August 14, 2014

To Fight ISIS, Make Peace with Syria's Assad

Syrian refugees walk amid damage and the remains of tents that were burnt in the fighting
between Lebanese army soldiers and Islamist militants in the Sunni Muslim border town of
Arsal, August 9, 2014
Photo by Ahmad Shalha/Reuters
by William Young
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph of the Islamic State, has said in his speeches
that he recognizes no borders. In light of his actions over the past two months and the recent
incursions into Arsal in Lebanon and Sinjar in Northern Iraq, the United States should take him
at his word and plan accordingly.
Al-Baghdadi's ambitions in the region seem limitless: expansion to the east and north through
Iraq and Kurdish areas, west into Lebanon and Jordan, and south into the Arab Gulf. Saudi
Arabia, however, contains what he wants most: control of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina,
and control of the kingdom's oil.
This week, President Obama authorized limited airstrikes against targets in Iraq and the first
attacks came Friday near the Kurdish capital of Irbil. Now U.S. advisers are headed to the region.
But there are other things the United States could be doing to contain the Islamic State.
No Arab country acting alone or in unison with others in the region is likely to intervene to
disrupt these plans. Iran may be able to slow the Islamic State's aspirations somewhere south and
east of Baghdad, but Iraqi forces have already shown that they lack the commitment and
firepower to be able to stand their ground against the onslaught, which continues to close in on
the capital.
The Lebanese Armed Forces with the help of Hezbollah might be able to make a stand along the
Syrian border. The discipline of Jordanian forces is also likely to pose a serious obstacle to the
expansion of the caliphate into Jordan. In the end, however, the real challenge to both the
Lebanese and Jordanians will be in fighting the internal threat as the Islamic State gains
adherents through its messaging campaign and capable administration of the territories it seizes.
Operating from his capital in Raqqah, Syria, al-Baghdadi is working hard to win the hearts and
minds of the Sunnis in the region by keeping the electricity on and attempting to show that his
governors are not corrupt. His military and political actions so far show that he not only thinks
strategically about war, but that he is intent on properly administrating and otherwise actually
governing the areas that have fallen under his control. These actions appeal to many people who
have grown tired of government corruption and years of war.
The United States and its allies in Europe and the Middle East should consider steps now to
counter the Islamic State's expansion before it more seriously threatens traditional political,
social, and economic relationships in the region, and rewrites Islam for the majority of the
Muslims in the world.
To disrupt al-Baghdadi's advance, the United States and its allies should start by addressing the
source of the problem the conflict in Syria. They can begin by negotiating a truce with
President Bashar Assad to stop the fighting in Syria. At the same time, an international
stabilization force should be mobilized to create humanitarian safe zones in Syria so
humanitarian aid can be delivered. This force, made up of NATO and Arab forces, could also be
instrumental in taking back territory lost to the Islamic State, and in countering the spread of
jihadist influence by Jabhat al-Nusra and its al-Qaida affiliates. This will show the people of the
region that al-Baghdadi's new Islamic State is not invincible and that it does not speak for the
majority of other Muslims in the region or beyond. Assad might accept such an arrangement
because it would allow him to retain power over at least a portion of Syria.
The United States and it allies also should provide direct military support to the Lebanese,
Jordanians, and Arab Gulf states, ensuring that any further attempts at expansion of the Islamic
State will meet stiff resistance. The Iraqis and Kurds too should continue to be given assistance
to support efforts to contain the Islamic State in the northern part of the country. Iran will defend
itself and will fight to preserve Shia areas of Iraq and the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf from
encroachment by the Islamic State.
Finally, a messaging campaign should be created that counters al-Baghdadi's efforts to sow
discord between Sunni and Shia and that focuses on the threat al-Baghdadi poses to Islam in
general and to the holy sites in Mecca, Medina, Karbala and Najaf. An end to the fighting in
Syria will help accomplish some of this new messaging. It also will help curb the increasing
radicalization of youth in the region and thereby prevent new jihadists from joining the battle on
both sides. In a coordinated effort, the Saudis and others in the region will be able to help turn
the propaganda tide back against al-Baghdadi and his allies.
The creation of an international stabilization force and serious defense assistance to allies and
neighboring states in the region will serve to contain al-Baghdadi's aspirations. It is always
possible that his new Islamic State may overextend itself and collapse under its own weight, a
possibility that would only be hastened by an alliance aimed at isolating it. But it is too
dangerous to wait and see. Al Baghdadi's ambitions at the moment threaten the stability of U.S.
allies in the region, as well as the prospects for the development and spread of democracy, and
ultimately the free trade and supply of oil from the Arab Gulf. It makes no sense to continue
waiting to see what happens next nothing good awaits.

William Young is a senior policy analyst at RAND Corporation.
This commentary appeared in USA Today on August 13, 2014


What's Going on in Iraq?
Here's what you need to know about the Islamic State and
U.S. military intervention.

Displaced Iraqis in Syria
By Karl Mueller Aug. 13, 2014 | 3:35 p.m. EDT + More
1) Why is the United States now conducting airstrikes against the Islamic State?
Recent advances by militants of the Islamic State in northern Iraq have created a situation of
immediate crisis on two fronts. One is a potential humanitarian disaster resulting from the
Islamic State's campaign to displace and kill members of the Yazidi minority population and
other civilians a literally genocidal action in legal terms. The other is the Islamic State's
advance toward the Kurdish regional capital of Irbil, where the failure to stop the Islamists would
not only imperil the citizens, international residents and refugees there, but would also threaten
the survival of the Iraqi Kurdish state-within-a-state, a longtime U.S. ally. In response, the
United States has been airdropping supplies to help Yazidis who are cut off in northwestern Iraq,
has begun for the first time to supply arms and ammunition directly to Kurdish peshmerga
forces, and has launched a small number of airstrikes against Islamic State forces attacking both
groups.
2) Why hasnt the Islamic State been bombed before this?
Earlier this summer, the Islamic State made alarming advances in northern and western Iraq that
led to fears that the group would advance to Baghdad and to calls for U.S. airstrikes. Several
factors made the case for launching air attacks less powerful than it is now. First, the prospect
that the Islamic State could actually seize the Iraqi capital a huge city now populated
overwhelmingly by the groups Shiite enemies was remote at best. Second, the United States
was not keen to act in conspicuous defense of a government that has been politically toxic for
Iraq, and the ability of the Iraqi army to fight effectively against the Islamic State even with air
support was very questionable. (Meanwhile, the United States has never seriously considered
attacking the Islamic State in Syria because, there, the Islamic State is the enemy of a U.S.
enemy the Assad regime and its Hezbollah supporters though it has also fought against the
Free Syrian Army rebels who launched the uprising against President Bashar Assad to the
applause of the West.)
3) Is this likely to go on for a long time?
Although President Barack Obama has warned that reestablishing a viable Iraqi state will be a
long-term project (and many analysts question whether that objective can be achieved at all),
how long the airstrikes will continue is likely to depend heavily on how the Islamic State
responds to them and to Kurdish efforts to stem the groups advances. If the air attacks and
assistance to the peshmerga are sufficient to fend off the Islamists offensive, the Islamic State
might decide the game is not worth the candle and turn its energies in another direction.
However, if the Islamic State carries on, it is reasonable to expect the current U.S. effort to
continue, or even to increase in intensity if that appears necessary to secure the Kurds position.
An increase in the use of airpower may also be called for if and when the Kurds go on the
offensive to retake territory they have recently lost. The Islamic State appears to have the
resources to make a long fight of it, but continuing to conduct air attacks even on a significantly
larger scale than the low frequency seen in the past few days is easily within the capabilities of
U.S. forces in the theater.
4) Are airstrikes likely to be effective?
Although the Kurdish forces are reasonably well organized and disciplined, they face a firepower
imbalance against the Islamic State, which has acquired significant amounts of equipment once
owned by the Iraqi and Syrian armies. The Islamic States vehicles and artillery make good
targets for air attacks, and when the Islamic State forces concentrate to attack (or defend against)
their opponents on the ground, their vulnerability to bombing increases. This sort of hammer-
and-anvil mechanism works best when ground forces are steady and capable and when there is
good coordination with airpower, making advisers and liaison officers working with the ground
forces invaluable for such a campaign. Thus, in concert with efforts to bolster the capabilities of
the peshmerga, air reconnaissance and strikes against the Islamic State could make a
considerable difference in terms of capabilities and the combatants morale on the ground.
Early reporting indicates that even the few strikes to date have had a noticeable effect.
5) Is this the start of greater U.S. military involvement in Iraq?
At present, the United States is not seeking to destroy the Islamic State, or even to substantially
weaken it through the ongoing airstrikes against its front line forces. In this sense, the bombing
can be said to resemble the attacks launched against Libyan troops advancing toward the rebel
stronghold of Benghazi in March 2011, when fears of a massacre by Moammar Gadhafi regime
forces mobilized international support for aerial intervention by a coalition led by France, Britain
and the United States. Airstrikes halted the Libyan armys thrust in the nick of time and
prevented the regime from destroying other centers of the rebellion. Thereafter, the campaign
quickly evolved into a broader and ultimately successful effort by Western airpower and
increasingly capable Libyan rebel forces acting in concert to remove the Gadhafi regime, on the
grounds that only by doing so could Gadhafis threat to his people be eliminated.
A similar transition could ultimately occur in Iraq as well, if and when the situation is stabilized.
However, destroying the Islamic State would be an ambitious undertaking, given its capabilities
and resources and the currently limited capabilities of the reform-averse Iraqi government to
mount an offensive against the group. Such an effort would also be greatly complicated by the
Islamic States presence not only in Iraq but also in Syria, where the United States is aligned
against its main adversary (while Iran, the Assad regimes principal ally, is also a supporter of
the Iraqi governments resistance to the Islamic State). Therefore, while the United States could
embark on a much wider war in Iraq, there is little reason to think that it will rush to do so or that
using airpower to help defend the Kurds will make such an escalation inevitable.

Karl P. Mueller is associate director of the Strategy and Resources Program in the RAND Arroyo
Center and a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
Defeating the Islamic State: Crafting a
Regional Approach
Shi'ite volunteers, who've joined the Iraqi army against militants from the radical Islamic State,
take part in weapons training, July 18, 2014
Photo by Alaa Al-Marjani/Reuters
by Douglas A Ollivant and Terrence K. Kelly
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), now calling itself the Islamic State, has burst
onto the world scene in an impressive way in the past month, with its Blitzkrieg-like seizure of
Mosul, Tikrit, Bayji, and Tal Afar. While experts in the region had been monitoring ISIL's
progress for some time, its emergence shocked the general public. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the
leader of ISIL, then furthered that shock by declaring ISIL (PDF) as the core of a caliphate (with
himself, of course, as its Caliph), the sole legitimate Islamic State on earth.
For the United States, crafting a policy to neutralize ISIL and its ever-expanding ambitions is a
difficult proposition with no easy answers. Solutions require recognition that ISIL has been
transformed by its successes from a localized terrorist group into an organized and effective
political and military powerhouse that poses serious threats to the region and beyond.
Fortunately, while ISIL may achieve some temporary tactical gains from declaring the caliphate,
it made the strategic error of declaring all other Sunni political actors illegitimate, including
Sunni nationalists and the Syrian moderate opposition, as well as both al Qaeda leader Ayman
al-Zawahiri and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia himself. Specifically, this may provide an
opening to build a coalition that includes major Sunni actors that can create and implement a
regional strategy to attack ISIL.
The remainder of this commentary is available at warontherocks.com.

Terrence Kelly is a senior operations researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation and the director of the Strategy and Resources Program at the RAND Arroyo
Center.
Douglas A. Ollivant is a Managing Partner of Mantid International, LLC, a strategic consulting
firm with offices in Baghdad, Beirut, and Washington DC. Previously a Director for Iraq at the
National Security Council, he is also a Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation.
This commentary appeared on warontherocks.com on July 22, 2014


Hitting ISIS Where It Hurts: Disrupt ISIS' s
Cash Flow in Iraq
A man purported to be Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the reclusive leader of the militant Islamic State,
allegedly in what would be his first public appearance at a mosque in Mosul, Iraq
Photo by Social Media Website via Reuters TV/Reuters
by Patrick B. Johnston and Benjamin Bahney
When the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria poured out from the eastern deserts of Syria into Iraq's
second-largest city last month, it was an image out of the eighth century: bearded Islamist
marauders summarily executing unbelievers, pillaging as they went. But underneath that grisly
exterior lurks something more modern and more insidious. As ISIS's most recent annual report
shows, the group is sophisticated, strategic, financially savvy and building structures that could
survive for years to come. ISIS currently brings in more than $1 million a day in revenue and is
now the richest terrorist group on the planet.
Despite the recent calls from hawks in Congress for a broader offensive, there are few
meaningful options available to the United States. There's no political appetite for a ground
operation in Iraq. A narrower intervention, like the airstrikes and humanitarian assistance
President Obama authorized last week, may be able to limit ISIS expansion, but will not defeat
it.
Only the Iraqis and the Kurds will be able to reclaim territory. But there are some options for
noncombat assistance that would help degrade the group's finances, which are strongly linked to
the group's violence. For one, America could send expert teams to assist Iraqi and Kurdish forces
in developing the financial intelligence needed to plan military operations against key ISIS
elements. Targeting the terrorist group's bookkeepers, its oil business and its cash holdings could
both disrupt ISIS's financing and provide additional intelligence on its inner workings.
Others have called for traditional counterterrorist methods to target ISIS's wealth by
disrupting international financial flows that support terrorism. But this view misreads how ISIS
makes its money. The group has always raised and spent most of its money locally, inside Iraq
and Syria. ISIS wants to create its own state, and has long raised funds like many nascent states
do, through coercion and co-optation.
ISIS has long been financially self-sustaining. We have analyzed hundreds of ISIS financial
documents captured by American and Iraqi forces since 2005, and we've found no evidence that
ISIS has ever relied on foreign patrons for funding. Contrary to the common myth that the group
relies on wealthy donors abroad, ISIS's meticulous records show that its money came mostly
from protection rackets that extorted the commercial, reconstruction, and oil sectors of northern
Iraq's economy. The group also made considerable money through war itself, plundering
millions of dollars from local Christians and Shiites, whom ISIS views as apostates.
We believe that ISIS will remain financially solvent for the foreseeable future. A conservative
calculation suggests that ISIS may generate a surplus of $100 million to $200 million this year
that it could reinvest in state-building.
So how can America disrupt ISIS's financing? Since 9/11, the United States has focused mainly
on international financiers sending money to Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The goal is to cut off
terrorists' foreign sources of wealth. These policies are designed to encourage proper banking
practices and bolster international customs enforcement, as well as to place terrorists and their
associates on designation lists that block their travel and freeze their bank accounts.
Unlike many other terrorist groups, ISIS has never relied on the largess of foreign patrons. ISIS
documents warn against it, because many terrorist groups that ceded influence to foreign
benefactors were devastated when patrons stopped sending money. Make your dog hungry,
one ISIS strategist wrote, and he will follow you.
America's post-9/11 approach to blocking terrorist financing will not be effective against ISIS
because the group uses money as an instrument of statecraft. Its leadership has established
institutions that administer an Islamist police state founded under Shariah law. While these
institutions provide few tangible services, they consolidate the group's governing authority by
facilitating trade, collecting taxes and maintaining control over the local population.
Moreover, ISIS has never relied on basic formal financial institutions, such as banks. Instead, it
has tended to reinvest its revenues in its own organization to further its fighting and state-
building agendas.
President Obama's decision last week to conduct airstrikes and send humanitarian aid will help
buy time for both Iraqi and Kurdish forces to regroup. But Baghdad needs a strategy that aligns
the political and economic interests of all Iraqis against ISIS. The group's center of gravity lies
not in the international financial system but within the local economies of Iraq and Syria.
Regardless of what limited additional measures America decides to undertake in the coming
weeks and months, there are three possible Iraqi policies that could help turn the tide.
If Iraq succeeds in replacing Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as now seems likely, the new
unity government should decentralize power and distribute a larger portion of the national budget
to Sunni-majority areas. Baghdad should also work to strike deals with local Sunni tribes and
business owners where ISIS has not yet taken control. These Sunni leaders would cooperate in
squeezing ISIS out of local markets in exchange for subsidies and other direct government
economic assistance.
Second, America could help the Iraqis and the Kurds analyze ISIS financial information
collected in raids and from informants, and then use that information to plot a strategy and to
plan operations.
Third, Iraqi and Kurdish forces should make it a priority to displace the group from oil wells in
northern Iraq, and to restrict its ability to process oil at its refining facilities in eastern Syria. The
Iraqi government must also engage Turkey, Jordan and the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds to plot a joint
strategy to contain ISIS's oil operations, especially stopping ISIS from controlling Baiji, Iraq's
largest oil production facility, which small Iraqi special forces teams have been defending for the
last two months.
The United States can help at the margins, but ultimately only the Iraqis have the power to defeat
ISIS.

Patrick B. Johnston is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, whereBenjamin Bahney is a
member of the adjunct staff.
This commentary appeared on The New York Times on August 13, 2014