Subject: The elastic German defense post-Kursk

A number of theories have been forwarded; some quite good; but let's focus
on the actual situation as it existed on the morning of July 13, 193!
"t is arguable that #$ von $anstein was the best field tactician the %ermans
&ossessed during 'orld 'ar ""! $odel's niche was in ma(ing the best of a
bad situation on the defensive with what resources were available, his
&articular shortcoming was a willingness to believe his own )&ress releases)!
*hose who have studied +urs(,-itadel can &oint to a number of events that
might be termed a )ti&&ing.&oint), but " loo( &rimarily at daylight of July 13!
At this &oint, the entire /te&&e #ront was rolling in, and %ermany had no
fresh reserves on an equivelant scale to match this force! #urther, 0itler went
into an absolute &anic when the 'estern Allies invaded /icily! %ermany was
also saddled with the difficulties of having to station troo&s in the 1al(ans;
both because of a less than fully coo&erative local &o&ulation, and the very
real &ossibility of a 'estern Allies invasion!
2vidence &oints out that both 0oth and $anstein wanted to &ress on after
July 13; with the reasoning being that even if the o&erational goals could not
be met, the /oviets could be severely damaged! *he situation on the north
face of the +urs( salient was quite grave, and even $odel could see the
writing on the wall in so far as the fate of 4rel!
4thers have &ointed out, accurately, that by the time of +urs(, %ermany was
under &ressure along many lines! *he Anglo.American strategic bombing
cam&aign was begging to become a real &roblem, and a consistent source of
drawing away fighter aircraft that were des&erately needed in action against
the /oviets! *he decision to hold onto and fight for "taly was far more for
&olitical rather than strategic reasons! At July of 193, the 'estern Allies
would have faced great difficulty &ursuing an offensive cam&aign through
"taly and into southern 2uro&e even if 0itler had elected to de&loy less force
there! *he greatest military threat that came from the Allies holding "taly
were closer airfields that &ut a (nife at the throat of the %erman.controlled
oil fields in the 1al(ans and southeast 2uro&e! 5ever the less, defending "taly
did tie down enough Allied resources to buy 0itler time to further &re&are
and strengthen the 'est 'all defenses; as it was now only a matter of time,
and location, before the Allies invaded western 2uro&e!
Although %ermany suffered tremdous tan( and infantry losses during +urs(;
and the most critical result of the battle was the &ermanent loss of the
strategic initiative to the /oviets; they were by no means bro(en! *he late
summer and autumn of 193 saw great im&rovements in wea&on systems on
both the %erman and /oviet forces! *he +6.78 began a&&earing in numbers,
along with the *.3,78, while the )teething) &roblems with the 9anther were
resolved, and greater numbers of tan( destroyers :li(e 5ashorn and $arder.
"""; were reaching the combat areas in greater numbers! Additionally, <end.
<ease cannot be em&hasi=ed enough! As others have &ointed out, the sheer
number of locomotives; and most es&ecially tens of thousands of truc(s and
halftrac(s; allowed the /oviets to concentrate &roduction on armor and
frontal aviation! "n &articular, the truc(s &rovided through <end.<ease gave
the /oviets an ability in mobile, in.de&th o&erations they had lac(ed in 191.
193! *he other side of this equation is that, des&ite the successes of the
Allied strategic bombing cam&aign, the %ermans were able to increase
wea&ons &roduction steadily throughout 193!
$uch of 5A*4's ground defensive strategy was modeled after examining
actions by the %ermans :often heavily outnumbered; against the /oviets in
the fall of 193, and the winter.s&ring of 19! 'ith few exce&tions, the
%ermans always retained better communications, and with it, su&erior
command and control of what forces; these crisis )fire brigades); were
available to counter /oviet thrusts! *his was a realm in which $anstein
excelled! 0owever, to be successful, 0itler would have had to be convinced to
trade s&ace for o&erational su&eriority; and the very idea of surrendering
conquered ground was anethma for Adolf! #urther, &eo&le shouldn't overloo(
the )&ersonality) issues &ost.+urs(! $odel was certainly more of an ardent
5a=i than $anstein, and so in 0itler's eyes was to be more trusted and relied
u&on, rather than these ris(y moves von $anstein &ro&osed, which involved
giving u& ground ta(en by %ermany! *he other side of that is a genius isn't
always at the to& of his game every day; and des&ite that the outcome of
-itadel was clearly obvious by July 1, $anstein wanted to &ress the attac(!
" believe that the historical evidence &oints to A; "# 0itler had a&&roved a
ra&id withdrawl to the >nei&er by August 1st, 193, the %ermans could have
built a formidable defense against any further westward movement by the
/oviets, and 1;had $anstein and $odel been given a more free hand in
o&erations with Army %rou& -enter and Army %rou& /outh, the /oviets
would have been mauled badly by the time they reached the >nei&er! 4h,
they would have certainly reached that line anyway, but $anstein had
already demonstrated &ost./talingrad what could be accom&lished with the
)bac(hand) strategy!
"t should be said that the )#ortress -ity) mentality did have one advantage
for the %ermans, in that it tied down significant /oviet forces to reduce these
centers of resistance! /till, in the greater sco&e, %ermany could ill.afford to
lose the men and equi&ment by these stands to the last bullet actions!
%ermany sim&ly did not have enough goodies to go around to effectively
meet each threat; or &otential threat; adequately! ?ltimately, war is waged
by the &oliticians, and history is full of exam&les of &oor decisions by &olitical
leaders leaving the troo&s out to dry!
"# Adolf had a sudden flash of insight, it is entirely &lausible the %ermans
could have halted the /oviets at the >nei&er! 0ow long they could do so is
debateable! *he %ermans demonstrated they could extract their &eo&le from
/oviet encirclements, but at a &rice, as these troo&s were often worn down
to their nubs, and with most of their equi&ment lost!
"t's extremely doubtful that Adolf would have sought a negotiated settlement
with the /oviets; or that the /oviets would acce&t one that involved a
%erman unit anywhere inside the 1939 boundry! " believe that without a
ma@or, catastro&hic loss inflicted on the /oviets; a.la +har(ov; the Aed Army
would have (e&t coming no matter what! Although the %ermans had the
tactics and s(ills; as demonstrated by how effectively they were able to delay
the general /oviet advance into 9oland; there sim&ly was not enough
resources to go around!
S-2 RE:The elastic German defense post-Kursk?Kalaloch Reply 1B,1B,3BB8 CD1DB
9$
)!!! A; "# 0itler had a&&roved a ra&id withdrawl to the >nei&er by August 1st,
193, the %ermans could have built a formidable defense against any further
westward movement by the /oviets, and 1;had $anstein and $odel been
given a more free hand in o&erations with Army %rou& -enter and Army
%rou& /outh, the /oviets would have been mauled badly by the time they
reached the >nei&er!) /ome thoughts! /icily,"taly was an )economy of force)
mission already, as had been Africa! Any fewer troo&s by the %ermans, and
the true value of "taly would have been an avenue to the southern %erman
border, uno&&osed! *errain added immensely to the %erman effort, but
anything less by the %ermans would have actually made -hurchill's )soft
underbelly) soft! 0itler showed both flexibility and &rescience in calling off
the attac(, though both 0oth and 6on $anstein did have a &oint about
attriting the /oviet forces continuing to arrive in the south :8th %*A and
others of the +oniev's /te&&e #ront;. but in fact they were &ro&osing to hold
the wolf by the throat by this &oint! 0itler actually allowed $odel to withdraw
to the 0agan <ine by late July, which sacrificed 4rel but stabili=ed the 0eer
%rou&e $ittre east of $ins( :around 6itebs(, $ogilev, and 4rsha;until June,
19! /econdly, without the /!/! -or&s :minus <iebstandardte, with
6i(ing;dis&lacing south in late July, the $ius front crac(s.with a direct &ath
to +remenchug and the lower >nie&er crossings! Eour first &oint about a
coherant, articulated defense of the >nie&er from, " &resume, +iev on south
through the great bend by August 1 @ust isn't &ossible unless you forego
+urs( altogether, and withdraw from the -rimea, something 0itler was
adamantly o&&osed to! Aemember, %erman forces from the /outh ?(raine
Army %rou& were still fighting around $eliti&ol in the /&ring of ! " believe
that /evasto&ol was reca&tured about the same time! #urther, a withdrawal,
in the absence of +urs(, would still have required massive &lanning and
eloquent execution to extract the entire Army %rou&e /ud from the +har(ov
and $ius fronts CBB(m west to the lower >nie&er and into &re&ared
defenses! -learly, if accom&lished, forces wasted at +urs( would have been
available in this defense, but /oviet forces would have also been fresh, and
sensitive to any wholesale withdrawal, even with significant forces behind to
delay the Aed Army's inevitable close &ursuit! 0ere, by the way, is where,
once again, 6on $anstein would be in his element! "f able to coherantly
withdraw his immobile assets behind the >nie&er while leaving much of his
&an=er forces :7th 9an=er -or&s, "" /!/! 9an=er -or&s, 1reith's """ 9an=er
-or&s from A!Ab! +em&f;to cover the withdrawal, "'m sure he would have
re&eatedly s&an(ed the Aed Army all the way bac( to the >nie&er, but the
correlation of forces may have been similar to actual events! 1y August 1,
the $ius #ront had been in battle for two wee(s, and the /te&&e #ront
attac(ed +har(ov, ca&turing 1elgorod in three days! 0uge battles were
fought southeast of A(htyr(a, near 1ogodu(hov, and around +har(ov,
ca&tured in late August! 'ithin a wee(, the race was on for the river!
2qui&ment! "n fact, the 9anther still ex&erienced considerable teething issues
through the fall of 193! $oreover, numbers were still inadequate with
9an=er Abteilungs returning from %ermany and immediately committed
&iecemeal, and without adequate maintanence,recovery ca&abilities in the
retreat to the >nie&er! 5ot very comforting! *hese units were rendered
nonfunctional within wee(s under the circumstances, leaving much of the
battle in the hands of the remaining $( "6s, who were ex&eriencing
difficulties cleanly &enetrating the new *.3,78 at normal engagement
ranges!

Fuote Ae&ly
arl S RE:The elastic German defense post-Kursk?Kalaloch Reply 1B,1B,3BB8
1BD33D33 9$
"'ve seen this idea &ro&osed before more than once! <ast year it was on one
of the discuassion boards on -onsimworld! "t is always good for a interesting
exchange! $y ta(e is such a strategy would have &rolonged the war by
about four to six months! *he Aed Army would have been ta(ing 'arsaw in
A&ril 198 instead of 1erlin! 1ut were the Aeich still intact in August 198
not only would Allied armys in the east G west still be in overwhelming
strength, the ?/,1rit bombing cam&aigns would be increasingly effective,
and at least two atomic bombs would have been available! "n terms of total
warfare the 5a=i stratigic situation a&&ears com&letely ho&eless from late
193!

Fuote Ae&ly
kalaloch RE:The elastic German defense post-Kursk?Kalaloch Reply 1B,11,3BB8
1DCD7 9$
" often watch the movie )A 1ridge *oo #ar) to remind me @ust how badly the
best of &lanning and ideas can end! /.3 is absolutely correct in that Adolf
would never have, of his own volition, sanctioned a withdrawl from the
-rimea! #urther, while " ma(e the case for a coherent, organi=ed and ra&id
withdraw to the >nei&er, " fail to mention that 0itler was going to do
everything &ossible; militarily; to retain control of the >onbass! " was
&utting a hec( of a lot of )what.if's) into the equation; but &rimarily some
rational thought &rocess on the &art of the %erman &olitical leadershi&! "t's
absolutely on the mar( that the 9= "6's :even with the <,7 H8mm and the
decreasing amount of A9B available; were having a hec( of a time with the
emerging *.3,78's! 1y the autumn of 193, /oviet units that were
ex&ecting to face %erman armor could ex&ect to have H or 7 rounds of their
sub.caliber ammunition; and this scale began to ti& in favor of the /oviets
versus %erman su&&ly and &roduction beginning at the end of the summer
of 193! " conceede that the &ersonnel on the $ius front were exhausted!
0owever, " believe that only bolsters my argument for the organi=ed retreat
to the >nei&er before 5ovember 1st! " also recogni=e there was growing,
and sustained, &ressure on Army %rou& 5orth...the &oor ste&child to Army
%rou&s -enter and /outh! 3// 9an=er was lac(ing its full second 9an=er
battalion at +urs(, because they were off training in and acquiring new
9anthers bac( in %ermany! 0ence the collection of 38 *.3,HC in the division
*42 on July ! "# the information " have is accurate, the training was cut
short and the battalion dis&atched to @oin >as Aeich as it rede&loyed west!
Ees, "taly was an exam&le of ecomony.of.force defense; although "'m not so
assured that the 'estern Allies would have had a clear road north were less
force to have been de&loyed! 4f course, the other side is that the 'estern
Allies learned a great deal from the o&erations at /alerno and An=io that
&ayed great dividens during 462A<4A>! "taly also highlighted less than
sterling American leadershi& :reD %eneral $ar( -lar(;, and only contributed
to the 1ritish disdain of American ground combat ca&abilities! 1ut to
Aussia!!!Adolf sim&ly was not going to a&&rove a &olicy that involved
wholesale evacuation of conqured turf! "t's fairly evident that %ermany did
need the resouces of the >onbass, but it's also &atently clear; &ost.+urs(;
that there was not going to be any &ossible chance of effectively defending
them! As to the delay of the /oviets entering 1erlin months later; that
very delay would have &ut enourmous &ressure on 2isenhower to move
dee&er into %ermany! %iven -hurchill's behavior u& to this &oint, " see no
reason to doubt that; were the /oviets hung u& on the 6istula and "#.."#..
matters had &layed out identically on the 'estern front :failed Ardennes
counter.offensive, &enetration of the Auhr;, the &olitical masters would have
forced action on "(e no matter his &rotestations! 5ever.the.less, " return to
my earlier &ointD %ermany sim&ly could not &roduce enough material, across
the board, to meet the needs! 'hile some of the results they acom&lished
were outstanding given what resources were avaialble!!!they were &urely
defensive accom&lishments! " would submit that had $anstein and $odel
been given free reign :and yes, " recogni=e that im&lies the two could 262A
learn to get along;, the /oviets could have been bled, and massively so, in
an organi=ed withdrawl to the >nei&er! *hat the %ermans were still able to
&erform local counter.attac(s and defenses which &roduced dis&ro&ortionate
losses on the encroaching /oviet forces is testament to better leadershi& and
training at the tactical level! 1ut " also submit that, no matter the s(ill of the
tactical leadershi&, &ersonnel and equi&ment, it will never redress &oor
&olitical decisions! )'olf by the throat) is a very a&t descri&tion; and it's
awfully hard to stab or shoot if your hands are already full!

Fuote Ae&ly
S-2 RE:The elastic German defense post-Kursk?Kalaloch Reply 1B,11,3BB8 8D87D13
9$
)!!!my argument for the organi=ed retreat to the >nei&er before 5ovember
1st!) " went bac( to your original thread where you said something about
0itler a&&roving a withdrawal by Aug! 1! A&&roval or actually withdrawnI A
cou&le odds and ends!!! you're correct about >as Aeich! 1,/!/! 9= Aegt! 3
returned from #rance in August equi&&ed with H1 9= 6! "nterestingly, from
July 1 through 4ct 31, 193, the entire eastern front only received 1BC
*igers, 337 9anthers, and 97 $( "6 :H8mm,<7;as &art of unit de&loyments
to the front! 4f course, individual tan(s continued to be shi&&ed east as
re&lacement tan(s to those 9=! Aegt! engaged in battle! *he above numbers
re&resented one com&lete

Fuote Ae&ly
S-2 RE:The elastic German defense post-Kursk?ontinued 1B,11,3BB8 9DBBD18 9$
heavy unit :s!9=!Abt!8BC;, and two w,only two com&anies
:s!9=!Abt!8B3,""",9=!Aegt!%!>!;! ",/!/! 9=! Aegt!3, "",9=! Aegt!33, and ",9=!
Aegt!3 moved east w,9anthers! 1 9=! >iv! and 3 9=! >iv! de&loyed with a
Aegt! staff and a single mixed abteilung of stug!""" and $(! "6! *hat was it
across the entire eastern front until early 5ov! 193! /ince 0itler's adamance
about the defense of the -rimea and >onbas made remote the &ossibility of
a strategic withdrawal to the >nie&er, one alternative a&&roach would have
been a defensive battle along the +urs( salient! *he &rimary advantage
would be three and one.half months of defensive &re&arations on either side
of the salient; fresh, trained, largely reconstituted forces :&articularly the
infantry divisions.for &erha&s the last time;; and the retention of a large
number of 9=! >iv! into an o&erational or strategic reserve! -learly, %erman
forces would have needed to reinforce the base of the salient to a far greater
degree than actuality! *he /oviet ?nion, regardless of fore(nowledge of
%erman intentions to >2#25>, would eventually need to attac( somewhere.
&robably +urs(! %iven significant mechani=ed o&erational reserves, and
healthy infantry divisions, 6on $anstein would have been endowed with
ca&abilities far beyond his assets in #eb!.$arch, 193! *oo, were %erman
forces able to withdraw from one side or the other of the salient, &referably
both sides, defensive lines would have been considerably shorter for the
%erman army! 9erha&s even more troo&s freed! 4f course, it was im&ossible
for 0itler to consider a withdrawal from 4rel and,or +har(ov! #inally, imagine
a withdrawal from the -rimea in the /&ring of 193! -ombined with the
above, that would be a considerably stronger 'ehrmacht than ultimately
faced by the /oviets from their defensive &ositions in early July, 193! *0A*
would have been a interesting scenario to me! /orry to all about the writus
interru&tus!