National Security Study

Memorandum 200 (NSSM 200) -

April 1974
EXEC!"#E SMMA$%
WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
1. World Population growth since World War II is quantitatively and qualitatively diferent
from any previous epoch in human history. The rapid reduction in death rates, unmatched
by corresponding birth rate reductions, has brought total growth rates close to percent a
year, compared with about 1 percent before World War II, under !." percent in 1#"!$1%!!,
and far lower rates before 1#"!. The efect is to double the world&s population in '" years
instead of 1!! years. (lmost )! million are now being added each year, compared with 1!
million in 1%!!.
2. The second new feature of population trends is the sharp differentiation between rich and poor
countries. Since 1950, population in the former group has been growing at 0 to 1.5 percent per year, and
in the latter at 2.0 to 3.5 percent doubling in 20 to 35 years!. Some of the highest rates of increase are in
areas already densely populated and with a wea" resource base.
3. #ecause of the momentum of population dynamics, reductions in birth rates affect total numbers
only slowly. $igh birth rates in the recent past ha%e resulted in a high proportion in the youngest age
groups, so that there will continue to be substantial population increases o%er many years e%en if a two&
child family should become the norm in the future. 'olicies to reduce fertility will ha%e their main
effects on total numbers only after se%eral decades. $owe%er, if future numbers are to be "ept within
reasonable bounds, it is urgent that measures to reduce fertility be started and made effecti%e in the
19(0)s and 19*0)s. +oreo%er, programs started now to reduce birth rates will ha%e short run ad%antages
for de%eloping countries in lowered demands on food, health and educational and other ser%ices and in
enlarged capacity to contribute to producti%e in%estments, thus accelerating de%elopment.
,. -... estimates use the 3./ billion population of 19(0 as a base there are nearly , billion now! and
pro0ect from about / billion to * billion people for the year 2000 with the -.S. medium estimate at /.,
billion. The -.S. medium pro0ections show a world population of 12 billion by 20(5 which implies a
fi%e&fold increase in south and southeast 1sia and in 2atin 1merican and a se%en&fold increase in 1frica,
compared with a doubling in east 1sia and a ,03 increase in the presently de%eloped countries see
Table 1!. +ost demographers, including the -... and the -.S. 'opulation 4ouncil, regard the range of
10 to 13 billion as the most li"ely le%el for world population stability, e%en with intensi%e efforts at
fertility control. These figures assume, that sufficient food could be produced and distributed to a%oid
limitation through famines.!
ADEQUACY OF WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES - Index
". *rowing populations will have a serious impact on the need for food especially in the
poorest, fastest growing +,-s. While under normal weather conditions and assuming food
production growth in line with recent trends, total world agricultural production could
e.pand faster than population, there will nevertheless be serious problems in food
distribution and /nancing, ma0ing shortages, even at today&s poor nutrition levels,
probable in many of the larger more populous +,- regions. 1ven today 1! to ! million
people die each year due, directly or indirectly, to malnutrition. 1ven more serious is the
consequence of ma2or crop failures which are li0ely to occur from time to time.
/. The most serious conse5uence for the short and middle term is the possibility of massi%e famines in
certain parts of the world, especially the poorest regions. 6orld needs for food rise by 2&172 percent or
more per year ma"ing a modest allowance for impro%ed diets and nutrition! at a time when readily
a%ailable fertili8er and well&watered land is already largely being utili8ed. Therefore, additions to food
production must come mainly from higher yields. 4ountries with large population growth cannot afford
constantly growing imports, but for them to raise food output steadily by 2 to , percent o%er the ne9t
generation or two is a formidable challenge. 4apital and foreign e9change re5uirements for intensi%e
agriculture are hea%y, and are aggra%ated by energy cost increases and fertili8er scarcities and price
rises. The institutional, technical, and economic problems of transforming traditional agriculture are also
%ery difficult to o%ercome.
(. :n addition, in some o%erpopulated regions, rapid population growth presses on a fragile
en%ironment in ways that threaten longer&term food production; through culti%ation of marginal lands,
o%ergra8ing, desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion, with conse5uent destruction of land and
pollution of water, rapid siltation of reser%oirs, and impairment of inland and coastal fisheries.
MINERALS AND FUEL - Index
). 3apid population growth is not in itself a ma2or factor in pressure on depletable
resources 4fossil fuels and other minerals5, since demand for them depends more on levels
of industrial output than on numbers of people. 6n the other hand, the world is
increasingly dependent on mineral supplies from developing countries, and if rapid
population frustrates their prospects for economic development and social progress, the
resulting instability may undermine the conditions for e.panded output and sustained
7ows of such resources.
9. There will be serious problems for some of the poorest 2<4s with rapid population growth. They
will increasingly find it difficult to pay for needed raw materials and energy. =ertili8er, %ital for their
own agricultural production, will be difficult to obtain for the ne9t few years. :mports for fuel and other
materials will cause gra%e problems which could impinge on the -.S., both through the need to supply
greater financial support and in 2<4 efforts to obtain better terms of trade through higher prices for
e9ports.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION GROWTH - Index
1!. 3apid population growth creates a severe drag on rates of economic development
otherwise attainable, sometimes to the point of preventing any increase in per capita
incomes. In addition to the overall impact on per capita incomes, rapid population growth
seriously afects a vast range of other aspects of the quality of life important to social and
economic progress in the +,-s.
11. 1d%erse economic factors which generally result from rapid population growth include;
reduced family savings and domestic investment8
increased need for large amounts of foreign e.change for food imports8
intensi/cation of severe unemployment and underemployment8
the need for large e.penditures for services such as dependency support,
education, and health which would be used for more productive investment8
the concentration of developmental resources on increasing food production to
ensure survival for a larger population, rather than on improving living conditions
for smaller total numbers.
1. While *9P increased per annum at an average rate of " percent in +,-s over the
last decade, the population increase of ." percent reduced the average annual per capita
growth rate to only ." percent. In many heavily populated areas this rate was percent
or less. In the +,-s hardest hit by the oil crisis, with an aggregate population of )!!
million, *9P increases may be reduced to less than 1 percent per capita per year for the
remainder of the 1%#!&s. :or the poorest half of the populations of these countries, with
average incomes of less than ;1!!, the prospect is for no growth or retrogression for this
period.
13. :f significant progress can be made in slowing population growth, the positi%e impact on growth
of >.' and per capita income will be significant. +oreo%er, economic and social progress will
probably contribute further to the decline in fertility rates.
1,. $igh birth rates appear to stem primarily from;
a. inade5uate information about and a%ailability of means of fertility control?
b. inade5uate moti%ation for reduced numbers of children combined with moti%ation for many children
resulting from still high infant and child mortality and need for support in old age? and
c. the slowness of change in family preferences in response to changes in en%ironment.
15. The uni%ersal ob0ecti%e of increasing the world)s standard of li%ing dictates that economic growth
outpace population growth. :n many high population growth areas of the world, the largest proportion of
>.' is consumed, with only a small amount sa%ed. Thus, a small proportion of >.' is a%ailable for
in%estment && the @engine@ of economic growth. +ost e9perts agree that, with fairly constant costs per
acceptor, e9penditures on effecti%e family planning ser%ices are generally one of the most cost effecti%e
in%estments for an 2<4 country see"ing to impro%e o%erall welfare and per capita economic growth. 6e
cannot wait for o%erall moderni8ation and de%elopment to produce lower fertility rates naturally since
this will undoubtedly ta"e many decades in most de%eloping countries, during which time rapid
population growth will tend to slow de%elopment and widen e%en more the gap between rich and poor.
1/. The interrelationships between de%elopment and population growth are comple9 and not wholly
understood. 4ertain aspects of economic de%elopment and moderni8ation appear to be more directly
related to lower birth rates than others. Thus certain de%elopment programs may bring a faster
demographic transition to lower fertility rates than other aspects of de%elopment. The 6orld 'opulation
'lan of 1ction adopted at the 6orld 'opulation 4onference recommends that countries wor"ing to affect
fertility le%els should gi%e priority to de%elopment programs and health and education strategies which
ha%e a decisi%e effect on fertility. :nternational cooperation should gi%e priority to assisting such
national efforts. These programs include; a! impro%ed health care and nutrition to reduce child
mortality, b! education and impro%ed social status for women? c! increased female employment? d!
impro%ed old&age security? and e! assistance for the rural poor, who generally ha%e the highest fertility,
with actions to redistribute income and resources including pro%iding pri%ately owned farms. $owe%er,
one cannot proceed simply from identification of relationships to specific large&scale operational
programs. =or e9ample, we do not yet "now of cost&effecti%e ways to encourage increased female
employment, particularly if we are concerned about not adding to male unemployment. 6e do not yet
"now what specific pac"ages of programs will be most cost effecti%e in many situations.
1(. There is need for more information on cost effecti%eness of different approaches on both the
@supply@ and the @demand@ side of the picture. An the supply side, intense eff!ts "!e !e#$i!ed t
"ss$!e f$%% "&"i%"'i%it( '( )*+, f 'i!t- .nt!% inf!/"tin "nd /e"ns t "%% fe!ti%e indi&id$"%s0
es1e.i"%%( in !$!"% "!e"s Bemphasis addedC. :mpro%ement is also needed in methods of birth control
most acceptable and useable by the rural poor. An the demand side, further e9perimentation and
implementation action pro0ects and programs are needed. :n particular, more research is needed on the
moti%ation of the poorest who often ha%e the highest fertility rates. 1ssistance programs must be more
precisely targeted to this group than in the past.
1*. :t may well be that desired family si8e will not decline to near replacement le%els until the lot of
the 2<4 rural poor impro%es to the e9tent that the benefits of reducing family si8e appear to them to
outweigh the costs. =or urban people, a rapidly growing element in the 2<4s, the liabilities of ha%ing
too many children are already becoming apparent. 1id recipients and donors must also emphasi8e
de%elopment and impro%ements in the 5uality of life of the poor, if significant progress is to be made in
controlling population growth. 1lthough it was adopted primarily for other reasons, the new emphasis of
1:<)s legislation on problems of the poor which is echoed in comparable changes in policy emphasis
by other donors and by an increasing number of 2<4)s! is directly rele%ant to the conditions re5uired for
fertility reduction.
POLITICAL EFFECTS OF POPULATION FACTORS - Index
1%. The political consequences of current population factors in the +,-s $$ rapid growth,
internal migration, high percentages of young people, slow improvement in living
standards, urban concentrations, and pressures for foreign migration $$ are damaging to
the internal stability and international relations of countries in whose advancement the
<.=. is interested, thus creating political or even national security problems for the <.=. In
a broader sense, t&ere i' a ma(or ri') o* 'e+ere dama,e to -orld economic.
political. and ecolo,ical 'y'tem' and. a' t&e'e 'y'tem' /e,in to *ail. to our
&umanitarian +alue' >emphasis added?.
20. The pace of internal migration from countryside to o%er&swollen cities is greatly intensified by
rapid population growth. Dnormous burdens are placed on 2<4 go%ernments for public administration,
sanitation, education, police, and other ser%ices, and urban slum dwellers though apparently not recent
migrants! may ser%e as a %olatile, %iolent force which threatens political stability.
21. 1d%erse socio&economic conditions generated by these and related factors may contribute to high
and increasing le%els of child abandonment, 0u%enile delin5uency, chronic and growing
underemployment and unemployment, petty thie%ery, organi8ed brigandry, food riots, separatist
mo%ements, communal massacres, re%olutionary actions and counter&re%olutionary coups. Such
conditions also detract from the en%ironment needed to attract the foreign capital %ital to increasing
le%els of economic growth in these areas. :f these conditions result in e9propriation of foreign interests,
such action, from an economic %iewpoint, is not in the best interests of either the in%esting country or
the host go%ernment.
22. :n international relations, population factors are crucial in, and often determinants of, %iolent
conflicts in de%eloping areas. 4onflicts that are regarded in primarily political terms often ha%e
demographic roots. Eecognition of these relationships appears crucial to any understanding or
pre%ention of such hostilities.
GENERAL GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR DEALING WITH RAPID
POPULATION GROWTH - Index
'. The central question for world population policy in the year 1%#@, is whether
man0ind is to remain on a trac0 toward an ultimate population of 1 to 1" billion $$
implying a /ve to seven$fold increase in almost all the underdeveloped world outside of
-hina $$ or whether 4despite the momentum of population growth5 it can be switched over
to the course of earliest feasible population stability $$ implying ultimate totals of ) to %
billions and not more than a three or four$fold increase in any ma2or region.
2,. 6hat are the sta"esF 6e do not "now whether technological de%elopments will ma"e it possible
to feed o%er * much less 12 billion people in the 21st century. 6e cannot be entirely certain that climatic
changes in the coming decade will not create great difficulties in feeding a growing population,
especially people in the 2<4s who li%e under increasingly marginal and more %ulnerable conditions.
There e9ists at least the possibility that present de%elopments point toward +althusian conditions for
many regions of the world.
25. #ut e%en if sur%i%al for these much larger numbers is possible, it will in all li"elihood be bare
sur%i%al, with all efforts going in the good years to pro%ide minimum nutrition and utter dependence in
the bad years on emergency rescue efforts from the less populated and richer countries of the world. :n
the shorter run && between now and the year 2000 && the difference between the two courses can be some
perceptible material gain in the crowded poor regions, and some impro%ement in the relati%e distribution
of intra&country per capita income between rich and poor, as against permanent po%erty and the
widening of income gaps. 1 much more %igorous effort to slow population growth can also mean a %ery
great difference between enormous tragedies of malnutrition and star%ation as against only serious
chronic conditions.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS - Index
A. There is no single approach which will BsolveB the population problem. The comple.
social and economic factors involved call for a comprehensive strategy with both bilateral
and multilateral elements. (t the same time actions and programs must be tailored to
speci/c countries and groups. (bove all, +,-s themselves must play the most important
role to achieve success.
2(. 4oordination among the bilateral donors and multilateral organi8ations is %ital to any effort to
moderate population growth. Dach "ind of effort will be needed for worldwide results.
2*. 6orld policy and programs in the population field should incorporate two ma0or ob0ecti%es;
4a5 actions to accommodate continued population growth up to A billions by the
mid$1st century without massive starvation or total frustration of developmental
hopes8 and
4b5 actions to 0eep the ultimate level as close as possible to ) billions rather than
permitting it to reach 1! billions, 1' billions, or more.
%. 0&ile 'peci1c ,oal' in t&i' area are di2cult to 'tate. our aim '&ould /e *or
t&e -orld to ac&ie+e a replacement le+el o* *ertility. (a t-o-c&ild *amily on t&e
a+era,e). /y a/out t&e year 2000 >emphasis added?. This will require the present
percent growth rate to decline to 1.# percent within a decade and to 1.1 percent by !!!.
-ompared to the <.9 medium pro2ection, this goal would result in "!! million fewer people
in !!! and about ' billion fewer in !"!. Attainment o* t&i' ,oal -ill re3uire ,reatly
inten'i1ed population pro,ram' >emphasis added?. ( basis for developing national
population growth control targets to achieve this world target is contained in the World
Population Plan of (ction.
30. The 6orld 'opulation 'lan of 1ction is not self&enforcing and will re5uire %igorous efforts by
interested countries, U2N2 "3en.ies "nd t-e! inte!n"tin"% 'dies t /"4e it effe.ti&e2 U2S2
%e"de!s-i1 is essenti"% Bemphasis addedC. The strategy must include the following elements and actions;
4a5 Concentration on key countries. (ssistance for population moderation should
give primary emphasis to the largest and fastest growing developing countries
where there is special <.=. political and strategic interest. Those countries areC
India, Dangladesh, Pa0istan, 9igeria, Ee.ico, Indonesia, DraFil, the Philippines,
Thailand, 1gypt, Tur0ey, 1thiopia and -olombia. Together, they account for @#
percent of the world&s current population increase. 4It should be recogniFed that at
present (I, bilateral assistance to some of these countries may not be acceptable.5
Dilateral assistance, to the e.tent that funds are available, will be given to other
countries, considering such factors as population growth, need for e.ternal
assistance, long$term <.=. interests and willingness to engage in self$help.
Eultilateral programs must necessarily have a wider coverage and the bilateral
programs of other national donors will be shaped to their particular interests. (t the
same time, the <.=. will loo0 to the multilateral agencies $$ especially the <.9. :und
for Population (ctivities which already has pro2ects in over )! countries $$ to
increase population assistance on a broader basis with increased <.=. contributions.
This is desirable in terms of <.=. interests and necessary in political terms in the
<nited 9ations. Dut progress nevertheless, must be made in the 0ey 1' and our
limited resources should give ma2or emphasis to them.
4b5 Integration of population factors and population programs into country
development planning. (s called for by the world Population Plan of (ction,
developing countries and those aiding them should speci/cally ta0e population
factors into account in national planning and include population programs in such
plans.
4c5 Increased assistance for family planning services, information and technology.
This is a vital aspect of any world population program. 415 :amily planning
information and materials based on present technology should be made fully
available as rapidly as possible to the )"G of the populations in 0ey +,-s not now
reached, essentially rural poor who have the highest fertility. 45 :undamental and
developmental research should be e.panded, aimed at simple, low$cost, efective,
safe, long$lasting and acceptable methods of fertility control. =upport by all federal
agencies for biomedical research in this /eld should be increased by ;A! million
annually.
4d5 Creating conditions conducive to fertility decline. :or its own merits and
consistent with the recommendations of the World Population Plan of (ction, priority
should be given in the general aid program to selective development policies in
sectors ofering the greatest promise of increased motivation for smaller family siFe.
In many cases pilot programs and e.perimental research will be needed as
guidance for later eforts on a larger scale. The preferential sectors includeC
o Providing minimal levels of education, especially for women8
o 3educing infant mortality, including through simple low$cost health care
networ0s8
o 1.panding wage employment, especially for women8
o ,eveloping alternatives to children as a source of old age security8
o Increasing income of the poorest, especially in rural areas, including providing
privately owned farms8
o 1ducation of new generations on the desirability of smaller families.
While (I, has information on the relative importance of the new ma2or socio$
economic factors that lead to lower birth rates, much more research and
e.perimentation need to be done to determine what cost efective programs and
policy will lead to lower birth rates.
4e5 Food and agricultural assistance is vital for any population sensitive
development strategy. The provision of adequate food stoc0s for a growing
population in times of shortage is crucial. Without such a program for the +,-s
there is considerable chance that such shortage will lead to con7ict and adversely
afect population goals and developmental eforts. =peci/c recommendations are
included in =ection IH4c5 of this study.
4f5 Development of a worldwide political and popular commitment to population
stabilization is fundamental to any efective strategy. This requires the support and
commitment of 0ey +,- leaders. This will only ta0e place if they clearly see the
negative impact of unrestricted population growth and believe it is possible to deal
with this question through governmental action. The <.=. should encourage +,-
leaders to ta0e the lead in advancing family planning and population stabiliFation
both within multilateral organiFations and through bilateral contacts with other
+,-s. This will require that the President and the =ecretary of =tate treat the sub2ect
of population growth control as a matter of paramount importance and address it
speci/cally in their regular contacts with leaders of other governments, particularly
+,-s.
'1. !&e 0orld 4opulation 4lan o* Action and t&e re'olution' adopted /y
con'en'u' /y 157 nation' at t&e Au,u't 1974 6N6 0orld 4opulation Con*erence.
t&ou,& not ideal. pro+ide an e7cellent *rame-or) *or de+elopin, a -orld-ide
'y'tem o* population8*amily plannin, pro,ram' >emphasis added?. 4The Plan of
(ction appears in (ppendi. 1.5 We should use them to generate <.9. agency and national
leadership for an all$out efort to lower growth rates. -onstructive action by the <.=. will
further our ob2ectives. To this end we shouldC
4a5 =trongly support the World Population Plan of (ction and the adoption of its
appropriate provisions in national and other programs.
4b5 <rge the adoption by national programs of speci/c population goals including
replacement levels of fertility for ,-s and +,-s by !!!.
4c5 A*ter 'uita/le preparation in t&e 6S6. announce a 6S6 ,oal to maintain
our pre'ent national a+era,e *ertility no &i,&er t&an replacement le+el
and attain near 'ta/ility /y 2000 >emphasis added?.
4d5 Initiate an international cooperative strategy of national research programs on
human reproduction and fertility control covering biomedical and socio$economic
factors, as proposed by the <.=. ,elegation at Ducharest.
4e5 (ct on our ofer at Ducharest to collaborate with other interested donors and
<.9. agencies to aid selected countries to develop low cost preventive health and
family planning services.
4f5 Wor0 directly with donor countries and through the <.9. :und for Population
(ctivities and the 61-,I,(- to increase bilateral and multilateral assistance for
population programs.
'. (s measures to increase understanding of population factors by +,- leaders and to
strengthen population planning in national development plans, we should carry out the
recommendations in Part II, =ection HI, includingC
4a5 -onsideration of population factors and population policies in all -ountry
(ssistance =trategy Papers 4-(=P5 and ,evelopment (ssistance Program 4,(P5
multi$year strategy papers.
4b5 Prepare pro2ections of population growth individualiFed for countries with
analyses of development of each country and discuss them with national leaders.
4c5 Provide for greatly increased training programs for senior oJcials of +,-s in the
elements of demographic economics.
4d5 (rrange for familiariFation programs at <.9. Keadquarters in 9ew Lor0 for
ministers of governments, senior policy level oJcials and comparably in7uential
leaders from private life.
4e5 (ssure assistance to +,- leaders in integrating population factors in national
plans, particularly as they relate to health services, education, agricultural
resources and development, employment, equitable distribution of income and
social stability.
4f5 (lso assure assistance to +,- leaders in relating population policies and family
planning programs to ma2or sectors of developmentC health, nutrition, agriculture,
education, social services, organiFed labor, women&s activities, and community
development.
4g5 <nderta0e initiatives to implement the Percy (mendment regarding
improvement in the status of women.
4h5 *ive emphasis in assistance to programs on development of rural areas.
Deyond these activities which are essentially directed at national interests, we must
assure that a broader educational concept is developed to convey an acute understanding
to national leaders of the interrelation of national interests and world population growth.
33. 6e must ta"e care that our acti%ities should not gi%e the appearance to the 2<4s of an
industriali8ed country policy directed against the 2<4s. 4aution must be ta"en that in any approaches in
this field we support in the 2<4s are ones we can support within this country. @Third 6orld@ leaders
should be in the forefront and obtain the credit for successful programs. :n this conte9t it is important to
demonstrate to 2<4 leaders that such family planning programs ha%e wor"ed and can wor" within a
reasonable period of time.
3,. To help assure others of our intentions we should indicate our emphasis on the right of indi%iduals
and couples to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to ha%e
information, education and means to do so, and our continued interest in impro%ing the o%erall general
welfare. 6e should use the authority pro%ided by the 6orld 'opulation 'lan of 1ction to ad%ance the
principles that 1! responsibility in parenthood includes responsibility to the children and the community
and 2! that nations in e9ercising their so%ereignty to set population policies should ta"e into account the
welfare of their neighbors and the world. To strengthen the worldwide approach, family planning
programs should be supported by multilateral organi8ations where%er they can pro%ide the most efficient
means.
35. To support such family planning and related de%elopment assistance efforts there is need to
increase public and leadership information in this field. 6e recommend increased emphasis on mass
media, newer communications technology and other population education and moti%ation programs by
the -. and -S:1. $igher priority should be gi%en to these information programs in this field
worldwide.
3/. :n order to pro%ide the necessary resources and leadership, support by the -.S. public and
4ongress will be necessary. 1 significant amount of funds will be re5uired for a number of years. $igh
le%el personal contact by the Secretary of State and other officials on the sub0ect at an early date with
4ongressional counterparts is needed. 1 program for this purpose should be de%eloped by ADS with $
and 1:<.
3(. There is an alternate view which holds that a growing number of e9perts belie%e that the
population situation is already more serious and less amenable to solution through %oluntary measures
than is generally accepted. :t holds that, to pre%ent e%en more widespread food shortage and other
demographic catastrophes than are generally anticipated, e%en stronger measures are re5uired and some
fundamental, %ery difficult moral issues need to be addressed. These include, for e9ample, our own
consumption patterns, mandatory programs, tight control of our food resources. :n %iew of the
seriousness of these issues, e9plicit consideration of them should begin in the D9ecuti%e #ranch, the
4ongress and the -... soon. See the end of Section : for this %iewpoint.!
3*. :mplementing the actions discussed abo%e in paragraphs 1&3/!, will re5uire a significant
e9pansion in 1:< funds for population7family planning. 1 number of ma0or actions in the area of
creating conditions for fertility decline can be funded from resources a%ailable to the sectors in 5uestion
e.g., education, agriculture!. Ather actions, including family planning ser%ices, research and
e9perimental acti%ities on factors affecting fertility, come under population funds. We !e.//end
in.!e"ses in AID '$d3et !e#$ests t t-e Cn3!ess n t-e !de! f 567-7, /i%%in "nn$"%%( t-!$3-
FY )*+, 8"'&e t-e 5)6927 /i%%in !e#$ested f! FY )*97: Bemphasis addedC. This funding would
co%er both bilateral programs and contributions to multilateral organi8ations. H;e&e!0 t-e %e&e% f
f$nds needed in t-e f$t$!e .$%d .-"n3e si3nifi."nt%(0 de1endin3 n s$.- f".t!s "s /"<!
'!e"4t-!$3-s in fe!ti%it( .nt!% te.-n%3ies "nd LDC !e.e1ti&ities t 11$%"tin "ssist"n.e
Bemphasis addedC. To help de%elop, monitor, and e%aluate the e9panded actions discussed abo%e, 1:< is
li"ely to need additional direct hire personnel in the population7family planning area. 1s a corollary to
e9panded 1:< funding le%els for population, efforts must be made to encourage increased contributions
by other donors and recipient countries to help reduce rapid population growth.
POLICY FOLLOW-UP AND COORDINATION
'%. This world wide population strategy involves very comple. and diJcult questions.
Its implementation will require very careful coordination and speci/c application in
individual circumstances. :urther wor0 is greatly needed in e.amining the mi. of our
assistance strategy and its most eJcient application. ( number of agencies are interested
and involved. *iven this, there appears to be a need for a better and higher level
mechanism to re/ne and develop policy in this /eld and to coordinate its implementation
beyond this 9==E. The following options are suggested for considerationC
4a5 That the 9=- <nder =ecretaries -ommittee be given responsibility for policy and
e.ecutive review of this sub2ectC
o ProsC
Decause of the ma2or foreign policy implications of the recommended
population strategy a high level focus on policy is required for the
success of such a ma2or efort.
With the very wide agency interests in this topic there is need for an
accepted and normal interagency process for efective analysis and
disinterested policy development and implementation within the 9.=.-.
system.
=taJng support for implementation of the 9==E$!! follow$on e.ists
within the <=- framewor0 including utiliFation of the 6Jce of
Population of the ,epartment of =tate as well as other.
<=- has provided coordination and follow$up in ma2or foreign policy
areas involving a number of agencies as is the case in this study.
o -onsC
The <=- would not be within the normal policy$ma0ing framewor0 for
development policy as would be in the case with the ,--.
The <=- is further removed from the process of budget development
and review of the (I, Population (ssistance program.
4b5 That when its establishment is authoriFed by the President, the ,evelopment
-oordination -ommittee, headed by the (I, (dministrator be given overall
responsibilityCM
o ProsC 4Provided by (I,5
It is precisely for coordination of this type of development issue
involving a variety of <.=. policies toward +,-s that the -ongress
directed the establishment of the ,--.
The ,-- is also the body best able to relate population issues to other
development issues, with which they are intimately related.
The ,-- has the advantage of stressing technical and /nancial aspects
of <.=. population policies, thereby minimiFing political complications
frequently inherent in population programs.
It is, in (I,&s view, the coordinating body best located to ta0e an
overview of all the population activities now ta0ing place under
bilateral and multilateral auspices.
o -onsC
While the ,-- will doubtless have substantial technical competence,
the entire range of political and other factors bearing on our global
population strategy might be more efectively considered by a group
having a broader focus than the ,--.
The ,-- is not within the 9.=.-. system which provides a more direct
access to both the President and the principal foreign policy decision$
ma0ing mechanism.
The ,-- might overly emphasiFe purely developmental aspects of
population and under emphasiFe other important elements.
4c5 hat the !"C#CI$% be asked to lead an Interdepartmental &roup for this sub'ect
to insure follow(up interagency coordination, and further policy development. 49o
participating (gency supports this option, therefore it is only included to present a
full range of possibilities5.
)ption *a+ is supported by "tate, reasury,
Defense *I", and -C"+, ,griculture, .$/,
Commerce !"C and CI,.00
Aption b! is supported by 1:<.
-nder any of the abo%e options, there should be an annual re%iew of our population policy to e9amine
progress, insure our programs are in "eeping with the latest information in this field, identify possible
deficiencies, and recommend additional action at the appropriate le%el.GGG
S9ME :E% 49"N!S ;$9M !<E MA"N =9>% 9; !<E $E49$! - "nde7
(ll readers are urged to read the detailed main body of the report which is presented in full
in (ppendi. Two. This will give the reader a better appreciation of the gravity of this new
threat to <.=. and global security and the actions the many departments of our
government felt were necessary in order to address this grave new threat $$ a threat
greater than nuclear war. These ! important points will be discussed in the remaining
chapters of this boo0.
An the magnitude and urgency of the problem;
1. B...World population growth is widely recogniFed within the *overnment as a current
danger of the highest magnitude calling for urgent measures.B >Page 1%@?
. B...it is of the utmost urgency that governments now recogniFe the facts and
implications of population growth, determine the ultimate population siFes that
ma0e sense for their countries and start vigorous programs at once to achieve their
desired goals.B >Page 1"?
'. B...population factors are indeed critical in, and often determinants of, violent
con7ict in developing areas. =egmental 4religious, social, racial5 diferences,
migration, rapid population growth, diferential levels of 0nowledge and s0ills,
ruralIurban diferences, population pressure and the spatial location of population in
relation to resources $$ in this rough order of importance $$ all appear to be
important contributions to con7ict and violence...-learly, con7icts which are
regarded in primarily political terms often have demographic roots. 3ecognition of
these relationships appears crucial to any understanding or prevention of such
hostilities.B >Page AA?
@. BWhere population siFe is greater than available resources, or is e.panding more
rapidly than the available resources, there is a tendency toward internal disorders
and violence and, sometimes, disruptive international policies or violence.B >Page
A%?
". BIn developing countries, the burden of population factors, added to others, will
wea0en unstable governments, often only marginally efective in good times, and
open the way to e.tremist regimes.B >Page )@?
A. The report gives three e.amples of population warsC the 1l =alvador$Konduras
B=occer WarB >Page #1?8 the 9igerian -ivil War >Page #1?8 and, the Pa0istan$India$
Dangladesh War, 1%#!$#1. >Page #?
#. B...population growth over the years will seriously negate reasonable prospects for
the sound social and economic development of the peoples involved.B >Page %)?
). BPast e.perience gives little assistance to predicting the course of these
developments because the speed of today&s population growth, migrations, and
urbaniFation far e.ceeds anything the world has ever seen before. Eoreover, the
consequences of such population factors can no longer be evaded by moving to
new hunting or graFing lands, by conquering new territory, by discovering or
coloniFing new continents, or by emigration in large numbers.
The world has ample warning that we all must ma"e more rapid efforts at social and economic
de%elopment to a%oid or mitigate these gloomy prospects. 6e should be warned also that we all
must mo%e as rapidly as possible toward stabili8ing national and world population growth.@
B'age *5C
Le"de!s-i1 is &it"%= - Index
%. B=uccessful family planning requires strong local dedication and commitment that
cannot over the long run be enforced from the outside.B >Page 1!A?
1!.B...it is vital that leaders of ma2or +,-s themselves ta0e the lead in advancing family
planning and population stabiliFation, not only within the <9 and other international
organiFations but also through bilateral contacts with leaders of other +,-s.B >Page
11?
11.BThese programs will have only modest success until there is much stronger and
wider acceptance of their real importance by leadership groups. =uch acceptance
and support will be essential to assure that the population information, education
and service programs have vital moral bac0ing, administrative capacity, technical
s0ills and government /nancing.B >Page 1%"?
W-"t /$st 'e dne= - Index
1.B-ontrol of population growth and migration must be a part of any program for
improvement of lasting value.B >Page )1?
1'.B...the -onference adopted by acclamation 4only the Koly =ee stating a general
reservation5 a complete World Population Plan of (ctionB >Page )#?
1@.B6ur ob2ective should be to assure that developing countries ma0e family planning
information, education and means available to all their peoples by 1%)!.B >Page
1'!?
1".B6nly nominal attention is >currently? given to population education or se.
education in schools...B >Page 1")? B3ecommendationC That <= agencies stress the
importance of education of the ne.t generation of parents, starting in elementary
schools, toward a two$child family ideal. That (I, stimulate speci/c eforts to
develop means of educating children of elementary school age to the ideal of the
two$child family...B >Page 1"%?
1A.B...there is general agreement that up to the point when cost per acceptor rises
rapidly, family planning e.penditures are generally considered the best investment
a country can ma0e in its own future,B >Page "'?
Cnt!"di.tin f t-e H%( See>s "ns;e! t t-e 11$%"tin 1!'%e/= - Index
1#.B-learly development per se is a powerful determinant of fertility. Kowever, since it
is unli0ely that most +,-s will develop suJciently during the ne.t "$'! years, it is
crucial to identify those sectors that most directly and powerfully afect fertility.B
>Page %%?
1).BThere is also even less cause for optimism on the rapidity of socio$economic
progress that would generate rapid fertility reduction in the poor +,-s, than on the
feasibility of e.tending family planning services to those in their populations who
may wish to ta0e advantage of them.B >Page %%?
1%.BDut we can be certain of the desirable direction of change and can state as a
plausible ob2ective the target of achieving replacement fertility rates by the year
!!!.B >Page %%?
A'!tin is &it"% t t-e s%$tin= - Index
!.BWhile the agencies participating in this study have no speci/c recommendations to
propose on abortion, the following issues are believed important and should be
considered in the conte.t of a global population strategy...-ertain facts about
abortion need to be appreciatedC
@ && .o country has reduced its population growth without resorting to abortion@. B'age 1*2C
@ && :ndeed, abortion, legal and illegal, now has become the most widespread fertility control
method in use in the world today.@ B'age 1*3C
@ && :t would be unwise to restrict abortion research for the following reasons; 1! The persistent
and ubi5uitous nature of abortion. 2! 6idespread lac" of safe abortion techni5ues...@ B'age 1*5C
M (I, e.pects the ,-- will have the following compositionC The (dministrator of (I, as
-hairman8 the <nder =ecretary of =tate for 1conomic (fairs8 the <nder =ecretary of
Treasury for Eonetary (fairs8 the <nder =ecretaries of -ommerce, (griculture and +abor8
an (ssociate ,irector of 6ED8 the 1.ecutive ,irector of -I1P, =T38 a representative of the
9=-8 the Presidents of the 1N$IE Dan0 and 6PI-8 and any other agency when items of
interest to them are under discussion.5
GG <epartment of 4ommerce supports the option of placing the population policy formulation
mechanism under the auspices of the -S4 but belie%es that any detailed economic 5uestions resulting
from proposed population policies be e9plored through e9isting domestic and international economic
policy channels.
GGG 1:< belie%es these re%iews underta"en only periodically might loo" at selected areas or at the entire
range of population policy depending on problems and needs which arise.
CHAPTER I - WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
INTRODUCTION
The present world population growth is uni5ue. Eates of increase are much higher than in earlier
centuries, they are more widespread, and ha%e a greater effect on economic life, social 0ustice, and &&
5uite li"ely && on public order and political stability. The significance of population growth is enhanced
because it comes at a time when the absolute si8e and rate of increase of the global economy, need for
agricultural land, demand for and consumption of resources including water, production of wastes and
pollution ha%e also escalated to historically uni5ue le%els. =actors that only a short time ago were
considered separately now ha%e interloc"ing relationships, inter&dependence in a literal sense. The
changes are not only 5uantitati%ely greater than in the past but 5ualitati%ely different. The growing
burden is not only on resources but on administrati%e and social institutions as well.
'opulation growth is, of course, only one of the important factors in this new, highly integrated tangle of
relationships. $owe%er, it differs from the others because it is a determinant of the demand sector while
others relate to output and supply. 'opulation growth also contributes to supply through pro%ision of
manpower? in most de%eloping countries, howe%er, the problem is not a lac" of but a surfeit of hands.! :t
is, therefore, most per%asi%e, affecting what needs to be done in regard to other factors. 6hether other
problems can be sol%ed depends, in %arying degrees, on the e9tent to which rapid population growth and
other population %ariables can be brought under control.
HIGHLIGHTS OF CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
Since 1950, world population has been undergoing unprecedented growth. This growth has four
prominent features;
1. :t is uni5ue, far more rapid than e%er in history.
2. :t is much more rapid in less de%eloped than in de%eloped regions.
3. 4oncentration in towns and cities is increasing much more rapidly than o%erall population
growth and is far more rapid in 2<4s than in de%eloped countries.
,. :t has a tremendous built&in momentum that will ine9orably double populations of most less
de%eloped countries by 2000 and will treble or 5uadruple their populations before le%eling off &&
unless far greater efforts at fertility control are made than are being made.
Therefore, if a country wants to influence its total numbers through population policy, it must act in the
immediate future in order to ma"e a substantial difference in the long run.
=or most of man)s history, world population grew %ery slowly. 1t the rate of growth estimated for the
first 1* centuries 1.<., it re5uired more than 1,000 years for world population to double in si8e. 6ith the
beginnings of the industrial re%olution and of modern medicine and sanitation o%er two hundred years
ago, population growth rates began to accelerate. 1t the current growth rate 1.9 percent! world
population will double in 3( years.
#y about 1*30, world population reached 1 billion. The second billion was added in about 100
years by 1930. The third billion in 30 years by 19/0. The fourth will be reached in 19(5.
#etween 1(50&1*00 less than , million were being added, on the a%erage, to the earth)s
population each year. #etween 1*50&1900, it was close to * million. #y 1950 it had grown to ,0
million. #y 19(5 it will be about *0 million.
:n the de%eloped countries of Durope, growth rates in the last century rarely e9ceeded 1.0&1.2 percent
per year, almost ne%er 1.5 percent. <eath rates were much higher than in most 2<4s today. :n .orth
1merica where growth rates were higher, immigration made a significant contribution. :n nearly e%ery
country of Durope, growth rates are now below 1 percent, in many below 0.5 percent. The natural
growth rate births minus deaths! in the -nited States is less than 0./ percent. :ncluding immigration
the world)s highest! it is less than 0.( percent.
:n less de%eloped countries growth rates a%erage about 2., percent. =or the 'eople)s Eepublic of 4hina,
with a massi%e, enforced birth control program, the growth rate is estimated at under 2 percent. :ndia)s is
%ariously estimated from 2.2 percent, #ra8il at 2.* percent, +e9ico at 3., percent, and 2atin 1merica at
about 2.9 percent. 1frican countries, with high birth as well as high death rates, a%erage 2./ percent? this
growth rate will increase as death rates go down.
The world)s population is now about 3.9 billion? 1.1 billion in the de%eloped countries 30 percent! and
2.* billion in the less de%eloped countries (0 percent!.
:n 1950, only 2* percent of the world)s population or /92 million, li%ed in urban localities. #etween
1950 and 19(0, urban population e9panded at a rate twice as rapid as the rate of growth of total
population. :n 19(0, urban population increased to 3/ percent of world total and numbered 1.3 billion.
#y 2000, according to the -.)s medium %ariant pro0ection, 3.2 billion about half of the total! of world
inhabitants will li%e in cities and towns.
:n de%eloped countries, the urban population %aries from ,5 to *5 percent? in 2<4s, it %aries from close
to 8ero in some 1frican states to nearly 100 percent in $ong Hong and Singapore.
:n 2<4s, urban population is pro0ected to more than triple in the remainder of this century, from /22
million in 19(0 to 2,0*( in 2000. :ts proportion in total 2<4 population will thus increase from 25
percent in 19(0 to ,1 percent in 2000. This implies that by the end of this century 2<4s will reach half
the le%el of urbani8ation pro0ected for <4s *2 percent! See Table 1!.
Table 1a. Projected Growth of Urban Population,
Selected Years 1965!"""#U.$. %ediu& 'ariant(
)))))
* Year * +orld Population * ,- Population * .,- Population *
* * * * *
* * Total Urban Percent * Total Urban Percent * Total Urban Percent *
* * #&illions( urban * #&illions( urban * #&illions( urban *
)))))
* 1965 * /,!09 1,150 /5.! * 1,"/1 651 6!.0 * !,!5! 5"1 !!.5 *
* 191" * /,6!1 1,/15 /6./ * 1,"02 69/ 6/.9 * !,5/1 6!! !2.5 *
* 190" * 2,2"1 1,191 2".1 * 1,10/ 0/" 1".! * /,!10 961 !9.9 *
* 199" * 5,/26 !,219 25./ * 1,!0! 911 16.! * 2,"62 1,22/ /5.5 *
* !""" * 6,2"1 /,!"5 5"." * 1,/60 1,110 01.0 * 5,"/9 !,"01 21.2 *
)))))
.ote; The urban) population has been estimated in accordance with di%erse national definitions of that
term.
3ppendi4 Table 1b
5ates of Growth of Urban and 5ural Populations,
191"!""" #U.$. %ediu& 'ariant(
)))))
* * +orld Population * ,- Population * .,- Population *
* 191"!""" * * * *
* * Total Urban 5ural * Total Urban 5ural * Total Urban 5ural *
)))))
* Total 6rowth * * * *
* #percent( * 16.9 12/.1 /0.0 * !6.! 61./ /6.1 * 90.6 !/5.5 52.! *
* * * * *
* 3nnual * * * *
a7era6e * * * *
* 6rowth * * * *
* #percent( * 1.9 /." 1.1 * ".0 1.6 1.5 * !./ 2.1 1.5 *
)))))
The enormous built&in momentum of population growth in the less de%eloped countries and to a degree
in the de%eloped countries! is, if possible, e%en more important and ominous than current population
si8e and rates of growth. -nli"e a con%entional e9plosion, population growth pro%ides a continuing
chain reaction. This momentum springs from 1! high fertility le%els of 2<4 populations and 2! the
%ery high percentage of maturing young people in populations. The typical de%eloped country, Sweden
for e9ample, may ha%e 253 of the population under 15 years of age. The typical de%eloping country has
,13 to ,53 or its population under 15. This means that a tremendous number of future parents,
compared to e9isting parents, are already born. D%en if they ha%e fewer children per family than their
parents, the increase in population will be %ery great.
Three pro0ections not predictions!, based on three different assumptions concerning fertility, will
illustrate the generati%e effect of this building momentum.
a. Present fertility continued; :f present fertility rates were to remain constant, the 19(, population 3.9
billion would increase to (.* billion by the hear 2000 and rise to a theoretical 103 billion by 20(5.
b. U.N. "Medium Variant"; :f present birth rates in the de%eloping countries, a%eraging about 3*71000
were further reduced to 2971000 by 2000, the world)s population in 2000 would be /., billion, with o%er
100 million being added each year. 1t the time stability non&growth! is reached in about 2100, world
population would e9ceed 12.0 billion.
c. Replacement Fertility by !!!; :f replacement le%els of fertility were reached by 2000, the world)s
population in 2000 would be 5.9 billion and at the time of stability, about 20(5, would be *., billion.
@Eeplacement le%el@ of fertility is not 8ero population growth. :t is the le%el of fertility when couples
are limiting their families to an a%erage of about two children. =or most countries, where there are high
percentages of young people, e%en the attainment of replacement le%els of fertility means that the
population will continue to grow for additional 50&/0 years to much higher numbers before le%eling off.!
:t is reasonable to assume that pro0ection a! is unreal since significant efforts are already being made to
slow population growth and because e%en the most e9treme pro&natalists do not argue that the earth
could or should support 103 billion people. =amine, pestilence, war, or birth control will stop population
growth far short of this figure.
The -... medium %ariant pro0ection b!! has been described in a publication of the -... 'opulation
<i%ision as @a synthesis of the results of efforts by demographers of the %arious countries and the -...
Secretariat to formulate realistic assumptions with regard to future trends, in %iew of information about
present conditions and past e9periences.@ 1lthough by no means infallible, these pro0ections pro%ide
plausible wor"ing numbers and are used by -... agencies e.g., =1A, :2A! for their speciali8ed
analyses. Ane ma0or shortcoming of most pro0ections, howe%er, is that @information about present
conditions@ 5uoted abo%e is not 5uite up&to&date. D%en in the -nited States, refined fertility and
mortality rates become a%ailable only after a delay of se%eral years.
Thus, it is possible that the rate of world population growth has actually fallen below or for that matter
increased from! that assumed under the -... medium %ariant. 1 number of less de%eloped countries
with rising li%ing le%els particularly with increasing e5uality of income! and efficient family planning
programs ha%e e9perienced mar"ed declines in fertility. 6here access to family planning ser%ices has
been restricted, fertility le%els can be e9pected to show little change.
:t is certain that fertility rates ha%e already fallen significantly in $ong Hing, Singapore, Taiwan, =i0i,
South Horea, #arbados, 4hile, 4osta Eica, Trinidad and Tobago, and +auritius See Table 2!.
Table !. ,eclines in Total 8ertilit9 5ates: Selected Years
)))))
* * * * 3nnual a7era6e *
* * * 8ertilit9 * fertilit9 decline *
* -ountr9 * Year * le7el * #Percent( *
)))))
* ;on6 <on6 * 1961 * 5,11" * 2." *
* * 1911 * /,2!/ * *
* * * * *
* Sin6apore * 196" * 5,"10 * 6.2 *
* * 191" * /,"00 * *
* * * * *
* Taiwan * 196" * 5,15" * /.6 *
* * 191" * 2,""" * *
* * * * *
* South <orea * 196" * 6,102 * 2.2 *
* * 191" * /,9/1 * *
* * * * *
* +est %ala9sia * 196" * 5,955 * 1.6 *
* * 191" * 5,"51 * *
* * * * *
* Sri .an=a * 196" * 5,296 * !.2 *
* * 191" * 2,212 * *
* * * * *
* >arbados * 196" * 2,615 * 5./ *
* * 191" * !,1"5 * *
* * * * *
* -hile * 196" * 5,126 * /.2 *
* * 191" * /,65/ * *
* * * * *
* -osta 5ica * 196" * 1,/55 * /.9 *
* * 191" * 2,95" * *
* * * * *
* Trinadad ? * 196" * 5,55" * *
* Toba6o * 191" * /,/01 * 2.0 *
* * * * *
* %auritius * 196" * 5,091 * 5.2 *
* * 191" * /,/01 * *
* * * * *
* @69pt * 196" * 6,/01 * !.! *
* * 191" * 5,"95 * *
* * * * *
* 8iji * 196" * 5,5"/ * 5.2 *
* * 191" * /,021 * *
)))))
Source of basic data: ASP-, U.S. >ureau of the -ensus
Total Fertility Rate: $u&ber of children a wo&an would ha7e
if she were to bear the& at the pre7ailin6 rate in each fi7e9ear
a6e 6roup of wo&anBs reporducti7e span #a6es 1519 !"!2...2529(.
5ates in this table refer to nu&ber of children per 1,""" wo&en.
+oderate declines ha%e also been registered in 6est +alaysia, Sri 2an"a, and Dgypt. Steady increases in
the number of acceptors at family planning facilities indicate a li"elihood of some fertility reduction in
Thailand, :ndonesia, the 'hilippines, 4olombia, and other countries which ha%e family planning
programs. An the other hand, there is little concrete e%idence of significant fertility reduction in the
populous countries of :ndia, #angladesh, 'a"istan, etc.1
'ro0ection c! is attainable if countries recogni8e the gra%ity of their population situation and ma"e a
serious effort to do something about it.
The differences in the si8e of total population pro0ected under the three %ariants become substantial in a
relati%ely short time.
"y #$%&, the medium %ariant pro0ects some 3,2 million fewer people than the constant fertility %ariant
and the replacement %ariant is (5 million lower than the medium %ariant.
"y the year !!! the difference between constant and medium fertility %ariants rises to 1., billion and
between the medium and replacement %ariants, close to 500 million. #y the year 2000, the span between
the high and low series && some 1.9 billion && would amount to almost half the present world population.
+ost importantly, perhaps, by !'& the constant %ariant would ha%e swamped the earth and the
difference between the medium and replacement %ariants would amount to 3.( billion. Table 3.!
Table /. +orld Population Growth Under ,ifferent 3ssu&ptions
-oncernin6 8ertilit9: 191"!"15
))))
* -onstant * %ediu& * 5eplace&ent *
* 8ertilit9 'ariant * 8ertilit9 'ariant * 8ertilit9 'ariant *
* * * *
* %illions GrowthC * %illions GrowthC * %illions GrowthC *
)))))
* 191" * /,6"" * /,6"" * /,6"" *
* 1905 * 5,!"" !.2D * 2,050 !."D * 2,10/ 1.0D *
* !""" * 1,0"" !.0D * 6,2"1 1.9D * 5,9!/ 1.2D *
* !"15 * 1"/,""" /.2D * 1!,"20 ".02D * 0,/51 ".26D *
)))))
C 3nnual a7era6e 6rowth rate since precedin6 date.
The significance of the alternati%e %ariants is that they reflect the difference between a manageable
situation and potential chaos with widespread star%ation, disease, and disintegration for many countries.
=urthermore, after replacement le%el fertility is reached, family si8e need not remain at an a%erage of
two children per family. Ance this le%el is attained, it is possible that fertility will continue to decline
below replacement le%el. This would hasten the time when a stationary population is reached and would
increase the difference between the pro0ection %ariants. The great momentum of population growth can
be seen e%en more clearly in the case of a single country && for e9ample, +e9ico. :ts 19(0 population
was 50 million. :f its 19/5&19(0 fertility were to continue, +e9ico)s population in 20(0 would
theoretically number 2.2 billion. :f its present a%erage of /.1 children per family could be reduced to an
a%erage of about 2 replacement le%el fertility! by 19*0&*5, its population would continue to grow for
about si9ty years to 110 million. :f the two&child a%erage could be reached by 1990&95, the population
would stabili8e in si9ty more years at about 22 percent higher && 13, million. :f the two&child a%erage
cannot be reached for 30 years by 2000&05!, the population at stabili8ation would grow by an additional
2, percent to 1/( million.
Similar illustrations for other countries are gi%en below.
Table 2. Projected Population SiEe Under ,ifferent 3ssu&ptions
-oncernin6 8ertilit9: 191"!"1"
)))))
* * * * 5atio of *
* * * Population * !"1" to *
* * * in &illions * 191" *
* * *))) *
* -ountr9 * 8ertilit9 assu&ption * 191" * !""" * !"1" * population *
)))))))
* 'eneEuela * -onstant fertilit9 * 11 * /1 * 2!"* /0.! *
* * 5eplace&ent * * * * *
* * fertilit9 b9: * * * * *
* * !""""5 * * !! * /2* /.1 *
* * 199"95 * * !" * !1* *
* * 190"05 * * 10 * !!* *
* * * * * * *
* Andonesia * -onstant fertilit9 * 1!" * !92 * 2,5"1* /1.6 *
* * 5eplace&ent * * * * *
* * fertilit9 b9: * * * * *
* * !""""5 * * !12 * /!0* !.1 *
* * 199"95 * * 19/ * !15* !./ *
* * 190"05 * * 111 * !/6* !." *
* * * * * * *
* %orocco * -onstant fertilit9 * 16 * 52 * 1,5"5* 12.1 *
* * 5eplace&ent * * * * *
* * fertilit9 b9: * * * * *
* * !""""5 * * /5 * 50* /.6 *
* * 199"95 * * /" * 22* !.0 *
* * 190"05 * * !6 * /5* !.! *
)))))))
Source of basic data: ASP-, U.S. >ureau of the -ensus
1s Table ,. indicates, alternati%e rates of fertility decline would ha%e significant impact on the si8e of a
country)s population by 2000. They would ma"e enormous differences in the si8es of the stabili8ed
populations, attained some /0 to (0 years after replacement le%el fertility is reached. Therefore, it is of
the utmost urgency that go%ernments now recogni8e the facts and implications of population growth
determining the ultimate population si8es that ma"e sense for their countries and start %igorous programs
at once to achie%e their desired goals. =-T-ED >EA6T$ :. +1IAE ED>:A.S 1.< 4A-.TE:DS
Throughout the pro0ected period 19(0 to 2000, less de%eloped regions will grow more rapidly than
de%eloped regions. The rate of growth in 2<4s will primarily depend upon the rapidity with which
family planning practices are adopted.
<ifferences in the growth rates of <4s and 2<4s will further aggra%ate the stri"ing demographic
imbalances between de%eloped and less de%eloped countries. -nder the -... medium pro0ection %ariant,
by the year 2000 the population of less de%eloped countries would double, rising from 2.5 billion in
19(0 to 5.0 billion Table 5!.
3>.@ 5. TFT3. PFPU.3TAF$, ,AST5A>UTAF$, 3$,
53T@S F8 G5F+T;, b9 %ajor 5e6ion: 191"!"""
#U$ G&ediu&G projection 7ariant(
))
%ajor 5e6ion and * Total Population * Growth
-ountr9 * *
))))
* 191" * 1905 * !""" * 191"!"""
* * * * 3nnual
* %il Per * %il * %il Per * %il a7era6e
* lions cent * lions * lions cent * lions rate
))))
+F5., TFT3. * /,6!1 1""." * 2,050 * 6,2"1 1""." * !,106 1.9D
))))
,@'@.FP@, * * * *
-FU$T5A@S * 1,"02 !9.9 * 1,!/2 * 1,/60 !1.2 * !02 ".0D
* * * *
%ar=et econo&ies: * 1/6 !"./ * 0/5 * 9!" 12.2 * 102 ".1D
US ? Hapan * * * *
* * * *
-entrall9 planned * * * *
econo&ies: * * * *
USS5 * * * *
))))
.@SS ,@'@.FP@, * * * *
-FU$T5A@S * !,5/1 1".1 * /,6!2 * 5,"/9 10.6 * !,5"! !./D
* * * *
-entrall9 planned * * * *
econo&ies:C * 192 !1.9 * 1,""1 * 1,!"1 10.1 * 2"1 1.2D
-hina * * * *
* * * *
%ar=et econo&ies: * 1,12/ /0.1 * !,616 * /,0/0 59.9 * !,"95 !.1D
@ast 3sia * 29 1.2 * 66 * 0/ 1./ * /2 1.0D
South 3sia * 1,"9" /".1 * 1,6!5 * !,/21 /6.5 * 1,!51 !.6D
@astern South 3sia* !62 1./ * /99 * 512 9." * /1" !.6D
Andonesia * 1!" /./ * 111 * !5" /.9 * 1/" !.5D
* * * *
%iddle South 3sia * 129 !".1 * 1,1"5 * 1,502 !2.1 * 0/5 !.5D
Andian sub * * * *
continentCC * 691 19.1 * 1,"16 * 1,229 !!.6 * 150 !.5D
* * * *
+estern South 3sia* 11 !.1 * 1!1 * 10/ !.9 * 1"6 !.9D
))))
3frica * /5! 9.1 * 5/6 * 002 1/.1 * 20! !.9D
$i6eriaCCC * 55 1.5 * 02 * 1/5 !.1 * 0" /."D
@69pt * // ".9 * 21 * 66 1." * // !./D
))))
.atin 3&erica * !20 6.0 * /02 * 51! 0.9 * /!2 !.0D
-aribbean * !6 ".1 * /6 * 20 ".0 * !! !.!D
-entral 3&erica * 61 1.0 * 1"9 * 11/ !.1 * 1"6 /.!D
%e4ico * 5" 1.2 * 0/ * 1/! !.1 * 0! /./D
Tropical S. * * * *
3&erica * 155 2./ * !/9 * /51 5.5 * 196 !.0D
>raEil * 95 !.6 * 125 * !1! /./ * 111 !.1D
-olo&bia * !! ".6 * /5 * 51 ".0 * !9 !.9D
* * * *
Fceania * 2 ".1 * 6 * 9 ".1 * 5 !.6D
))))
C -entrall9 planned econo&ies include P5-hina, $orth <orea,
$orth 'ietna& and %on6olia
CC I$ational 3rchi7es photocop9 not le6ibleJ
CCC I$ational 3rchi7es photocop9 not le6ibleJ
:n contrast, the o%erall growth of the population of the de%eloped world during the same period would
amount to about 2/ percent, increasing from 1.0* to 1.3( billion. Thus, by the year 2000 almost *0
percent of world population would reside in regions now considered less de%eloped and o%er 90 percent
of the annual increment to world population would occur there.
The paucity of reliable information on all 1sian communist countries and the highly optimistic
assumptions concerning 4hina)s fertility trends implicit in -... medium pro0ections2 argue for
disaggregating the less de%eloped countries into centrally planned economies and countries with mar"et
economies. Such disaggregation reflects more accurately the burden of rapidly growing populations in
most 2<4s.
1s Table 5. shows, the population of countries with centrally planned economies, comprising about 173
of the 19(0 2<4 total, is pro0ected to grow between 19(0 and 2000 at a rate well below the 2<4
a%erage of 2.3 percent. A%er the entire thirty&year period, their growth rate a%erages 1., percent, in
comparison with 2.( percent for other 2<4s. #etween #$'! and #$%&, the annual rate of growth in
1sian communist 2<4s is e9pected to a%erage 1./ percent and subse5uently to decline to an a%erage of
1.2 percent between #$%& and !!!. The growth rate of 2<4s with mar"et economies, on the other
hand, remains practically the same, at 2.( and 2./ percent, respecti%ely. (hus) barring both large*scale
birth control efforts +greater than implied by the medium variant, or economic or political upheavals)
the ne-t twenty*five years offer non*communist ./0s little respite from the burdens of rapidly
increasing humanity. Af course, some 2<4s will be able to accommodate this increase with less
difficulty than others.
+oreo%er, short of /raconian measures there is no possibility that any ./0 can stabili1e its population
at less than double its present si1e. For many) stabili1ation will not be short of three times their present
si1e.
N2(3 and 4astern 4urope. :n the west, only =rance and >reece ha%e a policy of increasing population
growth && which the people are successfully disregarding. :n a recent and significant change from
traditional positions, howe%er, the =rench 1ssembly o%erwhelmingly endorsed a law not only
authori8ing general a%ailability of contracepti%es but also pro%iding that their cost be borne by the social
security system.! Ather western .1TA members ha%e no policies.3 +ost pro%ide some or substantial
family planning ser%ices. 1ll appear headed toward lower growth rates. :n two .1TA member countries
6est >ermany and 2u9embourg!, annual numbers of deaths already e9ceed births, yielding a negati%e
natural growth rate.
Eomania, $ungary, #ulgaria, and 48echoslo%a"ia ha%e acti%e policies to increase their population
growth rates && despite the reluctance of their people to ha%e larger families. 6ithin the -SSE, fertility
rates in ES=SE and the republics of -"raine, 2at%ia, and Dstonia are below replacement le%el. This
situation has pre%ailed at least since 19/9&19(0 and, if continued, will e%entually lead to negati%e
population growth in these republics. :n the -nited States, a%erage fertility also fell below replacement
le%el in the past two years 19(2 and 19(3!. There is a stri"ing difference, howe%er, in the attitudes
toward this demographic de%elopment in the two countries. 6hile in the -nited States the possibility of
a stabili8ed non&growing! population is generally %iewed with fa%or, in the -SSE there is perceptible
concern o%er the low fertility of Sla%s and #alts mostly by Sla%s and #alts!. The So%iet go%ernment, by
all indications, is studying the feasibility of increasing their sagging birth rates. The entire matter of
fertility&bolstering policies is circumscribed by the relati%ely high costs of increasing fertility mainly
through increased outlays for consumption goods and ser%ices! and the need to a%oid the appearance of
ethnic discrimination between rapidly and slowly growing nationalities.
-... medium pro0ections to the year 2000 show no significant changes in the relati%e demographic
position of the western alliance countries as against eastern Durope and the -SSE. The population of the
6arsaw 'act countries will remain at /5 percent of the populations of .1TA member states. :f Tur"ey is
e9cluded, the 6arsaw 'act proportion rises somewhat from (0 percent in 19(0 to (3 percent by 2000.
This change is not of an order of magnitude that in itself will ha%e important implications for east&west
power relations. =uture growth of manpower in .1TA and 6arsaw 'act nations has not been e9amined
in this +emorandum.!
Af greater potential political and strategic significance are prospecti%e changes in the populations of less
de%eloped regions both among themsel%es and in relation to de%eloped countries.
2frica. 1ssessment of future demographic trends in 1frica is se%erely impeded by lac" of reliable base
data on the si8e, composition, fertility and mortality, and migration of much of the continent)s
population. 6ith this important limitation in mind, the population of 1frica is pro0ected to increase from
352 million in 19(0 to *3, million in 2000, an increase of almost 2.5 times. :n most 1frican countries,
population growth rates are li"ely to increase appreciably before they begin to decline. Eapid population
e9pansion may be particularly burdensome to the @least de%eloped@ among 1frica)s 2<4s including &&
according to the -... classification && Dthiopia, Sudan, Tan8ania, -ganda, -pper Jolta, +ali, +alawi,
.iger, #urundi, >uinea, 4had, Ewanda, Somalia, <ahomey, 2esotho, and #otswana. 1s a group, they
numbered 10, million in 19(0 and are pro0ected to grow at an a%erage rate of 3.0 percent a year, to some
250 million in 2000. This rate of growth is based on the assumption of significant reductions in
mortality. :t is 5uestionable, howe%er, whether economic and social conditions in the foreseeable future
will permit reductions in mortality re5uired to produce a 3 percent growth rate. 4onse5uently, the
population of the @least de%eloped@ of 1frica)s 2<4s may fall short of the 250 million figure in 2000.
1frican countries endowed with rich oil and other natural resources may be in a better economic
position to cope with population e9pansion. .igeria falls into this category. 1lready the most populous
country on the continent, with an estimated 55 million people in 19(0 see footnote to Table 5!, .igeria)s
population by the end of this century is pro0ected to number 135 million. This suggests a growing
political and strategic role for .igeria, at least in 1frica south of the Sahara.
:n .orth 1frica, Dgypt)s population of 33 million in 19(0 is pro0ected to double by 2000. The large and
increasing si8e of Dgypt)s population is, and will remain for many years, an important consideration in
the formulation of many foreign and domestic policies not only of Dgypt but also of neighboring
countries.
.atin 2merica. Eapid population growth is pro0ected for tropical South 1merican which includes #ra8il,
4olombia, 'eru, Jene8uela, Dcuador and #oli%ia. #ra8il, with a current population of o%er 100 million,
clearly dominates the continent demographically? by the end of this century, its population is pro0ected
to reach the 19(, -.S. le%el of about 212 million people. Eapid economic growth prospects && if they are
not diminished by demographic o%ergrowth && portend a growing power status for #ra8il in 2atin
1merica and on the world scene o%er the ne9t 25 years.
The 4aribbean which includes a number of countries with promising family planning programs
Iamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, 4uba, #arbados and also 'uerto Eico! is pro0ected to grow at 2.2
percent a year between 19(0 and 2000, a rate below the 2atin 1merican a%erage of 2.* percent.
'erhaps the most significant population trend from the %iewpoint of the -nited States is the prospect that
+e9ico)s population will increase from 50 million in 19(0 to o%er 130 million by the year 2000. D%en
under most optimistic conditions, in which the country)s a%erage fertility falls to replacement le%el by
2000, +e9ico)s population is li"ely to e9ceed 100 million by the end of this century.
5outh 2sia. Somewhat slower rates are e9pected for Dastern and +iddle South 1sia whose combined
population of 1.03 billion in 19(0 is pro0ected to more than double by 2000 to 2.20 billion. :n the face of
continued rapid population growth 2.5 percent!, the prospects for the populous :ndian subregion, which
already faces staggering economic problems, are particularly blea". South and Southeast 1sia)s
population will substantially increase relati%e to mainland 4hina? it appears doubtful, howe%er, that this
will do much to enhance their relati%e power position and political influence in 1sia. An the contrary,
preoccupation with the growing internal economic and social problems resulting from huge population
increases may progressi%ely reduce the ability of the region, especially :ndia, to play an effecti%e
regional and world power role.
6estern South 1sia, demographically dominated by Tur"ey and se%en oil&rich states including Saudi
1rabia, :ra5, and Huwait! is pro0ected to be one of the fastest growing 2<4 regions, with an annual
a%erage growth rate of 2.9 percent between 19(0 and 2000. 'art of this growth will be due to
immigration, as for e9ample, into Huwait.
The relati%ely low growth rate of 1.* percent pro0ected for Dast 1sian 2<4s with mar"et economics
reflects highly successful family planning programs in Taiwan, South Horea, and $ong Hong.
(he People6s Republic of 0hina +PR0,. The 'eople)s Eepublic of 4hina has by far the world)s largest
population and, potentially, se%ere problems of population pressure, gi%en its low standard of li%ing and
5uite intensi%e utili8ation of a%ailable farm land resources. :ts last census in 1953 recorded a population
of 5*3 million, and 'E4 officials ha%e cited a figure as high as *30 million for 19(0. The 4ommerce
<epartment)s #ureau of Dconomic 1nalysis pro0ects a slightly higher population, reaching 920 million
by 19(,. The present population growth rate is about two percent.
Cn.%$sin
Eapid population growth in less de%eloped countries has been mounting in a social milieu of po%erty,
unemployment and underemployment, low educational attainment, widespread malnutrition, and
increasing costs of food production. These countries ha%e accumulated a formidable @bac"log@ of
unfinished tas"s. They include economic assimilation of some ,0 percent of their people who are
pressing at, but largely remain outside the periphery of the de%eloping economy? the amelioration of
generally low le%els of li%ing? and in addition, accommodation of annually larger increments to the
population. The accomplishment of these tas"s could be intolerably slow if the a%erage annual growth
rate in the remainder of this century does not slow down to well below the 2.( percent pro0ected, under
the medium %ariant, for 2<4s with mar"et economics. $ow rapid population growth impedes social and
economic progress is discussed in subse5uent chapters.
CHAPTER II2 POPULATION AND WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES
Eapid population growth and lagging food production in de%eloping countries, together with the sharp
deterioration in the global food situation in 19(2 and 19(3, ha%e raised serious concerns about the
ability of the world to feed itself ade5uately o%er the ne9t 5uarter century and beyond.
1s a result of population growth, and to some e9tent also of increasing affluence, world food demand
has been growing at unprecedented rates. :n 1900, the annual increase in world demand for cereals was
about , million tons. #y 1950, it had risen to about 12 million tons per year. #y 19(0, the annual
increase in demand was 30 million tons on a base of o%er 1,200 million tons!. This is roughly
e5ui%alent to the annual wheat crop of 4anada, 1ustralia, and 1rgentina combined. This annual increase
in food demand is made up of a 23 annual increase in population and a 0.53 increased demand per
capita. 'art of the rising per capita demand reflects impro%ement in diets of some of the peoples of the
de%eloping countries. :n the less de%eloped countries about ,00 pounds of grain is a%ailable per person
per year and is mostly eaten as cereal. The a%erage .orth 1merican, howe%er, uses nearly a ton of grain
a year, only 200 pounds directly and the rest in the form of meat, mil", and eggs for which se%eral
pounds of cereal are re5uired to produce one pound of the animal product e.g., fi%e pounds of grain to
produce one pound of beef!.
<uring the past two decades, 2<4s ha%e been able to "eep food production ahead of population,
notwithstanding the unprecedentedly high rates of population growth. The basic figures are summari8ed
in the following table; Bcalculated from data in -S<1, (he 7orld 2gricultural 5ituation) +arch 19(,C;
A$,A-@S F8 +F5., PFPU.3TAF$ 3$, 8FF, P5F,U-TAF$
#e4cludin6 Peoples 5epublic of -hina(
1952K1""
))))
* +F5., * ,@'@.FP@, -FU$T5A@S*.@SS ,@'@.FP@, -FU$T5A@S*
* 8ood * 8ood * 8ood *
* production * production * production *
* * * *
* Popu Per * Popu Per * Popu Per *
*lation Total -apita*lation Total -apita*lation Total -apita *
)))))
* 1952 * 1"" 1"" 1"" * 1"" 1"" 1"" * 1"" 1"" 1"" *
* 191/ * 122 11" 119 * 1!2 11" 1/0 * 159 111 1"1 *
* * *
* -o&pound 3nnual Ancrease #D(: *
* * 1.9 !.0 ".9 * 1.1 !.0 1.1 * !.5 !.9 ".2 *
)))))
:t will be noted that the relati%e gain in 2<4 total food production was 0ust as great as for ad%anced
countries, but was far less on a per capita basis because of the sharp difference in population growth
rates. +oreo%er, within the 2<4 group were 2, countries including :ndonesia, .igeria, the 'hilippines,
Kaire, 1lgeria, >uyana, :ra5, and 4hile! in which the rate of increase of population growth e9ceeded the
rate of increase in food production? and a much more populous group including :ndia, 'a"istan, and
#angladesh! in which the rate of increase in production barely e9ceeded population growth but did not
"eep up with the increase in domestic demand. B6orld =ood 4onference, 'reliminary 1ssessment, *
+ay 19(,? -... <ocument D74A.=. /57 'ED'7/, p. 33.C
>eneral re5uirements ha%e been pro0ected for the years 19*5 and 2000, based on the -. +edium
Jariant population estimates and allowing for a %ery small impro%ement in diets in the 2<4s.
1 recent pro0ection made by the <epartment of 1griculture indicates a potential producti%e capacity
more than ade5uate to meet world cereal re5uirements the staple food of the world! of a population of
/., billion in the year 2000 medium fertility %ariant! at roughly current relati%e prices.
This o%erall picture offers little cause for complacency when bro"en down by geographic regions. To
support only a %ery modest impro%ement in current cereal consumption le%els from 1(( "ilograms per
capita in 19(0 to 200&20/ "ilograms in 2000! the pro0ections show an alarming increase in 2<4
dependency on imports. Such imports are pro0ected to rise from 21., million tons in 19(0 to 102&122
million tons by the end of the century. 4ereal imports would increase to 13&15 percent of total
de%eloping country consumption as against * percent in 19(0. 1s a group, the ad%anced countries cannot
only meet their own needs but will also generate a substantial surplus. =or the 2<4s, analyses of food
production capacity foresee the physical possibility of meeting their needs, provided that a! weather
conditions are normal, b! yields per unit of area continue to impro%e at the rates of the last decade,
bringing the a%erage by 19*5 close to present yields in the ad%anced countries, and c! a substantially
larger annual transfer of grains can be arranged from the surplus countries mainly .orth 1merica!,
either through commercial sales or through continuous and growing food aid. The estimates of
production capacity do not rely on ma0or new technical brea"throughs in food production methods, but
they do re5uire the a%ailability and application of greatly increased 5uantities of fertili8ers, pesticides,
irrigation water, and other inputs to moderni8ed agriculture, together with continued technological
ad%ances at past rates and the institutional and administrati%e reforms including %astly e9panded
research and e9tension ser%ices! essential to the successful application of these inputs. They also assume
normal weather conditions. Substantial political will is re5uired in the 2<4s to gi%e the necessary
priority to food production.
There is great uncertainty whether the conditions for achie%ing food balance in the 2<4s can in fact be
reali8ed. 4limatic changes are poorly understood, but a persistent atmospheric cooling trend since 19,0
has been established. Ane respectable body of scientific opinion belie%es that this portends a period of
much wider annual frosts, and possibly a long&term lowering of rainfall in the monsoon areas of 1sia
and 1frica. .itrogen fertili8er will be in world short supply into the late 19(0s, at least? because of
higher energy prices, it may also be more costly in real terms than in the 19/0s. 4apital in%estments for
irrigation and infrastructure and the organi8ational re5uirements for securing continuous impro%ements
in agricultural yields may well be beyond the financial and administrati%e capacity of many 2<4s. =or
some of the areas under hea%iest population pressure, there is little or no prospect for foreign e9change
earnings to co%er constantly increasing imports of food.
6hile it is always unwise to pro0ect the recent past into the long&term future, the e9perience of 19(2&(3
is %ery sobering. The coincidence of ad%erse weather in many regions in 19(2 brought per capita
production in the 2<4s bac" to the le%el of the early 19/0s. 1t the same time, world food reser%es
mainly 1merican! were almost e9hausted, and they were not rebuilt during the high production year of
19(3. 1 repetition under these conditions of 19(2 weather patterns would result in large&scale famine of
a "ind not e9perienced for se%eral decades && a "ind the world thought had been permanently banished.
D%en if massi%e famine can be a%erted, the most optimistic forecasts of food production potential in the
more populous 2<4s show little impro%ement in the presently inade5uate le%els and 5uality of nutrition.
1s long as annual population growth continues at 2 to 3 percent or more, 2<4s must ma"e e9panded
food production the top de%elopment priority, e%en though it may absorb a large fraction of a%ailable
capital and foreign e9change.
+oderation of population growth rates in the 2<4s could ma"e some difference to food re5uirements by
19*5, a substantial difference by 2000, and a %ast difference in the early part of the ne9t century. =rom
the %iewpoint of -.S. interests, such reductions in 2<4 food needs would be clearly ad%antageous. They
would not reduce 1merican commercial mar"ets for food since the reduction in 2<4 food re5uirements
that would result from slowing population growth would affect only re5uests for concessional or grant
food assistance, not commercial sales. They would impro%e the prospects for maintaining ade5uate
world food reser%es against climatic emergencies. They would reduce the li"elihood of periodic famines
in region after region, accompanied by food riots and chronic social and political instability. They would
impro%e the possibilities for long&term de%elopment and integration into a peaceful world order.
D%en ta"ing the most optimistic %iew of the theoretical possibilities of producing enough foods in the
de%eloped countries to meet the re5uirements of the de%eloping countries, the problem of increased
costs to the 2<4s is already e9tremely serious and in its future may be insurmountable. 1t current
prices the anticipated import re5uirements of 102&122 million tons by 2000 would raise the cost of
de%eloping countries) imports of cereals to L1/&20, billion by that year compared with L2.5 billion in
19(0. 2arge as they may seem e%en these estimates of import re5uirements could be on the low side if
the de%eloping countries are unable to achie%e the <epartment of 1griculture)s assumed increase in the
rate of growth of production.
The =1A in its recent @'reliminary 1ssessment of the 6orld =ood Situation 'resent and =uture@ has
reached a similar conclusion;
6hat is certain is the enormity of the food import bill which might face the de%eloping countries . . . :n
addition Bto cerealsC the de%eloping countries . . . would be importing substantial amounts of other
foodstuffs. clearly the financing of international food trade on this scale would raise %ery gra%e
problems.
1t least three&5uarters of the pro0ected increase in cereal imports of de%eloping countries would fall in
the poorer countries of South 1sia and .orth and 4entral 1frica. The situation in 2atin 1merica which is
pro0ected to shift from a modest surplus to a modest deficit area is 5uite different. +ost of this deficit
will be in +e9ico and 4entral 1merica, with relati%ely high income and easily e9ploitable transportation
lin"s to the -.S.
The problem in 2atin 1merica, therefore, appears relati%ely more manageable.
:t seems highly unli"ely, howe%er, that the poorer countries of 1sia and 1frica will be able to finance
nearly li"e the le%el of import re5uirements pro0ected by the -S<1. =ew of them ha%e dynamic e9port&
oriented industrial sectors li"e Taiwan or South Horea or rich raw material resources that will generate
e9port earnings fast enough to "eep pace with food import needs. 1ccordingly, those countries where
large&scale hunger and malnutrition are already present face the blea" prospect of little, if any,
impro%ement in the food inta"e in the years ahead barring a ma0or foreign financial food aid program,
more rapid e9pansion of domestic food production, reduced population growth or some combination of
all three. 6orse yet, a series of crop disasters could transform some of them into classic +althusian
cases with famines in%ol%ing millions of people.
6hile foreign assistance probably will continue to be forthcoming to meet short&term emergency
situations li"e the threat of mass star%ation, it is more 5uestionable whether aid donor countries will be
prepared to pro%ide the sort of massi%e food aid called for by the import pro0ections on a long&term
continuing basis.
Eeduced population growth rates clearly could bring significant relief o%er the longer term. Some
analysts maintain that for the post&19*5 period a rapid decline in fertility will be crucial to ade5uate
diets worldwide. :f, as noted before, fertility in the de%eloping countries could be made to decline to the
replacement le%el by the year 2000, the world)s population in that year would be 5.9 billion or 500
million below the le%el that would be attained if the -. medium pro0ection were followed. .early all of
the decline would be in the 2<4s. 6ith such a reduction the pro0ected import gap of 102&122 million
tons per year could be eliminated while still permitting a modest impro%ement in per capita
consumption. 6hile such a rapid reduction in fertility rates in the ne9t 30 years is an optimistic target, it
is thought by some e9perts that it could be obtained by intensified efforts if its necessity were
understood by world and national leaders. D%en more modest reductions could ha%e significant
implications by 2000 and e%en more o%er time.
:ntensi%e programs to increase food production in de%eloping countries beyond the le%els assumed in the
-.S.<.1. pro0ections probably offer the best prospect for some reasonably early relief, although this
poses ma0or technical and organi8ational difficulties and will in%ol%e substantial costs. :t must be
reali8ed, howe%er, that this will be difficult in all countries and probably impossible in some && or many.
D%en with the introduction of new inputs and techni5ues it has not been possible to increase agricultural
output by as much as 3 percent per annum in many of the poorer de%eloping countries. 'opulation
growth in a number of these countries e9ceeds that rate.
Such a program of increased food production would re5uire the widespread use of impro%ed seed
%arieties, increased applications of chemical fertili8ers and pesticides o%er %ast areas and better farm
management along with bringing new land under culti%ation. :t has been estimated, for e9ample, that
with better %arieties, pest control, and the application of fertili8er on the Iapanese scale, :ndian rice
yields could theoretically at least, be raised two and one&half times current le%els. $ere again %ery
substantial foreign assistance for imported materials may be re5uired for at least the early years before
the program begins to ta"e hold.
The problem is clear. The solutions, or at least the directions we must tra%el to reach them are also
generally agreed. 6hat will be re5uired is a genuine commitment to a set of policies that will lead the
international community, both de%eloped and de%eloping countries, to the achie%ement of the ob0ecti%es
spelled out abo%e.
CHAPTER III - MINERALS AND FUEL
'opulation growth per se is not li"ely to impose serious constraints on the global physical a%ailability of
fuel and non&fuel minerals to the end of the century and beyond.
This fa%orable outloo" on reser%es does not rule out shortage situations for specific minerals at
particular times and places. 4areful planning with continued scientific and technological progress
including the de%elopment of substitutes! should "eep the problems of physical a%ailability within
manageable proportions.
The ma0or factor influencing the demand for non&agricultural raw materials is the le%el of industrial
acti%ity, regional and global. =or e9ample, the -.S., with /3 of the world)s population, consumes about
a third of its resources. The demand for raw materials, unli"e food, is not a direct function of population
growth. The current scarcities and high prices for most such materials result mainly from the boom
conditions in all industriali8ed regions in the years 19(2&(3.
The important potential lin"age between rapid population growth and minerals a%ailability is indirect
rather than direct. :t flows from the negati%e effects of e9cessi%e population growth in economic
de%elopment and social progress, and therefore on internal stability, in o%ercrowded under&de%eloped
countries. The -nited States has become increasingly dependent on mineral imports from de%eloping
countries in recent decades, and this trend is li"ely to continue. The location of "nown reser%es of
higher&grade ores of most minerals fa%ors increasing dependence of all industriali8ed regions on imports
from less de%eloped countries. The real problems of mineral supplies lie, not in basic physical
sufficiency, but in the politico&economic issues of access, terms for e9ploration and e9ploitation, and
di%ision of the benefits among producers, consumers, and host country go%ernments.
:n the e9treme cases where population pressures lead to endemic famine, food riots, and brea"down of
social order, those conditions are scarcely conduci%e to systematic e9ploration for mineral deposits or
the long&term in%estments re5uired for their e9ploitation. Short of famine, unless some minimum of
popular aspirations for material impro%ement can be satisfied, and unless the terms of access and
e9ploitation persuade go%ernments and peoples that this aspect of the international economic order has
@something in it for them,@ concessions to foreign companies are li"ely to be e9propriated or sub0ected
to arbitrary inter%ention. 6hether through go%ernment action, labor conflicts, sabotage, or ci%il
disturbance, the smooth flow of needed materials will be 0eopardi8ed. 1lthough population pressure is
ob%iously not the only factor in%ol%ed, these types of frustrations are much less li"ely under conditions
of slow or 8ero population growth.
Rese!&es2
'ro0ections made by the <epartment of :nterior through the year 2000 for those fuel and non&fuel
minerals on which the -.S. depends hea%ily for imports5 support these conclusions on physical
resources see 1nne9!. 'ro%en reser%es of many of these minerals appear to be more than ade5uate to
meet the estimated accumulated world demand at 19(2 relati%e prices at least to the end of the century.
6hile petroleum including natural gas!, copper, 8inc, and tin are probable e9ceptions, the e9tension of
economically e9ploitable reser%es as a result of higher prices, as well as substitution and secondary
reco%ery for metals, should a%oid long&term supply restrictions. :n many cases, the price increases that
ha%e ta"en place since 19(2 should be more than sufficient to bring about the necessary e9tension of
reser%es.
These conclusions are consistent with a much more e9tensi%e study made in 19(2 for the 4ommission
on 'opulation >rowth and the 1merican =uture./
1s regards fossil fuels, that study foresees ade5uate world reser%es for at least the ne9t 5uarter to half
century e%en without ma0or technological brea"throughs. -.S. reser%es of coal and oil shale are
ade5uate well into the ne9t century, although their full e9ploitation may be limited by en%ironmental and
water supply factors. Dstimates of the -.S. >eological Sur%ey suggest reco%erable oil and gas reser%es
assuming sufficiently high prices! to meet domestic demand for another two or three decades, but there
is also respectable e9pert opinion supporting much lower estimates? present oil production is below the
pea" of 19(0 and meets only (0 percent of current demands.( .e%ertheless, the -.S. is in a relati%ely
strong position on fossil fuels compared with the rest of the industriali8ed world, pro%ided that it ta"es
the time and ma"es the hea%y in%estments needed to de%elop domestic alternati%es to foreign sources.
:n the case of the 19 non&fuel minerals studied by the 4ommission it was concluded there were sufficient
pro%en reser%es of nine to meet cumulati%e world needs at current relati%e prices through the year
2020.* =or the ten others9 world pro%en reser%es were considered inade5uate. $owe%er, it was 0udged
that moderate price increases, recycling and substitution could bridge the estimated gap between supply
and re5uirements.
The abo%e pro0ections probably understate the estimates of global resources. @'ro%ed Eeser%es,@ that is
"nown supplies that will be a%ailable at present or slightly higher relati%e costs 10 to 25 years from now,
rarely e9ceed 25 years) cumulati%e re5uirements, because industry generally is reluctant to underta"e
costly e9ploration to meet demands which may or may not materiali8e in the more distant future.
D9perience has shown that additional reser%es are disco%ered as re5uired, at least in the case of non&fuel
minerals, and @pro%ed reser%es@ ha%e generally remained constant in relation to consumption.
The ade5uacy of reser%es does not of course assure that supplies will be forthcoming in a steady stream
as re5uired. :ntermediate problems may de%elop as a result of business miscalculations regarding the
timing of e9pansion to meet re5uirements. 6ith the considerable lead time re5uired for e9panding
capacity, this can result in periods of serious shortage for certain materials and rising prices as in the
recent past. Similarly, from time to time there will be periods of o%ercapacity and falling prices.
.ecessary technical ad0ustments re5uired for the shift to substitutes or increased recycling also may be
delayed by the re5uired lead time or by lac" of information.
1n early warning system designed to flag impending surpluses and shortages, could be %ery helpful in
anticipating these problems. Such a mechanism might ta"e the form of groups of e9perts wor"ing with
the -. <i%ision of Eesources. 1lternati%ely, intergo%ernmental commodity study groups might be set
up for the purpose of monitoring those commodities identified as potential problem areas.
1de5uate global a%ailability of fuel and non&fuel minerals is not of much benefit to countries who
cannot afford to pay for them. Ail supplies currently are ade5uate to co%er world needs, but the
5uadrupling of prices in the past year has created gra%e financial and payment problems for de%eloped
and de%eloping countries ali"e. :f similar action to raise prices were underta"en by supplies of other
important minerals, an already bad situation would be intensified. Success in such efforts is
5uestionable, howe%er? there is no case in which the 5uantities in%ol%ed are remotely comparable to the
cases of energy? and the scope for successful price&gouging or cartel tactics is much smaller.
1lthough the -.S. is relati%ely well off in this regard, it nonetheless depends hea%ily on mineral imports
from a number of sources which are not completely safe or stable. :t may therefore be necessary,
especially in the light of our recent oil e9perience, to "eep this dependence within bounds, in some cases
by de%eloping additional domestic resources and more generally by ac5uiring stoc"&piles for economic
as well as national defense emergencies. There are also possible dangers of unreasonable prices
promoted by producer cartels and broader policy 5uestions of -.S. support for commodity agreements
in%ol%ing both producers and consumers. Such matters, howe%er, are in the domain of commodity policy
rather than population policy.
1t least through the end of this century, changes in population growth trends will ma"e little difference
to total le%els of re5uirements for fuel and other minerals. Those re5uirements are related much more
closely to le%els of income and industrial output, lea%ing the demand for minerals substantially
unaffected. :n the longer run, a lower ultimate world population say * to 9 billion rather than 12 to 1/
billion! would re5uire a lower annual input of depletable resources directly affected by population si8e
as well as a much lower %olume of food, forest products, te9tiles, and other renewable resources.
6hate%er may be done to guard against interruptions of supply and to de%elop domestic alternati%es, the
-.S. economy will re5uire large and increasing amounts of minerals from abroad, especially from less
de%eloped countries.10 That fact gi%es the -.S. enhanced interest in the political, economic, and social
stability of the supplying countries. 6here%er a lessening of population pressures through reduced birth
rates can increase the prospects for such stability, population policy becomes rele%ant to resource
supplies and to the economic interests of the -nited States.
ANNE?
3U(.338 F3R R27 M2(4R92.5
I2 F".t!s Affe.tin3 R"; M"te!i"% De/"nd "nd S$11%(
Some of the "ey factors that must be considered in e%aluating the future raw materials situation are the
stage of a country)s economic de%elopment and the responsi%eness of the mar"et to changes in the
relati%e prices of the raw materials.
Dconomic theory indicates that the pattern of consumption of raw materials %aries with the le%el of
economic acti%ity. D9amination of the intensity&of&use of raw materials incremental 5uantity of raw
material needed to support an additional unit of >.'! show that after a particular le%el of >.' is
reached, the intensity of use of raw materials starts to decline. 'ossible e9planations for this decline are;
1. :n industriali8ed countries, the ser%ices component of >.' e9pands relati%e to the non&ser%ices
components as economic growth occurs.
2. Technological progress, on the whole, tends to lower the intensity&of&use through greater efficiency in
the use of raw materials and de%elopment of alloys.
3. Dconomic growth continues to be characteri8ed by substitution of one material by another and
substitution of synthetics for natural materials.11
+ost de%eloped countries ha%e reached this point of declining intensity&of&use.12 =or other countries
that ha%e not reached this stage of economic de%elopment, their population usually goes through a stage
of rapid growth prior to industriali8ation. This is due to the relati%e ease in the application of impro%ed
health care policies and the resulting decline in their death rates, while birth rates remain high. Then the
country)s economy does begin to industriali8e and grow more rapidly, the initial rapid rise in industrial
production results in an increasing intensity&of&use of raw materials, until industrial production reached
the le%el where the intensity&of&use begins to decline.
1s was discussed abo%e, changes in the relati%e prices of raw materials change the amount of
economically reco%erable reser%es. Thus, the relati%e price le%el, smoothness of the ad0ustment process,
and a%ailability of capital for needed in%estment can also be e9pected to significantly influence raw
materials) mar"et conditions. :n addition, technological impro%ement in mining and metallurgy permits
lower grade ores to be e9ploited without corresponding increases in costs.
The following table presents the 19(2 net imports and the ratio of imports to total demand for nine
commodities. The net imports of these nine commodities represented 99 percent of the total trade deficit
in minerals.
))))
* * 191! * 5atio of A&ports *
* -o&&odit9 * $et A&ports * to Total ,e&and *
* * #L%illions(C * *
))))
* 3lu&inu& * 20./0 * .!06 *
* -opper * !"6.2 * .16" *
* Aron * 2!2.5 * ."29 *
* .ead * 1"!.9 * .!/9 *
* $ic=el * 211.1 * .1"2 *
* Tin * !!".! * .92/ *
* Titaniu& * !56.5 * .269 *
* Minc * !92.0 * .511 *
* Petroleu& * 5,292.5 * .!26 *
* #includin6 natural 6as( * * *
))))
The primary sources of these -S imports during the period 19/9&19(2 were;
))
* -o&&odit9 Source ? D *
))
* 3lu&inu& -anada 16D *
* -opper -anada /1D, Peru !1D, -hile !!D *
* Aron -anada 5"D, 'eneEuela /1D *
* .ead -anada !9D, Peru !1D, 3ustralia !1D *
* $ic=el -anada 0!D, $orwa9 0D *
* Tin %ala9sia 62D, Thailand !1D *
* Titaniu& Hapan 1/D, USS5 19D *
* Minc #Fre( -anada 6"D, %e4ico !2D *
* Minc #%etal( -anada 20D, 3ustralia 1"D *
* Pertroleu& #crude( -anada 2!D *
* Petroleu& #crude( 'eneEuela 11D *
))
W!%d Rese!&es
The following table shows estimates of the world reser%e position for these commodities. 1s mentioned
earlier, the 5uantity of economically reco%erable reser%es increases with higher prices. The following
tables, based on #ureau of +ines information, pro%ide estimates of reser%es at %arious prices. 1ll prices
are in constant 19(2 dollars.!
3lu&inu& #>au4ite(
Price #per pound pri&ar9 alu&inu&(
Price 3 Price > Price - Price ,
.!/ .!9 .// ./6
5eser7es #billion short tons, alu&inu& content(
+orld /.50 /.16 2.15 5.!1
U.S. ."1 ."! ."2 ."9
-opper
Price #per pound refined copper(
.51 .6" .15
5eser7es #&illion short tons(
+orld /1" 210 5"1
U.S. 0/ 9/ 115
Gold
Price #per tro9 ounce(
50.6" 9" 1"" 15"
5eser7es #&illion tro9 ounce(
+orld 1,""" 1,!!1 1,500 1,05"
U.S. 0! 1!" !"" !2"
Aron
Price #per short ton of pri&ar9 iron contained in ore(
11.0" !".0" !/.0"
5eser7es #billion short tons iron content(
+orld 96.1 1!9." !"6."
U.S. !." !.1 10."
.ead
Price #per pound pri&ar9 lead &etal(
.15 .10 .!"
5eser7es #&illion short tons, lead content(
+orld 96." 1!9." 122."
U.S. /6." 51." 56."
$ic=el
Price #per pound of pri&ar9 &etal(
1.5/ 1.15 !."" !.!5
5eser7es #&illions short tons(
+orld 26.! 6".5 10." 99.5
U.S. .! .! .5 .5
Tin
Price #per pound pri&ar9 tin &etal(
1.11 !."" !.5" /.""
5eser7es #thousands of lon6 tons tin content(
+orld 2,10" 5,5"" 1,5/" 9,!9"
U.S. 5 9 1"" !""
Titaniu&
Price #per pound titaniu& in pi6&ent(
.25 .55 .6"
5eser7es #thousands short tons titaniu& content(
+orld 150,""" !!!,""" /!1,"""
U.S. /!,2"" 25,""" 6","""
Minc
Price #per pound, pri&e western Einc deli7ered(
.10 .!5 ./"
5eser7es #&illion short tons, Einc content(
+orld 1/1 19/ !6"
U.S. /" 2" 5"
Petroleum:
<ata necessary to 5uantify reser%e&price relationships are not a%ailable. =or planning purposes, howe%er,
the #ureau of +ines used the rough assumption that a 1003 increase in price would increase reser%es
by 103. The a%erage 19(2 -.S. price was L3.397bbl. with pro%en world reser%es of ///.9 billion bbls.
and -.S. reser%es of 3/.3 billion barrels. -sing the #ureau of +ines assumption, therefore, a doubling in
world price a -.S. price of L/.(*7bbl.! would imply world reser%es of (33.5 billion bbls. and -.S.
reser%es of 39.9 billion barrels.
Natural ;as:
Price #wellhead price per thousand cubic feet(
.106 ./2 .22 .55
5eser7es #trillion cubic feet(
+orld 1,156 6,1/" 1",!2" 15,599
U.S. !66 50" 9"" !,/29
:t should be noted that these statistics represent a shift in 19(2 relati%e prices and assume constant 19(2
technology. The de%elopment of new technology or a more dramatic shift in relati%e prices can ha%e a
significant impact on the supply of economically reco%erable reser%es. 1luminum is a case in point. :t is
the most abundant metallic element in the earth)s crust and the supply of this resource is almost entirely
determined by the price. 4urrent demand and technology limit economically reco%erable reser%es to
bau9ite sources. 1lternate sources of aluminum e9ist e.g., alunite! and if impro%ed technology is
de%eloped ma"ing these alternate sources commercially %iable, supply constraints will not li"ely be
encountered.
The abo%e estimated reser%e figures, while representing appro9imate orders of magnitude, are ade5uate
to meet pro0ected accumulated world demand also %ery rough orders of magnitude! through the year
2000. :n some cases, modest price increases abo%e the 19(2 le%el may be re5uired to attract the
necessary capital in%estment.
CHAPTER IV - ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION GROWTH
Eapid population growth ad%ersely affects e%ery aspect of economic and social progress in de%eloping
countries. :t absorbs large amounts of resources needed for more producti%e in%estment in de%elopment.
:t re5uires greater e9penditures for health, education and other social ser%ices, particularly in urban
areas. :t increases the dependency load per wor"er so that a high fraction of the output of the producti%e
age group is needed to support dependents. :t reduces family sa%ings and domestic in%estment. :t
increases e9isting se%ere pressures on limited agricultural land in countries where the world)s @po%erty
problem@ is concentrated. :t creates a need for use of large amounts of scarce foreign e9change for food
imports or the loss of food surpluses for e9port!. =inally, it intensifies the already se%ere unemployment
and underemployment problems of many de%eloping countries where not enough producti%e 0obs are
created to absorb the annual increments to the labor force.
D%en in countries with good resource7population ratios, rapid population growth causes problems for
se%eral reasons; =irst, large capital in%estments generally are re5uired to e9ploit unused resources.
Second, some countries already ha%e high and growing unemployment and lac" the means to train new
entrants to their labor force. Third, there are long delays between starting effecti%e family planning
programs and reducing fertility, and e%en longer delays between reductions in fertility and population
stabili8ation. $ence there is substantial danger of %astly o%ershooting population targets if population
growth is not moderated in the near future.
<uring the past decade, the de%eloping countries ha%e raised their >.' at a rate of 5 percent per annum
as against ,.* percent in de%eloped countries. #ut at the same time the 2<4s e9perienced an a%erage
annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent. Thus their per capita income growth rate was only 2.5
percent and in some of the more highly populated areas the increase in per capita incomes was less than
2 percent. This stands in star" contrast to 3./ percent in the rich countries. +oreo%er, the low rate means
that there is %ery little change in those countries whose per capita incomes are L200 or less per annum.
The problem has been further e9acerbated in recent months by the dramatic increases in oil and fertili8er
prices. The 6orld #an" has estimated that the incomes of the *00 million inhabitants of the countries
hardest hit by the oil crisis will grow at less than 13 per capita per year of the remainder of the 19(0s.
Ta"ing account of ine5ualities in income distribution, there will be well o%er 500 million people, with
a%erage incomes of less than L100 per capita, who will e9perience either no growth or negati%e growth
in that period.
+oderation of population growth offers benefits in terms of resources sa%ed for in%estment and7or
higher per capita consumption. :f resource re5uirements to support fewer children are reduced and the
funds now allocated for construction of schools, houses, hospitals and other essential facilities are
in%ested in producti%e acti%ities, the impact on the growth of >.' and per capita income may be
significant. :n addition, economic and social progress resulting from population control will further
contribute to the decline in fertility rates. The relationship is reciprocal, and can ta"e the form of either a
%icious or a %irtuous circle.
This raises the 5uestion of how much more efficient e9penditures for population control might be than in
raising production through direct in%estments in additional irrigation and power pro0ects and factories.
6hile most economists today do not agree with the assumptions that went into early o%erly optimistic
estimates of returns to population e9penditures, there is general agreement that up to the point when cost
per acceptor rises rapidly, family planning e9penditures are generally considered the best in%estment a
country can ma"e in its own future.
II2 I/1".t f P1$%"tin G!;t- n E.n/i. De&e%1/ent)6
:n most, if not all, de%eloping countries high fertility rates impose substantial economic costs and
restrain economic growth. The main ad%erse macroeconomic effects may be analy8ed in three general
categories; 1! the sa%ing effect, 2! @child 5uality@ %ersus @child 5uantity@, and 3! @capital deepening@
%ersus @capital widening.@ These three categories are not mutually e9clusi%e, but they highlight different
familial and social perspecti%es. :n addition, there are often longer&run ad%erse effects on agricultural
output and the balance of payments.
1! (he saving effect. 1 high fertility economy has perforce a larger @burden of dependency@ than a low
fertility economy, because a larger proportion of the population consists of children too young to wor".
There are more non&wor"ing people to feed, house and rear, and there is a smaller surplus abo%e
minimum consumption a%ailable for sa%ings and in%estment. :t follows that a lower fertility rate can free
resources from consumption? if sa%ed and in%ested, these resources could contribute to economic
growth. There is much contro%ersy on this? empirical studies of the sa%ings effect ha%e produced
%arying results.!
2! 0hild <uality versus <uantity. 'arents ma"e in%estment decisions, in a sense, about their children.
$ealthier and better&educated children tend to be economically more producti%e, both as children and
later as adults. :n addition to the more&or&less conscious trade&offs parents can ma"e about more
education and better health per child, there are certain biologic ad%erse effects suffered by high birth
order children such as higher mortality and limited brain growth due to higher incidence of malnutrition.
:t must be emphasi8ed, howe%er, that discussion of trade&offs between child 5uality and child 5uantity
will probably remain academic with regard to countries where child mortality remains high. 6hen
parents cannot e9pect most children to sur%i%e to old age, they probably will continue to @o%er&
compensate@, using high fertility as a form of hedge to insure that they will ha%e some li%ing offspring
able to support the parents in the distant future.
3! 0apital deepening versus widening. =rom the family)s %iewpoint high fertility is li"ely to reduce
welfare per child? for the economy one may %iew high fertility as too rapid a growth in labor force
relati%e to capital stoc". Society)s capital stoc" includes facilities such as schools and other educational
inputs in addition to capital in%estments that raise wor"ers) outputs in agriculture and manufacturing. =or
any gi%en rate of capital accumulation, a lower population growth rate can help increase the amount of
capital and education per wor"er, helping thereby to increase output and income per capita. The problem
of migration to cities and the deri%ed demand for urban infrastructure can also be analy8ed as problems
of capital widening, which draw resources away from growth&generating in%estments.
:n a number of the more populous countries a fourth aspect of rapid growth in numbers has emerged in
recent years which has profound long&run conse5uences. 1gricultural output was able to "eep pace or
e9ceed population growth o%er the many decades of population rise prior to the middle of this century,
primarily through steady e9pansion of acreage under culti%ation. +ore recently, only marginal unused
land has been a%ailable in :ndia, Thailand, Ia%a, #angladesh, and other areas. 1s a result a! land
holdings ha%e declined in si8e, and b! land shortage has led to deforestation and o%ergra8ing, with
conse5uent soil erosion and se%ere water pollution and increased urban migration. 1reas that once
earned foreign e9change through the e9port of food surpluses are now in deficit or face early transition
to dependence on food imports. 1lthough the scope for raising agricultural producti%ity is %ery great in
many of these areas, the a%ailable technologies for doing so re5uire much higher capital costs per acre
and much larger foreign e9change outlays for @modern@ inputs chemical fertili8er, pesticides, petroleum
fuels, etc.! than was the case with the traditional technologies. Thus the population growth problem can
be seen as an important long&run, or structural, contributor to current 2<4 balance of payments
problems and to deterioration of their basic ecological infrastructure.
=inally, high fertility appears to e9acerbate the maldistribution of income which is a fundamental
economic and social problem in much of the de%eloping world. $igher income families tend to ha%e
fewer children, spend more on the health and education of these children, ha%e more wealth to pass on to
these children in contrast to the se%eral disad%antages that face the children of the poor. The latter tend
to be more numerous, recei%ing less of an in%estment per child in their @human capital@, lea%ing the
children with economic, educational and social constraints similar to those which restrict the
opportunities of the parents. :n short, high fertility contributes to the intergenerational continuity of
maldistributions of income and related social and political problems.
III2 T-e Effe.t f De&e%1/ent n P1$%"tin G!;t-
The determinants of population growth are not well understood, especially for low income societies.
$istorical data show that declining fertility in Durope and .orth 1merica has been associated with
declining mortality and increasing urbani8ation, and generally with @moderni8ation.@ =ertility declined
substantially in the 6est without the benefit of sophisticated contracepti%es. This mo%ement from high
fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality is "nown as the @demographic transition@.
:n many low income countries mortality has declined mar"edly since 6orld 6ar :: in large part from
reduction in epidemic illness and famine!, but fertility has remained high. 1part from a few poc"ets of
low fertility in Dast 1sia and the 4aribbean, a significant demographic transition has not occurred in the
third world. The 4hinese, howe%er, ma"e remar"able claims about their success in reducing birth rates,
and 5ualified obser%ers are persuaded that they ha%e had unusual success e%en though specific
demographic information is lac"ing.!
There is considerable, incontestable e%idence in many de%eloping countries that a larger though not
fully "nown! number of couples would li"e to ha%e fewer children than possible generally there && and
that there is a large unsatisfied demand by these couples for family planning ser%ices. :t is also now
widely belie%ed that something more that family planning ser%ices will be needed to moti%ate other
couples to want smaller families and all couples to want replacement le%els essential to the progress and
growth of their countries.
There is also e%idence, although it is not conclusi%e, that certain aspects of economic de%elopment and
moderni8ation are more directly related to lowered birth rates than others, and that selecti%e
de%elopmental policies may bring about a demographic transition at substantially lower per capita
income le%els than in Durope, .orth 1merica, and Iapan.1, Such selecti%e policies would focus on
impro%ed health care and nutrition directed toward reduced infant and child mortality? uni%ersal
schooling and adult literacy, especially for women? increasing the legal age of marriage? greater
opportunities for female employment in the money economy? impro%ed old&age social security
arrangements? and agricultural moderni8ation focussed on small farmers. :t is important that this focus
be made in de%elopment programs because, gi%en today)s high population densities, high birth rates, and
low income le%els in much of 1sia, 1frica, and 2atin 1merica, if the demographic transition has to await
o%erall de%elopment and moderni8ation, the %icious circle of po%erty, people, and unemployment may
ne%er be bro"en.
The causes of high birth rates in low income societies are generally e9plained in terms of three factors;
a. 9nade<uacy of information and means. 1ctual family si8e in many societies is higher than desired
family si8e owing to ignorance of acceptable birth control methods or una%ailability of birth control
de%ices and ser%ices. The importance of this factor is e%idenced by many sociological in%estigations on
@desired family si8e@ %ersus actual si8e, and by the substantial rates of acceptance for contracepti%es
when systematic family planning ser%ices are introduced. This factor has been a basic assumption in the
family planning programs of official bilateral and multilateral programs in many countries o%er the past
decade. 6hate%er the actual weight of this factor, which clearly %aries from country to country and
which shifts with changes in economic and social conditions, there remains without 5uestion a
significant demand for family planning ser%ices.
b. 9nade<uacy of motivation for reduced numbers of children. Dspecially in the rural areas of
underde%eloped countries, which account for the ma0or share of today)s population growth, parents often
want large numbers of children especially boys! i! to ensure that some will sur%i%e against the odds of
high child mortality, ii! to pro%ide support for the parents in their old age, and iii! to pro%ide low cost
farm labor. 6hile these elements are present among rural populace, continued urbani8ation may reduce
the need for sons in the longer term. The absence of educational and employment opportunities for
young women intensifies these same moti%ations by encouraging early marriage and early and fre5uent
maternity. This factor suggests the crucial importance of selecti%e de%elopment policies as a means of
accelerating the reduction of fertility.
c. (he "time lag". =amily preferences and social institutions that fa%or high fertility change slowly. D%en
though mortality and economic conditions ha%e impro%ed significantly since 6orld 6ar :: in 2<4s,
family e9pectations, social norms, and parental practice are slow to respond to these altered conditions.
This factor leads to the need for large scale programs of information, education, and persuasion directed
at lower fertility.
The three elements are undoubtedly intermi9ed in %arying proportions in all underde%eloped countries
with high birth rates. :n most 2<4s, many couples would reduce their completed family si8e if
appropriate birth control methods were more easily a%ailable. The e9tent of this reduction, howe%er,
may still lea%e their completed family si8e at higher than mere replacement le%els && i.e., at le%els
implying continued but less rapid population growth. +any other couples would not reduce their desired
family si8e merely if better contracepti%es were a%ailable, either because they see large families as
economically beneficial, or because of cultural factors, or because they misread their own economic
interests.
Therefore, family planning supply contracepti%e technology and deli%ery systems! and demand the
moti%ation for reduced fertility! would not be %iewed as mutually e9clusi%e alternati%es? they are
complementary and may be mutually reinforcing. The selected point of focus mentioned earlier && old
age security programs, maternal and child health programs, increased female education, increasing the
legal age of marriage, financial incenti%es to @acceptors@, personnel, && are important, yet better
information is re5uired as to which measures are most cost&effecti%e and feasible in a gi%en situation and
how their cost&effecti%eness compares to supply programs.
Ane additional interesting area is recei%ing increasing attention; the distribution of the benefits of
de%elopment. D9perience in se%eral countries suggests that the e9tent to which the poor, with the highest
fertility rates, reduce their fertility will depend on the e9tent to which they participate in de%elopment. :n
this %iew the a%erage le%el of economic de%elopment and the a%erage amount of moderni8ation are less
important determinants of population growth than is the specific structure of de%elopment. This line of
in%estigation suggests that social de%elopment acti%ities need to be more precisely targeted than in the
past to reach the lowest income people, to counteract their desire for high fertility as a means of
alle%iating certain ad%erse conditions.
IV2 E/1%(/ent "nd S.i"% P!'%e/s
Dmployment, aside from its role in production of goods and ser%ices, is an important source of income
and of status or recognition to wor"ers and their families. The inability of large segments of the
economically acti%e population in de%eloping countries to find 0obs offering a minimum acceptable
standard of li%ing is reflected in a widening of income disparities and a deepening sense of economic,
political and social frustration.
The most economically significant employment problems in 2<4s contributed to by e9cessi%e
population growth are low wor"er producti%ity in production of traditional goods and ser%ices produced,
the changing aspirations of the wor" force, the e9isting distribution of income, wealth and power, and
the natural resource endowment of a country.
The political and social problems of urban o%ercrowding are directly related to population growth. :n
addition to the still&high fertility in urban areas of many 2<4)s, population pressures on the land, which
increases migration to the cities, adds to the pressures on urban 0ob mar"ets and political stability, and
strains, the capacity to pro%ide schools, health facilities, and water supplies.
:t should be recogni8ed that lower fertility will relie%e only a portion of these strains and that its most
beneficial effects will be felt only o%er a period of decades. +ost of the potential migrants from
countryside to city o%er the coming 15 to 20 years ha%e already been born. 2ower birth rates do pro%ide
some immediate relief to health and sanitation and welfare ser%ices, and medium&term relief to pressures
on educational systems. The largest effects on employment, migration, and li%ing standards, howe%er,
will be felt only after 25 or 30 years. The time lags inherent in all aspects of population dynamics only
reinforce the urgency of adopting effecti%e policies in the years immediately ahead if the formidable
problems of the present decade are not to become utterly unmanageable in the 1990s and beyond the
year 2000.
CHAPTER V -- IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION PRESSURES FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY
:t seems well understood that the impact of population factors on the sub0ects already considered &&
de%elopment, food re5uirements, resources, en%ironment && ad%ersely affects the welfare and progress of
countries in which we ha%e a friendly interest and thus indirectly ad%ersely affects broad -.S. interests
as well.
The effects of population factors on the political stability of these countries and their implications for
internal and international order or disorder, destructi%e social unrest, %iolence and disrupti%e foreign
acti%ities are less well understood and need more analysis. .e%ertheless, some strategists and e9perts
belie%e that these effects may ultimately be the most important of those arising from population factors,
most harmful to the countries where they occur and seriously affecting -.S. interests. Ather e9perts
within the -.S. >o%ernment disagree with this conclusion.
1 recent study15 of forty&fi%e local conflicts in%ol%ing Third 6orld countries e9amined the ways in
which population factors affect the initiation and course of a conflict in different situations. The study
reached two ma0or conclusions;
1. @. . . population factors are indeed critical in, and often determinants of, %iolent conflict in de%eloping
areas. Segmental religious, social, racial! differences, migration, rapid population growth, differential
le%els of "nowledge and s"ills, rural7urban differences, population pressure and the spacial location of
population in relation to resources && in this rough order of importance && all appear to be important
contributions to conflict and %iolence...
2. 4learly, conflicts which are regarded in primarily political terms often ha%e demographic roots;
Eecognition of these relationships appears crucial to any understanding or pre%ention of such
hostilities.@
:t does not appear that the population factors act alone or, often, directly to cause the disrupti%e effects.
They act through inter%ening elements && %ariables. They also add to other causati%e factors turning what
might ha%e been only a difficult situation into one with disrupti%e results.
This action is seldom simple. 'rofessor 'hilip $auser of the -ni%ersity of 4hicago has suggested the
concept of @population complosion@ to describe the situation in many de%eloping countries when a!
more and more people are born into or mo%e into and are compressed in the same li%ing space under b!
conditions and irritations of different races, colors, religions, languages, or cultural bac"grounds, often
with differential rates of population growth among these groups, and c! with the frustrations of failure
to achie%e their aspirations for better standards of li%ing for themsel%es or their children. To these may
be added pressures for and actual international migration. These population factors appear to ha%e a
multiplying effect on other factors in%ol%ed in situations of incipient %iolence. 'opulation density, the
@o%erpopulation@ most often thought of in this connection, is much less important.
These population factors contribute to socio&economic %ariables including brea"downs in social
structures, underemployment and unemployment, po%erty, depri%ed people in city slums, lowered
opportunities for education for the masses, few 0ob opportunities for those who do obtain education,
interracial, religious, and regional ri%alries, and sharply increased financial, planning, and administrati%e
burdens on go%ernmental systems at all le%els.
These ad%erse conditions appear to contribute fre5uently to harmful de%elopments of a political nature;
Iu%enile delin5uency, thie%ery and other crimes, organi8ed brigandry, "idnapping and terrorism, food
riots, other outbrea"s of %iolence? guerilla warfare, communal %iolence, separatist mo%ements,
re%olutionary mo%ements and counter&re%olutionary coups. 1ll of these bear upon the wea"ening or
collapse of local, state, or national go%ernment functions.
#eyond national boundaries, population factors appear to ha%e had operati%e roles in some past
politically disturbing legal or illegal mass migrations, border incidents, and wars. :f current increased
population pressures continue they may ha%e greater potential for future disruption in foreign relations.
'erhaps most important, in the last decade population factors ha%e impacted more se%erely than before
on a%ailabilities of agricultural land and resources, industriali8ation, pollution and the en%ironment. 1ll
this is occurring at a time when international communications ha%e created rising e9pectations which are
being frustrated by slow de%elopment and ine5ualities of distribution.
Since population factors wor" with other factors and act through inter%ening lin"ages, research as to
their effects of a political nature is difficult and @proof@ e%en more so. This does not mean, howe%er, that
the causality does not e9ist. :t means only that -.S. policy decisions must ta"e into account the less
precise and programmatic character of our "nowledge of these lin"ages.
1lthough general hypotheses are hard to draw, some seem reasonably sustainable;
1. Population growth and inade<uate resources. 6here population si8e is greater than a%ailable
resources, or is e9panding more rapidly than the a%ailable resources, there is a tendency toward internal
disorders and %iolence and, sometimes, disrupti%e international policies or %iolence. The higher the rate
of growth, the more salient a factor population increase appears to be. 1 sense of increasing crowding,
real or percei%ed, seems to generate such tendencies, especially if it seems to thwart obtaining desired
personal or national goals.
2. Populations with a high proportion of growth. The young people, who are in much higher proportions
in many 2<4s, are li"ely to be more %olatile, unstable, prone to e9tremes, alienation and %iolence than
an older population. These young people can more readily be persuaded to attac" the legal institutions of
the go%ernment or real property of the @establishment,@ @imperialists,@ multinational corporations, or
other && often foreign && influences blamed for their troubles.
3. Population factors with social cleavages. 6hen ad%erse population factors of growth, mo%ement,
density, e9cess, or pressure coincide with racial, religious, color, linguistic, cultural, or other social
clea%ages, there will de%elop the most potentially e9plosi%e situations for internal disorder, perhaps with
e9ternal effects. 6hen such factors e9ist together with the reality or sense of relati%e depri%ation among
different groups within the same country or in relation to other countries or peoples, the probability of
%iolence increases significantly.
,. Population movements and international migrations. 'opulation mo%ements within countries appear
to ha%e a large role in disorders. +igrations into neighboring countries especially those richer or more
sparsely settled!, whether legal or illegal, can pro%o"e negati%e political reactions or force.
There may be increased propensities for %iolence arising simply from technological de%elopments
ma"ing it easier && e.g., international proliferation and more ready accessibility to sub&national groups of
nuclear and other lethal weaponry. These possibilities ma"e the disrupti%e population factors discussed
abo%e e%en more dangerous.
S/e Effe.ts f C$!!ent P1$%"tin P!ess$!es
:n the 19/0s and 19(0s, there ha%e been a series of episodes in which population factors ha%e apparently
had a role && directly or indirectly && affecting countries in which we ha%e an interest.
4l 5alvador*=onduras 7ar. 1n e9ample was the 19/9 war between Dl Sal%ador and $onduras. <ubbed
the @Soccer 6ar@, it was spar"ed by a riot during a soccer match, its underlying cause was tension
resulting from the large scale migration of Sal%adorans from their rapidly growing, densely populated
country to relati%ely uninhabited areas of $onduras. The $ondurans resented the presence of migrants
and in 19/9 began to enforce an already e9tant land tenancy law to e9pel them. Dl Sal%ador was angered
by the treatment gi%en its citi8ens. =laring tempers on both sides o%er this issue created a situation which
ultimately led to a military clash.
Nigeria. The .igerian ci%il war seriously retarded the progress of 1frica)s most populous nations and
caused political repercussions and pressures in the -nited States. :t was fundamentally a matter of tribal
relationships. :rritations among the tribes caused in part by rapidly increasing numbers of people, in a
situation of inade5uate opportunity for most of them, magnified the tribal issues and may ha%e helped
precipitate the war. The migration of the :bos from Dastern .igeria, loo"ing for employment, led to
competition with local peoples of other tribes and contributed to tribal rioting. This unstable situation
was intensified by the fact that in the 19/3 population census returns were falsified to inflate the 6estern
region)s population and hence its representation in the =ederal >o%ernment. The :bos of the Dastern
region, with the oil resources of the country, felt their resources would be un0ustly drawn on and
attempted to establish their independence.
Pa>istan*9ndia*"angladesh #$'!*'#. This religious and nationalistic conflict contains se%eral points
where a population factor at a crucial time may ha%e had a causal effect in turning e%ents away from
peaceful solutions to %iolence. The 4entral >o%ernment in 6est 'a"istan resorted to military
suppression of the Dast 6ing after the election in which the 1wami 2eague had an o%erwhelming
%ictory in Dast 'a"istan. This election had followed two sets of circumstances. The first was a growing
discontent in Dast 'a"istan at the slow rate of economic and social progress being made and the #engali
feeling that 6est 'a"istan was dealing une5ually and unfairly with Dast 'a"istan in the distribution of
national re%enues. The first population factor was the (5 million #engalis whom the ,5 million 6est
'a"istanis sought to continue to dominate. Some obser%ers belie%e that as a recent population factor the
rapid rate of population growth in Dast 'a"istan seriously diminished the per capita impro%ement from
the re%enues made a%ailable and contributed significantly to the discontent. 1 special aspect of the
population e9plosion in Dast 'a"istan second population factor! was the fact that the dense occupation
of all good agricultural land forced hundreds of thousands of people to mo%e into the ob%iously unsafe
lowlands along the southern coast. They became %ictims of the hurricane in 19(0. 1n estimated 300,000
died. The >o%ernment was unable to deal with a disaster affecting so many people. The leaders and
people of Dast 'a"istan reacted %igorously to this failure of the >o%ernment to bring help.
:t seems 5uite li"ely that these situations in which population factors played an important role led to the
o%erwhelming %ictory of the 1wami 2eague that led the >o%ernment to resort to force in Dast 'a"istan
with the massacres and rapes that followed. Ather e9perts belie%e the effects of the latter two factors
were of marginal influence in the 1wami 2eague)s %ictory.
:t further seems possible that much of the %iolence was stimulated or magnified by population pressures.
Two groups of +oslems had been competing for 0obs and land in Dast #engal since the 19,( partition.
@#iharis@ are a small minority of non&#engali +oslems who chose to resettle in Dast 'a"istan at that
time. Their integration into #engali society was undoubtedly inhibited by the deteriorating li%ing
conditions of the ma0ority #engalis. 6ith the 'a"istan army crac"down in +arch, 19(1, the #iharis
cooperated with the authorities, and reportedly were able thereby to impro%e their economic conditions
at the e9pense of the persecuted #engalis. 6hen the tables were turned after independence, it was the
#iharis who were persecuted and whose property and 0obs were sei8ed. :t seems li"ely that both these
outbursts of %iolence were induced or enlarged by the population @complosion@ factor.
The %iolence in Dast 'a"istan against the #engalis and particularly the $indu minority who bore the
brunt of 1rmy repression led to the ne9t population factor, the mass migration during one year of nine or
ten million refugees into 6est #engal in :ndia. This placed a tremendous burden on the already wea"
:ndian economy. 1s one :ndian leader in the :ndia =amily 'lanning 'rogram said, @The influ9 of nine
million people wiped out the sa%ings of some nine million births which had been a%erted o%er a period
of eight years of the family planning program.@
There were other factors in :ndia)s in%asion of Dast #engal, but it is possible that the necessity of
returning these nine or ten million refugees to east #engal && getting them out of :ndia && may ha%e
played a part in the :ndian decision to in%ade. 4ertainly, in a broader sense, the threat posed by this
serious, spreading instability on :ndia)s eastern frontier && an instability in which population factors were
a ma0or underlying cause && a "ey reason for the :ndian decision.
The political arrangements in the Subcontinent ha%e changed, but all of the underlying population
factors which influenced the dramatic acts of %iolence that too" place in 19(0&(1 still e9ist, in worsening
dimensions, to influence future e%ents.
2dditional illustrations. 'opulation factors also appear to ha%e had indirect causal relations, in %arying
degrees, on the "illings in 9ndonesia in 19/5&/, the communal slaughter in Rwanda in 19/1&2 and 19/3&
, and in "urundi in 19(2, the coup in Uganda in 19(2, and the insurrection in 5ri .an>a in 19(1.
Some 'otential Dffects of =uture 'opulation 'ressures
#etween the end of 6orld 6ar :: and 19(5 the world)s population will ha%e increased about one and a
half billion && nearly one billion of that from 19/0 to the present. The rate of growth is increasing and
between two and a half and three and a half billion will be added by the year 2000, depending partly on
the effecti%eness of population growth control programs. This increase of the ne9t 25 years will, of
course, pyramid on the great number added with such rapidity in the last 25. The population factors
which contributed to the political pressures and instabilities of the last decades will be multiplied.
PR0 & The demographic factors of the 'E4 are referred to on page (9 abo%e. The >o%ernment of the
'E4 has made a ma0or effort to feed its growing population.
4ulti%ated farm land, at 10( million hectares, has not increased significantly o%er the past 25 years,
although farm output has substantially "ept pace with population growth through impro%ed yields
secured by land impro%ement, irrigation e9tension, intensified cropping, and rapid e9pansion in the
supply of fertili8ers.
:n 19(3 the 'E4 adopted new, forceful population control measures. :n the urban areas 'e"ing claimed
its birth control measures had secured a two&child family and a one percent annual population growth,
and it proposes to e9tend this de%elopment throughout the rural areas by 19*0.
The political implications of 4hina)s future population growth are ob%iously important but are not dealt
with here.
9srael and the 2rab 5tates. :f a peace settlement can be reached, the central issue will be how to ma"e it
last. Dgypt with about 3( million today is growing at 2.*3 per year. :t will appro9imate ,* million by
19*5, (5 million by 1995, and more than *5 million by 2000. :t is doubtful that Dgypt)s economic
progress can greatly e9ceed its population growth. 6ith :srael starting at today)s population of 3.3
million, the disparity between its population and those of the 1rab States will rapidly increase. :nside
:srael, unless Iewish immigration continues, the gap between the si8e of the 1rab and Iewish
populations will diminish. Together with the traditional animosities && which will remain the prime
determinants of 1rab&:sraeli conflict && these population factors ma"e the potential for peace and for
-.S. interests in the area ominous.
9ndia*"angladesh. The Subcontinent will be for years the ma0or focus of world concern o%er population
growth. :ndia)s population is now appro9imately 5*0 million, adding a million by each full moon.
Dmbassy .ew <elhi .ew <elhi 2115, Iune 1(, 19(,! reports;
@There seems no way of turning off the faucet this side of 1 billion :ndians, which means :ndia must
continue to court economic and social disaster. :t is not clear how the sha"y and slow&growing :ndian
economy can bear the enormous e9penditures on health, housing, employment, and education, which
must be made if the society is e%en to maintain its current low le%els.@
<eath rates ha%e recently increased in parts of :ndia and episodes li"e the recent smallpo9 epidemic
ha%e led Dmbassy .ew <elhi to add;
@1 future failure of the :ndia food crop could cause widespread death and suffering which could not be
o%ercome by the >A: or foreign assistance. The rise in the death rate in se%eral rural areas suggests that
+althusian pressures are already being felt.@
1nd further;
@:ncreasing political disturbances should be e9pected in the future, fed by the pressures of rising
population in urban areas, food shortages, and growing scarcities in household commodities. The >A:
has not been %ery successful in alle%iating unemployment in the cities. The recent disturbances in
>u0arat and #ihar seem to be only the beginning of chronic and serious political disorders occurring
throughout :ndia.@
There will probably be a wea"ening, possibly a brea"down, of the control of the central go%ernment
o%er some of the states and local areas. The democratic system will be ta9ed and may be in danger of
gi%ing way to a form of dictatorship, bene%olent or otherwise. The e9istence of :ndia as a democratic
buttress in 1sia will be threatened.
"angladesh, with appalling population density, rapid population growth, and e9tensi%e po%erty will
suffer e%en more. :ts population has increased ,03 since the census 13 years ago and is growing at least
33 per year. The present (5 million, or so, unless slowed by famine, disease, or massi%e birth control,
will double in 23 years and e9ceed 1(0 million by 2000.
Ee5uirements for food and other basic necessities of life are growing at a faster rate than e9isting
resources and administrati%e systems are pro%iding them. :n the rural areas, the si8e of the a%erage farm
is being reduced and there is increasing landlessness. +ore and more people are migrating to urban
areas. The go%ernment admits a 303 rate of unemployment and underemployment. 1lready, Dmbassy
<acca reports <acca 3,2,, Iune 19, 19(,! there are important economic&population causes for the
landlessness that is rapidly increasing and contributing to %iolent crimes of murder and armed robbery
that terrori8e the ordinary citi8en.
@Some of the %ast army of unemployed and landless, and those strapped by the escalating cost of basic
commodities, ha%e doubtless turned to crime.@
Three paragraphs of Dmbassy <acca)s report sharply outline the effect on -.S. political interests we may
anticipate from population factors in #angladesh and other countries that, if present trends are not
changed, will be in conditions similar to #angladesh in only a few years.
@Af concern to the -.S. are se%eral probable outcomes as the basic political, economic and social
situation worsens o%er the coming decades. 1lready afflicted with a crisis mentality by which they loo"
to wealthy foreign countries to shore up their faltering economy, the #<> will continue to escalate its
demands on the -.S. both bilaterally and internationally to enlarge its assistance, both of commodities
and financing. #angladesh is now a fairly solid supporter of third world positions, ad%ocating better
distribution of the world)s wealth and e9tensi%e trade concessions to poor nations. 1s its problems grow
and its ability to gain assistance fails to "eep pace, #angladesh)s positions on international issues li"ely
will become radicali8ed, ine%itably in opposition to -.S. interests on ma0or issues as it see"s to align
itself with others to force ade5uate aid.
@-.S. interests in #angladesh center on the de%elopment of an economically and politically stable
country which will not threaten the stability of its neighbors in the Subcontinent nor in%ite the intrusion
of outside powers. Surrounded on three sides by :ndia and sharing a short border with #urma,
#angladesh, if it descends into chaos, will threaten the stability of these nations as well. 1lready
#engalis are illegally migrating into the frontier pro%inces of 1ssam and Tripura, politically sensiti%e
areas of :ndia, and into ad0acent #urma. Should e9panded out&migration and socio&political collapse in
#angladesh threaten its own stability, :ndia may be forced to consider inter%ention, although it is
difficult to see in what way the :ndians could cope with the situation.
@#angladesh is a case study of the effects of few resources and burgeoning population not only on
national and regional stability but also on the future world order. :n a sense, if we and other richer
elements of the world community do not meet the test of formulating a policy to help #angladesh
awa"en from its economic and demographic nightmare, we will not be prepared in future decades to
deal with the conse5uences of similar problems in other countries which ha%e far more political and
economic conse5uences to -.S. interests.@
2frica ** 5ahel 0ountries. The current tragedy of the Sahel countries, to which -.S. aid in past years has
been minimal, has suddenly cost us an immense effort in food supplies at a time when we are already
hard pressed to supply other countries, and domestic food prices are causing strong political
repercussions in the -.S. The costs to us and other donor countries for aid to help restore the de%astated
land will run into hundreds of millions. Met little attention is gi%en to the fact that e%en before the
ad%erse effect of the continued drought, it was population growth and added migration of herdsmen to
the edge of the desert that led to cutting the trees and cropping the grass, in%iting the desert to sweep
forward. 4ontrol of population growth and migration must be a part of any program for impro%ement of
lasting %alue.
Panama. The troublesome problem of 0urisdiction o%er the 4anal Kone is primarily due to 'anamanian
feelings of national pride and a desire to achie%e so%ereignty o%er its entire territory. Ane 'anamanian
agreement in pursuing its treaty goals is that -.S. control o%er the 4anal Kone pre%ents the natural
e9pansion of 'anama 4ity, an e9pansion needed as a result of demographic pressures. :n 190*, at the
time of the construction of the 4anal, the population of the Kone was about ,0,000. Today it is close to
the same figure, ,5,000. An the other hand, 'anama 4ity, which had some 20,000 people in 190*, has
recei%ed growing migration from rural areas and now has o%er 500,000. 1 new treaty which would gi%e
'anama 0urisdiction o%er land now in the Kone would help alle%iate the problems caused by this growth
of 'anama 4ity.
Me-ico and the U.5. 4losest to home, the combined population growth of +e9ico and the -.S.
Southwest presages ma0or difficulties for the future. +e9ico)s population is growing at some 3.53 per
year and will double in 20 years with concomitant increases in demands for food, housing, education,
and employment. #y 1995, the present 5( million will ha%e increased to some 115 million and, unless
their recently established family planning program has great success, by 2000 will e9ceed 130 million.
+ore important, the numbers of young people entering the 0ob mar"et each year will e9pand e%en more
5uic"ly. These growing numbers will increase the pressure of illegal emigration to the -.S., and ma"e
the issue an e%en more serious source of friction in our political relations with +e9ico.
An our side, the #ureau of the 4ensus estimates that as more and more 1mericans mo%e to the
Southwestern States the present ,0,000,000 population may appro9imate /1,000,000 by 1995. The
domestic use of 4olorado Ei%er water may again ha%e increased the salinity le%el in +e9ico and
reopened that political issue.
1membassy +e9ico 4ity +e9ico ,953, Iune 1,, 19(,! summari8ed the influences of population
factors on -.S. interests as follows;
@1n indefinite continuation of +e9ico)s high population growth rate would increasingly act as a bra"e
on economic and social! impro%ement. The conse5uences would be noted in %arious ways. +e9ico
could well ta"e more radical positions in the international scene. :llegal migration to the -.S. would
increase. :n a country where unemployment and under&employment is already high, the entry of
increasing numbers into the wor" force would only intensify the pressure to see" employment in the
-.S. by whate%er means. Met another conse5uence would be increased demand for food imports from
the -.S., especially if the rate of growth of agricultural production continues to lag behind the
population growth rate. =inally, one cannot dismiss the spectre of future domestic instability as a long
term conse5uence, should the economy, now strong, falter.@
UN0(2/) the 5pecial UN;2) and the UN. The de%eloping countries, after se%eral years of unorgani8ed
maneu%ering and erratic attac"s ha%e now formed tight groupings in the Special 4ommittee for 2atin
1merican 4oordination, the Argani8ation of 1frican States, and the Se%enty&Se%en. 1s illustrated in the
<eclaration of Santiago and the recent Special >eneral 1ssembly, these groupings at times appear to
reflect a common desire to launch economic attac"s against the -nited States and, to a lesser degree, the
Duropean de%eloped countries. 1 factor which is common to all of them, which retards their
de%elopment, burdens their foreign e9change, sub0ects them to world prices for food, fertili8er, and
necessities of life and pushes them into disad%antageous trade relations is their e9cessi%ely rapid
population growth. -ntil they are able to o%ercome this problem, it is li"ely that their manifestations of
antagonism toward the -nited States in international bodies will increase.
G%'"% F".t!s
:n industrial nations, population growth increases demand for industrial output. This o%er time tends to
deplete national raw materials resources and calls increasingly on sources of marginal profitability and
foreign supplies. To obtain raw materials, industrial nations see" to locate and de%elop e9ternal sources
of supply. The potential for collisions of interest among the de%eloping countries is ob%ious and has
already begun. :t is %isible and %e9ing in claims for territorial waters and national so%ereignty o%er
mineral resources. :t may become intense in ri%alries o%er e9ploring and e9ploiting the resources of the
ocean floor.
:n de%eloping countries, the burden of population factors, added to others, will wea"en unstable
go%ernments, often only marginally effecti%e in good times, and open the way for e9tremist regimes.
4ountries suffering under such burdens will be more susceptible to radicali8ation. Their %ulnerability
also might in%ite foreign inter%ention by stronger nations bent on ac5uiring political and economic
ad%antage. The tensions within the $a%e&not nations are li"ely to intensify, and the conflicts between
them and the $a%es may escalate.
'ast e9perience gi%es little assistance to predicting the course of these de%elopments because the speed
of today)s population growth, migrations, and urbani8ation far e9ceeds anything the world has seen
before. +oreo%er, the conse5uences of such population factors can no longer be e%aded by mo%ing to
new hunting or gra8ing lands, by con5uering new territory, by disco%ering or coloni8ing new continents,
or by emigration in large numbers.
The world has ample warning that we all must ma"e more rapid efforts at social and economic
de%elopment to a%oid or mitigate these gloomy prospects. 6e should be warned also that we all must
mo%e as rapidly as possible toward stabili8ing national and world population growth.
CHAPTER VI - WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE
=rom the standpoint of policy and program, the focal point of the 6orld 'opulation 4onference 6'4!
at #ucharest, Eomania, in 1ugust 19(,, was the 6orld 'opulation 'lan of 1ction 6''1!. The -.S. had
contributed many substanti%e points to the draft 'lan. 6e had particularly emphasi8ed the incorporation
of population factors in national planning of de%eloping countries) population programs for assuring the
a%ailability of means of family planning to persons of reproducti%e age, %oluntary but specific goals for
the reduction of population growth and time frames for action.
1s the 6''1 reached the 6'4 it was organi8ed as a demographic document. :t also related population
factors to family welfare, social and economic de%elopment, and fertility reduction. 'opulation policies
and programs were recogni8ed as an essential element, but only one element of economic and social
de%elopment programs. The so%ereignty of nations in determining their own population policies and
programs was repeatedly recogni8ed. The general impression after fi%e regional consultati%e meetings
on the 'lan was that it had general support.
There was general consternation, therefore, when at the beginning of the conference the 'lan was
sub0ected to a slashing, fi%e&pronged attac" led by 1lgeria, with the bac"ing of se%eral 1frican
countries? 1rgentina, supported by -ruguay, #ra8il, 'eru and, more limitedly, some other 2atin
1merican countries? the Dastern Duropean group less Eomania!? the 'E4 and the $oly See. 1lthough
the attac"s were not identical, they embraced three central elements rele%ant to -.S. policy and action in
this field;
1. Eepeated references to the importance or as some said, the pre&condition! of economic and social
de%elopment for the reduction of high fertility. 2ed by 1lgeria and 1rgentina, many emphasi8ed the
@new international economic order@ as central to economic and social de%elopment.
2. Dfforts to reduce the references to population programs, minimi8e their importance and delete all
references to 5uantitati%e or time goals.
3. 1dditional references to national so%ereignty in setting population policies and programs.
T-e P%"n f A.tin
<espite the initial attac" and continuing efforts to change the conceptual basis of the world 'opulation
'lan of 1ction, the 4onference adopted by acclamation only the $oly See stating a general reser%ation!
a complete 6orld 'opulation 'lan of 1ction. :t is less urgent in tone than the draft submitted by the -...
Secretariat but in se%eral ways more complete and with greater potential than that draft. The final action
followed a %igorous debate with hotly contested positions and forty&se%en %otes. .e%ertheless, there was
general satisfaction among the participants at the success of their efforts.
a. Principles and 2ims
The 'lan of 1ction lays down se%eral important principles, some for the first time in a -... document.
1. 1mong the first&time statements is the assertion that the so%ereign right of each nation to set its own
population policies is @to be e9ercised ... ta"ing into account uni%ersal solidarity in order to impro%e the
5uality of life of the peoples of the world.@ 'ara 13! This new pro%ision opens the way toward
increasing responsibility by nations toward other nations in establishing their national population
policies.
2. The conceptual relationship between population and de%elopment is stated in 'ara 13c!;
'opulation and de%elopment are interrelated; population %ariables influence de%elopment %ariables and
are also influenced by them? the formulation of a 6orld 'opulation 'lan of 1ction reflects the
international community)s awareness of the importance of population trends for socio&economic
de%elopment, and the socio&economic nature of the recommendations contained in this 'lan of 1ction
reflects its awareness of the crucial role that de%elopment plays in affecting population trends.
3. 1 basic right of couples and indi%iduals is recogni8ed by 'ara 13f!, for the first time in a single
declarati%e sentence;
1ll couples and indi%iduals ha%e the basic human right to decide freely and responsibly the number and
spacing of their children and to ha%e the information, education and means to do so?
,. 1lso for the first time, a -... document lin"s the responsibility of child&bearers to the community
B'ara 13f! continuedC;
The responsibility of couples and indi%iduals in the e9ercise of this right ta"es into account the needs of
their li%ing and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community.
:t is now possible to build on this newly&stated principle as the right of couples first recogni8ed in the
Tehran $uman Eights <eclaration of 19/* has been built on.
5. 1 flat declaration of the right of women is included in 'ara 13h!;
6omen ha%e the right to complete integration in the de%elopment process particularly by means of an
e5ual participation in educational, social, economic, cultural and political life. :n addition, the necessary
measures should be ta"en to facilitate this integration with family responsibilities which should be fully
shared by both partners.
/. The need for international action is accepted in 'ara 13"!;
The growing interdependence of countries ma"es the adoption of measures at the international le%el
increasingly important for the solution of problems of de%elopment and population problems.
(. The @primary aim@ of the 'lan of 1ction is asserted to be @to e9pand and deepen the capacities of
countries to deal effecti%ely with their national and subnational population problems and to promote an
appropriate international response to their needs by increasing international acti%ity in research, the
e9change of information, and the pro%ision of assistance on re5uest.@
b. Recommendations
The 'lan of 1ction includes recommendations for; population goals and policies? population growth?
mortality and morbidity? reproduction? family formation and the status of women? population
distribution and internal migration? international migration? population structure? socio&economic
policies? data collection and analysis? research? de%elopment and e%olution of population policies? the
role of national go%ernments and of international cooperation? and monitoring, re%iew and appraisal.
1 score of these recommendations are the most important;
1. >o%ernments should integrate population measures and programs into comprehensi%e social and
economic plans and programs and their integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities and
organi8ations for planning within the countries. 1 unit dealing with population aspects should be created
and placed at a high le%el of the national administrati%e structure. 'ara 9,!
2. 4ountries which consider their population growth hampers attainment of their goals should consider
adopting population policies && through a low le%el of birth and death rates. 'ara 1(, 1*!
3. $ighest priority should be gi%en to reduction in mortality and morbidity and increase of life
e9pectancy and programs for this purpose should reach rural areas and underpri%ileged groups. 'ara 20&
25!
,. 4ountries are urged to encourage appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and ma"e
a%ailable to persons who so desire ad%ice and means of achie%ing it. B'ara 29b!C
5. =amily planning and related ser%ices should aim at pre%ention of unwanted pregnancies and also at
elimination of in%oluntary sterility or subfecundity to enable couples to achie%e their desired number of
children. B'ara 29 c!C
/. 1de5uately trained au9iliary personnel, social wor"ers and non&go%ernment channels should be used
to help pro%ide family planning ser%ices. B'ara 29e!C
(. >o%ernments with family planning programs should consider coordinating them with health and other
ser%ices designed to raise the 5uality of life.
*. 4ountries wishing to affect fertility le%els should gi%e priority to de%elopment programs and health
and education strategies which ha%e a decisi%e effect upon demographic trends, including fertility. B'ara
31C :nternational cooperation should gi%e priority to assisting such national efforts. Such programs may
include reduction in infant and child mortality, increased education, particularly for females,
impro%ement in the status of women, land reform and support in old age. B'ara 32C
9. 4ountries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes are in%ited to set
5uantitati%e goals and implement policies to achie%e them by 19*5. B'ara 3(C
10. <e%eloped countries are urged to de%elop appropriate policies in population, consumption and
in%estment, bearing in mind the need for fundamental impro%ement in international e5uity.
11. #ecause the family is the basic unit of society, go%ernments should assist families as far as possible
through legislation and ser%ices. B'ara 39C
12. >o%ernments should ensure full participation of women in the educational, economic, social and
political life of their countries on an e5ual basis with men. B'ara ,0C 1 new pro%ision, added at
#ucharest.!
13. 1 series of recommendations are made to stabili8e migration within countries, particularly policies to
reduce the undesirable conse5uences of e9cessi%ely rapid urbani8ation and to de%elop opportunities in
rural areas and small towns, recogni8ing the right of indi%iduals to mo%e freely within their national
boundaries. B'ara ,,&50C
1,. 1greements should be concluded to regulate the international migration of wor"ers and to assure
non&discriminatory treatment and social ser%ices for these wor"ers and their families? also other
measures to decrease the brain drain from de%eloping countries. B'ara 51&/2C
15. To assure needed information concerning population trends, population censuses should be ta"en at
regular inter%als and information concerning births and deaths be made a%ailable at least annually. B'ara
(2&((C
1/. Eesearch should be intensified to de%elop "nowledge concerning the social, economic and political
interrelationships with population trends? effecti%e means of reducing infant and childhood mortality?
methods for integrating population goals into national plans, means of impro%ing the moti%ation of
people, analysis of population policies in relation to socio&economic de%elopment, laws and institution?
methods of fertility regulation to meet the %aried re5uirement of indi%iduals and communities, including
methods re5uiring no medical super%ision? the interrelations of health, nutrition and reproducti%e
biology? and utili8ation of social ser%ices, including family planning ser%ices. B'ara (*&*0C
1(. Training of management on population dynamics and administration, on an interdisciplinary basis,
should be pro%ided for medical, paramedical, traditional health personnel, program administrators,
senior go%ernment officials, labor, community and social leaders. Dducation and information programs
should be underta"en to bring population information to all areas of countries. B'aras *1&92C
1*. 1n important role of go%ernments is to determine and assess the population problems and needs of
their countries in the light of their political, social, cultural, religious and economic conditions? such an
underta"ing should be carried out systematically and periodically so as to pro%ide informed, rational and
dynamic decision&ma"ing in matters of population and de%elopment. B'ara 9(C
20. The 'lan of 1ction should be closely coordinated with the :nternational <e%elopment Strategy for
the Second -nited .ations <e%elopment <ecade, re%iewed in depth at fi%e year inter%als, and modified
as appropriate. B'aras 10/&10*C
The 'lan of 1ction hedges in presenting specific statements of 5uantitati%e goals or a time frame for the
reduction of fertility. These concepts are included, howe%er, in the combination of 'aras 1/ and 3/,
together with goals B'ara 3(C and the re%iew B'ara 10/C. 'ara 1/ states that, according to the -.. low
variant pro0ections, it is estimated that as a result of social and economic de%elopment and population
policies as reported by countries in the Second -nited .ations :n5uiry on 'opulation and <e%elopment,
population growth rates in the de%eloping countries as a whole may decline from the present le%el of
2.,3 per annum to about 23 by 19*5? and below 0.(3 per annum in the de%eloped countries. :n this
case the worldwide rate of population growth would decline from 23 to about 1.(3. 'ara 3/ says that
these pro0ections and those for mortality decline are consistent with declines in the birth rate of the
de%eloping countries as a whole from the present le%el of 3* per thousand to 30 per thousand by 19*5.
'ara 3/ goes on to say that @To achie%e by 19*5 these le%els of fertility would re5uire substantial
national efforts, by those countries concerned, in the field of socio&economic de%elopment and
population policies, supported, upon re5uest, by ade5uate international assistance.@ 'ara 3( then follows
with the statement that countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes
are in%ited to consider setting 5uantitati%e goals and implementing policies that may lead to the
attainment of such goals by 19*5. 'ara 10/ recommends a comprehensi%e re%iew and appraisal of
population trends and policies discussed in the 'lan of 1ction should be underta"en e%ery fi%e years and
modified, where%er needed, by D4ASA4.
Usef$%ness f t-e P%"n f A.tin
The 6orld 'opulation 'lan of 1ction, despite its wordiness and often hesitant tone, contains all the
necessary pro%isions for effecti%e population growth control programs at national and international
le%els. :t lac"s only plain statements of 5uantitati%e goals with time frames for their accomplishment.
These will ha%e to be added by indi%idual national action and de%elopment as rapidly as possible in
further -... documents. The basis for suitable goals e9ists in paragraphs 1/, 3/, 3(, and 10/, referred to
abo%e. The -... low %ariant pro0ection used in these paragraphs is close to the goals proposed by the
-nited States and other D41=D nations;
=or de%eloped countries &
replacement le%els of fertility by 19*5?
stationary populations as soon as practicable.
=or de%eloping countries &
replacement le%els in two or three decades.
=or the world &
a 1.(3 population growth rate by 19*5 with 23 a%erage for the de%eloping countries and 0.(3
a%erage for de%eloped countries?
replacement le%el of fertility for all countries by 2000.
The dangerous situation e%idenced by the current food situation and pro0ections for the future ma"e it
essential to press for the reali8ation of these goals. The beliefs, ideologies and misconceptions displayed
by many nations at #ucharest indicate more forcefully than e%er the need for e9tensi%e education of the
leaders of many go%ernments, especially in 1frica and some in 2atin 1merica. 1pproaches leaders of
indi%idual countries must be designed in the light of their current beliefs and to meet their special
concerns. These might include;
1. 'ro0ections of population growth indi%iduali8ed for countries and with analyses of relations of
population factors to social and economic de%elopment of each country.
2. =amiliari8ation programs at -... $ead5uarters in .ew Mor" for ministers of go%ernments, senior
policy le%el officials and comparably influential leaders from pri%ate life.
3. >reatly increased training programs for senior officials in the elements of demographic economics.
,. 1ssistance in integrating population factors in national plans, particularly as they relate to health
ser%ices, education, agricultural resources and de%elopment, employment, e5uitable distribution of
income and social stability.
5. 1ssistance in relating population policies and family planning programs to ma0or sectors of
de%elopment; health, nutrition, agriculture, education, social ser%ices, organi8ed labor, women)s
acti%ities, community de%elopment.
/. :nitiati%es to implement the 'ercy amendment regarding impro%ement in the status of women.
(. Dmphasis in assistance and de%elopment programs on de%elopment of rural areas.
1ll these acti%ities and others particularly producti%e are consistent with the 'lan of 1ction and may be
based upon it.
#eyond these acti%ities, essentially directed at national interests, a broader educational concept is needed
to con%ey an acute understanding of the interrelation of national interests and world population growth
4A$! !096 49?"C% $EC9MMEN>A!"9NS
I2 Int!d$.tin - A U2S2 G%'"% P1$%"tin St!"te3(
There is no simple single approach to the population problem which will provide a
Btechnological /.B. (s the previous analysis ma0es clear the problem of population growth
has social, economic and technological aspects all of which must be understood and dealt
with for a world population policy to succeed. With this in mind, the following broad
recommended strategy provides a framewor0 for the development of speci/c individual
programs which must be tailored to the needs and particularities of each country and of
diferent sectors of the population within a country. 1ssentially all its recommendations
made below are supported by the World Population Plan of action drafted at the World
Population -onference.
A2 @"si. G%'"% St!"te3(
The following basic elements are necessary parts of a comprehensive approach to the
population problem which must include both bilateral and multilateral components to
achieve success. Thus, <=* population assistance programs will need to be coordinated
with those of the ma2or multilateral institutions, voluntary organiFations, and other
bilateral donors.
The common strategy for dealing with rapid population growth should encourage constructi%e actions to
lower fertility since population growth o%er the years will seriously negate reasonable prospects for the
sound social and economic de%elopment of the peoples in%ol%ed.
6hile the time hori8on in this .SS+ is the year 2000 we must recogni8e that in most countries,
especially the 2<4s, population stability cannot be achie%ed until the ne9t century. There are too many
powerful socio&economic factors operating on family si8e decisions and too much momentum built into
the dynamics of population growth to permit a 5uic" and dramatic re%ersal of current trends. There is
also e%en less cause for optimism on the rapidity of socio&economic progress that would generate rapid
fertility reduction in the poor 2<4s than on the feasibility of e9tending family planning ser%ices to those
in their populations who may wish to ta"e ad%antage of them. Thus, at this point we cannot "now with
certainty when world population can feasibly be stabili8ed, nor can we state with assurance the limits of
the world)s ecological @carrying capability@. #ut we can be certain of the desirable direction of change
and can state as a plausible ob0ecti%e the target of achie%ing replacement fertility rates by the year 2000.
A%er the past few years, -.S. go%ernment&funded population programs ha%e played a ma0or role in
arousing interest in family planning in many countries, and in launching and accelerating the growth of
national family planning programs. :n most countries, there has been an initial rapid growth in
contracepti%e @acceptors@ up to perhaps 103 of fertile couples in a few 2<4s. The acceleration of
pre%ious trends of fertility decline is attributable, at least in part, to family planning programs.
$owe%er, there is growing appreciation that the problem is more long term and comple9 than first
appeared and that a short term burst of acti%ity or moral fer%or will not sol%e it. The danger in this
reali8ation is that the -.S. might abandon its commitment to assisting in the world)s population problem,
rather than facing up to it for the long&run difficult problem that it is.
=rom year to year we are learning more about what "ind of fertility reduction is feasible in differing
2<4 situations. >i%en the laws of compound growth, e%en comparati%ely small reductions in fertility
o%er the ne9t decade will ma"e a significant difference in total numbers by the year 2000, and a far more
significant one by the year 2050.
The proposed strategy calls for a coordinated approach to respond to the important -.S. foreign policy
interest in the influence of population growth on the world)s political, economic and ecological systems.
6hat is unusual about population is that this foreign policy interest must ha%e a time hori8on far beyond
that of most other ob0ecti%es. 6hile there are strong short&run reasons for population programs, because
of such factors as food supply, pressures on social ser%ice budgets, urban migration and social and
political instability, the ma0or impact of the benefits & or a%oidance of catastrophe & that could be
accomplished by a strengthened -.S. commitment in the population area will be felt less by those of us
in the -.S. and other countries today than by our children and grandchildren.
@2 Ae( C$nt!( 1!i!ities in U2S2 "nd M$%ti%"te!"% P1$%"tin Assist"n.e
6ne issue in any global population strategy is the degree of emphasis in allocation of
program resources among countries. The options available range from heavy
concentration on a few vital large countries to a geographically diverse program
essentially involving all countries willing to accept such assistance. (ll agencies believe
the following policy provides the proper overall balance.
:n order to assist the de%elopment of ma0or countries and to ma9imi8e progress toward population
stability, primary emphasis would be placed on the largest and fastest growing de%eloping countries
where the imbalance between growing numbers and de%elopment potential most seriously ris"s
instability, unrest, and international tensions. These countries are; :ndia, #angladesh, 'a"istan, .igeria,
+e9ico, :ndonesia, #ra8il, The 'hilippines, Thailand, Dgypt, Tur"ey, Dthiopia, and 4olombia. Aut of a
total (3.3 million worldwide a%erage increase in population from 19(0&(5 these countries contributed
3,.3 million or ,(3. This group of priority countries includes some with %irtually no go%ernment
interest in family planning and others with acti%e go%ernment family planning programs which re5uire
and would welcome enlarged technical and financial assistance. These countries should be gi%en the
highest priority within 1:<)s population program in terms of resource allocations and7or leadership
efforts to encourage action by other donors and organi8ations.
$owe%er, other countries would not be ignored. 1:< would pro%ide population assistance and7or
underta"e leadership efforts with respect to other, lower priority countries to the e9tent that the
a%ailability of funds and staff permits, ta"ing into account of such factors as ; long run -.S. political
interests? impact of rapid population growth on its de%elopment potential? the country)s relati%e
contribution to world population growth? its financial capacity to cope with the problem? potential
impact on domestic unrest and international frictions which can apply to small as well as large
countries!? its significance as a test or demonstration case? and opportunities for e9penditures that appear
particularly cost&effecti%e e.g. it has been suggested that there may be particularly cost&effecti%e
opportunities for supporting family planning to reduce the lag between mortality and fertility declines in
countries where death rates are still declining rapidly!? national commitment to an effecti%e program.
=or both the high priority countries and the lower priority ones to which funds and staff permit aid, the
form and content of our assistance or leadership efforts would %ary from country to country, depending
on each nation)s particular interests, needs, and recepti%ity to %arious forms of assistance. =or e9ample,
if these countries are recepti%e to -.S. assistance through bilateral or central 1:< funding, we should
pro%ide such assistance at le%els commensurate with the recipient)s capability to finance needed actions
with its own funds, the contributions of other donors and organi8ations, and the effecti%eness with which
funds can be used.
:n countries where -.S. assistance is limited either by the nature of political or diplomatic relations with
those countries or by lac" of strong go%ernment desire. :n population reduction programs, e9ternal
technical and financial assistance if desired by the countries! would ha%e to come from other donors
and7or from pri%ate and international organi8ations, many of which recei%e contributions from 1:<. The
-S> would, howe%er, maintain an interest e.g. through Dmbassies! in such countries) population
problems and programs if any! to reduce population growth rates. +oreo%er, particularly in the case of
high priority countries, we should be alert to opportunities for e9panding our assistance efforts and for
demonstrating to their leaders the conse5uences of rapid population growth and the benefits of actions to
reduce fertility.
:n countries to which other forms of -.S. assistance are pro%ided but not population assistance, 1:< will
monitor progress toward achie%ement of de%elopment ob0ecti%es, ta"ing into account the e9tent to which
these are hindered by rapid population growth, and will loo" for opportunities to encourage initiation of
or impro%ement in population policies and programs.
:n addition, the -.S. strategy should support in these 2<4 countries general acti%ities e.g. bio&medical
research or fertility control methods! capable of achie%ing ma0or brea"throughs in "ey problems which
hinder reductions in population growth.
C2 Inst!$/ents "nd Md"%ities f! P1$%"tin Assist"n.e
Dilateral population assistance is the largest and most invisible BinstrumentB for carrying
out <.=. policy in this area. 6ther instruments includeC support for and coordination with
population programs of multilateral organiFations and voluntary agencies8 encouragement
of multilateral country consortia and consultative groups to emphasiFe family planning in
reviews of overall recipient progress and aid requests8 and formal and informal
presentation of views at international gatherings, such as food and population
conferences. =peci/c country strategies must be wor0ed out for each of the highest
priority countries, and for the lower priority ones. These strategies will ta0e account of
such factors asC national attitudes and sensitivities on family planning8 which
BinstrumentsB will be most acceptable, opportunities for efective use of assistance8 and
need of e.ternal capital or operating assistance.
=or e9ample, in +e9ico our strategy would focus on wor"ing primarily through pri%ate agencies and
multilateral organi8ations to encourage more go%ernment attention to the need for control of population
growth? in #angladesh we might pro%ide large&scale technical and financial assistance, depending on the
soundness of specific program re5uests? in :ndonesia we would respond to assistance re5uests but would
see" to ha%e :ndonesia meet as much of program costs from its own resources i.e. surplus oil earnings!
as possible. :n general we would not pro%ide large&scale bilateral assistance in the more de%eloped
2<4s, such as #ra8il or +e9ico. 1lthough these countries are in the top priority list our approach must
ta"e account of the fact that their problems relate often to go%ernment policies and decisions and not to
larger scale need for concessional assistance.
6ithin the o%erall array of -.S. foreign assistance programs, preferential treatment in allocation of funds
and manpower should be gi%en to cost&effecti%e programs to reduce population growth? including both
family planning acti%ities and supporti%e acti%ities in other sectors.
6hile some ha%e argued for use of e9plicit @le%erage@ to @force@ better population programs on 2<4
go%ernments, there are se%eral practical constraints on our efforts to achie%e program impro%ements.
1ttempts to use @le%erage@ for far less sensiti%e issues ha%e generally caused political frictions and often
bac"fired. Successful family planning re5uires strong local dedication and commitment that cannot o%er
the long run be enforced from the outside. There is also the danger that some 2<4 leaders will see
de%eloped country pressures for family planning as a form of economic or racial imperialism? this could
well create a serious bac"lash.
Short of @le%erage@, there are many opportunities, bilaterally and multilaterally, for -.S. representations
to discuss and urge the need for stronger family planning programs. There is also some established
precedent for ta"ing account of family planning performance in appraisal of assistance re5uirements by
1:< and consultati%e groups. Since population growth is a ma0or determinant of increases in food
demand, allocation of scarce '2 ,*0 resources should ta"e account of what steps a country is ta"ing in
population control as well as food production. :n these sensiti%e relationships, howe%er, it is important in
style as well as substance to a%oid the appearance of coercion.
D2 P!&isin "nd De&e%1/ent f F"/i%( P%"nnin3 Se!&i.es0 Inf!/"tin "nd Te.-n%3(
Past e.perience suggests that easily available family planning services are a vital and
efective element in reducing fertility rates in the +,-s.
Two main ad%ances are re5uired for pro%iding safe and effecti%e fertility control techni5ues in the
de%eloping countries;
1. 4-pansion and further development of efficient low*cost systems to assure the full availability of
e-isting family planning services) materials and information to the %&? of ./0 populations not now
effectively reached. :n de%eloping countries willing to create special deli%ery systems for family
planning ser%ices this may be the most effecti%e method. :n others the most efficient and acceptable
method is to combine family planning with health or nutrition in multi&purpose deli%ery systems.
2. 9mproving the effectiveness of present means of fertility control) and developing new technologies
which are simple) low cost) effective) safe) long*lasting and acceptable to potential users. This in%ol%es
both basic de%elopmental research and operations research to 0udge the utility of new or modified
approaches under 2<4 conditions.
#oth of these goals should be gi%en %ery high priority with necessary additional funding consistent with
current or ad0usted di%isions of labor among other donors and organi8ations in%ol%ed in these areas of
population assistance.
E2 C!e"tin3 Cnditins Cnd$.i&e t Fe!ti%it( De.%ine
It is clear that the availability of contraceptive services and information is not a complete
answer to the population problem. In view of the importance of socio$economic factors in
determining desired family siFe, overall assistance strategy should increasingly
concentrate on selective policies which will contribute to population decline as well as
other goals. This strategy re7ects the complementarity between population control and
other <.=. development ob2ectives, particularly those relating to (I,&s -ongressional
mandate to focus on problems of the Bpoor ma2orityB in +,-&s.
6e "now that certain "inds of de%elopment policies && e.g., those which pro%ide the poor with a ma0or
share in de%elopment benefits && both promote fertility reductions and accomplish other ma0or
de%elopment ob0ecti%es. There are other policies which appear to also promote fertility reduction but
which may conflict with non&population ob0ecti%es e.g., consider the effect of bringing a large number
of women into the labor force in countries and occupations where unemployment is already high and
rising!.
$owe%er, 1:< "nows only appro9imately the relati%e priorities among the factors that affect fertility and
is e%en further away from "nowing what specific cost&effecti%e steps go%ernments can ta"e to affect
these factors.
.e%ertheless, with what limited information we ha%e, the urgency of mo%ing forward toward lower
fertility rates, e%en without complete "nowledge of the socio&economic forces in%ol%ed, suggests a
three&pronged strategy;
1. $igh priority to large&scale implementation of programs affecting the determinants of fertility in those
cases where there is probable cost&effecti%eness, ta"ing account of potential impact on population
growth rates? other de%elopment benefits to be gained? ethical considerations? feasibility in light of 2<4
bureaucratic and political concerns and problems? and timeframe for accomplishing ob0ecti%es.
2. $igh priority to e9perimentation and pilot pro0ects in areas where there is e%idence of a close
relationship to fertility reduction but where there are serious 5uestions about cost&effecti%eness relating
either to other de%elopment impact e.g., the female employment e9ample cited abo%e! or to program
design e.g., what cost&effecti%e steps can be ta"en to promote female employment or literacy!.
3. $igh priority to comparati%e research and e%aluation on the relati%e impact on desired family si8e of
the socio&economic determinants of fertility in general and on what policy scope e9ists for affecting
these determinants.
:n all three cases emphasis should be gi%en to mo%ing action as much as possible to 2<4 institutions
and indi%iduals rather than to in%ol%ing -.S. researchers on a large scale.
1cti%ities in all three categories would recei%e %ery high priority in allocation of 1:< funds. The largest
amounts re5uired should be in the first category and would generally not come from population funds.
$owe%er, since such acti%ities e.g., in rural de%elopment and basic education! coincide with other 1:<
sectoral priorities, sound pro0ect re5uests from 2<4)s will be placed close to the top in 1:<)s funding
priorities assuming that they do not conflict with other ma0or de%elopment and other foreign policy
ob0ecti%es!.
The following areas appear to contain significant promise in effecting fertility declines, and are
discussed in subse5uent sections.
providing minimal levels of education especially for women8
reducing infant and child mortality8
e.panding opportunities for wage employment especially for women8
developing alternatives to Bsocial securityB support provided by children to aging
parents8
pursuing development strategies that s0ew income growth toward the poor,
especially rural development focussing on rural poverty8
concentrating on the education and indoctrination of the rising generation of
children regarding the desirability of smaller family siFe.
The World Population Plan of (ction includes a provision 4paragraph '15 that countries
trying for efective fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health
and education strategies which have a decisive efect upon demographic trends, including
fertility. It calls for international information to give priority to assisting such national
eforts. Programs suggested 4paragraph '5 are essentially the same as those listed
above.
=ood is another of special concern in any population strategy. 1de5uate food stoc"s need to be created to
pro%ide for periods of se%ere shortages and 2<4 food production efforts must be reenforced to meet
increased demand resulting from population and income growth. -.S. agricultural production goals
should ta"e account of the normal import re5uirements of 2<4)s as well as de%eloped countries! and of
li"ely occasional crop failures in ma0or parts of the 2<4 world. 6ithout impro%ed food security, there
will be pressure leading to possible conflict and the desire for large families for @insurance@ purposes,
thus undermining other de%elopment and population control efforts.
F2 De&e%1/ent f W!%d-Wide P%iti."% "nd P1$%"! C//it/ent t P1$%"tin St"'i%iB"tin "nd
Its Ass.i"ted I/1!&e/ent f Indi&id$"% Q$"%it( f Life2
( fundamental element in any overall strategy to deal with the population problem is
obtaining the support and commitment of 0ey leaders in the developing countries. This is
only possible if they can clearly see the negative impact of unrestricted population growth
in their countries and the bene/ts of reducing birth rates $ and if they believe it is possible
to cope with the population problem through instruments of public policy. =ince most high
oJcials are in oJce for relatively short periods, they have to see early bene/ts or the
value of longer term statesmanship. In each speci/c case, individual leaders will have to
approach their population problems within the conte.t of their country&s values, resources,
and e.isting priorities.
Therefore, it is %ital that leaders of ma0or 2<4s themsel%es ta"e the lead in ad%ancing family planning
and population stabili8ation, not only within the -... and other international organi8ations but also
through bilateral contacts with leaders of other 2<4s. Eeducing population growth in 2<4s should not
be ad%ocated e9clusi%ely by the de%eloped countries. The -.S. should encourage such a role as
opportunities appear in its high le%el contact with 2<4 leaders.
The most recent forum for such an effort was the 1ugust 19(, -... 6orld 'opulation 4onference. :t
was an ideal conte9t to focus concerted world attention on the problem. The debate %iews and highlights
of the 6orld 'opulation 'lan of action are re%iewed in 4hapter J:.
The -.S. strengthened its credibility as an ad%ocate of lower population growth rates by e9plaining that,
while it did not ha%e a single written action population policy, it did ha%e legislation, D9ecuti%e #ranch
policies and court decisions that amounted to a national policy and that our national fertility le%el was
already below replacement and seemed li"ely to attain a stable population by 2000.
The -.S. also proposed to @oin with other de%eloped countries in an international collaborati%e effort of
research in human reproduction and fertility control co%ering bio&medical and socio&economic factors.
The -.S. further offered to collaborate with other interested donor countries and organi8ations e.g.,
6$A, -.='1, 6orld #an", -.:4D=! to encourage further action by 2<4 go%ernments and other
institutions to pro%ide low&cost, basic pre%enti%e health ser%ices, including maternal and child health
and family planning ser%ices, reaching out into the remote rural areas.
The -.S. delegation also said the -.S. would re5uest from the 4ongress increased -.S. bilateral
assistance to population&family planning programs, and additional amounts for essential functional
acti%ities and our contribution to the -.='1 if countries showed an interest in such assistance.
Dach of these commitments is important and should be pursued by the -.S. >o%ernment.
:t is %ital that the effort to de%elop and strengthen a commitment on the part of the 2<4 leaders not be
seen by them as an industriali8ed country policy to "eep their strength down or to reser%e resources for
use by the @rich@ countries. <e%elopment of such a perception could create a serious bac"lash ad%erse to
the cause of population stability. Thus the -.S. and other @rich@ countries should ta"e care that policies
they ad%ocate for the 2<4)s would be acceptable within their own countries. This may re5uire public
debate and affirmation of our intended policies.! The @political@ leadership role in de%eloping countries
should, of course, be ta"en whene%er possible by their own leaders.
The -.S. can help to minimi8e charges of an imperialist moti%ation behind its support of population
acti%ities by repeatedly asserting that such support deri%es from a concern with;
a! the right of the indi%idual couple to determine freely and responsibly their number and spacing of
children and to ha%e information, education, and 1means to do so? and
b! the fundamental social and economic de%elopment of poor countries in which rapid population
growth is both a contributing cause and a conse5uence of widespread po%erty.
=urthermore, the -.S. should also ta"e steps to con%ey the message that the control of world population
growth is in the mutual interest of the de%eloped and de%eloping countries ali"e.
=amily planning programs should be supported by multilateral organi8ations where%er they can pro%ide
the most efficient and acceptable means. 6here -.S. bilateral assistance is necessary or preferred, it
should be pro%ided in collaboration with host country institutions && as is the case now. 4redit should go
to local leaders for the success of pro0ects. The success and acceptability of family planning assistance
will depend in large measure on the degree to which it contributes to the ability of the host go%ernment
to ser%e and obtain the support of its people.
:n many countries today, decision&ma"ers are wary of instituting population programs, not because they
are unconcerned about rapid population growth, but because they lac" confidence that such programs
will succeed. #y acti%ely wor"ing to demonstrate to such leaders that national population and family
planning programs ha%e achie%ed progress in a wide %ariety of poor countries, the -.S. could help
persuade the leaders of many countries that the in%estment of funds in national family planning
programs is li"ely to yield high returns e%en in the short and medium term. Se%eral e9amples of success
e9ist already, although regrettably they tend to come from 2<4s that are untypically well off in terms of
income growth and7or social ser%ices or are islands or city states.
6e should also appeal to potential leaders among the younger generations in de%eloping countries,
focusing on the implications of continued rapid population growth for their countries in the ne9t 10&20
years, when they may assume national leadership roles.
#eyond see"ing to reach and influence national leaders, impro%ed world&wide support for population&
related efforts should be sought through increased emphasis on mass media and other population
education and moti%ation programs by the -..., -S:1, and -S1:<. 6e should gi%e higher priorities in
our information programs world&wide for this area and consider e9pansion of collaborati%e
arrangements with multilateral institutions in population education programs.
1nother challenge will be in obtaining the further understanding and support of the -.S. public and
4ongress for the necessary added funds for such an effort, gi%en the competing demands for resources.
:f an effecti%e program is to be mounted by the -.S., we will need to contribute significant new amounts
of funds. Thus there is need to reinforce the positi%e attitudes of those in 4ongress who presently
support -.S. acti%ity in the population field and to enlist their support in persuading others. 'ublic
debate is needed now.
'ersonal approaches by the 'resident, the Secretary of State, other members of the 4abinet, and their
principal deputies would be helpful in this effort. 4ongress and the public must be clearly informed that
the D9ecuti%e #ranch is seriously worried about the problem and that it deser%es their further attention.
4ongressional representati%es at the 6orld 'opulation 4onference can help.
An A%te!n"ti&e Vie;
The above basic strategy assumes that the current forms of assistance programs in both
population and economic and social development areas will be able to solve the problem.
There is however, another view, which is shared by a growing number of e.perts. It
believes that the outloo0 is much harsher and far less tractable than commonly perceived.
This holds that the severity of the population problem in this century which is already
claiming the lives of more than 1! million people yearly, is such as to ma0e li0ely
continued widespread food shortage and other demographic catastrophes, and, in the
words of -.P. =now, we shall be watching people starve on television.
The conclusion of this %iew is that mandatory programs may be needed and that we should be
considering these possibilities now.
This school of thought belie%es the following types of 5uestions need to be addressed;
Should the -.S. ma"e an all out commitment to ma0or limitation of world population with all the
financial and international as well as domestic political costs that would entailF
Should the -.S. set e%en higher agricultural production goals which would enable it to pro%ide
additional ma0or food resources to other countriesF Should they be nationally or internationally
controlledF
An what basis should such food resources then be pro%idedF 6ould food be considered an instrument of
national powerF 6ill we be forced to ma"e choices as to whom we can reasonably assist, and if so,
should population efforts be a criterion for such assistanceF
:s the -.S. prepared to accept food rationing to help people who can)t7won)t control their population
growthF
Should the -.S. see" to change its own food consumption patterns toward more efficient uses of
proteinF
1re mandatory population control measures appropriate for the -.S. and7or for othersF
Should the -.S. initiate a ma0or research effort to address the growing problems of fresh water supply,
ecological damage, and ad%erse climateF
6hile definiti%e answers to those 5uestions are not possible in this study gi%en its time limitations and
its implications for domestic policy, ne%ertheless they are needed if one accepts the drastic and persistent
character of the population growth problem. Should the choice be made that the recommendations and
the options gi%en below are not ade5uate to meet this problem, consideration should be gi%en to a
further study and additional action in this field as outlined abo%e.
Cn.%$sin
The overall strategy above provides a general approach through which the diJculties and
dangers of population growth and related problems can be approached in a balanced and
comprehensive basis. 9o single efort will do the 2ob. 6nly a concerted and ma2or efort in
a number of carefully selected directions can provide the hope of success in reducing
population growth and its unwanted dangers to world economic will$being and political
stability. There are no Bquic0$/.esB in this /eld.
#elow are specific program recommendations which are designed to implement this strategy. Some will
re5uire few new resources? many call for ma0or efforts and significant new resources. 6e cannot simply
buy population growth moderation for nearly , billion people @on the cheap@.
II2 A.tin t C!e"te Cnditins f! Fe!ti%it( De.%ine= P1$%"tin "nd " De&e%1/ent
Assist"n.e St!"te3(
II2 A2 Gene!"% St!"te3( "nd Res$!.e A%%."tins f! AID Assist"n.e
Dis.$ssin=
1. %ast %rogram ,ctions
=ince inception of the program in 1%A", (I, has obligated nearly ;A" million for
population activities. These funds have been used primarily to 415 draw attention to the
population problem, 45 encourage multilateral and other donor support for the worldwide
population efort, and 4'5 help create and maintain the means for attac0ing the problem,
including the development of +,- capabilities to do so.
:n pursuing these ob0ecti%es, 1:<)s population resources were focussed on areas of need where action
was feasible and li"ely to be effecti%e. 1:< has pro%ided assistance to population programs in some (0
2<4s, on a bilateral basis and7or indirectly through pri%ate organi8ations and other channels. 1:<
currently pro%ides bilateral assistance to 3/ of these countries. State and 1:< played an important role in
establishing the -nited .ations =und for 'opulation 1cti%ities -.='1! to spearhead multilateral effort
in population as a complement to the bilateral actions of 1:< and other donor countries. Since the
=und)s establishment, 1:< has been the largest single contributor. +oreo%er, with assistance from 1:< a
number of pri%ate family planning organi8ations e.g., 'athfinder =und, :nternational 'lanned
'arenthood =oundation, 'opulation 4ouncil! ha%e significantly e9panded their worldwide population
programs. Such organi8ations are still the main supporters of family planning action in many de%eloping
countries.
1:< actions ha%e been a ma0or catalyst in stimulating the flow of funds into 2<4 population programs &
from almost nothing ten years ago, the amounts being spent from all sources in 19(, for programs in the
de%eloping countries of 1frica, 2atin 1merica, and 1sia e9cluding 4hina! will total between L,00 and
L500 million. 1bout half of this will be contributed by the de%eloped countries bilaterally or through
multilateral agencies, and the balance will come from the budgets of the de%eloping countries
themsel%es. 1:<)s contribution is about one&5uarter of the total & 1:< obligated L112., million for
population programs in =M 19(, and plans for =M 19(5 program of L13(.5 million.
6hile world resources for population acti%ities will continue to grow, they are unli"ely to e9pand as
rapidly as needed. Ane rough estimate is that fi%e times the current amount, or about L2.5 billion in
constant dollars, will be re5uired annually by 19*5 to pro%ide the 2.5 billion people in the de%eloping
world, e9cluding 4hina, with full&scale family planning programs!. :n %iew of these limited resources
1:<)s efforts in both fiscal and manpower terms! and through its leadership the efforts of others, must
be focussed to the e9tent possible on high priority needs in countries where the population problem is
the most acute. 1ccordingly, 1:< last year began a process of de%eloping geographic and functional
program priorities for use in allocating funds and staff, and in arranging and ad0usting di%isions of labor
with other donors and organi8ations acti%e in the worldwide population effort. 1lthough this study has
not yet been completed, a general outline of a -.S. population assistance strategy can be de%eloped from
the results of the priorities studied to date. The geographic and functional parameters of the strategy are
discussed under 2. and 3. below. The implications for population resource allocations are presented
under ,.
2. &eographic %riorities in 3.". %opulation ,ssistance
The <.=. strategy should be to encourage and support, through bilateral, multilateral and
other channels, constructive actions to lower fertility rates in selected developing
countries. Within this overall strategy and in view of funding and manpower limitations,
the <.=. should emphasiFe assistance to those countries where the population problem is
the most serious.
There are three ma0or factors to consider in 0udging the seriousness of the problem;
The first is the country)s contribution to the world)s population problem, which is determined by the si8e
of its population, its population growth rate, and its progress in the @demographic transition@ from high
birth and high death rates to low ones.
The second is the e9tent to which population growth impinges on the country)s economic de%elopment
and its financial capacity to cope with its population problem.
The third factor is the e9tent to which an imbalance between growing numbers of people and a country)s
capability to handle the problem could lead to serious instability, international tensions, or conflicts.
1lthough many countries may e9perience ad%erse conse5uences from such imbalances, the
troublema"ing regional or international conditions might not be as serious in some places as they are in
others.
#ased on the first two criteria, 1:< has de%eloped a preliminary ran" ordering of nearly 100 de%eloping
countries which, after re%iew and refinement, will be used as a guide in 1:<)s own funding and
manpower resource allocations and in encouraging action through 1:< leadership efforts on the part of
other population assistance instrumentalities. 1pplying these three criteria to this ran" ordering, there are
13 countries where we currently 0udge the problem and ris"s to be the most serious. They are;
#angladesh, :ndia, 'a"istan, :ndonesia, 'hilippines, Thailand, Dgypt, Tur"ey, Dthiopia, .igeria, #ra8il,
+e9ico, and 4olombia. Aut of a total /( million worldwide increase in population in 19(2 these
countries contributed about ,53. These countries range from those with %irtually no go%ernment interest
in family planning to those with acti%e go%ernment family planning programs which re5uire and would
welcome enlarged technical and financial assistance.
These countries should be gi%en the highest priority within 1:<)s population program in terms of
resource allocations and7or leadership efforts to encourage action by other donors and organi8ations. The
form and content of our assistance or leadership efforts would %ary from country&to&country as
discussed in 3. below!, depending on each country)s needs, its recepti%ity to %arious forms of assistance,
its capability to finance needed actions, the effecti%eness with which funds can be used, and current or
ad0usted di%isions of labor among the other donors and organi8ations pro%iding population assistance to
the country. 1:<)s population actions would also need to be consistent with the o%erall -.S.
de%elopment policy toward each country.
6hile the countries cited abo%e would be gi%en highest priority, other countries would not be ignored.
1:< would pro%ide population assistance and7or underta"e leadership efforts with respect to other
countries to the e9tent that the a%ailability of funds and staff permits, ta"ing account of such factors as; a
country)s placement in 1:<)s priority listing of 2<4s? its potential impact on domestic unrest and
international frictions which can apply to small as well as large countries!? its significance as a test or
demonstration case? and opportunities for e9penditures that appear particularly cost&effecti%e e.g. its has
been suggested that there may be particularly cost&effecti%e opportunities for supporting family planning
to reduce the lag between mortality and fertility declines in countries where death rates are still declining
rapidly!.
4. 5ode and Content of 3.". %opulation ,ssistance
In moving from geographic emphases to strategies for the mode and functional content of
population assistance to both the higher and lower priority countries which are to be
assisted, various factors need to be consideredC 415 the e.tent of a country&s
understanding of its population problem and interest in responding to it8 45 the speci/c
actions needed to cope with the problem8 4'5 the country&s need for e.ternal /nancial
assistance to deal with the problem8 and 4@5 its receptivity to various forms of assistance.
Some of the countries in the high priority group cited abo%e e.g. #angladesh, 'a"istan, :ndonesia,
'hilippines, Thailand! and some lower priority countries ha%e recogni8ed that rapid population growth is
a problem, are ta"ing actions of their own to deal with it, and are recepti%e to assistance from the -.S.
through bilateral or central 1:< funding! and other donors, as well as to multilateral support for their
efforts. :n these cases 1:< should continue to pro%ide such assistance based on each country)s functional
needs, the effecti%eness with which funds can be used in these areas, and current or ad0usted di%isions of
labor among other donors and organi8ations pro%iding assistance to the country. =urthermore, our
assistance strategies for these countries should consider their capabilities to finance needed population
actions. 4ountries which ha%e relati%ely large surpluses of e9port earning and foreign e9change reser%es
are unli"ely to re5uire large&scale e9ternal financial assistance and should be encouraged to finance their
own commodity imports as well as local costs. :n such cases our strategy should be to concentrate on
needed technical assistance and on attempting to play a catalytic role in encouraging better programs
and additional host country financing for dealing with the population problem.
:n other high and lower priority countries -.S. assistance is limited either by the nature of political or
diplomatic relations with those countries e.g. :ndia, Dgypt!, or by the lac" of strong go%ernment interest
in population reduction programs e.g. .igeria, Dthiopia, +e9ico, #ra8il!. :n such cases, e9ternal
technical and financial assistance, if desired by the countries, would ha%e to come from other donors
and7or from pri%ate and international organi8ations many of which recei%e contributions from 1:<!.
The -S> would, howe%er, maintain an interest e.g. through Dmbassies! in such countries) population
problems and programs if any! to reduce population growth rates. +oreo%er, particularly in the case of
high priority countries to which -.S. population assistance is now limited for one reason or another, we
should be alert to opportunities for e9panding our assistance efforts and for demonstrating to their
leaders the conse5uences of rapid population growth and the benefits of actions to reduce fertility.
:n countries to which other forms of -.S. assistance are pro%ided but not population assistance, 1:< will
monitor progress toward achie%ement of de%elopment ob0ecti%es, ta"ing into account the e9tent to which
these are hindered by rapid population growth, and will loo" for opportunities to encourage initiation of
or impro%ement in population policies and programs.
:n addition, the -.S. strategy should support general acti%ities capable of achie%ing ma0or brea"throughs
in "ey problems which hinder attainment of fertility control ob0ecti%es. =or e9ample, the de%elopment of
more effecti%e, simpler contracepti%e methods through bio&medical research will benefit all countries
which face the problem of rapid population growth? impro%ements in methods for measuring
demographic changes will assist a number of 2<4s in determining current population growth rates and
e%aluating the impact o%er time of population7family planning acti%ities.
6. 7esource ,llocations for 3.". %opulation ,ssistance
(I, funds obligated for populationIfamily planning assistance rose steadily since inception
of the program 4;1! million in the :L 1%A"$A# period5 to nearly ;1" million in :L 1%#. In
:L 1%#', however, funds available for population remained at the ;1" million level8 in :L
1%#@ they actually declined slightly, to ;11." million because of a ceiling on population
obligations inserted in the legislation by the Kouse (ppropriations -ommittee. With this
plateau in (I, population obligations, worldwide resources have not been adequate to
meet all identi/ed, sensible funding needs, and we therefore see opportunities for
signi/cant e.pansion of the program.
Some ma0or actions in the area of creating conditions for fertility decline, as described in Section ::#,
can be funded from 1:< resources a%ailable for the sectors in 5uestion e.g., education, agriculture!.
Ather actions come under the pur%iew of population @Title N@! funds. :n this latter category, increases
in pro0ected budget re5uests to the 4ongress on the order of L35&50 million annually through =M 19*0 &&
abo%e the L13(.5 million re5uested by =M 19(5 && appear appropriate at this time. Such increases must
be accompanied by e9panding contributions to the worldwide population effort from other donors and
organi8ations and from the 2<4s themsel%es, if significant progress is to be made. The -S> should ta"e
ad%antage of appropriate opportunities to stimulate such contributions from others.
Title N 8undin6 for Population
))
* Year 3&ount #L &illion( *
))
* 8Y 191! 3ctual Fbli6ations 1!/./ *
* 8Y 191/ 3ctual Fbli6ations 1!5.6 *
* 8Y 1912 3ctual Fbli6ations 11!.2 *
* 8Y 1915 5eOuest to -on6ress 1/1.5 *
* 8Y 1916 Projection 11" *
* 8Y 1911 Projection !1" *
* 8Y 1910 Projection !5" *
* 8Y 1919 Projection /"" *
* 8Y 190" Projection /5" *
))
These Title N funding pro2ections for :L 1%#A$)! are general magnitudes based on
preliminary estimates of e.pansion or initiation of population programs in developing
countries and growing requirements for outside assistance as discussed in greater detail in
other sections of this paper. These estimates contemplated very substantial increases in
self$help and assistance from other donor countries.
Aur ob0ecti%e should be to assure that de%eloping countries ma"e family planning information,
educational and means a%ailable to all their peoples by 19*0. Aur efforts should include;
:ncreased 1.:.<. bilateral and centrally&funded programs, consistent with the geographic priorities cited
abo%e.
D9panded contributions to multilateral and pri%ate organi8ations that can wor" effecti%ely in the
population area.
=urther research on the relati%e impact of %arious socio&economic factors on desired family si8e, and
e9perimental efforts to test the feasibility of larger&scale efforts to affect some of these factors.
1dditional bio&medical research to impro%e the e9isting means of fertility control and to de%elop new
ones which are safe, effecti%e, ine9pensi%e, and attracti%e to both men and women.
:nno%ati%e approaches to pro%iding family planning ser%ices, such as the utili8ation of commercial
channels for distribution of contracepti%es, and the de%elopment of low&cost systems for deli%ering
effecti%e health and family planning ser%ices to the *53 of 2<4 populations not now reached by such
ser%ices.
D9panded efforts to increase the awareness of 2<4 leaders and publics regarding the conse5uences of
rapid population growth and to stimulate further 2<4 commitment to actions to reduce fertility.
6e belie%e e9pansions in the range of 35&50 million annually o%er the ne9t fi%e years are realistic, in
light of potential 2<4 needs and prospects for increased contributions from other population assistance
instrumentalities, as well as constraints on the speed with which 1:< and other donors! population
funds can be e9panded and effecti%ely utili8ed. These include negati%e or ambi%alent host go%ernment
attitudes toward population reduction programs? the need for complementary financial and manpower
inputs by recipient go%ernments, which must come at the e9pense of other programs they consider to be
high priority? and the need to assure that new pro0ects in%ol%e sensible, effecti%e actions that are li"ely
to reduce fertility. 6e must a%oid inade5uately planned or implemented programs that lead to e9tremely
high costs per acceptor. :n effect, we are closer to @absorpti%e capacity@ in terms of year&to&year
increases in population programs than we are, for e9ample, in annual e9pansions in food, fertili8er or
generali8ed resource transfers.
:t would be premature to ma"e detailed funding recommendations by countries and functional categories
in light of our inability to predict what changes && such as in host country attitudes to -.S. population
assistance and in fertility control technologies && may occur which would significantly alter funding
needs in particular geographic or functional areas. =or e9ample, 1:< is currently precluded from
pro%iding bilateral assistance to :ndia and Dgypt, two significant countries in the highest priority group,
due to the nature of -.S. political and diplomatic relations with these countries. $owe%er, if these
relationships were to change and bilateral aid could be pro%ided, we would want to consider pro%iding
appropriate population assistance to these countries. :n other cases, changing -.S.&2<4 relationships
might preclude further aid to some countries. =actors such as these could both change the mi9 and affect
o%erall magnitudes of funds needed for population assistance. Therefore, proposed program mi9es and
funding le%els by geographic and functional categories should continue to be e9amined on an annual
basis during the regular -S> program and budget re%iew processes which lead to the presentation of
funding re5uests to the 4ongress.
Eecogni8ing that changing opportunities for action could substantially affect 1:<)s resource
re5uirements for population assistance, we anticipate that, if funds are pro%ided by the 4ongress at the
le%els pro0ected, we would be able to co%er necessary actions related to the highest priority countries
and also those related to lower priority countries, mo%ing reasonably far down the list. 1t this point,
howe%er, 1:< belie%es it would not be desirable to ma"e priority 0udgments on which acti%ities would
not be funded if 4ongress did not pro%ide the le%els pro0ected. :f cuts were made in these le%els we
would ha%e to ma"e 0udgments based on such factors as the priority ran"ings of countries, then&e9isting
2<4 needs, and di%isions of labor with other actors in the population assistance area.
:f 1:<)s population assistance program is to e9pand at the general magnitudes cited abo%e, additional
direct hire staff will li"ely be needed. 6hile the e9pansion in program action would be primarily
through grants and contracts with 2<4 or -.S. institutions, or through contributions to international
organi8ations, increases in direct hire staff would be necessary to re%iew pro0ect proposals, monitor their
implementation through such instrumentalities, and e%aluate their progress against pre&established goals.
Specific direct hire manpower re5uirements should continue to be considered during the annual program
and budget re%iews, along with details of program mi9 and funding le%els by country and functional
category, in order to correlate staffing needs with pro0ected program actions for a particular year.
7ecommendations
1. The <.=. strategy should be to encourage and support, through bilateral, multilateral
and other channels, constructive action to lower fertility rates in selected developing
countries. The <.=. should apply each of the relevant provisions of its World Population
Plan of (ction and use it to in7uence and support actions by developing countries.
2. 6ithin this o%erall strategy, the -.S. should gi%e highest priority, in terms of resource allocation
along with donors! to efforts to encourage assistance from others to those countries cited abo%e where
the population problem is most serious, and pro%ide assistance to other countries as funds and staff
permit.
3. 1:<)s further de%elopment of population program priorities, both geographic and functional, should
be consistent with the general strategy discussed abo%e, with the other recommendations of this paper
and with the 6orld 'opulation 'lan of 1ction. The strategies should be coordinated with the population
acti%ities of other donors countries and agencies using the 6''1 as le%erage to obtain suitable action.
,. 1:<)s budget re5uests o%er the ne9t fi%e years should include a ma0or e9pansion of bilateral
population and family planning programs as appropriate for each country or region!, of functional
acti%ities as necessary, and of contributions through multilateral channels, consistent with the general
funding magnitudes discussed abo%e. The proposed budgets should emphasi8e the country and
functional priorities outlined in the recommendations of this study and as detailed in 1:<)s geographic
and functional strategy papers.
II2 @2 F$n.tin"% Assist"n.e P!3!"/s t C!e"te Cnditins f! Fe!ti%it( De.%ine
Int!d$.tin
Discussion
It is clear that the availability of contraceptive services and information, important as that
is, is not the only element required to address the population problems of the +,-s.
=ubstantial evidence shows that many families in +,-s 4especially the poor5 consciously
prefer to have numerous children for a variety of economic and social reasons. :or
e.ample, small children can ma0e economic contributions on family farms, children can be
important sources of support for old parents where no alternative form of social security
e.ists, and children may be a source of status for women who have few alternatives in
male$dominated societies.
The desire for large families diminishes as income rises. <e%eloped countries and the more de%eloped
areas in 2<4s ha%e lower fertility than less de%eloped areas. Similarly, family planning programs
produce more acceptors and ha%e a greater impact on fertility in de%eloped areas than they do in less
de%eloped areas. Thus, in%estments in de%elopment are important in lowering fertility rates. 6e "now
that the ma0or socio&economic determinants of fertility are strongly interrelated. 1 change in any one of
them is li"ely to produce a change in the others as well. 4learly de%elopment per se is a powerful
determinant of fertility. $owe%er, since it is unli"ely that most 2<4s will de%elop sufficiently during the
ne9t 25&30 years, it is crucial to identify those sectors that most directly and powerfully affect fertility.
:n this conte9t, population should be %iewed as a %ariable which interacts, to differing degrees, with a
wide range of de%elopment programs, and the -.S. strategy should continue to stress the importance of
ta"ing population into account in @non&family planning@ acti%ities. This is particularly important with
the increasing focus in the -.S. de%elopment program on food and nutrition, health and population, and
education and human resources? assistance programs ha%e less chance of success as long as the numbers
to be fed, educated, and employed are increasing rapidly.
Thus, to assist in achie%ing 2<4 fertility reduction, not only should family planning be high up on the
priority list for -.S. foreign assistance, but high priority in allocation of funds should be gi%en to
programs in other sectors that contribute in a cost&effecti%e manner in reduction in population growth.
There is a growing, but still 5uite small, body of research to determine the socio&economic aspects of
de%elopment that most directly and powerfully affect fertility. 1lthough the limited analysis to date
cannot be considered definiti%e, there is general agreement that the fi%e following factors in addition to
increases in per capita income! tend to be strongly associated with fertility declines; education,
especially the education of women? reductions in infant mortality? wage employment opportunities for
women? social security and other substitutes for the economic %alue of children? and relati%e e5uality in
income distribution and rural de%elopment. There are a number of other factors identified from research,
historical analysis, and e9perimentation that also affect fertility, including delaying the a%erage age of
marriage, and direct payments financial incenti%e! to family planning acceptors.
There are, howe%er, a number of 5uestions which must be addressed before one can mo%e from
identification of factors associated with fertility decline to large&scale programs that will induce fertility
decline in a cost&effecti%e manner. =or e9ample, in the case of female education, we need to consider
such 5uestions as; did the female education cause fertility to decline or did the de%elopment process in
some situations cause parents both to see less economic need for large families and to indulge in the
@lu9ury@ of educating their daughtersF :f more female education does in fact cause fertility declines, will
poor high&fertility parents see much ad%antage in sending their daughters to schoolF :f so, how much
does it cost to educate a girl to the point where her fertility will be reduced which occurs at about the
fourth&grade le%el!F 6hat specific programs in female education are most cost&effecti%e e.g., primary
school, non&formal literacy training, or %ocational or pre&%ocational training!F 6hat, in rough
5uantitati%e terms, are the non&population benefits of an additional dollar spent on female education in a
gi%en situation in comparison to other non&population in%estment alternati%esF 6hat are the population
benefits of a dollar spent on female education in comparison with other population&related in%estments,
such as in contracepti%e supplies or in maternal and child health care systemsF 1nd finally, what is the
total population plus non&population benefit of in%estment in a gi%en specific program in female
education in comparison with the total population plus non&population benefits of alternate feasible
in%estment opportunitiesF
1s a recent research proposal from $ar%ard)s <epartment of 'opulation Studies puts this problem;
@Eecent studies ha%e identified more specific factors underlying fertility declines, especially, the spread
of educational attainment and the broadening of non&traditional roles for women. :n situations of rapid
population growth, howe%er, these run counter to powerful mar"et forces. D%en when efforts are made to
pro%ide educational opportunities for most of the school age population, low le%els of de%elopment and
restricted employment opportunities for academically educated youth lead to high dropout rates and
non&attendance...@
=ortunately, the situation is by no means as ambiguous for all of the li"ely factors affecting fertility. =or
e9ample, laws that raise the minimum marriage age, where politically feasible and at least partially
enforceable, can o%er time ha%e a modest effect on fertility at negligible cost. Similarly, there ha%e been
some contro%ersial, but remar"ably successful, e9periments in :ndia in which financial incenti%es, along
with other moti%ational de%ices, were used to get large numbers of men to accept %asectomies. :n
addition, there appear to be some ma0or acti%ities, such as programs aimed to impro%e the producti%e
capacity of the rural poor, which can be well 0ustified e%en without reference to population benefits, but
which appear to ha%e ma0or population benefits as well.
The strategy suggested by the abo%e considerations is that the %olume and type of programs aimed at the
@determinants of fertility@ should be directly related to our estimate of the total benefits including non&
population benefits! of a dollar in%ested in a gi%en proposed program and to our confidence in the
reliability of that estimate. There is room for honest disagreement among researchers and policy&ma"ers
about the benefits, or feasibility, of a gi%en program. $opefully, o%er time, with more research,
e9perimentation and e%aluation, areas of disagreement and ambiguity will be clarified, and donors and
recipients will ha%e better information both on what policies and programs tend to wor" under what
circumstances and how to go about analy8ing a gi%en country situation to find the best feasible steps that
should be ta"en.
7ecommendations8
1. (I, should implement the strategy set out in the World Population Plan of (ction,
especially paragraphs '1 and ' and =ection I 4BIntroduction $ a <.=. *lobal Population
=trategyB5 above, which calls for high priority in funding to three categories of programs in
areas afecting fertility 4family$siFe5 decisionsC
a. Aperational programs where there is pro%en cost&effecti%eness, generally where there are also
significant benefits for non&population ob0ecti%es?
b. D9perimental programs where research indicates close relationships to fertility reduction but cost&
effecti%eness has not yet been demonstrated in terms of specific steps to be ta"en i.e., program design!?
and
c. Eesearch and e%aluation on the relati%e impact on desired family si8e of the socio&economic
determinants of fertility, and on what policy scope e9ists for affecting these determinants.
2. Eesearch, e9perimentation and e%aluation of ongoing programs should focus on answering the
5uestions such as those raised abo%e, relating to female education! that determine what steps can and
should be ta"en in other sectors that will in a cost&effecti%e manner speed up the rate of fertility decline.
:n addition to the fi%e areas discussed in Section ::. # 1&5 below, the research should also co%er the full
range of factors affecting fertility, such as laws and norms respecting age of marriage, and financial
incenti%es. 6or" of this sort should be underta"en in indi%idual "ey countries to determine the
moti%ational factors re5uired there to de%elop a preference for small family si8e. $igh priority must be
gi%en to testing feasibility and replicability on a wide scale.
3. 1:< should encourage other donors in 2<4 go%ernments to carry out parallel strategies of research,
e9perimentation, and cost&effecti%e well&e%aluated! large&scale operations programs on factors affecting
fertility. 6or" in this area should be coordinated, and results shared.
,. 1:< should help de%elop capacity in a few e9isting -.S. and 2<4 institutions to ser%e as ma0or
centers for research and policy de%elopment in the areas of fertility&affecting social or economic
measures, direct incenti%es, household beha%ior research, and e%aluation techni5ues for moti%ational
approaches. The centers should pro%ide technical assistance, ser%e as a forum for discussion, and
generally pro%ide the @critical mass@ of effort and %isibility which has been lac"ing in this area to date.
Dmphasis should be gi%en to ma9imum in%ol%ement of 2<4 institutions and indi%iduals.
The following sections discuss research e9perimental and operational programs to be underta"en in the
fi%e promising areas mentioned abo%e.
II2 @2 )2 P!&idin3 Mini/"% Le&e%s f Ed$."tin0 Es1e.i"%%( f! W/en
Discussion
There is fairly convincing evidence that female education especially of @th grade and
above correlates strongly with reduced desired family siFe, although it is unclear the
e.tent to which the female education causes reductions in desired family siFe or whether it
is a faster pace of development which leads both to increased demand for female
education and to reduction in desired family siFe. There is also a relatively widely held
theory $$ though not statistically validated $$ that improved levels of literacy contribute to
reduction in desired family siFe both through greater 0nowledge of family planning
information and increasing motivational factors related to reductions in family siFe.
<nfortunately, (I,&s e.perience with mass literacy programs over the past 1" years has
yielded the sobering conclusion that such programs generally failed 4i.e. were not cost$
efective5 unless the population sees practical bene/ts to themselves from learning how to
read $$ e.g., a requirement for literacy to acquire easier access to information about new
agricultural technologies or to 2obs that require literacy.
.ow, howe%er, 1:< has recently re%ised its education strategy, in line with the mandate of its legislation,
to place emphasis on the spread of education to poor people, particularly in rural areas, and relati%ely
less on higher le%els of education. This approach is focused on use of formal and @non&formal@
education i.e., organi8ed education outside the schoolroom setting! to assist in meeting the human
resource re5uirements of the de%elopment process, including such things as rural literacy programs
aimed at agriculture, family planning, or other de%elopment goals.
7ecommendations
1. Integrated basic education 4including applied literacy5 and family planning programs
should be developed whenever they appear to be efective, of high priority, and
acceptable to the individual country. (I, should continue its emphasis on basic education,
for women as well as men.
2. 1 ma0or effort should be made in 2<4s see"ing to reduce birth rates to assure at least an elementary
school education for %irtually all children, girls as well as boys, as soon as the country can afford it
which would be 5uite soon for all but the poorest countries!. Simplified, practical education programs
should be de%eloped. These programs should, where feasible, include specific curricula to moti%ate the
ne9t generation toward a two&child family a%erage to assure that le%el of fertility in two or three
decades. 1:< should encourage and respond to re5uests for assistance in e9tending basic education and
in introducing family planning into curricula. D9penditures for such emphasis on increased practical
education should come from general 1:< funds, not population funds.
II2 @2 C2 Red$.in3 Inf"nt "nd C-i%d M!t"%it(
Discussion
C Kigh infant and child mortality rates, evident in many developing countries, lead parents
to be concerned about the number of their children who are li0ely to survive. Parents may
overcompensate for possible child losses by having additional children. 3esearch to date
clearly indicates not only that high fertility and high birth rates are closely correlated but
that in most circumstances low net population growth rates can only be achieved when
child mortality is low as well. Policies and programs which signi/cantly reduce infant and
child mortality below present levels will lead couples to have fewer children. Kowever, we
must recogniFe that there is a lag of at least several years before parents 4and cultures
and subcultures5 become con/dent that their children are more li0ely to survive and to
ad2ust their fertility behavior accordingly.
4onsiderable reduction in infant and child mortality is possible through impro%ement in nutrition,
inoculations against diseases, and other public health measures if means can be de%ised for e9tending
such ser%ices to neglected 2<4 populations on a low&cost basis. :t often ma"es sense to combine such
acti%ities with family planning ser%ices in integrated deli%ery systems in order to ma9imi8e the use of
scarce 2<4 financial and health manpower resources See Section :J!. :n addition, pro%iding selected
health care for both mothers and their children can enhance the acceptability of family planning by
showing concern for the whole condition of the mother and her children and not 0ust for the single factor
of fertility.
The two ma0or cost&effecti%e problems in maternal&child health care are that clinical health care deli%ery
systems ha%e not in the past accounted for much of the reduction in infant mortality and that, as in the
-.S., local medical communities tend to fa%or relati%ely e9pensi%e 5uality health care, e%en at the cost
of lea%ing large numbers of people in the 2<4)s generally o%er two&thirds of the people! %irtually
unco%ered by modern health ser%ices.
1lthough we do not ha%e all the answers on how to de%elop ine9pensi%e, integrated deli%ery systems,
we need to proceed with operational programs to respond to A<4 re5uests if they are li"ely to be cost&
effecti%e based on e9perience to date, and to e9periment on a large scale with inno%ati%e ways of
tac"ling the outstanding problems. D%aluation mechanisms for measuring the impact of %arious courses
of action are an essential part of this effort in order to pro%ide feedbac" for current and future pro0ects
and to impro%e the state of the art in this field.
4urrently, efforts to de%elop low&cost health and family planning ser%ices for neglected populations in
the 2<4)s are impeded because of the lac" of international commitment and resources to the health side.
=or e9ample;
1. The 6orld #an" could supply low&interest credits to 2<4s for the de%elopment of low&cost health&
related ser%ices to neglected populations but has not yet made a policy decision to do so. The #an" has a
population and health program and the program)s leaders ha%e been 5uite sympathetic with the abo%e
ob0ecti%e. The #an")s staff has prepared a policy paper on this sub0ect for the #oard but prospects for it
are not good. 4urrently, the paper will be discussed by the #an" #oard at its .o%ember 19(, meeting.
1pparently there is some reticence within the #an")s #oard and in parts of the staff about ma"ing a
strong initiati%e in this area. :n part, the #an" argues that there are not pro%en models of effecti%e, low&
cost health systems in which the #an" can in%est. The #an" also argues that other sectors such as
agriculture, should recei%e higher priority in the competition for scarce resources. :n addition, arguments
are made in some 5uarters of the #an" that the #an" ought to restrict itself to @hard loan pro0ects@ and
not get into the @soft@ area.
1 current reading from the #an")s staff suggests that unless there is some change in the thin"ing of the
#an" #oard, the #an")s policy will be simply to "eep trying to help in the population and health areas
but not to ta"e any large initiati%e in the low&cost deli%ery system area.
The #an" stance is regrettable because the #an" could play a %ery useful role in this area helping to
fund low&cost physical structures and other elements of low&cost health systems, including rural health
clinics where needed. :t could also help in pro%iding low&cost loans for training, and in see"ing and
testing new approaches to reaching those who do not now ha%e access to health and family planning
ser%ices. This would not be at all inconsistent with our and the #an")s fran"ly admitting that we do not
ha%e all the @answer@ or cost&effecti%e models for low&cost health deli%ery systems. Eather they, we and
other donors could wor" together on e9perimentally oriented, operational programs to de%elop models
for the wide %ariety of situations faced by 2<4s.
:n%ol%ement of the #an" in this area would open up new possibilities for collaboration. >rant funds,
whether from the -.S. or -.='1, could be used to handle the parts of the action that re5uire short lead
times such as immediate pro%ision of supplies, certain "inds of training and rapid deployment of
technical assistance. Simultaneously, for parts of the action that re5uire longer lead times, such as
building clinics, 6orld #an" loans could be employed. The #an")s lending processes could be
synchroni8ed to bring such building acti%ity to a readiness condition at the time the training programs
ha%e mo%ed along far enough to permit manning of the facilities. The emphasis should be on meeting
low&cost rather than high&cost infrastructure re5uirements.
Ab%iously, in addition to building, we assume the #an" could fund other local&cost elements of
e9pansion of health systems such as longer&term training programs.
1:< is currently trying to wor" out impro%ed consultation procedures with the #an" staff in the hope of
achie%ing better collaborati%e efforts within the #an")s current commitment of resources in the
population and health areas. 6ith a greater commitment of #an" resources and impro%ed consultation
with 1:< and -.='1, a much greater dent could be made on the o%erall problem.
#. The 6orld $ealth Argani8ation 6$A! and its counterpart for 2atin 1merica, the 'an 1merican
$ealth Argani8ation '1$A!, currently pro%ide technical assistance in the de%elopment and
implementation of health pro0ects which are in turn financed by international funding mechanisms such
as -.<' and the :nternational =inancial :nstitutions. $owe%er, funds a%ailable for health actions
through these organi8ations are limited at present. $igher priority by the international funding agencies
to health actions could e9pand the opportunities for useful collaborations among donor institutions and
countries to de%elop low&cost integrated health and family planning deli%ery systems for 2<4
populations that do not now ha%e access to such ser%ices.
7ecommendations
C The <.=. should encourage heightened international interest in and commitment of
resources to developing delivery mechanisms for providing integrated health and family
planning services to neglected populations at costs which host countries can support
within a reasonable period of time. 1forts would includeC
1. Dncouraging the 6orld #an" and other international funding mechanisms, through the -.S.
representati%es on the boards of these organi8ations, to ta"e a broader initiati%e in the de%elopment of
ine9pensi%e ser%ice deli%ery mechanisms in countries wishing to e9pand such systems.
2. :ndicating -.S. willingness as the -.S. did at the 6orld 'opulation 4onference! to 0oin with other
donors and organi8ations to encourage and support further action by 2<4 go%ernments and other
institutions in the low&cost deli%ery systems area.
1. 1s offered at #ucharest, the -.S. should 0oin donor countries, 6$A, -.='1, -.:4D= and the
6orld #an" to create a consortium to offer assistance to the more needy de%eloping countries to
establish their own low&cost pre%enti%e and curati%e public health systems reaching into all areas of their
countries and capable of national support within a reasonable period. Such systems would include
family planning ser%ices as an ordinary part of their o%erall ser%ices.
#. The 6$A should be as"ed to ta"e the leadership in such an arrangement and is ready to do so.
1pparently at least half of the potential donor countries and the DD4)s technical assistance program are
fa%orably inclined. So is the -.='1 and -.:4D=. The -.S., through its representation on the 6orld
#an" #oard, should encourage a broader 6orld #an" initiati%e in this field, particularly to assist in the
de%elopment of ine9pensi%e, basic health ser%ice infrastructures in countries wishing to underta"e the
de%elopment of such systems.
II2 @2 62 Ex1"ndin3 W"3e E/1%(/ent O11!t$nities0 Es1e.i"%%( f! W/en
Discussion
1mployment is the 0ey to access to income, which opens the way to improved health,
education, nutrition, and reduced family siFe. 3eliable 2ob opportunities enable parents to
limit their family siFe and invest in the welfare of the children they have.
The status and utili8ation of women in 2<4 societies is particularly important in reducing family si8e.
=or women, employment outside the home offers an alternati%e to early marriage and childbearing, and
an incenti%e to ha%e fewer children after marriage. The woman who must stay home to ta"e care of her
children must forego the income she could earn outside the home. Eesearch indicates that female wage
employment outside the home is related to fertility reduction. 'rograms to increase the women)s labor
force participation must, howe%er, ta"e account of the o%erall demand for labor? this would be a
particular problem in occupations where there is already widespread unemployment among males. #ut
other occupations where women ha%e a comparati%e ad%antage can be encouraged.
:mpro%ing the legal and social status of women gi%es women a greater %oice in decision&ma"ing about
their li%es, including family si8e, and can pro%ide alternati%e opportunities to childbearing, thereby
reducing the benefits of ha%ing children.
The -.S. <elegation to the #ucharest 4onference emphasi8ed the importance of impro%ing the general
status of women and of de%eloping employment opportunities for women outside the home and off the
farm. :t was 0oined by all countries in adopting a strong statement on this %ital issue. See 4hapter J: for
a fuller discussion of the conference.
7ecommendations
C 1. (I, should communicate with and see0 opportunities to assist national economic
development programs to increase the role of women in the development process.
2. 1:< should re%iew its education7training programs such as -.S. participant training, in&country and
third&country training! to see that such acti%ities pro%ide e5ual access to women.
3. 1:< should enlarge pre&%ocational and %ocational training to in%ol%e women more directly in learning
s"ills which can enhance their income and status in the community e.g. paramedical s"ills related to
pro%ision of family planning ser%ices!.
,. 1:< should encourage the de%elopment and placement of 2<4 women as decision&ma"ers in
de%elopment programs, particularly those programs designed to increase the role of women as producers
of goods and ser%ices, and otherwise to impro%e women)s welfare e.g. national credit and finance
programs, and national health and family planning programs!.
5. 1:< should encourage, where possible, women)s acti%e participation in the labor mo%ement in order
to promote e5ual pay for e5ual wor", e5ual benefits, and e5ual employment opportunities.
/. 1:< should continue to re%iew its programs and pro0ects for their impact on 2<4 women, and ad0ust
them as necessary to foster greater participation of women & particularly those in the lowest classes & in
the de%elopment process.
II2 @2 D2 De&e%1in3 A%te!n"ti&es t t-e S.i"% Se.$!it( R%e P!&ided @( C-i%d!en t A3in3 P"!ents
Discussion
C In most +,-s the almost total absence of government or other institutional forms of
social security for old people forces dependence on children for old age survival. The need
for such support appears to be one of the important motivations for having numerous
children. =everal proposals have been made, and a few pilot e.periments are being
conducted, to test the impact of /nancial incentives designed to provide old age support
4or, more tangentially, to increase the earning power of fewer children by /nancing
education costs parents would otherwise bear5. Proposals have been made for son$
insurance 4provided to the parents if they have no more than three children5, and for
deferred payments of retirement bene/ts 4again tied to speci/ed limits on family siFe5,
where the payment of the incentive is delayed. The intent is not only to tie the incentive to
actual fertility, but to impose the /nancial cost on the government or private sector entity
only after the bene/ts of the avoided births have accrued to the economy and the
/nancing entity. =chemes of varying administrative comple.ity have been developed to
ta0e account of management problems in +,-s. The economic and equity core of these
long$term incentive proposals is simpleC the government ofers to return to the contracting
couple a portion of the economic dividend they generate by avoiding births, as a direct
trade$of for the personal /nancial bene/ts they forego by having fewer children.
=urther research and e9perimentation in this area needs to ta"e into account the impact of growing
urbani8ation in 2<4s on traditional rural %alues and outloo"s such as the desire for children as old&age
insurance.
7ecommendation
C (I, should ta0e a positive stance with respect to e.ploration of social security type
incentives as described above. (I, should encourage governments to consider such
measures, and should provide /nancial and technical assistance where appropriate. The
recommendation made earlier to establish an BintermediaryB institutional capacity which
could provide +,- governments with substantial assistance in this area, among several
areas on the BdemandB side of the problem, would add considerably to (I,&s ability to
carry out this recommendation.
II2 @2 72 P$!s$in3 De&e%1/ent St!"te3ies t-"t S4e; In./e G!;t- T;"!d t-e P!0 Es1e.i"%%( R$!"% De&e%1/ent
F.$ssin3 n R$!"% P&e!t(
Income distribution and rural developmentC The higher a family&s income, the fewer
children it will probably have, e.cept at the very top of the income scale. =imilarly, the
more evenly distributed the income in a society, the lower the overall fertility rate seems
to be since better income distribution means that the poor, who have the highest fertility,
have higher income. Thus a development strategy which emphasiFes the rural poor, who
are the largest and poorest group in most +,-s would be providing income increases to
those with the highest fertility levels. 9o +,- is li0ely to achieve population stability unless
the rural poor participate in income increases and fertility declines.
1griculture and rural de%elopment is already, along with population, the -.S. >o%ernment)s highest
priority in pro%ision of assistance to 2<4s. =or =M 19(5, about /03 of the L1.13 billion 1:< re5uested
in the fi%e functional areas of the foreign assistance legislation is in agriculture and rural de%elopment.
The L255 million increase in the =M 19(5 le%el authori8ed in the two year =M 19(, authori8ation bill is
%irtually all for agriculture and rural de%elopment.
1:<)s primary goal in agriculture and rural de%elopment is concentration in food output and increases in
the rural 5uality of life? the ma0or strategy element is concentration on increasing the output of small
farmers, through assistance in pro%ision of impro%ed technologies, agricultural inputs, institutional
supports, etc.
This strategy addresses three -.S. interests; =irst, it increases agricultural output in the 2<4s, and
speeds up the a%erage pace of their de%elopment, which, as has been noted, leads to increased
acceptance of family planning. Second, the emphasis on small farmers and other elements of the rural
poor spreads the benefits of de%elopment as broadly as is feasible among lower income groups. 1s noted
abo%e spreading the benefits of de%elopment to the poor, who tend to ha%e the highest fertility rates, is
an important step in getting them to reduce their family si8e. :n addition, the concentration on small
farmer production %s., for e9ample, highly mechani8ed, large&scale agriculture! can increase on and off
farm rural 0ob opportunities and decrease the flow to the cities. 6hile fertility le%els in rural areas are
higher than in the cities, continued rapid migration into the cities at le%els greater than the cities) 0ob
mar"ets or ser%ices can sustain adds an important destabili8ing element to de%elopment efforts and goals
of many countries. :ndeed, urban areas in some 2<4s are already the scene of urban unrest and high
crime rates.
7ecommendation
(I, should continue its eforts to focus not 2ust on agriculture and rural development but
speci/cally on small farmers and on labor$intensive means of stimulating agricultural
output and on other aspects of improving the quality of life of the rural poor, so that
agriculture and rural development assistance, in addition to its importance for increased
food production and other purposes, can have ma.imum impact on reducing population
growth.
II2 @2 E2 Cn.ent!"tin n Ed$."tin "nd Ind.t!in"tin f T-e Risin3 Gene!"tin f C-i%d!en Re3"!din3 t-e
Desi!"'i%it( f S/"%%e! F"/i%( SiBe
Discussion
C Present eforts at reducing birth rates in +,-s, including (I, and <9:P( assistance, are
directed largely at adults now in their reproductive years. 6nly nominal attention is given
to population education or se. education in schools and in most countries none is given in
the very early grades which are the only attainment of I'$'I@ of the children. It should be
obvious, however, that eforts at birth control directed toward adults will with even
ma.imum success result in acceptance of contraception for the reduction of births only to
the level of the desired family siFe $$ which 0nowledge, attitude and practice studies in
many countries indicate is an average of four or more children.
The great necessity is to con%ince the masses of the population that it is to their indi%idual and national
interest to ha%e, on the a%erage, only three and then only two children. There is little li"elihood that this
result can be accomplished %ery widely against the bac"ground of the cultural heritage of today)s adults,
e%en the young adults, among the masses in most 2<4s. 6ithout diminishing in any way the effort to
reach these adults, the ob%ious increased focus of attention should be to change the attitudes of the ne9t
generation, those who are now in elementary school or younger. :f this could be done, it would indeed
be possible to attain a le%el of fertility approaching replacement in 20 years and actually reaching it in
30.
#ecause a large percentage of children from high&fertility, low&income groups do not attend school, it
will be necessary to de%elop means to reach them for this and other educational purposes through
informal educational programs. 1s the discussion earlier of the determinants of family si8e fertility!
pointed out, it is also important to ma"e significant progress in other areas, such as better health care and
impro%ements in income distribution, before desired family si8e can be e9pected to fall sharply. :f it
ma"es economic sense for poor parents to ha%e large families twenty years from now, there is no
e%idence as to whether population education or indoctrination will ha%e sufficient impact alone to
dissuade them.
7ecommendation
1. That <.=. agencies stress the importance of education of the ne.t generation of parents,
starting in elementary schools, toward a two$child family ideal. . That (I, stimulate
speci/c eforts to develop means of educating children of elementary school age to the
ideal of the two$child family and that <91=-6 be as0ed to ta0e the lead through formal
and informal education.
Gene!"% Re.//end"tin f! UN A3en.ies
(s to each of the above si. categories =tate and (I, should ma0e speci/c eforts to have
the relevant <9 agency, WK6, I+6, :(6, <91=-6, <9I-1:, and the <9:P( ta0e its proper
role of leadership in the <9 family with increased program efort, citing the World
Population Plan of (ction.
II2 C2 Fd f! Pe".e P!3!"/ "nd P1$%"tin
Dis.$ssin=
6ne of the most fundamental aspects of the impact of population growth on the political
and economic well$being of the globe is its relationship to food. Kere the problem of the
interrelationship of population, national resources, environment, productivity and political
and economic stability come together when shortages of this basic human need occur.
-S<1 pro0ections indicate that the 5uantity of grain imports needed by the 2<4s in the 19*0s will grow
significantly, both in o%erall and per capita terms. :n addition, these countries will face year&to&year
fluctuations in production due to the influence of weather and other factors.
This is not to say that the 2<4s need face star%ation in the ne9t two decades, for the same pro0ections
indicate an e%en greater increase in production of grains in the de%eloped nations. :t should be pointed
out, howe%er, that these pro0ections assume that such ma0or problems as the %ast increase in the need for
fresh water, the ecological effects of the %ast increase in the application of fertili8er, pesticides, and
irrigation, and the apparent ad%erse trend in the global climate, are sol%ed. 1t present, there are no
solutions to these problems in sight.
The ma0or challenge will be to increase food production in the 2<4s themsel%es and to liberali8e the
system in which grain is transferred commercially from producer to consumer countries. 6e also see
food aid as an important way of meeting part of the chronic shortfall and emergency needs caused by
year&to&year %ariation at least through the end of this decade. +any outside e9perts predict 0ust such
difficulties e%en if ma0or efforts are underta"en to e9pand world agricultural output, especially in the
2<4s themsel%es but also in the -.S. and in other ma0or feed grain producers. :n the longer run, 2<4s
must both decrease population growth and increase agricultural production significantly. 1t some point
the @e9cess capacity@ of the food e9porting countries will run out. Some countries ha%e already mo%ed
from a net food e9porter to a net importer of food.
There are ma0or interagency studies now progressing in the food area and this report cannot go deeply
into this field. :t can only point to serious problems as they relate to population and suggest minimum
re5uirements and goals in the food area. :n particular, we belie%e that population growth may ha%e %ery
serious negati%e conse5uences on food production in the 2<4s including o%er&e9pectations of the
capacity of the land to produce, downgrading the ecological economics of marginal areas, and
o%erhar%esting the seas. 1ll of these conditions may affect the %iability of the world)s economy and
thereby its prospects for peace and security.
Re.//end"tins=
=ince 9=-I-I1P studies are already underway we refer the reader to them. Kowever the
following, we believe, are minimum requirements for any strategy which wishes to avoid
instability and con7ict brought on by population growth and food scarcityC
1! $igh priority for -.S. bilateral and multilateral 2<4 1gricultural 1ssistance? including efforts by the
2<4s to impro%e food production and distribution with necessary institutional ad0ustments and
economic policies to stimulate efficient production. This must include a significant increase in financial
and technical aid to promote more efficient production and distribution in the 2<4s.
2! <e%elopment of national food stoc"s1/ including those needed for emergency relief! within an
internationally agreed framewor" sufficient to pro%ide an ade5uate le%el of world food security?
3! D9pansion of production of the input elements of food production i.e., fertili8er, a%ailability of water
and high yield seed stoc"s! and increased incenti%es for e9panded agricultural producti%ity. :n this
conte9t a reduction in the real cost of energy especially fuel! either through e9pansion in a%ailability
through new sources or decline in the relati%e price of oil or both would be of great importance?
,! Significant e9pansion of -.S. and other producer country food crops within the conte9t of a
liberali8ed and efficient world trade system that will assure food a%ailability to the 2<4s in case of
se%ere shortage. .ew international trade arrangements for agricultural products, open enough to permit
ma9imum production by efficient producers and fle9ible enough to dampen wide price fluctuations in
years when weather conditions result in either significant shortfalls or surpluses. 6e belie%e this
ob0ecti%e can be achie%ed by trade liberali8ation and an internationally coordinated food reser%e
program without resorting to price&oriented agreements, which ha%e undesirable effects on both
production and distribution?
5! The maintenance of an ade5uate food aid program with a clearer focus on its use as a means to ma"e
up real food deficits, pending the de%elopment of their own food resources, in countries unable to feed
themsel%es rather than as primarily an economic de%elopment or foreign policy instrument? and
/! 1 strengthened research effort, including long term, to de%elop new seed and farming technologies,
primarily to increase yields but also to permit more e9tensi%e culti%ation techni5ues, particularly in
2<4s.
III2 Inte!n"tin"% O!3"niB"tins "nd t-e! M$%ti%"te!"% P1$%"tin P!3!"/s
III2 A2 UN O!3"niB"tin "nd S1e.i"%iBed A3en.ies
Dis.$ssin
In the mid$si.ties the <9 member countries slowly began to agree on a greater
involvement of the <nited 9ations in population matters. In 1%A# the =ecretary$*eneral
created a Trust :und to /nance wor0 in the population /eld. In 1%A% the :und was renamed
the <nited 9ations :und for Population (ctivities 4<9:P(5 and placed under the overall
supervision of the <nited 9ations ,evelopment Program. ,uring this period, also, the
mandates of the =pecialiFed (gencies were modi/ed to permit greater involvement by
these agencies in population activities.
-.='1)s role was clarified by an D4ASA4 resolution in 19(3; a! to build up the "nowledge and
capacity to respond to the needs in the population and family planning fields? b! to promote awareness
in both de%eloped and de%eloping countries of the social, economic, and en%ironmental implications of
population problems? c! to e9tend assistance to de%eloping countries? and d! to promote population
programs and to coordinate pro0ects supported by the -.='1.
+ost of the pro0ects financed by -.='1 are implemented with the assistance of organi8ations of the
-ntied .ations system, including the regional Dconomic 4ommission, -nited .ations 4hildren)s =und
-.:4D=!, :nternational 2abour Argani8ation :2A!, =ood and 1griculture Argani8ation =1A!, -nited
.ations Dducational Scientific and 4ultural Argani8ation -.DS4A!, the 6orld $ealth Argani8ation
6$A!. 4ollaborati%e arrangements ha%e been made with the :nternational <e%elopment 1ssociation
:<1!, an affiliate of the 6orld #an", and with the 6orld =ood 'rogramme.
:ncreasingly the -.='1 is mo%ing toward comprehensi%e country programs negotiated directly with
go%ernments. This permits the go%ernments to select the implementing e9ecuting! agency which may
be a member of the -. system or a non&go%ernment organi8ation or company. 6ith the de%elopment of
the country program approach it is planned to le%el off -.='1 funding to the speciali8ed agencies.
-.='1 has recei%ed L122 million in %oluntary contributions from /5 go%ernments, of which L,2
million was raised in 19(3. The 6or" 'lan of -.='1 for 19(,&(( sets a L2*0 million goal for fund&
raising, as follows;
1%#@ $ ;"@ million
1%#" $ ;A@ million
1%#A $ ;#A million
1%## $ ;)A million
Through 1%#1 the <.=. had contributed appro.imately half of all the funds contributed to
<9:P(. In 1%# we reduced our matching contribution to @) percent of other donations,
and for 1%#' we further reduced our contribution to @"G. In 1%#' requests for <9:P(
assistance had begun to e.ceed available resources. This trend has accelerated and
demand for <9:P( resources is now strongly outrunning supply. ,ocumented need for
<9:P( assistance during the years 1%#@$## is ;'"! million, but because the <9:P( could
anticipate that only ;)! million will be available it has been necessary to phase the
balance to at least 1%#).
Re.//end"tins
The <.=. should continue its support of multilateral eforts in the population /eld byC
a! increasing, sub0ect to congressional appropriation action, the absolute contribution to the -.='1 in
light of 1! mounting demands for -.='1 1ssistance, 2! impro%ing -.='1 capacity to administer
pro0ects, 3! the e9tent to which -.='1 funding aims at -.S. ob0ecti%es and will substitute for -.S.
funding, ,! the prospect that without increased -.S. contributions the -.='1 will be unable to raise
sufficient funds for its budget in 19(5 and beyond?
b! initiating or participating in an effort to increase the resources from other donors made a%ailable to
international agencies that can wor" effecti%ely in the population area as both to increase o%erall
population efforts and, in the -.='1, to further reduce the -.S. percentage share of total contributions?
and
c! supporting the coordinating role which -.='1 plays among donor and recipient countries, and
among -. and other organi8ations in the population field, including the 6orld #an".
III2 @2 En.$!"3in3 P!i&"te O!3"niB"tins
Dis.$ssin=
The cooperation of private organiFations and groups on a national, regional and world$
wide level is essential to the success of a comprehensive population strategy. These
groups provide important intellectual contributions and policy support, as well as the
delivery of family planning and health services and information. In some countries, the
private and voluntary organiFations are the only means of providing family planning
services and materials.
Re.//end"tins=
(I, should continue to provide support to those private <.=. and international
organiFations whose wor0 contributes to reducing rapid population growth, and to develop
with them, where appropriate, geographic and functional divisions of labor in population
assistance.
IV2 P!&isin "nd De&e%1/ent f F"/i%( P%"nnin3 Se!&i.es0 Inf!/"tin "nd
Te.-n%3(
In addition to creating the climate for fertility decline, as described in a previous section, it
is essential to provide safe and efective techniques for controlling fertility.
There are two main elements in this tas"; a! impro%ing the effecti%eness of the e9isting means of
fertility control and de%eloping new ones? and b! de%eloping low&cost systems for the deli%ery of
family planning technologies, information and related ser%ices to the *53 of 2<4 populations not now
reached.
2egislation and policies affecting what the -.S. >o%ernment does relati%e to abortion in the abo%e areas
is discussed at the end of this section.
IV2 A2 Rese"!.- t I/1!&e Fe!ti%it( Cnt!% Te.-n%3(
Dis.$ssin
The efort to reduce population growth requires a variety of birth control methods which
are safe, efective, ine.pensive and attractive to both men and women. The developing
countries in particular need methods which do not require physicians and which are
suitable for use in primitive, remote rural areas or urban slums by people with relatively
low motivation. 1.periences in family planning have clearly demonstrated the crucial
impact of improved technology on fertility control.
.one of the currently a%ailable methods of fertility control is completely effecti%e and free of ad%erse
reactions and ob0ectionable characteristics. The ideal of a contracepti%e, perfect in all these respects,
may ne%er be reali8ed. 1 great deal of effort and money will be necessary to impro%e fertility control
methods. The research to achie%e this aim can be di%ided into two categories;
1. 5hort*term approaches; These include applied and de%elopmental wor" which is re5uired to perfect
further and e%aluate the safety and role of methods demonstrated to be effecti%e in family planning
programs in the de%eloping countries.
Ather wor" is directed toward new methods based on well established "nowledge about the physiology
of reproduction. 1lthough short term pay&offs are possible, successful de%elopment of some methods
may ta"e 5 years and up to L15 million for a single method.
2. .ong*term approaches; The limited state of fundamental "nowledge of many reproducti%e processes
re5uires that a strong research effort of a more basic nature be maintained to elucidate these processes
and pro%ide leads for contracepti%e de%elopment research. =or e9ample, new "nowledge of male
reproducti%e processes is needed before research to de%elop a male @pill@ can come to fruition. 4osts and
duration of the re5uired research are high and difficult to 5uantify.
6ith e9penditures of about L30 million annually, a broad program of basic and applied bio&medical
research on human reproduction and contracepti%e de%elopment is carried out by the 4enter for
'opulation Eesearch of the .ational :nstitute of 4hild $ealth and $uman <e%elopment. The 1gency for
:nternational <e%elopment annually funds about L5 million of principally applied research on new
means of fertility control suitable for use in de%eloping countries.
Smaller sums are spent by other agencies of the -.S. >o%ernment. 4oordination of the federal research
effort is facilitated by the acti%ities of the :nteragency 4ommittee on 'opulation Eesearch. This
committee prepares an annual listing and analyses of all go%ernment supported population research
programs. The listing is published in the 9nventory of Federal Population Research.
1 %ariety of studies ha%e been underta"en by non&go%ernmental e9perts including the -.S. 4ommission
on 'opulation >rowth and the 1merican =uture. +ost of these studies indicate that the -nited States
effort in population research is insufficient. Apinions differ on how much more can be spent wisely and
effecti%ely but an additional L25&50 million annually for bio&medical research constitutes a conser%ati%e
estimate.
Re.//end"tins=
( stepwise increase over the ne.t ' years to a total of about ;1!! million annually for
fertility and contraceptive research is recommended. This is an increase of ;A! million
over the current ;@! million e.pended annually by the ma2or :ederal (gencies for bio$
medical research. 6f this increase ;@! million would be spent on short$term, goal directed
research. The current e.penditure of ;! million in long$term approaches consisting
largely of basic bio$medical research would be doubled. This increased efort would require
signi/cantly increased staJng of the federal agencies which support this wor0. (reas
recommended for further research areC
1. 5hort*term approaches; These approaches include impro%ement and field testing of e9isting
technology and de%elopment of new technology. :t is e9pected that some of these approaches would be
ready for use within fi%e years. Specific short term approaches worthy of increased effort are as follows;
a. 3ral contraceptives ha%e become popular and widely used? yet the optimal steroid hormone
combinations and doses for 2<4 populations need further definition. =ield studies in se%eral settings are
re5uired.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost; L3 million annually.
b. 9ntra*uterine devices of differing si8e, shape, and bioacti%ity should be de%eloped and tested to
determine the optimum le%els of effecti%eness, safety, and acceptability.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost; L3 million annually.
c. 9mproved methods for ovulation prediction will be important to those couples who wish to practice
rhythm with more assurance of effecti%eness than they now ha%e.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost; L3 million annually.
d. Sterili8ation of men and women has recei%ed wide&spread acceptance in se%eral areas when a simple,
5uic", and safe procedure is readily a%ailable. =emale sterili8ation has been impro%ed by technical
ad%ances with laparoscopes, culdoscopes, and greatly simplifies abdominal surgical techni5ues. =urther
impro%ements by the use of tubal clips, trans&cer%ical approaches, and simpler techni5ues can be
de%eloped. =or men se%eral current techni5ues hold promise but re5uire more refinement and
e%aluation.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost L/ million annually.
e. 9n@ectable contraceptives for women which are effecti%e for three months or more and are
administered by para&professionals undoubtedly will be a significant impro%ement. 4urrently a%ailable
methods of this type are limited by their side effects and potential ha8ards. There are reasons to belie%e
that these problems can be o%ercome with additional research.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost; L5 million annually.
f. .euteolytic and anti*progesterone approaches to fertility control including use of prostaglandins are
theoretically attracti%e but considerable wor" remains to be done.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost; L( million annually.
g. Non*0linical Methods. 1dditional research on non&clinical methods including foams, creams, and
condoms is needed. These methods can be used without medical super%ision.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost? L5 million annually.
h. Field studies. 4linical trials of new methods in use settings are essential to test their worth in
de%eloping countries and to select the best of se%eral possible methods in a gi%en setting.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost; L* million annually.
2. .ong*term approaches; :ncreased research toward better understanding of human reproducti%e
physiology will lead to better methods of fertility control for use in fi%e to fifteen years. 1 great deal has
yet to be learned about basic aspects of male and female fertility and how regulation can be effected. =or
e9ample, an effecti%e and safe male contracepti%e is needed, in particular an in0ection which will be
effecti%e for specified periods of time. =undamental research must be done but there are reasons to
belie%e that the de%elopment of an in0ectable male contracepti%e is feasible. 1nother method which
should be de%eloped is an in0ection which will assure a woman of regular periods. The drug would be
gi%en by para&professionals once a month or as needed to regulari8e the menstrual cycle. Eecent
scientific ad%ances indicate that this method can be de%eloped.
1ppro9. :ncreased 4ost; L20 million annually.
IV2 @2 De&e%1/ent f L;-.st De%i&e!( S(ste/s
Dis.$ssin
1.clusive of -hina, only 1!$1"G of +,- populations are currently efectively reached by
family planning activities. If eforts to reduce rapid population growth are to be successful
it is essential that the neglected )"$%!G of +,- populations have access to convenient,
reliable family planning services. Eoreover, these people $$ largely in rural but also in
urban areas $$ not only tend to have the highest fertility, they simultaneously sufer the
poorest health, the worst nutritional levels, and the highest infant mortality rates.
=amily planning ser%ices in 2<4s are currently pro%ided by the following means;
1. >o%ernment&run clinics or centers which offer family planning ser%ices alone?
2. >o%ernment&run clinics or centers which offer family planning as part of a broader based health
ser%ice?
3. >o%ernment&run programs that emphasi8e door to door contact by family planning wor"ers who
deli%er contracepti%es to those desiring them and7or ma"e referrals to clinics?
,. 4linics or centers run by pri%ate organi8ations e.g., family planning associations!?
5. 4ommercial channels which in many countries sell condoms, oral contracepti%es, and sometimes
spermicidal foam o%er the counter?
/. 'ri%ate physicians.
Two of these means in particular hold promise for allowing significant e9pansion of ser%ices to the
neglected poor;
1. 9ntegrated /elivery 5ystems. This approach in%ol%es the pro%ision of family planning in con0unction
with health and7or nutrition ser%ices, primarily through go%ernment&run programs. There are simple
logistical reasons which argue for pro%iding these ser%ices on an integrated basis. Jery few of the 2<4s
ha%e the resources, both in financial and manpower terms, to enable them to deploy indi%idual types of
ser%ices to the neglected *53 of their populations. #y combining a %ariety of ser%ices in one deli%ery
mechanism they can attain ma9imum impact with the scarce resources a%ailable.
:n addition, the pro%ision of family planning in the conte9t of broader health ser%ices can help ma"e
family planning more acceptable to 2<4 leaders and indi%iduals who, for a %ariety of reasons some
ideological, some simply humanitarian! ob0ect to family planning. =amily planning in the health conte9t
shows a concern for the well&being of the family as a whole and not 0ust for a couple)s reproducti%e
function.
=inally, pro%iding integrated family planning and health ser%ices on a broad basis would help the -.S.
contend with the ideological charge that the -.S. is more interested in curbing the numbers of 2<4
people than it is in their future and well&being. 6hile it can be argued, and argued effecti%ely, that
limitation of numbers may well be one of the most critical factors in enhancing de%elopment potential
and impro%ing the chances for well&being, we should recogni8e that those who argue along ideological
lines ha%e made a great deal of the fact that the -.S. contribution to de%elopment programs and health
programs has steadily shrun", whereas funding for population programs has steadily increased. 6hile
many e9planations may be brought forward to e9plain these trends, the fact is that they ha%e been an
ideological liability to the -.S. in its crucial de%eloping relationships with the 2<4s. 1.:.<. currently
spends about L35 million annually in bilateral programs on the pro%ision of family planning ser%ices
through integrated deli%ery systems. 1ny action to e9pand such systems must aim at the deployment of
truly low&cost ser%ices. $ealth&related ser%ices which in%ol%e costly physical structures, high s"ill
re5uirements, and e9pensi%e supply methods will not produce the desired deployment in any reasonable
time. The basic test of low&cost methods will be whether the 2<4 go%ernments concerned can assume
responsibility for the financial, administrati%e, manpower and other elements of these ser%ice
e9tensions. -tili8ing e9isting indigenous structures and personnel including traditional medical
practitioners who in some countries ha%e shown a strong interest in family planning! and ser%ice
methods that in%ol%e simply&trained personnel, can help "eep costs within 2<4 resource capabilities.
2. 0ommercial 0hannels. :n an increasing number of 2<4s, contracepti%es such as condoms, foam and
the 'ill! are being made a%ailable without prescription re5uirements through commercial channels such
as drugstores.1( The commercial approach offers a practical, low&cost means of pro%iding family
planning ser%ices, since it utili8es an e9isting distribution system and does not in%ol%e financing the
further e9pansion of public clinical deli%ery facilities. #oth 1.:.<. and pri%ate organi8ations li"e the
:''= are currently testing commercial distribution schemes in %arious 2<4s to obtain further
information on the feasibility, costs, and degree of family planning acceptance achie%ed through this
approach. 1.:.<. is currently spending about L2 million annually in this area.
:n order to stimulate 2<4 pro%ision of ade5uate family planning ser%ices, whether alone or in
con0unction with health ser%ices, 1.:.<. has subsidi8ed contracepti%e purchases for a number of years. :n
=M 19(3 re5uests from 1.:.<. bilateral and grantee programs for contracepti%e supplies && in particular
for oral contracepti%es and condoms && increased mar"edly, and ha%e continued to accelerate in =M
19(,. 1dditional rapid e9pansion in demand is e9pected o%er the ne9t se%eral years as the accumulated
population7family planning efforts of the past decade gain momentum.
6hile it is useful to subsidi8e pro%ision of contracepti%es in the short term in order to e9pand and
stimulate 2<4 family planning programs, in the long term it will not be possible to fully fund demands
for commodities, as well as other necessary family planning actions, within 1.:.<. and other donor
budgets. These costs must ultimately be borne by 2<4 go%ernments and7or indi%idual consumers.
Therefore, 1.:.<. will increasingly focus on de%eloping contracepti%e production and procurement
capacities by the 2<4s themsel%es. 1.:.<. must, howe%er, be prepared to continue supplying large
5uantities of contracepti%es o%er the ne9t se%eral years to a%oid a detrimental hiatus in program supply
lines while efforts are made to e9pand 2<4 production and procurement actions. 1.:.<. should also
encourage other donors and multilateral organi8ations to assume a greater share of the effort, in regard
both to the short&term actions to subsidi8e contracepti%e supplies and the longer&term actions to de%elop
2<4 capacities for commodity production and procurement.
Eecommendations; 1. 1.:.<. should aim its population assistance program to help achie%e ade5uate
co%erage of couples ha%ing the highest fertility who do not now ha%e access to family planning ser%ices.
2. The ser%ice deli%ery approaches which seem to hold greatest promise of reaching these people should
be %igorously pursued. =or e9ample;
a. The -.S. should indicate its willingness to 0oin with other donors and organi8ations to encourage
further action by 2<4 go%ernments and other institutions to pro%ide low&cost family planning and
health ser%ices to groups in their populations who are not now reached by such ser%ices. :n accordance
with Title N of the 1:< 2egislation and current policy, 1.:.<. should be prepared to pro%ide substantial
assistance in this area in response to sound re5uests.
b. The ser%ices pro%ided must ta"e account of the capacities of the 2<4 go%ernments or institutions to
absorb full responsibility, o%er reasonable timeframes, for financing and managing the le%el of ser%ices
in%ol%ed.
c. 1.:.<. and other donor assistance efforts should utili8e to the e9tent possible indigenous structures and
personnel in deli%ering ser%ices, and should aim at the rapid de%elopment of local community! action
and sustaining capabilities.
d. 1.:.<. should continue to support e9perimentation with commercial distribution of contracepti%es and
application of useful findings in order to further e9plore the feasibility and replicability of this approach.
Dfforts in this area by other donors and organi8ations should be encouraged. 1ppro9. -.S. 4ost; L5&10
million annually.
3. :n con0unction with other donors and organi8ations, 1.:.<. should acti%ely encourage the de%elopment
of 2<4 capabilities for production and procurement of needed family planning contracepti%es.
Special =ootnote; 6hile the agencies participating in this study ha%e no specific recommendations to
propose on abortion the following issues are belie%ed important and should be considered in the conte9t
of a global population strategy.
,bortion
16 0orld-ide A/ortion 4ractice' -ertain facts about abortion need to be appreciatedC
.o country has reduced its population growth without resorting to abortion.
Thirty million pregnancies are estimated to be terminated annually by abortion throughout the world.
The figure is a guess. +ore precise data indicate about ( percent of the world)s population li%e in
countries where abortion is prohibited without e9ception and 12 percent in countries where abortion is
permitted only to sa%e the life of the pregnant woman. 1bout 15 percent li%e under statutes authori8ing
abortion on broader medical grounds, that is, to a%ert a threat to the woman)s health, rather than to her
life, and sometimes on eugenic and7or 0uridical grounds rape, etc.! as well. 4ountries where social
factors may be ta"en into consideration to 0ustify termination of pregnancy account for 22 percent of the
world)s population and those allowing for electi%e abortion for at least some categories of women, for 3/
percent. .o information is a%ailable for the remaining * percent? it would appear, howe%er, that most of
these people li%e in areas with restricti%e abortion laws.
The abortion statutes of many countries are not strictly enforced and some abortions on medical grounds
are probably tolerated in most places. :t is well "nown that in some countries with %ery restricti%e laws,
abortions can be obtained from physicians openly and without interference from the authorities.
4on%ersely, legal authori8ation of electi%e abortion does not guarantee that abortion on re5uest is
actually a%ailable to all women who may want their pregnancies terminated. 2ac" of medical personnel
and facilities or conser%ati%e attitudes among physicians and hospital administrators may effecti%ely
curtail access to abortion, especially for economically or socially depri%ed women. C2 U2S2 Le3is%"tin
"nd P%i.ies Re%"ti&e t A'!tin 1lthough the Supreme 4ourt of the -nited States in%alidated the
abortion laws of most states in Ianuary 19(3, the sub0ect still remains politically sensiti%e. -.S.
>o%ernment actions relati%e to abortion are restricted as indicated by the following =ederal legislation
and the resultant policy decisions of the concerned departments and agencies. a. 1.:.<. 'rogram The
predominant part of 1.:.<.)s population assistance program has concentrated on contracepti%e or
foresight methods. 1.:.<. recogni8ed, howe%er, that under de%eloping country conditions foresight
methods not only are fre5uently una%ailable but often fail because of ignorance, lac" of preparation,
misuse and non&use. #ecause of these latter conditions, increasing numbers of women in the de%eloping
world ha%e been resorting to abortion, usually under unsafe and often lethal conditions. :ndeed, abortion,
legal and illegal, now has become the most widespread fertility control method in use in the world today.
Since, in the de%eloping world, the increasingly widespread practice of abortion is conducted often
under unsafe conditions, 1.:.<. sought through research to reduce the health ris"s and other comple9ities
which arise from the illegal and unsafe forms of abortion. Ane result has been the de%elopment of the
+enstrual Eegulation Hit, a simple, ine9pensi%e, safe and effecti%e means of fertility control which is
easy to use under 2<4 conditions.
Section 11, of the =oreign 1ssistance 1ct of 19/1 '.2. 93&1*9!, as amended in 19(,, adds for the first
time restrictions on the use of 1.:.<. funds relati%e to abortion. The pro%ision states that @.one of the
funds made a%ailable to carry out this part 'art : of the 1ct! shall be used to pay for the performance of
abortions as a method of family planning or to moti%ate or coerce any person to practice abortions.@
:n order to comply with Section 11,, 1.:.<. has determined that foreign assistance funds will not be used
to;
i! procure or distribute e5uipment pro%ided for the purpose of inducing abortions as a method of family
planning.
ii! directly support abortion acti%ities in 2<4s. $owe%er, 1.:.<. may pro%ide population program
support to 2<4s and institutions as long as 1.:.<. funds are wholly attributable to the permissible
aspects of such programs.
iii! information, education, training, or communication programs that promote abortion as a method of
family planning. $owe%er, 1.:.<. will continue to finance training of 2<4 doctors in the latest
techni5ues used in obstetrics&gynecology practice, and will not dis5ualify such training programs if they
include pregnancy termination within the o%erall curriculum. Such training is pro%ided only at the
election of the participants.
iiii! pay women in the 2<4s to ha%e abortions as a method of family planning or to pay persons to
perform abortions or to solicit persons to undergo abortions.
1.:.<. funds may continue to be used for research relati%e to abortion since the 4ongress specifically
chose not to include research among the prohibited acti%ities.
1 ma0or effect of the amendment and policy determination is that 1.:.<. will not be in%ol%ed in further
de%elopment or promotion of the +enstrual Eegulation Hit. $owe%er, other donors or organi8ations
may become interested in promoting with their own funds dissemination of this promising fertility
control method. b. <$D6 'rograms Section 100* of the =amily 'lanning Ser%ices and 'opulation
Eesearch 1ct of 19(0 '.2. 91&5(2! states that @.one of the funds appropriated under this title shall be
used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.@ <$D6 has adhered strictly to the
intent of 4ongress and does not support abortion research. Studies of the causes and conse5uences of
abortion are permitted, howe%er.
The 'ublic $ealth Ser%ice 1ct D9tension of 19(3 '.2. 93&,5! contains the 4hurch 1mendment which
establishes the right of health pro%iders both indi%iduals and institutions! to refuse to perform an
abortion if it conflicts with moral or religious principles. c. 'roposed 2egislation on 1bortion Eesearch
There are numerous proposed 4ongressional amendments and bills which are more restricti%e on
abortion research than any of the pieces of legislation cited abo%e.
:t would be unwise to restrict abortion research for the following reasons;
1. The persistent and ubi5uitous nature of abortion.
2. 6idespread lac" of safe abortion techni5ue.
3. Eestriction of research on abortifacient drugs and de%ices would;
a. 'ossibly eliminate further de%elopment of the :-<.
b. 're%ent de%elopment of drugs which might ha%e other beneficial uses. 1n e9ample is methotre9ate
E! which is now used to cure a hitherto fatal tumor of the uterus && choriocarcinoma. This drug was first
used as an abortifacient.
IV2 C2 Uti%iB"tin f M"ss Medi" "nd S"te%%ite C//$ni."tins S(ste/s f! F"/i%( P%"nnin3
)2 Uti%iB"tin f M"ss Medi" f! Disse/in"tin f F"/i%( P%"nnin3 Se!&i.es "nd Inf!/"tin
The potential of education and its various media is primarily a function of 4a5 target
populations where socio$economic conditions would permit reasonable people to change
their behavior with the receipt of information about family planning and 4b5 the adequate
development of the substantive motivating conte.t of the message. While dramatic
limitations in the availability of any family planning related message are most severe in
rural areas of developing countries, even more serious gaps e.ist in the understanding of
the implicit incentives in the system for large families and the potential of the
informational message to alter those conditions.
.e%ertheless, progress in the technology for mass media communications has led to the suggestion that
the priority need might lie in the utili8ation of this technology, particularly with large and illiterate rural
populations. 6hile there are on&going efforts they ha%e not yet reached their full potential. .or ha%e the
principal -.S. agencies concerned yet integrated or gi%en sufficient priority to family planning
information and population programs generally.
Met 1.:.<.)s wor" suggests that radio, posters, printed material, and %arious types of personal contacts by
health7family planning wor"ers tend to be more cost&effecti%e than tele%ision e9cept in those areas
generally urban! where a TJ system is already in place which reaches more than 0ust the middle and
upper classes. There is great scope for use of mass media, particularly in the initial stages of ma"ing
people aware of the benefits of family planning and of ser%ices a%ailable? in this way mass media can
effecti%ely complement necessary interpersonal communications.
:n almost e%ery country of the world there are channels of communication media! a%ailable, such, as
print media, radio, posters, and personal contacts, which already reach the %ast ma0ority of the
population. =or e9ample, studies in :ndia & with only 303 literacy, show that most of the population is
aware of the go%ernment)s family planning program. :f response is low it is not because of lac" of media
to transmit information.
1.:.<. belie%es that the best bet in media strategy is to encourage intensi%e use of media already
a%ailable, or a%ailable at relati%ely low cost. =or e9ample, radio is a medium which in some countries
already reaches a si8eable percentage of the rural population? a recent 1.:.<. financed study by Stanford
indicates that radio is as effecti%e as tele%ision, costs one&fifth as much, and offers more opportunities
for programming for local needs and for local feedbac".
7ecommendations
<=(I, and <=I( should encourage other population donors and organiFations to develop
comprehensive information and educational programs dealing with population and family
planning consistent with the geographic and functional population emphasis discussed in
other sections. =uch programs should ma0e use of the results of (I,&s e.tensive
e.perience in this /eld and should include consideration of social, cultural and economic
factors in population control as well as strictly technical and educational ones.
C2 Use f U2S2 '!"d."st s"te%%ites f! disse/in"tin f f"/i%( 1%"nnin3 "nd -e"%t- inf!/"tin t 4e( LDC .$nt!ies
Discussion8
6ne 0ey factor in the efective use of e.isting contraceptive techniques has been the
problem of education. In particular, this problem is most severe in rural areas of the
developing countries. There is need to develop a cost$efective communications system
designed for rural areas which, together with local direct governmental eforts, can provide
comprehensive health information and in particular, family planning guidance. 6ne new
supporting technology which has been under development is the broadcast satellite. 9(=(
and :airchild have now developed an (T= 4(pplied Technology =atellite5, now in orbit,
which has the capability of beaming educational television programs to isolated areas via
small ine.pensive community receivers.
.1S1)s si9th 1pplications Technology Satellite was launched into geosynchronous orbit o%er the
>alapagos :slands on +ay 30, 19(,. :t will be utili8ed for a year in that position to deli%er health and
educational ser%ices to millions of 1mericans in remote regions of the Eoc"y +ountain States, 1las"a
and 1ppalachia. <uring this period it will be made a%ailable for a short time to #ra8il in order to
demonstrate how such a broadcast satellite may be used to pro%ide signals to 500 schools in their
e9isting educational tele%ision networ" 1,00 miles northeast of Eio de Ianeiro in Eio >rande do .orte.
:n mid&19(5, 1TS&/ will be mo%ed to a point o%er the :ndian Acean to begin beaming educational
tele%ision to :ndia. :ndia is now de%eloping its broadcast program materials. Signals pic"ed up from one
of two :ndian ground transmitters will be rebroadcast to indi%idual stations in 2500 %illages and to
ground relay installations ser%ing networ"s comprising 3000 more. This operation o%er :ndia will last
one year, after which time :ndia hopes to ha%e its own broadcast satellite in preparation.
D%entually it will be possible to broadcast directly to indi%idual TJ sets in remote rural areas. Such a
@direct broadcast satellite,@ which is still under de%elopment, could one day go directly into indi%idual
TJ recei%ers. 1t present, broadcast satellite signals go to ground recei%ing stations and are relayed to
indi%idual tele%ision sets on a local or regional basis. The latter can be used in towns, %illages and
schools.
The hope is that these new technologies will pro%ide a substantial input in family planning programs,
where the primary constraint lies in informational ser%ices. The fact, howe%er, is that information and
education does not appear to be the primary constraint in the de%elopment of effecti%e family planning
programs. 1:< itself has learned from costly intensi%e inputs that a supply oriented approach to family
planning is not and cannot be fully effecti%e until the demand side & incenti%es and moti%ations & are
both understood and accounted for.
2ea%ing this %ast problem aside, 1:< has much rele%ant e9perience in the numerous problems
encountered in the use of modern communications media for mass rural education. =irst, there is
widespread 2<4 sensiti%ity to satellite broadcast, e9pressed most %igorously in the Auter Space
4ommittee of the -.. +any countries don)t want broadcasts of neighboring countries o%er their own
territory and fear unwanted propaganda and sub%ersion by hostile broadcasters. .1S1 e9perience
suggests that the -.S. Onotemust tread %ery softly when discussing assistance in program content.
:nternational restrictions may be placed on the types of proposed broadcasts and it remains technically
difficult to restrict broadcast area co%erage to national boundaries. To the e9tent programs are de%eloped
0ointly and are appreciated and wanted by recei%ing countries, some rela9ation in their position might
occur.
1greement is nearly uni%ersal among practitioners of educational technology that the technology is
years ahead of software or content de%elopment. Thus cost per person reached tend to be %ery high. :n
addition, gi%en the current technology, audiences are limited to those who are willing to wal" to the
%illage TJ set and listen to public ser%ice messages and studies show declining audiences o%er time with
large audiences primarily for popular entertainment. :n addition, "eeping %illage recei%ers in repair is a
difficult problem. The high cost of program de%elopment remains a serious constraint, particularly since
there is so little e9perience in %alidifying program content for wide general audiences.
6ith these factors it is clear that one needs to proceed slowly in utili8ation of this technology for the
2<4s in the population field.
7ecommendations8
1. The wor0 of e.isting networ0s on population, education, ITH, and broadcast satellites
should be brought together to better consolidate relative priorities for research,
e.perimentation and programming in family planning. Wider distribution of the broad (I,
e.perience in these areas would probably be 2usti/ed. This is particularly true since
speci/c studies have already been done on the e.perimental (T=$A programs in the <.=.,
DraFil, and India and each clearly documents the very e.perimental character and high
costs of the efort. Thus at this point it is clearly inconsistent with <.=. or +,- population
goals to allocate large additional sums for a technology which is e.perimental.
2. 2imited donor and recipient family planning funds a%ailable for education7moti%ation must be
allocated on a cost&effecti%eness basis. Satellite TJ may ha%e opportunities for cost&effecti%eness
primarily where the decision has already been ta"en && on other than family planning grounds && to
underta"e %ery large&scale rural TJ systems. 6here applicable in such countries satellite technology
should be used when cost&effecti%e. Eesearch should gi%e special attention to costs and efficiency
relati%e to alternati%e media.
3. 6here the need for education is established and an effecti%e format has been de%eloped, we
recommend more effecti%e e9ploitation of e9isting and con%entional media; radio, printed material,
posters, etc., as discussed under part : abo%e.
V2 A.tin t De&e%1 W!%d-Wide P%iti."% "nd P1$%"!
C//it/ent t P1$%"tin St"'i%it(
Dis.$ssin=
( far larger, high$level efort is needed to develop a greater commitment of leaders of
both developed and developing countries to underta0e eforts, commensurate with the
need, to bring population growth under control.
:n the -nited States, we do not yet ha%e a domestic population policy despite widespread recognition
that we should && supported by the recommendations of the remar"able Eeport of the 4ommission on
'opulation >rowth and the 1merican =uture.
1lthough world population growth is widely recogni8ed within the >o%ernment as a current danger of
the highest magnitude calling for urgent measures, it does not ran" high on the agendas of con%ersations
with leaders of other nations.
.e%ertheless, the -nited States >o%ernment and pri%ate organi8ations gi%e more attention to the sub0ect
than any donor countries e9cept, perhaps, Sweden, .orway and <enmar". =rance ma"es no meaningful
contribution either financially or %erbally. The -SSE no longer opposes efforts of -.S. agencies but
gi%es no support.
:n the 2<4s, although 31 countries, including 4hina, ha%e national population growth control programs
and 1/ more include family planning in their national health ser%ices && at least in some degree && the
commitment by the leadership in some of these countries is neither high nor wide. These programs will
ha%e only modest success until there is much stronger and wider acceptance of their real importance by
leadership groups. Such acceptance and support will be essential to assure that the population
information, education and ser%ice programs ha%e %ital moral bac"ing, administrati%e capacity, technical
s"ills and go%ernment financing.
Re.//end"tins=
1. $9ecutive :ranch
a. The President and the =ecretary of =tate should ma0e a point of discussing our national
concern about world population growth in meetings with national leaders where it would
be relevant.
b. The D9ecuti%e #ranch should gi%e special attention to briefing the 4ongress on population matters to
stimulate support and leadership which the 4ongress has e9ercised in the past. 1 program for this
purpose should be de%eloped by S7'+ with $ and 1:<.
2. /orld %opulation Conference
a. In addition to the speci/c recommendations for action listed in the preceding sections,
<.=. agencies should use the prestige of the World Population Plan of (ction to advance all
of the relevant action recommendations made by it in order to generate more efective
programs for population growth limitation. (I, should coordinate closely with the <9:P( in
trying to e.pand resources for population assistance programs, especially from non$61-,,
non$traditional donors.
The -.S. should continue to play a leading role in D4ASA4 and >eneral 1ssembly discussions and
re%iew of the 6''1.
4. Department of "tate
a. The =tate ,epartment should urge the establishment at <.9. headquarters of a high
level seminar for +,- cabinet and high level oJcials and non$governmental leaders of
comparable responsibility for indoctrination in population matters. They should have the
opportunity in this seminar to meet the senior oJcials of <.9. agencies and leading
population e.perts from a variety of countries.
b. The State <epartment should also encourage organi8ation of a -.='1 policy staff to consult with
leaders in population programs of de%eloping countries and other e9perts in population matters to
e%aluate programs and consider actions needed to impro%e them.
c. 1 senior officer, preferably with ambassadorial e9perience, should be assigned in each regional bureau
dealing with 2<4s or in State)s 'opulation Affice to gi%e full&time attention to the de%elopment of
commitment by 2<4 leaders to population growth reduction.
d. 1 senior officer should be assigned to the #ureau of :nternational Argani8ation 1ffairs to follow and
press action by the Speciali8ed 1gencies of the -... in population matters in de%eloping countries.
e. 'art of the present temporary staffing of S7'+ for the purposes of the 6orld 'opulation Mear and the
6orld 'opulation 4onference should be continued on a permanent basis to ta"e ad%antage of
momentum gained by the Mear and 4onference.
2lternate View on A.c.
c. The <epartment should e9pand its efforts to help 1mbassadorial and other high&ran"ing -.S.>.
personnel understand the conse5uences of rapid population growth and the remedial measures possible.
d. The <epartment would also gi%e increased attention to de%eloping a commitment to population
growth reduction on the part of 2<4 leaders.
e. 1de5uate manpower should be pro%ided in S7'+ and other parts of the <epartment as appropriate to
implement these e9panded efforts.
6. ,.I.D. should e9pand its programs to increase the understanding of ;DC leaders
regarding the conse<uences of rapid population growth and their commitment
to undertaking remedial actions.
This should include necessary actions for collecting and analyFing adequate and reliable
demographic data to be used in promoting awareness of the problem and in formulating
appropriate policies and programs.
=. 3"I,.
(s a ma2or part of <.=. information policy, the improving but still limited programs of <=I(
to convey information on population matters should be strengthened to a level
commensurate with the importance of the sub2ect.
$3TAF$3. S@-U5ATY -FU$-A.
+3S;A$GTF$, ,.-. !"5"6
3pril !2, 1912
$ational Securit9 Stud9 %e&orandu& !""

TF: The Secretar9 of ,efense

The Secretar9 of 36riculture
The ,irector of -entral Antelli6ence
The ,eput9 Secretar9 of State
3d&inistrator, 36enc9 for Anternational ,e7elop&ent
SU>H@-T: A&plications of +orldwide Population Growth for U.S.
Securit9 and F7erseas Anterests
The President has directed a stud9 of the i&pact of world popula
tion 6rowth on U.S. securit9 and o7erseas interests. The stud9
should loo= forward at least until the 9ear !""", and use se7eral
alternati7e reasonable projections of population 6rowth.
An ter&s of each projection, the stud9 should assess:
the correspondin6 pace of de7elop&ent, especiall9 in poorer
countriesP
the de&and for US e4ports, especiall9 of food, and the trade
proble&s the US &a9 face arisin6 fro& co&petition for re
sourcesP and
the li=elihood that population 6rowth or i&balances will
produce disrupti7e forei6n policies and international insta
bilit9.
The stud9 should focus on the international political and econo&ic
i&plications of population 6rowth rather than its ecolo6ical, socio
lo6ical or other aspects.
The stud9 would then offer possible courses of action for the United
States in dealin6 with population &atters abroad, particularl9 in
de7elopin6 countries, with special attention to these Ouestions:
+hat, if an9, new initiati7es b9 the United States are needed
to focus international attention on the population proble&Q
-an technolo6ical inno7ations or de7elop&ent reduce
6rowth or a&eliorate its effectsQ
-ould the United States i&pro7e its assistance in the popu
lation field and if so, in what for& and throu6h which a6en
cies bilateral, &ultilateral, pri7ateQ
The stud9 should ta=e into account the PresidentBs concern that
population polic9 is a hu&an concern inti&atel9 related to the
di6nit9 of the indi7idual and the objecti7e of the United States is to
wor= closel9 with others, rather than see= to i&pose our 7iews on
others.
The President has directed that the stud9 be acco&plished b9 the
$S- Under Secretaries -o&&ittee. The -hair&an, Under Secre
taries -o&&ittee, is reOuested to forward the stud9 to6ether with
the -o&&itteeBs action reco&&endations no later than %a9 !9,
1912 for consideration b9 the President.
;@$5Y 3. <ASSA$G@5
cc: -hair&an, Hoint -hiefs of Staff
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This docu&ent can onl9 be declassified b9 the +hite ;ouse.

,eclassifiedR5eleased on 1R/R09

under pro7isions of @.F. 1!/56
b9 8. Grabos=e, $ational Securit9 -ouncil
T3>.@ F8 -F$T@$TS
@4ecuti7e Su&&ar9 65 0!
+Reader: For Parts 3ne and (wo) see 2ppendi- ,
Part Fne 3nal9tical Section

-hapter A +orld ,e&o6raphic Trends
-hapter AA Population and +orld 8ood Supplies
-hapter AAA %inerals and 8uel
-hapter A' @cono&ic ,e7elop&ent and
Population Growth
-hapter ' A&plications of Population Pressures
for $ational Securit9
-hapter 'A +orld Population -onference
Part Two Polic9 5eco&&endations

Section A 3 U.S. Global Population Strate69
Section AA 3ction to -reate -onditions for 8ertilit9 ,e
cline: Population and a ,e7elop&ent 3ssis
tance Strate69
3. General Strate69 and 5esource for 3.A.,. 3ssistance
>. 8unctional 3ssistance Pro6ra&s to -reate -ondi
tions for 8ertilit9 ,ecline
-. 8ood for Peace Pro6ra& and Population
Section AAA Anternational Fr6aniEations and other %ul
tilateral Population Pro6ra&s
3. U$ Fr6aniEation and SpecialiEed 36encies
>. @ncoura6in6 Pri7ate Fr6aniEations
Section A' Pro7ision and ,e7elop&ent of 8a&il9
Plannin6 Ser7ices, Anfor&ation and Tech
nolo69
3. 5esearch to A&pro7e 8ertilit9 -ontrol Technolo69
>. ,e7elop&ent of .ow-ost ,eli7er9 S9ste&s
-. UtiliEation of %ass %edia and Satellite -o&&uni
cations S9ste& for 8a&il9 Plannin6
Section ' 3ction to ,e7elop +orldwide Political and
Popular -o&&it&ent to Population Stabilit9