THIRD DIVISION

DR. JOSE S. LUNA,

Complainant,



-versus-



JUDGE EDUARDO H.
MIRAFUENTE, Municipal Trial Court,
Buenavista, Marinduque,
Respondent.


A. M. No. MTJ-05-1610
[formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1548-MTJ]

Present:

PANGANIBAN, Chairman,
SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.


Promulgated:


September 26, 2005


x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N


CARPIO MORALES, J .:


Judge Eduardo H. Mirafuente of the Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista,
Marinduque, respondent, is charged with Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service, Violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure in
Special Cases and Gross Ignorance of the Law by Dr. Jose S. Luna (Dr. Luna)
arising from respondents act of giving due course to the belatedly filed and
unverified answer of the defendants in a complaint for unlawful detainer.

In May 2003, Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as
Civil Case No. Y2K3-01, against Florencio Sadiwa and Alex Sadiwa (the
defendants) with the Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista, Marinduque presided by
respondent.

As adverted to above, the defendants filed an unverified answer to the
complaint, seven (7) days beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) days from the
service of the summons on them.

In mid July 2003, Dr. Lunas counsel filed a Motion for Judgment,
[1]
invoking
Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, to which motion the
defendants did not file any opposition. By Order
[2]
of August 28, 2003 respondent
denied the motion.

Dr. Luna later filed an Urgent Manifestation
[3]
relative to the said order of
respondent which the latter treated as a motion for reconsideration and which he
denied.

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint
[4]
against respondent, Dr.
Luna asserting that as the defendants answer was unverified and belatedly filed,
respondent should havemotu proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs rendered
judgment as warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, following Section 6 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

In his Comment
[5]
dated April 16, 2004, respondent explains that his admission
of the defendants unverified, belatedly filed answer was premised on the spirit of
justice and fair play, which underlie[s] every court litigation and serves as the
bedrock to preserve the trust and faith of parties litigants in the judicial system; that
the admission was proper because the delay was negligible, it involving only four (4)
days as June 13 to 15, 2003 were non-working holidays (per presidential
proclamation in connection with the Independence Day celebration); that the
defendants might have believed that the period to file answer was 15 days, which is
the usual or common period to file an answer; and that the delay was also excusable
as defendants acted pro se, without the benefit of legal assistance, and not dilatory.

At any rate, respondent contends that, assuming arguendo that he erred in
denying Dr. Lunas Motion for Judgment, a judge may not be held administratively
liable for every erroneous order or decision, for to hold otherwise would render
judicial office untenable as no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering the law can be infallible in his judgment. Besides,
respondent adds, there is a judicial remedy to correct the error.

For ignorance of the law, the Office of the Court Administrator, by Report and
Recommendation
[6]
dated December 21, 2004, recommends that respondent be
faulted and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P11,000.00, with stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote the ends of
justice by administering it speedily and impartially. A judge is the visible
representation of the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not
even have to be emphasized, but to which this Court is wont to advert when
members of the judiciary commit legal faux pas, hopefully only through unwitting
error or inattention.
[7]


Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence
in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
[8]
Such a
requirement is especially demanded in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.

For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases involve perturbation of social
order, which must be restored as promptly as possible, such that technicalities or
details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be
avoided.
[9]
That explains why the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which
governs ejectment, among other cases, lays down procedural safeguards to guarantee
expediency and speedy resolution.

Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provide:

Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and
serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. xxx

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant
fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided,
the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion
reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for
being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without
prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, if there are two or more defendants. (Italics in the original,
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The word shall in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character.
[10]
Giving the
provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule and defeat its
objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits covered thereby. To admit a late
answer is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers the very mischief that the Rule
seeks to redress.

In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation of the above-said
Rule. Liberal interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, is not a free
commodity that may be availed of in all instances under the cloak of rendering
justice. Liberality in the interpretation and application of Rules applies only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.
[11]


Respondents act, albeit a disregard of procedural rules, does not, however,
constitute grave misconduct.
Neither does it constitute gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance
transcends a simple error in the application of legal provisions. In the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
[12]


For liability for ignorance of the law to attach, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to
be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that the issuance thereof
was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive.
[13]
Any of
such circumstances does not obtain in the instant case.

That respondent granted complainants motion for inhibition
[14]
just to erase
any nagging doubts on his impartiality and fairness negates malice or any like motive
on his part.

Respondents act of admitting the belated answer violated Section 6 of the
above-quoted Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, which violation is
classified as less serious charge
[15]
under Section 9 of Rule 140, as amended by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC
[16]
(Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars).

In Ruperto v. Banquerigo
[17]
wherein the therein respondent Judge was
charged also for violation of some provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary
Judgment, he was severely reprimanded after taking into account the fact that he was
not only detailed to the court where the cases therein involved were pending, but also
to other courts. Such multiple assignments were seen to affect his efficient handling
of cases. Additionally, lack of showing of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations on the part of the judge was appreciated.

Respecting respondents admission of the unverified answer of the defendants,
while paragraph (B) of Section 3 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
requires that all pleadings shall be verified, the requirement is formal, not
jurisdictional. The court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification
is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the end of justice may thereby be served.
[18]


After considering the appreciation by respondent of the fact that the defendants
filed a belated and unverified answer without the assistance of counsel, and the lack
of showing of malice, corrupt motives or the like on his part, this Court finds that, as
in the above-cited Ruperto case, the penalty may be as it is hereby mitigated to
severe reprimand.

WHEREFORE, for violation of Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, respondent Judge Eduardo H. Mirafuente is hereby SEVERELY
REPRIMANDED
[19]
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more strictly.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134498 November 13, 2001
CELIA M. MERIZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
VITUG, J .:
A maxim in statutory construction mandates that penal statutes should be strictly
construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. The phrase,
truly, may not be a mere clich but, so also, it is not meant to wrongly shield an
accused from criminal liability.
On appeal to this Court is the decision, dated 06 July 1999, of the Court of Appeals
(6
th
Division), in CA-G.R. No. 18985 affirming in toto the decision of the court a
quo in Criminal Case No. 90-5598 to Criminal Case No. 5601, inclusive, which
found Celia M. Meriz, herein petitioner, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
transgressed Batas Pambansa ("BP") Bilang 22.
Petitioner was engaged in the business of manufacturing garments for export using
the name and style of "Hi-Marc Needlecraft." During the course of her business
undertakings, she obtained a number of loans from Amelia Santos (Santos) and
Summit Financing Corporation. Sometime in 1988, petitioner issued in favor of
Santos four Pilipinas Bank Checks in the aggregate amount of P188,400.00. Santos
deposited the checks with her bank. The checks, however, were later returned, with
the notation "Insufficient Funds" tamped on the dorsal portion of each check,
1
by the
depositary bank.1wphi1.nt
On 15 December 1988, Santos, through her counsel, sent a telegram to petitioner,
reading
"Unless your bounced checkes for Two Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand
Three Hundred Pesos paid in cash in three (3) days, [we] shall institute
criminal action."
2

Despite the warning, petitioner failed to settle her account. On 05 January 1990,
another demand letter was sent; it read:
"Your account with Mr. and Mrs. Leonardo G. Santos as of December 1,
1989 has amounted to P285,773.90.
"In this connection we demand that you settle this account within seven (7)
days from receipt hereof. Failing to do so, we might be constrained to take
legal action, including damages and attorneys fees."
3

On 12 January 1990, petitioner acknowledged the letter-demand; she wrote thusly:
"Dear Mr. Santos,
"RE: OUR OUTSTANDING ACCOUNT OF P285,733.90
"With reference to the DEMAND LETTER dated January 5, 1990 [sent] to
us by your counsel Vicente P. Fernando, we would like to request from you
to please give us a little more time to settle said account with you.
"Business has not been good the past year and up to now we havent
collected yet from our buyer. Weve been doing all possible means to
generate funds and be able to settle our account. For the meantime, all we
ask from you is give us more time.
"We thank you for the consideration.
"Very truly yours,
"(Sgd.) CELIA M. MERIZ"
4

Still, petitioner did not settle the obligation.
In due time, four informations for violation of BP 22 were filed before Branch 147 of
the Regional trial Court of Makati City; to wit:
"Criminal Case No. 90-5598
"That on or about the 30
th
day of September, 1988, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused being then the authorized signatory of
Hi-Marc Needle Craft, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Amelia A. Santos, to apply on
account or for value the check described below:
Check No. 01587894
Drawn Against Pilipinas Bank
- 135 Sen. Gil Puyal Ave.,
Makati, Metro Manila
In the amount of P47,100.00
Dated September 30, 1988
Payable to Amelia Santos
said accused well knowing fully that at the time of issue Hi-Marc
Needlecraft had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
Drawn against insufficient funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of
notice of dishonor, the accused and or Hi-Marc Needlecraft failed to pay
said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment thereof, within five (5) banking days after receiving notice."
5

Criminal Case No. 90-5599
"That on or about the 31
st
day of October, 1988, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused being then the authorized signatory of
Hi-Marc Needle Craft, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Amelia A. Santos, to apply on
account or for value the check described below:
Check No. 01587895
Drawn Against Pilipinas Bank
- 135 Sen. Gil Puyal Ave.
Makati, Metro Manila
In the amount of P47,100.00
Dated October 31, 1988
Payable to Amelia Santos
said accused well knowing fully that at the time of issue Hi-Marc
Needlecraft had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
Drawn against insufficient funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of
notice of dishonor, the accused and or Hi-Marc Needlecraft failed to pay
said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment thereof, within five (5) banking days after receiving notice."
6

Criminal Case No. 90-5600
"That on or about the 30
th
day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused being then the authorized signatory of
Hi-Marc Needle Craft, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Amelia A. Santos, to apply on
account or for value the check described below:
Check No. 01587896
Drawn Against Pilipinas Bank
- 135 Sen. Gil Puyal Ave.
Makati, Metro Manila
In the amount of P47,100.00
Dated November 30, 1988
Payable to Amelia Santos
said accused well knowing fully that at the time of issue Hi-Marc
Needlecraft had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
Drawn against insufficient funds and despite receipt of notice of dishonor,
the accused and or Hi-Marc Needlecraft failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof,
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice."
7

Criminal Case No. 90-5601
"That on or about the 15
th
day of December, 1988, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused being then the authorized signatory of
Hi-Marc Needle Craft, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Amelia A. Santos, to apply on
account or for value the check described below:
Check No. 01587897
Drawn Against Pilipinas Bank
- 135 Sen. Gil Puyal Ave.
Makati, Metro Manila
In the amount of P47,100.00
Dated December 15, 1988
Payable to Amelia Santos
said accused well knowing fully that at the time of issue Hi-Marc
Needlecraft had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
Drawn against insufficient funds and despite receipt of notice of dishonor,
the accused and or Hi-Marc Needlecraft failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof,
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice."
8

Pleas of "not guilty" were entered by the accused at the arraignment. Trial ensued
with both parties submitting their respective cases. On 16 March 1994, the trial
court, following the reception of evidence, rendered its judgment convicting
petitioner of all the charges; it held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, hereby sentences her
to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year in each of these cases, and to
indemnify the complainant the sum of P47,100.00 in each case. With
costs."
9

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case, docketed CA-G.R. CR No. 18985, to the
Court of Appeals. In its decision of 06 July 1998, the appellate court affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner, in the instant appeal, would have it that there was an absolute lack of
consideration for the subject checks which were issued only as a condition for the
grant of loan in her favor and that the requisite element of notice was not complied
with.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The essential elements of the offense penalized under BP 22 are "(1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."
10

The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of the
check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The Court
has since said
11
that a "check issued as an evidence of debt, although not intended for
encashment, has the same effect like any other check" and must thus be held to be
"within the contemplation of BP 22." Once a check is presented for payment, the
drawee bank gives it the usual course whether issued in payment of an obligation or
just as a guaranty of an obligation.
12
BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with
what might actually be envisioned by the parties,
13
its primordial intention being to
instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual
substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for
their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be
made. The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act
effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query
then is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad
check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.
14

The element of "knowledge" involves a state of mind that obviously would be
difficult to establish; hence, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of
knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit coincidental with the attendance of
the two other elements. Section 2 of the Act provides:
"Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee
bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee."
The Court has elucidated in one case
15
thusly
"The begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the
issuer at the time of the checks issuance that he did not have enough funds
or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22
creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie
exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present (Magno
vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 471). But such evidence may be rebutted.
If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor
of the issue, which it supports (People vs. Nuque, 58 O.G. 844). As pointed
out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of
petitioners funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for
insufficiency of funds."
The prima facie presumption that the drawer has knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds or credit at the time of the issuance, or on the presentment for payment, of the
check might be rebutted by payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or
by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonor given to the
drawer. The payment could thus be a complete defense that would lie regardless of
the strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution.
16
It must be presupposed then
that the issuer receives a notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt
thereof, he would have failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement
for its payment.
Anent the notice of dishonor, petitioner bewails the inaccuracy thereof. She
underscores the fact that the questioned checks have not been sufficiently identified.
There is nothing in the law, however, that prescribes the contents of a notice of
dishonor except that the same be in writing as opposed to a mere oral notice.
17

Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that a telegram, dated 15
December 1988, and a demand letter, dated 05 January 1990, were sent to petitioner.
The latter, in reply to the 05 January 1990 letter, acknowledged her liability and
indeed sought an extension within which to satisfy her account. A review of the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not a function that the Supreme Court
undertakes, and there is here no cogent reason to depart from the rule.
All told, the judgment of conviction must be upheld. Given the circumstances,
however, the Court deems it appropriate to modify the sentence of the trial court by
deleting the prison sentence of one (1) year and, in its stead, imposing a fine of
P94,200.00 in each of the cases.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the prison sentence
of one year and, in its stead, imposing, as the Court so hereby imposes, a fine of
P94,200.00 in each of the cases, herein involved, on petitioner Celia M. Meriz. The
award of civil indemnity made by the trial court in favor of private complainant is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.































G.R. No. 176832 May 21, 2009
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIAN T. VICENCIO Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, CJ .:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision
2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR SP No. 74790 which set aside the Decision
3
of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-14245-702. The ECC denied respondent
Marian T. Vicencios (Mrs. Vicencios) claim for the death benefits of her husband,
the late Judge Honorato S. Vicencio (Judge Vicencio).
The facts are established.
Judge Vicencio entered government service in 1964 as a Legal Researcher of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). In 1966, after passing the bar
examinations, he became an Assistant Attorney. He rose from the ranks until he was
promoted to Senior Bank Attorney, which position he held until his retirement from
DBP in 1985.
In 1987, Judge Vicencio re-entered government service as Assistant Fiscal for the
City of Manila. In 1992, he was appointed as Judge of Branch 27, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila. In 1999, he was appointed as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of
Branch 17, Manila and served as such until his death in 2001.
Records
4
show that on November 30, 2000, Judge Vicencio suffered loss of
consciousness due to pericardial effusion. He was admitted at the Makati Medical
Center where he was diagnosed with Adenocarcinoma of the Left Lung with
Metastases to Pedicardium. He underwent intravenous chemotherapy. He was
confined from November 30, 2000 to May 7, 2001.
On May 31, 2001, Judge Vicencio died. Per his Death Certificate,
5
the immediate
cause of his death was Cardiopulmonary Arrest, and the antecedent cause was T/C
Fatal Arrythmia. No underlying cause of death was indicated in his Death
Certificate. He was survived by his wife, respondent Mrs. Vicencio, and daughter,
Mary Joy Celine Vicencio.
Respondent Mrs. Vicencio applied for the death benefits of her late husband with
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) but her application was
denied by Mr. Marcelino S. Alejo, Manager of the GSIS Employees Compensation
Department, on the ground that the illness which caused Judge Vicencios death is
not considered an occupational disease and there is no showing that his work as RTC
Judge has increased his risk of contracting said ailment.
6
Respondent Mrs. Vicencio
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
7

On June 17, 2002, respondent Mrs. Vicencio appealed to the ECC but the same was
dismissed.
8

Respondent Mrs. Vicencio filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court with the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the ECC as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Employees Compensation Commission, dated November 6, 2002, in ECC Case
No. GM-14245-702 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The GSIS is
ORDERED to grant the claim for the death benefits of Judge Honorato S. Vicencio
under the Employees Compensation Act. No costs.
9

Petitioner GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
CA in its Resolution dated February 26, 2007.
10

Hence, this Petition.
The sole issue is whether or not respondent Mrs. Vicencios claim for death benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626 (P.D. No. 626), as amended, is compensable.
Petitioner GSIS argues that based on the medical records in this case, Judge
Vicencios underlying cause of death was Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs with
Metastases. According to petitioner GSIS, the cause of death stated in his Death
Certificate, Cardiopulmonary Arrest T/C Fatal Arrythmia, was a mere complication
of his lung cancer. However, the attending physician did not fill up the portion on the
Death Certificate to indicate that the underlying cause (which was left in blank) was
Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs with Metastases. Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs is not
an occupational disease listed under the law. Pursuant to Annex "A" of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation, lung cancer is occupational only with respect to
vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. According to petitioner GSIS,
respondent Mrs. Vicencio failed to show by substantial evidence that the risk of
contracting the same was increased by his working conditions.
On the one hand, respondent Mrs. Vicencio contends that per the Death Certificate of
her husband, the cause of his death was Cardiopulmonary Arrest T/C Fatal
Arrythmia. According to respondent Mrs. Vicencio, the CA correctly found that the
requisites for cardiovascular disease to be compensable under paragraph (r) of ECC
Resolution No. 432
11
were satisfied; hence, the death of her husband is compensable.
Respondent Mrs. Vicencio adds that assuming only lung cancer was the cause of
death of her husband, the same is still compensable. She argues that the CA correctly
held that the nature of work and the corresponding difficulties brought about by
Judge Vicencios duties and work contributed to the development of his illness.
We affirm the decision of the CA.
P.D. No. 626, as amended, defines compensable sickness as "any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused
by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by the working conditions." Under Section 1 (b), Rule III, of the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the same must be an "occupational disease"
included in the list provided (Annex "A"), with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, the claimant must show proof that the risk of contracting it is increased by
the working conditions. Otherwise stated, for sickness and the resulting death of an
employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of
an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so
listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
First, we hold that the CA correctly considered Cardiopulmonary Arrest T/C Fatal
Arrythmia in this case a cardiovascular disease a listed disease under Annex "A" of
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
The Death Certificate of Judge Vicencio clearly indicates that the cause of his death
is Cardiopulmonary Arrest T/C Fatal Arrythmia. Whether, however, the same was a
mere complication of his lung cancer as contended by petitioner GSIS or related to
an underlying cardiovascular disease is not established by the records of this case
and, thus, remains uncertain.
It must be remembered that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose
primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against
the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of
income. Thus, the official agents charged by law to implement social justice
guaranteed by the Constitution should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the
employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis
in the facts for inferring a work-connection with the illness or injury, as the case may
be. It is only this kind of interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code
which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of the Labor Code including their implementing rules and regulations should be
resolved in favor of labor.
12

Guided by this policy, we therefore hold that Cardiopulmonary Arrest T/C Fatal
Arrythmia, the cause of death stated in Judge Vicencios Death Certificate, should be
considered as a cardiovascular disease - a listed disease under Annex "A" of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.1avvphi1
Considering the stress and pressures of work inherent in the duties of a judge and it
was established that Judge Vicencio was doing work in his office a few days
immediately before the moment of his cardiac arrest,
13
we sustain the findings of the
CA that the requisites for cardiovascular disease to be compensable under paragraph
(r) of ECC Resolution No. 432 are satisfied in the case at bar.
Granting, however, that the only cause of Judge Vicencios death is lung cancer, we
are still one with the CA in its finding that the working conditions of the late Judge
Vicencio contributed to the development of his lung cancer.
It is true that under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
lung cancer is occupational only with respect to vinyl chloride workers and plastic
workers. However, this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the
complainant can adduce substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness is
increased or aggravated by the working conditions to which the employee is exposed
to.
It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely
substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." What the law requires is a
reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workman's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to
the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.
14
It is not
required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or
acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is
enough that his employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the
development of the disease.
15

The late Judge Vicencio was a frontline officer in the administration of justice, being
the most visible living representation of this country's legal and judicial system.
16
It
is undisputed that throughout his noble career from Fiscal to Metropolitan Trial
Court Judge, and, finally, to RTC Judge, his work dealt with stressful daily work
hours, and constant and long-term contact with voluminous and dusty records. We
also take judicial notice that Judge Vicencios workplace at the Manila City Hall had
long been a place with sub-standard offices of judges and prosecutors overflowing
with records of cases covered up in dust and are poorly ventilated. All these, taken
together, necessarily contributed to the development of his lung illness.
The case of Dator v. Employees Compensation Commission
17
should be instructive:
Until now the cause of cancer is not known. Despite this fact, however, the
Employees' Compensation Commission has listed some kinds of cancer as
compensable. There is no reason why cancer of the lungs should not be considered as
a compensable disease. The deceased worked as a librarian for about 15 years.
During all that period she was exposed to dusty books and other deleterious
substances in the library under unsanitary conditions. (eiomphasis added)
On a final note, it bears stressing that the late Judge Vicencio worked in the
government for a total of 37 years.
18
He is survived by his wife, respondent Mrs.
Vicencio, and a daughter.lavvphil.net Their claim for death benefits has been
pending since 2001. As the public agency charged by law in implementing P.D. No.
626, petitioner GSIS should not lose sight of the fact that the constitutional guarantee
of social justice towards labor demands a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.