controversy between Mr. Carter and Petitioner, and thus he is not a proper party to this case. According to the Petition, Mr. Carter conveyed his copyright ownership interests in all sound recordings to Roc-A-Fella . . . by way of contractual assignment under [the Copyright Act]. Pet. at 272. The relevant SR Registrations confirm that he has no current interest in the disputed sound recordings. See Bart Decl. Exs. B-F. In Shady Records, the court held that where the Petition alleged that that artist had assigned his rights to a record label, and the label had registered the challenged copyrights, the artist was not a contestant in that dispute, and there [was] no basis for involving him as a defendant. Shady Records, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 77-78. Likewise, in Parks v. ABC, the Second Circuit faced a similar factual Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 26 of 27 22 situation and held that where a defendant sold its interest in disputed songs before the applicable statute of limitations period, it could not have been responsible to the plaintiff. 341 Fed. Appx at 739. Thus, the claims should be dismissed against Mr. Carter on that basis alone. Likewise, there is no controversy between Petitioner and any Respondent regarding All Money is Legal, which is owned by Sony, a separate entity from Respondents and a competitor of Roc-A-Fellas. According to Exhibit M of the Bart Declaration, comprised of judicially- cognizable Copyright Office records and liner notes relied upon by the Petition, the sound recording was copyrighted by Sony and bears a Sony copyright notice. Id. Ex. M at 1-2, 17, 19- 20. Thus, any reference to that album, or to its Outtakes, Components, and Backups, should be stricken from the Petition. CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that this Petition be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. Respectfully submitted, By: /s/Andrew H. Bart Andrew H. Bart Lindsay W. Bowen JENNER & BLOCK LLP 919 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 891-1600 Attorneys for Respondents Roc-A-Fella Records, LLC and Shawn C. Carter Case 1:14-cv-05075-LGS Document 14 Filed 08/28/14 Page 27 of 27
CITY OF MANILA Petitioners vs. HON. ANGEL VALERA COLET As Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila Br. 43 and MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM Respondents. G.R. No. 120051 December 10 2014 PDF