Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
28
issues about the status of art itself.
According to Cebik, an analysis of forgeries
demonstrates that our understanding of art is dominated
by a limiting paradigm--"production by individuals." We
focus almost exclusively on the individual identity of the
artist as the determining factor in assessing authenticity.
"Nowhere...is there room for paradigmatic art being
fluid, unfinished, evolving, and continuous in its cre-
ation." Cebik has in mind a dynamic, communally based
art, an everchanging neighborhood mural or music passed
on for generations, as in a folk tradition.
29
Another exam-
ple would be classical ballet, a performance of which is a
unique dynamic movement, different from every other
performance of the same ballet.
These suggestions about a different paradigm of art
show clearly, I think, what is wrong with the art/nature
analogy as a useful analytical tool. Natural entities and
systems are much more akin to the fluid evolving art of
Cebiks alternative model than they are to the static, fin-
ished, individual artworks of the dominant paradigm. It is
thus an error to use criteria of forgery and authenticity that
derive from an individualistic, static conception of art for
an evaluation of natural entities and systems. Natural
entities and systems are nothing like static, finished ob-
jects of art. They are fluid, evolving systems without an
artist or creator. The perceived disvalue in restored natural
objects does not derive then from a misunderstanding over
the identity of the creator of the objects. It derives instead
from the misplaced category of "creator"--for natural
object
s
do not have creators or designers as human art-
works do. Once we realize that the natural entity we axe
viewing has been "restored" by a human artisan it ceases
to be a natural object. It is not a forgery; it is an artifact.
We thus return to artifacts, and their essentially anthro-
pocentric nature. We cannot (and should not) think of
natural objects as artifacts, for this imposes a human
purpose or design on their very essence. As artifacts, they
are evaluated by their success in meeting human interests
and needs, not by their own intrinsic being. Using the
art/nature analogy of forgery reinforces the impression
that natural objects are similar to artifacts--artworks--
and that they can be evaluated using the same anthropo-
centric criteria. Natural entities have to be evaluated on
their own terms, not as artworks, machines, factories, or
any other human-created artifact.
V
But what are the terms appropriate for the evaluation of
natural objects? What criteria should be used? To answer
this question we need to do more than differentiate natural
objects from artifacts; we need to examine the essence or
nature of natural objects. What does it mean to say that an
entity is natural (and hence not an artifact)? Is there a
distinguishing mark or characteristic? What makes an
object natural, and why is the standard not met through the
restoration process?
The simple answer to this question--a response I basi-
cally support--is that the natural is defined as being
independent of the actions of humanity. Thus, Taylor
advocates a principle of noninterference as a primary
moral duty in his ethic of respect for nature. "We put aside
our personal likes and our human interests...Our respect
for nature means that we acknowledge the sufficiency of
the natural world to sustain its own proper order through-
out the whole domain of life.
3
The processes of the
natural world that are the most natural are those that are
most free of human interference.
94
Restoration & Management Notes
9:2
There are two obvious problems with this first simple
answer. First, there is the empirical point that human
i nfl ~ence on the environment is. by now, fairly pervasive.
No part of the natural world lies untouched by our palltl-
tion and technology. In a sense, then, nothing natural truly
cxists (anymore). Second, there is the loyical point that
humans themselves are naturally evolved beings, and so
all human actions would be "namml." regardless of the
amount of technology used or the interfe~ence on nonhu-
man nature. The creation of artifacts is a natural human
act ~vi q, and thus the distinction between anifacl and
natural ohjcct begins to blur.
These problems in the relationship of humanity to
nature are no1 new. Mill raised similar objecrions rn the
idea of4*nature" as amoral norm over a hundred years ago,
when he argued !ha[ it was either impossible to "folInw
nature" sincc anything hurnan was heyond natural forces,
or impossible not to Ibflow nature, since nature is all that
31
exists, The answer to these problems is twofold. First.
we admit that the concepts of "natural" and "artifactual"
are not absolutes; they exist along a spectrum. where
gradations of both conccpk can be discerned. The human
cffecz on the natural world is pervasive, but human actions
dirler in significant ways. A toxic waste dump is different
born a compost heap of organic material. To claim that
both arc equally non-natural obscures important
disrinc!ions.
A second response is presented by ~rennan. ~* ~ l ~ h o u ~ h
a broad definition of "natural" denotes indepcndence from
human management or interference, a more useful notion
(hccause it has impliceions for value theory and cthics)
can be derived from the consideration of evalulionary
adaptations. Our natural diet is the one we are adapted for.
the one that is "in keeping with out nature." All human
activity is not unnatural, only that activity which goes
heyond our biologics! and evolutionary capacities. As an
example, Brennan cites h e procedure of ''natural child-
birth'-that is, childbirth free of medical intcrvcntions.
'"Childbirth Is an especially striking example of the wild-
ness within us. . .where we can appreciate the na l t ~nl at
first hand ..." he writes. It is natural, Free, and wild not
because it is a nonhuman activity-after all, it is human
childbirth-but because it is independenz of a certain kind
of human activity, actions designed to control or to
manipulate natural processes.
The "natural" then is a term we use to designate ob.jects
and processes that exist as far as possible from human
manipulation and cont~ol. Natural entitics are autonomous
in ways that human-created artifacts are not. They are. in
Taylor's words. "Free to pursue the realization of one's
good according to the laws of oneBs nature."" When we
lhus judge natt~ral objects, and value them more highly
than artifacts, we are focusing on the extent of their
independence from human domination, In this sense. then,
human actions can also be judged to he natural-these are
the human actions that exist as evolutionary adaptations.
free of the control and atreration of technological pro-
cesses. The "runner's high" is a biological adaptation
useful for the perpetuation of the species in a hunter-gather
scxliery: the cocainc "high." though physiologically sim-
itar, i s a technological imposition and manipulation of
natural biological processes.
i f these reflections on the meaning of "natural" arc
plausible, then it should k clear why the restoration
prmcss fails to meet the criteria of naturalness. The at-
tempt to redesign, recreate, and restare natural areas and
objects i s a radical intervention in natural processes, Al-
though there is an obvious spectrum of possible reqtora-
tion and redesign pmjccts which differ in their value-
Maser's redesigned, sustainable ores! i s better than a tree
plantation, and Packard's tallgrass savanna is Getter than
an urban park-all of these projects lnvdve the manipu-
lation and. 1 argue. the domination of naturaI areas. All of
thcse projects involve t he imposition of anthropocentric
interests on [he processes and objects of nature so as to
create artifactual natuml realities. Thc imposition of ex-
ternal human interests on natural entities and systems is a
form of domination. Nature is not permitted to be free, to
pursue its own independent course of development.
The fundamental error is thus domination, lhe denial of
freedom and autonomy. Although anrhropocentrism i s
generally considered a major problem by most environ-
menial philosophers, it i s really only one version of !he
more basic attack on the preeminent value of self-reajiza-
tion. From within thc perspeclive of anthropmentrism,
humanity believes it is justified in dominating and mold-
ing the non-human world to its own human purposes. But
a policy of domination transcends even the anthropocen-
tric subversion of natural processes. A policy of domina-
lion subverts both namrc and human existence: i t denies
bolh the cultural and natural realization of individual
good. human as well as non-human. Liberation from all
forms of dominrltion i s thus the chief goal of any ethical
or political system.
I t is difficult to awaken from the dream of domination.
We are all impressed by the power and breadth of human
technological achievements. Why is it not possible to
extend this power further. until we control, manipulate,
xnd dominate the entirc natural universe? This is the
illusion that the restoration of nature presents lo us. But it
is only an illusion. Once we dominate nature, once we
restorc. redesign, regenerate, sustain, or reconstruct nltture
for ourown purposes, then we have destroyed n a m e w e
have created an anifactual reality. in a sense, a false reality,
which merely provides us the pleasant illusory appearance
of the natural environmen!.
As a concluding note, let me leave the realm of philo-
sophical speculation and return to the world of practical
envirtlnrnental policy. Nothing I have said in this essay
should be taken as an endorsement of aclions that devciop,
exploit, or injure areas of the natural environment and
leave them in a damaged state. I believe. for example, that
Exxon should attempt to clean-up and restore the Alaskan
waterways and lands that were harmed by its corporate
negligence. I also believe that restorfitionists should con-
Restoration & Management Notes
9:2
tinue in their work. Steve Packard, for example, should
continue to create savanna; Chris Maser should continue
to try to modify destructive short-term forestry practices.
But perhaps restorationists should adopt a different lan-
guage to describe their work. They should talk about their
work as an artifactual creation, not a restoration of nature.
The point of my argument here is that we must not misun-
derstand what we humans are doing when we attempt to
restore or repair natural areas. We are not restoring nature;
we are not making it whole and healthy again. Ecological
restoration is a compromise; it should not be a basic policy
goal. It is a policy that makes the best of a bad situation;
it cleans up our mess. We are putting a piece of furniture
over the stain in the carpet for the sake of appearances. As
a matter of policy, however, it would be much better to
prevent the stains in the first place.
References
1 An earlier and somewhat different version of this paper was read at the
conference Morn Philosophy in the Public Domain under the title "The
Bi~Lie Human Restoration of Nature " at the University of British
Cmumbia, Vancouver, Canada, June 8 1990. That version of the paper
will appear in Research in Philosoph~y
and Technology 12 (1992). The
author wishes to thank Edwin Hettinger, Eric Higgs Holmes Rolston
and Bill Jordala for important comments that helpedlnthe revision of thi~
paper.
2 Steve Packard, "Just a Few Oddball Species: Restoration and the
Rediscovery of the Tallgrass Savanna," Restoration & Management
Notes 6:1 (Surraner 1988), pp. 13-22 (Quotation from p. 14).
3 Chris Maser, The Redesigned Forest (San Pedro: R.& E. Miles, 1988),
p. 173.
4 Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 186-92, 304-06, and
generally Chapters Four and Six.
5 .
Peter S. Wenz, Envtronmental Justice (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), pp.
287-91.
6 .
Robert Elhot, "Faking Nature," Inquiry 25 (1982): 81-93; reprinted in
Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce, eds. People, Penguins, and
Plastic Trees." Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics (Belmont:
Wadsworth, 1986), pp. 142-150. See also Peter Losin, "Faking Nature--
AReview,"Restoratton & Management Notes 4 2 (Winter !986): 55; and
"The Sistine Chapel Debate: Peter Losin Replies," Restoration & Man-
agement Notes 6:1 (Summer 1988): 6.
7 Elliot, p. 86 (VanDeVeer and Pierce, p. 145).
8 Elliot, p. 91 (VanDeVeer and Pierce, p. 149).
9 Eric Katz, "Organism, Community and the Substitution Problem,"
Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 253-~5.
10 See, for example, Barry Cormnoner, The Closing Circle (New York:
1971) and Arnold Pacey, The Culture of Technology (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1983).
11 Michael Losonsky, "The Nature of Artifacts," Philosophy 65 (1990):
88.
12 Losonsky, p. 84.
13 .
Andrew Brennan, "The Moral Standing of Natural Objects," Environ-
mental Ethics 6 (1984): 41-44. The only way one could say that natural
entities were designed for a purpose would be to accept a cosmic or divine
principle of design in the universe. I hesitate to make such metaphysical
claims.
14 See footnotes 2 and 3, above. Steve Packard is the Illinois director of
science and stewardship for The Nature Conservancy. Chris Maser is a
former research scientist for the United States Department of Interior
Bureau of Land Management.
15 Maser, The Redesigned Forest, p. xvii.
16
Maser, pp. 176-77.
17
Maser, pp. 88-89.
18
Maser, p. 174.
19
Maser, p. 94.
2o
Maser, pp. 148-49.
21
Packard, "Just a Few Oddball Species," p. 13.
96
22 Packard, p. 14.
23 Packard, p. 15.
24 Packard, p. 15.
25 Packard, p. 18.
26 Packard, p. 14.
27 Packard, p. 15
28 .
L. B. Cehik, "Forging Issues from Forged Art," Southern Journal of
Philosophy 27 (1989): 331-46.
29 Cebik, p. 342.
30 . . .
Taylor, p. 177. The rule of nomnterference ~s discussed on pp. 173-179.
Note that Packard, for example, does not put aside his personal prefer-
ences: he is unwilling to wait two hundred years for nature to take its
course, and so accelerates the bum; see notes 23 and 24 above.
31 J.S. Mill, "Nature," in Three Essays on Religion (London: 1874).
32 . .
Andrew Brennan, Thinking About Nature." An Investigation of Nature,
Value, and Ecology (Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1988), pp.
88-91.
33 Taylor, p. 174.
Restoration & Management Notes
9:2