JURISPRUDENCE IN POLITICAL LAW

Funda-
mental
Powers of
the State
EMINENT DOMAIN; Expropriation; It may be
initiated by court action or by legislation. In both
instances, just compensation is determined by the
courts.
Republic v.
Salem
Investment
orp., !R
"#$%&',
(une )#,
)***.
Same; Same; Two stages +", the determination
of the authority of the plainti- to e.ercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
e.ercise in the conte.t of the facts involved in the
suit/ +), the determination by the court of just
compensation for the property sought to be ta0en.
1he two stages apply to both judicial and
legislative e.propriation and said stages are not
complete until payment of just compensation. It is
only upon payment of just compensation that title
to the property passes to the government
id.
Same; Same; Expropriation s!it is in"apa#$e
o% pe"!niar& estimation and falls w2in the
jurisdiction of the R1, regardless of the value of
the subject property.
3arangay
San Ro4ue
v. 5eirs of
Pastor, !R
"#66'&,
(une )*,
)***.
Same; Same; Entr&; 1he re4uirements of 78
"*#%, i.e., conduct of feasibility studies,
information campaign and detailed
engineering2surveys, are not conditions precedent
to the issuance of a writ of possession against the
property being e.propriated. 1he re4mts for the
issuance of a writ of possession, once the
e.propriation case is 9led, are e.pressly and
speci9cally governed by Sec. ), Rule &$ of the
"''$ Rules of ivil Procedure. Pursuant to said rule
and the Robern :evelopment orp. case, the only
re4uisites for authori;ing immediate entry in
e.propriation proceedings are< ="> the FI?I@! of a
complaint for e.propriation suAcient in form and
substance/ =)> the ma0ing of a :7P8SI1 e4uivalent
to the assessed value of the property subject to
e.propriation. 1he owners of the e.propriated land
are entitled to ?7!B? I@17R7S1 on the
compensation eventually adjudged from the date
the condemnor ta0es possession of the land until
the full compensation is paid to them or deposited
in court.
3iglang-awa
v. (udge
3acalla, !R
"#'')$ and
"#''#&,
@ov. )),
)***.
Same; Same; Rig't o% Wa&; 1he ac4uisition of
an easement of right of way falls w2in the power of
eminent domain.
amarines
@orte
7lectric
oop. v. B,
!R "*'##6,
@ov. )*,
)***
iti;enshi
p
I% an A$ien =i> gave or donated his money to a
citi;en of the Phils. so that the latter could invest it
in the purchase of private agricultural lands, or =ii>
han Sui 3i
v. B, !R
")'%*$,
purchased private agricultural lands for a citi;en of
the Phils., such acts, provided they are done in
!88: FBI15, do not violate our laws. Chat is
prohibited by the Bnti-:ummy ?aw and the Retail
1rade ?aw then prevailing were the ac4uisition by
an alien for himself of private lands in the Phils.,
and his conduct of retail trade, respectively.
Sept, )',
)***.
E(TRADITION; Rig't to Noti"e an) *earing;
Private respondent does not have the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the e.tradition process, for the -. reasons< ="> P:
"*&' w2c implements the RP-DS 7.tradition 1reaty
provides the time when an e.tradite shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for e.tradition as
well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the 9ling of
the said petition in the e.tradition court. 1here is
no provision in the above law and treaty w2c gives
an e.trditee the right to demand from the Sec. of
(ustice copies of the e.tradition re4uest from the
DS government and its supporting documents and
to comment thereon while the re4uest is still
undergoing evaluation/ =)> Bll treaties, including
the RP-DS 7.tradition 1reaty, should be interpreted
in the light of their intent. 1he RP-DS 7.tradition
1reaty calls for an interpretation that will minimi;e
if not prevent the escape of the e.tradite form the
long arm of the law and e.pidite their trial/ =#> 1he
7.ecutive :ept., thru the :FB and the :8(, has
steadfastly maintained that the RP-DS 7.tradition
1reaty and P: "*&' do not grant the private
respondent a right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the e.tradition process. 1his
understanding of the treaty is shared by the DS
government, the other party to the treaty. 8ther
countries w2 similar e.tradition treaties w2 the
Phils. have e.pressed the same interpretation
adopted by the Phils. and Ds governments/ =E> Bn
e.tradition proceeding is sui generic. It is not a
criminal proceeding that will call into operation all
the rights of the accused guaranteed by the 3ill of
Rights.
Sec. of
(ustice v.
?antion, !R
"#'E&%,
8ct. "$,
)***.
3ill of
Rights
DUE PROCESS; B decision is void for lac0 of due
process, as when a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard. B void judgment never
ac4uires 9nality.
1he
Summary
:ismissal
3oard v.
1orcita, !R
"#*EE#,
Bpril &,
)***.
Same; B denial of due process suAces to cast on
the oAcial acts ta0en by whatever branch of
government the impression of @D??I1F. B decision
rendered w2o due process is void ab initio and may
be attac0ed directly or collaterally.
Dy v. B, !R
"*'%%$,
@ov. )',
)***.
E+UAL PROTECTION O, T*E LAW; the doctrine
that if the conviction of the accused rests upon the
same evidence used to convict the co-accused, the
ac4uittal of the former should bene9t the latter.
Such doctrine does not apply to this case. 1he
strongest pieces of evidence against petitioner
Peligrino v.
People, !R
"#&)&&,
Bug. "#,
)**".
were the ones obtained from the entrapment, in
which 3uenafe was not involved. 5ence, the
evidence against petitioner and that against his co-
accused were simply not at par with each other.
,REEDOM ,ROM UNREASONA-LE SEARC*ES
AND SEI.URES; In cases where warrant is
necessary, the steps prescribed by the onstitution
and reiterated in the Rules of ourt must be
complied with. In the e.ceptional events where
warrant is not necessary to e-ect a valid search or
sei;ure, or when the latter cannot be performed
e.cept without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or sei;ure is
purely a judicial 4uestion, determinable from the
uni4ueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or sei;ure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and sei;ure was made,
the place or thing searched and the character of
the articles procured.
Posadas vs.
B, "66
SRB )66
+"''*,,
citing People
vs. FI of
Ri;al, "*"
SRB 6&
+"''&,.
Same; Warrant o% Arrest; Re4uirements for the
valid issuance of search warrant< ="> the warrant
must be issued upon probable cause/ =)>
PR83B3?7 BDS7 must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person/ =#> In determining probable cause, the
judge must 7GBHI@7 under oath or aArmation the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce/ =E> the warrant issued must
PBR1ID?BR?F :7SRI37 the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be sei;ed. B
description of the place to be searched is suAcient
if the oAcer w2 the warrant can, w2 reasonable
e-ort, ascertain and identify the place intended
and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Search Carrants are not issued on
loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere
suspicion or belief. In this case, most of the items
listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of
PBR1ID?BRI1F, especially since the witness had
furnished the judge photocopies of the documents
sought to be sei;ed. 1he search warrant is
separable, and those items not particularly
described may be cut o- w2o destroying the whole
warrant.
Dy v. 3IR,
!R ")'&%",
8ct. )*,
)***.
Same; Same; Pro#a#$e Ca!se; For the issuance
of search warrants, the Rules of ourt re4uires a
9nding of probable cause in connection w2 one
speci9c o-ense to be :717RHI@7: P7RS8@B??F 3F
157 (D:!7 after e.amining the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. Since, in this case,
there is no crime to spea0 of, the search warrant is
null and void and all property sei;ed by virtue
thereof shall be returned in accordance w2
established jurisprudence.
Savage v.
(udge
1aypin, !R
"#E)"$,
Hay "",
)***.
Same; Same; J!ris)i"tion; B search warrant is
merely a process issued by the court in the
e.ercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a
criminal action w2c it may entertain pursuant to its
original jurisdiction. 1he authority to issue search
id.
warrants is inherent in all courts and may e-ected
outside their territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners
apparently misconstrued the import of the
designation of Special ourts of IPR. Bdministrative
8rder @o. ""#-'% merely speci9ed w2c court could
try and decide cases involving violations of the IPR.
It did not, and could not, vest e.clusive jurisdiction
w2 regard to all matters +including the issuance of
search warrants and other judicial processes, in
any one court. (urisdiction is conferred upon courts
by substantive law, in this case, 3P 3lg. ")', and
not by a procedural rule, much less by an
administrative order. 1he power to issue search
warrants for violation of IPR has not been
e.clusively vested in the courts enumerated in S
Bdmin 8rder @o. ""#-'%. erti9cation against
forum-shopping is not re4uired in applications for
search warrants.
Warrant$ess Sear"' an) Sei/!re; 1he
constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and sei;ures is not absolute but admits of
certain e.ceptions, namely< +", CBRRB@1?7SS
S7BR5 I@I:7@1B? 18 B ?BCFD? BRR7S1
recogni;ed under Section "), Rule ")& of the Rules
of ourt and by prevailing jurisprudence =PP vs.
Figueroa, )E6 SRB &$' +"''%,/ Horfe vs. Hutuc, ))
SRB E)E +"'&6,/ :avis vs. Dnited States, #)6 D.S.
%6).>/ +), S7IIDR7 8F 7JI:7@7 I@ P?BI@ JI7C
=8bra vs. B, #"$ SRB %'E +"''',/ P vs. 3agista, )"E
SRB &# +"''),/ Padilla vs. B, )&' SRB E*) +"''$,/ PP
vs. ?o 5o Cing, "'# SRB ")) +"''",/ oolidge vs. @ew
5ampshire, E*# D.S. EE#.>/ +#, S7BR5 8F H8JI@!
J75I?7S =PP vs. 7scaKo, #)# SRB $%E +)***,/ Bniag,
(r. vs. omelec, )#$ SRB E)E +"''E,/ PP vs. Saycon,
)#& SRB #)% +"''E,/ PP vs. 7.ala, ))" SRB E'E
+"''#,/ Jalmonte vs. de Jilla, "$6 SRB )"" +"'6',/
arroll vs. Dnited States, )&$ D.S. "#).>/ +E,
8@S7@17: CBRRB@1?7SS S7BR5 =PP vs. Hontilla,
)6% SRB $*# +"''6,/ PP vs. ui;on, )%& SRB #)%
+"''&,/ Hustang ?umber vs. B, et al., )%$ SRB E#*
+"''&,/ PP vs. Ramos, ))) SRB %%$ +"''#,/ PP vs.
8maweng, )"# SRB E&) +"''),.>/ +%, DS18HS
S7BR5/ +&, S18P B@: FRISL SI1DB1I8@S +M17RRF
S7BR5N, =PP vs. Salayao, )&) SRB )%% +"''&,/
Posadas vs. B, "66 SRB )66 +"''*, citing 1erry vs.
8hio, )* ?. 7d. )d 6'&.>/ and +$, 7GI!7@1 B@:
7H7R!7@F IRDHS1B@7S =PP vs. de !racia,
)## SRB $"& +"''E, citing PP vs. Halmstedt, "'6
SRB E*" +"''", and Dmil, et al. vs. Ramos, "6$
SRB #"" +"''*,>.
PP v. de
!racia, )##
SRB $"&
+"''E, citing
PP v.
Halmstedt,
"'6 SRB
E*" +"''",
and Dmil v.
Ramos, "6$
SRB #""
+"''*,.
Same; 0P$ain1iew Do"trine2; 1he prosecution
against illegal search and sei;ure covers both
innocent and guilty ali0e against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers. 1he MplainviewN
doctrine +w2c may justify a search w2o a warrant,
applies only where the police oAcer is @81
S7BR5I@! for evidence against the accused, but
I@B:J7R17@1?F comes across an incriminating
object. (ust because the marijuana plants were
found in an unfenced lot does not prevent the
appellant from invo0ing the protection a-orded by
the onstitution. 1he right against unreasonable
searches and sei;ures is the immunity of oneOs
person, w2c includes his residence, papers and
PP v. Jalde;,
!R ")')'&,
Sept. )%,
)***.
other possessions. For a person to be immune
against unreasonable searches and sei;ures, he
need not be in his home or oAce, w2in a fenced
yard or private place.
Same; Same; Bn object is in plain view if the
object itself is plainly e.posed to sight. Chere the
object sei;ed was inside a closed pac0age, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be sei;ed without a warrant. 5owever, if the
pac0age proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive con9guration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be sei;ed.
aballes v.
B, !R
"#&)'), (an.
"%, )**).
Same; Consente) Sear"' or Wai1er; It is
fundamental that to constitute waiver< =i> it must
9rst appear that the right e.ists/ =ii> the person
involved had 0nowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the e.istence of such right/ and =iii>
the said person had an actual intention to
relin4uish the right.
PP v.
Figueroa, !R
"#E*%&, (uly
&, )***.
Same; Same; Essentia$ Re3!isites; In case of
consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must
9rst appear that +", the right e.ists/ +), that the
person involved had 0nowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the e.istence of such right/ and +#,
the said person had an actual intention to
relin4uish the right.
aballes v.
B, !R
"#&)'), (an.
"%, )**).
Same; Same; Bn alleged consent to a warrantless
search and sei;ure cannot be based merely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty. 1his presumption, by itself, cannot prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an
individual, and ;eal in the pursuit of criminals
cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that
the onstitution itself abhors.
PP v. 3aula,
!R "#)&$",
@ov. "%,
)***.
Same; Same; 1he constitutional immunity against
unreasonable searches and sei;ures is B P7RS8@B?
RI!51 which may be waived. 1he consent must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i.e., the consent is
une4uivocal, speci9c, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 5ence,
consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
1he 4uestion whether a consent to a search was in
fact voluntary is a 4uestion of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are
the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is
given< +", the age of the defendant/ +), whether he
was in a public or secluded location/ +#, whether he
objected to the search or passively loo0ed on/ EE
+E, the education and intelligence of the defendant/
+%, the presence of coercive police procedures/ +&,
the defendantPs belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found/ E% +$, the nature of the
aballes v.
B, !R
"#&)'), (an.
"%, )**).
police 4uestioning/ +6, the environment in which
the 4uestioning too0 place/ and +', the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State w2c has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and voluntarily given.
Same; Sear"' o% Mo1ing 4e'i"$e; B warrantless
search of a moving vehicle is justi9ed on the
ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can 4uic0ly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. Searches w2o warrant of automobiles is
also allowed for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws,
provided such searches are made at borders or
constructive borders li0e chec0points near the
boundary lines of the State. 1he mere mobility of
these vehicles, however, does not give the police
oAcers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches w2o warrants if made w2in
the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause.
aballes v.
B, !R
"#&)'), (an.
"%, )**).
Same; 0Stop an) Sear"'2; Stop and search at
military or police chec0points has been declared to
be @81 I??7!B? P7R S7, for as long as it is
warranted by the e.igencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. B
chec0point may either be a mere routine inspection
or it may involve an e.tensive search.
aballes v.
B, !R
"#&)'), (an.
"%, )**).
Same; Same; Ro!tine Inspe"tion; 1hey are not
regarded as violative of an individualOs right
against unreasonable search. 1he search w2c is
normally permissible in this instance is limited to
the -< ="> where the oAcer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle w2c is par0ed on the
public fair grounds/ =)> simply loo0s into a vehicle/
=#> Qashes a light therein w2o opening the carOs
doors/ =E> where the occupants are not subjected
to aphysical or body search/ =&> where the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection/ and =$> where the
routine chec0 is conducted in a 9.ed area. In this
case, the police oAcers did not merely conduct a
visual search or visual inspection of herein
petitionerOs vehicle. 1hey had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the 0a0wati leaves and loo0 inside the
sac0s before they were able to see the cable wires.
It cannot be considered a simple routine chec0.
aballes v.
B, !R
"#&)'), (an.
"%, )**).
Same; Same; Extensi1e Sear"'; Chen a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an e.tensive search,
such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible 8@?F if the oAcers conducting the
search have reasonable or PR83B3?7 BDS7 to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist
is a law-o-ender or they will 9nd the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in
the vehicle to be searched. 1his ourt has in the
past found probable cause to conduct w2o a judicial
warrant an e.tensive search of moving vehicles in
aballes v.
B, !R
"#&)'), (an.
"%, )**).
situations where +", there had emanated from a
pac0age the distinctive smell of marijuana/ +),
agents of the @arcom of the P@P had received a
con9dential report from informers that a si;eable
volume of marijuana would be transported along
the route where the search was conducted/ +#,
@arcom agents had received information that a
aucasian coming from Sagada, Hountain
Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs
and when the @arcom agents confronted the
accused aucasian, because of a conspicuous
bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his
passport and other identi9cation papers when
re4uested to do so/ +E, @arcom agents had
received con9dential information that a woman
having the same physical appearance as that of
the accused would be transporting marijuana/ +%,
the accused who were riding a jeepney were
stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received con9dential reports that said
accused would transport a large 4uantity of
marijuana/ and +&, where the moving vehicle was
stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep
penetration agent or spy R one who participated in
the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to
which the accused belonged R that said accused
were bringing prohibited drugs into the country. In
the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was
Qagged down because the police oAcers who were
on routine patrol became suspicious when they
saw that the bac0 of the vehicle was covered with
0a0awati leaves w2c, according to them, was
unusual and uncommon. 1he fact that the vehicle
?88L7: SDSPII8DS simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with 0a0awati
leaves does not constitute Sprobable causeS as
would justify the conduct of a search without a
warrant. Bnd Bbsence of any con9dential report or
tipped information that petitioner was carrying
stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could
otherwise have sustained their suspicion. 8ur
jurisprudence is replete with cases where 1ipped
Information has become a suAcient probable
cause to e-ect a warrantless search and sei;ure.
Dnfortunately, none e.ists in this case.
Same; Sear"' In"i)enta$ to a Law%!$ Arrest; B
search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the
person of one arrested and the premises within his
immediate control. Dnder the Splain view doctrine,S
unlawful objects within the Splain viewS of an
oAcer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to sei;ure and may be
presented in evidence. "& @onetheless, the sei;ure
of evidence in plain view must comply with the
following elements< +a, a prior valid intrusion based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their oAcial
duties/ +b, the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are/ +c, the evidence must be
immediately apparent/ and +d, Splain viewS justi9ed
mere sei;ure of evidence without further search.
PP v.
Bspiras, !R
"#6#6)-6E,
Feb. "),
)**).
I$$ega$ Sear"' an) Sei/!re; Ex"$!sionar& R!$e;
7nshrined in our onstitution is the inviolable right
of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and
sei;ures. 1he e.clusionary rule under Section #+),,
Brticle III of the onstitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.
aballes v.
B, !R
"#&)'), (an.
"%, )**).
I$$ega$ sear"'5arrest; 1his case clearly illustrates
how constitutional guarantees against illegal
arrests and sei;ures can be violated by over;ealous
police oAcers in the arrest of suspected drug
o-enders. 1he State cannot in a cavalier fashion
intrude into the persons of its citi;ens as well as
into their houses, papers and e-ects. 1he
constitutional provision sheathes the private
individual with an impenetrable armor against
unreasonable searches and sei;ures. It protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself against
unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and
prevents him from being irreversibly Scut o- from
that domestic security which renders the lives of
the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.S
For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a
blan0et prohibition against all searches and
sei;ures as it obviously operates only against
searches and sei;ures that are Sunreasonable.S 1he
arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying
search was li0ewise illegal. 7very evidence thus
obtained during the illegal search cannot be used
against accused-appellants/ hence, their ac4uittal
must follow in faithful obedience to the
fundamental law.
PP v. 3olasa,
!R ")%$%E,
:ec. ),
"'''.
Sear"'es an) Sei/!res; Con6s"ation; 7ven if
the medicines or drugs sei;ed were genuine and
even if they had the proper chemicals or
ingredients in their productions, if the producer,
manufacturer or seller has no permit or authority
from the appropriate government agency, the
drugs or medicines cannot be returned although
the search warrants were declared illegal. 1he
policy of the law enunciated in RB 6)*# is to
protect the consumers as well as the licensed
businessmen.
PP v. (udge
7strada, !R
")EE&",
(une )&,
)***.
,REEDOM O, T*E PRESS; A"a)emi" ,ree)om
on Camp!s Jo!rna$ism; Sec. $ of the ampus
(ournalism Bct prohibits e.pulsion or suspension of
a student solely on the basis of articles he or she
has written, 7G7P1 when such article materially
disrupt class wor0 or involve substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others. 1he power of the
school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or e.pel. It is corollary to the enforcement
of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a
safe and orderly environment to learning. 1hat
power, li0e the power to suspend or e.pel, is an
inherent part of academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the onstitution.
Hirriam
ollege
Foundation
v. B,
")$'#*,
:ec. "%,
)***.
RI7*T TO IN,ORMATION; B self-e.ecutory
provision which can be invo0ed by any citi;en
before the courts. 1he ourt classi9ed the right to
!on;ales v.
@arvasa, !R
"E*6#%,
information as a public right and Mwhen a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the re4uirement of personal interest is
satis9ed by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citi;en, and therefore, part of the general TpublicO
which possesses the right.N 5owever, ongress
may provide for reasonable conditions upon the
access to information. Such limitations were
embodied in Republic Bct @o. &$"#, otherwise
0nows as the Mode of onduct and 7thical
Standards for Public 8Acials and 7mployees,N
which too0 e-ect on Harch )%, "'6'. 1his law
provides that, in the performance of their duties, all
public oAcials and employees are obliged to
respond to letters sent by the public within 9fteen
+"%, wor0ing days from receipt thereof and to
ensure the accessibility of all public documents for
inspection by the public within reasonable wor0ing
hours, subject to the reasonable claims of
con9dentiality.
Bug. "E,
)***.
Same; ?imited to Mmatters of public concern,N to
Mtransactions involving public interest.N 1he
negotiation and subse4uent sale of the property by
the !SIS to private respondent was not imbued w2
public interest as it was a purely private
transaction. Petitioners cannot therefore demand
that they be informed of such negotiation and sale,
more so since they no longer had any interest in
the property upon their failure to comply w2 !SIS
terms for repurchase and its denial of petitionerOs
o-er to repurchase.
Drbano v.
!SIS, !R
"#$'*E,
8ct. "',
)**".
,REEDOM O, ASSOCIATION; 1he constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of association includes the
freedom not to associate. 1he right to choose with
whom one will associate oneself is the very
foundation and essence of that partnership. It
should be noted that the provision guarantees the
right to form an association. It does not include the
right to compel others to form or join one. Private
respondents cannot be compelled to become
members of the S5B by the simple e.pedient of
including them in its Brticles of Incorporation and
3y-laws w2o their e.press or implied consent. 1rue,
it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners in
a subdivision to band themselves together to
promote their common welfare. 3ut that is possible
only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or
indirectly, to become members of the association.
1rue also, memberships in homeownersP
associations may be ac4uired in various ways R
often through deeds of sale, 1orrens certi9cates or
other forms of evidence of property ownership. In
the present case, however, other than the said
Brticles of Incorporation and 3y-laws, there is no
showing that private respondents have agreed to
be S5B members. 5ence, membership in a
homeownersP association is voluntary and cannot
be unilaterally forced by a provision in the
associationPs articles of incorporation or by-laws,
which the alleged member did not agree to be
bound to.
Sta. lara
5omeownerO
s Bssn v.
Sps. !aston,
!R "E"'&",
(an. )#,
)**).
RI7*T TO TRA4EL; 7!i)e$ines on *o$)8
)epart!re Or)ers 9*DO:
+", 5:8 shall be issued only in criminal cases w2in
the e.clusive jurisdiction of the R1/
+), 1he R1 issuing the 5:8 shall furnish the :FB
and the 3I w2 a copy each of the 5:8 w2in )E hours
from the time of issuance and through the fastest
available means of transmittal/
+#, 1he 5:8 shall contain the -. information<
=a> 1he complete name +incl. the middle name,
the date and place of birth and the place of last
residence of the person against whom the 5:8 has
been issued or whose departure from the country
has been enjoined/
=b> 1he complete title and doc0et number of
the case w2c the 5:8 was issued/
=c> 1he speci9c nature of the case/ and
=d> 1he date of the 5:8.
If available, a recent photograph of the person
against whom a 5:8 has been issued or whose
departure from the country has been enjoined
should also be included.
+E, Chenever the accused has been ac4uitted or
the case against him dismissed, the judgment of
ac4uittal or the order of dismissal shall include
therein the cancellation of the 5:8 issued. 1he
courts concerned shall furnish the :FB and the 3I
w2 a copy each of the judgment of ac4uittal or the
order of dismissal )E hours from the time of
promulgated2issuance and through the fastest
available means of transmittal.
R7< 5old-
:eparture
8rder Issued
by (udge
Sardido,
B.H. @o. *"-
'-)E%, H1,
:ec. %,
)**".
E( POST ,ACTO LAW; Bn e. post facto law is one
which< +", ma0es criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act/ +), aggravates a
crime, or ma0es it greater than it was when
committed/ +#, changes the punishment and
inQicts a greater punishment than the law anne.ed
to the crime when committed/ +E, alters the legal
rules of evidence, and authori;es conviction upon
less or di-erent testimony than the law re4uired at
the time of the commission of the o-ense/ +%,
assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies
only, in e-ect imposes penalty or deprivation of a
right for something which when done was lawful/
and +&, deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled such as the protection of a former
conviction or ac4uittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty. 1he test whether a penal law runs afoul
of the e. post facto clause of the onstitution is<
:oes the law sought to be applied retroactively
ta0e Sfrom an accused any right that was regarded
at the time of the adoption of the constitution as
vital for the protection of life and liberty and which
he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the
o-ense charged against himUS 1he crucial words in
the test are Svital for the protection of life and
liberty.US Ce 9nd, however, the test inapplicable to
the penal clause of Republic Bct @o. $&%#. Penal
laws and laws which, while not penal in nature,
nonetheless have provisions de9ning o-enses and
prescribing penalties for their violation operate
prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given
3enedicto v.
B, !R
")%#%',
Sept. E,
)**".
retroactive e-ect, e.cept when they are favorable
to the accused. @owhere in Republic Bct @o. $&%#,
and in particular Section #&, is there any indication
that the increased penalties provided therein were
intended to operate retroactively. 1here is,
therefore, no e. post facto law in this case.
Rights of
the
accused
RI7*T TO -E PRESUMED INNOCENT; 1he law
presumes the accused innocent unless shown
otherwise by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 1he
burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the
o-ense charged lies upon the prosecution. If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more e.planations, one of w2c is consistent
w2 his guilt, then the evidence is not suAcient to
support conviction.
PP v. ?a.a,
!R "#6%*",
(uly )*,
)**".
RI7*TS UNDER CUSTODIAL IN4ESTI7ATION;
ustodial investigation means any 4uestioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is ta0en into DS18:F or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any signi9cant
manner. It begins when the in4uiry as to oneOs
involvement in a crime is no longer general but
starts to focus on a particular person as a SDSP71.
PP v. Horial,
!R ")')'%,
Bug. "%,
)**".
Same; Section "), Brt. III of the "'6$ onstitution
embodies the mandatory protection a-orded a
person under custodial investigation for the
commission of a crime and the duty of the State to
enforce such mandate, w2c are<
+", Bny person under investigation for the
commission of an o-ense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot a-ord the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
1hese rights cannot be waived e.cept in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
+), @o torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
+#, Bny confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
PP v. Suela,
!R "##%$*-
$", (an. "%,
)**).
Same; B person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights, w2c attach upon the
commencement thereof, viz< +", to remain silent/
+), to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice/ and +#, to be
informed of the two other rights above.
PP v. Horial,
!R ")')'%,
Bug. "%,
)**".
Same; 1he mantle of protection under Sec. "), Brt.
III of the "'6$ onstitution covers the period from
the time a person is ta0en into custody for
investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of a
crime although not yet in custody.
PP v. 3ravo,
!R "#%%&),
@ov. )),
"'''.
Same; 1he mantle of protection under Sec. "), Brt. PP v.
III of the onstitution covers the period from the
time a person is ta0en into custody for
investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime, or from the time he is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
crime, although not yet in custody. ustodial
investigation begins when it is no longer a general
in4uiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus
on a particular person as suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or e.acting
a confession from the suspect in connection with
an alleged o-ense. 1he place of interrogation is not
determinative of the e.istence or absence of
custodial investigation but the tone and manner of
4uestioning by the police authorities. 1hus, there
was custodial investigation when the police
authorities, upon their arrest of some of the
accused, immediately as0ed them regarding their
participation in the commission of the crime, even
while they were still wal0ing along the highway on
their way to the police station. 1his is in line w2
prevailing jurisprudence and the provisions of RB
$E#6, that the re4uisite of a custodial investigation
are applicable even to a person not formally
arrested but Mmerely invited for 4uestioningN.
3ari4uit, !R
"))$##,
8ct. ),
)***/ PP v.
Feli.minia,
!R ")%###,
Harch )*,
)**).
Same; Pro"e)!re; B suspect in custodial
investigation must be given the following warnings<
+", 5e must be informed of his RI!51 18 R7HBI@
SI?7@1/ +), he must be CBR@7: that anything he
says can and will be used against him/ and +#, he
must be told that he has a RI!51 18 8D@S7?,
and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him. In this case, accused-
appellant was given no more than a perfunctory
recitation of his rights, signifying nothing more
than a feigned compliance with the constitutional
re4uirements. 1his manner of giving warnings has
been held to be Smerely ceremonial and
inade4uate to transmit meaningful information to
the suspect.S For this reason, we hold accused-
appellantPs e.trajudicial confession is invalid.
PP v.
Samolde,
!R ")6%%",
(uly #",
)***.
Same; It has been held that these rights attach
from the moment the investigation starts, i.e.,
when the investigating oAcers begin to as0
4uestions to elicit information and confessions or
admissions from the suspect. It is always
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the
trial that prior to in-custody 4uestioning, the
confessant was informed of his constitutional
rights. 1he presumption of regularity of oAcial acts
does not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence. 5ence, in the absence
of proof that the arresting oAcers complied with
these constitutional safeguards, e.trajudicial
statements, whether inculpatory or e.culpatory,
made during custodial investigation are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the
adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions
and admissions in violation of Section ") +",,
Brticle III of the onstitution are inadmissible in
evidence against the declarant and more so
against third persons. 1his is so even if such
statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given.
PP v.
Figueroa, !R
"#E*%&, (uly
&, )***.
Such statements are useless e.cept as evidence
against the very police authorities who violated the
suspectPs rights.
Same; RI7*T TO COUNSEL; =1>he right to
counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation,
i.e. when the investigating oAcer starts to as0
4uestions to elicit information and2or confessions
or admissions from the respondent2accused. Bt
such point or stage, the person being interrogated
must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice e.torting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an o-ense.
1he moment there is a move or even urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information which may appear innocent
or inocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
PP v.
?abtan, !R
")$E'#,
:ec. 6,
"'''.
Same; Same; 1he right refers to M8HP717@1
B@: I@:7P7@:7@1 8D@S7?,N not the mere
presence of a lawyer beside the accused. Bn
e-ective and vigilant counsel necessarily and
logically re4uires that the lawyer present and able
to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the 9rst 4uestion as0ed by the
investigating oAcer until the signing of the
e.trajudicial confession. 1he lawyer should
ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily
and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and the conse4uence of his
e.trajudicial confession in relation to his
constitutional rights. 1he modi9er competent and
independent stresses the need to accord the
accused, under the uni4uely stressful conditions of
a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on
the choices e.plained to him by a diligent and
capable lawyer.
PP v. Suela,
!R "##%$*-
$", (an. "%,
)**).
Same; Rig't to 'a1e a Competent an)
In)epen)ent Co!nse$; It is noteworthy that the
modi9ers competent and independent were terms
absent in all organic laws previous to the "'6$
onstitution. 1heir addition in the fundamental law
of "'6$ was meant to stress the primacy accorded
to the voluntariness of the choice, under the
uni4uely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, by according the accused, deprived
of normal conditions guaranteeing individual
autonomy, an informed judgment based on the
choices given to him by a competent and
independent lawyer. 1hus, the lawyer called to be
present during such investigation should be as far
as possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
4uestioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the
accusedOs behalf, it is important that he should be
competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing
to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individualOs
PP v.
?abtan, !R
")$E'#,
:ec. 6,
"'''.
constitutional rights. Ideally, therefore, a lawyer
engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation +if the latter could not a-ord one,
Tshould be engaged by the accused +himself,, or by
the latterOs relative or person authori;ed by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authori;ed by the
accused to 9le such petition. ?awyers engaged by
the police, whatever testimonials are given as
proof of their probity and supposed independence,
are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic.
Same; Same; Such right refers to T7FF71IJ7
8D@S7?N. In essence, it refers to the right to be
assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring
that an accused is not denied the collateral right to
due process.
PP v2
?iwanag, !R
")*E&6,
Bug. "%,
)**".
Same; Same; 1he term Se-ective and vigilant
counselS, is necessarily and logically =re4uires> that
the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist
his client from the time the confessant answers the
9rst 4uestion as0ed by the investigating oAcer
until the signing of the e.trajudicial confession.
Horeover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
confession is made voluntarily and that the person
under investigation fully understands the nature
and the conse4uence of his e.trajudicial confession
in relation to his constitutional rights. B contrary
rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel
and to be presumed innocent. Bn Me-ective
counselN is characteri;ed as Sone who can be made
to act in protection of his =accusedOs> rights, and
not by merely going through the motions of
providing him with anyone who possesses a law
degree.
PP v.
?abtan, !R
")$E'#,
:ec. 6,
"'''.
Same; Same; 1he accused must continuously
have a counsel assisting him from the very start of
custodial investigation until its termination. 1his
right was negated by the precipitate departure of
the lawyer of the accused before the termination of
the investigation.
PP v. Horial,
!R ")')'%,
Bug. "%,
)**".
Same; Same; B counsel who failed to inform the
accused of the latterOs right to remain silent, who
0ept Mcoming and goingN during the custodial
investigation, and abruptly departed before the
termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the
competent, vigilant and e-ective counsel
contemplated in the onstitution.
PP v. Horial,
)**"/ PP v.
Bran;ado,
)**".
Same; Same; Chere the accused is represented
by someone who is not a member of the Phil. 3ar,
conviction in the lower court was set aside and the
case remanded for new trial.
PP v.
Santociles,
!R "*'"E',
:ec. )",
"'''.
Same; Same; Con%ession; onfessions of the
accused in the absence of counsel are invalid.
PP v. 1ulin,
!R """$*',
Bug. #*,
)**".
Same; Same; Same; 7ven if a confession is
subse4uently signed in the presence of counsel, it
is not cured of constitutional defects.
PP v. Horial,
)**".
Same; Same; it is more than just the presence of
a lawyer in the court room or the mere
propounding of standard 4uestions and objections.
It means that the accused is amply accorded legal
assistance by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. 1he
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer
in the proceedings, particularly, at the trial of the
case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic
rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the
case, and his 0nowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and e.isting jurisprudence.
PP v.
Bran;ado,
!R "#)EE)-
EE, Sept. )E,
)**".
Same; Same; Po$i"e Line8!p; 1he stage of
investigation wherein a person is as0ed to stand in
a police line-up has been held to be outside the
mantle of protection of the right to counsel
because it involves a general in4uiry into an
unsolved crime and is purely investigative in
nature.
PP v.
Pavellare,
!R ")''$*,
Bpril %,
)***.
Same; Same; Same; Bs a rule, an accused is not
entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police
line-up considering that such is usually not a part
of the custodial in4uest. 5owever, the cases at bar
are di-erent inasmuch as accused-appellant,
having been the focus of attention by the police
after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as
the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already
under custodial investigation when these out-of-
court identi9cations were conducted by the police.
PP v.
7scordial,
!R "#6'#E-
#%, (an. "&,
)**).
Same; Same; O!t8o% Co!rt I)enti6"ation; Bn
out-of-court identi9cation of an accused can be
made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused
alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identi9cation, while in a police line-up, the suspect
is identi9ed by a witness from a group of persons
gathered for that purpose. :uring custodial
investigation, these types of identi9cation have
been recogni;ed as Scritical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecutionS which necessitate the
presence of counsel for the accused. 1his is
because the results of these pre-trial proceedings
Smight well settle the accusedPs fate and reduce
the trial itself to a mere formality.S Ce have thus
ruled that any identi9cation of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up
for that matter, after the start of the custodial
investigation is inadmissible as evidence against
him.
PP v.
7scordial,
!R "#6'#E-
#%, (an. "&,
)**).
Same; Same; In1itations; Said right was not
violated in this case where the police invited for
4uestioning residents of the compound, including
the appellants. 1hey were not yet singled out as
the perpetrators of the crime. Chen the accused
was as0ed a single 4uestion at the police station
PP v.
Pavellare,
!R ")''$*,
Bpril %,
)***.
regarding his whereabouts on the evening of @ov.
)6, it was not a custodial investigation inasmuch as
the 4uery was merely part of the Mgeneral
e.ploratory stage.N
Same; A)ministrati1e In1estigation; 1he right
to counsel applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation and not to administrative
investigation.
Remolona v.
S, !R
"#$E$#,
Bug. ),
)**".
Same; WAI4ER; Bs a rule, to be valid, must be
made in writing, and in the presence of counsel.
!ranting that appellant consented to his counselOs
departure during the investigation and to answer
4uestions during the lawyerOs absence, such
consent was not a valid waiver of his right to
counsel.
PP v. Horial,
)**".
Same; Same; @o valid waiver where admissions
obtained during custodial investigations w2o the
bene9t of counsel although later reduced to writing
and signed in the presence of counsel are still
Qawed under the onstitution.
PP v.
Hatignas,
!R ")&"E&,
Harch "),
)**).
Same; Same; Same; 5owever, the manifestation
of accused-appellants that they were adopting the
evidence adduced when they were represented by
a non-lawyer was deemed a valid waiver of the
right, considering that it was une4uivocally,
0nowingly, and intelligently made and w2 full
assistance of a bona fde lawyer.
PP v. 1ulin,
!R """$*',
Bug, #*,
)**".
E(TRA8JUDICIAL CON,ESSION; B confession to
be admissible must satisfy the following
re4uirements< +", the confession must be
voluntary/ +), the confession must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent
counsel/ +#, the confession must be e.press/ and
+E, the confession must be in writing. B suspectPs
confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when
ta0en without the assistance of counsel without a
valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the
absence of coercion or the fact that it had been
voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even
if appellantPs confession were gospel truth.
PP v. Suela,
!R "##%$*-
$", (an. "%,
)**).
Same; B judicial confession constitutes evidence
of a high order. 1he presumption is that no sane
person would deliberately confess to the
commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by
truth and conscience. Indeed, it is hard to believe
that a person, of whatever economic status, would
confess to a crime that he did not commit for
monetary considerations and thus barter away his
liberty, and for that matter, even his life, for a
mess of potage, for that is what the mere sum of
P"*,***.** allegedly paid to him to ma0e the
confession means.
PP v.
Samolde,
!R ")6%%",
(uly #",
)***.
Same; Bs a Rule, these rights Scannot be waived
e.cept in writing and in the presence of counsel.S B
suspectPs confession, whether verbal or non-verbal,
when ta0en without the assistance of counsel
PP v. :ano,
!R ""$&'*,
Sept. ",
)*** /
without a valid waiver of such assistance
regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact
that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in
evidence, even if appellantPs confession were
gospel truth.
Same; Same; 5owever, SP8@1B@78DS
S1B17H7@1S voluntarily given, as where appellant
orally admitted 0illing the victim before the
barangay captain +who is neither a police oAcer
nor a law enforcement agent,, do not fall under
custodial investigation. Such admission, even w2o
the assistance of a lawyer, does not violate
appellantOs constitutional rights.
PP v. :ano,
!R ""$&'*,
Sept ",
)***/ PP v.
Hayorga, !R
"#%E*%,
@ov. )',
)***
Same; Pres!mption; 1he presumption that
oAcial duty has been regularly performed cannot
by itself prevail over positive averments concerning
violations of the constitutional rights of an accused.
PP v. :ano,
!R ""$&'*,
Sept. ",
)*** /
RI7*T A7AINST SEL,8INCRIMINATION; Chat is
actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to e.tort communication and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when material to
the case.
PP v.
Rondero, !R
")%&6$,
:ec. ',
"'''.
Same; 1he essence of this right is 17S1IH8@IB?
8HPD?SI8@ or the giving of evidence against
oneself through a testimonial act. 5ence, an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical
e.amination and have a substance ta0en from his
body for medical determination as to whether he
was su-ering from a disease that was contracted
by his victim w2o violating this right.
PP v.
3anihit, !R
"#)*E%,
Bug. )%,
)***/ PP v.
ontinente,
!R "**6*"-
*), Bug. )%,
)***.
RI7*T A7AINST DOU-LE JEOPARD;; Bn
accused is placed in double jeopardy when he is
again tried for an o-ense for w2c he has been
convicted, ac4uitted, or in w2c the indictment
against him was dismissed w2o his consent.
1upa; v.
5on. Dlep,
!R ")$$$$,
8ct ", "'''.
Same; 1o raise the defense of double or second
jeopardy, the following elements must be present<
+", a 9rst jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second/ +), the 9rst jeopardy must have
terminated/ and +#, the second jeopardy must be
for the same o-ense as that in the 9rst.
Sarabia v.
People, !R
"E)*)E, (uly
)*, )**".
Same; E1o$!tion o% t'e )o"trine. Bppeal by the
!overnment from verdicts of ac4uittal. Bs
mandated by the onstitution, statutes and
cognate jurisprudence, an ac4uittal is 9nal and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy,
whether it happens at the trial court level or before
the B. In general, the rule that remand to a trial
court of a judgment of ac4uittal brought before the
S on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a
9nding of HIS1RIB?, as in !alman v.
Sandiganbayan.
PP v.
Jelascoi, !R
")$EEE,
Sept. "#,
)***.
Same; (udgment of ac4uittal in criminal
proceedings is 9nal and unappeallable whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the B.
Fuchengco
v. B, !R
"#'$&6,
1his means that a review of alleged errors in the
said judgment arising from misappreciation of facts
and the evidence adduced cannot be made w2o
trampling upon the right of the accused against
double jeopardy.
Feb. $,
)**).
RI7*T TO -E IN,ORMED O, T*E
ACCUSATIONS A7AINST *IM; this means that
every element of the o-ense must be alleged in
the complaint or information. 1he accused is
presumed to have no 0nowledge of the facts that
constitute the o-ense charge.
PP v. 1abion,
!R "#)$"%,
8ct. )*,
"'''.
RI7*T TO -E *EARD -; *IMSEL, AND
COUNSEL AND TO PRESENT E4IDENCE ,OR
*IS DE,ENSE; In this case, the non-appearance of
counsel fort he accused on the scheduled hearing
was not construed as a waiver by the accused of
his right to present evidence for his defense. :enial
of due process can be successfully invo0ed where
no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this
case.
PP v.
Fambot, !R
")*#%*,
8ct. "#,
)***.
Same; B counsel assisting an accused is guided by
the provisions of Sec. )*, Rule "#6 of the Rules of
ourt/ anon ), "), "$, "6, and "' of the ode of
Professional Responsibility and anons E, %, and "%
of the anons of Professional 7thics. 1he proper
measure of a counselOs performance is
R7BS8@B3?7@7SS under the prevailing
professional norms. In this case, the issue raised
regarding a lawyerOs acts or omissions in the
conduct of his duties as counsel for the accused
was deemed not proper as it may breed more
unwanted conse4uences than merely upholding an
accusedOs constitutional right or raising the
standard of the legal profession.
PP v.
?iwanag,
)**".
Same; Wai1er o% presentation o% E1i)en"e;
1he accused-appellant validly waived his right to
present evidence. 1his is in consonance w2 the
doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the
bene9t and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed w2 and
relin4uished w2o infringing on any public right, and
w2o detriment to the community at large.
PP v.
3anihit, !R
"#)*E%,
Bug. )%,
)***.
RI7*T TO SPEED; DISPOSITION O, T*E CASE;
1he right of the accused to speedy trial shall not be
used to deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. It allows
for reasonable continuance. It is deemed violated
only when the proceedings are attended by
ve.atious, capricious, and oppressive delays/ or,
when unjusti9ed postponements of the trial are
as0ed for and secured.
1ai ?im v.
B, !R
"#"E6#,
8ct. )&,
"'''.
Same; It is deemed violated 8@?F when the
proceedings is attended by ve.atious, capricious
and oppressive delays/ or when unjusti9ed
postponements of the trial are as0ed for and
secured, or when w2o cause or unjusti9able motive,
a long period as allowed to elapse w2o the party
1y- :a;o v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
"E#66%-6&,
(an. )",
)**).
having his case tried.
Same; 1he determination of whether an accused
had been denied the right to speedy trial depends
on the surrounding circumstances of each case.
Blthough it too0 about 6 years before the trial of
this case was resumed, such delay did not amount
to violation of petitionerOs right to speedy trial
considering that such delay was not attributable to
the prosecution.
Sumbang v.
!en. ourt
Hartial, !R
"E*"66,
Bug. #,
)***.
Same; Factors to consider in determining whether
or not such right has been violated< ="> ?ength of
delay/ =)> Reasons for such delay/ =#> Bssertion or
failure to assert such rights by the accused/ and =E>
1he prejudice caused by the delay.
3lanco v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
"#&$%$-%6,
@ov. )$,
)***
Same; Not $imite) in a Crimina$ Pro"ee)ing
#!t A$$ Cases an) Pro"ee)ings #e%ore J!)i"ia$<
+!asi8=!)i"ia$ or A)ministrati1e #o)ies. 1he
failure of the 8mbudsman to resolve the
complaints that have been pending for almost E
years is clearly violative of this mandate and the
rights of the petitioner as a public oAcial. In such
event, petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the
cases 9led against him. Indeed, the ourt directly
dismissed the informations already 9led before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner.
?ope; v.
8Ace of the
8mbudsman
, !R
"E*%)',
Sept. &,
)**".
RI7*T TO SPEED; TRIAL; T'e Spee)& Tria$ A"t
o% >??@ 9RA @A?B:; 1he authority of the Sec. of
(ustice to review resolutions of his subordinates
even after an information has already been 9led in
court does not present an irreconcilable conQict w2
the #*-day period prescribed in Sec. $ of RB 6E'#.
Section $ of the Speedy 1rial Bct of "''6
prescribing the thirty-day period for the
arraignment of the accused is not absolute. In fact,
Section "* of the same law enumerates periods of
delay that shall be e.cluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence. 1he e.ceptions
provided in the Speedy 1rial Bct of "''6 reQect the
fundamentally recogni;ed principle that the
concept of Sspeedy trialS is Sa relative term and
must necessarily be a Qe.ible concept.S prudence
and wisdom dictate that the court should hold in
abeyance the proceedings while the Secretary of
(ustice resolves the petition for review 4uestioning
the resolution of the prosecutor. 1he delay in such
a case is justi9ed because the determination of
whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting
to a transgression of the right to a speedy trial,
cannot be simply reduced to a mathematical
process. 5ence, the length of delay is not the lone
criterion to be considered, several factors must be
ta0en into account in determining whether or not
the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
violated. 1he factors to consider and balance are
the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion
of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice
caused by such delay. 1he importance of the
review authority of the Secretary of (ustice cannot
be overemphasi;ed/ as earlier pointed out, it is
Solar 1eam
7ntertainme
nt v. 5on.
5ow, !R
"E*6&#,
Bug. )),
)***.
based on the doctrine of e.haustion of
administrative remedies that holds that Smista0es,
abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps
of an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency should be corrected by
higher administrative authorities, and not directly
by courts.S
Same; Con"ept o% Spee)& Disposition o%
Cases -roa)er t'an Spee)& Tria$; 1he 3ill of
Rights provisions of the "'6$ onstitution were
precisely crafted to e.pand substantive fair 1RIB?
RI!51S and to Protect iti;ens From Procedural
Hachinations which tend to nullify those rights.
Horeover, Section "&, Brticle III of the onstitution
e.tends the right to a speedy disposition of cases
to cases Sbefore all judicial, 4uasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.S 1his protection e.tends to
all citi;ens, including those in the military and
covers the periods before, during and after the
trial, a-ording broader protection than Section
"E+), which guarantees merely the right to a
speedy trial.
Bbadia v.
B, !R
"*%%'$,
Sept. )#,
"''E.
State
Immunity
from Suit
A s!it against a p!#$i" oC"er %or 'is oC"ia$
a"ts is< in eDe"t< a s!it against t'e State if its
purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.
alub v. B,
!R ""%&#E,
Bpril )$,
)***.
?egislativ
e :epart-
ment
,ran"'ise; PA7COR; B historical study of its
creation, growth and development will readily show
that it was never given a legislative franchise to
operate jai-alai.
:el Har v.
PB!8R, !R
"#6)'6,
@ov. )',
)***
(udicial
:epart-
ment
DOCTRINE O, STARE DECISIS; Chen a court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same.
1ala Realty
Services
orp. v.
3anco
Filipino
Savings and
Hortgage
3an0, !R
"#$'6*,
(une )*,
)***.
J!rispr!)en"e; 1he ourtOs interpretation of laws
are as much a part of the law of the land as the
letters of the laws themselves.
7vangelista
v. Sisto;a,
!R "E#66",
Bug. ',
)**".
SUPREME COURT; En -an" Cases; It includes all
other cases as the ourt en banc, by majority of its
actual membership, may deem of suAcient
importance.
Firestone
eramics v.
B, !R
")$*)),
(une )6,
)***.
Same; Same; 1he ourt en banc is not an
appellate court to w2c a decision or resolution a
:ivision may be appealed.
id.,
:issenting
opinion of
(ustice
!on;aga-
Reyes.
Same; S!per1ision o1er Lower Co!rts an)
t'eir Personne$; Brt. JIII, Sec. & of the
onstitution e.clusively vests in the S
administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the presiding (ustice of the B to
the lowest municipal trial court cler0.
(udge
Fuentes v.
8Ace of the
8mbudsman
-Hindanao,
supra.
JUDICIAL POWER; 1he inherent power of the
ourt to amend and control its processes and
orders so as to ma0e them comformable to law and
justice includes the right to reverse it.
1ocao v. B,
!R ")$E*%,
Sept. )*,
)**".
JUDICIAL RE4IEW; 1he ourt has control over a
case until the full satisfaction of the 9nal judgment
conformably w2 established legal process. It has
the authority to suspend the e.ecution of a 9nal
judgment or to cause a modi9cation thereof as and
when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when a supervening event warrants it.
PP v. :e los
Santos, !R
")"'*&,
Bpril %,
)***.
Same; 1he S has the discretionary power to ta0e
cogni;ance of the petition at bar where the issues
have generated an oasis of concern, even days of
dis4uiet in view of the public interest at sta0e.
:el Har v.
PB!8R,
)***.
Same; 1he S has inherent power to suspend its
own rules in a particular case in order to do justice.
For e4uitable considerations, the ourt has rela.ed
the application of otherwise stringent rules by
giving due course to appeals 9led out of time,
treating petitions for certiorari as petitioners for
review, and remanding the case for trial even
though their previous dismissal had become 9nal.
Bnacleto v.
Jan 1west ,
!R "#"E"",
Bug. )',
)***.
LE7AL STANDIN7 9Locus Standi:; Stri"t
interpretation; 1he 4uestion of standing is
whether a party has Malleged such personal sta0e
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness w2c2 sharpens the
presentation of issue upon w2c the court so largely
depends for illumination of diAcult constitutional
4uestions.N =i> Citizen suit. B citi;en ac4uires
standing only if he can establish that he su-ered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government/ the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action/
and the injury is li0ely to be redressed by a
favorable action. =ii> Taxpayers suit. B ta.payer is
deemed to have a standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have
been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law
or the onstitution. 1hus, a ta.payerOs action is
properly brought only when there is an e.ercise of
ongress of its ta.ing power or spending power. In
the 9nal analysis, the ourt retains the power to
decide whether or not it will entertain a ta.payerOs
suit.
!on;ales v.
@arvasa, !R
"E*6#%,
Bug. "E,
)***.
Same; Same; 1he 4uestion of standing is whether
a party has Malleged such personal sta0e in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that
!on;ales v.
@arvasa, !R
"E*6#%,
concrete adverseness w2c2 sharpens the
presentation of issue upon w2c the court so largely
depends for illumination of diAcult constitutional
4uestions.N =i> Citizen suit. B citi;en ac4uires
standing only if he can establish that he su-ered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government/ the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action/
and the injury is li0ely to be redressed by a
favorable action. =ii> Taxpayers suit. B ta.payer is
deemed to have a standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have
been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law
or the onstitution. 1hus, a ta.payerOs action is
properly brought only when there is an e.ercise of
ongress of its ta.ing power or spending power. In
the 9nal analysis, the ourt retains the power to
decide whether or not it will entertain a ta.payerOs
suit.
Bug. "E,
)***.
Same; Li#era$ Po$i"&; B party suing as a
ta.payer must speci9cally prove that he has
suAcient interest in preventing the illegal
e.penditure of money raised by ta.ation. In line w2
the liberal policy of the ourt on locus standi when
a case involves an issue of overarching signi9cance
to society, the ourt 9nds the petitioners, as
members of the 5ouse of Representatives, to have
legal standing to 9le the petitions at bar, as they
claim that the operation of jai-alai constitute
infringement by PB!8R of the legislatureOs
e.clusive power to grant franchise.
:el Har v.
PB!8R, !R
"#6)'6,
@ov. )',
)***.
Same; DiDeren"e #etween t'e R!$e on Rea$8
Part&8in8Interest an) t'e R!$e on Stan)ing;
1here is a di-erence between the rule on real-
party-in-interest and the rule on standing, as the
latter has constitutional underpinnings. In the case
at bar, petitioner has suAciently alleged
constitutional rami9cations in the 4uestioned
public bidding of the P5I?S78 that merit the
attention of the ourt. Horeover, the prospect of
9nancial gains arising from the award of the sale of
P5I?S78 is enough personal sta0e in the outcome
of the controversy to vest upon petitioner the locus
standi to 9le the petition for mandamus. B winning
bidder has personality to initiate proceedings to
prevent setting at naught his right/ otherwise, his
right to due process would be violated.
(! Summit
5oldings v.
B, !R
")E)'#,
@ov. )*,
)***.
DECISION; Faithful adherence to the re4uirements
of Sec. "E, Brt. JIII of the onstitution is a
paramount component of due process and fair play.
Fao v. B,
!R "#)E)6,
8ct. )E,
)***
Same; 1he Philippine onstitution no less,
mandates that no decision shall be rendered by
any court w2o e.pressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
1his vital re4uirement is not only demanded from
the courts. Vuasi-judicial bodies are similarly
re4uired to give basis for all their decisions, rulings
or judgments pursuant to the Bdministrative ode
whose roots may also be traced to the
PP v. 3aring,
!R "#$'##,
(an. )6,
)**).
onstitutional mandate. B decision need not be a
complete recital of the evidence presented. So long
as the factual and legal basis are clearly and
distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions
drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid.
@onetheless, in order to e-ectively buttress the
judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision
should not be simply limited to the dispositive
portion but must state the nature of the case,
summari;e the facts with references to the record,
and contain a statement of the applicable laws and
jurisprudence and the tribunalPs assessments and
conclusions on the case. 1his practice would better
enable a court to ma0e an appropriate
consideration of whether the dispositive portion of
the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent
with the 9ndings of facts and conclusions of law
made by the tribunal that rendered the decision.
ompliance with this re4uirement will suAciently
apprise the parties of the various issues involved
but more importantly will guide the court in
assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is
consistent with the facts and the law.
Same; EC"a"& o% t'e De"ision; 1he judge who
rendered the decision was not the one who tried
and heard the testimonies of the witnesses. 1he
complete records of the case, including the
transcript of stenographic notes, were before (udge
who rendered the decision and it can be fairly
assumed that, in rendering the decision, the
records were thoroughly scrutini;ed and evaluated
by him. Indeed, the eAcacy of a decision is not
necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only
too0 over from a colleague who had earlier
presided at the trial.
PP v. Fatco,
!R "#6#66,
Harch "',
)**).
Same; Memoran)!m De"ision; Blthough a
memorandum decision is permitted under certain
conditions, it cannot merely refer to the 9ndings of
facts and conclusions of law of the lower court. 1he
court must ma0e a full 9ndings of fact and
conclusion of law of its own.
8ng v. B,
!R ""#**&,
@ov. )#,
)***.
Same; ,orm o% )e"ision; 1here is no hard and
fast rule as to the form of a decision. Chether or
not the trial court chooses to summari;e the
testimonies of the witnesses of both parties is
immaterial. Chat is called for is that the judgment
must be written in the oAcial language, personally
and directly prepared and signed by the judge and
that it should contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of facts proved or admitted by the
parties and the law upon w2c the judgment is
based.
PP v.
8rdoKo, !R
")'%# W
"E#%##-#%,
(uly "*,
)***.
Same; Obiter Dictum; Bn obiter dictum has been
de9ned as an opinion e.pressed by a court upon
some 4uestion of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it. It is a remar0 made,
or opinion e.pressed, by a judge, in his decision
upon a cause, Sby the way,S that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the 4uestion
before him, or upon a point not necessarily
Jillanueva v.
B, !R
"E)'E$,
Harch "',
)**).
involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. Such are not binding as precedent. Bn
adjudication on any point within the issues
presented by the case cannot be considered as
obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent
4uestions, although only incidentally involved,
which are presented and decided in the regular
course of the consideration of the case, and led up
to the 9nal conclusion, and to any statement as to
matter on which the decision is predicated.
Bccordingly, a point e.pressly decided does not
lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is, or might have been,
made on some other ground, or even though, by
reason of other points in the case, the result
reached might have been the same if the court had
held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did.
B decision which the case could have turned on is
not regarded as obiter dictum merely because,
owing to the disposal of the contention, it was
necessary to consider another 4uestion, nor can an
additional reason in a decision, brought forward
after the case has been disposed of on one ground,
be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case
presents two +), or more points, any one of which
is suAcient to determine the ultimate issue, but
the court actually decides all such points, the case
as an authoritative precedent as to every point
decided, and none of such points can be regarded
as having the status of a dictum, and one point
should not be denied authority merely because
another point was more dwelt on and more fully
argued and considered, nor does a decision on one
proposition ma0e statements of the court regarding
other propositions dicta.
PRINCIPLE ON *IERARC*; O, COURTS; Chile
the ourt has concurrent jurisdiction w2 the R1
and the B to issue writs of certiorari, this
concurrence is not to be ta0en as an unrestrained
freedom of choice concerning the court to w2c
application for the writ will be directed. 1here is
after all a hierarchy of courts. B direct invocation of
the ourtOs original jurisdiction to issue the
e.traordinary writ is allowed only when there are
special and important reasons clearly and
speci9cally set out in the petition.
S!H
Realty orp.
v. 8Ace of
the Pres.,
!R ")&''',
Bug. #*,
)***/
People v.
uaresma ,
!R &$$6$,
"'6'/ 7nrile
v. Sala;ar,
!R ')"&#-
&E, "''*.
Same; It is the duty of the lower courts to obey the
:ecisions of this ourt and render obeisance to its
status as the ape. of hierarchy of courts. For Sthere
is only one Supreme ourt from whose decisions all
other courts should ta0e their bearings,S as
elo4uently declared by (ustice (.3.?. Reyes.
Sps. Hallari
v. Brcega,
!R "*&&"%,
Harch )*,
)**).
Same; Chile the petition is denominated as one
for certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually
the nulli9cation of the PB?-PB?7B agreement. Bs
such, petitionersP proper remedy is an ordinary civil
action for annulment of contract, an action which
Rivera v.
7spiritu, !R
"#%%E$, (an.
)#, )**).
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional
trial courts.
Same; Petitioner has failed to advance a
satisfactory e.planation as to her failure to comply
with or non-observance of the principle of judicial
hierarchy. 1here is no reason why the instant
petition could not have been brought before the
ourt of Bppeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it.
Fared v.
Ilarde, !R
""E$#),
Bug. ",
)***.
8mbuds-
man
J!ris)i"tion; 1he 8mbudsman has no jurisdiction
to entertain criminal charges against a judge of the
R1 relative to his handling cases before the court.
1he determination of whether a judge maliciously
delayed the disposition of the case is 7G?DSIJ7?F
a judicial function.
:e Jera v.
Pelayo, !R
"#$#%E, (uly
&, )***.
IN4ESTI7ATI4E POWERS; 1he duty of a
government prosecutor to prosecute crimes does
not preclude him from refusing to 9le information
when he believes there is no prima facie evidence
to do so. 1he ourt will not intervene in this case.
1he power to withdraw the information already
9led is a mere adjunct or conse4uence of the
8mbudsmanOs overall power to prosecute.
7spinosa v.
8Ace of the
8mbudsman
, !R
"#%$$%,
8ct. "',
)***.
Same; 1he P8C7R 18 I@J7S1I!B17 and 18
PR8S7D17 granted by law to the 8mbudsman is
plenary and un4uali9ed. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public oAcer or employee when
such act or omission appears to be I??7!B?,
D@(DS1, IHPR8P7R or I@7FFII7@1. 1he law does
not ma0e any distinction between cases cogni;able
by the Sandiganbayan and those cogni;able by
regular courts. 1he clause Many illegal act or
omission of any public oAcial< is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public oAcer
or employee. Horeover, the jurisdiction of the
8Ace of the 8mbudsman should not be e4uated w2
the limited authority of the SP7IB? PR8S7D18R
under Sec. "" of RB &$$*. 1he 8Ace of the Special
Prosecutor is merely a component of the 8Ace of
the 8mbudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control and upon authority of the
8mbudsman. Its power to conduct prelim.
Investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal
cases w2in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
5ence, in this case, 1he 8mbudsman has authority
to investigate and prosecute the criminal cases
against respondents in the R1, even as this
authority is not e.clusive and is shared w2 the
regular prosecutors.
Same; it has been the consistent policy of the S
not to interfere w2 the 8mbudsmanOs e.ercise of
his investigative powers.
Hamburao
v. 8Ace of
the
8mbudsman
, !R
"#'"E"-E),
@ov. "%,
)***
Same; It is not the ourt to review the 3lanco v.
8mbudsmanOs e.ercise of discretion in prosecuting
or dismissing a complaint 9led before his oAce.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
"#&$%$-%6,
@ov. )$,
)***
Same; Dnder RB &$$*, the 8mbudsman has the
power to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of a public oAcer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be I??7!B?, D@(DS1,
IHPR8P7R, or I@7FFII7@1. 1he prosecution of
o-enses committed by public oAcers is vested in
the 8Ace of the 8mbudsman. 1o insulate the 8Ace
from outside pressure and improper inQuence, the
onstitution as well as RB &$$* has endowed it w2
a wide latitude of investigative and prosecutorial
powers virtually free from legislative, e.ecutive or
judicial intervention. 1he 8mbudsman has the
power to dismiss a complaint w2o going through a
preliminary investigation as provided in
Bdministrative 8rder @o. *$ of the 8Ace of the
8mbudsman, otherwise 0nown as the MRules of
Procedure of the 8Ace of the 8mbudsman.N
Presidential
Bd 5oc Fact
Finding
omm. 8n
3ehest
?oans v.
8mbudsman
, !R
"#%E6),
Bug. "E,
)**"/ Pres.
Bd 5oc Fact
Finding
omm. J.
:esierto, !R
"#$$$$,
8ct. ),
)**".
Same; 1he 8mbudsmanOs resolution of criminal
cases under preliminary investigation cannot be
the subject of review under Rule E% of the Rules of
ourt w2c covers only judgments or 9nal orders or
resolutions of the B, Sandiganbayan, R1Os and
other courts, whenever authori;ed by law. In other
words, a party may appeal only from orders or
decisions of the 8mbudsman in administrative
cases.
@ava v.
8B, !R
"#&E$*,
8ct. "&,
)**".
Same; 5owever, judicial review of the actions of
the 8mbudsman via an original action for certiorari
under Rule &% is available.
id/ 3aylon v.
8mbudsman
, !R
"E)$#6,
:ec. "E,
)**".
Same; Limitations; +", 1he 8mbudsman may not
pass upon errors of the prosecutorOs oAce in the
e.ercise of powers intrinsic to the resolution itself
of the case as that function pertains to the power
of review of the Sec. of (ustice.
!arcia-
Rueda v.
Bmores, !R
""&'#6,
Sept. )*,
)**".
Same; Same; +), 1he 8mbudsman may not
initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative
complaint before his oAce against a judge. 1he
8mbudsman must indorse the case to the S for
appropriate action.
(udge
Fuentes, v.
8Ace of the
8mbidsman-
Hindanao,
!R ")E)'%,
8ct. )#,
)**"
Same; Same; No A!t'orit& to Dire"t$&
Remo1e or Dismiss 7o1ernment OC"ia$s or
Emp$o&ees; Dnder Sec. "#, subpar. +#, of Brt. GI of
the "'6$ onstitution, the 8mbudsman can only
R78HH7@: the removal of the public oAcial or
employee found to be at fault, to the public oAcial
1apaidor v.
8Ace of the
8mbudsman
, !R
")'")E,
Harch "%,
concerned. 1he 8mbudsman has no authority to
sirectly dismiss the petitioner from the government
service, more particularly, from his position in the
3I:.
)**).
Pre$iminar& In1estigation; :espite the
8mbudsmanOs non-compliance w2 the aAdavit
re4mt., petitioner 9led his counter-aAdavit and
answered the charges against him. 5ence, having
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
8mbudsman and having allowed the proceedings
to go on until the prelim investigation was
terminated and the information 9led w2 the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner is deemed to have
waived whatever right he may otherwise have to
assail the manner in w2c prelim investigation was
conducted.
3autista v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
"#&*6),
Hay "),
)***.
De"ision; Not ,ina$ an) Exe"!tor&; B decision
of the 8Ace of the 8mbudsman 9nding respondent
administratively liable for misconduct and imposing
a penalty of " year suspension w2o pay X is not
among those listed in the 8mbudsman Bct of "'6'
as 9nal and unappealable, hence, immediately
e.ecutory. 1here is no general legal principle w2c
mandates that all decisions of 4uasi-judicial
agencies are immediately e.ecutory. Sec. &6 of the
?ocal !overnment ode only applies to
administrative decisions rendered by the 8Ace of
the President or the appropriate Sanggunian
against elective local government oAcials.
Similarly, the provisions of the Bdministrative ode
of "'6$ mandating the e.ecution pending review
applies to administrative decisions of the S
involving members of the ivil Service. 1here is no
basis in law for the proposition that the provisions
of the Bdminitrative ode of "'6$ and the ?ocal
!overnment ode on e.ecution pending review
should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of
the 8mbudsman Bct as there is nothing in the said
Bct w2c provides for such suppletory application.
ourts, may not, under the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided or intended by the
lawma0ers. Bn omission at the time of enactment,
whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially
supplied however later wisdom may recommend
the inclusion.
!ov. ?apid v.
B, !R
"E))&",
(une )',
)***.
Sandigan-
bayan
J!ris)i"tion; Bs construed in !arcia, (r. v.
Sandiganbayan, P: "&*& creating the
Sandiganbayan gave it ?IHI17: jurisdiction that did
not include jurisdiction over petitions for
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. Bfter the
!arcia decision, ongress enacted RB $'$% +Bn Bct
Strengthening the Functional and Structural
8rgani;ation of the Sandiganbayan, Bmending for
that Purpose P: "&*&, as Bmended,, w2c too0
e-ect on Hay &, "''%. Sec. E Y thereof 7GPB@:7:
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Bbbot v.
Hapayo, !R
"#E"*), (uly
&, )***/
Blarilla v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
"#&6*&,
Bug. )),
)***.
Same; It has FD?? BD158RI1F to decide on all
incidents in the ill-gotten wealth case, including the
propriety of the writs of se4uestration issued by
the P!!.
Republic v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
"#%$6', (an.
#", )**).
Se3!estere) Assets; 1he jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to pass upon the partiesO
compromise agreement is beyond dispute. 1he
compromise agreement does not deal merely w2
private interest/ it involves se4uestered shares of
stoc0 - and the parties e.pressly ac0nowledged the
need to obtain approval of the Sandiganbayan.
SH v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
"*E&#$-#6,
Sept. "E,
)***.
Recovery
of Ill-
gotten
Cealth
Sec. "%, Brt. IG of the "'6$ onstitution provides
that such power is impres"ripti#$e; It applies
8@?F 18 IJI? B1I8@S and not to criminal cases.
Pres. Bd 5oc
Fact Finding
omm. 8n
3ehest
?oans v.
:esierto, !R
"#*"E*,
8ct. )%,
"'''.
Sec. "%, Brt. GI of the onstitution applies only to
civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
Republic v.
:esierto, !R
"#&%*&,
Bug. )#,
)**".
Se4uestra
-tion
Procee-
dings
PC77; Lega$ an) *istori"a$ #a"Egro!n);
Immediately after the "'6& 7:SB Revolution, then
President ora;on . B4uino issued 7.ecutive
8rder +7.8., @os. ", ) and "E. M8n the e.plicit
premise that Tvast resources of the government
have been amassed by former President Ferdinand
7. Harcos, his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates both here and abroad,O the
Presidential ommission on !ood !overnment
+P!!, was created by 78 @o. " to assist the
President in the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth
thus accumulated whether located in the
Philippines or abroad.N
78 @o. ) states that the ill-gotten assets and
properties are in the form of ban0 accounts,
deposits, trust accounts, shares of stoc0s,
buildings, shopping centers, condominiums,
mansions, residences, estates, and other 0inds of
real and personal properties in the Philippines and
in various countries of the world.
78@o. "E, on the other hand, empowered the
P!!, with the assistance of the 8Ace of the
Solicitor !eneral and other government agencies,
inter alia, to 9le and prosecute all cases
investigated by it under 7.8. @os. " and ).
Pursuant to these laws, the P!! issued and
implemented numerous se4uestrations, free;e
orders and provisional ta0eovers of allegedly ill-
gotten companies, assets and properties, real or
personal. Bmong the properties se4uestered by the
Republic v.
88F7:,
!R "E$*&)-
&E, :ec. "E,
)**".
ommission were shares of stoc0 in the Dnited
oconut Planters 3an0 +DP3, registered in the
names of the alleged Mone million coconut
farmers,N the so-called oconut Industry
Investment Fund companies +IIF companies, and
Private Respondent 7duardo ojuangco (r.
Co"o Le1& ,!n)s; Prima ,a"ie P!#$i" ,!n)s;
the coconut levy funds are not only a-ected with
public interest/ they are, in fact, prima facie public
funds. Public funds are those moneys belonging to
the State or to any political subdivision of the
State/ more speci9cally, ta.es, customs duties and
moneys raised by operation of law for the support
of the government or for the discharge of its
obligations. Dndeniably, coconut levy funds satisfy
this general de9nition of public funds, because of
the following reasons<
". oconut levy funds are raised with the use of
the police and ta.ing powers of the State.
). 1hey are levies imposed by the State for the
bene9t of the coconut industry and its farmers.
#. Respondents have judicially admitted that
the se4uestered shares were purchased with public
funds.
E. 1he ommission on Budit +8B, reviews the
use of coconut levy funds.
%. 1he 3ureau of Internal Revenue +3IR,, with
the ac4uiescence of private respondents, has
treated them as public funds.
&. 1he very laws governing coconut levies
recogni;e their public character.
Republic v.
88F7:,
supra.
Rig't to 1ote Se3!estere) S'ares; In
Presidential ommission on !ood !overnment v.
ojuanco, (r., the ourt ruled that who should vote
the se4uestered shares re4uires the determination
of the ill-gotten character of those shares and
conse4uently the rightful ownership thereof.
P!! v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
""'&*'-"*,
Sept. )",
)**".
Same; 1he right to vote se4uestered shares of
stoc0 registered in the names of private individuals
or entities and alleged to have been ac4uired with
ill-gotten wealth shall, as a rule, be e.ercised by
the registered owner. 1he P!! may, however, be
granted such voting right provided it can +", show
prima facie evidence that the wealth and2or the
shares are indeed ill-gotten/ and +), demonstrate
imminent danger of dissipation of the assets, thus
necessitating their continued se4uestration and
voting by the government until a decision, ruling
with 9nality on their ownership, is promulgated by
the proper court. 5owever, the foregoing Mtwo-
tieredN test does not apply when the se4uestered
stoc0s are ac4uired with funds that are prima facie
public in character or, at least, are a-ected with
public interest. Inasmuch as the subject DP3
shares in the present case were undisputably
ac4uired with coco levy funds which are public in
character, then the right to vote them shall be
e.ercised by the P!!. In sum, the Mpublic
characterN test, not the Mtwo-tieredN one, applies in
the instant controversy.
Republic v.
88F7:,
supra.
@817< See
dissenting
opinions of
(ustices
Jitug, Helo
and
3ellocillo.
Writ o% Se3!estration San Mig!e$
Corporation 9SMC:; SH shares were
se4uestered in "'6& and the government 9led ivil
ase @o. **## in "'6$ to determine whether they
are part of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
Pres. Harcos and his cronies. Said case has
remained unresolved by the Sandiganbayan. 1he
:7?BF is no longer tolerable for it loc0s in billions
of Pesos w2c could well rev-up the sputtering
economy. 1he Sandiganbayan must not be the
burial ground of cases of far-reaching importance.
SH v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
"*E&#$-#6,
Sept. "E,
)***.
Same; 1he writ of se4uestration issued against
8C@I is not or has ceased to be valid because the
suit in ivil ase @o. ***' against some
defendants therein, as stoc0holders of 8C@I, is not
a suit against 8C@I. Failure to implead these
corporations and merely anne.ing a list of such
corporations to the complaints is a violation of their
right to due process for it would in e-ect be
disregarding their distinct and separate personality
w2o a hearing.
P!! v.
Sandiganba
yan, !R
""'&*'-"*,
Sept. )",
)**".
ommis-
sion on
7lection
COMELEC; Its powers may be classi9ed into =">
adjudicatory or 4uasi-adjudicatory functions/ and
=)> administrative function or ministerial in
character. 8H7?7 Resolution @o. )'6$, w2c
provides for the rules and regulations governing
the conduct of the re4uired plebiscite, was not
issued pursuant to the 8H7?7Os 4uasi-judicial
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of the
plebiscites/ thus, said resolution may not be
deemed a M9nal orderN reviewable by certiorari by
the ourt. Bny 4uestion pertaining to the validity of
said resolution may be well ta0en in an ordinary
action before the trial courts.
Salva v.
Ha0alintal,
!R "#)&*#,
Sept. "6,
)***.
Same; 1he ourt once more reiterates that the
onstitution gives the ommission on 7lections the
broad power Sto enforce and administer all laws
and regulations to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. S )"
1he ommission indisputably e.ercises the power
of supervision and control over boards of election
inspectors and boards of canvassers. 1he
ommission must do everything in its power to
secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast
in the elections. )) 1he onstitution upgraded to a
constitutional status the statutory authority under
3atas Pambansa 3lg. 66" to grant the ommission
broad and more Qe.ible powers to e-ectively
perform its duties and to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to
serve as the guardian of the peoplePs sacred right
of su-rage.
8Ohara v.
8H7?7,
!R "E6'E"-
E), Harch
"), )**).
COMELEC EN BANC; No =!ris)i"tion to 'ear
an) )e"i)e e$e"tion "ases in t'e 6rst
instan"eF 1he power pertains to the divisions of
the 8H7?7.
Bbad v.
8H7?7,
!R ")66$$,
:ec. "*,
"'''/
Iarate v.
8H7?7,
!R ")'*'&,
@ov. "',
"'''.
Same; It does not have the re4uisite authority to
hear and decide election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies in the 9rst instance.
1his power pertains to the :ivisions of the
8H7?7. Bny decision by the 8H7?7 en banc
as regards election cases decided by it in the 9rst
instance is null and void.
Soller v.
8H7?7,
!R "E)'*$,
@ov. )',
)***.
Same; Ex'a!stion o% A)ministrati1e reme)ies
in t'e COMELEC; Petitioners did not e.haust all
the remedies available to them at the 8H7?7
level. Speci9cally, they did not see0 a
reconsideration of the assailed 8H7?7 7n 3anc
Resolution as re4uired by Section " +d,, Rule "# of
the "''# 8H7?7 Rules of Procedure.
3ernardo v.
Bbalos, !R
"#$)&&,
:ec. %,
)**".
*o!se o% Representati1e E$e"tora$ Tri#!na$
9*RET:; Dnder Brt. JI, Sec. "$ of the onstitution,
the 5R71 has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
all contests relative to the election, returns, and
4uali9cations of H7H37RS of the 5ouse of
Representatives. 8nce a winning candidate is
proclaimed, ta0es his oath, and assumes oAce as a
member of the 5ouse of Representatives,
8H7?7Os jurisdiction over the protests relating to
his election, returns and 4uali9cations ends, and
5R71Os own jurisdiction begins.
!uerrero v.
8H7?7,
!R "#$**E,
(uly )&,
)***.
Same; Appea$ )ire"t$& to t'e COMELEC En
Banc %rom t'e )e"ision o% t'e tria$ "o!rt o%
originF Such recourse transgressed Sec. # +c,, Brt.
IG of the onstitution.
1ypoco v.
8H7?7,
!R "#&"'",
@ov. )',
"'''.
Writs o% Certiorari< Pro'i#ition< an)
Man)am!s; J!ris)i"tion to iss!e; 3oth the S
and the 8H7?7 have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue such writs. 1he ourt that ta0es jurisdiction
9rst shall e.ercise e.clusive jurisdiction over the
case.
arlos v.
Bngeles,
supra.
ivil
Service
ommis-
sion +S,
Career Exe"!ti1e Ser1i"e OC"ers 9CESO:;
Bppointments, assignments, reassignments, and
transfers in the 7S8 are based on ran0. Security
of tenure in the 7S8 is thus ac4uired w2 respect to
ran0 and not to position. Hobility and Qe.ibility in
the assignment of personnel, to better cope w2 the
e.igencies of public service, is the distinguishing
feature of 7S8.
Sec. of
(ustice v.
3acal, !R
"#'#6),
:ec. &,
)***.
APPOINTMENT DISTIN7UIS*ED ,ROM
REASSI7NMENT; RE DESI7NATION; Bn
appointment may be de9ned as the selection, by
the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to e.ercise the functions of a
given oAce. Chen completed, usually with its
con9rmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of
his oAce 8n the other hand, a reassignment is
:r. 8sea v.
:r. Halaya,
!R "#'6)",
(an. #*,
)**).
merely a movement of an employee from one
organi;ational unit to another in the same
department or agency which does not involve a
reduction in ran0, status or salary and does not
re4uire the issuance of an appointment. In the
same vein, a designation connotes merely the
imposition of additional duties on an incumbent
oAcial.
Same; Permanent Stat!s; It is settled that a
permanent appointment can be issued only Sto a
person who meets all the re4uirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including
the appropriate eligibility prescribed.S First, in order
to 4ualify an appointment as permanent, the
appointee must possess the ran0 appropriate to
the position. Second, security of tenure in the
career e.ecutive service +S7SS, is thus ac4uired
with respect to ran0, and not to position. 1he
guaranty of security of tenure to members of the
career e.ecutive service does not e.tend to the
particular positions to which they may be
appointed R a concept w2c is applicable only to
9rst and second-level employees in the civil service
R but to the ran0 to which they are appointed by
the President.
:imayuga v.
3enedicto,
!R "EE"%#,
(an. "&,
)**).
Same; Same; In the recent case of +:e ?eon v. a,
!R )$"6), (an. )), )**",, it held that the mere fact
that a position belongs to the areer Service does
not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the re4uired
4uali9cations. Such right will have to depend on
the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lac0 of it. B person who
does not have the re4uisite 4uali9cations for the
position cannot be appointed to it in the acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.
1he appointment e.tended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated. In this case, the subse4uent inclusion
of petitionerOs position under 7S, w2o the re4uired
eligibility, did not automatically 4ualify her fort he
said position. 1he permanent status accorded to
her appointment would only allow her to occupy
said position until the appointing authority would
replace her w2 someone who has the re4uired
eligibility therefor.
:imayuga v.
3enedicto,
!R "EE"%#,
(an. "&,
)**).
Same; A"ting Capa"it&; 1he mere fact that a
position belongs to the areer Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the re4uired
4uali9cations. Such right will have to depend on
the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lac0 of it. B person who
does not have the re4uisite 4uali9cations for the
position cannot be appointed to it in the 9rst place
or, only as an e.ception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles. 1he appointment
e.tended to him cannot be regarded as permanent
even if it may be so designated.
:e ?eon v.
B, ")$"6),
:ec. %,
)**".
Same; Temporar& Appointment; Petitioner was
recommended to the position of Schools :ivision
Superintendent of amarines Sur, having been
endorsement by the Provincial School 3oard.
5owever, her 4uali9cation to the oAce lac0s the
essential ingredient, of appointment thereto.
PetitionerPs designation as 8Acer-in-harge,
Bssistant Schools :ivision Superintendent, was
e.pressly made subject to further advice from the
:7S. 1hus, her designation was temporary. In
fact, there was a need to recommend her to the
President for appointment in a permanent capacity.
Inasmuch as she occupied her position only
temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or
reassigned to other positions without violating her
right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has
no vested right to the position of Schools :ivision
Superintendent of amarines Sur.
:r. 8sea v.
:r. Halaya,
!R "#'6)",
(an. #*,
)**).
SECURIT; O, TENURE; Failure to ma0e a
courtesy call to the superior or to submit
appointment papers is not a ground for dismissal.
Failure to report to wor0 in this case is not
tantamount to abandonment. For failure to accord
due process to respondent, the termination of her
employment is illegal. onse4uently, she is entitled
to reinstatement, plus payment of bac0 salaries.
Bdiong v.
B, !R
"#&E6*,
:ec. E,
)**".
-ACG SALARIES; Payment of salaries
corresponding to the period when an employee is
not allowed to wor0 may be decreed if he is found
innocent of the charges. 5owever, if the employee
is not completely e.onerated of the charges, such
as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to
mere suspension, he would not be entitled to the
payment of bac0 salaries.
astro v.
!loria, !R
"#)"$E,
Bug. )*,
)**".
Termina$ Lea1e; 1he money value of the terminal
leave of a retiring government oAcial shall be
computed at the retireeOs highest monthly salary. In
this case, petitionerOs highest monthly salary is
that corresponding to position of Sec. of Finance
w2c petitioner received while he was Bcting Sec.,
during the travel abroad of the Secretary.
3elicena, v.
Sec. of
Finance, !R
"E#"'*,
8ct. "$,
)**".
PARENS PATRIAE AND PATRIA POTESTAS;
app$ie) in t'e Ci1i$ Ser1i"e; Paternal power
should consist or be e.ercised w2 a-ection, not in
atrocity. Is a government employee who has been
ordered arrested and detained for a non-bailable
o-ense and for which he was suspended for his
inability to report for wor0 until the termination of
his case, still re4uired to 9le a formal application
for leave of absence to ensure his reinstatement
upon his ac4uittal and thus protect his security of
tenureU oncomitantly, will his prolonged absence
from oAce for more than one +", year
automatically justify his being dropped from the
rolls without prior notice despite his being already
placed under suspension by his employer until the
termination of his case, which 9nally resulted in his
ac4uittal for lac0 of evidenceU 1his case was
resolved by the ourt w2 a view to do justice to the
wor0er where the punctilious adherence to
Hunicipality
of Ha0ati
ity v. S,
!R "#"#'),
Feb. &,
)**).
technicality, the re4uirement that private
respondent should have 9led an application for
leave of absence in proper form, petitioner had
actual notice, and the suspension order couched in
simple language that she was being suspended
until the 9nal disposition of her criminal case
petitioner had actual notice, and the suspension
order couched in simple language that she was
being suspended until the 9nal disposition of her
criminal case. 1he meaning of her suspension until
the 9nal disposition of her case is that should her
case be dismissed she should be reinstated to her
position with payment of bac0 wages. She did not
have to apply for leave of absence since she was
already suspended by her employer until her case
would be terminated. Ce have done justice to the
wor0ingman in the past/ today we will do no less by
resolving all doubts in favor of the humble
employee in faithful obeisance to the constitutional
mandate to a-ord full protection to labor.
LEA4E O, A-SENCE; A!tomati" Lea1e o%
a#sen"e; Bs a general rule, Secs. )* and %), as
well as Secs. #% and &# +Sec. )* of the ivil Service
Rules is now Sec. %) of Rule GJI, on ?eave of Bbsence, of
Resolution @o. '"-"&#" dated )$ :ecember "''" as
amended by S H @o. E", s. "''6, and Sec. #% is now
Sec. &# as amended by S H @os. E", s. "''6 and "E,
s. "'''.,, re4uire an approved leave of absence to
avoid being on BC8?. ## 5owever, these
provisions cannot be interpreted as e.clusive and
referring only to one mode of securing the approval
of a leave of absence which would re4uire an
employee to apply for it, formalities and all, before
e.ceeding thirty +#*, days of absence in order to
avoid being dropped from the rolls. 1here are, after
all, other means of see0ing and granting an
approved leave of absence, one of which is the S
recogni;ed rule of automatic leave of absence
under speci9ed circumstances, i.e., where an
applicant could not probable do so as he is legally
and physically prevented from doing it or is
beyond his control, or in case of illness +Sec. )*,
S Rules,. 1he rule of automatic leave of absence
clearly falls within the constitutionally delegated
power of the S and is reasonable under the
circumstances to address absences from wor0
which are not attributable to the concerned
government employee.
Hunicipality
of Ha0ati
ity v. S,
!R "#"#'),
Feb. &,
)**).
CI4IL SER4ICE COMMISSION 9CSC:; A!t'orit&
to Interpret its Own R!$es; 1he S li0e any
other agency has the power to interpret its own
rules and any phrase contained in them w2 its
interpretation signi9cantly becoming part of the
rules themselves. Bn administrative body has
power to interpret its own rules which have the
force and e-ect of law, and such an interpretation
becomes part of the rule +Foley vs. 3enedict, "))
1e. "'#, %% SC =)d> 6*%, 6& B?R E$$,. . . 1he
contemporaneous construction of a statute +and
similarly of rules and regulations, by the e.ecutive
oAcers of the government whose duty it is to
e.ecute it is entitled to great respect, and should
ordinarily control the construction of the statute by
Hunicipality
of Ha0ati
ity v. S,
!R "#"#'),
Feb. &,
)**).
the courts +Dnited States vs. Philbric0, ")* D.S. %),
#* ? 7d. %%',. Bnd the interpretation of an agency
of its own rules should be given more weight than
the interpretation by that agency of the law it is
merely tas0ed to administer. 1hus, ourts is guided
in cases where the dispute concerns the
interpretation by an agency of its own rules, we
should apply only these standards< SChether the
delegation of power was valid/ whether the
regulation was within that delegation/ and if so,
whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due
process test.S Bn aArmative answer in each of
these 4uestions should caution us from discarding
the agencyPs interpretation of it own rules.
Same; SUSPENSION; In placing private
respondent under suspension until the 9nal
disposition of her criminal case, the Hunicipal
Personnel 8Acer acted w2 competence so he
presumably 0new that his order of suspension was
not a0in to either suspension as penalty or
preventive suspension since there was no
administrative case against private respondent. Bs
competence on the part of the HP8 is presumed,
any error on his part should not prejudice private
respondent, and that what he had in mind was to
consider her as being on leave of absence w2o pay
and their 7R-77 relationship being merely deemed
suspended, not severed, in the meanwhile. 1his
construction of the order of suspension is actually
more consistent with logic as well as fairness and
0indness to its author, the HP8. Signi9cantly, the
idea of a suspended 7R-77 relationship is widely
accepted in labor law to account for situations
wherein laborers would have no wor0 to perform
for causes not attributable to them. Ce 9nd no
basis for denying the application of this principle to
the instant case which also involves a lowly wor0er
in the public service.
Hunicipality
of Ha0ati
ity v. S,
!R "#"#'),
Feb. &,
)**).
Same; DROPPIN7 ,ROM T*E ROLLS; :ue
process demands serving upon the employee
himself the notice dropping him from the rolls. 1he
ity !overnment of Ha0ati ity slept on the
re4uest of private respondent to reinstate her on
the basis of the condition in the order suspending
her, i.e., her reinstatement upon her ac4uittal/
instead, after three +#, long years, without prior
warning and out of the blue, adversely by dropping
her from the service for not 9ling an application for
leave. 1he action of herein petitioner cuts too
deeply into private respondentPs right to continue
her employment in the government and unduly
dilutes the constitutional guarantees of security of
tenure and due process.
Hunicipality
of Ha0ati
ity v. S,
!R "#"#'),
Feb. &,
)**).
Same; REINSTATEMENT WIT* -ACGWA7ES; In
loc0ing her out of her job, the ity !overnment
illegally deprived her of the opportunity to wor0
and so must be held liable for such unlawful action.
Bll in all, we hold that private respondent must be
reinstated as ler0 III or a position of e4uivalent
ran0 and compensation in the ity !overnment.
She must also be paid bac0 wages and other
Hunicipality
of Ha0ati
ity v. S,
!R "#"#'),
Feb. &,
)**).
bene9ts lawfully due her counted from "' 8ctober
"''E when she presented herself for resumption of
duties but was refused. 1his is very much
consistent with the elementary rule that a
government oAcial or employee who had been
illegally dismissed and whose reinstatement had
later been ordered is considered as not having left
his oAce +(ustice Jitug is his separate opinion said
the award of bac0 salries should be reduced to %
years conformably w2 the pronouncement of the
ourt in a long line of cases,, so that he is entitled
to all the rights and privileges that should accrue to
him by virtue of the oAce that he held.
ommis-
sion on
Budit
+8B,
*iring o% Pri1ate Law&ers #& 7o1ernment
Agen"ies; 8B ircular @o. 6&-)%% dated Bpril ",
"'6& R7S1RI1S government agencies and
instrumentalities from hiring private lawyers to
render legal services or handle cases and provides
that no funds shall be disbursed for payment to
private lawyers D@?7SS prior to the hiring of said
lawyer, there is written conformity and
ac4uiescence from the S8?!7@ or the !overnment
orporate ounsel.
Polloso v.
!angan, !R
"E*%&#, (uly
"E, )***.
POWER TO E(AMINE AND AUDIT; Dnder Sec. )
+",, Brt. IG-: od the onstitution, the power of 8B
to e.amine and audit is @8@-7G?DSIJ7. 8n the
other hand, under Sec. ) +), of the same Brticle of
the onstitution, 8BOs authority to de9ne the
scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary e.penditures
is 7G?DSIJ7. 1he framers of the onstitution were
fully aware of the need to allow independent
private audit of certain government agencies in
addition to the 8B audit, as =a> when there is a
private investment in a !8, or =b> when a
government corporation is privati;ed or publicly X
listed, or =c> as in the case at bar, when the
government borrows money abroad, In these
instances the government enters the mar0etplace
and competes w2 the rest of the world in attracting
investments or loans. 1o succeed, the government
must abide w2 reasonable business practices of the
mar0etplace. 8therwise, no investor or creditior will
do business w2 the government, frustrating
government e-orts to attract investments or
secure loans that may be critical to stimulate
moribund industries or resuscitate a badly
shattered national economy as in the case at bar.
:3P v. 8B,
!R 66E#%,
(an. "&,
)**).
Same; 1he 9ndings and conclusions of the private
auditor may guide private investors or creditors
who re4uire such private audit. !overnment
agencies and oAcials, however, remain bound by
the 9ndings and conclusions of the 8B, whether
the matter falls under the 9rst or second paragraph
of Section ), unless of course such 9ndings and
conclusions of the 8B, whether the matter falls
under the 9rst or second paragraph of Section ),
unless of course such 9ndings and conclusions are
modi9ed or reversed by the courts.
:3P v. 8B,
!R 66E#%,
(an. "&,
)**).
Same; 1he power of the 8B to e.amine and audit :3P v. 8B,
government agencies, while non-e.clusive +Sec. #,
Brt. IG-: of the onstitution,. 1he mere fact that
private auditors may audit government agencies
does not divest the 8B of its power to e.amine
and audit the same government agencies. 1he 8B
is neither by-passed nor ignored since even w2 a
private auditor, the 8B will still conduct its usual
e.amination and audit, and its 9ndings and
conclusions will still bind government agencies and
their oAcials. Bs the constitutionally mandated
auditor of all government agencies, the 8BOs
9ndings and conclusions necessarily prevail over
those of private auditors, at least insofar as
government agencies and oAcials are concerned.
!R 66E#%,
(an. "&,
)**).
Same; *iring o% Pri1ate A!)itors; Section #" of
P: @o. "EE% merely grants authority to the 8B to
hire and deputi;e private auditors to assist the 8B
in the auditing of government agencies. Such
private auditors operate under the authority of the
8B. 8n the other hand, Section 6 of P: @o. )*)'
states in part that S1he audit of government
corporations by the 8B shall not preclude
government corporations from engaging the
services of private auditing 9rms< Provided,
however, that even if the services of the latter are
availed of, the audit report of the 8B shall serve
as the report for purposes of compliance w2 audit
re4uirements as re4uired of government
corporations under applicable law.S Said Section
also provides that the Spolicy of withdrawal of
resident auditors shall be fully implemented . . .S
Section ) of the same decree also e.cludes from
the term S!8S two classes of corporations. 1he
9rst are originally private corporations the majority
of the shares of stoc0 of w2care ac4uired by
government 9nancial institutions through
foreclosure or dacion en pago. 1he second are
subsidiary corporations of government
corporations, w2c subsidiaries are organi;ed
e.clusively to own, manage or lease physical
assets ac4uired by government 9nancial
institutions through foreclosure or dacion en pago.
:3P v. 8B,
!R 66E#%,
(an. "&,
)**).
Same; Same; !overnment Buditing ode of the
Phils. +P: "EE%, Secs, )&, #", and #), does not
prohibit the hiring of private auditors by
government agencies. 1hus, Sec. )& must be
applied in harmony w2 Sec. %6 of the entral
3an0ing ?aw of )*** +RB 6$'", w2c authori;es
une4uivocally the Honetary 3oard to re4uire ban0s
to hire independent auditors and Sec. )% and )6 of
the @ew entral 3an0 Bct +RB $&%#,, w2c authori;e
e.pressly the Honetary 3oard to conduct periodic
or special e.amination of all ban0s.
:3P v. 8B,
!R 66E#%,
(an. "&,
)**).
POWER TO RE7ULATE DIS-URSEMENTS
,UNDS AND DISALLOWANCES O, ILLE7AL OR
IRRE7ULAR DIS-URSEMENTS O, ,UNDS; 1he
onstitution speci9cally vests in the ommission
the authority to determine whether government
entities comply with laws and regulations in the
disbursement of government funds and to disallow
illegal or irregular disbursements of government
@7B v. 8B,
!R "E#E6",
Feb. "%,
)**).
funds. In the case at bar, @7BPs accelerated
implementation of the Salary Standardi;ation ?aw
II is not in accordance with law. 1he "''$ !BB is
not self-e.ecutory so as to serve as outright legal
authority for @7B to spend what had been
appropriated for @7BPs SPersonal ServicesS under
the "''$ !BB. 3udgetary appropriations under the
!BB do not constitute unbridled authority to
government agencies to spend the appropriated
amounts as they may wish. It re4uires further
process as the entire budget process consists of
four major phases, namely< 3udget Preparation,
3udget Buthori;ation, 3udget 7.ecution and
3udget Bccountability. Bfter approval of the
Sproposed budgetS by the :3H, the same is
submitted to ongress for evaluation and inclusion
in the appropriations law w2c sets forth the
authori;ed appropriations of the departments and
agencies. 5owever, this Sauthori;ationS does not
include the authority to disburse. B program of
e.penditures is 9rst prepared showing approved
programs and projects. Bn itemi;ation of personal
services is also prepared listing authori;ed
itemi;ed positions and their corresponding
classi9cations and authori;ed salaries. Bs clearly
stated in Section &*, hapter $, 3oo0 JI of the
Bdministrative ode, Sno portion of the
appropriations in the !BB shall be used for
payment of any salary increase or adjustment
unless speci9cally authori;ed by law or appropriate
budget circular.S @3 @o. E%6 is the appropriate
budget circular referred to by the law with respect
to the payment of the last phase of the Salary
Standardi;ation ?aw II.
8mnibus
7lection
ode
ELECTION; In this jurisdiction, an election means
Sthe choice or selection of candidates to public
oAce by popular vote,S through the use of the
ballot, and the elected oAcials of which are
determined through the will of the electorate.S Bn
election is the embodiment of the popular will, the
e.pression of the sovereign power of the people.
Speci9cally, the term election, in the conte.t of the
onstitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting
of votes.
8Ohara v.
8H7?7,
!R "E6'E"-
E), Harch
"), )**).
,AILURE O, ELECTION; Ca$$ing o% Spe"ia$
E$e"tions; 3efore 8H7?7 can act on a veri9ed
petition see0ing to declare a failure of election,
two 9H: "on)itions must concur< 9rst, no voting
has ta0en place in the precincts concerned on the
date 9.ed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect/
and second, the votes cast would a-ect the result
of the election. Bnd that the cause of such failure
of election should have been any of the following<
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud of other
analogous cases. learly then, there are only t'ree
9B: instan"es where a failure of election may be
declared, namely< +a, the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date 9.ed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
1ypoco v.
8H7?7,
!R "#&"'",
@ov. )',
"'''/ arlos
v. Bngeles,
!R "E)'*$,
@ov. )',
)***.
fraud, or other analogous causes/ +b, the election
in any polling place had been suspended before
the hour 9.ed by law for the closing of the voting
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes/ +c, after the
voting and during the preparation and transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes. In all instances
there must have been failure to elect/ this is
obvious in the 9rst scenario where the election was
not held and the second where the election was
suspended. Bs to the third scenario, the
preparation and transmission of the election
returns which give rise to the conse4uence of
failure to elect must as aforesaid be literally
interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a
winner.
Same; 1he omelec is duty-bound to conduct an
investigation as to the veracity of respondentsP
allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that
attended the conduct of the Hay "E, )**" election.
:atu
Bmpatuan v.
8H7?7,
!R "E'6*#,
(an. #",
)**).
Same; J!ris)i"tion; 1he trial court has no
jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, w2c
power is vested e.clusively in the 8H7?7 sitting
en banc.
arlos v.
Bngeles, !R
"E)'*$,
@ov. )',
)***.
ELECTION RETURNS; Dis"repan"ies; 1he
wisdom of the order to e.amine the election
returns is that . . . between another copy of the
8 and the election returns, the latter could
provide a more accurate basis for the
determination of the true and genuine results of
the votes cast. 1his is obvious because the former
constitutes a mere summary of the latter and
errors, deliberate or otherwise, may be committed
in entering therein the 9gures obtained from the
election returns. 3esides, among the copies of the
election returns readily available to the
ommission, those intended speci9cally for it are
the least li0ely to be tampered with after leaving
the hands of the board of election inspectors. If it
9nds discrepancies in the election returns, Section
)#& of the 8mnibus 7lection ode provides the
remedy w2c is a re-canvass of the election returns
or the re-counting of the ballots.
8Ohara v.
8H7?7,
!R "E6'E"-
E), Harch
"), )**).
Same; Mani%est Errors; In the case of 1rinidad
vs. omelec =#)* SRB 6#&, 6E# +"''',> , de9nition
of Smanifest errorS is that it is evident to the eye
and understanding/ visible to the eye/ that which is
open, palpable, uncontrovertible/ needing no
evidence to ma0e it more clear/ not obscure or
hidden. . . SB manifest clerical error is one that is
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,
and is apparent from the papers to the eye of the
appraiser and collector, and does not include an
error which may, by evidence dehors the record be
8Ohara v.
8H7?7,
!R "E6'E"-
E), Harch
"), )**).
shown to have committed . . . S In the case of
have; vs. omelec =)"" SRB #"% +"''),>, this
ourt e.plained that. . . 1o be manifest, the errors
must appear on the face of the certi9cates of
canvass or election returns sought to be corrected
and2or objections thereto must have been made
before the board of canvassers and speci9cally
noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings. 1hus, in this case, 1he alleged error
w2c the H3 of 3inangonan committed and w2c it
attributes to physical e.haustion and sleepless
nights, is obviously not a plain error apparent from
the erti9cate of anvass.
Same; Corre"tion o% Mani%est Errors; Section %
of Rule )$ of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the
8H7?7 re4uires that the correction be one
involving a manifest error such as Sa mista0e in the
copying of the 9gures into the Statement of Jotes
or into the erti9cate of anvass.S 1he provision,
however, also re4uires that Ssuch errors could not
have been discovered during the canvassing
despite the e.ercise of due diligence.S 1he
rationale for the provision is obvious. If the error
sought to be corrected is truly a manifest error,
then the matter should have already been raised
before the board of canvassers. 1he e.ception is if
the error is one that Scould not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the
e.ercise of due diligence.S In the case at bar, the
error allegedly committed by the H3 of
3inangonan, w2c it attempted to describe and
rationali;e in their aAdavits, is one that should
have been discovered even with ordinary diligence.
1he truth of the matter, however, is that the error,
even assuming it to be true, is not manifest and
was not apparent from the erti9cate of anvass
and, therefore, cannot be corrected simply by
correction of alleged tabulation error.
8Ohara v.
8H7?7,
!R "E6'E"-
E), Harch
"), )**).
PRE8PROCLAMATION CONTRO4ERS;; refers to
any 4uestion pertaining to or a-ecting the
proceedings of the 38 or any matter raised under
Secs. )##, )#E, )#% and )#& of the 87, in relation
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of 7ROs. Sec. )E# of the ode
enumerates the speci9c issues that may be raised
in a pre-proc controversy. In addition to the
R7S1RI1IJ7 B@: 7G?DSIJ7 S8P7 of its subject
matter, all pre-proc controversies on 7ROs or 8Os
shall be disposed of summarily X by the 38 and
then the 8H7?7.
hu v.
8H7?7,
!R "#%E)#,
@ov. )',
"'''/ Si4uia
v. 8H7?7,
!R "#%&)$,
:ec. ',
"'''.
Same; 1he 38 and the 8H7?7 are not to loo0
beyond or behind 7ROs w2c are on their face regular
and authentic. 3eing a summary proceeding, there
is no room for the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
hu v.
8H7?7,
!R "#%E)#,
@ov. )',
"'''/ Si4uia
v. 8H7?7,
!R "#%&)$,
:ec. ',
"'''.
Same; B party see0ing to raise issues the hu v.
resolution of w2c would compel or necessitate the
8H7?7 to pierce the veil of 7ROs w2c are prima
acie regular on their face, has his proper remedy
in a regular election protest.
8H7?7,
!R "#%E)#,
@ov. )',
"'''/ Si4uia
v. 8H7?7,
!R "#%&)$,
:ec. ',
"'''.
Same; 1he legislative intent of the summary
disposition of pre-proc controversy is to give life to
the policy that the canvass and proclamation be
delayed as little as possible for it is in the public
interest that the position for w2c the election was
held should be 9lled promptly, even though the
proclamation of the winning candidates be
provisional in nature, as the same may still be
subject to the results of the election protests that
may be subse4uently 9led. 3esides the 38Os are
merely ad hoc bodies, e.isting only for the interim
tas0 of canvassing 7ROs and do not have the
facitlities, time, nor competence to hear, e.amine
and decide on alleged election irregularities, unli0e
regular courts, the 8H7?7, or the 7lectoral
1ribunal.
hu v.
8H7?7,
!R "#%E)#,
@ov. )',
"'''.
Same; It may be 9led directly w2 the 8H7?7
pursuant to Section % of Rule )$ of the Revised
Rules of Procedure of the 8H7?7.
Pre8Pro"$amation Contro1ers& 1sF Ann!$ment
o% E$e"tion Res!$t< or ,ai$!re o% E$e"tion; B
pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an
action for annulment of election results, or failure
of elections. 1hese two remedies were more
speci9cally distinguished in this wise< SChile,
however, the omelec is restricted, in pre-
proclamation cases, to an e.amination of the
election returns on their face and is w2o jurisdiction
to go beyond or behind them and investigate
election irregularities, the omelec is duty bound
to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism,
violence, and other analogous causes in actions for
annulment of election results or for declaration of
failure of elections, as the 8mnibus 7lection ode
denominates the same. 1hus, the omelec, in the
case of actions for annulment of election results or
declaration of failure of elections, may conduct
technical e.amination of election documents and
compare and analy;e votersP signatures and
thumbprints in order to determine whether or not
the elections had indeed been free, honest and
clean.S
?oong v.
8H7?7,
#)& Phil.
$'*, 6"E,
cited in
Hatalam v.
8H7?7,
##6 Phil.
EE$ +"''$,.
ANNULMENT O, ELECTION AND5OR ,AILURE
O, ELECTION; 1he fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed oAce does not deprive
the omelec of its authority to annul any canvass
and illegal proclamation. In the case at bar, we
cannot assume that petitionersP proclamation and
assumption into oAce on (une #*, )**", was legal
precisely because the conduct by which the
elections were held was put in issue by
respondents in their petition for annulment of
:atu
Bmpatuan v.
8H7?7,
!R "E'6*#,
(an. #",
)**).
election results and2or declaration of failure of
elections. Ce are not unmindful of the fact that a
pattern of conduct observed in past elections has
been the pernicious Mgrab-the-proclamation-
prolong-the-protestN slogan of some candidates or
parties such that even if the protestant wins, it
becomes Sa mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication
when the term of oAce is about to e.pire or has
e.pired.S . . . Ce have but to reiterate the oft-cited
rule that the validity of a proclamation may be
challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed
candidate has assumed oAce.
Same; 1he omelec en banc has the authority to
annul election results and2or declare a failure of
elections as provided for in Section & of the
8mnibus 7lection ode.
:atu
Bmpatuan v.
8H7?7,
!R "E'6*#,
(an. #",
)**).
Same; 1he great breadth of the constitutional and
statutory powers granted omelec has brought to
the fore judicial pronouncements which have long
become guidelines. 1ime and again, this ourt has
given its imprimatur on the principle that omelec
is with authority to annul any canvass and
proclamation which was illegally made.
8Ohara v.
8H7?7,
!R "E6'E"-
E), Harch
"), )**),
cited Bguam
vs.
8H7?7,
)# SRB
66# +"'&6,.
ELECTION CONTEST; 7lection contests involve
public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to
the determination of the true will of the electorate
in the choice of their elective oAcials. 1he ourt
frowns upon any interpretation of the law that
would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but
also the correct ascertainment of the results. In any
election contest, the ultimate issue is to determine
the electoral will. In other words, who among the
candidates was the votersP choice.
8Ohara v.
8H7?7,
!R "E6'E"-
E), Harch
"), )**).
RB &&E& DIS+UALI,ICATION PROCEEDIN7S; Sec. &, RB
&&E& authori;es the continuation of proceedings
for dis4uali9cation, even after the elections if the
respondent has not been proclaimed. Proclamation
bars further proceeding of such nature.
Pere; v.
8H7?7,
!R "##'EE,
8ct. )6,
"'''.
Same; Possi#$e Reme)ies +",Hove for the
suspension of the proclamation reiterating his
prayer in the petition for dis4uali9cation and in the
vent it is denied, to 9le a petition for ertiorari in
the S w2 prayer for 1R8/ or +), File a petition for
Vuo Carranto w2in "* days after the proclamation.
Pere; v.
8H7?7,
!R "##'EE,
8ct. )6,
"'''.
Same; Dis3!a$i6"ations o% Can)i)ates %or
P!#$i" OC"e; Jiolation of 3P )) involves moral
turpitude. 1he deletion in recent jurisprudence of
the penalty of imprisonment and the imposition in
lieu thereof, of a 9ne X does not mean that the
o-ense no longer involves moral turpitude.
Jillaber v.
8H7?7,
!R "E6#)&,
@ov. "%,
)**".
CERTI,ICATE O, CANDIDAC;; Failure to specify
the public oAce he was see0ing in his 8 was not
a fatal defect in this case.
on4uilla v.
8H7?7,
!R "#'6*),
Bpril )6,
)***.
-a$$ots; ounting of contested ballots. Since the
main issue at hand is the contested ballots claimed
by the parties, the computation shall be based on
the number of uncontested ballots after revision at
the lower court. 1hus, petitioner who garnered )%"
uncontested ballots would be credited with )' valid
votes per 9ndings after revision. 5e therefore has a
total of )6* votes. 8n the other hand, private
respondent with )&6 uncontested ballots shall be
credited with 6 valid votes out of the "" votes
claimed, or a total of )$& votes.
Ferrer v.
8H7?7,
!R "#'E6',
Bpril "*,
)***.
Can)i)ates %or E$e"ti1e P!#$i" OC"e;
Certi6"ate o% Can)i)a"&F Use o% Ni"Ename;
Dnder par. +),, Sec. $E of the 87, # 0inds of votes
are considered stray< ="> a vote containing initials/
=)> a vote w2c is illegible/ and =#> a vote w2c does
not suAciently identify the candidate for whom it is
intended. he 9rst category of stray votes under this
rule is not to be 4uali9ed by the third category in
the sense that votes in initials only may be counted
for a candidate provided that the initials would
suAciently identify the candidate voted for. Such
construction of the rule fails to give meaning to the
disjunctive conjunction 8R separating the 9rst
category from the second, and the second from the
third.
Jillarosa v.
5R71, !R
"E##%",
Sept. "E,
)***.
Same; Same; Same; 1he initials M(1JN were used
by petitioner as a nic0name, for purpose of being
voted upon. 1here is no law or rule that prohibits
the adoption of initials as a nic0name/ nor is there
any law or rule that re4uires that the initials
adopted by a person as a nic0name strictly
correspond to his or her own initials. Petitioner is
the lawful wife of (ose 1. Jillarosa and could legally
present or identify herself as SHrs. (1JS. @o law was
transgressed when she registered S(1JS as her
nic0name in her certi9cate of candidacy. 1herefore,
the applicable provision of the 87 is Section )"",
par +"#,, which sets out the rule for the
appreciation of votes using nic0names. Said rule
establishes that a nic0name alone is a valid vote,
provided< +", it is that by which a candidate is
generally or popularly 0nown in the locality, and +),
there is no other candidate with the same
nic0name running for the same oAce. 1he
underlying purpose for the rule, as e.plained in the
opening provision of Section )"" of the 87, is to
ascertain and carry into e-ect the intention of the
voter, where such intention could be determined
with reasonable certainty. 1o this end, every ballot
is presumed to be valid and all doubts are to be
liberally construed in favor of its validity if only to
give e-ect to the will of the voter as reQected
therein.
id.
Same; Resi)en"& Re3!irement; 1he 1orayno v.
onstitution and the law re4uires residence as a
4uali9cation for see0ing and holding elective public
oAce, in order to give candidates the opportunity
to be familiar with the needs, diAculties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters
vital to the welfare of their constituencies/ li0ewise,
it enables the electorate to evaluate the see0ersP
4uali9cations and 9tness for the job they aspire for.
Inasmuch as Jicente F. 7mano has proven that he,
together with his family, +", had actually resided in
a house he bought in "'$# in agayan de 8ro ity/
+), had actually held oAce there during his three
terms as provincial governor of Hisamis 8riental,
the provincial capitol being located therein/ and +#,
has registered as voter in the city during the period
re4uired by law, he could not be deemed Sa
stranger or newcomerS when he ran for and was
overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. 7lection laws
must be liberally construed to give e-ect to the
popular mandate.
8H7?7,
!R "#$#)',
Bug. ',
)***.
E$e"tion Protest; Pa&ment o% 6$ing %ees; 1he
non-payment of the proper 9ling fees is no longer
e.cusable and is a valid ground for the dismissal of
election protests.
Soller v.
8H7?7,
)***.
Same; Period for disposition of election protest
must be observed faithfully.
Ri;on v.
(udge Ierna,
supra.
Same; Opening o% -a$$ot -oxes; Chen there is
an allegation in an election protest that would
re4uire the perusal, e.amination or counting of
ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the
trial court to order the opening of the ballot bo.es
and the determination and counting of ballots
deposited therein.
Higuel v.
8H7?7,
!R "#&'&&,
(uly %, )***.
Time$iness o% Motion; Hotion for Reconsideration
was timely 9led on (une ", "''6 considering that
Hay #" was a Sunday, hence, he had until the ne.t
wor0ing day, w2c was (une ", w2in w2c to as0 for
reconsideration.
on4uilla v.
8H7?7,
supra.
RB 6"6' Reassignment o% E$e"tion OC"ers; JoterOs
Registration Bct of "''& +RB 6"6',F Section EE of
RB 6"6' enjoys the presumption of validity, and
the ourt discerns no ground to invalidate it. It
)oes not 1io$ate e3!a$ prote"tion 1he singling
out of election oAcers in order to Sensure the
impartiality of election oAcials by preventing them
from developing familiarity with the people of their
place of assignmentS does not violate the e4ual
protection clause of the onstitution. Neit'er
in%ringe se"!rit& o% ten!re 1he guarantee of
security of tenure under the onstitution is not a
guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means
that an employee cannot be dismissed +or
transferred, from the service for causes other than
those provided by law and after due process is
accorded the employee. Chat it see0s to prevent is
capricious e.ercise of the power to dismiss. 3ut,
where it is the law-ma0ing authority itself which
furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of
:e !u;man
v. 8H7?7,
!R ")'""6,
(uly "',
)***.
employees, no such capriciousness can be raised
for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a
perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the
law. More so< !n)ermines t'e a!t'orit& o%
COMELEC to appoint Section EE establishes a
guideline for the 8H7?7 to follow. Said section
provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment
or transfer of an election oAcer and does not
deprive the 8H7?7 of its power to appoint, and
maintain its authority over its oAcials and
employees. It is still the 8H7?7 which has the
power to reassign and transfer its oAcials and
employees. 3ut as a government agency tas0ed
with the implementation and enforcement of
election laws, the 8H7?7 is duty bound to
comply with the laws passed by ongress.
Party-?ist
System
Dnder this system, any national, regional or
sectoral party or organi;ation registered w2 the
8H7?7 may participate in the election of party-
list representatives who, upon their election and
proclamation, shall sit in the 5ouse of
Representatives as regular members. 1o determine
the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election,
the onstitution and Republic Bct +RB, @o. $'E"
mandate at least four inviolable parameters.
1hese are<
First, the twenty percent allocation R the
combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not e.ceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the 5ouse of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold R only those
parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
S4uali9edS to have a seat in the 5ouse of
Representatives/
1hird, the three!seat limit R each 4uali9ed party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a ma.imum of three seats/
that is, one S4ualifyingS and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation R the
additional seats which a 4uali9ed party is entitled
to shall be computed Sin proportion to their total
number of votes.S
="> 1he )*Z allocation< translate this legal
provision into a mathematical formula, as follows<
"o. o district rep.
########### x .$% & "o. o party!list rep.
.'%
1his formulation means that any increase in the
number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats. 1hus, 1wenty Percent Bllocation a Here
eiling.
=)> 1he two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the onstitution
and the law, but with the very essence of
Srepresentation.S Dnder a republican or
representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is e.ercised by
representatives chosen by them. 3ut to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a suAcient number of
Jeterans
Federation
Party v.
8H7?7,
!R "#&$6",
8ct. &,
)***.
people. 8therwise, in a legislature features the
party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing signi9cant legislation, and which might
even pose a threat to the stability of ongress.
1hus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to Sthe number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratioS to ensure meaningful local
representation.
=#> In adopting the party-list system is to promote
and encourage a multiparty system of
representation. ongress set the seat-limit to three
+#, for each 4uali9ed party, organi;ation or
coalition. SVuali9edS means having hurdled the two
percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit
ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature/ thus, no single
group, no matter how large its membership, would
dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
5ouse.
=E> 1o distribute additional seats Sproportionally,S
bearing in mind the three-seat limit further
imposed by the law. Formula for :etermining
Bdditional Seats for the First Party<
"umber o votes
o frst party (roportion o votes o
######## & frst party relative to
Total votes or total votes or party!list
system
party!list system
Formula for Bdditional Seats of 8ther Vuali9ed
Parties<
"o. o votes o
)ddtl seats concerned party "o. o addtl.
or concerned & #######!!!! x seats
allocated
party "o. o votes o to the frst
party
frst party
@ational
7conomy
and
Patrimony
,is'pon) Lease; 1he Fisheries Bct prohibits the
holder of a 9shpond permit from transferring or
subletting the 9shpond granted to him, w2o the
previous consent or approval of the Sec. of
Bgriculture and @atural Resources.
:iancin v.
B, !R
""'''",
@ov. )*,
)***.
-angEo Sentra$ ng Pi$ipinas; Examination an)
A!)it o% -anEs; entral 3an0Os constitutional
power of MsupervisionN over ban0s under Sec. )*,
Brt. GII of the onstitution includes the power to
e.amine and audit ban0s. 1hus, 8B and the
entral 3an0 have concurrent jurisdiction under the
onstitution to e.amine and audit government
ban0s. 1he 3ang0o Sentral ng Pilipinas, w2c
succeeded the entral 3an0, retained under the
"'6$ onstitution and the !eneral 3an0ing ?aw of
)*** +RB##$, w2 respect to the independent audit
of ban0s.
:3P v. 8B,
!R 66E#%,
(an. "&,
)**).
Drban
?and
Reform
and
5ousing
T'e Ur#an Re%orm Law 9PD >I>J:; RI7*T O,
,IRST RE,USAL; 1he right of refusal applies only
to tenants who have resided for ten +"*, years or
more on the leased land declared as w2in the Drban
?and Reform Ione, and who have built their homes
on that land. It does not apply to apartment
Brlegui v.
B, !R
")&E#$,
Harch &,
)**).
dwellers. P: )*"&, w2c amended P: "%"$, did not
e.tend its bene9ts to apartment dwellers. 1he said
law grants the right of 9rst refusal only to
legitimate tenants who have built their homes on
the land they are leasing.
*o!sing an) Lan) Use Reg!$ator& -oar)
9*LUR-:; *OMEOWNERSK ASSOCIATION;
8riginally, administrative supervision over
homeownersO associations was vested by law in the
S7. Pursuant to 78 %#%, however, the 5ome
Insurance and !uarranty orporation +5I!,
assumed the R7!D?B18RF B@: B:(D:IB18RF
FD@1I8@S of the S7 over homeownersO
associations. 1he powers and responsibilities
vested in the 5I! w2 respect to homeownersO
associations were later transferred to the 5?DR3
pursuant to RB 6$&#.
Sta. lara
5omeowner
sO Bssn. v.
Sps. !aston,
!R "E"'&",
(an. )#,
)**).
Same; Same; J!ris)i"tion; 5I! e.ercises
limited jurisdiction over homeownerOs disputes. 1he
law con9nes its authority to controversies that
arise from any of the -. intra-corporate relations<
="> between and among members of the
association/ =)> between any and2or all of them and
the association of w2c they are members/ and =#>
between the association and the State insofar as
the controversy concerns its right to e.ist as a
corporate entity. 1he omplaint here is for
damages. It does not assert membership in the
S5B as its basis. Rather, it is based on an alleged
violation of the alleged right of access through the
subdivision and on the alleged embarrassment and
humiliation su-ered by the plainti-s.
Sta. lara
5omeowner
sO Bssn. v.
Sps. !aston,
!R "E"'&",
(an. )#,
)**).
7ducatio-
nal
Institution
s
In"rementa$ T!ition ,ee In"reases; 1he
mandatory share of an educational institution in
the SSS, Hedicare and Pag-Ibig premiums of its
employees may be charged against the $*Z
incremental tuition fee increase authori;ed under
Sec. % +), of RB &$)6.
ebu
Institute of
Hedicine v.
ebu
Institute of
Hedicine
7mployeeOs
Dnion, !R
"E")6%, (uly
%, )**".
?ocal
!overn-
ment
ode
POWER TO APPOINT; Lo"a$ C'ie% Exe"!ti1e;
1he power to appoint is vested in the local chief
e.ecutive. 1he power of the city council, on the
other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating,
reorgani;ing city oAces2positions and
con9rmations.
Hathay v.
B, !R
")E#$E,
:ec. "%,
"'''.
POWER TO LE7ISLATE; Limitation; 1he game of
lotto is a game of chance duly authori;ed under RB
""&', as amended by 3P E), the law w2c grants a
franchise to the PS8 and allows it to operate the
lotteries. 1his statute remains valid today. 5ence, a
provincial board may not prohibit the lotto by
ordinance or resolution. 1he power of the local
government units to legislate and enact ordinances
and resolutions is merely a delegated power
coming from ongress. 1his basic relationship
between the local government unit and ongress
?ina v. PaKo,
!R ")'*'#,
Bug. #*,
)**".
has not been enfeebled by the new provisions of
the onstitution strengthening local autonomy or
the State policy re4uiring all national agencies and
oAces to conduct periodic consultations w2
appropriate local government units +Secs. ) =c>
and )$ of RB $"&*, otherwise 0nown as the ?ocal
!overnment ode of "''".
-OUNDAR; DISPUTE; 1he signi9cance of the
monument mar0er cannot simply be disregarded. It
has a technical purpose of preserving the survey
being conducted.
Prov. 8f
amarines
@orte v.
Prov.
Vue;on, !R
6*$'&, 8ct.
"", )**".
C$aim against Lo"a$ 7o1ernment OC"ia$s an)
Pri1ate Co!nse$; In resolving whether a local
government oAcial may secure the services of
private counsel in an action 9led against him in his
oAcial capacity, the nature of the action and the
relief sought are to be considered, as where the
complaint contained other allegations and a prayer
for moral damages, w2c, if due from the
defendants, must be satis9ed by them in their
private capacity.
Hancenido
v. B, !R
""6&*%,
Bpril "),
)***.
*iring o% Pri1ate Co!nse$ #& Lo"a$
7o1ernment Units; ?!DOs may be represented by
a private attorney only when the provincial 9scal is
dis4uali9ed from representing a particular
municipality, as in the -. instances< +", when the
jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies
w2 the S/ +), when the municipality is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality in the same province/ or +#,
when in a case involving the municipality, the
provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is
involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise.
id.
RECALL; 1he Resolution providing for recall is no
longer applicable inasmuch as the respondent had
already vacated the oAce of the Jice Hayor to w2c
the Recall was directed and has assumed the
position of Hayor. 7ven if the Preparatory Recall
ommittee were to convene to adopt another
resolution for the recall of respondent, this time as
Hayor, the same would still not proper since no
recall shall ta0e place w2in one +", year from the
date the oAcial assumes oAce or one +", year
immediately preceding a regular election.
B9ado v.
8H7?7,
!R "E"$6$,
Sept. "6,
)***.
Interna$ Re1en!e A$$otment 9IRA:; 1he
President of the Philippines may not withhold
portions or alter any IRBs legally due to the ?!Ds.
Pimentel v.
Bguirre, !R
"#)'66, (uly
"', )***.
TA( ORDINANCE an) RE4ENUE MEASURES;
Section "6$ of the ?ocal !overnment ode of "''"
re4uires that an appeal of a ta. ordinance or
revenue measure should be made to the Secretary
of (ustice w2in thirty +#*, days from e-ectivity of
the ordinance and even during its pendency, the
e-ectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be
5agonoy
Har0et
Jendor
Bssn. v.
5agonoy,
!R "#$&)",
Feb. &,
suspended. 1he timeframe 9.ed by law for parties
to avail of their legal remedies before a competent
court is not a Smere technicalityS that can be easily
brushed aside. 1he periods stated in Section "6$ of
the ?ocal !overnment ode are HB@:B18RF.
Posting was validly made +1he 8rdinance was
posted during the period from @ovember E-)%,
"''& in three +#, public places, in lieu of
publication as there was no newspaper of local
circulation in the municipality of 5agonoy.
)**).
Lo"a$ ,ran"'ise Tax; 7.emption claimed by the
P?:1 X not established. Sec. )# of R.B. @o. $')%
cannot be considered as having amended
petitionerPs franchise so as to entitle it to
e.emption from the imposition of local franchise
ta.es. It does not appear that, in approving Sec. )#
of R.B. @o. $')%, ongress intended it to operate
as a blan0et ta. e.emption to all
telecommunications entities. Bpplying the rule of
strict construction of laws granting ta. e.emptions
and the rule that doubts should be resolved in
favor of municipal corporations in interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal ta.ing powers.
P?:1 v. ity
of :avao,
!R "E#6&$,
Bug. )),
)**".
LOCAL ELECTI4E O,,ICIALS; Term o% OC"e; 1o
apply the dis4uali9cation under Sec. 6. Brt. G of the
onstitution, two +), conditions must concur< =a>
that the oAcial concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and =b> that he has fully serve
the three consecutive terms. Dnder Sec. E# +b, of
the ?ocal !overnment ode of "''", the term limit
for elective oAcials must be ta0en to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. onse4uently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local post, he
must also have been elected to the same position
for the same number of times before the
dis4uali9cation can apply. J8?D@1BRF
R7@D@IB1I8@ of a term +as e.ception to the rule,
does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the term limit/ conversely,
involuntary severance from oAce for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service.
Bdormeo v.
8H7?7,
!R "E$')$,
Feb. E,
)**).
Public
8Acers
Co)e o% Con)!"t; Sec. % of RB &$"# re4uires
public oAcials and employees to respond to letters,
telegrams or other communications from the
public, w2in "% wor0ing days from receipt thereof,
stating the action ta0en thereon.
Notar& P!#$i"; Ex8OC"io P!#$i" O6"ers; Bs ex!
o*cio notary public or a public oAcer authori;ed
to administer oath< cannot subscribe a document
in w2c he is one of the aAants citing Brt. )) of the
@otarial ?awF 1he function of a @otary Public is,
among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangements. 1hat function would be
defeated if the notary public is one of the
signatories to the instruments.
Jales v.
Br;agao-
Vuijano, BH
@o. P-''-
"##6, @ov.
"6, "'''.
Same; B notary public is not prohibited from acting
at the same time as witness to the document
notari;ed by him. 1he only 7G7P1I8@ is when the
document is a will.
Solarte v.
Btty.
Pugeda, B.c.
@o. E$%"),
(uly #",
)***.
Same; 1he party ac0nowledging a document must
appear before the notary public or any other
person authori;ed to ta0e ac0nowledgments of
documents. @otari;ation is not an empty routine. It
converts a private document into a public one and
renders it admissible in court w2o further proof of
its authenticity.
oronado v.
Btty.
Felongco,
B.c. @o.
)&"", @ov.
"%, )***.
C$erEs o% Co!rt; D!ties an) ,!n"tions Dnder
Section $, Rule "#& of the Rules of ourt and
Section B, hapter II of the Hanual for ler0s of
ourt, it is the cler0 of courtPs duty to safely 0eep
all records, papers, 9les, e.hibits and public
property committed to his charge, including the
library of the court and the seal and furniture
belonging to his oAce. Bs court custodian, it was
his responsibility to ensure that records are safely
0ept and the same are readily available upon the
re4uest of the parties or order of the court. 5e
must be diligent and vigilant in performing his
oAcial duties and in supervising and managing
court doc0ets and records. $ 1his custodial duty
necessarily e.tends to evidence submitted by the
parties and mar0ed as e.hibits.
3ongalos v.
Honungolh,
B.H. @o. P-
*"-"%"6,
@ov. "E,
)**".
Same; C!sto)& o% ,!n)s; ler0s of ourt may
not 0eep funds in their custody. Bll collections from
bailbonds, rental deposits, and other 9duciary
collections shall be deposited within twenty-four
+)E, hours by the ler0 of ourt concerned, upon
receipt thereof, with the ?and 3an0 of the
Philippines. Dndue delay in remitting collections
amounts no less to grave misfeasance if not
malversation of funds. @o protestation of good faith
can override the mandatory nature of the circulars
designed to promote full accountability for
government funds. Failure of a ler0 of ourt to
turn over money deposited with him and to e.plain
and present evidence thereon constitutes gross
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even
malversation of public funds which this ourt will
never countenance as they indubitably diminish
the faith of the people in the judiciary.
Hallare v.
Ferry, B.H.
@8. P-**-
"#6" and
B.H. @o. P-
**-"#6),
(uly #",
)**".
Same; B cler0 of court had no authority to mediate
among constituents.
Brroyo v.
Blcantara,
B.H. @o. P-
*"-"%"6,
@ov. "E,
)**".
S'eriD; 1he sheri- has the primary responsibility
of ensuring the speedy and eAcient service of
court processes and orders. In the discharge of his
duty a high degree of professionalism is
demanded. For it cannot be overemphasi;ed that a
decision or process that is left une.ecuted or
1alion v.
Byupan,
B.H. @o. P-
*"-"%)',
(an. )#,
)**).
unserved because of the ineAciency, negligence,
misconduct, or ignorance of the law of those
charged with their e.ecution inevitably delays the
administration of justice and rightly deserves the
condemnation of the parties who are prejudiced
thereby. Dnder the "''$ Revised Rules of ivil
Procedure, the service of summons may be
entrusted to the sheri-. 1he sheri- has the duty to
serve the process promptly and to ma0e a return of
his service within a reasonable time. 1his is
necessary in order for the court to determine if the
period for 9ling an answer has not yet e.pired.
Same; Sheri-s play an important role in the
administration of justice. Bs agents of the law, they
are called upon to discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence because in serving the
courtPs writs and processes and implementing its
orders, they can not a-ord to err without a-ecting
the integrity of their oAce and the eAcient
administration of justice. Bs an oAcer of the court,
Sheri- @e4uinto was obliged to conduct himself
with propriety and restraint. 5e cannot ma0e use of
his public oAce to oppress or abuse a party
especially a sensitive 9nancial institution li0e the
:3P. 5is conduct showed unjusti9ed braggadocio.
5e did not comply with the set procedure in the
rules.
:3P v.
@e4uinto,
B.H. @8.
H1(-*"-
"#$&, (an.
)#, )**).
Same; Hinisterial duty to promptly enforce writs of
e.ecution.
B4uino v.
?avadia,
B.H. @o. P-
*"-"E6#,
Sept. )*,
)**"/
Jisitacion v.
7di;a, B.H.
@o. P-*"-
"E'%, Bug.
', )**".
Same; Respondent sheri- was tas0ed to enable a
prevailing party to bene9t from the judgment. Bfter
' years, complainant is entitled to reali;e the lawOs
promise that his right to possession would be
vindicated as speedily as possible to preserve
peace and order in the community.
Jalencia v.
JaleKa, B.H.
@o. P-**-
"E*', Bug,
"&, )***.
Same; Rule "E", Sec. ', 9nal paragraph, governs
the payment of e.penses for the enforcement of
writs of e.ecution.
1iongco v.
Holina, B.H.
@o. P-**-
"#$#, Sept.
E, )**".
Same; Respondent is guilty of misconduct for his
failure to prepare an estimate of e.penses to be
incurred in e.ecuting the writ, for w2c he must see0
the courtOs approval/ to render an accounting/ and
to issue oAcial receipt for the total amount
received from the judgment debtor/ and for
deducting the money he should have deposited in
court the amount for e.penses the former incurred.
1an v. :ael,
B.H. @8. P-
**-"#'),
(uly "#,
)***.
Same; 8nly the payment of the sheri-Os fees can Ignacio v.
be lawfully received by a sheri- and acceptance of
any other amount is IHPR8P7R, even if it were
applied for lawful purposes. B sheri- acts
irregularly when he submits his Sheri-Os Partial
Report and Sheri-Os Return w2o li4uidating the
amounts previously received.
Payumo,
B.H. @o. P-
**-"#'&,
8ct. )E,
)***.
!overn-
ment
7mployee
s
7ro!n)s %or Dismissa$; 7ra1e Mis"on)!"t an)
Con)!"t 7ross$& Pre=!)i"ia$ to t'e Interest o%
t'e Ser1i"e; B govOt. employee should be
dismissed from the service not only for his failure
to give due courtesy and respect to his superiors or
to maintain good conduct and behavior, but
because of his de9ance of basic norms or virtues
w2c a government employee must uphold at all
times.
Haningas v.
3arcenas,
BH @o. P-''-
"#"%, @ov.
#, "'''.
Same; Dis'onest&; Failure to turn over the
e.cess of the bid price.
@eeland v.
Jillanueva,
BH @o. P-''-
"#"&, 8ct.
)', "'''.
Bdministr
ative ?aw
PU-LICATION; Handatory re4uirement for the
e-ectivity of 38I Hanual of 8perations that is
meant to enforce or implement 3P #'" +Incentives
for Registration of @ew or 7.panding 7.port
Producers,, a law of general application.
Pilipinas Lao
v. B, !R
"*%*"E,
:ec. "6,
)**".
ADMINISTRATI4E DISCIPLINAR; ACTIONS;
P!#$i" S"'oo$ Tea"'ers; 1heir mass action was
for all intents and purposes a stri0e, a concerted
and unauthori;ed stoppage of, or absence from,
wor0. :ismissal orders of :ept. 5eads are
immediately e.ecutory even pending appeal.
Dnder Sec. E$+),, Subtitle B, 1itle I, 3oo0 J of
7.ecutive 8rder @o. )'), otherwise 0nown as the
Bdministrative ode of "'6$, the decision of a
department secretary con9rming the dismissal of
an employee under his jurisdiction is e.ecutory
even pending appeal thereof. Since dismissal
orders remain valid and e-ective until modi9ed or
set aside, the intervening period during which an
employee is not permitted to wor0 cannot be
argued as amounting to unjusti9ed suspension.
Bcosta v.
B, !R
"#)*66,
(une )6,
)***.
Same; Same; Petitioners, who were earlier
dismissed for allegedly participating in a mass
action2stri0es, are entitled to their bac0 salaries
upon their reinstatement after they were found
guilty only of violating reasonable oAce rules and
regulation and penali;ed only with reprimand.
aniete v.
Sec. of
7ducation,
!R "E*#%',
(une "',
)***.
Same; P'i$F Nationa$ Po$i"e 9PNP:; 1he
administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing
with complaints or charges against any member of
the P@P is laid down in RB &'$%, otherwise 0nown
as the S:epartment of the Interior and ?ocal
!overnment Bct of "''*.S 1his law de9nes the
summary dismissal powers of the P@P hief and
Regional :irectors, among others in cases, Swhere
the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of
a police oAcer.S Hemo. ircular @o. ')-**&
prescribes the SRules and Regulations in the
1he
Summary
:ismissal
3oard v.
1orcita,
supra.
conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against
erring P@P membersS and de9nes conduct
unbecoming of a police oAcer under Section # +c,,
Rule II, as< MConduct unbecoming of a police
ocerS refers to any behavior or action of a P@P
member, irrespective of ran0, done in his oAcial
capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise
disgracing himself as a P@P member, seriously
compromise his character and standing as a
gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his
vitiated or corrupt state of moral character/ it may
also refer to acts or behavior of any P@P member in
an unoAcial or private capacity which, in
dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a
gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a
P@P member and e.hibits himself as morally
unworthy to remain as a member of the
organi;ation. 8n the other hand, the acts
constituting Ssimple irregularit! in t"e
performance of dut!S are de9ned in Hemo.
ircular @o. '"-**). It is a light o-ense, incurred,
among others, by a member of the P@P who shall,
among others, be found to Shave the odor or smell
of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess
alcoholic beverages on his person, police vehicle,
post or oAce.S +Sec. ).B, Rule JI,.
ADMINISTRATI4E IN4ESTI7ATIONS; B party in
an administrative in4uiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of
the charges and of the respondentOs capacity to
represent himself. Bdmissions by respondent
during such investigation may be used as evidence
to justify his dismissal.
Remolona v.
S, )**".
PRE4ENTI4E SUSPENSION; #reventive
suspension pending investigation, as already
discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of
enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an
unhampered investigation. 8n the other hand,
preventive suspension pending appeal is
actually punitive although it is in e-ect
subse4uently considered illegal if respondent is
e.onerated and the administrative decision 9nding
him guilty is reversed. 5ence, he should be
reinstated with full pay for the period of the
suspension. 1hus, [E$+E, states that respondent
Sshall be considered as under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in
the event he wins.S 8n the other hand, if his
conviction is aArmed, i.e. if he is not e.onerated,
the period of his suspension becomes part of the
9nal penalty of suspension or dismissal.
!loria v. B,
!R "#"*"),
Bpril )",
"'''.
A)ministrati1e Cases; Rig't to Co!nse$; Said
right is not imperative in administrative
investigations.
Sebastian,
Sr. v.
!archetorin
a, !R
""E*)6,
8ct. "6,
)***.
Same; D!e Pro"ess; 1he essence of due process
in administrative proceedings is simply the
:amasco v.
@?R, !R
opportunity to see0 reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. B formal or trial-type hearing
is not at all times essential to due process, the
re4mts. 8f w2c is satis9ed where parties are
a-orded fair and reasonable opportunity to e.plain
their side. 1he 9ling of position papers and
supporting documents ful9lls the r4mts. of due
process.
""%$%%,
:ec. E,
)***.
Same; Ex'a!stion o% A)ministrati1e
Reme)ies; @o appeal need be ta0en to the 8Ace
of the President from the decision of a department
head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of
the former. 1here is greater reason for not re4uiring
prior resort to the 8Ace of the President in this
case since the administrative decision sought to be
reviewed is that of the President himself.
Sec. of
(ustice v.
3acal, )***.
Same; Deat' o% Respon)ent; 1he charges
against respondent Bntonio were referred to (udge
Para;o for investigation, report and
recommendation, and therafter, to the 8Ace of the
ourt Bdministrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. Respondent was able to answer
the complaint and substantiate his defenses. Chile
the administrative case was pending, respondent
die. 5is heirs moved for the dismissal of the case
against him and to facilitate the release of
whatever bene9ts may have accrued to him during
his )* years in service. 1he ourt resolved that
respondent BntonioPs death has permanently
foreclosed the prosecution of any criminal action
against him for malfeasance in oAce. 5owever, we
are not precluded from imposing the appropriate
administrative sanctions against him.
8Ace of the
ourt
Bdministrato
r v. Btty.
Saguyod,
B.H. @os. P-
'&-"))'-#*,
Harch )%,
)**).
Appea$s %rom A)ministrati1e De"isions;
Philippine ivil Service ?aw does not allow the
complainant to appeal a decision e.onerating or
absolving a civil service employee. 1he above
doctrine may have been modi9ed to allow the S
to appeal decisions e.onerating an employee.
@onetheless, e.cepting the privilege of appeal
granted to the S, the law does not contemplate
a review of decisions e.onerating oAcers and
employees from administrative charges.
(ustice Helo,
dissenting in
Flora v.
Sunga,
)**".
Same; Bdministrative charges comprising grave or
less grave o-enses 9led against judiciary
employees are to be immediately referred to the
ourt +n ,anc, from whose decision there is no
appeal.
id.
Desistan"e; Subse4uent desistance by the
complainant in an administrative case does not
necessarily warrant its dismissal.
Ri;on v.
(udge Ierna,
B.H. @o. R1(-
**-"%$%,
Sept. "$,
)**".
RULE8MAGIN7 POWER o% A)ministrati1e
Agen"ies; *ome De1e$opment M!t!a$ ,!n)
9*DM,:; 1he 5:HF 3oard has rule-ma0ing power
as provided in Sec. % of RB $$E) and Sec. "# of P:
Romulo
Habanta,
3uenaventu
ra, Sayoc W
"$%). 5owever, rules and regulations w2c are the
product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the e-ect of
law should be w2in the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is re4uired that the
regulation be germane to the object and purposes
of the law, and not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
:e los
Bngeles v.
5:HF, !R
"#"*6),
(une "',
)***.
Same ; Same ; Sec. " of Rule JII of the
Bmendments to the Rules and Regulations
implementing RB $$E) and 5:HF ircular @o. ")E-
3 prescribing the Revised !uidelines and Procedure
for 9ling application for Caiver or Suspension of
Fund overage under P: "$%), as amended by RB
$$E), are null and void insofar as they re4uire that
an employer should have both provident
fund2retirement plan and a housing plan superior to
the bene9ts o-ered by the Fund in order to 4ualify
for waiver or suspension of the Fund overage.
id.
ADMINISTRATI4E O,,ENSES AND PENALTIES;
Immora$it&; B grave o-ense but 9rst o-enders are
only suspended as provided for under Section )#
+8,, Rule GIJ of the Rules Implementing 3oo0 J of
7.ecutive 8rder @o. )') +8therwise 0nown as the
Bdministrative ode of "'6$ and other Pertinent
ivil Service ?aws, that for disgraceful and immoral
conduct \"st 8-ense, Suspension for si. +&,
months and one day +", day to one +", year/ )nd
8-ense, :ismissal.]S Horeover, such suspension
is w2o pay under the general proposition that a
public oAcial is not entitled to any compensation if
he has not rendered any service.
astro v.
!loria, !R
"#)"$E,
Bug. )*,
)**".
Same; Dis'onest&; B grave o-ense punishable
by dismissal for the 9rst o-ense. @eed not be
committed in the course of the performance of
duty. Blthough no pecuniary damage was incurred
by the govOt., there was still falsi9cation of oAcial
document that constitute gross dishonesty.
Remolona v.
S, !R
"#$E$#,
Bug. ),
)**".
Same; Same; 1he entry in the record of birth that
respondent is married is certainly spurious. Chy
she has not ta0en any legal step to have it
corrected clearly indicates her predeliction to
dishonesty.
Flora v.
Sunga, B.H.
@o. B-*"-
"*-P", @ov.
"E, )**".
Same; Same; :emanding and receiving Mgrease
moneyN for the implementation of a writ of
demolition.
8Ace of the
ourt
Bdministrato
r v. Hagno,
B.H. @o. P-
**-"E"',
8ct. "$,
)**".
Same; Dis'onest& an) ,a$si6"ation o% OC"ia$
Do"!ment; 1his case involves falsi9cation of :1R.
:ishonesty under Rule GIJ, Sec. )#, of the 8mnibus
Rules of the ivil Service is punishable by dismissal
on commission of the 9rst o-ense. 1he penalty
becomes even more deserved when the dishonesty
1he ourt
Bdministrato
r v.
Bbdullahi,
B.H. @o. P-
*)-"%&*,
amounts also to falsi9cation of an oAcial document
the penalty for which is dismissal from the service,
it being grave in nature, under Hemorandum
ircular @o. #*, series of "'6', of the S re
-uidelines in the )pplication o (enalties in
)dministrative Cases. 1hus we have not hesitated
in previous cases to impose the ultimate penalty of
dismissal on oAcials and employees found guilty of
the o-ense.
Harch )*,
)**).
Pres"ription o% ODense; Bdministrative o-enses
do not prescribe.
Flora v.
Sunga, B.H.
@o. B-*"-
"*-P", @ov.
"E, )**".
!overn-
ment
Bgencies
and
Instrumen
talities/
Ur#an Lan) De1e$opment an) *o!sing A"t o%
>??H 9RA JHJ?:; 7viction and :emolition/ RB
$)$', is not applicable to the instant case. Sect. )6
of the said law which partially provides that<
7viction and :emolition. R 7viction or demolition
as a practice shall be discouraged. 7viction or
demolition, however, may be allowed under the
following situations<
+a, Chen persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad trac0s, garbage
dumps, riverban0s, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewal0s, roads, par0s,
and playgrounds/
+b, Chen government infrastructure projects
with available funding are about to be
implemented/ or
+c, Chen there is a court order for eviction and
demolition.
1he petitioner subse4uently see0s the issuance of
a preliminary mandatory injunction on account of
the demolition of the houses and forcible eviction
of its members from the alderon compound
conducted by the respondents in alleged violation
of Section )6 of Republic Bct @o. $)$'. 1he
respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the
said demolition and eviction were done legally and
in accordance with the 8rders of the trial court/
that the trial court found that the relocation site in
!aya-gaya was already fully developed for
occupancy/ and that the petitioner agreed and
undertoo0 to transfer its members to the said
relocation site on or before Bpril "%, "''$ provided
that the amenities are substantially completed.
Cith the complete development of the relocation
site at !aya-gaya, to which the remaining
members of the petitioner can be relocated, and
considering the said Hemorandum of Bgreement of
the parties, respondent ourt of Bppeals correctly
found and ruled, in e-ect, that there is no factual
and legal basis to issue a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to compel the respondents to
allow the members of the petitioner to return to
the alderon compound especially since the
facilities and structures of the lot owner,
respondent 1oyota, have already been established
therein. In other words, petitionerPs reliance on
Republic Bct @o. $)$' in connection with its prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction is indeed
misplaced.
@ag0a0aisan
g Lapisanan
Lapitbahaya
n sa
ommonwe
alth Bve. v.
B, !R
"#%6&%, (uly
)*, )**".
Commission on t'e Sett$ement o% Lan)
Pro#$ems 9COSLAP:; 7.8. @o. %&" creating the
8S?BP was issued in "'$'. Relative thereto,
Section #+), of the e.ecutive order provides<
Powers and Functions. R 1he ommission shall
have the following powers and functions<
". oordinate the activities, particularly the
investigation wor0, of the various government
oAces and agencies involved in the settlement of
land problems or disputes, and streamline
administrative procedures to relieve small settlers
and landholders and members of cultural
minorities of the e.pense and time-consuming
delay attendant to the solution of such problems or
disputes/
). Refer and follow-up for immediate action by
the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land
problem or dispute referred to the ommission<
Provided, that the ommission may, in the
following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve
land problems or disputes which are critical and
e.plosive in nature considering, for instance, the
large number of the parties involved, the presence
or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other
similar critical situations re4uiring immediate
action<
+a, 3etween occupants2s4uatters and pasture
lease agreement holders or timber
concessionaires/
+b, 3etween occupants2s4uatters and
government reservation grantees/
+c, 3etween occupants2s4uatters and public
land claimants or applicants/
+d, Petitions for classi9cation, release and2or
subdivision of lands of the public domain/ and
+e, 8ther similar land problems of grave
urgency and magnitude.
1he ommission shall promulgate such rules of
procedure as will insure e.peditious resolution and
action on the above cases. 1he resolution, order or
decision of the ommission on any of the foregoing
cases shall have the force and e-ect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision and
shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon
the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said
resolution, order or decision shall become 9nal and
e.ecutory within thirty +#*, days from its
promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari
only to the Supreme ourt. 5owever, appeals from
the 8S?BP may not be brought directly before us
in view of Rule E%, Section ". ?i0ewise, if a petition
for certiorari under Rule &% is the prescribed
remedy, the ourt of Bppeals cannot be bypassed
without running afoul of the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy. In this connection, it cannot be doubted
that the 8S?BP is among those 4uasi-judicial
agencies e.ercising 4uasi-judicial functions. @o
convincing reason e.ists why appeals from the
8S?BP should be treated di-erently from other
4uasi-judicial agencies whose orders, resolutions or
decisions are directly appealable to the ourt of
Bppeals under Rule E# of the "''$ Rules of ivil
Procedure. Horeover, the enumeration of the
agencies therein mentioned is not e.clusive. In that
Sy v.
8S?BP, !R
"E*'*#,
Sept. "),
)**".
sense, Section #+), of 7.8. @o. %&" declaring that
the 8S?BPPs orders, resolutions or decisions are
appealable e.clusively to this ourt is erroneous in
the light of Section ", Rule E% and Section ", Rule
E# of the "''$ Rules of ivil Procedure,
Same; 78 %&" creating the 8S?BP. (urisdiction
over land disputes involving occupants of the land
in 4uestion and pasture lease agreement holders.
Blcantara v.
8S?BP, !R
"E%6#6, (uly
)*, )**".
*o!sing an) Lan) Reg!$ator& -oar) 9*LUR-:;
J!ris)i"tion an) Reg!$ator& Powers; 7.clusive
jurisdiction and regulatory powers of the 5?DR3
under P: '%$ +issued on (uly "), "'$&,, P: "#EE
+issued on Bpril ), "'$6, 78 &E6 dated Feb. $, "'6"
and 78 '* dated :ec. "$, "'6&. 1he 5?DR3 and
not the S7 has jurisdiction over a complaint 9led
by subdivision homeowners against a subdivision
developer +under receivership, for speci9c
performance regarding basic homeownersO needs
such as water, security and open spaces. 1he
ruling has consistently been that the 5?DR3 has
jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts
between the subdivision developer and the lot
buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision
developer to comply w2 its contractual and
statutory obligations to ma0e the subdivision a
better place to live in. 1he fact that respondent is
under receivership does not divest the 5?DR3 of
that jurisdiction. 1he appointment of a receivership
does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it
interfere w2 the e.ercise of its corporate rights.
Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at
ma0ing more secure, e.isting rights/ it cannot be
used as an instrument for the destruction of those
rights.
Brran;a v.
3.F. 5omes,
!R "#"&6#,
(une "',
)***.
Same; J!ris)i"tion; Bn aggrieved townhouse
buyer may see0 protection from the 5?DR3 under
P: '%$, otherwise 0nown as MSubdivision and
ondominium 3uyerOs Protective :ecree.N B direct
resort to the S 4uestioning the BrbiterOs refusal to
issue writ of e.ecution is improper and premature.
1he "''& Rules of Procedure of the 5?DR3 provides
that the decision of the Brbiter is reviewable by the
3oard ommission. In turn, any party may appeal
the 3oard of ommissionerOs decision to the 8Ace
of the President, the aggrieved party can resort to
the B.
Btty. ole v.
B, !R
"#$%%",
:ec. )&,
)***.
S!#i" -a& Metropo$itan A!t'orit& 9S-MA:;
-i)s an) Awar)s o% Contra"ts; 5PP? has not
suAciently shown that it has a clear and
unmista0able right to be declared the winning
bidder w2 9nality, such that the S3HB can be
compelled to negotiate a oncession ontract w2
5PP?. 1he S3HB 3oard Resolution declaring 5PP?
as the winning bidder is subject to the control and
supervision of the 8Ace of the President. Bll
projects underta0en by S3HB re4uire that approval
under ?8I @8. &)* dated 8ct. )$, "''$. 1he
President may, w2in this authority, overturn or
reverse any award made by the S3HB 3oard of
5utchison
Ports Phils.
v. S3HB, !R
"#"#&$,
Bug. #",
)***.
:irectors F8R (DS1IFIB3?7 R7BS8@S. 1he
discretion to accept or reject a bid, or even recall
the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the
courts will not generally interfere w2 the e.ercise
thereof by the e.ecutive department, unless it is
apparent that such e.ercise of discretion is DS7:
18 S5I7?: D@FBIR@7SS 8R I@(DS1I7.
Po$$!tion A)=!)i"ation -oar) 9PA-:; 1he PB3
has not been divested of its authority +under RB
#'#" entitled MBn Bct reating the @ational Cater
and Bir Pollution ontrol ommission,N as amended
by P: '6E, to hear pollution cases connected w2
mining operations X by virtue of the subse4uent
enactment of RB $'E) +Philippine Hining Bct of
"''%, and in relation to 78 "'), series of "'6$
+1he Reorgani;ation Bct of the :7@R,. Chile the
mines Regional :irector has e.press administrative
and regulatory powers over mining operations and
installations, it has no adjudicatory powers over
complaints for violation of pollution control statutes
and regulations. Such powers pertain to PB3.
Republic v.
Harcopper
Hining
orp., !R
"#$"$E, (uly
"*, )***.
P'i$ippine Am!sement an) 7aming
Corporation 9PA7COR:; 5as a valid franchise by
itself but not in association w2 any other person or
entity to operate, maintain and2or manage the
game of jai-alai.
:el Har v.
PB!8R, !R
"#6)'6,
Bug. )E,
)**".
P'i$ippine Retirement A!t'orit& 9PRA:; PRB is
a government-owned and controlled corporation
under the 8Ace of the President. It was created to
oversee an unconventional program designed to
meet the tight foreign e.change situation in the
country. Its objective is to promote and develop the
Philippines as a retirement destination for foreign
nationals and former Filipino citi;ens. 1o become a
PRB member, a retiree must maintain a minimum
D.S. dollar time deposit account with a PRB-
accredited ban0. 1he PRB then converts this
account into active investment. In return, the
foreign retiree is e.tended bene9ts and incentives,
such as grants of certain ta. e.emptions, resident
status, bali0bayan privileges, etc. 1he 4uali9ed
retiree is also given a multiple entry Special
Resident RetireePs Jisa +SRRJ,. Should he decide to
withdraw his dollar account, he shall surrender his
passport to the PRB for cancellation of the SRRJ by
the ommission on Immigration and :eportation
+I:,. 1he PRB shall then issue the retireePs
withdrawal clearance to the ban0 where he has a
deposit. 8nly then shall the ban0 concerned return
the dollar deposit to the retiree.
PRB v. Rupa,
!R "E*%"',
Bug. )",
)**".
-oar) o% In1estment 9-OI: ; Form and contents
of 38I :ecisions / ?ac0ing of the essential attribute
of a decision, the acts in 4uestion were at best
interlocutory orders that did not attain 9nality nor
ac4uire the e-ects of a 9nal judgment despite the
lapse of the statutory period of appeal.
Pilipinas Lao
v. B, !R
"*%*"E,
:ec. "6,
)**".
-!rea! o% Immigration has authority to correct
its own records.
!o 0im 5uy
v. !o Lim
5uy, !R
"#$&$E,
Sept. )*,
)**".
7o1ernment Ser1i"e Ins!ran"e S&stem
97SIS:; ?iable for damages resulting from the
negligence of its employees.
!SIS v. Sps.
!on;alo, !R
"#%&EE,
Sept. "$,
)**".
Same; 5ousing assistance to the less-privileged
!SIS members and their dependents. % year
restriction on the assignment of the awardeesO
rights or the resale of the lot awarded to them.
San Bgustin
v. B, !R
")"'E*,
:ec. E,
)**".
S!gar Reg!$ator& A)ministration; Social
Bmelioration 3ene9ts +SB3,. 1he classi9cation of
8B as to who were entitled to the SB3 and
e.cluding therefrom those employees hired after
8ctober #", "'6', has no legal basis. 7vidently,
any distinction among employees must be based
on substantial di-erences, that is, level or ran0,
degree of diAculty and amount of wor0. 1o
discriminate against some employees on the basis
solely of date of hiring is to run against the
progressive and social policy of the law. 1he
ommission on Budit, in 8B :ecision @o. '&-*)*,
ruled that the board resolutions of the Sugar
Regulatory Bdministration could no longer be
considered as the Sprior authorityS for the release
of the social amelioration bene9ts as per R. B. @o.
&$%6 and @o. "*. It further ruled that such
bene9ts may be granted if there was a prior
authority from the 8Ace of the President. Fet,
when the SRB employees were 9nally able to
secure a post facto approval2rati9cation from the
8Ace of the President, the 8B declared, by
sweeping statement, that only those hired before
8ctober #", "'6', were entitled to the SB3. It did
not mention any legal basis or justi9cation for the
distinction. R. B. @o. &$%6 and @o. "* do not
ma0e any distinction between those hired before
and after 8ctober #", "'6'. @either did the "st
Indorsement of the 8Ace of the President ma0e
any such distinction. 1he legal ma.im that Swhen
the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courtS apply in this case.
ru; v. 8B,
!R "#E$E*,
8ct. )#,
)**".
P!#$i" Estate A!t'orit& 9PEA:; 1he government
agency tas0ed by the 3ases onversion
:evelopment Buthority to develop the 9rst-class
memorial par0 0nown as the 5eritage Par0,
?ocated in Fort 3onifacio, 1aguig, Hetro Hanila.
P7B v. Dy,
!R "E$'##-
#E, :ec. "),
)**".
Constr!"tion In)!str& Ar#itration Commission
9CIAC:; 78 "**6 vest upon the IB original and
e.clusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or
connected w2 contracts entered into by parties
involved in construction in the Phils., whether the
disputes arises before or after the completion of
the contract, or after the abandonment or breach
thereof. Dnder the "''$ Rules of ivil Procedure,
the B can now review 4uestions of fact, of law, or
Hetro
onstruction
v. hatam
Properties,
!R "E"6'$,
Sept. )E,
)**".
mi.ed 4uestions of fact and law in appeals from
judgments or 9nal orders of the IB.
Nationa$ Te$e"omm!ni"ations Commission
9NTC:; Nat!re o% oC"e an) ,!n"tions; 1he @1
was created pursuant to 78 %E&, promulgated on
(uly )#, "'$'. It assumed the functions formerly
assigned to the 3oard of ommunications and the
1elecommunications ontrol 3ureau, w2c were both
abolished under the said 7.ecutive 8rder.
Previously, the @1Ps functions were merely those
of the defunct Public Service ommission +PS,,
created under B "E&, as amended, otherwise
0nown as the Public Service Bct, considering that
the 3oard of ommunications was the successor-in-
interest of the PS. Dnder 78 ")%-B, issued in Bpril
"'6$, the @1 became an attached agency of the
:epartment of 1ransportation and
ommunications. In the regulatory
telecommunications industry, the @1 has the sole
authority to issue erti9cates of Public
onvenience and @ecessity +P@, for the
installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio
communications systems, telephone and telegraph
systems. Such power includes the authority to
determine the areas of operations of applicants for
telecommunications services. Speci9cally, Section
"& of the Public Service Bct authori;es the then
PS, upon notice and hearing, to issue erti9cates
of Public onvenience for the operation of public
services within the Philippines Swhenever the
ommission 9nds that the operation of the public
service proposed and the authori;ation to do
business will promote the public interests in a
proper and suitable manner.S
Republic v.
7.press
1elecommun
ications o.,
!R "E$*'&,
(an. "%,
)**)/ 3ayan
1elecommun
ications v.
7.press
1elecommun
ications o.,
!R "E$)"*,
(an. "%,
)**).
Same; Pro1isiona$ ,ran"'ise; Rule "%, Sec. # of
its "'$6 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which
provides<
MSec. #. Provisional Relief. R Dpon the 9ling of
an application, complaint or petition or at any
stage thereafter, the 3oard may grant on motion of
the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief
prayed for, based on the pleading, together with
the aAdavits and supporting documents attached
thereto, without prejudice to a 9nal decision after
completion of the hearing which shall be called
within thirty +#*, days from grant of authority
as0ed for.N Chile the "''# Revised Rules deleted
the phrase Son its own initiative/S accordingly, a
provisional authority may be issued only upon 9ling
of the proper motion before the ommission.
id.
Same; Tax Exemptions; Public
1elecommunications Policy Bct of the Phils. +RB
$')%,. 1he grant of ta.ing powers to local
government units under the onstitution and the
?! does not a-ect the power of ongress to grant
e.emptions to certain persons, pursuant to a
declared national policy. 1he legal e-ect of the
constitutional grant to local governments simply
means that in interpreting statutory provisions on
municipal ta.ing powers, doubts must be resolved
P?:1 v. ity
of :avao,
!R "E#6&$,
Bug. )),
)**".
in favor of municipal corporations. Chen e.emption
is claimed, it must be shown indubitably to e.ist. Bt
the outset, every presumption is against it. B well-
founded doubt is fatal to the claim. It is only when
the terms of the concession are too e.plicit to
admit fairly of any other construction that the
proposition can be supported. In this case, the
word Se.emptionS in [)# of R.B. @o. $')% could
contemplate e.emption from certain regulatory or
reporting re4uirements, bearing in mind the policy
of the law. It is noteworthy that, in holding Smart
and !lobe e.empt from local ta.es, the 3?!F did
not base its opinion on [)# but on the fact that the
franchises granted to them after the e-ectivity of
the ?! e.empted them from the payment of local
franchise and business ta.es. In approving [)# of
R.B. @o. $')%, ongress intended it to operate as a
blan0et ta. e.emption to all telecommunications
entities. Bpplying the rule of strict construction of
laws granting ta. e.emptions and the rule that
doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on
municipal ta.ing powers, we hold that [)# of R.B.
@o. $')% cannot be considered as having amended
petitionerPs franchise so as to entitle it to
e.emption from the imposition of local franchise
ta.es.
Department o% Nat!ra$ Reso!r"es an)
En1ironment 9DENR:; Con6s"ation< ,or%eit!re
an) Disposition o% 7at'ering Tim#er or Ot'er
,orest Pro)!"ts w5o Li"ense; 3y authority of the
Sec. of the :7@R, subject vehicles sei;ed in
accordance w2 law are validly deemed in custodia
legis and are not subject to an action for replevin.
alub v. B,
!R ""%&#E,
Bpril )$,
)***.
Same; Same; Dnder Sec. &6-B of the Forestry
ode of the Phils., the Sec. of the :7@R or a duly
authori;ed representative has 7G?DSIJ7
BD158RI1F to order the con9scation in favor of the
government of vehicles used in the commission of
o-enses punishable by the said ode. =Bdmin.
8rder +B8, @o. %E-'#, amending :ept. Bdmin.
8rder +:B8, @o. %'-'* provides the guidelines for
the con9scation, forfeiture and disposition of
conveyances used in violation of forestry laws,
rules and regulations,. 8n the other hand, Sec. &6
of the same ode penali;es the transportation,
movement or conveyance of forest products w2o
legal documents and the criminal case is w2in the
jurisdiction of the R1. 5owever, the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case is
IHHB17RIB? to the con9scation of the vehicle
under Sec. &6-B w2c involves a di-erent matter
cogni;able by the :7@R Secretary. 5ence, the R1
cannot order the release of the con9scated vehicle
on the ground that the accused in the criminal case
was ac4uitted.
:7@R v.
:araman,
!R ")%$'$,
Feb. "%,
)**).
O,,ICE O, T*E SOLICITOR 7ENERAL; 1he legal
representative of the government of the Republic
of the Philippines and its agencies and
instrumentalities, and its oAcials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter
ity Carden
of the
Hanila ity
(ail v.
7strella, !R
re4uiring the services of a lawyer, e.cepting only
as may otherwise be provided by law. 1hat the ity
Carden appears to have ac4uiesced in the release
order of the trial court by his compliance therewith
does not preclude the S8?!7@ from ta0ing
contrary position and appealing therefrom.
"E")"",
Bug. #",
)**".
P!#$i" -i))ing; 1he right to top, the Bsset
Privati;ation 1rust +BP1, in favor of L5I-P5I violated
the rule on competitive public bidding. Chile it may
be argued that the right to top was aimed at giving
the best 9nancial advantage to the government,
the manner by w2c right was conceived and arrived
at in this case manifested bias in favor of L5I,
clearly brushing aside the rule on fair competition
and completely disregarded the stipulation in the
(JB between @I: and L5I of the &*Z-E*Z
capitali;ation arrangement. onse4uently, the BP1
rendered nugatory the constitutional and
contractual proscriptions clearly to favor a foreign
investor.
(! Summit v.
B, !R
")E)'#,
@ov. )*,
)***.
Same; Not re3!ire) under the circumstances of
these cases< involving !SIS disposition of ac4uired
assets +Drbano v. !SIS, !R "#$'*E, 8ct. ', )**",/
purchase of 1erumo blood bags by the @ational
Lidney and 1ransplant Institute +3aylon v.
8mbudsman, !R "E)$#6, :ec. "E, )**",.
7o1ernment In%rastr!"t!re Contra"ts;
Reali;ing the need to adopt a comprehensive,
uniform, and updated set of policies, guidelines,
rules and regulations covering government
contracts for infrastructure and other construction
projects in order to achieve a more eAcient and
e-ective implementation of these projects, P:
"%'E was enacted to prescribe policies, guidelines,
rules and regulations for government infrastructure
contracts. PetitionerOs )re)ging "ontra"t w2
@BP88R being considered as a government
infrastructure contract +Ma construction,
improvement or rehabilitation of roads and bridges,
railways, airports, seaports, communication
facilities, irrigation, Qood control and drainage,
water supply and sewerage systems, shore
protection, power facilities, national buildings,
school buildings, hospital buildings, and other
related construction projects that form part of the
government capital investment.N,, is subject to the
provisions of P: "%'E +Prescribing Policies,
!uidelines, Rules and Regulations for !overnment
Infrastructure ontracts, and its IRR. Bn
Sinfrastructure projectS such as PetitionersO having
ac4uired mobili;ation lump sum as provided in the
dredging contract is, and should be, considered an
advance-payment item which forms part of the
contract price and not an addition thereto/S and
Ssubject to the conditions provided under I E of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations for P.:.
@o. "%'E that upon the written re4uest of the
contractor, the government shall ma0e an advance
payment in an amount e4ual to 9fteen percent
+"%Z, of the total contract price, subject to
recoupment from periodic progress billings
( ?ope; W
Bssociates
v. 8B, !R
")6"E%,
Sept. %,
)**".
submitted by the contractor.
!8Os J!ris)i"tion; orporations organi;ed pursuant to
the orporation ode of the Phils. are under the
S7, even if the majority or controlling shares
thereof are owned by the government.
P@ v.
Pabion, !R
"#"$"%,
:ec. 6,
"'''.
Same; 1he S7 may not have authority over
government corporations w2 original charters or
those created by special law, it does have
jurisdiction over MBVDIR7: BSS17S
8RP8RB1I8@SN as de9ned in Bdmin. 8rder @o.
%'.
P@ v.
Pabion, !R
"#"$"%,
:ec. 6,
"'''.
Same; 1he S7 en banc has competence to
distinguish a private corporation from a !8.
P@ v.
Pabion, !R
"#"$"%,
:ec. 6,
"'''.
De6nition; Par. +"#,, Sec. ), Introductory
Provisions of the Bdministrative ode of "'6$, i. e.,
any agency organi;ed as a stoc0 or non-stoc0
corporation vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by the !overnment directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stoc0
corporations, to the e.tent of at least 9fty-one +%",
percent of its capital stoc0. 1he de9nition mentions
three +#, re4uisites, namely, 9rst, any agency
organi;ed as a stoc0 or non-stoc0 corporation/
second, vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature/ and, third, owned by the !overnment
directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stoc0
corporations, to the e.tent of at least 9fty-one +%",
percent of its capital stoc0. 1hus, ?egaspi 8il, Inc.,
!rane.port Hanufacturing orp. and Dnited
oconut hemicals, Inc., are private corporations.
?eyson v.
8Ace of the
8mbudsman
, !R
"#E''*,
Bpril )$,
)***.
Water Distri"ts; 1he members of the board of
directors of water districts are not entitled to
receive bene9ts and allowances in e.cess of those
allowed by P: "'6 +as amended by P: $&6 and P:
"E$', and the guidelines of the ?ocal Cater
Dtilities Bdministration +?CDB, and other applicable
law. RB &$%6, otherwise 0nown as the Salary
Standardi;ation ?aw, does not apply to water
districts nor refer to the compensation of its board
of directors who do not receive salaries but per
diems for their compensation. 1he right to
compensation of members of the board of directors
of water districts is limited to per diems.
3aybay
Cater
:istrict v.
8B, !R
"E$)E6-E',
(an. )#,
)**).