Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28025 December 16, 1970
D!"D CE#EDO $ DLMN, petitioner,
vs.
%ON. MLCOLM G. SRM"ENTO, &' ()*+e o, -.e Co)r- o, /0r'- "1'-&1ce o,
P&m2&1+& &1* T%E PRO!. /"SCL O/ PMPNG, respondents.
Filemon Cajator for petitioner.
Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento in his own behalf.
Provincial Fiscal Regidor . !glipa" for and in his own behalf as respondent.

/ERNNDO, J.:
This Court not so long ago reaffirmed the doctrine that here a dismissal of a
criminal prosecution amounts to an ac!uittal, even if arising from a motion presented
b" the accused, the ban on being tice put in #eopard" ma" be invo$ed, especiall"
here such dismissal as predicated on the right to a speed" trial.
1
The specific
!uestion then that this certiorari and prohibition proceeding presents is hether on
the undisputed facts, an order of dismissal given in open court b" respondent %udge
falls ithin the operation of the above principle, precluding its reconsideration later as
the defense of double #eopard" ould be available. &ere respondent %udge did
reconsider, and his actuation is no assailed as a grave abuse of discretion. As ill
be made apparent, petitioner has the la on his side. The rits should be granted.
't as shon that on August (, )*+*, respondent Provincial ,iscal filed in the Court
of ,irst 'nstance of Pampanga a criminal information for damage to propert" through
rec$less imprudence against petitioner and a certain Chi Chan Tan. As there ere no
further proceedings in the meantime, petitioner on Ma" )*, )*-+ moved to dismiss
the criminal charge. Respondent %udge as not in agreement as shon b" his order
of denial of %ul" )., )*-+. Then, after to more "ears, came the trial ith the
complainant having testified on direct e/amination but not having as "et been full"
cross0e/amined. At the continuation of the trial set for %une 1, )*-1 such itness did
not sho up. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel for petitioner,
hoever, not onl" ob#ected but sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of
the accused to speed" trial. Respondent %udge this time acceded, but ould li$eise
base his order of dismissal, orall" given, on the cross0e/amination of complainant not
having started as "et. 2ater that same da", respondent %udge did reconsider the
order and reinstated the case, his action being due to its being shon that the cross0
e/amination of the complainant had alread" started.
3n the above facts, there can be no dispute as to the applicable la. 't is not to be
lost sight of that the petition on its face had more than its fair share of plausibilit",
thus eliciting an affirmative response to the plea for a rit of preliminar" in#unction,
dul" issued b" this Court. ,or it as all too evident that petitioner could rel" on his
constitutional right to a speed" trial. ,or more than si/ "ears the threat of his being
sub#ected to a penal liabilit" did hang over his head, ith the prosecution failing to
ta$e an" step to have the matter heard. &e did as$ that the case be dismissed, but
respondent %udge turned him don. 4hen the trial did at long last ta$e place after
to more "ears and again postponement as sought as the complainant as not
available for cross0 e/amination, petitioner, as could have been e/pected, did again
see$ to put an end to his travail ith a motion for dismissal grounded once more on
the undeniable fact that he as not accorded the speed" trial that as his due. This
time respondent %udge as !uite receptive 5 and about time too. The order of
dismissal given in open court had then the effect of an ac!uittal. ,or the respondent
%udge to give vent to a change of heart ith his reconsideration as to sub#ect
petitioner to the ris$ of being put in #eopard" once more. Nor could respondent
%udge6s allegation that he could do so as he acted under a misapprehension be
impressed ith the !ualit" of persuasiveness. The decisive fact as the absence of
that speed" trial guaranteed b" the Constitution. This petition then, to repeat,
possesses merit.
). The right to a speed" trial means one free from ve/atious, capricious and
oppressive dela"s, its salutar" ob#ective being to assure that an innocent person ma"
be free from the an/iet" and e/pense of a court litigation or, if otherise, of having
his guilt determined ithin the shortest possible time compatible ith the
presentation and consideration of hatever legitimate defense he ma" interpose.
2

The remed" in the event of a non0observance of this right is b" habeas corpus if the
accused ere restrained of his libert", or b" certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for
the final dismissal of the case.
3

'n the first 7upreme Court decision after the Constitution too$ effect, an appeal from
a #udgment of conviction, it as shon that the criminal case had been dragging on
for almost five "ears. 4hen the trial did finall" ta$e place, it as tainted b"
irregularities. 4hile ordinaril" the remed" ould have been to remand the case again
for a ne trial, the appealed decision of conviction as set aside and the accused
ac!uitted. 7uch a #udgment as called for according to the opinion penned b"
%ustice 2aurel, if this constitutional right ere to be accorded respect and deference.
Thus8 9The :overnment should be the last to set an e/ample of dela" and
oppression in the administration of #ustice and it is the moral and legal obligation of
1
this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused came to an end
and that the" be immediatel" discharged from the custod" of the la.9
4

Conformabl" to the above ruling as ell as the earlier case of Conde v. Rivera,
5
the
dismissal of a second information for frustrated homicide as ordered b" the
7upreme Court on a shoing that the first information had been dismissed after a
lapse of one "ear and seven months from the time the original complaint as filed
during hich time on the three occasions the case as set for trial, the private
prosecutor tice as$ed for postponements and once the trial court itself cancelled
the entire calendar for the month it as supposed to have been heard. As pointed out
in such decision8 9The right of the accused to have a speed" trial is violated not onl"
hen un#ustified postponements of the trial are as$ed for and secured, but also
hen, ithout good cause or #ustifiable motive, a long period of time is alloed to
elapse ithout having his case tried.9 6 't did not matter that in this case the
postponements ere sought and obtained b" the private prosecution, although ith
the consent and approval of the fiscal. Nor as there a aiver and abandonment of
the right to a speed" trial hen there as a failure on the part of the accused to urge
that the case be heard. 97uch a aiver or abandonment ma" be presumed onl"
hen the postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained ;b" him<9. 7 A
finding that there as an infringement of this right as predicated on an accused
having been criminall" prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastit" in a #ustice of the
peace court as a result of hich he as arrested three times, each time having to
post a bond for his provisional libert". Mandamus to compel the trial #udge to dismiss
the case as under the circumstances the appropriate remed". 8
'n Mercado v. Santos, 9 the second occasion %ustice 2aurel had to rite the opinion
for the 7upreme Court in a case of this nature, the transgression of this constitutional
mandate came about ith petitioner having in a space of tent" months been
arrested four times on the charge of falsif"ing his deceased ife6s ill, the first to
complaints having been subse!uentl" ithdran onl" to be refiled a third time and
thereafter dismissed after due investigation b" the #ustice of the peace. =ndeterred
the provincial fiscal filed a motion for reinvestigation favorabl" acted on b" the Court
of ,irst 'nstance hich finall" ordered that the case be heard on the merits. At this
stage the accused moved to dismiss but as rebuffed. &e sought the aid of the Court
of Appeals in a petition for certiorari but did not prevail. 't as then that the matter
as elevated to the 7upreme Court hich reversed the Court of Appeals, the
accused 9being entitled to have the criminal proceedings against him !uashed.9 't
as stressed in %ustice 2aurel6s opinion8 9An accused person is entitled to a trial at
the earliest opportunit". ... &e cannot be oppressed b" dela"ing the commencement
of trial for an unreasonable length of time. 'f the proceedings pending trial are
deferred, the trial itself is necessaril" dela"ed. 't is not to be supposed, of course,
that the Constitution intends to remove from the prosecution ever" reasonable
opportunit" to prepare for trial. 'mpossibilities cannot be e/pected or e/traordinar"
efforts re!uired on the part of the prosecutor or the court.9
10
The opinion li$eise
considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until an
information as filed charging the accused ith the crime of falsification the third
time. Thus8 9The Constitution does not sa" that the right to a speed" trial ma" be
availed of onl" here the prosecution for crime is commenced and underta$en b" the
fiscal. 't does not e/clude from its operation cases commenced b" private individuals.
4here once a person is prosecuted criminall", he is entitled to a speed" trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in hich it is authori>ed to be
commenced.9
11

?. More specificall", this Court has consistentl" adhered to the vie that a dismissal
based on the denial of the right to a speed" trial amounts to an ac!uittal. Necessaril",
an" further attempt at continuing the prosecution or starting a ne one ould fall
ithin the prohibition against an accused being tice put in #eopard". The e/tensive
opinion of %ustice Castro in People v. #bsania noted earlier made reference to four
Philippine decisions, People v. $ia%,
12
People v. !bano,
13
People v. Robles,
14
and
People v. Cloribel.
15
'n all of the above cases, this Court left no doubt that a
dismissal of the case, though at the instance of the defendant grounded on the
disregard of his right to a speed" trial as tantamount to an ac!uittal. 'n People v.
$ia%, it as shon that the case as set for hearing tice and the prosecution
ithout as$ing for postponement or giving an" e/planation failed to appear. 'n People
v. !bano, the facts disclosed that there ere three postponements. Thereafter, at the
time the resumption of the trial as scheduled, the complaining itness as in this
case as absent@ this Court held that respondent %udge as #ustified in dismissing
the case upon motion of the defense and that the annulment or setting aside of the
order of dismissal ould place the accused tice in #eopard" of punishment for the
same offense. People v. Robles li$eise presented a picture of itnesses for the
prosecution not being available, ith the loer court after having transferred the
hearings on several occasions den"ing the last plea for postponement and
dismissing the case. 7uch order of dismissal, according to this Court 9is not
provisional in character but one hich is tantamount to ac!uittal that ould bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.9
16
This is a summar" of the
Cloribel case as set forth in the above opinion of %ustice Castro8 9'n Cloribel, the case
dragged for three "ears and eleven months, that is, from 7eptember ?1, )*+A hen
the information as filed to August )+, )*-? hen it as called for trial, after
numerous postponements, mostl" at the instance of the prosecution. 3n the latter
date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon motion of defendants, the
case as dismissed. This Court held &that the dismissal here complained of was not
trul" a &dismissal& but an ac'uittal. For it was entered upon the defendants& insistense
on their constitutional right to speed" trial and b" reason of the prosecution&s failure
to appear on the date of trial.& BEmphasis supplied.C9
17
There is no escaping the
conclusion then that petitioner here has clearl" made out a case of an ac!uittal
arising from the order of dismissal given in open court.
(. Respondent %udge ould rel" on Cabarroguis v. San $iego
18
to lend support to
the reconsideration of his order of dismissal. The case is not applicable@ the factual
setting is different. The order of dismissal set aside in that case arose from the belief
of the court that the crime of estafa as not committed as the liabilit" as civil in
character. At no stage then as there a plea that the accused as denied his right to
a speed" trial. The reconsideration as granted as there as documentar" evidence
to sho that the intention to defraud on the part of the accused could be shon.
=nder such circumstances, this Court sa no grave abuse of discretion in the
actuation of the trial #udge. To repeat, the proceeding no before this Court is
2
an"thing but that. Petitioner not once but tice did see$ to have the prosecution for
damage to propert" against him terminated as the matter as pending for at least si/
"ears, the first time he sought to put an end to it. 4hen at last, the trial stage as
reached, the complaining itness testified on direct e/amination but made no
appearance hen his cross0e/amination as to be continued. A clear case of a
denial of the right to a speed" trial as thus made out. There as an order of
dismissal that amounted to an ac!uittal. No reconsideration could therefore be had
ithout offending the provision on double #eopard".
4&ERE,3RE, the rit of certiorari is granted annulling the order of respondent
%udge of %une 1, )*-1 reconsidering his order of dismissal and reinstating the
criminal case against petitioner. The rit of prohibition is li$eise granted,
respondent %udge and respondent Provincial ,iscal of Pampanga being restrained
and precluded from continuing ith this case against petitioner, no ad#udged
definitel" dismissed. The rit of preliminar" in#unction issued is made permanent.
3