Uniqueness

Regional
General

Chinese investment in Latin America is strong and increasing.
Economic Observer 13 Byline Wang Xiaoxia, Economic Observer, Translated by Worldcrunch (In
America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America, Worldcrunch/Economic Observer, May 6,
2013, Available Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-
rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/,
Accessed: 05/25/2013)
Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in Latin America in a
number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such
as oil, copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-
forum was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region.
Since 2011, China has overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin Americas second biggest investor
behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin
American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy.
According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American
trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%.
This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin Americas single dominant
trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion.


Latin America in transition to Chinas SOI- (domestic problems hamstring US action)

Regenstreif 6-12-13, Gary: Editor at Large at Reuters, Special projects. Quoting Eric Farnsworth: vice
president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, an international forum on social
development and open markets
The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/

The United States, Latin Americas largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still retains
this position. Washington has now signed free trade agreements with more than a third of the
hemispheres nations and annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and services with Latin
America more than three times the regions commerce with China.
In Obamas first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America.
And China has moved in fast .
China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in
2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest trading partner of Brazil, the regions
powerhouse largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy.
Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazils
foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the
Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties.
Washingtons renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America
the economic success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner
there, which has played well against the Wests history of meddling in domestic affairs.
Its about influence and leverage , said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas,
The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than *in the+ patronizing way
it happened in the past.
The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington
confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823
Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy which muddies its approach to
trade and investment. Washingtons domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises,
also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words as
has happened before.
China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches
opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there.






Chinese aggression
Transition now- Chinese involvement

Valencia 6-24-13
New York-based foreign affairs analyst and is a contributing writer for the World Policy Institute and
Global Voices Online
World policy Institute: US and China: The Fight for Latin America June 24, 2013 - 6:46am By Robert
Valencia http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america

As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more than
usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden
visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico
and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation. Chinas active involvement in Latin American
geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, Chinas largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion
deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru
has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Perus largest trading partner. Chinas
imports to Peru, however, rank second with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds
first place with 24.5 percent. China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in
terms of infrastructure and technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an
instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela known as El Vergatario
(Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chvez introduced this new phone to low-income
families making it the worlds cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail
construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a major buyer of farm products and
metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from
Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.


Chinese aggression now- incentives for involvement

Mallen 6-28-13
Latin America reporter for the International Business Times quoting Michael Cerna of China Research
Center, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State
By Patricia Rey Malln on June 28 2013 9:53 PM Latin America Increases Relations With China: What
Does That Mean For The US? http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-
does-mean-us-1317981

China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a
competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil,
soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its
presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political
influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention
elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. *The U.S.'+ attention of late has
been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on Americas list of
priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void, Cerna said.

U.S. influence declining independence and backlash

Martinez 3-23-13
Columnist for Sun Sentinel
May 23, 2013|Guillermo I. Martinez America losing influence throughout Latin America
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-23/news/fl-gmcol-oped0523-20130523_1_drug-cartels-latin-
america-pri

Once upon a time, as many fairy tales start, the United States was the prevailing force in Latin
America. It had a coherent policy for its southern neighbors, and its opinions mattered to those who
governed in the region. Despite President Barack Obama's recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and Vice
President Joe Biden's upcoming trip to the region, that is no more . The days when John F. Kennedy
created the Alliance for Progress and was a hero to the young throughout the western hemisphere have
been gone for more than half a century. The time when Jimmy Carter pledged to back only those
governments that respected human rights and encouraged that caudillos be ousted is also a historical
footnote. True, the world has changed. The attacks of September 11, 2001 made everyone look to the
East; to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to Iran, Syria and other countries in the Middle East. Israel is still crucial to
American foreign policy, more so now that militants are willing to die to kill Americans and Israelis. Latin
America also changed when the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez was elected. The rising price
of oil gave Chvez riches beyond belief and he began sharing it with similar-minded leaders in Cuba,
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina; just to name a few. Colombia once depended
greatly on the Plan Colombia assistance from the United States to fight the FARC guerrillas and the
drug lords that governed much of the country. The emphasis on the Plan Colombia since Juan Manuel
Santos took office has decreased. Santos also believes in negotiations with the FARC and closer ties to
those who govern in Venezuela. Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight
the drug cartels until Obama's visit to Enrique Pea Nieto, recently elected president. The communique
at the end of the meeting talked about new economic cooperation between the two nations and how
together they would fight the drug cartels. Not highlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the
United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country and that the cooperation would be
respectful of their sovereign rights. Pea Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary
Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had
killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the
fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super
power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to
the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner
for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so
little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has
close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and
Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicols Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping
to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called
Cubazuela the alliance between Cuba's Ral Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all
have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet
the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home.
Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence . Many of the leftists' presidents in
the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations
with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China.


Trade

China controls trade- growth rates prove

Marketwatch 6-25-13
Quoting Tommy Wong, President of Global Sources Exhibitions
June 25, 2013 http://www.marketwatch.com/story/global-sources-opens-third-annual-china-sourcing-
fairs-in-miami-amid-sino-latin-american-trade-growth-2013-06-25

"China's trade value with Latin America rose by 8 percent in 2012 to $255.5 billion -- a significant
volume," said Tommy Wong, President of Global Sources Exhibitions. The growth in China's trade with
the region has surpassed that of the Unite States, which was 6.2 percent last year. "Demand for China-
made products is on the rise. The China Sourcing Fairs here in Miami act as a platform for buyers and
manufacturers to meet and conduct business. In fact, pre-registrations from buyers in Latin America are
up by 15 percent this year -- indicating strong interest in the Fairs," said Wong.


China winning trade war- flexibility

Goodman 5-29-13
Bloomberg reporter responsible for economic and political coverage in Latin America quoting
Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties By Joshua Goodman - May 29, 2013 12:52
PM ET http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-s-duels-china-for-latin-
america-influence.html

Competing with Chinas checkbook isnt easy for the U.S. Seeking South American soy, copper and iron
ore, China boosted imports from Latin America 20-fold, to $86 billion in 2011 from $3.9 billion in 2000,
according to calculations by the Inter-American Development Bank. By contrast, the U.S. policy of
pursuing free-trade accords has been controversial, said Kevin Gallagher, a Boston University
economist. If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with,
said Gallagher, author of the 2010 book The Dragon in the Room, about Chinas inroads in the region.
The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy
because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to.

China beating the US - Brazil

Ellis 6-6-13
Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research
focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran
China's New Backyard Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag in Latin
America? BY R. EVAN ELLIS JUNE 6, 2013
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america

In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day,
three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and
Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-
Bissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago
included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government,
discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's itinerary took him
to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de
Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his
words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and
the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in
2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian
President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United
States. Make no mistake : China is now a presence in the region. Xi's trip to Trinidad and Tobago is only
the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited communist
Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing
rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica.
Xi's choice of three destinations near the United States, followed by a "shirt-sleeves" summit with U.S.
President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort in California, sends a subtle message
that the new Chinese leadership seeks to engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the
deference shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders.


Agriculture

China increasing ag ties now

MercoPress 6-12-13
News agency based in Montevideo, Uruguay. It provides information focused on Latin America and the
South Atlantic
Wednesday, June 12th 2013 - 07:20 UTC China set eyes on Latan agriculture to promote cooperation
and food security http://en.mercopress.com/2013/06/12/china-set-eyes-on-latam-agriculture-to-
promote-cooperation-and-food-security

China is determined to promote cooperation and food security, with an emphasis in technological
development with Latinamerica said Minister Han Changfu at the conclusion of the forum which was
organized by the Chinese government and the UN Economic Commission for Latinamerica and the
Caribbean.
To this effect China has already earmarked 50 million dollars to finance projects in Latinamerica, one
of which is to increase and incorporate an additional half a million hectares of farming land in
Argentina.
Antonio Prado, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) said that there is a raft of complementation opportunities in the agricultural sectors
of Latinamerica and China which can help build a strategic trade and technology relationship.




Political Relations
Latin America wants China now because theyre looking to counterbalance the U.S.
Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics,
Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online,
http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Hu Jintao celebrate at closing of
investment and trade seminar. Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the United States and
Western Institutions. Chinas historical status as a leader of the developing world positions it as the
natural ally of the new generation of Latin American populist leaders, such as Hugo Chvez, Rafael
Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing after being elected president, for example,
Morales proclaimed himself to be a great admirer of Mao, while Chvez has exclaimed that Mao
and South American revolutionary icon Simn Bolvar would have been great friends. While these
leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese investments and commodity purchases, the position of the
PRC as a geopolitical alternative to the United States shapes the way that they court the Chinese. In
permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with the anti-
U.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship
with the United States and the West. Nonetheless, the relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the
relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War. Bolivia
turned to China to purchase K8 combat aircraft, for example, after the United States blocked its ability
to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.

Chinas expanding political relations
Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and
Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
1/2012: 3-19, page 3-4, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491,
accessed 7/18/13) PE
At the same time, economic relations go substantially beyond trade, and are also perhaps more visibly
characterised by the often successful attempts of Chinese state-owned corporations (such as PetroChina
and Sinopec) to acquire shares in Latin American oil and mineral commodities exploration companies.
On the political side, Beijings involvement in the Western hemisphere has materialised in the
establishment of socalled strategic partnerships with several states in the region; Chinas training of
increasing numbers of Latin American military personnel; and attempts to expand the ties of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with political parties across the continent. These examples of the
intensifying Sino-Latin American links seemingly support a neorealist perspective according to which
Beijing uses trade, investment, development aid and diplomacy in an attempt to balance the regional
and global dominance of the United States and other OECD nations. Li (2008: 195) argues that China is
taking advantage of a power vacuum in the region that was created by the United States and Russias
declining interest in Latin America.

Uniqueness China is increasing influence in Latin America recent trip proves
Funaro, 13 (Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence
in Latin America, Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-
battles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position
China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico
Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to
discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly
when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the
American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing
domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science
professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest
(relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to
economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America. China is increasing its
funding to the region just as the US has been coming under pressure to cut aid and investment. "If Im a
Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with," Kevin Gallagher,
author of the 2010 book "The Dragon in the Room," about Chinas inroads in Latin America, told
Bloomberg. "The onus is on the US to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so
easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to." Latin America's growing economy makes
for an attractive investment. The International Monetary Fund forecasts the regions economies will
expand 3.4 percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world. Xi's tour of
Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are setting the stage for his visit to California later this week, which will
be his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office. That Xi's Latin America trip came so early
into his presidency is a confident approach that shows little concern for American reaction, Evan Ellis, a
professor at the National Defense University in Washington told Bloomberg. "In the past Chinese
presidents were very deferential to the US., always making reference to Washingtons backyard," Ellis
said. "You dont hear any of that from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either."

Economic Relations
China & Latin American economies are become dependent on one another
Schmidt & Nicholson 10 (Susan & Tara, Susan Schmidt is a partner at the law firm Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips and Managing Director at ManattJones Global Strategies. Tara Nicholson is an intern with
ManattJones Global Strategies and a candidate for a dual MA/MBA degree from the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies and The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania,
Chinas Relationship with Latin America in Perspective, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP April 18, 2010,
www.manatt.com/Articles/China%E2%80%99s_Relationship_with_Latin_America_in_Perspective.aspx#
sthash.uZO1xhJ1.dpuf)

Chinas relations with Latin America are driven by the joint desire for mutually beneficial economic
relations and a multi-polar world. The countrys increasing presence in Latin America is neither a
panacea for the regions economic challenges nor a substitute for its historical economic relationships.
Although China is laying the groundwork to expand its influence in Latin America, that influence will
primarily serve Chinas own commercial interests. Chinas largely economic focus in Latin America is
evident by contrasting the breath and depth of Chinas interests and relations in Southeast Asia.
The opportunity for Latin America then lies in making Chinas interests a part of long-term economic
strategy in the region. Long-term country attempts to turn Chinas primarily economic interests into
political tools are likely to be unsuccessful. Regional growth and diversification will not be achieved
misunderstanding Chinas primarily economic interests. The challenge is to transform the opportunity
provided by a more diverse trade and economic relationship into domestic benefits and sustained
growth and development. That will be accomplished only with perspective on an increasingly
multilateral economic structure.

Chinas influence in Latin America is growing
Sarmiento-Saher 13 (Sebastian Sarmiento-Saher is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat. China and Latin America: Big Business
and Big competition. The Diplomat 14 March 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latin-america-big-business-and-
big-competition/ EW
According to Barbara Stallings, Chinese exports to Latin America grew substantially from U.S. $6.9 billion in 2000 to U.S.
$69.7 billion in 2008; while LAC exports to China increased from U.S. $5.3 billion in 2000 to U.S. $70.3 billion in 2008. However, despite these
dramatic increases of 910 percent and 1,226 percent, the United States and the EU are still ahead of China in terms of
trade flows with Latin America. China is quickly catching up to many of LACs traditional trading
partners, however. Already Chinas trade numbers with LAC have surpassed those of Japan, the
previously dominant Asian trading partner for Latin America. What is most significant about these
developments overall is how rapidly Chinese businesses and organizations have expanded their activity in the region
a trend that continues to grow.

Uniqueness More evidence multiple warrants
Darlington, 12 (Shasta, international correspondent for CNN based in Brazil, China-Latam economic
ties tightening, Latam is not my typo, thats totes on CNN, November 19, 2012, Online,
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/18/business/china-latam-ties, accessed 7/17/13) PE
The rise of China in Latin America, long considered the United States' "backyard," took many by
surprise. Now, its economic influence in the region is only expected to grow. For the past decade China
has fueled high growth in major commodity producing countries like Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru
with its appetite for raw materials such as iron ore, soybeans and copper. In fact, China replaced the
United States as the top trading partner in Brazil and Chile and is on the way to doing so in many others
countries in Latin America. That relationship made China popular with many countries weary of trying
to get their goods onto American and European shelves. But when global demand for Chinese goods
dried up in 2008 and 2009, the relationship with Latin America evolved. "China figured out that Latin
America could be a very good alternative market for its surplus," said Roberto Dumas Damas, a
professor at Sao Paulo's INSPER business school. The flood of cheap exports from China sparked a
backlash from many of the hardest-hit industries, but overall, the trade relationship still tips in Latin
America's favor. Brazil's trade surplus with China, for example, was $11.5 billion in 2011. China followed
up not only with cheap exports of its goods, but hefty investments in Latin America to make it easier to
reach the region's growing middle class consumers. "There were two waves of foreign direct
investment," Dumas said. "First to guarantee access to raw materials, like land for soybeans and iron
ore plants." "In the second wave," he added. "Companies want to explore the region's consumer
markets." He pointed to plans by Chinese carmakers Chery and JAC carmakers to build automobiles in
South America. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, Chinese foreign investment in Latin America
jumped to $10.5 billion in 2010 from $7.3 billion in 2009.

U.S. Inf Low

Link is unique- America backing out now

Hilton 13
former Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of China Dialogue, a non-profit
Chinese/English platform for news.
Isabel Hilton China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge? from the Norwegian Peacebuilding
Research Center
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb
c054aad9.pdf

The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, has reacted calmly to date to Chinas
increasing presence in Latin America. In a striking acknowledgement of Chinas importance in the
region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for mutual transparency through the U.S. China
Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintaos visit to
Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogue to date,
the U.S. has conceded Chinas standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to
Chinas action in troublesome countries such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when
Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lend its support.
Although China eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign. The shale oil
revolution in the U.S. has also diminished fears of Chinese competition for the regions energy
resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan and Ecuadorian markets, and Chinas
success in locking up the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina.
Venezuela now exports less than 50% of its oil to the U.S., down from 80% in the past. There are
warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of Chinese involvement in
Latin America in the future, and concerns about Chinas still modest military sales to the region.
Examples of these sales include Venezuelas 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters from China. Despite the
concerns of the State Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy circles to the
China threat. Regardless of whether there is any real threat to the U.S., key decision-makers have
not reacted. Chinas presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its
regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence
in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In the
context of the Obama administrations pivot to Asia,
U.S. influence low Snowden affair
Riechmann, 13 (Deb, Associated Press, Edward Snowden Affair Dampens U.S.-Latin America Ties,
Huffington Post, Online, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/edward-snowden-
us_n_3591560.html, accessed 7/18/13) PE
America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the "backyard," as Secretary of State John Kerry
once referred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker
Edward Snowden lays bare already thorny U.S. relations with Latin America. Taking the opportunity to
snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua have already said they'd be willing to
grant asylum for Snowden, who is wanted on espionage charges in the United States for revealing the
scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spy on Americans and foreigners. Ecuador
has said it would consider any request from him. Relations between the US and these countries were
already testy, but the Snowden affair also stunned the Obama administration's effort to improve ties
with friendlier nations in the region like Mexico and Brazil. Snowden hasn't been the only recent
setback. Leaders in the region harshly criticized the U.S. earlier this week when a newspaper in Brazil,
which was privy to some documents released by Snowden, reported that a U.S. spy program was widely
targeting data in emails and telephone calls across Latin America. That revelation came just days after
an uproar in Latin America over the rerouting of Bolivian President Evo Morales' plane over Europe amid
suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowden was aboard. And all this comes right after President
Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Kerry have all made recent treks to the region to bolster
U.S. engagement in Latin America.

A2: Obama Tour
Obamas tour isnt a non-unique Obamas still perceived as abandoning Latin
America to China
Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and
Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
1/2012: 3-19, page 8, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491,
accessed 7/18/13) PE
Obamas Latin America tour of 2011 cannot cover for the fact that the Chinese presence in Latin
America is not a high priority for Washington; Chinas relations with the region have remained a minor
issue because they lack sufficient strategic and political importance for the United States. Washingtons
perception might change soon, though, as there are already a number of factors that it is starting to
become concerned about. The US is mostly interested in supporting liberal and economic orders and
deepening economic integration between itself and Latin American countries. With regard to these core
interests, the US is closely observing Sino-Latin American relations to understand whether China is
disrupting the existing patterns of bi- and multilateralism. For the time being, however, China is not a
firmly established power in Latin America, and Beijings rise on the continent is a relatively recent
phenomenon.


A2: China Trade Low
It doesnt matter if Chinese trade with Latin America is low, influence is based on
perception of the future
Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics,
Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online,
http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/17/13) PE
In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to
underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are
the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the worlds youth for American music, media, and
lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites
who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that soft power is
based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality.
Although Chinas current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited
compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current
size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future.
Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is
shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The Bolivarian socialist regime
of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western imperialism,
while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an
important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of
Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the
PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present
tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In
general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets
hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America
hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China
as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as the wave of the
future. In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct
sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and
the general population.

A2: Biden Visit
Bidens visit wasnt enough multiple warrants
Ellis, 13 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with
external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Chinas New Backyard, Foreign Policy, June 6, 2013,
Onlinehttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america,
accessed 7/19/13) PE
In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day,
three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and
Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-
Bissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and
Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese
government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's
itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to
Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States
and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with
China since 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest
trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an
accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying
one to the United States.

Venezuela

General Influence

China will keep up relations with Maduro
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 4-16 (Governmental
organization in charge of cataloguing foreign affairs, President Xi Jinping Congratulates Maduro on
Presidential Election Win, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 2013,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1032740.shtml)

On April 15, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to Nicolas Maduro on his
winning the Venezuelan presidency. In his message, Xi said with the joint efforts of the leaders of both sides,
China-Venezuela relations have been developing remarkably since the two countries forged strategic
partnership of common development in 2001. "China and Venezuela have become good friends of
mutual trust and good partners of close cooperation," he said. Xi stressed the great importance he
attached to developing ties with Venezuela, adding China is willing to join hands with Venezuela to
carry forward bilateral ties into the future and open up new prospects for the relations.

Despite risks, China wont abandon ties
Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, What Chavez Taught China, Inter-American Dialogue, 1-18,
http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/)

Though more aware of country-specific risk, China is unlikely to abandon its deals and strategic
agreements with Venezuela and other risky nations in the region. Chinas leaders instead are genuinely
committed to expanding relations throughout Latin America in coming years, including investment
and lending in a wider variety of sectors. Recent agreements with the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLAC), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) suggest as much. The region as a whole is looking east for
economic opportunity. A new Venezuelan leadership-whether chavista or notwould be likely to
do the same. Chinas strategic partnerships with Venezuela and other countries will remain intact. Its foreign policy apparatus
is looking to forge stronger and longer-term friendships, and its firms will continue to engage the
region based on a combination of Chinese domestic interests and profit-driven motives. But the trend is
toward comprehensive risk assessment and a more cautious, research-based, and well-informed approach to the region. Latin America
should expect ever more methodical engagement from China.

Without US aid, Maduro increases Chinese ties
Negroponte, 4-16 (Diana Villiers, senior fellow with the Latin American Initiative under Foreign Policy
at Brookings, former trade lawyer and professor of history, Maduro As President of Venezuela: What to
Expect, Brookings Institute, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/04/16-
venezuela-maduro-negroponte)

With oil production down from 3.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to 2.4 mbd and a $42.5 billion debt to the China Development Bank (CDB),
Maduro will face a shortage of cash. He can persuade Venezuelans that they should tighten their belts and endure a period of
austerity, but that could provoke protest from the very constituency who supported his election. He could approach the
multilateral banks, but Chavez rejected these institutions as being tools of the U.S. empire. Maduros
supporters in Cuba are reliant on the continued provision of 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized oil to the island, preventing him from drawing
down that account to sell the oil on the open market. Maduro has two options: seek a further loan from CDB, similar
to the $12 billion that Chavez obtained in June 2011, or renegotiate the repayment terms on the
current Chinese loans. (Currently 21 percent of Venezuelas debt goes to Chinese institutions.) The Chinese government response is
critical. Discussions with officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington in late March
revealed that continued Venezuelan oil production and political stability are necessary for the Chinese authorities. Since 2007, the
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC) have
gained large stakes in Venezuelas oil industry after Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips abandoned the
country under the threat of nationalization. If continued oil supplies and political stability are important to the Chinese government, its
institutions may agree to renegotiate the loan terms. However, extended repayment schedules will
probably come with the condition that more effective management be put in place at Venezuelas
national oil company (PDVSA) as well as the housing and agricultural projects financed by CDB. That
means additional Chinese personnel operating within Venezuelan projects.

Venezuela moving toward China- Maduro and Capriles prove

Arsenault 3-12-13
Al Jazeera web producer, His work focuses on North and South America, geopolitics, and social
movements. He holds a BA in history and economics from Dalhousie University and an MA in history
from the University of British Columbia
Venezuela looks to China for economic boost China may become the South American state's biggest
trading partner, but some economists are sceptical of the benefits Chris Arsenault 12 Mar 2013
09:31http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331271053389351.html

As relations between Venezuela and the US soured in recent years, Venezuela looked away from its
traditional trading partner towards the east. China could soon surpass the US as Venezuelas largest
trading partner. Venezuela's interim President Nicolas Maduro, who took the job following the death of
President Hugo Chavez on March 5, held talks with Chinese officials over the weekend. "The best
tribute that we could give to our comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our
beloved China ," said Maduro, who once served as Venezuelas foreign minister. In a televised meeting
with Maduro, Zhang Ping, chairman of Chinas National Development and Reform Commission, said
deepening relations between China and Venezuela are the only way to comfort the soul of
President Hugo Chavez. If elected president on April 14, Maduro has said his first trip abroad will be
to China. Henrique Capriles, leader of Venezuelas opposition, criticises most government policies but
generally supports expanding trade with China. The countries have launched two satellites together in
recent years, and China is negotiating a free trade deal with Mercosur, a South American trading zone.

China working actively with Venezuela

Correo Del Orinoco 5-17-13
Venezuela-China Relations Grow Following VPs Visit By CORREO DEL ORINOCO INTERNATIONAL May
17, 2013 http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9380

Venezuela and the Peoples Republic of China took a further step forward in strengthening their
bilateral relations last Monday when Vice President Li Yuancho visited the Caribbean country as part of
his recent tour of South America. We have come to amplify our political similarities as well as our
areas of cooperation, reciprocal benefit, and shared profits, said VP Li upon arriving at the
Presidential Palace of Miraflores in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas. Li was met by President Nicolas
Maduro and his executive cabinet in order to advance projects that will satisfy the essential needs of
our people, wrote Venezuelas second-in-command, Vice President Jorge Arreaza via his Twitter
account.


Economic Influence
China expanding influence in Venezuela now strong oil partnership
Laguna and Cunningham 7-2-13 (Francisco and Jennie Linder. Francisco is the owner of Translegal LLC. Francisco assists clients
with every aspect of international commerce, including compliance with regulatory issues, obtaining required licenses and permits, establishing
subsidiaries / representative offices. He has a JD from the University of Arizona and a BA in English from UC Berkeley. Jennie Linder Cunningham
is a partner at Translegal LLC. Chinas Economic Influence in Latin America. Translegalllc.com. 2 July 2013. Web.)
http://translegalllc.wordpress.com/2013/07/02/chinas-economic-influence-in-latin-america/

Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have invested heavily in Venezuela, often following a loans-for-
oil deal pattern. Reports indicate that the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) has now become the countrys
primary foreign source of financing. China currently reports 230,000 barrels imported per day, although official PDVSA
(Venezuelas state oil company) reports ~ 319,000 exported barrels. This discrepancy indicates that China is not
only importing oil from Latin America for domestic energy security, but that Chinese NOCs are
simultaneously reselling their equity oil on the global market. With an almost 100,000 barrel-per-day disparity, it
appears that Chinese NOCs (which are heavily state-supported) have entered the international oil trade,
not just the import business.


Chinas influence on Venezuela is growing and sustainable
The Economist 13 (H.T. Writer for The Economist. Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? The Economist 6 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3
The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised
distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither
socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The
beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder,
you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister
announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion
already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana
Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest
fad.

China is expanding influence foreign investment and manufactured goods
The Economist 13 (H.T. Writer for The Economist. Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? The Economist 6 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3
However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the
destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing
that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business
relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of
investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin
America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct
investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China
has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of
economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities,
importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and
Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost
manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much
to Mexico as it imports

China has major influence opportunity Venezuelan debt
Marquez 13 (Humberto Marquez, Journalist at IPS specialising in international news. He worked for 15 years with Agence France-Presse
(AFP), 10 as assignment editor in Caracas, covering Venezuela, the Caribbean and the Guyanas. China Maps out Venezuelas Valuable Mining
Resources. Inter Press Service 28 February 2013. Web.) http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/china-maps-out-venezuelas-valuable-mining-
resources/
The prospecting agreement is part of a growing alliance between the two countries, which has turned
Venezuela into a major source of petroleum for China, while the Asian giant is meeting the South
American countrys growing need for credit to finance its constant outflow of public funds. Venezuela
exports over 600,000 barrels of crude oil a day to China, according to Ramrez, although other sources
put the figure at half that much. Beijing, in turn, has granted Caracas more than 38 billions dollars in
credits, and at the same time it participates in energy and construction projects.

China is main source for Venezuelan oil funds, cheap interest rates make it attractive
to Venezuela
Devereux 12, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine,
former CNN International Reporter, China Bankrolling Chavezs Re-election Bid With Loans, 9-26,
Bloomberg magazine, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-re-
election-bid-with-oil-loans.html)

One vehicle for the lending is a joint fund to finance infrastructure projects set up in 2007 by CDB and
Venezuelas Bank for Social & Economic Development. To date, China has contributed $16 billion, while Venezuela has
committed half that amount, according to the Venezuelan government. Separately Chavez also
secured a $20 billion loan from CDB in 2010, half of which is payable in U.S. dollars and half in renminbi. Chavez said this month
that hes seeking a third credit line. Were thinking about 2013, he told reporters Sept. 11. I sent Hu Jintao a letter and the teams
are already working on it, he said, referring to the Chinese president. Venezuela pays off the loans with oil, the amount of
which fluctuates depending on the price of crude. Currently debt- servicing consumes about 200,000
barrels of the 640,000 a day that Venezuela sends China, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Sept. 25, or about 9 percent of
production. Venezuela relies on oil for 95 percent of its exports and half of public spending. The savings
for Venezuela are significant. As a result of Chavezs nationalization drive and inflation that has
remained above 18 percent since 2007, the countrys borrowing costs have soared to the highest
among major emerging markets. The extra yield investors demand to own Venezuelan dollar debt rather than U.S. Treasuries
widened 5 basis points, or 0.05 percentage point, to 987 at 10 a.m. in Caracas, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.s EMBI Global index. Cheap
Credit Venezuela pays no more than 6 percent interest on its loans from China compared with 12
percent it pays for bonds issued in capital markets, Ramirez told El Nacional in an interview published Sept. 19. Ramirezs
office didnt immediately respond to a request to confirm his comments as reported by El Nacional. The lower cost has allowed
Chavez to avoid tapping global investors. While the government and state oil company Petroleos de
Venezuela SA sold a record $17.5 billion of dollar- denominated debt in 2011, so far this year PDVSA
has issued just $3 billion.


Oil
China taking over influence in LA- prefer predictive evidence

Wallis 3-15-13
Reporter on political and economic news from across east Africa, Iraq and Latin America
Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy to focus on China, Russia Fri Mar 15, 2013 9:07am EDT By Daniel
Wallis http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315

Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on deals with China and Russia if acting
President Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs. During
his 14 years in power, Hugo Chavez nationalized most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with the aim of
putting its crude reserves - the biggest in the world - at the service of his power base, Venezuela's poor
majority. Turning away from the United States, the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan oil, Chavez also
sharply increased fuel sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source of
foreign funding. "We are not going to change one iota of the fundamental themes of President
Chavez's policies," Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said in a recent interview with a local TV station.
"We have a very important strategic relationship with China, which we're going to continue
deepening and cultivating. It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ... Chavez's policies are more
alive than ever, and we will push ahead with them."
China engaging Venezuela on oil

Iwata 6-6-13
Reporter for the Wall Street Journal
Venezuela Secures $4 Billion Funding From China By Mari Iwata June 6, 2013, 8:32 a.m.
EThttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324798904578528922435217366.html

Venezuela has secured $4 billion in funds from China to be used for oil field development, Oil Minister
Rafael Ramirez said Thursday. The minister didn't give details of the new funding from China, which
will add to at least $35 billion of credit Beijing has provided to Venezuela, mostly in return for future
oil deliveries. The South American country's state energy company Petroleos de Venezuela SA, or
PDVSA, said Wednesday that Venezuela was negotiating a $4 billion credit line from Export-Import Bank
of China.

spillover
Venezuela is key China needs energy, agriculture, and telecommunications
engagement.
Ellis 5 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on
Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political
Science (U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America, Strategic Studies
Institute Monograph, Available Online: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf ,
Accessed: 07/15/2013)
It can be argued that Venezuela is currently Chinas principal strategic partner in Latin America, both in
terms of the volume of investment, as well as in the nature of the relationship between the two
countries.29 China currently has over $1.5 billion invested in Venezuelaprior to the recently
announced $100 million in investment commitments, the largest investment position of any country in
the region.30 Bilateral trade between China and Venezuela increased from $150 million in 2003 to $1.2
billion in 2004,31 and is anticipated to reach $3 billion in 2005, based on agreements signed during the
state visit of Venezuelas populist president Hugo Chvez Frias to China during the 2004 Christmas
holiday,32 as well as a series of 19 cooperation accords signed between Venezuela and China in January
2005.33 These figures reflect growth in both imports and exports. Venezuelan imports from China grew
by 120 percent over 2004 to reach $560 million, while similarly growing oil exports have allowed
Venezuela to maintain a net trade surplus.34 The Chinese relationship with Venezuela reflects not only
Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but also the receptivity of President Chvez. His interest in
developing alternative markets for Venezuelan petroleum, and developing a hedge against U.S.
influence in the region, make him a strong potential Chinese ally.35 In his high- profile state visit to
China, Chvez signed a number of accords in which he committed Venezuela to put its petroleum
production at the disposition of the great Chinese fatherland.36 On the other hand, he is also a
potential threat to Chinese interests, insofar as his Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous
populism and anti- globalist causes could foment instability in Chinas trading partners in Latin America,
and undermine Chinese access to the resources of the region. Chinas principal interest in Venezuela,
based on trade and investment patterns, is petroleum products. Exports of Venezuelan petroleum
products to China registered a 75 percent increase in 2003,37 and a 25 percent increase in 2004,
reaching a level of $640 million.38 Although the volume of petroleum shipments from Venezuela to
China is limited and there are restrictions on the size of tankers and cargo ships which can be sent
through the Panama Canal, infrastructure projects are under consideration which could sidestep these
constraints by using pipelines to carry the oil overland to Pacific portseither across Colombia or
Panama. As part of a series of accords signed during the state visit of Chvez to China in December 2004,
and leveraging the close working relationship with the Chinese developed over recent years,39
Venezuela will give China access to 15 mature oil fields, with proven reserves of up to a billion barrels of
oil, for Chinese firms to develop and exploit.40 As part of the accord, China will invest $350 million
toward bringing these fields on line,41 and in exchange will be allowed to build refineries on Venezuelan
territory to process the oil.42 The agreement will help the Venezuelan government to overcome the
shortfalls in technical management that it created when it fired half of all workers in its state oil firm,
Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), following the December 2002-March 2003 national strike. By allowing
the Chinese to directly develop these fields, Venezuela will be able to almost double its production
despite a lack of internal technical capacity to do so, selling significant quantities of oil to China while
still serving its traditional markets. As a compliment to its assistance to Venezuela in extracting its oil,
China is also investing $60 million in a number of projects to help Venezuela extract its natural gas. 43
During a scheduled state visit at the end of January 2005, Chinese Vice-President Zeng Quinghong and
senior directors of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will analyze the viability of even
greater Chinese investment in the development of Venezuelan natural gas reserves.44 A third significant
element of Chinese engagement with Venezuela in the petroleum sector involves the Chinese purchase
of Venezuelan ormulsin, and conversion of Chinese facilities to use it for the generation of electricity.
Ormulsin is a low-grade, high-pollution content fuel oil traditionally given little or no value because of
the lack of a global market for its use. In December 2001, CNPC and PdVSA established the joint venture
Orifuels Sinoven, S.A (Sinovensa) and invested $330 million to develop a capability to produce 6.5
million metric tons of ormulsin per year by the end of 2004. In conjunction with this effort, in
November 2003 CNPC began constructing a special new type of power plant capable of burning
ormulsin in the Guangdong province of China.45 Through a deal finalized in 2004, Chinas commercial
agent, Petrochina, a subsidiary of CNPC, is currently purchasing 1.5 millions of tons of orimulsin
annually from Venezuela.46 By building the new power plant, China is able to make use of the
Venezuelan ormulsin, which it is able to purchase at relatively low cost because of the lack of a global
market. Moreover, Venezuela is Chinas natural partner for the ormulsin deal, in that the Latin
American country currently possesses the worlds largest proven ormulsin reservesalmost double
those of Saudi Arabia, the next largest source. China is also helping Venezuela to extract its coal. At the
end of 2004, China announced that it will invest in the development of mines in the Orinoco River Basin
area in the south of the country.47 China Minmetal and the Venezuelan firm, Corpozulia, are slated to
sign an agreement during the scheduled state visit of Chinese Vice President Zeng Quinghong at the end
of January 2005 that would use Chinese investment to increase Venezuelan carbon production.48
Beyond the domain of extractive industries, the Chinese- Venezuelan partnership has extended to the
agricultural sector, where Venezuelan interests in improving agricultural productivity coincide with
Chinese interests in developing reliable, friendly suppliers of foodstuffs. As part of the accords reached
between the two nations during the Christmas 2004 visit of Chvez to China, the Asian giant has agreed
to provide Venezuela with agricultural machinery and credits for the nation to increase its food
production.49 In keeping with the vertically integrated strategy that China has pursued in other
Latin American countries to secure access to sources of supply for strategic materials, China
announced in December 2005 that it will invest in the construction of a national railway line, helping
Venezuela to transport raw materials and foodstuffs to market.50 Finally, China is also helping
Venezuela to develop its telecommunications industry, including assistance to Venezuela in access to
space. As part of the series of accords reached during the Christmas 2004 visit of Hugo Chvez to China,
the two nations announced that China will launch a telecommunications satellite for Venezuela, helping
the nation become less dependent on U.S. telecommunications networks.51 The initiative built on
broader discussions of how China could help Venezuela to develop and modernize its
telecommunications infrastructure more broadly, including a December 2004 visit to Venezuela by Vice
minister of the Chinese information ministry Lou Kinjian to discuss possible collaboration on
telecommunication projects with the Venezuelan telecommunications firm, CVG Telecom.52

Venezuela key to Chinese natural resource access.
Cerna 11 Michael Cerna, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State
University, GA (Chinas Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence
in the Region, China Research Center, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 15, 2011, Available Online:
http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-
chinese-presence-in-the-region/, Accessed: 05/21/2013)
Chinas thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil, soy
and iron ore. In South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in the
world. China is devouring Latin American commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million people.
Countries in South America have arable land and need our technology and investment, and they
welcome our companies. Its a win-win solution, said Wang Yunkun, deputy director of the Agriculture
and Rural Affairs Committee of the National Peoples Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006,
more than 36% of Chiles total exports were directed toward Asia, with China taking 12% of the total.
Chile was the first Latin American country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China
(Santiso, 2007). Since then China has looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador,
Argentina and Peru.
In 2009, China became Brazils largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S. for the first time in history.
Later, Brazils then-president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, signed an
agreement that allowed the China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan Brazils state-controlled oil
company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil for ten years
(Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America
when traditional lenders such as the Inter-American Development Bank are being pushed to their limits.
Just one of Chinas loans, the $10 billion for Brazils national oil company, is almost as much as the
$11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008, according to The New York
Times.
It was not only in Brazil that China went after oil. In order to meet rising industrial needs and consumer
demand, China has pursued investments and agreements with a variety of Latin American oil
producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund for infrastructure projects at
home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007).
Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000 barrels per day. Then in 2009, Venezuela
announced a $16 billion investment deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil
exploration in the Orinoco River to develop heavy crude oil resources (Economist, 2009). Meanwhile,
the CNPC has invested $300 million in technology to use Venezuelas Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power
plants. This exemplifies Venezuelas desire to break away from the U.S. During a visit to China in 2004,
President Chavez said shifting exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the United
States (Johnson, 2005).

A2: Chavez Death Changed Everything
No change in relations post-Chavez
Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, Chinese Press on Chavezs Death, China-Latin America Blog, Inter-
American Dialogue, 3-14, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/)

The following news stories, assembled by former Dialoguer Peng Ruijie, were published in the Chinese press
following Hugo Chavez's death on March 5th. Although the reports offer a variety of perspectives on
Chavez, most conclude that little will change with respect to the China-Venezuela relationship.
According to most, the results of upcoming elections in Venezuela will have little effect on China's various agreements
and lending arrangements in Venezuela. Xinhua News - Predicts stability in Venezuela
because of Chavezs appointment of Maduro. States that Maduro has a 60 percent chance of winning in the upcoming
elections. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher, Xu Shicheng, notes that even if Capriles wins the
election, there will be some continuity in terms of social policy and that Capriles might even try to lead other leftist countries in the region. Xu
goes on to say that a Maduro or Capriles government will still maintain good relations with China and will
honor Chinese agreements in such areas as energy, infrastructure and finance. The report concludes
that the political transition will have little effect on China-Venezuela relations.

Maduro has furthered commitment to China
DT 4/29, China in Venezuela: loans for oil, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragons
Tail, blog about Chinese international affairs, Mollie
Beyond these difficulties, prospects are good for China-Venezuela relations, even after Chavezs death.
Since his election, Maduro has already promised that his first trip abroad would be to China. He even
said the best tribute that we could give to our Comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic
relationship with our beloved China. China seems evermore poised to secure new deals in Venezuelas
oil-economy and eventually buy stakes in debt-ridden PDVSA if it is denationalised. Talks have also
started in 2012 to establish a free trade agreement with Mercosur. The dragons strategy of tied loans
and loans-for-oil means it is at the same time securing resources and creating business through its
investment. Although not risk-free, it is clear that Venezuela will need Chinese funds in the future and
should respect the deals even in the case of a collpase of Maduros government. It is also establishing
itself as the second power in the Caribbean region and in Latin America. China will have to be careful
not to push the continent into a bipolar balance of power and not confront the US but rather build
partnerships with it, so as not to hinder its peaceful rise global strategy.

A2 LA trip ignored Venezuela
China still involved with Venezuela- their author concludes neg

Economist 6-6-13
Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? Jun 6th 2013
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3

XI JINPING'S first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June
6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and
Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao
did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation,
Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa
Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba
and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have
been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to
come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?
The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised
distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither
socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The
beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you
can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister
announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion
already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana
Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest
fad.

Mexico

General Influence

Chinese Influence Spreads to Mexico
Xinhua 13 ( The Encirclement Gathers Pace: China Enters Into a Strategic Partnership With
Mexico, People's Daily Online, http://www.trevorloudon.com/2013/06/the-encirclement-gathers-pace-
china-enters-into-a-strategic-partneship-with-mexico/).
From the Communist Party of China website: MEXICO CITY Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican
counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a
comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for
a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held
talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that
strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of
the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing
countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the
development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has
entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through
more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward
the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects.
Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve
political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each others concerns, and show mutual
understanding and support on issues concerning each others core interests. China and Mexico will
maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the
existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each others
development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with
their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy,
mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to promote trade balance, China supports the
increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and
promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. Thirdly, as two major countries with
rich cultural traditions, China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will
encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication
among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in
Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural
center in Beijing as well. Fourthly, China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on
their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will
maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security,
food safety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and
safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support the
establishment of the China-Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China
and Latin America at a higher level. After their talks, Xi and Pena Nieto signed a joint statement between the two countries,
witnessed the signing of a host of agreements and jointly met the press. Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global
economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations. As two emerging powers, Mexico and China are each
others important strategic cooperative partners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties
with the Chinese side to achieve common development, the Mexican president said. China is ready to work
with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually
beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xi said his visit to Mexico
aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico relations
will enter a new stage, he said.

China and Mexico are upgrading relations now
Xinhua 13 (Xinhua News Agency is the official press agency of the People's Republic of China and the
biggest center for collecting information and press conferences in China. China, Mexico upgrade
bilateral relationship, June 5, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-
06/05/content_29033628.htm)

Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral
relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for
a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral
cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly
cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and
cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement,
and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China
ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to
constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The
two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four
aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political
mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other's concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues
concerning each other's core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures,
give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other's development strategies.
Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to
increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to
promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and
promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. The two countries will also maintain exchanges and learn from each other in such
areas as poverty reduction, environmental protection and urbanization. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China
and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote
tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in
Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly,
China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on
major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance,
energy security, food safety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and
safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support the establishment of the China-
Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level.

Mexico wants closer trade ties to China
Mallen 6-28 (Patricia Rey, covers Latin America for the Internation Business Times, former employee
BBC America in New York, La Repblica in Lima, La2 TV in Madrid and the UN in Brussels, Latin America
Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For the U.S.?, 2013, International Business
Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981)

Even more significant was Xis visit to Mexico. President Enrique Pea Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart,
whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with
China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important development
considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. Bidens visit was not
as successful. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was called brutal and tense by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist
Andrs Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America
Washingtons backyard in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogot, no
agreements were signed during his trip.

China taking over in Mexico- Nieto causes transition

Ellis 6-6-13
Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research
focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran
China's New Backyard Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag in Latin
America? BY R. EVAN ELLIS JUNE 6, 2013
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america

Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make
up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president,
both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate
himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific
Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries
(Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas,
relatively independent of the United States.

Nieto seeking Chinese ties

Peoples Daily 6-9-13
Quoting Osvaldo Rosales, director of International Trade and Integration of the Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean
Xi's visit opens new chapter in China-Latin America ties, says UN official 6/9/13
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8279196.html

As for Xi's visit to Mexico, during which the two countries elevated their ties to comprehensive
strategic partnership, Rosales said "it is important to highlight that (Mexican) President Enrique Pena
Nieto visited China in April during the Boao Forum... Barely two months later, President Xi Jinping has
already returned the favor." The ECLAC official stressed that the first meeting between the two
presidents was in China and it marked the first time that a Mexican president met with his Chinese
counterpart before meeting with his U.S. counterpart, Barack Obama, who visited Mexico in May.
"That points to a historical change that we should consider closely," said Rosales. Rosales hailed Xi's
efforts to strengthen trade and investment with Mexico and to create Chinese-Mexican business
alliances. He said that the Chinese president's tour of the region opened a new chapter in the relations
between the two sides and their ties were experiencing fast growth.


Chinas sphere of influence in Mexico is increasing now.
Perrault 6/6 (Mike, 6/6/13, President Xi uses trip to increase China's influence,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/)//DR. H

When Chinese President Xi Jinping's four-nation tour of the Americas comes here Friday for a two-day summit with President Barack
Obama, area economists and economic development officials say China already will have taken fresh steps to bolster its
economic influence in nations such as Costa Rica, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Xi took office in March and has used the trip to expand China's exports and relations:
Friday, the Chinese leader met with Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar of the Caribbean Republic of Trinidad and Tobago a nation rich
in liquefied natural gas where they announced they had discussed ways to cooperate in key areas of energy, minerals, infrastructure
development, telecommunications and agriculture.
Monday, Xi met Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla to discuss commercial and energy projects, including upgrading the Central American
country's oil refineries and developing a free-trade zone.
Tuesday, in Mexico, President Enrique Pena Nieto and business leaders met with Chinese delegates to determine
ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links. Mexican officials said
while $57 billion of Mexico's imports 15% came from China last year, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion 1.5% to China.
"The bottom line is everybody is looking for export markets," said Chapman University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary
Anderson Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "They're asking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?' and they're
putting their efforts there."
Last year, China eclipsed the United States to become the world's biggest trading nation, as measured by total
exports and imports of goods (excluding services), according to figures both countries released earlier this year.
Chinese exports and imports reached $3.87 trillion last year, the Chinese customs administration reported. The U.S. exports and imports
combined for $3.82 trillion in 2012, the Commerce Department said.
China's latest efforts to boost export markets in places such as Latin America and Africa don't surprise Wes
Ahlgren, chief operating officer for the Coachella Valley Economic Partnership in Palm Springs, Calif. Ahlgren has traveled to China and
Europe on trade missions to promote this area's renewable energy and clean technology opportunities.
During a recent conference call with U.S. state, trade and commerce officials who were in Africa at the time,
Ahlgren said it was clear China has already made substantial investments in Latin America and Africa, and
China continues to look for markets, resources and ways to expand its influence.
"Similarly, the U.S. foreign policy includes a large component of economic development, foreign military sales, direct investment, support for
NGOs (non-government organizations), etc.," Ahlgren said. "Perhaps they are taking a page from our playbook and
modeling it to their own vision."
At a time when the USA is under financial pressure and has had to cut aid internationally, China is
opening its wallet.
"Because (China) is so rich with foreign currency and surplus, they are willing to make direct
investments in these countries to improve their ties," Adibi said. "Whereas we have budgetary constraints."
Chinese officials announced last week they would loan Trinidad and Tobago $250 million to build a children's hospital, for instance.
During his visit to Costa Rica, the Chinese president signed an agreement to grant Costa Rica a $400 million line of credit for energy and
infrastructure projects, the countries announced. They also formalized a $900 million loan enabling Costa Rica to upgrade its main oil refinery
to process 65,000 barrels a day.
Economists said China needs oil not only for the growing number of cars for its middle class but to fuel
all facets of its expanding economy.
Unlike the United States, where some 70% of the economy centers around consumer spending, countries
such as China and Japan rely far more heavily on exports, Adibi said.
As Latin American ministers and presidents, business executives and others increasingly recognize
China's rapidly growing impact on the world economy, countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile have
expanded bilateral ties, economists said.
Mexico was among the last of the major Latin American countries to sign free-trade agreements with
Beijing, which meant it lost out as China became the principal trade partner to regional competitors such as Brazil and Peru.

Mexico seeking China diversification

Zhendong 6-4-13
Reporter of China Daily, quoting Rivera Banuet, Permanent Secretary of the Latin American and
Caribbean Economic System, educated at Instituto Tecnolgico Autnomo de Mxico (ITAM), B.A.
Degree in Economics
Closer trade ties with China 2013-06-04 08:16 By Pu Zhendong ( China Daily)
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-06/04/content_16562774.htm

Jose Rivera Banuet, executive secretary-general of the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin
America and the Caribbean, said that investments and joint ventures from China are most welcome in
Latin America. "Mexico, for example, has around 85 percent of its trade volume with the United
States," said Rivera, who is Mexican. "It is very important for Mexico to diversify its economy, and an
ideal partner would be China since it is the most dynamic economy in the world," he added


China is only investing in Mexico for its natural resources-Nieto assumes your link
uniqueness claims
Yi 13 (Yang Yi, Reporter for Xinhuanet-a leading Chinese news source, 6/4/13, China, Mexico upgrade
relationship to comprehensive strategic parternship, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-
06/05/c_132431199.htm)
MEXICO CITY, June 4 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena
Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic
partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit
aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena
Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that strengthening the
China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries
and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the
decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target
for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-
China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to
work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective
mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push
forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following
four aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective
and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other's concerns, and
show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each other's core interests. China and
Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full
play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other's
development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance
with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as
energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to promote trade balance, China
supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest
here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. The two countries will also
maintain exchanges and learn from each other in such areas as poverty reduction, environmental
protection and urbanization. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China and
Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art
troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and
athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly, China and
Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on
major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on
global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change.

Nieto is focusing only on Chinese investment-Economic framework for presidency
Esenaro 13(Alberto Esenaro, Writer for JDSupra Law News, 6/20/13 President Xi Jinping sees
Opportunities for Chinese Companies in Mexico, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/president-xi-
jinping-sees-opportunities-35209/)

Pea Nieto is focused on making economic prosperity the cornerstone of his presidency, and he
believes improved ties with China are of upmost importance. During his trip to China, he made an
agreement to send China 30,000 barrels of oil a day, an amount he hopes will increase. President Xi also
mentioned the possibility of a free trade agreement between the two nations. It appears as though
oil will present one of the largest opportunities for Chinese companies in Mexico: if legislation passes
allowing foreign investment in the countrys oil sector, China could very well be the nation that could
modernize the aging, outdated infrastructure and provide the know-how needed for deep water oil
exploration. China would benefit greatly: China is an energy hungry nation and it needs to secure energy
resources from as many sources as possible. However, oil is not the only sector where opportunities
exist for Chinese companies. During his visit to China, the Mexican president spoke of the expertise
the Chinese have in the field of national infrastructure and how Mexico could benefit greatly from
Chinese companies investing in and building much needed public transportation infrastructure. The
telecommunications industry is also opening up to foreign investment; Chinese investment could be
crucial in the Mexican drive to provide affordable, high quality telecommunications to all of its
citizens.


China is encroaching on the US because of US Asia pivot
The Economist 13(The Economist-A leading news source, 6/20/13, Why has china snubbed Cuba
and Venezuela?, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-
3)
However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for
picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia
by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas
business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of
investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National
Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient
of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica
may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin
America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper,
iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the
region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing,
have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it
exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high
energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for
bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade
agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an
immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch
ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic
interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case,
Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to
work hard to stay relevant.


China Latin America investment is challenging US pivoit
Robledo 13(Carmen Robledo, Writer for Anclas.net, 6/11/13Relaunching China Mexico Relations:
President Xi Jingping Vistit to Mexico, http://anclas.net/2013/06/11/relaunching-china-mexico-
relations-president-xi-jinping-visit-to-mexico/)
Some specialists point out that the Chinese visit to Latin America is a sign to the US. China is pointing
out that it has interests in other parts of the world, and is not afraid to contest US hegemony, even in
the its back yard. Similarly, the US could interpret the visit as a payback for the recent increase in US
engagement in Asia, Chinas back yard. In any case, this is a perfect environment for Mexicos
diversification, since it could help to break the Mexican trade dependency on the US and to reaffirm
itself as a key global player.



Economic Influence
China increased influence in Xis recent tour plus, economic relations are zero-sum
Funaro, 13 (Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence
in Latin America, Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-
battles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position
China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico
Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to
discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly
when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the
American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing
domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science
professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest
(relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to
economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America.

China Is increasing influence in Mexico Now
Economist 6/13(Economist, The Economist is an English-language weekly news and international
affairs publication owned by The Economist Newspaper Ltd. and edited in offices in London, t targets
highly educated readers and claims an audience containing many influential executives and policy-
makers. , Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3) SJH

Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of
influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa,
but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National
Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest
recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms
of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered
up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly
from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its
relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only
about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it
imports.

China Values Sino Influence in Mexico-Trying to improve them
Castillo 13 (E. Eduardo, Spanish News Editor, Leaders of Mexico, China promise broadened relations,
move toward more balanced trade, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, JUNE 4, 2013,
http://www.timescolonist.com/cmlink/gmg/canadian-press/business/leaders-of-mexico-china-promise-
broadened-relations-move-toward-more-balanced-trade-1.312535/)

MEXICO CITY - The presidents of China and Mexico agreed Tuesday to broaden relations between their
countries and expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila
and pork. After meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto said they are transforming the
relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancing their trade,
which now is heavily in favour of China. The leaders signed a dozen memorandums of understanding and co-operation
agreements in areas including energy, mining, education and infrastructure. "Today, we are giving way to a new
relationship, a new phase of the relationship," Pena Nieto said in a joint statement. Xi said China wanted better relations with
Mexico, which he called "a great friend and a great partner in the Latin American region."

Sino-Mexican Trade Increasing due to spread of Influence
Fox News Latino 13 (China's President Wants To Open The Floodgates Of Trade With Mexico, FOX
News Network, LLC, June 02, 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/china-
president-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/#ixzz2ZKRH6wpO)

Beteta noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China needs to guarantee oil for its citizens' cars,
but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil
power," he said. At the same time, Pena Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to allow greater national
and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of
many people." State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small steps to
increase its relationship with China, which until recently had been minimal. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of
crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the
United States and about 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives. In April,
during Pena Nieto's visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company,
agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec. Mexico may have other goods and
investment opportunities to offer as well. "China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries
like cement, steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey
Technological Institute. "Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs."
Chinese-Mexican relations are increasing new deal with Pemex
Globalpost 13 (Globalpost, an online US news company that focuses on international news. Pemex
and Sinopec agree to boost Mexican oil exports to China, April 6, 2013,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/agencia-efe/130406/pemex-and-sinopec-agree-boost-
mexican-oil-exports-china)

The Mexican oil company Pemex signed Saturday on the southern Chinese island of Hainan an accord with the second
largest oil company of China, Sinopec, to strengthen trade relations between the two firms and promote a
larger volume of crude exports to the Asian giant, the second largest petroleum importer in the world. The accord
was signed by the director general of Pemex, Emilio Lozoya, and the president of the XinXing Cathay International Group, a subsidiary of
Sinopec, Sha Ming, in the presence of Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto. The pact marks the de facto
opening of trade relations between the two giants, something of particular interest to the world's second economy
because of its need for alternative sources of supply. The agreement was signed shortly after Pea Nieto met with the
new president of China, Xi Jinping, during the Boao Forum on economic issues. The Mexican leader is one of the first Latin
American heads of state to meet with the new Chinese president, along with Peruvian President Ollanta Humala. The Boao Forum, an economic
summit that has been called the "Asian Davos," began its 2013 meeting Saturday in China with a marked Latin American character, thanks to
the presence as speakers of the presidents of Peru, Ollanta Humala, and of Mexico, Enrique Pea Nieto.

China is just beginning a strategic economic partner relationship with Mexico
Associated Press 6/4/2013 (Associated Press is a multi-national non-profit news agency, Leaders of
Mexico, China promise broadened relations, move toward more balanced trade, Associated Press,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/04/leaders-mexico-china-promise-broadened-relations-
move-toward-more-balanced/)

The presidents of China and Mexico have agreed to broaden relations between their countries and
expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila and pork. After
meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto say they are transforming their
relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancing their trade,
which now is heavily in favor of China. The leaders on Tuesday signed a dozen memorandums of
understanding and cooperation agreements in areas including energy, mining, education and
infrastructure.

China expanding influence in Mexico - PEMEX
Reuters 13 (The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America. Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.) http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW
China has particular interest in Mexico, the regions second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply
the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City investing in
infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry
to foreign investment. There are obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Pea Nieto shared with Xi is that though
Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China.

China expanding influence in Mexico
USA Today 13 (President Xi uses trip to strengthen Chinas influence. USA Today 6 June 2013. Web.)
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/ EW
In Mexico, President Enrique Pena Nieto and business leaders met with Chinese delegates to determine
ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links. Mexican officials said while $57
billion of Mexico's imports 15% came from China last year, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion 1.5% to China. "The bottom line
is everybody is looking for export markets," said Chapman University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary Anderson
Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "They're asking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?'
and they're putting their efforts there."


China and Mexico forming stronger trade ties opens nation up to more influence
from China
NYT 13 (Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building trip to Mexico. New York Times 4 June 2013. Web.)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/americas/xi-makes-bridge-building-trip-to-mexico.html?_r=0 EW
Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are taking steps toward
changing their frosty relationship. Mexicos government would like to narrow its large trade gap with
China. Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back only $5.7 billion in products, according to Mexicos Ministry
of Economy. The two countries announced a series of agreements late Tuesday covering energy, trade
and education. We agree on the importance of balancing our trade and investment relationship, Mr. Pea Nieto said, noting
promises from China to start by accepting more tequila and pork imports.

China and Mexico trading raw materials now builds influence
Knowland 13 (Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. Chinas President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking Economic Ties. World
Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html
Upon his arrival, Xi said that he wanted to help with Mexicos huge trade deficit. This means oil, which China
needs to fuel its economy and the cars of its middle class. Access to strategic raw materials is key to
understanding the dynamic of relations with China, said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil. China is the
principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete, said Juan Carlos
Rivera, director of Mexicos Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. Evidently (China) is looking to
satisfy their market needs.

Chinas has influence in Mexico Pemex
Knowland 13 (Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. Chinas President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking Economic Ties. World
Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html
Not coincidentally, Xis visit to Mexico comes just as the Mexican government is bent on opening up the
state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to private and foreign investment in order to stem decreasing
production by funding deepwater drilling. Pea Nieto will soon present an energy reform bill to the Mexican Congress allowing that. Of the
roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a day that Pemex presently produces, about 1.2 million are
exported. Some 75 percent of those exports go to the US, but only 7 percent to the Far East, including China. China is looking for
much more. During Pea Nietos April visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese
company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec.


China-Mexico Relations
Pena Nieto Resets China-Mexico Relations
Zhang 13 (Tao, staffwriter Caoxin, 4-26-13, Caoxin Online, Building Bridges, http://english.caixin.com/2013-04-26/100521052.html)

Mexico's new president, Enrique Pena Nieto, wants to redefine bilateral relations with China. In a trip to the
southern province of Hainan in early April, four months after he took office, the 47-year-old Pena Nieto met with the head of China's
new leadership, Xi Jinping; announced the establishment of a government agency to handle trade with China; and repeatedly sent
the message that the two economies can complement each other, rather than compete. "I've come to
reaffirm, and to also confirm very clearly, the interest Mexico has to expand its relationship with
China," Pena Nieto said in an exclusive interview with Caixin on April 6. Sino-Mexican economic relations have long been tense. Both
are major suppliers of manufactured goods, especially to the United States. Mexico was the last country to sign a bilateral deal with China in
2001 to pave the latter's way into the World Trade Organization, and it has launched several WTO complaints against Chinese exports. Mexico's
trade deficit with China is the largest among its trade partners.
Past Issues Dont MatterNew Chapter in Mexico-China Relations
GbTimes 13 (gb Times, 6-6-13, GbTimes, China, Mexico seek strategic partnership, end to trade issues
http://gbtimes.com/focus/politics/news/china-mexico-seek-strategic-partnership-end-trade-issues#sthash.tVMHq3TW.dpuf)

China and Mexico signed deals on Tuesday to step up Mexico's exports to China, as the two emerging economies seek to
'relaunch' ties that have been dogged by trade imbalances and rivalry in international markets. Following a meeting between visiting
Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pea Nieto in Mexico City, the two countries agreed to
upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a series of agreements. New contact
with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its development - Xi
Jinping The deals enable Mexico to export pork and tequila to the Chinese market after years of negotiation, and Mr Xi announced that
China also plans to sign contracts to purchase Mexican products worth an additional $1 billion. "New
contact with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its
development," the Chinese leader told Mexico's Senate on the second day of his visit. China's investment in and pursuit of raw materials and oil
in Latin America is in contrast to its relationship with Mexico, which has competing with China in the US market in sectors such as manufactured
goods. The two countries also agreed to move to balance Mexico's trade deficit with China.
Mexico and China Deepening Relations Now
Xinhua 13 (Xinhua News, 6-5-2013, Xinhuanet, China, Mexico upgrade relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/05/c_132431199_2.htm)

Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power i n international relations. As two
emerging powers, Mexico and China are each other's important strategic cooperative partners, and the
Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side to achieve common development, the
Mexican president said. Pena Nieto believed Xi's visit will advance bilateral cooperation into a new stage
and promote bilateral ties to a higher level. Xi, for his part, said the Chinese and Mexican peoples feel close to each other, as the two countries
are both ancient civilizations and have a glorious history of fighting bravely for national independence and liberation. Since the two sides establ ished diplomatic ties
in 1972, China and Mexico have achieved rapid development of friendly cooperation in all fields, shown mutual understanding and support to each other, and
maintained close cooperation in international affairs, Xi said, adding that they are good friends and good partners. The Chinese president noted that China and
Mexico are faced with the common task of developing economy and improving people's livelihood. China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the
content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xi said his
visit to Mexico aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. "I believe
with our joint efforts, China-Mexico relations will enter a new stage," he said. Xi, accompanied by Pena Nieto, then
inspected Mexico's guard of honor. Members of the Mexican cabinet and military leaders also attended the welcoming ceremony.

Economic Cooperation Means Closer Mexico-China Relations Now
NewsAsia 13 (NewsAsia, 6-5-2013, Channel NewsAsia, China, Mexico presidents agree on 'strategic' partnership,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/china-mexico-presidents/698924.html)

MEXICO CITY: Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart vowed to work jointly to access
international markets, like the lucrative US market, as part of a new strategic partnership. Xi on Wednesday begins his
second day of a three-day visit to the Latin American economic powerhouse, which will include a speech before Mexico's congress. Xi arrived in
Mexico after visiting Costa Rica, and after meeting Caribbean leaders in Trinidad and Tobago. On Friday Xi travels to the United States for a
much-anticipated weekend summit with US President Barack Obama. China has in recent years aggressively pushed trade
and investment ties with the developing world, particularly Africa and Latin America, to secure raw materials to fuel its
economic growth and wield greater geopolitical influence in relation to the United States. On Tuesday Xi and Mexican President Enrique
Pena Nieto pledged to enhance diplomatic and trade ties between the two countries, and to smooth
over their long-standing rivalry on exporting products to the United States. "We expect to broaden
investments of Chinese capital in our country," Pena Nieto told reporters late Tuesday, a move that will create
more jobs and make Mexico "an important platform for exports to the countries with which we have free trade agreements." Mexico is a
member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), along with the United States and Canada. Xi in turn praised the
"comprehensive strategic partnership" between the two countries. In a joint statement Mexico and
China agreed to increase talks at various government levels "to deepen mutual trust and conduct
bilateral dialogues on strategic issues," Chinese state news service Xinhua reported. Closer ties include more
coordination in forums like the United Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
grouping, Xinhua said.
Spillover
Mexico is key to China most important market.
Dominguez 6 Jorge Dominguez, Professor at Harvards Weatherhead Center for International
Affairs (China's Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American
Dialogue Working Paper, June 2006, Available Online: www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf,
Accessed: 07/15/2013)
Mexico is one of Chinas strategic partners in Latin America. Its overall trade importance for China
is second only to Brazils in this region. It is Chinas principal export market in Latin America.
Compared to the four South American countries under discussion, China runs a substantial bilateral
trade surplus with Mexico (see Tables 3 and 4). From 2000 to 2004, Chinas exports to Mexico nearly
quadrupled while its imports from Mexico quintupled. The dynamic of Sino-Mexican trade since 2000
is thus closest to that of Sino-Brazilian trade, except that Chinas bilateral trade surplus with Mexico
also tripled in those years. China is also a significant foreign direct investor in Mexico; in 2004, the
stock of accumulated Chinese direct investment in Mexico exceeded $28 billion, with clothing
manufacturing accounting for a third and plastic products nearly a fourth of the total.52 Mexico is the
most important Latin American economy for Chinese investment, much of which is geared for sales
throughout the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area. China has good reasons to call
Mexico a strategic partner.


Mexico is economically key to China consumer products.
Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama
Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with
Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the
Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online:
usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013)
One summary of Chinas relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domnguez et al., 2006)
juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic
considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used
China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are
expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military
and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the triangular
relationship between China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of
debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). Chinas multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the
diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China
through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and
manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a
non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the
eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast, offers China
more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products , a
manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of
potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and
opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to
respond effectively.

A2: China-Mexico Econ Comp
Perceived competition doesnt hamper soft power
Xinhua 13 (Xinhua, 6-4-2013, Xinhuanet, China, Mexico set to further promote trade ties,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/04/c_132428986.htm)

Chinese President Xi Jinping's upcoming visit to Mexico is a sign of deepening cooperation and indicates the two
countries are eager to boost their economic and trade ties, officials and experts say. Xi's three-day stay in Mexico starting later Tuesday will
include his second meeting with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in less than two months. He will also meet parliament leaders,
entrepreneurs and members of the Chinese community. The two sides are expected to sign a series of economic and trade agreements and
issue a joint statement on further development of bilateral ties. China is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while
the latter is China's second-largest in Latin America. Two-way trade jumped from about 5 billion U.S. dollars in 2003 to
more than 36 billion dollars in 2012. In a written interview with Mexican media before his three-nation Latin American tour, Xi said China was
ready to work with Mexico to expand and optimize bilateral trade, raising the possibility of starting negotiations on a bilateral free trade deal.
Officials and experts believe trade relations between China and Mexico are complementary rather
than competitive, and the two countries should make more efforts to identify the complementarities
in their economies. In a trip to China in early April, four months after he took office, Pena Nieto met Xi in China's southern city of
Sanya and the two leaders agreed to work together to enhance trust and achieve win-win cooperation.

No Conflict from Trade ImbalanceTequila Pact Proves
Prados 13, (Luis Prados, writer for El Pais, 6-5-2013, El Pais, China and Mexico sign tequila pact to boost bilateral trade,
http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/06/05/inenglish/1370460721_956003.html)

Chinese President Xi Jinping continued his first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean on Wednesday after signing a far-reaching
bilateral trade agreement with Mexican President Enrique Prez Nieto. Called the tequila pact because the distilled
beverage is one of the major products Mexico will export to China as part of a $1-billion package the accord is geared toward
offsetting the trade imbalance between Beijing and Mexico City. Xi and Pea Nieto agreed to put
aside their countrys past differences over trade issues. According to Mexican statistics, Mexico exported about $5.7
billion in products to China last year while it imported $57 billion from the Asian giant. At a news conference, Pea Nieto said he
immediately touched on the need to search for improved balance in trade. He also promised Xi to resolve
in a friendly way Mexicos complaint lodged against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) for unfair
business practices in the textile sector. Mexico charges that China is selling its products under price while at the same time giving
government subsidies to the industry. Besides tequila, which is Mexicos national beverage, Xi said that China has committed itself to
purchasing more Mexican pork products. The two nations agreed to create a joint working group of businessmen
and government officials to seek out investment opportunities in both countries. Pea Nieto said that Mexico
could also become a gateway for Chinese products to other Latin American nations, as well as the United States. Xi explained to reporters that
Beijing was interested in investing in Mexicos energy and mining industries, as well as in infrastructure projects, and announced that in 2015
Mexico has agreed to host the first ever summit between Chinese and Latin American businessmen. The two leaders didnt give any precise
figures on how much money they had pledged in investment or give a timetable as to when some of these accords will be put into place.
Pea Nieto and Xi, however, both stressed that they were willing to work to forge new relations and
cooperate in international forums.






Cuba
General Influence
China is working closely with Cuba now- just met with Cubas VP
Xinhuanet 6/18/13 Sponsored by the Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet is an important central news
service-oriented website, an important information organ of the central government, and an important
platform for building up China's online international communication capacity. Chinese President meets
Cuban VP on stronger tieshttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/19/c_124874409.htm-
SJH

BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday met with Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuban first vice-
president of the councils of state and ministers. Xi asked Diaz-Canel to convey his greetings to Cuban President Raul Castro and former
leader Fidel Castro. Xi reviewed the growth of China-Cuba relations since the two countries forged
diplomatic relations in 1960, particularly the increasingly mature relations and robust cooperation
since the beginning of the 21st century. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese
government cherish its friendship with Cuba. It would like to maintain bilateral high-level exchange of
visits, increase party-to-party exchange and experience sharing on state governance, enhance political
trust, deepen mutual understanding, expand pragmatic cooperation and promote their own
development and common prosperity, Xi said. China would like to work more closely with Cuba on
international and regional issues and promote fairness and justice of the international community, Xi
said. Xi said he witnessed vigor and potential of the Latin America and Caribbean region during his visit earlier this month. China would
like a good partnership with Latin American and Caribbean countries, featuring political trust,
economic cooperation and cultural mutual learning, Xi said. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between
China and Latin America through a comprehensive cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum at the core. China
appreciates Cuba's efforts to promoting China-Latin America relations and expects growth of relations
during Cuba's role as the rotating chair of Community of Latin American and Caribbean states. Diaz-Canel
conveyed the greetings of Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro to Xi. Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great
importance on building ties with China, pledging to enhance high-level visits and communication,
expand mutually-beneficial cooperation and seek growth of ties between the two countries and
relations between China and Latin America. Diaz-Canel will conclude his three-day China visit on Wednesday.

China is beating out US for Cuban influence
Boston Globe 13 (Cubas reforms pave way for new US policy, too. Bostonglobe.com 9 February 13. Web.)
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-drag-policy-into-
century/xER2NTTXGsxdLej0miHwFM/story.html
Direct relations would also further US national security and environmental interests; as Cuba opens
up, other countries will sweep in to seek influence, as China has already done. Especially as Cuba
increasingly promotes offshore drilling and other maritime exploration, the United States must improve
communication with Havana. Currently, even though the United States and Cuba are separated by a
narrow channel, the two countries have no bilateral communications to ensure safety standards for
their mutual protection from oil spills.

China maintains high influence in the squo
MFA 6/18/13 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA or MFA) of the Government of the People's Republic of China is an executive agency responsible
for foreign relations between the People's Republic of China and other countries in the world President
Xi Jinping Meets with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First
Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Stressing to Push China-Cuba, China-
Latin America Relations for Greater Development http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1051842.shtml)
SJH

On June 18, 2013, President Xi Jinping met with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First Vice President
of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, at the Great Hall of the People. Xi Jinping asked Diaz-Canel to convey his sincere greetings to
President Raul Castro of Cuba and Fidel Castro. Xi Jinping said that China and Cuba have always understood and
supported each other since the establishment of diplomatic relationship. In the new century, the
China-Cuba relationship has been increasingly mature with more content of cooperation and strong
vitality. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish the traditional
friendship with Cuba and is willing to work with the Cuban side to maintain high-level exchanges, to
strengthen party-to-party exchanges and to share the experiences of state governance, to enhance
political mutual trust, to build up consensus, to deepen mutual understanding, to expand practical
cooperation and to boost development and common prosperity in the two countries. China is willing to
coordinate and cooperate closely with Cuba on international and regional affairs and to make positive contributions to enhancing the influence
of developing countries and promoting fairness and justice of the international community. Xi Jinping said, I paid a visit recently to three Latin
American and Caribbean countries. I was deeply impressed by the vigour and potential of development of the Latin American and Caribbean
region. China is ready to be a good partner of Latin American and Caribbean countries, with political
mutual respect and trust, complementary and mutual benefit in economy and trade, and exchanges in
culture. China is willing to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to establish an overall China-Latin America cooperation
mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum as the core to push forward mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation between
China and Latin America at a higher level. China appreciates the positive efforts of Cuba to promote the overall China-Latin America
cooperation and is looking forward to greater development of China-Latin America relations while Cuba holding the rotating presidency of
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of President Raul Castro and Fidel Castro to Xi Jinping.
Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on Cuba-China relations and is willing to work with China to
strengthen high-level visits and communication, to expand friendly and mutually-beneficial
cooperation and to push for greater development of relationship between the two countries and
relations between China and Latin America.

Trade Influence
Cuba and China deepening trade ties
HavanaTimes 12 (Cuba and China strengthening trade relations. HavanaTimes.com. 27 September 2012. Web.)
The 25th Meeting of the Cuba-China Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Trade Relations
took place yesterday in Havana, where both countries expressed their willingness to deepen ties.
According to the Prensa Latina news agency, talks gave priority to issues such as the provision of spare
parts for automotive equipment on the island, as well as Chinas participation in the islands program
for the development of renewable energy. On the Chinese side, Commerce Minister Chen Deming said
that sugar, nickel and biotechnology are the main items exported to his country from Cuba. Cuban
President Raul Castro visited the Asian giant this past July, at which time important agreements were
signed in the areas of health, information technology, banking, agriculture and customs. At the end of
the first half of this year, trade between the two countries exceeded $870 million, making China the
second largest trading partner globally with the Island for the eighth consecutive year.

China building Cuban merchant fleet in the squo- boosts influence
CAN 7/11/13 ( Cuban News Agency This page offers users news social, economic, political, sports and
cultural developments that take place in Cuba and in third world nations) Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese
Bulk Carrier http://www.cubanews.ain.cu/2013/0711Ninth%20Chinese.htm- SJH

Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese Bulk Carrier HAVANA, Cuba, July 11 (acn) Cuba received in the Chinese city of Shanghai the
ninth of 10 bulk carriers as part of a contract with the shipyards of that Asian port to develop the
islands merchant fleet. Cuban News Agency Gertrudis is the name of the boat, which was received by Cuban authorities during a
ceremony at the shipyard located on Conngming Island, in Shanghai. Executives with Chinas National Machinery Import and Export Corporation
and with the Trade Minister attended the ceremony. Cubas commercial attach in China, Tania Velazquez, was present at the shipyard along
representatives of the ACEMEX Company, engineers and technicians, who supervised the construction of boat. Shanghai shipyard
president Ma Shixiong described as fruitful the current collaboration between China and Cuba and he
stressed his companys commitment to keep strengthening such links, which were established 50
years ago at the diplomatic level. Tania Velazquez recalled the historic friendly and cooperation
relations between Beijing and Havana and she noted that the construction of these boats is the result of those bonds.
Sources with the Cuban embassy in China stressed the strategic importance of these boats for Cuba,
and the current bilateral economic and commercial relations.

China is boosting Cuban influence in the squo- just supplied them with tech.
infrastructure
Nelson 7-13 , Ana, who teaches New Media and Development Communication at Columbia's School of
International and Public Affairs China influence in Cuba http://laredcuana.blogspot.com/ SJH

Jennifer Hernandez of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami
has posted a note on her research on Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba. She notes that "through
bilateral trade agreements, China has been expanding its sphere of influence," and looks at the
activities of two large Chinese telecommunication equipment companies, Huawei and ZTE. Much of her emphasis
is on surveillance and she concludes that "Chinas transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit Cubans. Instead China seems
to be equipping the islands information technology infrastructure with systems that can potentially spy on Cubans."
Internet surveilance is pretty well taken for granted in Cuba and China, and it is deplorable, but I wonder about the up side.

Chinese control of telecommunications in Cuba grants regional influence and
espionage opportunities
Hernandez, 13 (Jennifer, research Assistant at the Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies,
University of Miami, Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba, Cuba Transition Project, Issue 186,
March 13, 2013, online, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue186.htm, accessed 7/16/13) PE
Both Chinese companies have commercial presence in Cuba and actively participate in conferences
organized by the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). Among these conferences are the
XIV Edition of Converging Technologies: Integration and Independence held in Havana in 2011, where
Huawei was one of the sponsors, and the V International Symposium of Telecommunications, where
both Huawei and ZTE Corporation actively participated. (10) Ramiro Valdes, Cubas Vice-President,
Communist party member and former Minister of Information and Communication, position he held
until 2011, is an avid supporter of restriction and censorship of information technologies. It is not a
coincidence that Ramiro Valdes promotes the commercialization and application of Chinese software
and equipment that can be used to monitor and be remotely accessed. Cuba and China have been two
amorous friends since the 1960s when Cuba became the first country in the Caribbean and Latin
America to normalize relations with the Asian nation. Since that time, both countries have promoted
communist ideology and have cooperated and coordinated with each other at multilateral organizations
and on the issue of human rights. Chinas transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit
Cubans. Instead China seems to be equipping the islands information technology infrastructure with
systems that can potentially spy on Cubans. Perhaps, the Peoples Republic of China is also equipping an
anti-American leadership with sophisticated communication and network technology capable of cyber
espionage 90 miles from our shores.


US Losing Influence
US influence in Cuba is decreasing
Llana 12 (Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City for seven years.
Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan50 Years after Cuba Missile Crisis, US
Influence in Hemisphere is Waning. Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.)
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning
It was not only the containment of communism that drove US attempts to oust Fidel Castro from the
helm of Cuba in the early 1960s, says Mr. Brenner. The US was also concerned about Latin American
countries emulating Cuba, particularly its geopolitical stance in the cold war, and thus undermining
American leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Some 50 years later, the US faces the same
situation, just a more modern iteration. What the US feared the most in 1962 has come to pass, says
Brenner, who wrote "Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile
Crisis." We were concerned about our sphere of influence that we had taken for granted. *Today+
we cannot dominate this region anymore. They do not look to us for leadership. Countries look within
the region, and to some extent to Cuba still.

US is losing Cuban influence to China
Llana 12 (Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City for seven years.
Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan50 Years after Cuba Missile Crisis, US
Influence in Hemisphere is Waning. Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.)
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US turned its attention from Latin America as it focused on
terrorism and threats from the Middle East. At the same time, over the past decade Latin American
democracy has flourished and the global economy shifted, with Latin America no longer looking just
north to the US for leadership and investment, but to India, China, and Russia. China surpassed the US
as Brazils biggest trading partner in 2009.



Cuba/U.S. Relations Low
Cuba/U.S. Relations are low history of isolation, Alan Gross incident, and discontent
with Obama
Hanson and Lee, 13 (director of policy and outreach at One Acre Fund and Senior Production Editor
on the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-Cuba Relations, January 31, 2013, Online,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113, accessed 7/16/13) PE
What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations? They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in
Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the
official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation.
The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions.
Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two
weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in
April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the
restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-
family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congress amended
the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S.
companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation,
according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent
in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska,
Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years. Tension between
Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID
subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet
access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the
Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently
sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians
and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Ral and
Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Ral Castroaccused the
United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."


Tech

China taking over in LA- tech expansion

Hernandez 3-13-13
Research Assistant at the Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami
Issue 186 March 13, 2013 Jennifer Hernandez http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue186.htm

The Peoples Republic of China has a strong commercial presence in Latin America. The Asian giant is
providing professional expertise and technology transfer while Latin American countries guarantee
access to their natural resources. China has been particularly successful in securing oil from Venezuela
by providing the Bolivarian country with components for its information technology infrastructure. In
recent years, Chinese technology enterprises have had a more open presence in Cuba- its largest trade
partner in the Caribbean (1). Several Trade Fairs have been held in Havana with the participation of
numerous Chinese companies offering products from kitchen appliances to sophisticated information
technology equipment, which have substantial demand in Cuba. China, in turn, has benefited from
heavy investments in the islands nickel industry, agricultural products such as rice and sugar, and oil
exploration. Through bilateral trade agreements, China has been expanding its sphere of influence.

spillover
Influence in Cuba key to Chinas overall Latin American agenda.
Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama
Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with
Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the
Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online:
usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013)
China is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade
reported for 2007 (Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this
could change if Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand.
Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin Americas New Left, Cuba is a
unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of Latin American
natural resources is at least as voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly
supported by Ral Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an external
potentially imperialisticthreat to economic sovereignty.


Chinese investment in Cuba key to persuade other Latin American countries.
Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama
Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with
Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the
Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online:
usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013)
Chinas multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and
Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel
extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly
political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-
South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that
make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic
incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and
legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil
sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico
and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.
A2: Cuba is Independent
Cuba can be controlled, but only by China multiple political weaknesses
Werlau, 96 (New Jerseybased consultant and executive director of the nonprofit Cuba Archive,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA: THE LIMITS OF COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT, page 493-194, ASCE
Cuba, Online, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf,
accessed 7/17/13) PE

Because in Cuba power is strongly centralized and forcefully exercised, and decision-making is very vertical,
market forces, which operate spontaneously and in a decentralized manner, are inherently constrained. This
negates the main theoretical argument for engagement and renders it essentially flawed at the core. Foreign investment
in Cuba is, in essence, hostage to the prevailing dialectic. A recent analysis on China concludes that economic engagement has also failed to
bring about political moderation and a modicum of pluralism there because the three elements that would foster reformthe rule of law,
political accountability and a free presschallenge the security of the regime and are, thus, banned. A prominent scholar on Asia declares: If
China is permitted to merely pick and choose which aspects of integration it finds palatable, and to resist those
that push change in the direction of moderation and plualism, them the time scale required by economic engagement will stretch
toward infinity.229 The same selective approach to capitalist mechanisms is the one applied by the Cuban
leadership, and it has been effective. A systematically repressive apparatus appears to have tremendous impact on the feasibility
and timing of political change regardless of economic reform. The Cuban people simply do not possess the means to exercise self-
determination. When the leadership is committed to survival at all costs, regime legitimization is not the
issue; the issue is capacity to exercise control. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin
America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The Bolivarian socialist regime of Hugo Chvez in
Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western imperialism, while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view
the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The
core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that
the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business
opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally.
A2 LA trip ignored Cuba
China still involved with Cuba - their author concludes neg

Economist 6-6-13
Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? Jun 6th 2013
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3

XI JINPING'S first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June
6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and
Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao
did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation,
Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa
Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba
and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have
been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to
come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?
The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised
distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither
socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The
beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you
can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister
announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion
already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times
reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad.



Links
General
Generic
Influence is zero sum Latin America allows Chinese investment because of lack of
US economic engagement.
Erikson and Chen 7 Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for U.S. policy at the Inter-American
Dialogue and coeditor of Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond, and Janice
Chen, joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University
Law Center, former intern at Inter-American Dialogue (China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Journal, Tufts University, Summer, 2007, 31 Fletcher F. World Aff.
69, Available Online from Lexis Nexis Law Journals)
Meanwhile, China's galloping entrance into the Latin American market for energy resources and
other commodities has been accompanied by an accelerating pace of high-level visits by Chinese
officials to the region over the past few years. Though China's foreign policy strategy toward the
developing world prioritizes South Asia and Africa over Latin America, this last relationship has
experienced explosive growth . In 2001, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's landmark visit to the region
sparked a wave of visits by senior officials and business leaders to discuss political, economic, and
military concerns. Since then, the volume of trade between China and the region has skyrocketed.
President Hu Jintao traveled to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba in 2004 and visited Mexico in 2005.
The presidents of all those and other countries have paid reciprocal visits to China.
China's economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming
Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century.
The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have
grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $ 60 billion in 2006.
China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America,
benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America--particularly Argentina,
Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $ 6.5
billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas. n9
China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean exceeded $ 2 billion in
2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year. n10 China has promised to increase its
investments in Latin America to $ 100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed
away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in
Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. FIGURE 2. CHINA V. TAIWAN: TRADING WITH LATIN AMERICA n11
[*75] For their part, Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade
and investment. As a rising superpower without a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western
Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the
European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituencies that are increasingly anti-
American and skeptical of Western intentions. n12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin
America's embrace of China--to the extent that this has actually occurred--is intimately linked to its
perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about China's rise runs
deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or
Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competition posed by the
endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors.

Economic engagement trades off with Chinese influence

Dowd 12
Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation
Countering China's Reach in Latin America By Alan W. Dowd, Julys 23, 2012
http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas

Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security
challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres
more at work here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America
and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in Chinas neighborhood,
China is developing trade and military ties in Americas neighborhood. This is a direct challenge to U.S.
primacy in the regiona challenge that must be answered. First, Washington needs to relearn an
obvious truththat Chinas rulers do not share Americas valuesand needs to shape and conduct its
China policy in that context. Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated
3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them guilty of political dissent
or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion
and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with
unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political
reform, but as reason to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade, according to
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing.
And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled
during the Cold War, There is no true international security without respect for human rights. Second,
the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own
neighborhood economically, politically and militarily. That means no more allowing trade dealsand
the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and
foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years,
before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S.
diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State
Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a
year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense
spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep respect for U.S. military
power. We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United
States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect
will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be whats
happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its
security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America.
We should remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and
Chileborder the Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners
on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally,
all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the
Americas, this Monroe Doctrine 2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes
Chinas efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of controlimplied or
explicitby China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington
should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of
Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short,
what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only
one great power in the Western Hemisphere.
U.S. intervention tanks U.S.-China relations

Carpenter 10
Vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books
on international affairs
By Ted Galen Carpenter This article appeared on The National Interest (Online) on October 19,
2010.Resets and Spheres of Influence http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/resets-spheres-
influence

The Obama administration has explicitly sought to reset the relationship with Russia, which had
become quite dysfunctional during the final years of the Bush administration. Although Washington has
not used the reset terminology with respect to the troubled U.S. relationship with China, the substantive
goal appears to be similar. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates effort to restore the dialogue between
the militaries of the two countries is one indication of that intent. Both goals, however, are
encountering headwinds for a key reason. Policy makers seem unwilling to accept the reality that any
great power in the international system expects, and will seek to enforce, a sphere of influence in its
immediate region. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice famously (or infamously) insisted that the
concept of a sphere of influence was both obsolete and pernicious. But that viewpoint is dangerously
erroneous. The tensions between the United States and Russia and those between the United States
and China confirm that point. The latest, clumsy provocation is Moscows agreement to help Venezuela
build a nuclear-power plant. Predictably, that move has caused hawks in the United States to thunder
about perfidious Russian contempt for the Monroe Doctrine. There is more than a little hypocrisy in that
outrage, since many of those same hawks successfully lobbied for adding the Baltic republics to NATO
and now advocate deploying ballistic missile defenses in Eastern Europe and offering NATO membership
to Ukraine and Georgia as though Russia has no justifiable reason to object to such moves in its
geopolitical back yard. Like the proverbial broken clock that is right twice a day, however, the hawks are
correct with respect to the Russian-Venezuelan nuclear deal. The United States has an important
interest at stake in making sure that Latin America, currently a nuclear-weapons-free zone, stays free of
nuclear weapons. Moscows willingness to help Hugo Chavez, the Crazy Eddie of the Western
Hemisphere, acquire nuclear capabilities even if they are ostensibly for peaceful power-generation
purposes is an unfriendly act in our geopolitical back yard. Both sides need to back off. Russia needs
to find a graceful way out of its increasingly cozy relationship with Chavez, and the United States needs
to stop talking about deploying missile defenses or expanding NATO eastward. Washington and
Moscow must acknowledge that the concept of spheres of influence is alive and well, and that
gratuitous violations of that concept will negate any prospect for a reset in relations. U.S. leaders
must also comprehend that cordial relations with China require a willingness to accept that East Asias
rapidly rising great power will seek to establish a sphere of influence in its neighborhood. Beijings
expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea and the recent spat with Japan over disputed islets in
another body of water are signs of that process. Chinas growing power and assertiveness means that
the United States will need to tread softly regarding such territorial disputes, as well as the even more
sensitive Taiwan issue, if Washington wants to avoid nasty confrontations with Beijing.

American action in LA trades off with Chinese influence

Johnson 05
senior associate of the CSIS Americas Program, senior foreign policy analyst at the Washington-based
Heritage Foundation,holds a B.A. from the University of Wyoming and an M.A.L.S. from Georgetown
University.
Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America By Stephen Johnson October 24, 2005
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-
america

Today, another communist state-the People's Republic of China (PRC)-is seeking trade, diplo-matic, and
military ties in Latin America and the Car-ibbean. The region is rich in natural resources and developing
markets for manufactured goods and even arms. China does not currently pose a direct military threat
in Latin America and has steadily embraced market concepts, but it represents serious competi-tion that
could dilute U.S. influence. Washington could ignore this intrusion or attempt to contain it. Ignoring it
leaves a vacuum for China to fill, while trying to contain it runs against America's own free market ideals.
Instead, the United States can best look after its hemispheric interests and moderate China's presence
by: Consolidating trade relations with Latin America and removing protectionist U.S. trade barriers,
Emphasizing comprehensive relationships as opposed to narrow-interest diplomacy such as
counternarcotics, Minimizing unproductive restrictions on assis-tance to U.S. neighbors, and Pressing
harder for democratic and economic reforms, prioritizing support for these pur-poses, and
reenergizing public diplomacy.
US still has dog in fight over Latin America, increased imports, economic dependency
Sol M. Linowitz Forum 12 (Bi-annual forum to discuss western hemispheric political conditions,
hosted by Inter-American Dialogue and affiliates Genaro Arriagada, former minister of the presidency of
Chile and ambassador of Chile to the United States, chairman of the Board of Radio Cooperativa and
national director of the NO Campaign; Sergio Bitar, former Chilean minister of public works under
President Michelle Bachelet from 2008 to 2010, minister of education, minister of mining, a senator,
president of the Party for Democracy (PPD) on two occasions, and author of numerous books about
Chilean politics and international relations; Nora Lustig, former visiting Shapiro professor of
international affairs at George Washington University, president and professor of the Department of
Economics of the Universidad de las Americas in Mexico, and professor at the Center of Economic
Studies at the Colegio de Mexico; Margaret Myers, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-
American Dialogue, Former China Analyst for US government; Manuel Orozco, chair of US Foreign
Service Institutes division on Central America and the Caribbean, senior researcher at the Institute for
the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, adjunct professor at the School for
International Service at American University; Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin
America, Inter-American Dialogue, April,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years . Just a decade ago, 55
percent of the regions imports originated in the United States . Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin Americas imports
. China and Europe have made huge inroads . Chinas share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of
the United States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia . Furthermore, Latin American nations now trade
much more among themselves . Argentina, for example, may soon replace the United States as Brazils second largest trading
partner, just behind China . Still, these changes must be put in perspective . Even as the US share of the Latin
American market has diminished, its exports to the region have been rising at an impressive pace .
They have more than doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent
higher than US exports worldwide . US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin
Americas growth continues to be strong . But the United States will have to work harder and harder
to compete for the regions markets and resources . While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic
ties, the regions expanding economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability
. Today the United States exports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to
Mexico than it does to China; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia.

Chinese view Latin American investment as key to their global standing
Trinh et al, 06 Senior Economist (Tamara, Silja Voss, Researcher, Steffen Dyck, "China's commodity hunger: Implications for
Africa and Latin America" Deutsche Bank Research)

B. Africa and Latin America have become destinations for Chinese investment Even if the spotlight has been on the
massive inflows of foreign investment money into China in recent years, China is increasingly investing abroad as well. We
estimate the stock of Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) to have totalled USD 44-50 bn at the end of 2005. While the largest part of
these flows remains within Asia (60% of flows in 2005, 73% of the stock as of end-2005, see chart 23), China has been increasingly investing in
other regions as well, including Latin America and more recently also Africa. However, the high share of Asia is likely biased by the
phenomenon of round-tripping through Hong Kong9which would explain its dominant position in the ODI statistics (see table 24)10.Chinese
ODI to Latin America and Africa only makes up 2% and 1% (the latter excluding round-tripping11), respectively, of the total, but China has
stepped up its investment in the two regions recently (see boxes). In the last few years Chinese government officials have
made high profile trips to both Latin America and Africa, announcing extensive investment plans. During his trip
to Latin America in late 2004, Hu Jintao announced that China would invest up to USD 100 bn in Latin America over the next ten years.
We therefore think that ODI flows could increase substantially over the next few years, as China tries to
secure more and more resources in an environment of rising commodity prices. In fact, in a survey about their
ODI intentions in the next 2-5 years, Chinese firms indicated that the share of ODI flowing into Africa and Latin America could increase to about
15% and 11%, respectively, of the total (see chart 25).12While many of the investment projects in both Africa and Latin America are carried out
by Chinese state-owned enterprises, private companies also increasingly invest abroad.13 The Chinese government has created a framework in
the form of its Go-out or Going Global strategy, which centres on active government support and encouragement for domestic firms to
pursue investments abroad. Chinese firms have taken up the call: AnUNCTAD report lists five Chinese (state-owned) transnational corporations
(TNC) among the top 50 non-financial TNCs from developing economies14(see table 26). Some 700 Chinese companies are active in Africa
alone.15Three main goals have been mentioned as driving Chinese outward direct investment: 1. Economic
rationale : Improving energy security and securing access to resources, markets, and strategic assets.16
Strategic assets in this context refer to management skills, brands or distribution networks. Access to markets includes setting up production
sites in countries with favoured access to major markets (e.g. access to the US market from Mexico via NAFTA, or from African countries via the
African Growth and Opportunity Act). 2. Political intentions : Official recognition as a market economy from its
trading partners and adherence to the One-China principle.173. Strategic goals : Supporting Chinas
emergence as a major global power. Concomitant with its economic success China wants to be
accepted as an important international player. Closer external trade ties can be leveraged towards
reaching this goal. Moreover, China supports the idea of a multi-polar world to counter American hegemony.


Econ
We have a link to their econ advantage maintaining financial weakness in America
gives China the edge in control of Latin America
Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., ARC Future Fellow and professor at the University of Sydney in the Department
of Sociology and Social Policy, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current
Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 156, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE
At a 2009 symposium on security in Washington DC, a foreign policy specialist from a prominent US
think tank took the stage with a Chinese official to debate Chinas deepening ties with Latin America.
The specialist asked whether China is willing to come to the table with the United States to promote
democratic development in the region. The Chinese officials reply was revealing: We are interested in
trade, and not in politics. Talking past rather than with each other, the officials revealed a
disjuncture of US and Chinese approaches to international affairs, in particular concerning the role of the
state in shaping the course of economic cooperation. Exchanges like these suggest that calls for China to
unilaterally adapt to prevailing conventions of governance are unrealistic, and that Chinese attempts to
rhetorically divorce trade from politics are equally so. They also suggest the need for compromise on
both sides of the Pacific as China assumes a more prominent role in world affairs. Financial instability in
the United States and Europe has intensified Chinas engagement with developing countries. Sino-
Latin American trade skyrocketed from 10 billion USD in 2000 to 183 billion USD in 2011, and Chinas
priorities in the region are clear: Tap new sources of foodstuffs and energy to sustain domestic growth,
and open new markets for Chinese manufactured products. Literature on the resulting trans-Pacific
relationships focuses mainly on the economic and strategic implications of this process, drawing
predictable conclusions. Chinese publications, generally penned by government officials, emphasise the
economic benefits of their countrys demand for the regions primary products, evinced by Latin
Americas impressive performance during the global financial crisis (GFC) (Jiang 2005, 2009; Sun 2011).
Latin American publications reflect the regions historical anxieties about 1) overdependence on
resource exports, 2) declining manufacturing sectors, and 3) Dutch disease (IADB 2010; ECLAC 2010;
Dussel Peters 2005, 2010). Policy briefs and analyses from the United States exhibit both concerns
about the economic sustainability of Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign
interference in a region traditionally subsumed by US hegemony (Arnson and Davidow 2011; Ellis 2009;
Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010).

Econ Engagement
Economic engagement pushes out China
Dowd 2012 (Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. Countering China's Reach in Latin
America 2012. http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)

Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own
neighborhood economically, politically and militarily . That means no more allowing trade dealsand
the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion
agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.
Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy . The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in
Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six
Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.
Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that
China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been
to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one
wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security
ties . A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S.
is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps its time to do the same in
Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and
Chileborder the Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners
on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.


Inaction Link
Chinese Influence Based on US Inaction plan is an attempt to push china out.
Cerna 11 (Michael, writer China Research Center, 4-15-2011, Chinas Growing Presence in Latin America, web)

In March 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama met with leaders and officials in Brazil, Chile and El Salvador. Mr. Obama made this visit amid
growing Chinese power in the region. The trip marked the first time President Obama had visited Latin America since becoming President. By
comparison, at this point in Hu Jintaos presidency, the Chinese president already had visited four countries, including Brazil, where he signed
39 bilateral agreements and announced $100 billion in investments. While Mr. Obama was well-received during his trip, the most common
response in those countries was that the trip was symbolic but not very substantive. Obamas visit did not reflect any shift in policy. Many of
the major statements these countries hoped for (such as a call for Brazils permanent place on the U.N. Security Council), in fact, were not
made. Mr. Obama admitted on his trip: There have been times when the United States took this region for
granted, according to the Latin American Herald Tribune. Those times are not yet in the distant past and there are fears
this administration is making mistakes similar to ones in the past. After promising during his 2000 election campaign to correct Washingtons
indifference to Latin America, George W. Bush was accused of turning his back on the region in favor of more
pressing issues in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The President showed no concern for a
growing Chinese influence in the hemisphere, and China put both feet inside before anyone in
Washington seemed to realize the door was open. This was a move China had planned during the
administration of George H.W. Bush.

Indirect Issues
China views even indirect issues as zero-sum with the U.S
Perlez 12
Jane, Lieberthal, Kenneth, Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent for the Beijing bureau of the
New York Timse, Kenneth Lieberthal is the director of the John L. Thorton Center for China Studies at
Brookings, Chinese Influence Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S-China Frictions, The New York Times, April 2,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-
china-frictions.html

In the face of Chinas strengths, and worries that the United States will be displaced from its premier
position in the world, Washington is engaged in activities including stepped-up spying by American
planes and ships along Chinas borders that anger the Chinese, particularly its military, Mr. Wang writes.
Promotion of human rights in China by American-supported nongovernmental organizations is viewed
as an effort to Westernize the country and undermine the Communist Party, a stance the party will
not stand for, he says. That China is increasingly confident that it will prevail in the long run against the
United States is backed, in part, by Mr. Lieberthals appraisal of American policy toward China. Mr.
Lieberthal cites findings from American intelligence based on internal discussions among crucial
Chinese officials that these officials assume very much a zero-sum approach when discussing issues
directly and indirectly related to United States-China relations. Because these are privileged
communications not intended for public consumption, American officials interpret them to be
particularly revealing of Chinas real objectives, he writes. In turn, American law enforcement
officials see an alarming increase in Chinese counterespionage and cyberattacks against the United
States that they have concluded are directed by the Chinese authorities to gather information of
national interest.


Oil Link
China needs Latin America to maintain oil demands
Xiaoxia, 13 (Wang, Department of Economics, Tsinghua University, Translated by Laura Lin, In
Americas Backyard: China in Latin America, Economic Observer Online, April 27, 2013, Online,
http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving
force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become
the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports,
which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin
America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China.
China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must
also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China
National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and Chinas
investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector.

Oil is a zero-sum game- uniquely true in the context of China and Latin America
Luft, 2006 (Gal, PhD and Co-Director for the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security Challenge or
Opportunity? Chinas Role in Latin America, United States Government Printing Office,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG-109shrg28258.htm)

China's pursuit of Latin American oil will only make matters worse. With half of its oil imports coming
from the Western Hemisphere and with oil imports in the United States projected to surge 60 percent
during the next two decades, the United States cannot afford to lose chunks of Western hemispheric
crude. Every barrel of oil China buys in the Americas means one less barrel of Western hemispheric oil
available to the United States market. This means that China will have to--the United States will have to
look for this oil elsewhere, and that will be particularly in the Middle East, which is contrary to President Bush's pledge to make the
United States less dependent on, ``places that don't particularly like us.'' So when it comes to oil, Mr. Chairman, this is a zero-sum
game.

Perception
Perception key- China will base its action towards Latin America based off of its ability to maintain
access
Ellis, 2011 (R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1
st
Quarter,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not
necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin
America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much
on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in
the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin
America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist"
regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru,
Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free
market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread
perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology
development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with
globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets
hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve
as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture
and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the
political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

Perception is key
Ferchen, 2013 (Matt, Specializes Chinas Political-Economic Relations with Emerging Economies
Chinas Latin American Interests, 4/6, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-
american-interests/a7av)

While overall the United States remains the regions main trade and investment partner, the perception that Chinas star is
rising and Americas is falling means the United States must reengage the region both economically
and politically in a way that is seen as contributing to rather than inhibiting Latin American economic
and political development. And even if the idea of a China Model or Beijing Consensus remains vague and open to various
interpretations, the idea that China itself presents a successful model of development, and is a major new trade and
investment partner for the region, exposes the need for the United States to rethink its own approach toward both economic and
political development issues in Latin America and elsewhere.


Cuba
Embargo
We have a specific link eliminating or lessening the Embargo brings Latin America
back to the U.S.s court
Goodman, 9 (Joshua, Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Harvard, Latin America to Push Obama
on Cuba Embargo at Summit, April 13, 2009 15:07, Online,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk, accessed
7/17/13) PE
Then Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba will be at the heart of
the U.S. relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for half a century. While
Latin American leaders split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift the 47-year-old U.S.
trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to Mexicos pro-business Felipe
Calderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point for reviving U.S. relations with
the region, which are at their lowest point in two decades. Obama, born six months before President
John F. Kennedy imposed the embargo, isnt prepared to support ending it. Instead, hell seek to satisfy
the leaders at the April 17-19 summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with less ambitious steps
disclosed by the administration today -- repealing restrictions on family visits and remittances imposed
by former President George W. Bush. That would mesh with his stated goal of changing the perception
of U.S. arrogance that he attributed to his predecessor in his sole policy speech on the region last
May. All of Latin America and the Caribbean are awaiting a change in policy toward Cuba, Jose
Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Washington-based Organization of American States, said in an
interview. They value what Obama has promised, but they want more. The policy changes unveiled
today also include an expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island, and a plan to allow U.S.
telecommunications companies to apply for licenses in Cuba. Symbolically Important Cuba, the only
country in the hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is symbolically important to the
regions leaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes and looked to Cuba and its
longtime leader Fidel Castro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though most countries shun the
communist policies of Castro and his brother, now-President Raul Castro, the U.S. alone in the
hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with the island. Cuba represents a 50-year policy
failure in Latin America and thats why its so important for Obama to address it now, says Wayne
Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, who headed the State
Departments Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979-1982. Unless Obama wants to be booed off
the stage, he better come with fresh ideas. The U.S. president, 47, thinks it would be unfortunate if
Cuba is the principal theme at the summit and would prefer the session focus instead on the economy,
poverty and the environment, says Jeffrey Davidow, the White Houses top adviser for the meeting.
Obama also understands that he cant control the discussion and intends to deal with the other leaders
as partners, Davidow told reporters on April

U.S. is losing influence to China because of the Cuban embargo 2012 summit proves
Cawthorne and Ellsworth, 12 (Andrew, British journalist who has worked for Reuters since 1992 on
various assignments in Latin America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East, Brian, Personal Property
lawyer at Alston and Bird LLP, Latin America rebels against Obama over Cuba, Reuters, Sun Apr 15,
2012 10:13pm, Online, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summit-
idUSBRE83D0E220120416, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Unprecedented Latin American opposition to US sanctions on Cuba left President Barack Obama
isolated at a summit on Sunday and illustrated Washington's declining influence in a region being
aggressively courted by China. Unlike the rock-star status he enjoyed at the 2009 Summit of the
Americas after taking office, Obama has had a bruising time at the two-day meeting in Colombia of
some 30 heads of state. Brazil and others have bashed Obama over US monetary policy and he has
been on the defensive over Cuba and calls to legalize drugs. Due to the hostile US and Canadian line on
communist-run Cuba, the heads of state failed to produce a final declaration as the summit fizzled out
on Sunday afternoon. There was no declaration because there was no consensus, said Colombian
President Juan Manuel Santos. He bristled at suggestions the summit had been a failure, however,
saying the exchange of different views was a sign of democratic health. For the first time, conservative-
led US allies like Mexico and Colombia are throwing their weight behind the traditional demand of leftist
governments that Cuba be invited to the next Summit of the Americas. Cuba was kicked out of the
Organization of American States (OAS) a few years after Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and has been
kept out of its summits due mainly to US opposition. But Latin American leaders are increasingly
militant in opposing both Cuba's exclusion and the 50-year-old US trade embargo on the Caribbean
island. The isolation, the embargo, the indifference, looking the other way, have been ineffective,
Santos said. I hope Cuba is at the next summit in three years. Santos, a major US ally in the region who
has relied on Washington for financial and military help to fight guerrillas and drug traffickers, has
become vocal about Cuba's inclusion even though he also advocates for democratic reform by Havana.
In an ironic twist to the debate, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went dancing in the early hours of
Sunday at a Cartagena bar called Cafe Havana, where Cuban music is played. Argentine President
Cristina Fernandez, who has insisted without success that Washington recognize its claim to the Falkland
Islands controlled by Britain, was one of several presidents who left the summit well before its official
closure. She missed a verbal gaffe by Obama, who referred to the Maldives instead of the Malvinas
when using the name Latin Americans give to the disputed islands. The leftist ALBA bloc of nations --
including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and some Caribbean nations - said they will not attend
future summits without Cuba's presence. It's not a favor anyone would be doing to Cuba. It's a right
they've had taken away from them, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said from Managua.
Lifting the embargo puts the U.S. back in the lead
Goodman, 13 (Josh, Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government,
Obama Can Bend Cuba Embargo to Help Open Economy, Groups Say, Bloomberg Business News, Feb
20, 2013 6:21, Online, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obama-should-bend-cuba-
embargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Now, in a second term, and with private business expanding in Cuba, Obama has a freer hand to do
more, said Sabatini. An exception to the embargo allowing U.S. businesses and consumers to trade with
non-state enterprises in Cuba would be small in scale though help empower a growing, viable
constituency for change on the island, he said. Since his brother Fidel started handing over power in
2006, Castro has relaxed state control of the economy in the biggest economic overhaul since the 1959
revolution. To provide jobs for the 1 million state workers being laid off, the government began allowing
the buying and selling of homes and the creation of farming co-operatives and other private businesses.
The latest sign of change are new rules that took effect in January allowing most Cubans to bypass
requirements they obtain an exit visa or invitation from abroad to leave the island. Castro in December
said that he hopes that productivity gains will boost economic growth this year to at least 3.7 percent.
Gross domestic product expanded 3.1 percent in 2012. The Washington-based Cuba Study Group urges
Obama to gain even more leverage by getting Congress to repeal the so-called Helms-Burton act of
1996 and other legislation that conditions the easing of sanctions on regime change. Any move to ease
the five-decade-old embargo would probably encounter anti-Castro resistance in Florida, one of the
biggest prizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from key lawmakers including Senator
Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A bill
introduced by Representative Jose Serrano, a New York Democrat, in the 112th Congress to dismantle
the web of legislation governing relations with Cuba since as early as the 1960s received no co-
sponsors.
Ending the Embargo lets the U.S. compete with China lowering restrictions isnt
enough
Goodes, 9 (Jeff, Lt. Col. in the U.S. military, military fellows program, Marine colonel: Drop the Cuba
embargo, Friday, October 23, 2009, Foreign Policy, Online,
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo, accessed
7/18/13) PE
The Obama administration's decision to extend the U.S. economic trade embargo on Cuba for an
additional year is detrimental to our national and regional security and further emboldens our
economic, military, and infrastructure rivals. What is most perplexing is the fact that earlier this
summer the Obama administration decided to relax some of the regulations regarding personal travel
and personal money transfers from Cuban-Americans to their relatives in Cuba, as well as
telecommunication exchanges between private U.S. and state-run Cuban companies: all are steps in the
right direction for U.S. interests - but are not enough. While these relaxed restrictions are certainly a
step forward in normalizing relations, these steps do not outweigh the heavy diplomatic, information,
and economic influence of Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, China, Russia, India, and Iran, all of whom
support the Cuban government and all of whom seek to be peer competitors with the United States.

Lifting the embargo reasserts U.S. influence

RT 10
Russia Today quoting Daniel Griswold, associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy
Studies , earned a Bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Wisconsin at Madison and a
Diploma in Economics and a Masters degree in Politics of the World Economy from the London School
of Economics.
Stumbling blockade: Opposition grows in US over Cuban embargo
October 19, 2010 http://rt.com/usa/american-embargo-cuba-rethink/

The embargo has largely been seen as ineffective. It has given the Castro regime a handy excuse for the
failures of its socialist experiment. It is hurting the very Cuban people that we claim to be helping, says
Daniel Griswold from the CATO Institute based in Washington DC. Lets lift the embargo, move more
products there, more Americans will be able to spread their influence there. I think it is our best hope
for having influence in Cuba when that wonderful day comes when the Castro regime falls, he
advocates.


General
Cuba is strategically important for China political symbol of influence.
Hearn 2009 (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the
University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study
of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January,
usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)

In terms of economic openness and political ideology Mexico and Cuba are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Nevertheless, for China
both hold high strategic value. Examining Chinas relations with Mexico and Cuba opens an analytic window into
the way that bilateral commercial, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation programs have adapted to
distinct local conditions. Based on interviews and observations gathered during three years in Cuba, ten months in China, and eight months in
Mexico, this Pacific Rim Report outlines some of the positive and negative local responses that intensifying engagement with China has
produced. It also suggests that China has effectively tailored bilateral programs to local environments to advance common economic, political,
and cultural objectives.Chinas economic impact across Latin America has been uneven. Its demand for energy resources has driven up
commodity prices, benefiting exporters such as Argentina and Brazil (soy), Chile (copper), Peru (iron, fishmeal), and Venezuela (crude oil) (Jiang
2005, Zweig and Jianhai 2005). Nevertheless, as the case studies of Jos Luis Len Manrquez (2006) show, the exports of Mexico and the
countries of Central America consist primarily of manufactured products and textiles, resulting in seemingly insurmountable competition from a
tidal wave of legal and illicit Chinese imports. Romer Cornejo (2005) suggests that this regional variation results in part from the structural
adjustments of the public and private sectors pursued by Latin American countries to facilitate cooperation with China. To examine this issue in
depth, in 2006 the Red de Estudios de Amrica Latina y el Caribe sobre Asia del Pacfico (Latin American and Caribbean Study Network on Asia
and the Pacific, or REDEALAP) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) brought together scholars from IADB member countries to
debate the effectiveness and future trajectory of structural adjustments in order to deepen cooperation with China in areas ranging from fiscal
integration into regional trade blocks to natural disaster relief (REDEALAP 2006). A recent book from the OECD (Santiso 2007) argues that
although Chinas emergence represents a valuable opportunity for Latin America to develop alternative economic partnerships that reduce
dependence on the United States and Europe, resource exports to China could gradually push the region into a raw materials corner. Similarly,
a book from the Inter-American Development Bank entitled, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the
Caribbean, argues that to avoid future dependence on primary resource exports, Latin American governments should adopt long-term
strategies that position their countries as service providers for the expanding Chinese middle class, particularly in the tourism and education
sectors (Devlin et al. 2006). The authors signal that to climb the industrial value chain in this way will require a greater coordinating role for
Latin American governments, since development strategies guided by the market alone, adopted in part as a backlash to previous import
substitution strategies, will naturally favor short-term growth through commodity export.One summary of Chinas relations with six Latin
American countries (Jorge I. Domnguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although
economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in
the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated
with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the triangular relationship between
China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). Chinas multiple
objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba
harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and
electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas
image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common
ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast,
offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic
and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss
the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.

Engagement with Cuba blocks out China

Benjamin-Alvarado 06
PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska
The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban
Research Institute, Florida International University. Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, University of Nebraska
Omaha1 November 2006

Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the
United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three
reasons in the following interest areas: energy 2 security interests; broader regional strategic; and
purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil although it
really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis is seen as possible if only partial
remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil
partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and
members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S.
opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as
there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence
of the United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it
stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the
presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006
U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cubas oil industry. To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations
applying strategic thought to what I will termPost-Oil Cuba a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development
questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3 The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations
with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4 This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in
the period since the demise of Cubas favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cubas energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havanas energy policies. Most
of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-termenergy development
scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining
capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on Americas refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The
potential of viewing Cuba as a staging area for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly
demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos 3 refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of
foreign firms.6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing
Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in
the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy
capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cubas vaunted public education
systemremains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that bei ng the role that Cuba will play in the region in
the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has
cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results fromimproved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like.
Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well
enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears
of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the
present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and
possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting
to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to
Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than
optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

Influence in Cuba key to Chinas overall Latin American agenda.
Hearn 2009 (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the
University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study
of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January,
usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)

China is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007
(Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if
Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight
resource-rich countries that comprise Latin Americas New Left, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol
of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is at least as
voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly supported by Ral Castro, decreases the danger
of being perceived in the region as an externalpotentially imperialisticthreat to economic sovereignty.



Medical Tech
Cuba and Chinas medical tech partnership is a part of a larger bi-national agreement
Whitney, 2012 (W.T, Writer for the Peoples World magazine on Latin American Issues, Peoples
World March 5
th
, 2012, web)

The present era of cooperation began in Nov. 2004, when Chinese President Hu Jintao brought 200
businesspersons and investors to Cuba. He ended up signing a 16-point bi-national agreement covering
bio-technical, higher education, telecommunications, nickel extraction initiatives, and more, with
China providing favorable credit terms. Follow-up took place in Havana in 2009, as national assembly
presidents of the two nations agreed on new financial and commercial arrangements, and prepared
for Cuban port, radio and television, and bulk transport modernization. In Dec. 2011, Cuban Council of
State Vice-Minister Ricardo Cabrisas, meeting in China with the inter-governmental Cuba-China
Commission, signed updates and reported on the 6th Cuban Communist Party Congress of that year.
Bilateral trade rose from $590 million in 2004 to $1.8 billion in 2010. China became Cuba's second
largest trading partner, exceeded only by Venezuela. Chinese trade with Latin America overall has
increased 42 percent over five years. China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances,
medical and electronic equipment, buses (8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba
provides sugar, rum, cigars, high technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel
China needs for steel production. China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring
underwater oil deposits off Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived
recently from China. Cuba's Molecular Immunology Center (MIC) recently announced that the anti-lung
cancer vaccine CimaVax-EGF, made by the Cuban-Chinese Biotech Pharmaceutical Ltd (BPL) Company,
would undergo trials in China. MIC head Augustin Lage visited China in February to assess use of
Nimotuzumab monoclonal antibody, a BPL product directed at several human several cancers.

Cuban Biotechnology is a key growing interest for China
Meacham 2012 (Karen, director of educational outreach and dean of the Abshire-Inamori
Leadership Academy at CSIS, where she designs and implements the Centers executive education,
leadership, and training activities. She also directs the CSIS Seven Revolutions Project, an ongoing
research effort to identify and analyze global strategic trends looking out to 2030. Chinese
Investments in the Cuban Biotech Industry, CSIS, Print)

Although Chinas investment portfolio in Latin America is highly concentrated in energy and raw
materials, advanced technology and biotechnology specifically have stimulated interest and serve as
catalysts for a stronger relationship between China and Cuba. This growing partnership has opened
significant Asian markets to Cuba. For China, the partnership offers access to Cuban biotechnology
expertise and a presence in the Western Hemisphere just 90 miles off the coast of the United States
Cubas strength in biotechnology stems from a long history of investment in its own nations health,
scientific, and medical research and delivery. As a result, Cuba boasts some of the best health indicators
of any country in the developing world. Its infant mortality rate is lower than that of the United States
and several other large industrialized nations, Cuba has made considerable advances in biotechnology,
including the development of the worlds first vaccine for meningitis 13 has developed a pesticide for
dengue carrying mosquitoes and is an exporter of one of the most effective hepatitis 13 vaccines in the
region. Cuba is working to market its expertise and products on the global market and as an example, is
advancing its TheraClM hR3 anticancer therapy through a joint venture with Germany. During the past
two decades an economic partnership between China and Cuba has developed. According to Cubas
National Office of Statistics, trade in goods to China in 2007 was roughly $2.7 billion. Though hard to
measure, this number has been boosted by expanded Chinese investments in the Cuban biotechnology
industry. Since 2000, several successful Chinese-Cuban biotech pharmaceutical companies have
emerged. Biotech cooperation between China and Cuba began in earnest in 2004 when Chinese and
Cuban officials signed a memorandum of biotechnological cooperation during Chinese president Hu
Jintaos visit to Havana. The goal of the memorandum was to amplify cooperation and deepen the
economic and commercial ties between the two countries. Following the agreement, in 2005, the first
joint Chinese-Cuban biotech entity, Biotech Pharmaceutical, set up a plant in Beijing. Biotech
Pharmaceutical was created with the specific purpose of bringing Cuban research and pharmaceuticals
to China and began by making monoclonal antibodies to treat Chinese cancer patients. Since 2006,
China and Cuba have created two new biotechnology firms: ChangHeber Pharmaceuticals, which
produces interferon and other compounds; and, most recently. Beijing Neurotechnology Limited,which
will develop, produce, and commercialize neurotechnological products. Chinas recent economic growth
and increasing global power have cast a new light on this relationship, Beijings interest in Cuba has
produced more frequent highIevel meetings; rapidly expanding levels of economic cooperation; and
numerous exchanges in the areas of science, technology, and defense. Chinese investment in the Cuban
biotechnology industry specifically has opened many doors to the global market for Cuba and is
expected to continue to grow.


Oil
China assisting Cuba in supplying key rig components, indicates interest in oil
Jeff Franks (Staff writer, journalist), 1-19-12, Reuters, Oil rig arrives for Cuba offshore exploration
work, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-cuba-oil-rig-idUSTRE80I1WV20120119
The rig, known as Scarabeo 9, could be seen as it sailed slowly westward, miles off the north coast and
Havana's famed Malecon seaside boulevard. Its arrival went mostly unnoticed by people in the capital,
but it was a long-awaited and landmark day for the island's oil industry, which believes the platform
will tap into rich oil fields in Cuba's part of the Gulf of Mexico. Starting next week, Spanish oil giant
Repsol YPF, working in partnership with Norway's Statoil and ONGC Videsh, a unit of India's Oil and
Natural Gas Corp, is expected to drill at least two wells in Cuban waters about 70 miles from the
Florida Keys. Malaysia's Petronas, in partnership with Russia's Gazprom Neft, will also drill a well using
the Scarabeo 9. The rig has been contracted from its owner Saipem, a unit of Italian oil company Eni. All
the wells will be in water at least a mile deep, like that of the BP well that blew out and spilled millions
of gallons of oil in the U.S. part of the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Cuba has said it may have 20 billion barrels
of oil in its parts of the Gulf, but the U.S. Geological Survey has estimated about 5 billion. Repsol drilled
the only previous offshore well in Cuba in 2004 and said it found oil, but said it was not "commercial." It
has been trying for several years to bring another rig for more drilling, a task that was complicated by
the longstanding U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and the limits it places on the amount of U.S.
technology that can be used. The Scarabeo 9, a semi-submersible rig that floats on four giant pontoon
legs and has living quarters for more than 200 crewmembers, was built in China, then sent to Singapore
in late 2010 for completion.

Chinas intent to drill confirmed by exploratory drilling
Investors.com (Business magazine and advisory), 4-11-12, Investors Business Daily, While We Dither
On Oil, It's Drill, Beijing, Drill, http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/041112-607461-china-seeks-
canadian-cuban-oil.htm?p=full
Energy Policy: A Chinese oil company is now the world's top producer. While we sleep and watch pump
prices rise, China, India and even Cuba seek supplies the world over, including drilling off the Florida
coast. Global demand for oil is rising, as is its global price, as energy-hungry economies such as China,
India and Brazil scour the earth for oil they know will be the energy of the present for some time to
come. Even those lacking their own technology are asking others to help them get more. For them,
there is no such thing as "peak oil." The U.S., however, stands alone as the only major country not
actively seeking new supplies. Less than two years after the Deepwater Horizon explosion of a single rig
virtually shut down our efforts in the Gulf of Mexico, a Chinese rig built for a Spanish company, Repsol,
has begun exploratory drilling for oil off Cuba as close as 50 miles to Key West, Fla. The Scarabeo 9 rig
will drill at a depth of 6,000 feet underwater. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill happened at a
shallower depth of 5,500 feet. The U.S. Geological Survey recently estimated the North Cuban Basin
contains as much as 9 billion barrels of oil and 22 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Other estimates range
from 5 billion to 20 billion barrels. Pools of oil and natural gas tend not to obey lines drawn on a map. It
is certain that at least some of Cuba's wells will be tapping oil pools that straddle the boundary
separating our zone from theirs, meaning Havana will be getting oil that should be ours. Countries like
China clearly don't see oil as an energy source of the past. China and India provided a combined $24
billion in oil industry subsidies in 2010, according to the International Energy Agency. The figure dwarfs
the $4 billion in industry incentives that President Obama is seeking to end.

China enabled by Cuba to drill in restricted areas, indicates intent to compete
Aaron Sharockman (Deputy government and politics editor, writer/editor for PolitiFact.com, Times
staff writer), 4-4-10, Tampa Bay Times, PolitiFact: Stearns' claim about Chinese oil drilling in Gulf of
Mexico is half true, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/politifact-stearns-claim-
about-chinese-oil-drilling-in-gulf-of-mexico-is/1085129
"Cuba wants to let the Chinese drill in some of the very parts of the gulf that American producers are
currently forbidden to touch, as close as 45 miles off the Florida coast," Stearns, R-Ocala, says on his
campaign Web site. Stearns' point that if Cuba is going to drill anyway, why shouldn't we? is
obvious. But are his facts right? First, some background. In 1977, Cuba and the United States negotiated
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and the waters south of the Florida Keys, called the Florida
Straits, according to the U.S. Department of State. The boundaries, called Exclusive Economic Zones,
give countries special rights of exploration and marine usage. Mexico, Cuba and the United States have
EEZs in the gulf, and Cuba and the United States control the Florida Straits. When it comes to oil, Cuba
decides who drills in its EEZ and oil that may come from it and the United States controls who can drill
in its territory. The United States currently bans drilling in much of the eastern Gulf of Mexico
(including waters within 234 miles of Tampa Bay), and all of its portion of the Florida Straits. But last
week, President Barack Obama proposed to open new areas to oil and gas exploration along the
eastern seaboard south of New Jersey and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico within 125 miles of Florida's
coast. U.S. drilling would still be banned in the Florida Straits. . Now onto Cuba, the heart of Stearns'
claim. Cuba's maritime boundary in the Florida Straits extends to within 45 miles of the Keys, as
Stearns suggests. Cuba has no drilling moratorium. Its EEZ is broken down into 59 areas. In 2002, Cuba's
state-run oil company, Cubapetroleo, started leasing individual areas to foreign oil companies in both
the Florida Straits and the Gulf of Mexico for exploration. So far, Cuba has leased 15 of the 59 areas, said
Jorge Pinon, a former oil executive with Shell and Amoco who is an expert on Cuba's energy sector and a
former energy fellow with the University of Miami's Center for Hemispheric Policy. The waters closest
to the United States have not yet been leased. Who holds the rights to the areas? Oil and gas
companies based in Spain, Norway, India, Malaysia, Venezuela, Vietnam and Brazil. But not China. China
has an onshore, land-based lease in Cuba but not an offshore lease, Pinon said.
Chinese industrial oil initiatives key in Cuba
Cuban Research Institute, 05-26-09, Commissioned report for the CubaInfo Series, Cuba and
China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-
reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf
Chinese enterprises have developed a broad range of industrial initiatives in Cuba. Agricultural
cooperation has focused on the production of rice, soy, sorghum, and maize, and Cuba exports 400,000
tonnes of raw sugar annually to China. Scientific exchange has developed in earthquake detection, solar
energy research, cancer treatment, and vaccine production. In 2004, Hu Jintao pledged to invest $500
million in Cubas nickel sector, and although Venezuela emerged as the leading financier of the Las
Camariocas ferro-nickel plant, China has since consumed 20,000 tons of the resource (Cheng 2009:1).
The Chinese oil company Sinopec has teamed up with Cubas CUPET to develop onshore operations in
Pinar del Rio (CRS 2008:24), while the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is negotiating
exploration of Cuban deposits in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2007, 10,000 Chinese tourists visited Cuba, and
as discussed below, electronics manufacturing and transport infrastructure have emerged as key areas
of expansion. China often pays for developing country natural resources with trade credits, construction
equipment, infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather than hard currency (Robles 2005).
Chinese oil refurbishments of Cuban refineries trade off
Reuters, 06-05-11, NewsMax.com, China to Refurbish Cuban Oil Refinery,
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/cubanrefinery-china-partnership/2011/06/05/id/398888
China signed a letter of intent to refurbish a Cuban oil refinery and agreed to give new credit and start
drawing up a five-year cooperation plan between the two communist-run countries in accords signed
Sunday during a visit by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The agreement on the refinery was the first
official word on a project first reported by Reuters in November that is expected to cost $6 billion and
would be a significant step forward in budding Cuba-Chinese economic relations. The signing of the
accords followed talks between Xi and Cuban President Raul Castro on Xi's second day in Cuba after
arriving Saturday from Italy. XI is widely expected to succeed Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2013. Few
details about the credit and other agreements were available. China is Cuba's second largest trading
partner, behind Venezuela, with trade last year totaling $1.83 billion, according to official Chinese
news agency Xinhua. The refinery letter of intent is an agreement among Cuvenpetrol, which is a joint
venture between Cuba and Venezuela, China National Petroleum Corp's Huanqiu Contracting and
Engineering unit and the Italian unit of French oilfield service company Technip to finalize a contract to
expand and improve a Soviet era refinery in Cienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. The plan would
expand the refinery's capacity to 150,000 barrels per day, from 65,000, and is a key part of Cuba's plans
to develop its still untapped oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico.
Scarabeo 9 indicates dependent partnership between China and Cuba
W.T. Whitney Jr (Cuba solidarity activist and member of Veterans for Peace), 03-05-12, Peoples
World, Cuba reaffirms ties with China, http://www.peoplesworld.org/cuba-reaffirms-ties-with-china/
China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses
(8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba provides sugar, rum, cigars, high
technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel China needs for steel production.
China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oil deposits off
Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived recently from China.
Sinopec and Cupet are mutually dependent, key operation to mining Cuban resources
Alexander Wstmann (Author, GasAndOil.com writer, founder, CEO), 3-16-04, GasAndOil.com,
Sinopec and Cupet to explore oil blocks in Cuba,
http://www.gasandoil.com/news/ms_america/d7c92d068a2d16b0faaa819123514b2d
China Petrochemical Corp., or Sinopec, has signed a memorandum of understanding with Cuba's
national oil company, Cuba Petroleo, or Cupet, to explore four oil blocks in Cuba, a Sinopec official
said. The MoU will allow Sinopec to conduct geological studies of the four Cuban blocks over six
months beginning mid-March, which could lead to the signing of a production sharing contract
between the two companies, he said. "We will do a survey on these blocks first and then decide if we
will enter into a PSC," he said, adding the blocks are likely to contain mostly crude oil, as opposed to
natural gas. The MoU marks the first attempt by Sinopec, China's second largest oil and gas company,
to enter oil and gas exploration and production in Cuba.



Now Key
We have a now is key booster Chinese influence is solidifying itself in Cuba
through long-term policy planning
Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 171, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE
Recent changes in Cuba indicate that even in a country at diplomatic odds with the United States,
Chinese initiatives are not inimical to mainstream principles of development and governance. Long-
term market expansion, coordinated industrial sectors, and state oversight of private initiative are
goals that drive the engineers and policy advisers behind Sino-Cuban projects. These goals also
resemble the principles advocated by Latin American, European, and US officials in the wake of the GFC.
The Cuban reforms formalised by the 2011 Communist Party Congress will support a further
convergence of positions, as they propose a more balanced mix of state and market forces. Although
Sino-Cuban initiatives are managed under the banner of state-to-state cooperation, Chinese support for
Cubas liberalisation agenda is prompting the Western hemispheres only communist nation toward
alignment with international norms.



Mexico
Agriculture
China investing in Mexican agriculture now
Sun, 2013 (Hongbo, A New Stage of Interaction MERL Research / Technical Staff
Senior Principal Member Research Staff Ph.D., Chongqing University
China Daily, 6/6/2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisit/2013-
06/06/content_16573253.htm)

China and Mexico will work together to safeguard each other's national interests and the interests of developing countries. President Xi
Jinping's visit to Mexico shows the new Chinese leadership's support for Mexico's development and their will to expand and deepen
cooperation. On Tuesday, Xi and his Mexican counterpart, Enrique Pena Nieto, pledged they will enhance
political dialogue on bilateral, regional and global issues so as to consolidate the China-Mexico
comprehensive strategic partnership. Since diplomatic ties were established 40 years ago, bilateral
relations have developed rapidly. Confucius said, at 40 one should be free of doubts, and China-Mexico ties have matured and are
now robust, featuring mutual respect and mutual benefit. And with Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party returning to power, China-
Mexico relations can open a new chapter in their longstanding friendship. Mexico established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. At the
26th session of the UN General Assembly, seven Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba
voted that the government of the People's Republic of China was the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. In the
1970s and 1980s, China and Mexico cooperated in the international community supporting South-South cooperation in a bid to promote the
establishment of a new international political and economic order. In 2003, the two countries forged a strategic
partnership, expanding their friendly exchanges and cooperation in various fields. Both China and Mexico are
emerging economies with increasingly close bilateral economic and trade relations and the two countries' influence on the global governance
reform is irreplaceable. China is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while Mexico is China's second-largest trading partner in Latin
America. The two countries should take more political initiative and make pragmatic policy efforts to push relations to a new level. On issues
concerning each other's core national interests, the two countries should enhance mutual understanding and properly handle their differences.
And partisan politics in Mexico should not be allowed to have an adverse impact on the bilateral relationship. What concerns Mexico most is
how to narrow the huge trade deficit with China. The trade imbalance is an indisputable fact mainly due to the differences in the two countries'
economic structures. To solve the problem, the two sides should adopt a constructive attitude, put more political resources into their economic
cooperation mechanism and improve the quality, level and sustainability of their economic and trade cooperation. Economic and trade
cooperation is high on Mexico's agenda and the Mexican business community is eager to gain more market access to China, which is
considering expanding imports of Mexico's competitive products, such as agricultural, livestock and fishery products. The two countries can also
expand mutual investment. According to Chinese official statistics, at the end of 2011, China's investment in Mexico was only $264 million,
which is less than its investment in some other Latin American countries. With regard to their economic and trade
cooperation mechanism, the two countries can try to set up a China-Mexico cooperation fund to
facilitate financing for mutual investment and trade. Mexico has great demand for investment in
transportation, agriculture, communication networks and other areas, and China hopes to expand direct investment in
Mexico, which will create employment opportunities for local people. The two sides can also consider starting a feasibility study on building
a free trade area. Meanwhile, the Mexican government is actively promoting energy reform and the prospects for energy cooperation are
bright. The two countries should also strengthen consultation and safeguard each other's national interests and the common interests of
developing countries in the fields of finance, trade and climate change under the framework of multilateral mechanisms such as the United
Nations, the G20, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. They should also expand people-to-people exchanges and strengthen
cultural and educational exchanges and contacts. Mexico has the most Confucius Institutes in Latin America and the National Autonomous
University of Mexico has set up the Mexican Center in China. Cultural and academic exchanges between China and Mexico are frequent and the
two sides may consider expanding the number of exchange students. In addition, the two countries should also strengthen public diplomacy to
deliver a real and vivid national image to each other's people. Finally, relations between the two countries must take into account the United
States. Because of the complex and asymmetrical interdependence between Mexico and the US, developing relations with the US is the top
priority in Mexico's diplomacy. However, it is definitely not a zero-sum game, and the three countries can explore potential areas for future
cooperation.

China already invested in Mexico Agriculture
Watts, 2013 (Elleka, Editorial Assistant at The Diplomat Chinese Firms Go Global
The Diplomat, May 31, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinese-farms-go-global/)

Already, as China has developed more of its land, concerns have developed over whether enough
arable land will be available to produce enough food to feed its massive population. This problem has
serious implications. As Katherine Morton, a specialist on Chinese environmental governance, notes:
Ten percent of the Chinese population is estimated to be undernourished, the rural labor force is
declining, and agricultural productivity is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, natural disasters
and water shortages. She goes on to explain, For planning purposes, China must have at least 120 million hectares of arable land to produce enough
food to meet future demands. But around two-thirds of available land in China is now classified as either barren or
low in agricultural potential Despite its long-standing policy of being agriculturally self-sufficient, the Chinese government has
tried to cope with rising food insecurity by encouraging overseas investment in agricultural farms around
the world, including in Mexico, Cuba, Russia, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Uganda, Tanzania, Laos, the Philippines, and Australia. A 2012 report from the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) examined Chinas domestic and global agricultural investment strategies, and found that China is
becoming increasingly dependent on agricultural imports. Indeed, the IISD report notes that soybeans have become Chinas main imports, accounting for 38 percent
of total agricultural imports, while other major agricultural imports include cotton (9 percent), and palm oil (8 percent). The majority of these imports come from
Asia, North and South America, and Africa. Some Chinese farmers, like Zhu Zhangjin, believe this new trend of outsourcing will help strengthen food safety
standards and improve quality, while lowering production costs and increasing profit margins. Zhu has followed other individual farmers, agribusiness corporations,
and governments by buying huge tracts of land in countries like Brazil and Australia. While outsourcing agriculture has its benefits, as evident from the sheer
number of countries pursuing this avenue, there are also many potential problems with transnational land investments. For the investor, these challenges include
having to secure large plots of land in order to achieve economies of scales, high transportation costs, political unrest in recipient states, and hostility and
resentment from local populations. Chinese investors have been no exception as they have encountered increasing hostility from local populations in purchasing
land in areas like South America and Africa, including the charge that this new wave of outsourcing is the equivalent of neocolonialism. These allegations are
inaccurate though, since neocolonialism involves a relationship whereby a states policy is influenced by the political, mili tary, or economic leverage it exercises over
an external actor. In the case of agricultural outsourcing, there is no loss of sovereignty in recipient countries even if trade patterns resemble those in colonial
times. As Deborah Brautigam, an expert on China-African relations and Director of the International Development Program at John Hopkins SAIS, explained in a
recent interview with The Diplomat, observers accusing China of neocolonialism are using an oversimplified idea of neocolonialism i.e. that China exports
manufactured goods and imports raw materials. This structure of trade is accurate but its a very narrow definition. Colonialism is about domination and political
control, occupation and military force. This is hardly true of China in Africa. Furthermore, charging China with neocolonial ism absolves the governments in recipient
countries of all blame. As Brautigam adds, I think those who use this term fail to appreciate that African economies are already structured as raw material
exporters. It is up to Africans themselves to develop other kinds of attractive export products. Indeed, countries like Brazil have found ways to resist eager Chinese
investment in its arable land by strengthening regulations on foreigners purchasing land. If other countries are opposed to the increasing attention they are
receiving from international land investors, they too can pass laws to keep investors in check and focus on developing other export industries. Nonetheless, China
has been proactive in devising ways to ensure that local populations benefit from its investment policies. As the IISD report cited above notes, Acquiring farmland
is one of the investment strategies that China is pursuing. But it is part of a much broader strategy that includes joint ventures with local governments or local
companies and contracts with local farmers. Locals are often able to benefit from the investment by continuing to work on the farms rather than being replaced by
Chinese labor that is imported for specific projects. Furthermore, in many countries Chinese investment in land leads to sharp rises in its productivity due to the
importation of modern technology and additional investments in key irrigation infrastructure. In some cases, Chinese investment in other types of infrastructure like
roads and ports can expand these benefits to other local industries. Nevertheless, local grievances need to be considered and addressed when companies, states,
and individuals invest in countries with rich, arable land. For instance, local farmers need to be fairly compensated if they are asked to move off land that is being
used for transnational land investments. As mentioned above, local farmers should be given the option of continuing to work the land, and local food security
should be guaranteed before any of the harvest is exported to other countries. In adopting these methods, investors can avoid charges of neocolonialism and the
accompanying local hostility that puts investments at risk.


China greatly values investment in Mexican Agriculture
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, 2012 (Niu Dun Co-chairs 5
th
China-Mexico Agricultural Working
Group meeting April 5, 2012 http://english.agri.gov.cn/ic/ao/201304/t20130412_19396.htm)

China and Mexico held the 5th Agricultural Working Group (AWG) Meeting of China-Mexico Inter-
governmental Standing Committee in Beijing on April 5, 2012. Vice Minister Niu Dun and Dr. Pedro Brajcich Gallegos,
Director General of the Mexican National Institute of Forestry, Agriculture, and Livestock Research (INIFAP) of the Secretariat of Agriculture,
Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGAR) led their respective agricultural delegations to attend the Meeting. Initiated in 2004,
the Inter-governmental Standing Committee aims at guiding and coordinating bilateral cooperation and reducing conflicts over trade and
investment. Both sides reviewed and evaluated the progress in agricultural cooperation between China
and Mexico. Both agreed that, with joint efforts, China-Mexico agricultural cooperation witnessed
increasing number of mutual visits, smooth agricultural S&T exchange, and agricultural trade growth. Both sides recognized that
in terms of future agricultural development and market demand, there is still greater potential for further cooperation. To this end, both sides
expressed their willingness to make concerted efforts to tap cooperation potential based on mutual benefits and win-win outcomes. Both
sides briefed their achievements in recent years, development plans for the years ahead and related
agricultural policies. Both were of the view that the exchange of agricultural development and related
policies is beneficial to drawing on advantages from each other and boosting agricultural
development. Both agreed to facilitate the signing of Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural
Science and Technology Cooperation between INIFAP and the Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Sciences (CAAS). The Memorandum aims to strengthen exchange and cooperation in the fields of prevention and control of animal and
plant diseases and plant pests, climate change adaptation and agricultural bio-technology, germplasm exchange of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco
and other crops, as well as to hold the second Sino-Mexico Forum on Agricultural Science and Technology. The Meeting also reached
consensus on an early signing of Agreement on Fishery Cooperation, inter alia to intensify cooperation in marine
fishing, aquaculture, introduction of new species and fishery stock enhancement. Other issues discussed at the Meeting
included creating favorable conditions for investment, granting appropriate preferential policies, and providing
necessary service and facilitation measures so as to encourage and support eligible enterprises from both sides into
agricultural trade and investment.

Drugs
China supports Mexican trade, empirically proven
David Gibson (Former legislative aide to a state senator, staff writer for Examiner), 9-2-11,
Examiner.com, Chinese companies supporting Mexican drug cartels,
http://www.examiner.com/article/chinese-companies-supporting-mexican-drug-cartels
On Thursday, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency announced the seizure of 520 pounds of
methylamine hydrochloride, the chief chemical component used in producing methamphetamine. The
shipment which was found at an air cargo facility at Los Angeles International Airport originated in
China and was headed to Mexico. A Drug Enforcement Agency official told Fox News that the amount
of chemicals seized could have produced 330 pounds of methamphetamine, with a street value worth
as much as $16 million. This shipment was only the latest of its kind to have been sent from China in
support of Mexicos drug trade. -In August 2011, a shipment of gamma-Butyrolactone, the chief
component used in manufacturing gamma-Hydroxybutrate, or the date-rape drug. -In February 2011,
Mexican authorities seized over 23 tons of ethyl phenylacetate, which is also used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. The drug component was discovered at the Pacific port of Manzanillo. -In April
2010, Mexican officials seized 80 tons of phenylacetic acid and its derivatives shipped from Shanghai,
China. Imports of ethyl phenylacetate require authorization from the countrys health ministry, so the
shipments are intentionally mislabeled before leaving China. Last year, an anonymous U.S. official told
Reuters that between October and November 2010, Mexican authorities seized 818 tons of chemicals
used in making crystal meth. Due to rampant corruption among port officials, the cartels are allowed to
receive large shipments of the chemicals from China which are transported to meth labs throughout
Mexico. The chemicals are used in a production process known as phenyl-2-propanone (P2P method),
and cost much less than pseudoephedrine, thus increasing the cartels profits. In 2009 alone, the
Mexican police and military found 215 meth labs, a 400 percent increase of the labs discovered in 2008.
90 percent of the methamphetamine sold in the U.S. is brought into this country from Mexico and
distributed by several street gangs such as the notoriously violent MS-13.
Experts support theory of Chinese involvement in Mexican meth trade
Kari Huus (Reporter, staff writer for MSNBC, Newsweek writer, foreign/domestic policy journalist), 9-
18-06, NBC News, Crystal cartels alter face of U.S. meth epidemic,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14817871/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/crystal-cartels-alter-face-us-
meth-epidemic/#.Ueh3Go2yCn9
Recognizing the new international threat, Washington is taking legislative and diplomatic initiatives to
ensure cooperation from the global players in the meth trade manufacturing centers like Mexico and
the world's biggest producers of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, China, India and Germany. At the
United Nations, the U.S. pushed through a resolution that calls on countries to submit a yearly estimate
of their legitimate need for the chemicals and to provide information on all exports -- both bulk
shipments and those of pharmaceutical preparations. Previously those ingredients were uncontrolled,
a gaping loophole in regulations that allowed millions of tablets containing pseudoephedrine and
ephedrine to be sold on the black market. Under the Combat Methamphetamine act, the State
Department also is required to certify that the biggest exporters and importers of the chemicals
cooperate with the United States, with the threat of withdrawal of foreign aid hanging over those that
do not. The U.S. initiative is working to a degree. The DEA says the U.S. has seen increasing cooperation
from Mexico, China, India and Germany in sharing intelligence and conducting joint enforcement
operations. The urgency of the mission is clear because they too are witnessing a rising tide of meth
abuse, the DEA says. But political will doesn't always translate into control over agile drug trafficking
organizations. We're seeing ephedrine shipped from India and China to South Africa and then from
there to South and Central America, DEA administrator Karen Tandy said in a recent speech in Canada.
Chinese ephedrine is being diverted through Cairo on its way to Mexico. And ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine are being diverted in other African countries including Angola, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Kenya and Mozambique.
DEA findings indicate China is providing drug precursors to Mexico
David W. Koop (Huffington Post staff writer), 12-14-09, Huffington Post World, Pseudoephedrine
Crackdown Forces Mexican Meth Cartels To Go Back To Basics,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/14/pseudoephedrine-crackdown_n_390894.html#
"We are starting to see a rise in chemicals that are easier to get," said U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration spokeswoman Dawn Dearden. Preisler, who works at an electroplating factory and has
been arrested twice in the U.S. for his work with methamphetamine, says he isn't surprised traffickers
have turned to P2P. "P2P is old school," he said. "Hell, I used to cook by that route circa 1980." The fight
has come full circle. In the 1980s, the U.S. government severely restricted access to P2P seeking to
curtail methamphetamine production. Meth makers shifted to ephedrine, which could be found in
common cold remedies. When authorities cracked down on ephedrine, they switched to
pseudoephedrine, the active ingredient in Sudafed and other decongestants. When U.S. authorities
regulated bulk sales of the ephedrines ,meth production shifted to Mexico, where, at the time, gangs
could get their hands on mammoth quantities of pseudoephedrine imported from China and India.
Mexico was soon supplying up to 80 percent of the drug sold in the U.S ., and American authorities
were calling meth the No. 2 drug threat to society after cocaine. Once Mexico restricted imports and
sales of pseudoephedrine, the cartels took a hit. The volume of methamphetamine seized in the United
States fell 34 percent, from 7.1 tons in 2006 to 4.7 tons in 2007, according to the U.S. National Drug
Intelligence Center. It also said it observed decreased drug purity. Dearden says DEA agents found the
price of meth increased. Experts say a crackdown on phenylacetic acid would likely just push traffickers
to other chemicals. "People forget that these are synthetically made drugs, and we haven't even seen
the end of all the possible recipes," said Ralph A. Weisheit, an Illinois State University professor who
wrote "Methamphetamine: Its History, Pharmacology and Treatment."

General
Mexico is key to Chinas sphere of influence
Brandt et al, 2012 (Jon Brandt American University School of International Science Derek Hottle
Nicole Adams Nav Aujla Christina Dinh Kirsten Kaufman Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew,
Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy,
December http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-
FINAL.pdf)

The PRCs military interests in LAC are closely aligned with its commercial objectives. Bilateral security ties build political
goodwill with regional players, thus reducing the likelihood of actions against Chinese exports and investments.57 Chinas economic priorities
are seen in its official system of cataloguing states as cooperative, friendlycooperative or strategic partnerswith the
implication that this has for the allocation of economic resources.58 Chinas four strategic partners in Latin America - Argentina, Mexico ,
Brazil and Venezuela serve as important trading partners and commodity suppliers. Chinas strategic posture
in the Western Hemisphere is consistent with its publically stated national security priorities. The PRCs 2010 national
defense white paper emphasizes a defensive Chinese military strategy, focusing on strengthening international military relations and countering foreign
interference in domestic affairs. The paper highlights Chinese concerns about international military competition in the areas of missile defense, cyberspace, outer
space, and the polar regions, while simultaneously insisting the PRC does not seek confrontation or global hegemony. While Chinas ties with LAC
reflect a growing desire to protect economic and security interests, the PRC is promoting cooperation
which reflects mutual trust and benefit, not offensive measures that would directly threaten the United States. A number of high-level
defense visits have occurred between China and Latin American nations.59 While these interactions have not resulted in groundbreaking
bilateral strategic initiatives, they serve as confidence building measures and provide openings for arms transactions.606

US-Mexico Relations Check Chinese Influence
Arizona Daily Star 12, (Arizona Daily Star, 9/14/2012, Fox says US-Mexico ties deter China's influence, web)

Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the United States has to bolster ties with Mexico - including
recognizing the benefits of migrant labor - or get used to the idea of China setting the international agenda on its
own terms. "The threat is this so-called power shift from the West to the East," he told a press conference Thursday
at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox
explained, saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that
means a very important question to all of us: Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their leadership?" Fox
said. His point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and other Latin American countries
than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this
continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge." That means bolstering the economies of the
United States and Mexico, he said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that Mexicans in the
United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to
this country and under what circumstances.

Plan reduces the attention deficit pushes out China
Martinez 13 (Guillermo I, writer South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 5-23-13, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, America losing influence throughout
Latin America, web)

Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until
Obama's visit to Enrique Pea Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new
economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not highlighted was the
Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country
and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Pea Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last
decade. Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several
years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China
offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative
economic trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American
media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that
Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many
critics of President Nicols Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new
country in the region called Cubazuela the alliance between Cuba's Ral Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard
the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers
and importers, and not on the consumers at home. Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence.
Many of the leftists' presidents in the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even
friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China.


Oil
China is investing in PEMEX now plan pushes them out.
Yang 13 (Yang Jingjie is a reporter for Global Times. Global Times a daily Chinese tabloid focusing on
international issues. Increase in Mexican oil exports indicates thawing ties, Global Times, April 9, 2013,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/773515.shtml#.Ueht4I1OSSo)

Observers say Mexican state oil company Pemex's decision to significantly boost oil exports to China will help optimize
the imbalanced bilateral trade structure and indicates thawing ties following their leadership transitions. On the
sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia on Saturday, Pemex Chief Executive Emilio Lozoya said the company would begin increasing exports to
China by 30,000 barrels a day starting this month, according to a two-year agreement between Pemex and China's Sinopec, Reuters reported.
The level of exports to China could increase over time as part of the agreement, he added. Mexico, the seventh largest oil producer in the
world, exports nearly 80 percent of its oil to the US and only some 50,000 barrels to China each month, according to China Radio International.
Lin Boqiang, director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, told the Global Times that the increase
stemmed from China's potential for growth in demand, against the backdrop of shrinking US imports
as a result of its shale boom. A report released by OPEC last week expected China to overtake the US as
the world's largest oil importer by 2014. This would also diversify China's sources of oil imports, "as only about 9 percent of the
imports came from Latin America last year," Lin added. Data from the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation showed last year
nearly half of China's oil imports came from the Middle East. Yang Zhimin, a researcher with the Institute of Latin
American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that the supply of oil is not
solely decided by market demands, given its strategic nature. "We can't rule out the possibility of US influence in
Mexico's decision, but the current president Enrique Pena Nieto won't follow the US as closely as his
predecessor did." Pena Nieto, who is from the center-left Institutional Revolutionary Party, last year replaced rightist Felipe Calderon as
president. Yang noted that the visit by Pena Nieto, which was paid just weeks after Xi became president, was a move aimed at mending
bilateral ties. His predecessor Calderon met the Dalai Lama in 2011, drawing discontent and objection from Beijing. Yang said the new oil deal
would also help narrow the bilateral trade imbalance. Mexico said its trade deficit with China reached $51.2 billion in 2012.

Chinese pursuit for oil takes from US production denying China risks anti-US
cooperation
Pierson 9 (David Pierson is a reporter for the LATimes. He is based in Beijing and covers the Chinese
economy. China's push for oil in Gulf of Mexico puts U.S. in awkward spot, LATimes, October 22, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/22/business/fi-china-oil22

A Chinese company's gambit to drill for oil in U.S. territory demonstrates China's determination to lock up
the raw materials it needs to sustain its rapid growth, wherever those resources lie. The state-owned China National Offshore Oil
Corp., or CNOOC, reportedly is negotiating the purchase of leases owned by the Norwegian StatoilHydro in U.S.
waters in the Gulf of Mexico, the source of about a quarter of U.S. crude oil production. China's push to
enter U.S. turf comes four years after CNOOC's $18.5-billion bid to buy Unocal Corp. was scuttled by Congress on national security grounds. The
El Segundo oil firm eventually merged with Chevron Corp. of San Ramon. Whether CNOOC's second attempt to lock up U.S. petroleum assets
will trigger a similar political backlash remains to be seen. The sour U.S. economy and the need for Washington and Beijing to
cooperate on potentially larger issues could mute any outcry. The U.S. could also find it difficult to rebuff China
when it has long welcomed other foreign investment in the gulf. In addition to StatoilHydro, foreign oil companies with
stakes in deep-water projects there include Spain's Repsol, France's Total, Brazil's Petrobras, British oil giant BP and the Dutch-British
multinational Shell. The U.S. risks undercutting its foreign policy goals as well. Concern is growing over China's aggressive
investment in oil-rich nations with anti-U.S. regimes, including Iran and Sudan. Denying China a shot at drilling
in U.S. waters would only encourage Beijing to make deals in volatile regions given that new oil reserves in
stable, democratic nations are getting harder to find. "China doesn't have a lot of alternatives," said Ben Simpfendorfer, chief
China economist for Royal Bank of Scotland. "They're very late to the game."


China views Pemex as way to increase relations lowers trade gap
Johnson 13 (Tim Johnson, the Mexico bureau chief for McClatchy Newspapers. Chinas Xi splashes
cash, deals on leisurely trip to woo Mexico, McClatchy News Service, June 5, 2013,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/05/193101/chinas-xi-splashes-cash-deals.html#.Uehqko1OSSo)

Chinas leader is a guest who brings lots of gifts and lingers. President Xi Jinping, on the second day of an unhurried three-day visit to
Mexico, spoke to the nations Senate Wednesday afternoon, then left for City Hall and prepared to visit the nations most renowned Mayan
pyramid before heading on to California later in the week. Throughout his activities, Xi emphasized that China is upgrading its
relations with Latin America, and Mexico in particular. Xi opened his nations wallet to prove it, splashing
out $1 billion in credit to Petroleos Mexicanos, the state oil giant, and pledging $1 billion in trade deals. He also vowed
to strengthen cultural and educational ties, offering 300 scholarships for Mexican students to study in China and announcing the opening of
Chinas first cultural center in Latin America. Other accords promised cooperation in renewable energy, disease control and promotion of
tourism. Xis presence marked the first official state visit of President Enrique Pena Nietos six-month-old government, which
hailed it as giving new impetus to ties between the two nations after passing through a cool phase. Appearing
before lawmakers, the 59-year-old Xi highlighted that he and Pena Nieto had upgraded ties to what he called a
comprehensive strategic partnership. By doing this, we send a strong message to the international community that China
and Mexico will form a common front to face various challenges in the future, Xi said. The relationship between China and the region is now
at an important stage of accelerated development, Xi said. Xi did not spell out what commercial deals were in the offing, but the
announcement appeared intended to lessen frictions over a wide trade deficit. Local news accounts said Chinese firms are interested in building
ports, highways and pipelines. Mexico is Chinas second-largest trade partner in Latin America. But even as total trade has risen sixfold, to more
than $36 billion in 2012, a trade gap is yawning. For every $9 in goods that China sells to Mexico, Mexico only sells $1 in goods back. China said
it had agreed to permit imports of Mexican pork and tequila, and to a bigger presence of Mexican products in China. China is not looking for
a trade surplus, Xi told lawmakers. On the contraryit is ready to actively increase the import of Mexican products. China also sees
crude oil purchases from Mexico as a way to ameliorate the trade gap. Mexico agreed in April to provide China
with 30,000 barrels a day of crude oil. Both Xi and Pena Nieto offered effusive words at a joint appearance, followed by a banquet Tuesday
evening. The Mexican leader described Mexico and China as two countries on the rise that are strategic allies, while Xi noted that both are
descended from millenary civilizations. Banners of Chinas red flag with five gold stars festooned poles along the capitals main boulevard,
Paseo de la Reforma. The visit marked a warming of relations that were chilled under two previous Mexican presidents, both of whom met with
the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetan minority in China, who Beijing brands as an incorrigible separatist. In a 33-point joint statement
released Tuesday night, Mexico pledged not to interfere in Chinas affairs regarding its inalienable region of Tibet and its claims on Taiwan,
the independently governed island off its shores. On the sprawling Tibetan Plateau, 118 ethnic Tibetans, many of them monks or nuns, have set
themselves on fire since 2009 to protest Chinese rule. Xis visit to Mexico drew wide coverage in media on the Chinese mainland, and is likely to
boost tourism interest in Mexico, especially after Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, a renowned singer, tour the Mayan pyramids at Chichen Itza on
the Yucatan Peninsula on Thursday. Growing numbers of Chinese are traveling outside the mainland, but of the 93 million who did so last year,
only 47,810 came to Mexico. The joint statement said the two countries would work to promote reciprocal tourism and develop direct airline
connections, both for passengers and freight, by a Chinese airline. Xi pledged to lawmakers that there will be more Chinese tourists at the
temples of the moon and sun at the pre-Aztec Teotihuacan ruins near the capital, and more at Chichen Itza and on the beaches of Acapulco.
Xis visit came amid a growing courtship of Latin America by the United States and China, the worlds No. 1
and 2 economies, respectively, as both nations seek to boost trade with a region that the United Nations says has lifted 58
million people from poverty in the past decade. President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month, and Vice President Joe
Biden just returned from Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil. In a column printed in the Wall Street Journal Wednesday, Biden wrote the Obama
administration has launched the most sustained period of U.S. engagement with the Americas in a long, long time.


Transport Infrastructure
China likely to invest in Mexican Infrastructure
Universia 2013 (Knowledge @ Wharton; online resource publication that offers the latest business
insights, and information and interviews with business leaders, members of Gumtree, and presidents of
various universities; NAFTAs Uninvited Guest: Why Chinas Path to U.S. manufacturing Runs Through
Mexico; Article contains interview from Kevin Gallagher, associate professor of International relations
at Boston University, 3-20-2013,
http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2324&language=english)

Gallagher predicts that the next wave of Chinese exports to Mexico may well include finished vehicles,
but he argues that those Chinese-built cars are more likely to be assembled in Mexico than in the U.S. There will be
Chinese automotive manufacturing plants in Mexico before there are any such plants in the U.S. because the costs are lower [in Mexico], and it
is harder to operate a plant in the U.S., where there are so many regulations. Nevertheless, Gallagher worries about whether
Mexicos transportation infrastructure is up to the task of handling huge, additional volumes of goods
made within the countrys own borders. To overcome the significant gaps in Mexicos industrial and
transportation infrastructure, Gallagher suggests that Mexico approach the China Development
Bank for loans that would be used to construct and expand Mexican seaports and high-speed
highways. That way, Mexico could smoothly accommodate additional volumes of imported Chinese raw materials and components that
would flow from the decision by Chinese firms to build automotive plants inside Mexico.

China looking to invest in Mexican infrastructure
Regenstreif 2013 (Gary Regenstreif; news editor for Thomson Reuters; The looming U.S.-China
rivalry over Latin America; Reuters; 6-12-13; http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-
looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/)

China has particular interest in Mexico, the regions second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply
the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City investing in
infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry
to foreign investment.



Venezuela
Drugs
Anti-Drug Cooperation Seen as First Step to Mend Relations
Cordoba and Munoz 13 (JOS DE CRDOBA and SARA MUOZ, Latin America news reporters for Wall Street Journal,
Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties, 1/9/13, web,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html)

But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was
interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made
"with the authorization" of Mr. Chvez. For its part, the U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to
see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say. They say they would like to beef up the number
of antidrug agents in the country as a first step. "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.
US Sees Drug Cooperation as First step in Relations
Kappa 13 (Bradley, 1/9/2013, writer, Associated Press, US seeking renewed Venezuela ties after Chavez, web)

Washingtons goal is a pragmatic relationship with Chavezs successors, even as the two countries will likely have
much to continue disagreeing over. The approach is somewhat akin to the one President Barack Obama
adopted with Russia after taking office four years ago, hoping to eliminate the distrust that built up during George W.
Bushs presidency by re-establishing cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation, while
acknowledging that Moscow and Washington wont necessarily agree on democracy and the rule of law. The reset in ties with the Kremlin
has stalled amid sharp U.S.-Russian disputes over missile defense plans and Syrias civil war, but the administration still fiercely defends its
merits. With Venezuela, the U.S. is hoping to start with stronger counter-narcotics coordination, a
challenge given that the Venezuelan government includes officials subject to U.S. drug kingpin sanctions. Other American priorities include
energy cooperation and stronger enforcement of sanctions against Iran. The U.S. also fears Iranian efforts to use Venezuela as a base for
terrorist or other activity in the Western Hemisphere against American interests.
Counternarcotics Represent Key Area of China-Venezuela Cooperation
Daniel 10, (Frank, staff writer Reuters, 3-13-2010, Reuters, China delivers Venezuela jets for anti-drugs fight, web)

Venezuela on Saturday tested six training and light attack jets bought from China for defense and anti-drugs
flights in a deal that dodges an embargo banning sales of U.S. weapons parts to oil exporter Venezuela.
President Hugo Chavez ordered a total of 18 K-8 jets built by China after a plan to buy similar jets from Brazil's Embraer fell
through, apparently because they include U.S. electrical systems. "Thank you, China. The empire wanted to leave us
unarmed. Socialist China, revolutionary China appeared and here are our K-8 planes," he said during a
televised display of the jets' capabilities. Officials at the ceremony said the versatile jets will be used to train pilots and intercept drug
traffickers who use Venezuela as a stop off point to take Colombian cocaine to the United States, Europe and Africa.
New Regime Makes Cooperation Likely
Cordoba and Munoz 13 (JOS and SARA, Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties, Latin America news reporters for Wall
Street Journal, 1/9/13, web, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html)

Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with
the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chvez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary
mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric. But Mr. Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the
international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels
privately, say experts and observers. "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little
bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the
subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater
cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving
the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing
to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chvez, who expanded state control over
parts of the oil sector.

General
Venezuela is under Chinas Sphere of influence now plan impedes that.
Noriega 2010 (Roger, Former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs and a
former U.S ambassador to the Organization of the United States, Chvez and China: Challenging U.S.
Interests America Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-
policy/regional/asia/chvez-and-china-challenging-us-interests/)

Under the cloak of Washington's indifference, Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chvez is making steady
progress in cementing strategic relations with China, which is eager to eclipse U.S. presence in a key,
mineral-rich South American economy. Russia is a source of weapons and foreign policy clout, Iran is
abetting Chvez's shadowy nuclear program, and Cuba is managing a system of internal control and
repression in Venezuela. Together with China's capital, in the form of loans and investments, this cadre
of hostile powers has selfish motives and ruthless methods for keeping Chvez in power. China has
funneled money and expertise into Venezuela's oil industry and taken an authoritative role in
improving the country's manufacturing sector and finances. With so much to gain in trade and oil, China
will strive to keep Chvez in power. The United States can no longer afford to practice wishful thinking
but must recognize the threat growing in Venezuela. Key points in this Outlook: China's growing
economic role in Venezuela is a direct result of Hugo Chvez's systematic drive to supplant U.S.
influence and impose a socialist system on his country. U.S. oil producers and manufacturers stand to
lose their market share in Venezuela and may soon see new competitors with Chinese backing emerge
there. The United States must abandon its policy of inaction and recognize the foreign-backed threat
growing under Chvez in Venezuela. In the last six years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has
increased its presence in Venezuela's oil industry dramatically, filling a void as Chvez muscles out U.S.
and even local expertise. More recently, China has also been providing financial support as Chvez
grapples with fiscal chaos of his own making and looks to ramp up domestic spending on the eve of
September's National Assembly elections. U.S. diplomats are loath to speak out against Chvez's
antidemocratic, anti-U.S. agenda; however, in July a State Department spokesperson broke this eerie
silence to say that "we want to continue our mutually beneficial energy relationship" with
Venezuela.[1] Washington's wishful thinking and passive policy are no match for Chvez's tireless
campaign to convert Venezuela into a bulwark for U.S. enemies.

Lack of US demand drives Venezuela to China
Agence France-Presse 13 (Largest French newspaper, publishes in English, Venezuela Looks
Beyond US to China As a Customer, Rappler Beta, 3-15, http://www.rappler.com/world/23924-
venezuela-united-states-china-oil)

CARACAS, Venezuela - Woe is Venezuela, sitting atop the world's largest oil reserves. Production is down and
its top customer, the United States, is buying less. So here comes China to the rescue, among others, as
Venezuela seeks to diversify its markets. Under the late Hugo Chavez, Washington and Caracas had a
difficult diplomatic relationship, and they have had no ambassadors in each other's capital since 2010. But oil makes the
world go round and a buck is a buck, so pragmatism prevailed. The US remained the main destination
for Venezuelan oil. But those exports have dropped, from 1.38 million barrels in 2007 to 906,000 in
2012, according to figures from the US Energy Department. That poses a problem for Venezuela. The United States
pays cash, unlike countries of the Caribbean and South America which import Venezuelan crude under
preferential terms or even trade oil for services like doctors and teachers, said analyst Diego Gonzalez. The US is importing
less from Venezuela because it wants to diversify its vendor portfolio, said Rafael Quiroz, former director of the state oil company PDVSA. In
2012, Venezuelan exports to the US dropped 11% to $37.4 billion, amid higher prices for Venezuelan crude and derivatives, according to
Venamcham, the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce. The United States is seeking energy efficiency in consumption and has
promoted investment and technology in non-conventional oil fields. It will achieve energy independence in around 2020, when it will be the
world's top oil producer, says the International Energy Agency (IEA). "It is not easy to substitute a client like the United
States for any old client," said Gonzalez, president of the Center of Energy Orientation. What is harder is to have Venezuelan crude
keep going to Venezuelan Citgo refineries in the US, as they do not exist in other countries. "That is hard to transfer," said Gonzalez. Then
there's China, with its booming energy demand. Venezuela has developed serious economic and
political cooperation with the Asian giant. Since 2008 exports of oil to China have doubled to 640,000
barrels a day. Of that, 264,000 are to pay off loans totaling $30 billion that Beijing made to Caracas in
recent years.


Loans
Loans are a tool the Chinese use to gain influence in Venezuela plan trades off
Devereux 12, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine,
former CNN International Reporter, China Bankrolling Chavezs Re-election Bid With Loans, 9-26,
Bloomberg magazine, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-re-
election-bid-with-oil-loans.html)

Winning Twice The loans give the Chinese influence over Chavez, who regularly speaks of recovering Venezuelas sovereignty
after decades of subjugation to the U.S. empire. In addition to securing large deliveries of oil, much of the money lent to
Venezuela returns in the form of contracts to Chinese state-run companies whose global expansion is
also being financed by the Beijing-based CDB, the worlds biggest policy lender. Among the
beneficiaries are China Petrochemical Corp and the countrys biggest oil and gas producer, China
National Petroleum Corp. Both gained stakes in Venezuelas oil industry after Exxon Mobil Corp.
(XOM) and ConocoPhillips (COP) abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization.
Venezuelas oil is at the service of China, Chavez, 58, said in February 2009 at a meeting in Caracas with a delegation of
Chinese businessmen led by Vice President Xi Jinping.

Oil
Now is the tipping point peaceful rise is only possible if status quo investments are not increased
DT 4/29, China in Venezuela: loans for oil, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragons
Tail, blog about Chinese international affairs, Mollie

Beyond these difficulties, prospects are good for China-Venezuela relations, even after Chavezs death.
Since his election, Maduro has already promised that his first trip abroad would be to China. He even
said the best tribute that we could give to our Comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic
relationship with our beloved China. China seems evermore poised to secure new deals in Venezuelas
oil-economy and eventually buy stakes in debt-ridden PDVSA if it is denationalised. Talks have also
started in 2012 to establish a free trade agreement with Mercosur. The dragons strategy of tied loans
and loans-for-oil means it is at the same time securing resources and creating business through its
investment. Although not risk-free, it is clear that Venezuela will need Chinese funds in the future and
should respect the deals even in the case of a collpase of Maduros government. It is also establishing
itself as the second power in the Caribbean region and in Latin America. China will have to be careful
not to push the continent into a bipolar balance of power and not confront the US but rather build
partnerships with it, so as not to hinder its peaceful rise global strategy.
Chavezs oil policies are continuing, shying away from the US in favor of China
Wallis 13 (Daniel Wallis, Senior Correspondent for Reuters. Daniel used to work for The Times
newspaper and PA News agency in London before joining Reuters in 2003. Since then he has reported
on political, general and economic news from across east Africa, Iraq and Latin America. Venezuela's
post-Chavez oil policy to focus on China, Russia Reuters, Mar 15, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315)

Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on deals with China and Russia if acting President
Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs. During his 14 years in power, Hugo Chavez nationalized
most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with the aim of putting its crude reserves - the biggest in the world - at the service of his power base,
Venezuela's poor majority. Turning away from the United States, the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan oil, Chavez also sharply increased fuel
sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source of foreign funding. "We are not going to change one iota
of the fundamental themes of President Chavez's policies," Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said in a
recent interview with a local TV station. "We have a very important strategic relationship with China, which we're
going to continue deepening and cultivating. It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ... Chavez's policies are
more alive than ever, and we will push ahead with them." Maduro, the late president's preferred successor, faces
Henrique Capriles, governor of Miranda state, in the forthcoming election. The vote was called after Chavez's death last week following a two-
year battle with cancer. If Maduro wins, he can be expected to increase oil sales to political allies at the expense
of the United States, while taking on more debt from those partners. Venezuela is sending China about 430,000 barrels per day (bpd) of
crude and products, up from just a few thousand bpd in 2005, in repayment of loans totaling $36 billion. The biggest Chinese energy company,
China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), is a key part of Venezuela's efforts to tap its enormous Orinoco extra heavy crude belt, one
of the planet's largest hydrocarbon reserves. CNPC has joined with state oil company PDVSA in a joint venture in the
Orinoco called Petrourica that is expected to begin producing within weeks. A PDVSA project with a Russian consortium, Petromiranda,
began pumping there last year.


China benefits from Latin American regimes opposed to the US such as Venezuela
Ellis 10 (R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case
Study, August 9, 2010, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)

The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is
highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's
sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as
the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese
interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance
into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being
used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa
Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the
Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the PRC benefits from the challenges
posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and
its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to
avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship
with the United States.

China is increasing competition against the US in Latin American specifically in
Venezuelan oil
Bajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Masters degree in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan
University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint Kings-National University
of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN
AMERICA, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005,
http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5Bback
Pid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq)

Latin America is fast emerging as the major stage of competition for oil and gas resources among the global powers. The region, which
has traditionally come under the U.S. sphere of influence, caught the attention of China following the significant
growth potential of its energy resources. Latin America is estimated to hold 13.5 percent of the worlds proven oil reserves but
accounts for only 6 percent of total output. Although China has tapped energy resources in Venezuela, Columbia,
Ecuador and Peru, and has begun to tap Argentina and Bolivia, there still exists significant room for expansion, especially
given that China still depends on the Middle East for 60 percent of its oil imports and wishes to further diversify. Chinas domestic
energy needs and regional developments in the Asia Pacific region are likely to fuel Beijings desire to access
Latin American energy resources. China, which has been a net oil importer since 1993, is the world's number two oil consumer
after the U.S., importing one third of its crude oil consumption. In the presence of sporadic power shortages, growing car ownership, cross-
country air travel, and the importance of energy to maintain Chinas burgeoning growth rates, pressure is mounting on China to access energy
resources on the world stage. Furthermore, Chinas limited progress in accessing local energy resources due to poor relations with neighboring
states (witness the Sino-Japanese dispute over the energy-rich East China Sea, the disputed status of the Spratly and Paracel islands and
growing political instabilities in Central Asia) have forced China to search for energy further afield. However, China's growing
presence on the international energy stage could ultimately bring it into confrontation with the world's
largest energy consumer, the U.S. Nowhere is the Sino-U.S. energy competition more evident than in the
United States backyard. The competition for energy resources in Latin America is unlikely to be confined to the economic sphere as
seen by developments in other regions where China is attempting to access energy resources. For example, Chinas military cooperation with
Myanmar, Sudan and the Central Asian republics cannot be separated from its attempts to access energy resources in these states. While not a
zero-sum game, growing interlinkages and interdependence between China and Latin America is likely to come at the cost
of the United States relations with its neighbors, which will only undermine U.S. ability to access the
regions energy resources. This will force the U.S. to rely on energy resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as
West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East.
Entering the U.S. Sphere of Influence
As the worlds number five crude exporter with the largest proven oil reserves in the Western hemisphere, Venezuela is emerging as
a major prize in the competition for energy resources in Latin America. While Venezuela sells 60 percent of its crude oil
exports to the U.S. and is the United States fourth largest oil supplier, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is
attempting to reduce his countrys dependence on the U.S. market. President Chavez has stated that "We
have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years but they have been years of dependence on
the United States. Now we are free and we make our resources available to the great country of China." [1]
Easier said than done, as Chinas refineries will have to be refitted to process Venezuelas heavy crude oil. Furthermore, transporting energy
resources from Venezuela and Argentina is particularly difficult given that both states are on South Americas Atlantic coast although there
have been discussions to overcome this by constructing a pipeline from the Atlantic to the Pacific through Panama. [2] Nevertheless, China
has made significant inroads in accessing Venezuelas energy resources. During Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez's visit to Beijing in December and Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong's visit to Venezuela in January 2005, China committed to
develop Venezuelas energy infrastructure by investing $350 million in 15 oil fields, $60 million in a gas project as well as upgrading the
countrys railway and refinery infrastructure. In exchange, China will get 100,000 barrels of oil a day, 3 million tones of fuel oil a year and 1.8
million tones of Orimulsion, an alternative boiler fuel from Venezuela. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has also been given
significant oil and gas development opportunities in Venezuela including the fields at Zumano in eastern Venezuela, which has an estimated
400 million barrels of oil.

LA countries exporting oil to China over US gain leverage
Bajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Masters degree in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan
University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint Kings-National University
of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN
AMERICA, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005,
http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5Bback
Pid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq)

China's growing energy interests in the Americas have been accompanied by a growing involvement in
the region's security. In October, in its first military deployment to Latin America, China sent a UN peacekeeping contingent to Haiti
comprising 140 Chinese policemen with plans to deploy an additional 125 personnel. Ironically, Haiti is one of only 25 states that recognize
Taiwan rather than China. Recently, the issue of extending the mandate of the 6,000-strong UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),
which is due to expire in June, has come under pressure from Sino-Taiwanese frictions. While UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the interim
government of Haiti have asked that the mandate be extended by one year in order to oversee the municipal, legislative and Presidential
elections to be held later this year, China is pushing for only a six month extension due to a scheduled visit by interim Haitian President
Alexendre Boniface to Taiwan in July. While having to accept the humiliation of aiding a state that engages in relations with Taiwans
secessionist forces, China has garnered the goodwill of Latin American states, which will come in handy
when negotiating energy and other deals. The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches
upon a region that has traditionally been a major supplier of energy resources. Venezuela and Canada together
provide the U.S. with a third of its energy imports. For every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America
there is potentially one less barrel available for the U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce
their reliance on the U.S. oil market, they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on
contentious issues such as Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over human rights
abuses in Venezuela.

Venezuela hopes to increase oil exports to China, tradeoffs with US imports
Ratliff 6 (William Ratliff, research fellow and curator of Americas Collection at Stanford University's
Hoover Institution, specializing in Latin America, China, and U.S. foreign policy. Pragmatism Over
Ideology: Chinas Relations with Venezuela, The Jamestown Foundation, March 15, 2006,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31481&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1#.Uebtgo1OSSo

Chavez seeks a special relationship so that China can replace the United States as Venezuelas chief
foreign client, Burgos adds, enabling him to toss the U.S. out of Venezuela in the context of his continent-
wide Bolivarian revolution. At present, the United States imports about 15% of its foreign oil from Venezuela. Late in 2005,
Chavez noted that so long as the United States does not try to invade Venezuela and overthrow him, oil will continue to flow north (ABC
Nightline, September 16). In the end, however, this self-styled successor to Fidel Castro seems to think Venezuela must break all economic
dependence on the United States, and even a Fudan (Shanghai) University specialist sees Chavez using oil as a diplomatic weapon (China
Daily, November 22). In early February 2006 Rafael Ramirez, the president of Venezuelas state-run oil company Petroleos de
Venezuela (PDVSA), reviewed Venezuelas oil-related relations with China in a Caracas interview, saying we are hoping
to send 300,000 bpd to *China+ very soon (Xinhua, February 9). This would be double the current amount, most of which goes into
asphalt. (Much of what China buys now is orimulsion, a low-grade, dirty fuel oil made by PDVSA from the heavy oil of the Orinoco Tarbelt.)
Venezuelas ultimate goal is to provide 15-20% of Chinas oil import needs. Much of that might have
to come from what the United States now receives, for Chinese and foreign sources fear that production is falling, not
rising, in Venezuela.

China lacks oil security US dominance gets in the way
Peterson 7 (Keith Alan, Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINAS
GROWING DEMAND FOR OIL: A CASE STUDY IN VENEZUELA, December 2007, 07Dec_Peterson.pdf)

As one energy expert states, petroleum has proven to be the most versatile fuel source ever
discovered, situated at the core of the modern industrial economy.66 Beijing certainly understands
this and is striving to secure enough of this precious resource to meet current and future needs. China
is now the second largest energy-consumer in the world after the United States.67 China became a net
petroleum importer in 1993 and net energy importer in 1996.68 Unlike the United States and other
developed nations, China lacks sufficient long-term relationships with energy exporters to guarantee
an uninterrupted supply. This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position of securing new international oil
sources to meet future demands in a market that is dominated by the United States.



Relations Link
US-Venezuela rift allows China to step in
Luft 05 (Dr. Gal, Executive Director at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Challenge or
Opportunity: Chinas Role in Latin America, Speech before senate foreign relations committee, 9-20,
http://www.setamericafree.org/SenateForeignRelationsSept202005.pdf)

Last but not least is Venezuela, U.S.'fourth largest oil supplier. Since April 2002, U.S. relations with Venezuela have
become increasingly acrimonious. Venezuelas President Hugo Chavez warned the U.S. against any interference with Venezuelas
internal affairs threatening that Venezuela has enough allies on this continent to start3 a 100-year war," and that "U.S. citizens could forget
about ever getting Venezuelan oil." This threat is not being ignored. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked in her confirmation hearing
that two of her chief worries with regards to Venezuela are U.S. dependence on Venezuelan oil and whether Chavez will continue to supply it.
The fissure in the relations enables China to step in and reduce Venezuelas dependence on selling oil
to the U.S., which currently buys 60% of Venezuelas crude. A series of oil agreements signed in early
2005 allow Chinese companies to explore for oil and gas and set up refineries in Venezuela.
Venezuelas state run oil company PDVSA opened a marketing office in Beijing and has a target of
selling to China 300,000 barrels per day by 2012. But for now Venezuelas oil exports to China are much more limited. The
majority of Venezuela's exports to China as of now consist of Orimulsion, a boiler fuel alternative which is burned by power plants to generate
electricity. Chinas refineries are not equipped to refine Venezuelas crude. Geography is also a constraint. Venezuela has no access to the
Pacific shore and the Panama Canal cannot accommodate the biggest tankers. A tanker trip from Venezuela to China takes 45 days. But China
and Venezuela are trying to resolve these problems. In July 2004 Venezuela signed a contract with Colombia to build a crude oil pipeline
connecting its oil fields with a port on Colombia's Pacific coast sparing Chinese tankers the need to traverse the Panama Canal. This could
reduce the travel time by half.




Internal Links
Influence Tradeoff I/Ls
Plan eliminates motive US engagement prevents Latin American interest in China.
Economic Observer 13 Byline Wang Xiaoxia, Economic Observer, Translated by Worldcrunch (In
America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America, Worldcrunch/Economic Observer, May 6,
2013, Available Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-
rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/,
Accessed: 05/25/2013)
In their book America's Blind Spot: Chavez, Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J.
Economides avoid the usual patter of linking South Americas "China factor" with some sordid
conspiracy theory. Instead, they investigate Latin Americas subtle choice between China and the
United States, attributing Washington's weakened influence in the region to its failure in foreign
policy and economic development -- while China rises on the back of globalization.
Since 1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and declared its sphere of influence to
Europeans, it has maintained the unique position of the United States in the Americas.
Military intervention has always served as the most important tool for the United States. Especially after
the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used
military means largely without restraint.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external challenges such as the
threat of global terrorism. Latin Americas strategic significance has quickly slipped to a secondary and
more local ranking. The United States has shifted its focus in Latin America to specific issues such as
illegal immigration and drug smuggling.

Option Tradeoff Latin America chooses China due to lack of US economic
engagement.
Ellis 12 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with
the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on
Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political
Science (The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Working Paper:
Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, Available Online:
http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424en.pdf, Accessed: 05/21/2013)
The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has
influenced the regions receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of
investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic
low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources. 25 The 2007-2009
global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US
credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American
governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors
helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied
an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not
been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention
also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as
the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran.

Engagement is zero-sum Chinas power depends on Americas neglect.
Kreps and Flores-Macas 13 Sarah E. Kreps & Gustavo A. Flores-Macas, Assistant Professors of
Government at Cornell (No Strings Attached? Evaluating Chinas Trade Relations Abroad, The
Diplomat, 5/17/2013, Available Online: http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-
evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/, Accessed: 07/15/2013)
To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign
policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this gravitational effect has a sound economic
basis. Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on
China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudans trade with China rose
from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for
which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the
resources in these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to
these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign
policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with Chinas
foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin
America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an
explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears
to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of new colonialism as former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship
make that prospect more likely. A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the
same period in which Chinas trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have
increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior.
This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which Chinas growing trade relations make it
easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these
trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the
September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect
and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial
relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of
projecting influence abroad.


Chinas investment depends on US negligence US economic engagement pushes
them out.
Romero & Barrionuevo 9 Simon Romero & Alexei Barrionuevo, NYT Bureau Chiefs in Brazil
(Deals Help China Expand Sway in Latin America, New York Times, 4/16/2009, Available Online:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/world/16chinaloan.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013)
CARACAS, Venezuela As Washington tries to rebuild its strained relationships in Latin America,
China is stepping in vigorously, offering countries across the region large amounts of money while
they struggle with sharply slowing economies, a plunge in commodity prices and restricted access to
credit. In recent weeks, China has been negotiating deals to double a development fund in Venezuela to
$12 billion, lend Ecuador at least $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant, provide Argentina with access
to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency and lend Brazils national oil company $10 billion. The deals
largely focus on China locking in natural resources like oil for years to come. Chinas trade with Latin
America has grown quickly this decade, making it the regions second largest trading partner after the
United States. But the size and scope of these loans point to a deeper engagement with Latin America
at a time when the Obama administration is starting to address the erosion of Washingtons influence
in the hemisphere. This is how the balance of power shifts quietly during times of crisis, said David
Rothkopf, a former Commerce Department official in the Clinton administration. The loans are an
example of the checkbook power in the world moving to new places, with the Chinese becoming more
active. Mr. Obama will meet with leaders from the region this weekend. They will discuss the economic
crisis, including a plan to replenish the Inter-American Development Bank, a Washington-based pillar of
clout that has suffered losses from the financial crisis. Leaders at the summit meeting are also expected
to push Mr. Obama to further loosen the United States policy toward Cuba. Meanwhile, China is rapidly
increasing its lending in Latin America as it pursues not only long-term access to commodities like
soybeans and iron ore, but also an alternative to investing in United States Treasury notes. One of
Chinas new deals in Latin America, the $10 billion arrangement with Argentina, would allow Argentina
reliable access to Chinese currency to help pay for imports from China. It may also help lead the way to
Chinas currency to eventually be used as an alternate reserve currency. The deal follows similar ones
China has struck with countries like South Korea, Indonesia and Belarus. As the financial crisis began to
whipsaw international markets last year, the Federal Reserve made its own currency arrangements with
central banks around the world, allocating $30 billion each to Brazil and Mexico. (Brazil has opted not to
tap it for now.) But smaller economies in the region, including Argentina, which has been trying to dispel
doubts about its ability to meet its international debt payments, were left out of those agreements.
Details of the Chinese deal with Argentina are still being ironed out, but an official at Argentinas central
bank said it would allow Argentina to avoid using scarce dollars for all its international transactions. The
takeover of billions of dollars in private pension funds, among other moves, led Argentines to pull the
equivalent of nearly $23 billion, much of it in dollars, out of the country last year. Dante Sica, the lead
economist at Abeceb, a consulting firm in Buenos Aires, said the Chinese overtures in the region were
made possible by the lack of attention that the United States showed to Latin America during the
entire Bush administration. China is also seizing opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders
over which the United States holds some sway, like the Inter-American Development Bank, are pushing
up against their limits. Just one of Chinas planned loans, the $10 billion for Brazils national oil company,
is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008.
Brazil is expected to use the loan for offshore exploration, while agreeing to export as much as 100,000
barrels of oil a day to China, according to the oil company. The Inter-American bank, in which the United
States has de facto veto power in some matters, is trying to triple its capital and increase lending to $18
billion this year. But the replenishment involves delicate negotiations among member nations, made all
the more difficult after the bank lost almost $1 billion last year. China will also have a role in these talks,
having become a member of the bank this year. China has also pushed into Latin American countries
where the United States has negligible influence, like Venezuela. In February, Chinas vice president, Xi
Jinping, traveled to Caracas to meet with President Hugo Chvez. The two men announced that a
Chinese-backed development fund based here would grow to $12 billion from $6 billion, giving
Venezuela access to hard currency while agreeing to increase oil shipments to China to one million
barrels a day from a level of about 380,000 barrels.

US-Latin American ties trade-off with Chinese influence in Latin America
Dowd 12
Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, Crisis in the America's,
http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas
Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas
backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war , the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all
across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America . We should
remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the
Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the
alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived
Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this Monroe Doctrine 2.0 would
make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes Chinas efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but
discourages any claims of controlimplied or explicitby China over territories, properties or
facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American
people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or
military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the
21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

The PRC benefits from faltering United States presence in Latin America
Ellis 11 (R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study
NDU Press, 1
st
quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM

Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global
economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global
institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's
sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as
the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese
interests.
In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat
at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes
of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin
America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
Finally, the PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region
by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes
help to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-
U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.

China soft power directly trades off with Western soft-power
Follath 10 (Erich, Der Spiegel writer, Chinas Soft Power is a Threat to the West July 29, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/chinas-soft-power-threat-united-
states/story?id=11277294#.UdGkavlwex4)//MM


China may have no intentions of using its growing military might, but that is of little comfort for
Western countries. From the World Trade Organization to the United Nations, Beijing is happy to use its soft power to
get what it wants -- and it is wrong-footing the West at every turn.
Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen once told me, half with amusement and half with resignation,
that military people around the world are all more or less the same. "They can only be happy when
they have the most up-to-date toys," he said.
If this is true, Beijing's generals must be very happy at the moment. China has increased its military budget by 7.5 percent in 2010, making funds
available for new fighter jets and more cruise missiles. Beijing's military buildup is a source of concern for Western experts, even though the
US's military budget is about eight times larger. Some feel that China poses a threat to East Asia, while others are even convinced that Beijing is
preparing to conquer the world militarily.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Unlike, say, the United States, the People's Republic has not attacked any other country in more than
three decades, not since it launched an offensive against Vietnam in 1979. And even though Beijing's leaders periodically rattle their sabers
against Taiwan, which they refer to as a "renegade province," they have no intention of entering into any armed conflicts.
Unlike many in the West, they have long since recognized that bombs are little more than deterrents these days. In today's asymmetric
conflicts, it is difficult to hold on to territory captured in bloody battles. War is an instrument of the past, and Mao's argument that "political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun" no longer holds true today.
Soft Is the New Hard
It is, however, true that the Chinese are in the process of conquering the world. They are doing this very
successfully by pursuing an aggressive trade policy toward the West, granting low-interest loans to
African and Latin American countries, applying diplomatic pressure to their partners, pursuing a campaign
bordering on cultural imperialism to oppose the human rights we perceive to be universal, and providing the largest
contingent of soldiers for United Nations peacekeeping missions of all Security Council members. In other words, they are doing it
with soft power instead of hard power.
Beijing is indeed waging a war on all continents, but not in the classical sense. Whether the methods it uses
consistently qualify as "peaceful" is another matter. For example, the Chinese apply international agreements as they see
fit, and when the rules get in their way, they "creatively" circumvent them or rewrite them with the
help of compliant allies.
But why are politicians in Washington, Paris and London taking all of this lying down, kowtowing to the Chinese
instead of criticizing them? Does capturing -- admittedly lucrative -- markets in East Asia and trying to impress the Chinese really help their
cause?
The Communist Party leaders manipulate their currency to keep the prices of their exports artificially low. The fact that they recently allowed
their currency, the renminbi, to appreciate slightly is evidence more of their knack for public relations than of a real change of heart. They are
known for using every trick in the book when buying commodities or signing pipeline deals, with participants talking of aggressive and pushy
tactics. Meanwhile, these free-market privateers unscrupulously restrict access to their own natural resources. They denounce
protectionism, and yet they are more protectionist than most fellow players in the great game of
globalization.



Its a zero-sum between the U.S. and China resources, purchasing power and geographic proximity.
Valencia 6/24 (Robert, Contributing Writer at Global Voices Online and the World Policy Institute, 6/24/13, US and China: The Fight for
Latin America, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america)//DR. H

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to
discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for
influence in another area could be even more importantLatin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an
overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an
abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United
States, which has long considered Latin America as its backyard.
The key question now is will Latin American countries lean more toward China or the United States, or will
it find a way to balance the two against each other? Right now, Latin American countries are increasingly confident
thanks to burgeoning economic and political integration by way of trading blocs, and they're
demanding to be treated as an equal player.
As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more
than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil,
and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation.
Chinas active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, Chinas largest
mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru
has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Perus largest trading partner. Chinas imports to Peru, however, rank second with
13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent.
China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and
technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela
known as El Vergatario (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chvez introduced this new phone to low-income families
making it the worlds cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela
and has become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million
tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.

U.S. neglect and Chinas low cost-less politicized appeal creates a zero sum relationship.
Fergusson 12 (Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.e-
ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H

The Chinese economic threat to the U.S in the region
The U.S is still the most important economic partner for Latin America, but recently many in the
region have felt neglected by Washington, whose focus on terrorism and the middle east and rigid
U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has left regional leaders with no option but to look for other
patrons. Net foreign direct investment in Latin America has fallen from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in 2003. *71+ This economic
neglect is exacerbating the political grievances of the likes of Hugo Chavez, but the more moderate social
democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recently extended the designation of Market Economy Status (MES) to China,
something the U.S and the E.U have still denied. MES substantially diminishes the effect of anti-dumping legislation under World Trade
Organization rules. Given the preponderance of non-market factors in the P.R.C.s economy there can be
little doubt that the three countries made their decision almost exclusively on the basis of Chinas
growing political and economic influence. [72] This highlights the politico-economic independence of
the U.S that Latin America is exerting.
This is also symptomatic of a deep paradox in the American thinking about how to deal with China. On
one hand, tying the nominally communist state to the world economy is expected to bring about economic maturity and gradual political
change, but on the other, China is still a U.S rival whose influence China is competing against. The situation is
reciprocal, as China views the U.S as *using+ its economic leverage to exert political pressure on
China, which is one reason that China seeks to diversify its economic relationships. [73] In this respect, the
U.S has what it wants China is intrinsically tied to the ideals of the open market as a lower cost, less
politicized alternative to the United States.
Chinese and Western Engagement Mutually Trade off
Ellis 13 (Evan, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an
analyst of Latin American economic, political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin
Americas relationships with China and other extraregional actors, including India, Russia and Iran, 6-7-
13, Manzella Report, U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America,
web)

In Latin America, while many governments and private interests have benefitted from the PRCs entry into the
region, that same engagement has indirectly undermined a range of U.S. policy objectives there,
including the promotion of democracy, human rights, free trade, and the respect for contracts and rule of law. Although the PRC has been
careful not to associate itself with the anti-imperialistic rhetoric of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), efforts by China
Development Bank and the International Commerce Bank of China to expand lending has been
complimented by the interest within ALBA nations to free themselves from the constraints of borrowing
from Western financial institutions. The resulting $50 billion loaned to Ecuador and Venezuela since 2007
has proved an important source of liquidity for those regimes, that have enabled them to sustain anti-
Western policies and promote groups sympathetic to their cause throughout the region. Similarly, the willingness of Chinese
companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those
regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired Western corporations. Indeed, so
long as ALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRCs indifference to their political systems has cleared
the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, including the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents.
Beyond ALBA, Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas
such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001
debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sells 75 percent of its output to the PRC.


China gaining soft power from Latin America now, specifically Cuba and Venezuela
Castillo 9 (Antonio Castillo is a Senior Lecturer & Program Director At RMIT China in Latin America
http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/) SJH

China's growing influence on international affairs is nowhere more evident than in Latin America, a
region pejoratively regarded as the 'backyard' of the United States. Latin America and the Caribbean are the next stop in
Chinas global expansion, and the first-ever Chinese white paper for this region, released on 4
November, 2008, doesnt leave any doubt about Chinas intentions. Latin America has abundant
natural resources, a good base for economic and social growth and tremendous development
potential, the document says. In the November-December 2008 issue of The Diplomat, Peter Hartcher wrote of China emerging from the
current financial crisis as a more credible and respected international leader. This is precisely Chinas image in Latin America. China is not only
regarded as an alternative to the US hegemony in the region, but it is also seen as a good and credible partner. According to the 2007 Pew
Global Attitudes Project, China enjoys a positive image among Latin American countries. Chinas aim in Latin America
these days differs dramatically from the 1960s, when the Maoist revolution was the main exporting commodity into Latin America. Chinese
policy towards Latin America today is highly pragmatic rather than ideologically driven, Professor Gonzalo
Paz, a China-Latin American expert at George Washington University told The Diplomat. Professor Paz said this is a new development paradigm
that seems to be attractive to Latin American countries. A sign of this new paradigm is the growing and wider range of bilateral agreements
China has signed with Latin American countries, from education to tourism; from aviation to natural resources exploitation. The trade between
China and Latin America has jumped from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$102.6 billion in 2007, and Beijing has committed to increase its direct
investment by around US$50 billion over the next few years. Due to its export boom and favourable terms of trade, Latin America enjoys a
healthy surplus. The Chinese diplomatic model soft power, multipolar and non-interference is
considered as a real alternative to the US political and economic influence in the region. South-south
cooperation, strategic partnership of common development or common understanding is the narrative used by Chinese leaders to frame the
Sino-Latin American relationship. This has been the narrative used by the considerable number of high-ranking Chinese officials who have
become frequent visitors to the region, including President Hu Jintao, who has visited Latin America three times in less than five years. This says
a lot. Dr Adrian Hearn, a China-Latin American Researcher at the University of Sydney and author of the forthcoming book, China and Latin
America: The Social Foundations of a Global Alliance, said Chinas soft power, technology transfer and integrated development had been the
key to this link. The soft power exercised by Beijing relies heavily on the Chinese communities that began flourishing in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, Hearn said. The first Chinese immigrants in Latin America arrived in Cuba in 1847 and since
then have formed well-established Chinatowns in the majority of Latin American countries. Hearn
suggests, Chinatowns are key to the soft power exercised by China in the region. This is especially the
case in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama, countries with the largest number of Chinese
immigrants. Chinatowns leaders play a central role in making connections and building partnerships.
China leverages ethnic locals, technology transfer, development Hearn highlights the northern Mexican city of Mexicali, the heart of the
Mexican Chinese community. Here Chinatown leaders have been luring Chinese investors to get involved in the development of the frontera
del silicio [silicon border] a high-tech park for the production of semiconductors and other electrical products. This is very much part of the
Chinese growth model of building a series of industrial hubs. Technology transfer is the second way the Sino-Latin American relationship is
developing and, according to Dr Hearn, this is. different to the United States and Europe. Venezuela is one of the largest producers of oil in the
world and had previously been reliant on technicians from the US company Chevron for drilling. China, however, is happily teaching
Venezuelans how to do it themselves. China has implemented a lengthy training programme that has allowed Venezuelans to learn how to
make drills something that they have been doing since 2008, says Hearn. And technology transfer is exactly what Latin American countries
need desperately to improve their economies. Integrated development is the third way China has been able to forge relationships with Latin
American countries. For example, Cuban workers trained by Chinese technicians are manufacturing a wide range of electrical goods, from
televisions to electrical fans. These are moved to the ports by a transport system designed and developed by Chinese experts. The Cuban docks
from where the goods will be shipped to China are no longer inefficient facilities. Chinese investors have transformed them into world-class
ports. Dr Hearn argues that soft power, integrated development and technology transfer have a political edge:
It is a way not to upset the US. You can build cooperation with a country and never express a political ideology or affinity and this is what
China is doing in the case of Cuba and Venezuela.

China Influence Displaces US political leverage
Hilton 13 (Isabel, former Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and editor of
www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change
news and analysis, 2-2013, The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, China in Latin America:
Hegemonic challenge?, web)

The availability of Chinese funds changes the Latin American political and social landscape in a number of
ways. The Pacific nations of Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico seek Chinese money for market reasons unconnected with a political project, since
these countries are building societies that are more consonant with U.S. than Chinese values. In other cases, however, the
availability of Chinese funds signals a loss of political leverage for the United States and permits the
survival of anti-U.S. governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance that wish to pursue more radical political and
social models.

China threatened by US stealing cooperation opportunities
Ellis 2011(R. Evan Ellis; Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University; Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case
Study; Joint Force Quarterly; January 2011; http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-
america.html)

Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global
economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global
institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's
sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such
as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting
Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its
acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep
them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to
Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is
to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the
PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Chinese Influence is a Direct Result of US Diplomatic Absence
Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey, writer Bloomberg, 6-28-13, Bloomberg, Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean
For The US?, web)

China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a
competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which
Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S.,
whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe
Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. *The U.S.'+
attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on Americas list of
priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void, Cerna said. Between 2000 and 2009, China
increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century
to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports.
Chinas share of the regions trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent.

LA Key to China Soft Power
Chinese influence in Latin America is key to Chinese soft power- It provides a basis of
understanding between countries.
Ellis 2008 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and
simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas
relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Chinese Soft Power in Latin
America: A Case Study http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html- SJH

This article examines Chinese soft power in the specific context of Latin America. The United States has long exercised significant influence in
the region, while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China's economic footprint in Latin
America, and its attempts to engage the region politically, culturally, and otherwise, has expanded
enormously. Understanding the nature and limits of PRC soft power in Latin America casts light on
Chinese soft power in other parts of the world as well. The Nature of Chinese Soft Power In general, the bases of Chinese soft
power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on
those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the
widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S.
institutions. Chinese President Hu Jintao and Cuban President Raul Castro watch signing of treaties in Havana after Hu signed dozens of trade
and investment deals with Cuba It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that
is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and
investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its
influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on
hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power,
the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation,
hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally
in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an
important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in
Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its
sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous
business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this
perception can be divided into seven areas: Hopes for Future Access to Chinese Markets. Despite China's impressive rates of sustained growth,
only a small fraction of its population of 1.3 billion is part of the "modern" economy with the resources that allow them to purchase Western
goods. Estimates of the size of the Chinese middle class range from 100 million to 150 million people, depending on the income threshold used,
although the number continues to expand rapidly.4 While selling to Chinese markets is a difficult and expensive proposition, the sheer number
of potential consumers inspires great aspirations among Latin American businesspeople, students, and government officials. The Ecuadorian
banana magnate Segundo Wong, for example, reportedly stated that if each Chinese would eat just one Ecuadorian banana per week, Ecuador
would be a wealthy country. Similar expressions can be found in many other Latin American countries as well. In the commodities sector, Latin
American exports have expanded dramatically in recent years, including Chilean copper, Brazilian iron, and Venezuelan petroleum. In
Argentina, Chinese demand gave rise to an entire new export-oriented soy industry where none previously existed. During the 2009 global
recession, Chinese demand for commodities, based in part on a massive Chinese stimulus package oriented toward building infrastructure, was
perceived as critical for extractive industries throughout Latin America, as demand from traditional export markets such as the United States
and Europe fell off. Beyond commodities, certain internationally recognized Latin American brands, such as Jos Cuervo, Caf Britt, Bimbo,
Modelo, Pollo Campero, and Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee, sell to the new Chinese middle class, which is open to leveraging its new wealth to
"sample" the culture and cuisine of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, most products that Latin America has available to export, including
light manufactures and traditional products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively uncompetitive in China and subject to multiple
formal and informal barriers to entry. Despite the rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in this arena can be measured in terms
of the multitude of business owners who are willing to invest millions of dollars and countless hours of their time and operate in China at a loss
for years, based on the belief that the future of their corporations depends on successfully positioning themselves within the emerging Chinese
market. The hopes of selling products to China have also exerted a powerful impact on political leaders seeking to advance the development of
their nations. Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, for example, made Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of Chile's
economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin American nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan
Garcia made similar efforts to showcase that nation as a bridge to China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in
November 2008. Governments in the region have also invested significant sums of money in the China-related activities of trade promotion
organizations such as APEX (Brazil), ProChile, ProComer (Costa Rica), Fundacin Exportar (Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador), among others, as
well as representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities, with the objective of helping their nationals to place
products in those countries. Latin American leaders, from presidents to mayors, lead delegations to the PRC and fund elaborate pavilions in
Chinese culture and trade shows such as the Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai World Expo in an effort to help their countries' businesses sell
products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese Investment. China's combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings
rates gives the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped
to generate widespread awareness of the possibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin American countries in 2004,
specifically mentioning tens of billions of dollars in possible investment projects. A public controversy over whether his use of the figure $100
billion was actually referring to trade or investment has only called more attention in Latin America to China as a potential source of funds.
Although the expected Chinese investment was initially slow to materialize, today, thanks to China's growing familiarity with
doing business in Latin America, and its enormous financial reserves (including a foreign currency
surplus that had reached $2.5 trillion by mid-20105), the PRC has begun to loan, or invest, tens of
billions of dollars in the region, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3 billion
commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10 billion to Argentina to modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to
purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1 billion advance payment to Ecuador for petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for a
hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion in additional investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments
to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho, Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Au, and
another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake in Brazilian offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's
Petrobras for the development of its offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For Latin America, the
timing of the arrival of the Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major deals ramping up in 2009, at a time when many traditional funding
sources in the region were frozen because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil
company Petrobras has commented, China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private sector activities in ways that
U.S. investors cannot.6 Influence of Chinese Entities and Infrastructure in Latin America. Although the
presence of Chinese corporations and workers in Latin America pales by comparison to that of the
United States, it is growing and exerting an increasing weight in select countries.

Chinese soft power is contingent on having influence in Latin America
Wiest 11 (Nailene Chou teaches financial journalism at the School of Journalism and Communication,
Tsinghua University Soft Power and China's Story in Latin America Caixin Online 11.09.2011
http://english.caixin.com/2011-11-09/100324170.html)

The Spanish expression "cuento chino," or "Chinese story" is a synonym for "tall tale." It's a fitting expression for our times, since China's size, population and
spectacular economic achievements of late have inspired grand fantasies across Latin America. Barely a decade ago, China was the
world's seventh-largest economy. Now, by the reckoning of the International Monetary Fund, China will overtake the United States and
become the world's largest economy in 2016. No wonder the developing world is held in thrall. There's likewise a prevailing
readiness to accept and emulate China, which in turn has given China a golden opportunity to extend
its cultural soft power abroad. Indeed, promoting soft power overseas was a policy goal recently declared by the
Chinese government. The initiative recognizes that a nation's success on the world stage, as Harvard University's Joseph Nye once said, "depends not
only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins." Yes, the story is important. Now, China needs a convincing narrative. The China-Latin
America attraction is easy to understand. China provides a growth model as a counterweight to the
United States. Latin American countries have tried one failed development model after another only to find themselves, unlike the dynamic economies of
East Asia stuck in a slow-growth rut. State-led import substitution policies mired these countries in self-imposed isolation and inefficiencies. Neoliberal policies in
line with the Washington Consensus led to dependency on fickle capital inflow. China's economic success, achieved via controlled economic liberalization and by
expanding technical capacities in order to attract foreign investment, offers a viable alternative. In the second half of the 20th century, Mao Zedong's doctrine of
guerrilla warfare which once shone like a beacon guiding fervent revolutionaries in South America faded into the Andean jungles. But since launching its
capitalist transformation, China has avoided ideological exports. It carefully keeps a safe distance from leftist politics in Venezuela and Bolivia, while adhering to
mercantilist policies: Doing business for business' sake. Latin American countries that today count China as their No. 1 trading partner, such as Brazil, Chile and
Peru, have benefited enormously as Chinese commodity purchases boosted export revenues and helped them weather the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast,
countries overly dependent on the United States, such as Mexico, were hurt more than others during that recent downturn. With the U.S. economy in recession,
cash-rich China is now in a unique position to invest in capital-intensive projects. "Cuento chino" is more relevant than ever this year amid buzz over an US$ 8
billion railroad project scheduled to link two Colombian cities: the port of Cartagena on the Caribbean Sea, and Buenaventura on the Pacific Ocean. This would be an
engineering feat that arguably only the Chinese could accomplish: A 220-kilometer railway across floodplains and three mountain ranges, and through a region
marred by drug-trafficking violence. The rail project's plans sparked wild speculation about China's intent and what some said was an unabashed incursion into
America's backyard. The story got more intriguing when the railway started being called a "canal seco," or "dry canal," by those who guessed ships would be ferried
on railroad cars from sea to sea. Infatuation with China, however, can quickly turn to antipathy. An economic powerhouse China may be, but it can hardly be cal led
a gentle giant. It's actually a voracious monster, gobbling crude oil, minerals and natural resources, wreaking havoc on the environment, blithely emitting
unacceptable amounts of the carbon dioxide that causes global warming. China as "la fabrica del mundo" the factory of the world arouses fear and resentment,
as more than 90 percent of Latin American manufacturing exports are threatened by Chinese competition. No wonder some 60 percent of all anti-dumping cases
launched against China at the World Trade Organization were filed by Latin American countries. Latin America's perceptions of China are
still largely shaped by international media. The Chinese government's soft-power Confucius Institutes, if managed well, could bring greater
understanding of China. A Colombian woman I recently met said she is keen to learn the Chinese language but confesses she's more drawn to Tibetan Buddhism
than the moral teachings of that ancient sage, Confucius. In predominantly Catholic countries, China as an atheist country does not go down very well.
Bonding China and Latin America calls for a narrative that resonates. For a country of 1.3 billion people with a per capita
GDP no higher than Colombia or Peru's, China has shared experiences and future hopes to tell to other emerging economies.
Finding the right story will be crucial for soft power policy to succeed. Otherwise, the game will be lost
even before it begins.

LA trade key to Chinese soft power

RFERL 7-18-13
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty internally quoting Bruce Stokes the director of the global economic
program at the Pew Research Center
Tuesday, July 23, 2013 Study Shows Many See China Becoming World's Leading Power
http://www.rferl.org/content/china-us-pew-study/25050541.html

In Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, favorable opinions of China are on the rise, but lower than
those of the United States. Stokes says this is likely linked to China's sizable investments in both
regions. "Chinese influence [and] the appreciation of China is fairly strong in Latin America and Africa.
Actually, one might expect it to be not quite this strong. There is a fair appreciation for Chinese soft
power in both of these regions. In part that may be due to growing Chinese trade relations with many
of these countries and growing Chinese foreign investment in these countries."
LA is key to soft power
Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)

Farther abroad, Beijing's soft-power influence is felt in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. The
BBC poll found that of seven countries in these regions, six have either a majority (Lebanon, South
Africa, Chile and Brazil) or a plurality (Argentina and Mexico) favouring Chinese influence in the world. It
is particularly interesting that China receives favourable ratings from countries in Latin America whose
manufacturing sectors face significant competition from China. When asked about China's economic
influence, 54% of Mexicans surveyed see it as positive, and only 18% have a negative view. The
existence of like-minded states in these regions and the attractiveness of China's development model
have facilitated Beijing's quest for market, natural resources and political influence. Under President
Lula, Brazil has agreed to recognise China as a 'market economy', which would make it harder to impose
penalties on China for dumping exports. Ideological sympathies were reported to play an important role
in forging Brazil's policy toward China.35 In Iran, two of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's
foreign-policy advisers are big champions of the Chinese model - former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Velayati and his former deputy, Abbas Maleki.56 With their blessings, Iran looks to steadily increase its
linkages with countries to its east, such as China and India.57

Zero Sum
Latin American countries treat U.S./China influence as zero-sum
Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and
Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
1/2012: 3-19, page 11-12, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Overall, there can be little doubt that particularly some of the leftwing and as it seems, by default,
more Washington-critical Latin American governments perceive a partnership with Beijing as a
welcome means of soft-balancing or hedging against traditional US hegemony in the region. While
Latin American governments may rightly complain about both a frequent lack of serious attention on
the part of the United States and the latters rather narrowly defined national security interests in its
relations with its hemispheric neighbours, why should they be interested in replacing a decades-long
dependency on the United States by a new dependency on China? Is there any convincing economic
reason for Latin American countries to play the China card in an attempt to balance against the United
States? China is an increasingly important factor in Latin America, but it is one among many. David
Shambaugh (2008) accurately stresses that Latin American countries embrace China as part of their new
multidirectional diplomacy. Multidirectional is the key word here. All Latin American governments have
diversified their foreign relations. Their main interest is moderating US hegemony, not substituting it. As
part of this strategy and particularly in times of economic hardship such as in the wake of the global
economic crisis of 200809, every trade and investment opportunity is welcome. States in the era of
globalisation are best described as rational opportunity maximisers. This applies to Latin America as
much as to East Asia; it is true for Vietnam or South Korea in the same way as for Peru or Mexico. The
result of opportunity-maximising in AsiaLatin America relations is a growing and fast-tightening (but not
yet deeply institutionalised) trans- Pacific network comprising trade, investment, political and even
security links in both bilateral and (increasingly) multilateral contexts. China is a founding member of the
Forum for East AsiaLatin America Cooperation (FEALAC), a permanent observer at the Organization of
American States (OAS) and has expanded its diplomatic ties to the Group of Rio, the Andean Community,
and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

China US Relations are Zero Sum
Menendez 13 (Fernando Menndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China US Focus, The
Counterbalance in Americas Backyard, web)

From the perspective of Latin Americas foreign policy makers, China is undeniably a welcome economic, and
potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S., especially given the objectives of some Latin American countries. Despite its
preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the
presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly
shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union once described
as a third world country with nuclear weapons China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of
financing, trade and development. Chinas foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to
ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding
tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States
are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors
find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional
tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise Chinas cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or
actual ties between some Chinese companies and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) will
undoubtedly raise concerns from Americas national security apparatus.

Latin American influence is a zero sum game
Kreps and Flores-Macias 13 (Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University and Gustavo A. Flores-
Macas, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. No Strings Attached? Evaluating Chinas Trade Relations Abroad. The
Diplomat 17 May 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/ EW
To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign
policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this gravitational effect has a sound economic basis.
Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten
year period, for example, Sudans trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country
like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these
countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The
asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes
even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with Chinas foreign policy goals is
important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the
prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as
did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of new
colonialism as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the
relationship make that prospect more likely.A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the same period in
which Chinas trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the
United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior. This suggests
something of a zero sum dynamic in which Chinas growing trade relations make it easier to attract
allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater
engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001
attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its
attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade
and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.




A2: Africa Resources Sufficient
China needs Latin American resources
Caspary 8 (Georg, advisor to the governments of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala and
Bolivia, China Eyes Latin American Commodities, Yale Global Online, Online,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-eyes-latin-american-commodities, accessed 7/16/13) PE
Latin America is increasingly attractive as a source for large emerging economies with rising
commodity import needs. The recent large find of oil and gas in Brazilian waters has only added to that
attraction. Thus, with their large reserves of commodities, especially non-renewable resources in high
demand from the global market, Latin American countries should be in the catbirds seat, calling shots
and setting prices. Yet, despite the allure of the region for resource-hungry emerging economies like
China, the cards are not necessarily stacked in Latin Americas favor. Unless the region develops policies
of sustainable development and transparent transactions, the advantages it enjoys from its riches could
prove to be limited. Latin America produces 47 percent of the worlds soybean crop, 40 percent of
copper and 9.3 percent of its crude oil and in five years Brazilian oil will add to that. China needs an
increasing amount of such commodities both as inputs in its fast industrialization process and for
private consumption, given the nations rapidly rising living standards. Its commodity imports are set to
rise at lower double-digit rates until at least 2020. Annual average oil and copper import growth rates
have recently been 10 times higher than average import growth rates for the rest of the world.

African resources arent enough China needs raw materials and export markets in
Latin America
Valencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, US
and China: The Fight for Latin America, World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in
California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these
topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more
importantLatin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming
influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but
Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic
proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its backyard.

A2: U.S./China Dont Compete
The U.S. and China inevitably compete theyve got eyes on the same prize
Regenstreif, 13 (Gary, Editor of special projects at Reuters, The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin
America, Reuters, JUNE 12, 2013, Online, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-
looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/, accessed 7/18-13) PE
Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a new model of cooperation at their weekend
summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack
Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washingtons
sights are set on a similar prize and face differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin America
and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have
pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and
energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals.
Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe
Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chiles president paid Obama a visit
last week, Perus leader arrived Tuesday and Brazils is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left
Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and
cooperation. Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America,
able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will
likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against China which has
money to burn in the region. There is a more energetic *U.S.+ tone, a more optimistic mood about
economic agenda in second term than *the+ first time, Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American
Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. Theres something happening in the region and the U.S.
wants to be part of it. Whether theres a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there
is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.


A2: China Hurts LA Econ
China doesnt hurt Latin America because they want to import different things,
instead it provides them with new markets
Chen and Chen, 13 (Kayla, intern at VOX Global, Xiangming, founding Dean and Director of the
Center for Urban and Global Studies and Paul Raether Distinguished Professor of Global Urban Studies
and Sociology at Trinity College in Hartford, China And Latin America: Connected And Competing
Analysis, Eurasia Review, June 17, 2013, Online, http://www.eurasiareview.com/17062013-china-and-
latin-america-connected-and-competing-analysis/, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Chinas stronger economic ties with Latin America are generating concerns in some Latin American
countries that the Asian superpower is quickly outcompeting them. In the short term though, Chinas
demand for raw materials helps to raise direct exports from Latin America. Since Latin American
countries and China have different export structures, the former is not as threatened by Chinas rapid
market penetration as assumed, with the clear exception of Mexico. According to Kevin Gallagher, a
specialist on international economic development, Mexico is the only country in Latin America whose
comparative advantage has been moving in the same direction as the comparative advantage of [India
and China+, and faces strong commercial competition.11 Interestingly though, the head-to-head
economic competition between China and Mexico has shifted around to eithers favor in turns.

Impact
Soft Power

China Soft Power Up
Chinese soft power increasing now
Jaime A. Florcruz (Beijing Bureau Chief and correspondent at CNN, Newsweek reporter, TIME magazine
writer), 3- 30-12, CNN, China works hard to project soft power,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/florcruz-china-soft-power)

After investing tens of billions of dollars in Southeast Asia, China has now decided that its vaunted
economic power, which has bought it significant influence with regional governments, is not enough.
Beijing now wants to be loved, too. In this brave new world of Chinese diplomacy, language and culture -
- and, yes, pop songs -- are playing a major role in Beijings quest to be understood and, if all go well, win
the affection of Southeast Asia's 600 million people. Its uncharted territory for a government that until
recently appeared to care very little about how it was perceived outside of China. "The Chinese
government is paying much more attention to public diplomacy than before," said Yang Baoyun, a
Southeast Asia expert at Peking University in Beijing. "The government has realized that people are
important, and that cultural exchange can supplement traditional diplomacy." On Nov. 18-20,
Cambodia will host Barack Obama, Wen Jiabao, and other world leaders at the ASEAN Summit. As the
United States pivots from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and re-engages with the 10 countries of
ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, much of the focus at the summit will be on
Washington's ability to revive its flagging diplomatic influence. But in the contest for public opinion,
which the United States is accustomed to leading without challenge, the landscape is shifting. The
Chinese government, with the help of large companies and thousands of young language teachers
willing to relocate overseas, has launched an ambitious cultural diplomacy effort designed to clean up
its image, which has been soiled by a number of high-profile scandals in the region, including
investment projects that have resulted in land grabbing and environmental damage. To counter these
negative perceptions, Beijing has overseen an explosion of language schools, exchange programs,
bookstores, and cultural corners. The effort began in earnest in 2004 when Hanban, an organization
that falls under the Ministry of Education, began establishing Confucius Institutes at universities around
the world.

Chinese soft power increasing in Latin America cultural exchanges
Farnsworth, 12 (Eric, vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, Memo to
Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, Americas Quarterly, Summer 2012, Online,
http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth, accessed 7/19/13) PE
This will be an increasingly important issue because China is laying the groundwork for a long-term
relationship. Its toolkit goes beyond commercial engagement. It includes student exchanges and the
export of Chinese language studies through the Confucius Institutes, which have spread like kudzu
across Latin America since the first institute was opened in South Korea in 2004. There is nothing
inappropriate or frightening about student exchanges or language study. Indeed, U.S. and European
officials understand that these initiatives are unrivaled instruments of soft power. They introduce
students to another culture and, presumably, provide them at an early age with positive impressions of
the host nation. As well, mastery of another language can lock in future patterns of trade and
investment, travel and tourism, research and scientific exchanges, and eventually, government-to-
government relationships.


A2: Culture blocks Soft Power
Nye is wrong chinas economic soft power is working in the nations it needs to work
in
Dynon 13
Nicholas a Macquarie University Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), International Communication and is
coordinator of the Line 21 project Academic and former diplomat with a research focus on country and
regime branding and contemporary propaganda media. Success of China's soft power campaign can't
be gauged by rich countries Global Times 7-7-2013
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/794405.shtml#.Uelff43VCSo SCTM

US political scientist Joseph Nye claims that the leaders of China and Russia just don't get his concept of
"soft power." In an article published in Foreign Policy in April, he reminds us that soft power springs
from individuals, the private sector and civil society. China and Russia, Professor Nye points out, "make
the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power." Clearly there is
dissonance between Nye's soft power and the strategies followed by Beijing and Moscow in their
respective pursuits of it. But are they all talking about the same "soft power?" Hong Kong University's
David Bandurski, charting the appearance of the term "soft power" in Chinese print publications from
1998 to 2008, has identified massive growth in the importance of the concept. Usage of "soft power" in
Chinese newspapers grew from a negligible number of appearances in 2003 to around 7,500 in 2008. A
closer look suggests that China's increasing interest in soft power has less to do with Nye than it does
with an ongoing focus on the unprecedented growth of its own national power and the need to
measure it, assess it and control its implications. Usage of the term "comprehensive national power"
(CNP) first appeared in the mid-1980s, when it was suggested by some Chinese scholars considering
various national power equations as methods for analyzing the international balance of power. Huang
Shuofeng of China's Academy of Military Science, a founder of the CNP concept, writes that the CNP
"refers to the combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of
a sovereign state, including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as well." As Deng
Xiaoping once stated, "in measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively
and from all sides." As part of the CNP equation, the soft power concept, rendered in Chinese as
ruanshili, has evolved in Chinese discourse into a range of concepts quite distinct from that envisaged by
Joseph Nye. As Nye has pointed out, polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in
Africa and Latin America, but not so much in the developed world. China's approach to soft power
doesn't resonate as much with the rich nations of the world as it does with much of the developing
world where Beijing's traditional non-alignment and aid work has had positive reputational results.
Similarly, as the same international polls indicate, China's reputation at home far exceeds its reputation
within the developed world. An emergent China is unsurprisingly perceived far more positively by its
own population relative to how it is perceived by publics in Europe, North America and developed East
Asia. Beijing's idea of soft power appears to be working relatively well across large tracts of the
developing world for whom its emerging success shines as a relevant alternative to Western models.
Beijing's "internal" soft power also appears to be doing nicely in articulating China's national power
ascendancy to its own increasingly globalized population. And while many Western policymakers and
media commentators pen a pervasive narrative of concern in relation to China's rise, how much of the
rest of the world is actually listening? Does Nye's comment that China doesn't quite get his version of
soft power really matter? Probably not. They have their own.

Asia Stability Mpx
Chinese soft power is key to Asian trade and interdependence thats key to regional
stability
Garrison 5 (Jean, Director of Global & Area Studies Program at the University of Wyoming, Spring 05,
China's prudent cultivation of "soft" power and implications for U.S. policy in East Asia, Asian Affairs:
An American Review, 32.1, Academic OneFile)

China's patience, confidence, and rising economic power translate into a growing pool of "soft"
power, giving China increasing influence in East Asia and the global economic system. (1) China's policy
approach represents the sophisticated neomercantilist view that globalization has altered the way
nations compete for power. China acknowledges that acceding to international and regional rules-based
organizations and agreements has become a sovereignty-enhancing mechanism rather than a limit to its
autonomy. In the near future China will primarily follow agreed-upon international practices, although it
is increasingly moving in position to directly shape the system itself. China's growing soft power is not
inherently a threat to U.S. interests, but how the United States responds to this change in the coming
years will shape prospects for future stability in East Asia and the global economic system. China's
"Good Neighbor" Diplomacy A few years ago China's dominance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
East Asian region, speedy regional economic growth, and military spending increases were cast in zero-
sum terms in East Asia, emphasizing the dangers associated with China's growing shadow. (2) Cognizant
of this apprehension, China launched an aggressive campaign to alleviate those fears by establishing
closer political, economical, and cultural ties with its neighbors. Tangible examples of China's new
diplomacy include bilateral efforts along various fronts in the 1990s when it settled long-term border
conflicts with Russia and Vietnam, adopted a pragmatic approach to settle disputes over the Paracel,
Spratly, and Senkaku Islands, and aided its neighbors during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Seeking a
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become a
cornerstone of China's most recent efforts to promote the benign view of its rise. At the October 2003
ASEAN Summit, China continued FTA negotiations and broadened the dialogue to promote peace and
security through China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)--the first of its kind that
China has signed with a regional grouping. China also proposed using the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
to form a conference to increase communication among Asian militaries. Although the ARF largely
remains a confidence-building mechanism rather than a means of preventive diplomacy, it serves
China's goal to reassure other countries in the region as to its peaceful intentions. China has seized the
political initiative from the Japanese who, in response, launched bilateral free-trade talks of its own and
acceded to the TAC (Korea has made similar moves for FTAs with Singapore and Japan). China has
broadened its efforts by seeking FTAs, outside the ASEAN structure, with Australia and New Zealand. A
possible FTA with India has been discussed as well. The prominent exception to China's savvy diplomatic
initiatives is its relationship with Taiwan. The dangerous zero-sum nature of China's rhetoric surrounding
Taiwan's recent election demonstrates the continuing sensitivity of the issue in Chinese politics.
However, because maintaining the cross-strait status quo is necessary for continued stability and
economic growth, China has reason to opt for patience. Beijing's logical policy will be to maintain the
status quo. China's Lure and Growing East Asian Economic Interdependence East Asian states and
Taiwan recognize that economically, China has become the new game in town. Asian trade is
flourishing due to China's huge market for industrial components, raw materials, food, and other
consumer products. A close relationship has developed between China's import growth and increasing
exports to other Asian countries. In contrast, Japan is now recovering from a decade-long decline and
its current recovery appears dependent on China. In 2003, growth of total exports of China's trading
partners stemmed from exports to the People's Republic of China (PRC): almost a one-third increase for
each of Japan and Korea's totals and a 68-percent increase for Taiwan, according to U.S. government
reports. A large percentage of the trade with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is in the form of components
destined for export to other markets as finished products--commonly, shipments to the United States.
States in the East Asian region recognize the need to take advantage of their closeness to China to
become an active supplier of fuel or intermediate goods in China's export engine. This trend is
reflected in the increasing two-way trade between ASEAN countries and China since 1990--which ASEAN
reports to be an average increase of 20 percent annually, while ASEAN-Japan trade is on the decline. In
addition, China's willingness to tolerate trade deficits with regional states (such as the $14.8-billion
trade deficit with Japan, $23 billion deficit with Korea, $16.4 billion deficit with ASEAN states, and $40
billion deficit with Taiwan in 2003 according to Chinese Customs statistics) adds to the interdependence,
with China at the center. East Asian investment patterns further strengthen regional interdependence.
First, East Asian states invest heavily in China. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reports that
61 percent of China's FDI inflows in 2002 originated in Asia, with Hong Kong leading at 34 percent with
the remainder of the figure attributed to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Macau, Malaysia,
Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. Second, China has also begun to encourage outward FDI into East
Asia through its "Go Forth" policy. According to an United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) report, China's overall investment in ASEAN countries grew from $400 million in
the 1980s to $2.9 billion in 2002. The investment is heavily resource-based, with oil and gas in Australia,
Indonesia, and Thailand, although Chinese manufacturing is poised to expand its investment. For
example, Thailand seeks an opportunity for direct investment from China with the idea that Chinese
companies may aim to escape regulatory barriers, overcapacity at home, and even higher land and labor
costs in China by relocating to Thailand. As regional fears have calmed, a sense of common purpose has
emerged. Growing economic interdependence with China provides new incentives for states in the
East Asian region to promote a stable framework for bilateral relations to maintain prosperity. Japan
focuses on strengthening China's regional economic ties for development to prevent a pattern of power
projection in the region. For other countries, the more formal stake in China's future development,
such as ASEAN's FTA negotiations with China and Japan, gives them leverage in negotiations with both
countries and "power of say" in the region's development. Even the Taiwan issue potentially
reinforces the status quo. East Asian countries generally value stable economic ties over Taiwan's
independence and register little enthusiasm over Taiwan's quest for freedom.

Nuclear war
Dibb, 01 emeritus professor of strategic and defence studies at The Australian National University
(Paul, Winter. Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads. Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, Issue 1.
Ebsco.)

The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of the
former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than anywhere in
Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War
ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and
these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia--which is the world's fourth-largest country--faces a highly uncertain future
that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of
the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear
powers than any other region of the world. Asia's security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the
direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive
tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of
negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and
religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or
arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted
with major crises.



China Rise Mpx
China soft power is key to their overall power
Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)

Analysis and debate concerning China's rise is focused almost entirely on the economic and military
aspects of its growing power.1 Yet 'soft' sources of power - including culture, political ideology and
diplomacy - are increasingly recognised as essential components of Great Power status. It seems odd
that the subject of soft power is either missing from discussions of China, or misapplied. While China is
constrained in many ways in the exercise of such power, its soft-power resources are considerable and
demand scrutiny.

Thats key to the global economy and stability the impact is nuclear war
Buzan 4 (Barry, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, 2004, Does China Matter? A Reassessment, New York, Questia, p. 145-147)

The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power
and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great
power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its
political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and
perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wver, 2003). The US clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western
hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it
(and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the
great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from
much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical
option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind
of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over
twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global
standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance
against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing
will be diminished. Since the US is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds
with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions,
those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial
powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global
standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the
strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the US. It
projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of
some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy
becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus
inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it
now has with the US, and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the US uses the Organization of American
States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both
free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds
in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with
the US and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours.
Japan's alliance with the US deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate
their defences against China, probably with US support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable
regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political
stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play
on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces
in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or
is its rise to power more likely to produce US-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three
levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with
the US and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and
prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: Does China get stronger (because its economic
development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? Does
China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it
become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's
development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on
to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it
in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the
socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger
large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious
threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global
level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question
matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a
benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence
was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

Immigration Mpx
China soft power is key to attract foreign students
Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)

Foreign student enrolment has also seen dramatic growth. Within a decade, total enrolment of
international students in China (excluding those from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) increased
threefold to no,844.6 Over 75% of students are from Asia, with South Korea and Japan consistently
sending the most.7 A growing number of students, though, are from Southeast Asia, a region that
accommodates the majority of overseas Chinese and has a centuries-old history of Chinese-language
education. Students from Vietnam, for example, have increased more than sixfold over the past six
years.8 While a major influx of international students in China is driven by the country's booming
economy, this dramatic growth in foreign enrolments also reflects China's role as the cultural magnet
of Asia. According to the Ministry of Education, over three-quarters of foreign students went to China
to study academic disciplines of general cultural concern (Chinese language, arts, history, philosophy
and traditional Chinese medicine).9

Thats key to China-EU relations
Xinhua 13 (China.org, 5/1/13, Chinese gov't to support international students,
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-05/01/content_28704250.htm, acc. 7/19/13)

The Chinese government will support about 50,000 international students in China in 2015, and the country will
become the largest Asian destination for such students in 2020, high-level Chinese officials said on April 25. About 320,000
overseas students came to China in 2012, the majority from South Korea and the United States, said Liu Jinghui, secretary-general of the China
Scholarship Council. Last year, the ministry implemented the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) for the education sector, she said. According to the
plan, in 2015, the number of international students in China supported by the government's scholarship program will reach 50,000. While
Europe has become the second-largest destination for Chinese students abroad, "only about 35,000 students came from EU member states to
study in China last year, so we will promote China's education system in Europe now," Liu said. Du Yubo, vice-minister of education, said that by
2020, about 500,000 international students will be in China, enabling the country to become the largest Asian destination for international
students. China and the European Union will deepen education and exchange cooperation this year, said
European commission and Chinese government officials at the first meeting of the EU-China Higher Education Platform for Cooperation and
Exchanges, which was held on Thursday in Brussels. "We should learn from each other's strong points, and boost
cooperation in various areas," Du said. In 2013, the Chinese government will provide 1,087 scholarships to 27 EU
countries, the ministry said. "The Chinese government has been paying close attention to cooperation
projects between China and Europe. Our cooperation has a long history, a lot of achievements and
potential," said Jan Truszczynski, director general for Education, Training, Culture and Youth of the European Commission. China has
established 105 Confucius Institutes in about 20 EU member states, and joined hands with the European Commission to set up three programs
in three Chinese universities. For instance, the EU has injected 17 million euros ($22.16 million) to establish the China-
EU School of Law with the China University of Political Science and Law, one of the top law schools in the country.

China-EU relations are key to solve climate change
Balme 9 (Richard, Centre for European Studies and Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and
Management, June 2009, Global Warming Politics: the EU, China and Climate Change,
http://sciencespo-globalgovernance.net/node/23, acc. 7/18/13)

The European Union (EU) and China were to a large extent at the core of the process whereby climate change
became a prominent issue in international relations. Supported by the sensitivity of European public
opinion on environmental issue, its preference for multilateralism, and by its own policy expertise,
the EU was from the onset very active in promoting international agreements on climate. As the United
States eventually failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol signed by the Clinton Administration, and remained reluctant to negotiations
on climate under Georges Bush presidencies, the EU was able to assume leadership among developed countries on
the issue. As evidence about human influence on climate change accumulated, the tension between energy-intensive modes of
development and the capacity to mitigate climate change also became more apparent. As the most populated and fastest
growing economy of developing countries, Chinas environmental policy and attitude with regard to
climate change regime became increasingly scrutinized. Its record of first CO2 emitter surpassing the USA for the first
time in 2008 was widely noticed, and China is frequently vilainized for its dirty growth model and its global consequences. China nevertheless
developed a significant policy to address climate and energy issues over the recent years. To a large extent,
the limited steps accomplished so far at the global level in climate change policy largely relied on the
convergence of policies and cooperation programs between the EU and China.

Warming is an existential risk
Mazo 10 PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research
Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
in London, 3-2010, Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,
pg. 122

The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-
industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely
range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been
matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000
levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2C
(O'9""1.5C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions
in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to
be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the
associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of
emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state
failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as
melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond
the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is
no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the
best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.


North Korea Mpx
Chinese soft power is key to prevent North Korean proliferation and conflict
Pei 3 (Minxin, The Financial Times, 3/12/03, A Docile China is Bad for Global Peace, Carnegie
Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/12/docile-china-is-bad-for-global-peace/2vyo,
acc. 7/19/13)

This question may strike many in Beijing as absurd. Keeping a low international profile, maintaining a
stable relationship with the US and capitalising on globalisation to spur economic growth have served
the country well. Why change? Indeed, few would dispute that, on balance, Beijing's foreign policy has
demonstrated increasing maturity and sophistication. Yet, China's handling of the crises in Iraq and
North Korea also shows the risks and costs of passivity. It is time the leadership re-evaluated the
geopolitical assumptions underlying Chinese foreign policy. In the crises in Iraq and North Korea, the
desire to keep a low profile has led China to adopt a more ambiguous stance and lose whatever
influence it may have had in shaping their resolution. Unlike Russia, which has taken a more proactive
approach, China has been missing in action. Its position on the use of force against Iraq is unclear. Its
declared goal of keeping nuclear weapons out of the Korean peninsula has not been accompanied by
visible diplomatic measures. Inaction becomes harder to defend when one considers what is at stake
for China. Its immediate economic interests in Iraq are modest. But because of its growing
dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which accounts for 60 per cent of imports, it may better serve its
interests by getting more actively involved and taking a clear stand. Quiescence risks marginalisation.
In dealing with an unfolding nuclear confrontation in North Korea, Beijing's inaction has disappointed
its friends and irked Washington. Although it does not have to toe the US line toward Pyongyang, China
needs to come up with an alternative to Washington's policy of no negotiation. If it allows the crisis to
spiral out of control, it could be dragged into a nuclear maelstrom with devastating consequences for
peace and prosperity in the region. In a world where the threats from rogue states and international
terrorism are at least as dangerous as rivalry among major powers, Beijing can better defend its
interests by modifying its diplomatic strategy. While it should continue a policy of co-operation with
the US, it must use its growing influence to assume a more active role in the international community.
This may require Beijing to break some old habits, such as its aversion to substantial participation in
peacekeeping missions, reluctance to increase its financial contributions to the United Nations, and
abdication of any leadership role in multilateral organisations. Chinese leadership will be necessary
above all in reshaping its own volatile neighbourhood. To be sure, its initiative to establish a free-trade
zone with the Association of South-East Asian Nations is a good start. But Beijing can do much more to
allay the fears of its neighbours about China's growing power. This may require it to adopt a new two-
pronged regional strategy. First, China should use its clout to push for regional integration and co-
operation. On the top of this agenda should be expanded regional free trade. Despite Tokyo's
lukewarm response to Beijing's proposal for a Japan-China-Asean free trade agreement, China should
continue to push this initiative. Second, Beijing needs to mend its frayed ties with Tokyo, where
sinophobia is at a feverish level. To reassure Japan, China must be more transparent about its military
modernisation, stop using Japan's war guilt as a diplomatic tool, and start treating it as a full co-equal
partner in maintaining peace and prosperity in East Asia. A genuine Sino-Japanese reconciliation is the
requisite for regional collective security. No doubt, this may seem an ambitious agenda for China's new
foreign policy team. It also goes against ingrained thinking in Beijing's diplomatic strategy. But if Chinese
leaders do not seize the current opportunity to reshape their regional environment, others will do it
for them - and not necessarily to their liking.

North Korean conflict escalates and goes nuclear
Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable
Development, AND Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act
Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open:
Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of
which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of
nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product
of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Koreas nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the
Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over Chinas increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The
consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments,
and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole
international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention,
miscalculation, or merely accident , leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula
itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2
million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a
holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited
nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear
exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is,
individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced
would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global
winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last
1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also followThe
period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will
continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hungerTo make matters even worse, such
amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earths
protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem
and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use.
Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via
ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the
great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the
global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global
security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including
possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath
chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat
but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.


Resources Mpx

China soft power is key to their resource access thats key to economic growth
Hunter 9 (Alan, Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry
University, Soft Power: China on the Global Stage, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2,
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/373.full.pdf, acc. 7/19/13)

Competition for resources is now a key issue for all major powers. As the largest in population among
all developing countries, and with the fastest growing manufacturing base, Chinas need for natural
resources is truly enormous. One analyst recently showed that among 10 countries with populations of
over 100 million, China is second from bottom as regards indigenous natural resources: only Japan is
worse off. As population growth puts even more pressure on resources, effective political handling of
resource issues is thus essential, because shortages could threaten the future of the country.
Maintaining stable resource supplies, therefore, is a factor crucial to determining whether or not
China can continue its development trajectory in the 21st century.23 The West now fears competition
from China for access to global resources, particularly oil and gas.24 Henry Kissinger has mooted
competition over hydrocarbon resources in coming years as the most likely cause of international
conflict.25 As Hu Jintao showed at an Asian summit in 2005, Beijing leaders are also well aware of the
issue. Hu stated that achieving balanced and orderly growth through proper handling of the energy issue
is a Chinese priority: China would focus on energy conservation and effective use of resources, as well as
fresh exploration and new imports. But to satisfy its demand for oil and other resources China must
explore many different options on every continent.26 The government announced in 2002 a new policy
encouraging its three major national oil corporations to go out (zouchuqu) and ensure secure overseas
energy supplies: through direct purchases, exploring and drilling programmes, constructing refineries,
and building pipelines.27 The Chinese oil demand between 1993 and 2002 grew by almost 90%, and
now stands at around 6 million barrels a day, some 40% of which has to be imported. Conversely, about
40% of oildemand growth worldwide from 2000 to 2004 is attributable to China.28 In November 2004,
Chinese President Hu signed 39 commercial agreements with Latin American countries; investments in
Argentina alone amounted to US$ 20 billion. On a later visit in 2005, Vice-President Zeng signed a key
agreement with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez on oil and gas explorations; China also announced it
would extend favourable trade credits to Cuba. By 2005, China had offered more than US $ 50 billion of
investment to countries within the US backyard, and has pursued a similar strategy in sub-Saharan
African countries. Chinese businesses are participant in many projects, including major infrastructure
development; corporations also invest heavily in oil production, notably in the Sudan, Angola, and
Nigeria.29 An online newspaper report in December 2005 evidenced the fierce competition between
China and the USA for African black gold.30 Chinas potential competition with the USA in West Asia
and North Africa could be an even more sensitive issue than that in Latin America and East Asia. The
potentially explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept US leadership and the
prospect of competition between China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses
particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East.31 Frequent high-level exchange
visits between Beijing and West Asian leaders endorse economic ties. Altogether, reflecting the title of a
recent study, China is a future hegemon whose rise inevitably engenders new transnational dynamics.
We have therefore explored Chinas need to avoid military conflict, its massive economic
development, and its need to secure resources as important contexts for Chinese soft power in the
21st century.32 The author believes that the climate change is another factor which will become even
more urgent and prominent in the immediate future.

Resources and growth are key to CCP stability
Zweig and Jianhai, 05 (David, director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong
Kong University of Science and Technology, and Bi, post-doctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs,
Chinas Global Hunt for Energy, September/October, proquest)

An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy. A booming domestic economy, rapid
urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars are increasing the country's demand for oil and
natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter.
Now it is the world's second-largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the
workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial resources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of
aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000; it has now
reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other
politicians to cut consumption of energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China
Center for Economic Research at Peking University, in Beijing, says the country's economy could grow at 9 percent per year for the next 20
years. These new needs already have serious implications for China's foreign policy. Beijing's access to foreign resources is
necessary both for continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China's social
stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains a relatively centralized, government-driven
economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign
Affairs Leading Small Group of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and allowing business
leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a government think tank, holds numerous conferences
bringing together academics and leaders in business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist
Party.

Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear war
Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper)
August 3, 2005, CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-
3/30931.html)

Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human
life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred
million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The speech, free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil
filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The
theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves
with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCPs bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has
killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.


Taiwan Independence Mpx
China soft power key to prevent Taiwanese independence
Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)

A most intriguing example of China's soft power can be seen in its relations with Taiwan. In 2005,
China launched a charm offensive against the politicians and people in the island by inviting opposition
party leaders to visit the main-land, extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese studying at mainland
universities, and, through a zero-tariff policy on imports of Taiwan's fruit, offering export incentive perks
to farmers in the south of Taiwan (traditionally a pro-Taiwan independence stronghold). This 'hearts-
and-minds' policy not only aims to reduce the perception of military threat from China, but also gives
the Chinese government leverage to exercise influence in Taiwan's political culture and society, and
politically marginalise Taiwan's independence-oriented president, Chen Shui-bian. In part as a result of
Beijing's manoeuvres in recent years - and Chen's increasingly frustrated but worrisome responses - the
possibility for Taiwan independence seems more distant and difficult. Chen Shiubian has increasingly
alienated American supporters in Washington who do not appreciate what they see as his provocative
political stance on cross-Strait issues. In the meantime, some 1 million, or about 5%, of the Taiwan
population lives and works in China, and Taiwan business has invested more than sioobn on the
mainland. To be sure, some of China's influence over Taiwan is not so 'soft' at all: its military build-up
along the Taiwan Strait, including the deployment of more than 700 ballistic missiles targeting the
island, is a coercive threat aimed at thwarting independence moves by Taiwan. On the other hand, the
Taiwan legislature's inability or unwillingness since 2001 to appropriate funding to purchase some
$18bn worth of weapons offered by Washington - a seemingly wise course in the face of China's
growing military clout - is another indication of the mainland's ability to shape policy decisions on
Taiwan in its favour. Beijing's influence still falls far short of achieving reunification with Taiwan. Indeed,
the vast majority of Taiwan's citizens prefer a status quo which neither invites Chinese coercion (or
worse) nor requires unification with the Communist mainland. But a combination of Beijing's soft- and
hard-power instruments in recent years appears to have stemmed the political fortunes of the pro-
independence movement in Taiwan for the time being.

The impact is China/Taiwan war which goes nuclear
OHanlon adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush, 07 *Michael, A war like no other: the truth about
China's challenge to America, p. google books+

War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag in the United
States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power and thus leading to the first
serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states . It seems inconceivable, in this day and age, that
the United States and China could really wind up in war. Their mutual interests in cooperating are so strong,
their economies are so intertwined, the dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other
problems for them to worry about is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two
huge powers ever to come to blows. There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chap- ter three, most of the reasons whv
China and the United States could theoretically fight do not in the end hold water. But the Taiwan problem is
different . Not only does it involve a third actor over which neither Beijing nor Washington has control. Not only does it involve
a territory that China sees as an integral part of its own nation and that the United States sees as a
long-standing, stalwart, and democratic friend. In addition, the way that a China-Taiwan crisis could begin and
escalate would hold the inherent potential for escalation to direct superpower war . This chapter explains whv. The-
next chapters get into the dynamics of what could happen if that war began, how it might be terminated before getting extremely seriousbut also why it could be tough to control. The
overall message is sobering. Even if the chances of war between the United States and China are less than 25 percent indeed, even
if they are less than 10 percentthey are far from zero. And given the enormous consequences of any
such war, in terms ol immediate danger as well as lasting effects on the interna- tional system, every effort must be made to prevent it . World
War I did not seem very likely to most world leaders in 1912 or 1913 either; certainly a horrible four-year struggle, followed two
decades later by an even worse world war, was not predicted. We must avoid dire mistakes of that era and take
seriously the possibility of a war that, even if unlikely already, must be rendered more unlikely still. In short, the reasons whv that war
could occur, are as follows: First. China really does consider Taiwan its own, and even as it has arguably adopted a more subtle and
sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in recent years, it has explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1 Second,
Chinas military capabilities are growing last even as Taiwan's begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an opportunityif it can keep the United
States out of the light Third, Taiwan could push the sovereignty' issue in away that China interprets as the
pursuit of full independence. While China would probably be wrong in reaching any such con- clusion, perceptions
could matter more than reality in such a situation . Fourth, while Washington's commitment to Taiwan is long- standing, it is also somewhat
ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United States real!)' would sit out a China-Taiwan war.



Economy Mpx
1nc
China Sphere of Influence in Latin America critical to Chinese growth
Ellis 11(Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study NDU
press. 1st quarter 2011 http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf SCTM)

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese
companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when
economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an
effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors
seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and
aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and
penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC
has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the
hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and
government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the
resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country
who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of
Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce
Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and
Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a
longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14

Now Key For China Econ
China is at a crtical transition point, they need long-term sustained growth to keep up
the world economy
Xinhua July 15,2013
Three international organizations: China's economy has reached critical period of transition Xinhua
http://www.best-news.us/news-4907485-Three-international-organizations:-China-39s-economy-has-
reached-critical-period-of-transition.html SCTM

Xinhua Beijing, July 15 (Xinhua) (Reporter Hanjie An Bei) 15, National Bureau of Statistics released the first half of China's economy grew 7.6
percent, the Xinhua News Agency reporters Di Yishi and Jian Lianxian interviewed the IMF [microblogging], the Asian Development Bank, World
Bank [microblogging] three international institutions relevant experts. Look growth: Economic growth of 7.6% in the world what it means?
'The U.S. economy is expected to grow 1.7 percent this year, the euro zone average negative growth, Japan may reach 2%, Russia is expected to
increase 2% ......' In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research Department chief economist Olivier Blanchard Seoul seems that
China's current economic growth is undoubtedly a major highlight of the global economy. 'The economic
growth of 7.6% in line with expectations.' Asian Development Bank Resident Representative Zhuang Jian, senior economist, told reporters that
although the year in the second quarter, China's economic growth slowed down continuously reproduced, but the decline is
Around the world, the world economy is still slow growth, and presented 'three-speed' growth
pattern: China to lead the emerging market countries continue to maintain the 'fastest growing legion' advantage, the U.S. economy is
steadily recovering, the vast majority of European countries are still struggling with difficult times. At the same time, China, Brazil, India
and other emerging economies, growth is slowing collective confirms an important signal: After years
of rapid growth, the emerging economies are gradually entering the 'deceleration zone.' Blanchard also noted that
China's economic growth slowdown. Few days ago, IMF updated forecasts for the global economy of the agency predicted that
China's economic growth this year of 7.8%, compared with April predictive value of cut 0.3 percentage points . 'China is becoming an economic
slowdown affecting the global economy is one of the three new risks.' Blanchard said. On Risk: China should avoid pursuing short-term
economic growth superficial National Bureau of Statistics data show that the first half of the investment in China's economic growth is still the
largest engine, contribution to GDP ratio reached 53.9%. Blanchard said that a large investment in China's economic growth, but a lot of
investment from the shadow banking, which makes the Chinese macro-control policy-makers face a dilemma: If you
continue to maintain high investment, it will exacerbate overcapacity and credit risk, but if the
tightening credit control investment will result in slowdown in economic growth. 'China should pay
more attention to the quality of investment, to avoid the pursuit of short-term economic growth
superficial.' Zhuang Jian said. Zhuang Jian pointed out that the investment plays an important role in developing countries, China's current
development is inseparable from the support of investment, but the investment structure and quality is very important. 'If there is insufficient
economic structure adjustment and upgrading of industrial structure, continue to increase investment will only make the problem more severe
overcapacity will further exacerbate the local debt and credit risks.' He said. In this regard, Blanchard believes that although China's
economy is still at risk, but the macro-control policy makers, there is still enough space for policy control to prevent rapid decline in
economic growth. Seeking good way: China's economy has slowed down to a critical period of structural adjustment
In a globalized world, China's economy can achieve sustained and healthy development of the global
economy is essential. Blanchard noted that the global economy to achieve sustainable and balanced development, the major
economies are facing the task of structural adjustment reforms. For China, a policy to focus on improving growth potential
and increase spending on economic growth driven role. 'If say when the opportunity to achieve this
transformation, it may be right now. ' 'China's economy continues to years of rapid growth, has been the need to slow down to
adjust the structure to the way a critical stage.' Zhuang Jian pointed out the factors supporting China's economic growth is changing, China
urgently looking for a new economic growth point, and widespread Consensus is to slow down the growth rate, in both the
economic growth, more emphasis on improving the quality and efficiency of economic growth.

Chinese Economic collapse causes war
Kaminski 7 (Antoni Z., Professor Institute of Political Studies, World Order: The Mechanics of
Threats (Central European Perspective), Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although
the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of
political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law,
clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China.
Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global
repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese
political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A
potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal
policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is
high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the
region.


China Key to Global Econ
Chinese slowdown is bringing down economies all over the world
AFP 13 (Chinese slowdown casts shadow over world economy Jul 17, 2013
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/chinese-slowdown-casts/746714.html
SCTM)

LONDON: China's slowdown cast a shadow over Europe and Asia on Tuesday, sparking questions over
Beijing's ability to avoid a hard landing that would wreak havoc on the world economy, analysts said. The
nation's powerhouse economy slowed to 7.5-per-cent growth in the second quarter, down from 7.7 per cent in the previous three months,
official data showed Monday. "China is a key downside risk to the global economy. Recent data does suggest that the
economy is sluggish," VTB Capital economist Neil MacKinnon told AFP. "In addition, the authorities are concerned about the
rapid rate of credit expansion and the impact it might have on inflation. This rules out any near-term monetary or
fiscal stimulus." New evidence emerged Tuesday of the impact of slowing Chinese growth in Europe, which is
still struggling to recover from the eurozone's long-running sovereign debt crisis. Investors in
Germany, Europe's biggest economy, turned gloomy this month on fears over falling exports to China,
in a stark illustration of the new globalised power of the Asian nation's industry and consumers. Germany's investor confidence index,
calculated by ZEW economic institute, fell by 2.2 points to 36.3 points in July. That disappointed analysts' forecasts for an increase to 40
points. "New dark clouds have started to black out growth prospects of the German economy," said ING DiBa economist Carsten Brzeski.
"These clouds are not coming from the South but from the East. The stuttering and now slowing Chinese economy is a clear cause of concern
(and) could become a new risk factor for the German economic outlook." China is now the fifth most important single export market for
German companies and accounts for some six per cent of total exports. The Asian Development Bank meanwhile warned Tuesday that China's
slowing growth was weakening momentum and trimmed its outlook for developing Asia this year to 6.3 per cent, from 6.6 per cent. The
sluggishness comes as "China is attempting to rebalance its economy away from investment towards a
more consumer-driven economy," said Currencies Direct analyst Alistair Cotton. But this rebalancing would present growth
opportunities for the West, he noted. "The big winners, should they crack the market, will be consumer companies with strong brand
identity," he said. "The losers are likely to be the countries supplying the raw materials for Chinese investment, conversely the ones that were
doing so well in the last decade." Daiwa Capital Markets economist Chris Scicluna added that markets were eager to see an "orderly" Chinese
slowdown that would not disrupt the world economy. "China's support for global demand has been welcome over the past couple of years as
the West has had to work off the excesses of the pre-Lehman era," Scicluna told AFP, in reference to US bank Lehman Brothers whose collapse
in 2008 triggered a global slump. "A slowing of China's growth, over the medium term, to a sub-7.0-per-cent rate was always inevitable as the
economy matured. "The main concern is that the authorities there can engineer an orderly slowdown -- ie. one that does not see growth
plummet sub-5.0 per cent and lead to financial and social crisis." Gekko Markets analyst Anita Paluch added that the West had relied on
booming China to help overcome a fierce recession which followed the global financial crisis. "Slower growth will have impact on those
countries who have strong trade links with China -- like Australia, Brazil and (the) South East Asia region -- as demand will fall," Paluch said.
China is vital for the smooth functioning of global economies because the Asian powerhouse nation is a major
consumer of commodities, like crude oil, steel, and copper, and of manufactured products like cars and airplanes. At the same time, China is
also widely regarded as the workshop of the world, and its vast factories benefit from low labour costs and high volume production. But the
International Monetary Fund cut its global economic growth forecast last week, citing the increased "possibility of a longer growth slowdown"
in emerging market economies like China. Scicluna added Tuesday that all nations around the world needed to return to "appropriate" levels
of growth to create a balanced global economy. "Over the long run we would hope to have all economies running at their potential," he told
AFP. "It will, however, be a long time before Europe's economies have returned to that position. My big fear is a very abrupt Chinese
slowdown with disorderly consequences." But due to the poor quality of Chinese economic data and lack of
information about risks in the Chinese banking sector, "it is difficult to gauge with any confidence the
probability of that happening," he said.

Banking crisis in China creates collapse if growth isnt sustained
Fisher June 20 2013
Max Fisher is the Post's foreign affairs blogger. Before joining the Post, he edited international coverage
for TheAtlantic.com. Chinas economy is freezing up. How freaked out should we be?
The Washington Post June 20 2013
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/20/chinas-economy-is-freezing-up-
how-freaked-out-should-we-be/ SCTM

Thursday was a very bad day for Chinas economy, the worlds second-largest and a crucial pillar of the global economy,
with credit markets freezing up in an unnerving parallel to the first days of the U.S. financial collapse.
The question of how bad depends on whom you talk to, how much faith you have in Chinese leaders and, unfortunately, several factors that are
largely unknowable. But we do know two things. First, Chinese leaders appear to be causing this problem deliberately, likely to try to avert a
much worse problem. And, second, if this continues and even it works, it could see Chinas economy finally cool after years of
breakneck growth, with serious repercussions for the rest of us. Things got so bad that the Bank of China has been
fighting rumors all day that it defaulted on its loans; if true, this would risk bank runs and more defaults, not unlike the first days of the U.S.
financial collapse. Theres no indication that the rumors are true, and no one is running on Chinas banks. But the fact that the trouble has even
gotten to this point is a sign of how potentially serious this could be. Heres what has happened: Chinas credit market has been
in a bubble for years, with too much lending and borrowing, similar to what happened in the United States during the financial crisis.
All that lending helps grow the economy until, one day, the bubble bursts, and it all comes crashing
down, as happened the United States. Chinas economic growth has been slowing, making a similar a crisis
more likely. Chinese leaders seem to be trying to prevent a disaster by basically popping the bubble, a kind of controlled mini-collapse
meant to avoid The Big One. In a real, uncontrolled credit crisis like the U.S. financial meltdown, credit suddenly freezes up, particularly
between banks, meaning that the daily loans banks were relying on to do business are suddenly no longer affordable. Banks with too many
unsafe loans suddenly owe more money than they can get their hands on, sometimes leading them to default or even collapse. And that means
that it suddenly becomes much tougher for everyone else companies that want to build new
factories, families that went to buy a home to borrow money. Thats an uncontrolled credit crisis, and a number of
China-watchers have been worried that China, in its pursuit of constant breakneck growth, could be headed for one. Chinas central bank,
which is likely to tamp down all that unsafe lending and over-borrowing before it leads to a crash, appears to have forced an artificial credit
crisis. (It tested a more modest version just two weeks ago.) It looks like the Peoples Bank of China has already tightened credit considerably,
making it suddenly very difficult for banks to borrow money. Something called the seven-day bond repurchase rate, which indicates liquidity
or the ease of borrowing money, shot way up to triple what it was two weeks ago. This pair of charts, from the economics site Zero Hedge,
shows the eerie parallels between todays freeze-up in the Chinese interbank lending market and what happened in the United States when
Lehman Brothers collapsed, setting off a global crisis that were still recovering from: That second chart shows something called the TED
spread, a key indicator of credit risk and how easy it is for U.S. banks to lend to one another. Money markets in China have also skyrocketed to
what the Financial Times David Keohane called silly levels. This chart, via Keohane and Reuters Jamie McGeever, shows the money market
rates way, way, way beyond any high of the last five years: Heres where things get a little confusing. Bloomberg News reported Thursday
evening Beijing time that, as panic moved through the Chinese financial system, the countrys central bank stepped in and offered $8.2 billion in
relief to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which just happens to be both state-owned and the largest bank in the world. What
does this mean? Maybe that Chinese leaders got cold feet and are trying to walk back the self-imposed crunch, maybe that Chinas largest bank
managed to negotiate some preferential treatment, maybe that leaders are worried their most important bank might actually be less healthy
than they thought and want to protect it from default. Or maybe this is just part of the process of easing down the markets. But then the
Chinese Web portal Sina announced that the reports were false (thanks to Bill Bishop for this link), adding some unnecessary confusion and
uncertainty to an already volatile situation. So what happens next? There are four categories of outcome. The first is that Chinese leaders back
off on the credit crunch and nothing happens, in which case theyll probably just try the strategy again later. The second is that they press on
and it works miraculously, cleaning out the financial system without causing too much pain. The third is that this spirals out of control, maybe
because Beijing underestimated the risk or acted too late, potentially sending the global economy lurching once more. The fourth, and probably
most likely, is that this works but is painful, averting catastrophe but slowing the Chinese economy after 20 years of miraculous growth. China-
watchers, who tend to vary widely in their assessments of the countrys economic health, seem to be converging on that fourth scenario, of a
painful but necessary slowdown. Nomura, a Japanese investment bank, recently issued a note (via the Financial Times) addressing fears that
China could face a financial collapse. Their less-than-comforting caveat: This is a tricky issue, as the definition of financial crisis can differ
among investors. The bank predict that China will not slip into a full-on crisis, citing Beijings control over the financial system and
unwillingness to let it go under. But the Japanese bank warned: Nonetheless, we expect a painful deleveraging process in
the next few months. Some defaults will likely occur in the manufacturing industry and in non-bank
financial institutions. If that happens, Chinas growth would slow even more. HSBC just cut their prediction for
Chinese GDP growth rate from 8.4 percent in 2014 to 7.4 percent, still high but a major drop that could plunge farther. This would be difficult
for China, which has built its economy and political stability on keeping high economic growth. Recall that the U.S. financial collapse was
disastrous for Americas already unhealthy economic sectors: city budgets, real estate, news media. Something similar could happen in China,
which is also facing a massive property bubble. All of this could also be dire for the rest of the world, which is
heavily linked to Chinas economy and is still struggling to recover from the U.S. and European crises

China Econ Turns LA Econ
Chinese investment and involvement stabilize Latin American economies most
recent economic downturn proves
Arnson and Davidow, 11 (Cynthia J., director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Jeffery, career foreign service officer from the U.S. state of
Virginia. Davidow has served as a member of the Senior Foreign Service, as well as having been the U.S.
Ambassador to Zambia, Venezuela, and Mexico, China, Latin America, and the United States,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, January 2011, page 7, Online,
http://www.cudi.mx/noticias/2011/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt_21.pdf, accessed 7/18/13) PE
In a keynote address, Enrique Garca, president and CEO of the Corporacin Andina de Fomento (CAF), a
Latin American development bank, indicated that despite the economic downturn in 2009, the global
economic crisis has not obstructed Latin Americas path to sustained economic growth,
macroeconomic stability, and positive external balances. On average, the region was projected to grow
by 4.5 percent in 2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 7 [to]8 percent. This success is partially
due to the implementation of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued central bank
independence, and strict financial regulations. Strong regional growth rates and resilience in the face of
the crisis can also be attributed to the favorable terms of trade between Latin Americas resource rich
countries and China.

Chinese trade with Latin America is a positive force creates sustainable growth in
Latin America
Gallagher, 13 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese
dragon, The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE
First, the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America because it
diversifies the sources of finance finance that for too long has relied on the west. The US and
European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin American
growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated with a 1.2%
increase in Latin American growth. Chinese finance is more in tune with what Latin American nations
want, rather than with what western development experts say they "need". Whereas the US and
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF tend to finance in line with the
latest development fads such as trade liberalisation and micro-anti-poverty programmes, Chinese loans
tend to go into energy and infrastructure projects in a region that has an annual infrastructure gap of
$260bn. Neither do Chinese loans come with the harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are
notorious for their "conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment
programmes that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region.






China Relations
Relations Internal
Regional competition in Latin America kills US-China Relations
Zweig, 10 Director of the Center on Chinas Transnational Relations and a Chair Professor in the
Division of Social Science (David, Chinas Energy Rise, The U.S., And The New Geopolitics Of Energy,
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, April)

Americas bilateral policy may be better coordinated. The Strategic Dialogues will give America a clearer voice when it
speaks to the Chinese. But the target of this dialogue must not be only to promote U.S. interests, but to find ways to help China adapt to the
world and help Chinas energy and environmental sector. But there are numerous voices in the U.S. that wish to inflate
the China threat. For them, Chinas global energy dependence is a godsend, an excellent mechanism for limiting Chinas rise and
challenge to the U.S. But there are also ears in China that thrive on expressions of American concerns about
Chinas rise. Mistrust of America runs surprisingly deep within the Chinese bureaucracy; since most
Chinese are Realists and believers of conspiracy theories, they expect the U.S. to try to stop their rise
and see it doing so, even when it is not. And while American concerns about China cannot, nor should not be silenced, they
must not drive Americas China policy. The message must be clear: the U.S. welcomes a rising China that brings solutions to the bilateral,
triangular and global problems. Finally, if the hypothesis is correct, that America is a silent and often invisible player triangularizing Chinas
bilateral ties, then many issues could be best discussed within a triangular format, such as a Sino-American-
African dialogue or a Sino-American-Latin America one. While the U.S. may hesitate to join such
discussions, as they give credence and legitimacy to Chinas engagement in regions from which the
U.S. would have preferred to exclude them, such dialogue with a rising China is necessary. Many of
the meetings could be track-two, bringing influential academics and middle level policy makers
together to discuss how Chinas rise in a particular region can be best managed to insure a win-win
scenario. Conferences in the West on these issues tend to be run by the U.S. congressional
committees and reflect the concerns of a declining hegemon. No doubt, both sides will hesitate to put their cards on
the table. But the first step is to get people to recognize that U.S.-China interdependence occurs at the global level, and that regional
competition poses a serious threat to the bilateral relationship. Only then can the potentially negative implications of
Sino-American triangularization be better managed.

US presence in Latin America kills US-China relations
Hilton, 13 (Isabel, Latin America correspondent China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge?, 2/20,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb
c054aad9.pdf)

The United States is Latin Americas traditional hegemonic power, but Chinas influence in the region
is large and growing. How far does Chinas presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important
in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter
of manufactured goods. The impact of Chinas activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has
suffered from cheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments,
and China is having an important impact on the regions infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource
curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite its significant
economic presence, China has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S.
and to maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been
important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So
far the two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S.
allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too
assertive in its own East Asian backyard.

Infringements on Chinese sphere of influence spillover to prevent cooperation kills
relations
Hills & Blair 7 (Carla A. & Dennis c., Carla A. Hills is chairman and chief executive officer of Hills &
Company, International Consultants, which advises companies on global trade and investment issues.
Ambassador Hills served as U.S. trade representative (1989-93) in the first Bush administration and as
secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Ford administration. Prior,
she was assistant attorney general, heading the civil division of the U.S. Department of Justice. She
currently serves on the board of Gilead Sciences, Inc. and on the international boards of J.P. Morgan
Chase, Rolls Royce, and the Coca-Cola Company. She also serves as co-chair of the Inter-American
Dialogue and the Advisory Board of Center for Strategic & International Studies, chair of the National
Committee on US-China Relations, and member of the executive committee of the Peterson Institute for
International Economics and of the Trilateral Commission. Ambassador Hills is a member of the
President's Council on International Activities at Yale University and of the board of trustees of the
International Crisis Group., and Dennis C. Blair, Former Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command,
April 2007, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, Council on Foreign
Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-china-relations/p12985)

No relationship will be as important to the twenty-first century as the one between the United States,
the worlds great power, and China, the worlds rising power. Chinas development is directly
transforming the lives of one-fifth of the worlds population, and is otherwise influencing billions more.
Chinas rapid economic growth, expanding regional and global influence, continued military
modernization, and uneven human rights record are also shifting the geopolitical terrain and
contributing to uncertainty about Chinas future course. After thirty-five years of engagement, the
United States and China have a relationship that was truly unimaginable two generations ago. At the
same time, there are some Americans who believe that Chinas strategic interests are incompatible with
those of the United States. The Council on Foreign Relations established an Independent Task Force to take
stock of the changes under way in China today and to evaluate what these changes mean for China
and for the U.S.-China relationship. Based on its careful assessment of the developments in the country
and Chinas likely future trajectory, the Task Force recommends that the United States pursue a
strategy focused on the integration of China into the global community and finds that such an
approach will best encourage China to act in a way consistent with U.S. interests and international
norms. The Task Force concludes with a series of recommendations aimed to reinforce recent efforts
to deepen U.S.-China cooperation . The overall message is that while the United States should not turn a blind eye
to the economic, political, and security challenges posed by Chinas rise and should be clear that any
aggressive behavior on Chinas part would be met with strong opposition, U.S. strategy toward China
must focus on creating and taking advantage of opportunities to build on common interests in the
region and as regards a number of global concerns.

War Mpx Boosters
US-Chinese political tensions already high-Cool War to come
Feldman 13 (Noah, professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard and the author of five
books. bachelor's degree from Harvard, a law degree from Yale and a doctorate in Islamic thought from
Oxford, where he was a Rhodes scholar. He clerked for Justice David Souter on the Supreme Court. As an
adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, he contributed to the creation of the country's new
constitution. He lives in Cambridge, Mass., and is a senior fellow of the Society of Fellows at Harvard.,
The Coming Cool War With China, BLOOMBERG L.P, June 2, 2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html)

Ahead of the first summit meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China on June 7, the two nations
are on the brink of geopolitical conflict. As its officials acknowledge, China is a classic rising power, poised to
challenge U.S. dominance. In historical terms, the sole global superpower never gives up without a fight.
Chinas peaceful rise was a useful slogan, while it lasted, for Chinas leaders. Americas peaceful decline will get no one elected, whether
Democrat or Republican. Geopolitics is almost always a zero-sum game. If China can copy or work around U.S. missile
defenses, fighter jets and drones, the U.S.s global position will be eroded -- and the gains will go
directly to China.
US already anticipated, but not inevitable-War preparations being made now
Peck 12 (Michael, is Games Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine and a writer for Training & Simulation
Journal at Defense News, Wargaming A U.S.-China War, Gawker Media 2013, 9/3/12,
http://kotaku.com/5939729/wargaming-a-us+china-war)

As if the U.S. and China don't have enough problems, now they're eyeing each other like two high school jocks
competing to be Big Alpha Male on Campus. Oh, they're not exactly enemies. Actually, they're kind of friendly with
each other. One loans the other money, and the other uses that money to buy cigarettes from the first guy. But beneath the
bromance, both are steeling themselves for a rumble to decide who's the biggest, baddest dude at
Pacific Ocean High. This has prompted the U.S. to change its strategic focus. Post-1945, America's main concern was stopping a Soviet
tank blitz of Western Europe. Then for the last decade, we have been obsessed with the Global War on Terror (though Terror has yet to
surrender). Now the Pentagon is preparing for a confrontation in the Pacific. The question boils down to who is allowed
to play in China's backyard. A quick glance at a map shows that the Western Pacific is a lot closer to Bejiing than Los Angeles. But the U.S. has
allies over there: Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam (who'd have believed it?), and the biggest flashpoint of all, Taiwan. China regards
Taiwan as a renegade republic that must be reclaimed for the Fatherland, while the other nations
claim resource-rich waters and islands that resource-hungry China also calls its own. Considering that
China versus its neighbors, with the possible exception of Japan, is like Mike Tyson versus Tiny Tim,
America is the only power that can stand up to the biggest kid in the neighborhood. It's not a question
of altruism. The U.S. has its interests. So does China. Much mayhem may ensue. The new U.S.
doctrinethe guiding principles of how the U.S. would fightare embodied in a new concept called
Air-Sea Battle. As the name suggests, Air-Sea Battle envisions a Pacific war as a contest of ships and aircraft, which is logical: until they
build a Star Trek transporter or a 6,000-mile San Francisco-Shanghai bridge, tank divisions and infantry battalions are useless in a trans-oceanic
war without sea and air transportation to move them to where they're going. This is good news for swabbies and zoomies: the War on Terror
has mostly been an Army/Marine/Special Forces war, with the Air Force and Navy as supporting players (Air-Sea Battle also happens to be great
timing as the services compete for shares of a shrinking defense budget). For its part, China has vastly increased its defense spending, including
advanced jets, missiles, subs, and even a pathetic ex-Soviet carrier. Air-Sea Battleand a U.S.-China Warwould be
primarily a missile war. China would use its vast arsenal, including carrier-killing ballistic missiles
originally designed to carry nukes, to target the platforms that project U.S. power: airbases in Taiwan,
Japan, and islands such as Diego Garcia and Guam, as well as the mobile airbases that are the U.S.
Navy's aircraft carriers. If China can neutralize American airpower, it will render American ground and sea forces (except for subs)
impotent, and then Beijing can go about its business as it invades Taiwan or the Spratly Islands. Under Air-Sea Battle, America would use its
own missiles to destroy China's sensor network; if China can't detect the carriers in the wide-open ocean, it can't shoot at them. Then American
forces would destroy own China's missile forces, and then... who knows how this war would end.

The US & China already have a potential war scenario
Saunders 13 (Doug, well -known British-Canadian journalist and author, and columnist for the Globe
and Mail, a Canadian national newspaper based in Toronto, Canada, international-affairs columnist, and
a long-serving foreign correspondent formerly based in London and Los Angeles. His journalism has won
the National Newspaper Award, Canada's counterpart to the U.S. Pulitzer Prize, on five occasions. In
2006 and in 2013, he was honored as the best columnist in Canada. One of the five finalists for the 2011
Lionel Gelber Prize honouring the world's best book on international affairs, and for the Shaughnessy
Cohen Prize for Political Writing., Why are the U.S. and China preparing for war with one another? The
Globe and Mail Inc., July 12, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/us-and-china-smile-
for-cameras-prepare-for-war/article13196146/)

Both the Pentagon and the Peoples Liberation Army are arming for an all-out war and pursuing
enormously expensive master strategies that assume that such a war will occur. In the case of the United
States, this appears to be taking place without any authorization or approval from the White House or Congress. The Pentagon is now
basing its global strategy on a detailed plan known as the AirSea Battle concept, in which the U.S.
Army and Air Force defend the presence of 320,000 U.S. troops in the area by readying themselves for
a full-scale land and air assault on China in the event of a threat in the South China Sea or its
surroundings. In a detailed analysis paper in this summers issue of the Yale Journal of International Affairs, the famed sociologist and
military-policy expert Amitai Etzioni asks, Who authorized preparations for war with China? His answer is stark: Mr. Obama has spoken of a
pivot to Asia, but there has been no political intent or desire to have such an active military confrontation with China in fact, the politics and
diplomacy have been moving in the opposite direction. The United States is preparing for a war with China, a momentous decision that so far
has failed to receive a thorough review from elected officials, namely the White House and Congress, Prof. Etzioni writes. In the public sphere
there was no debate led by either think tanks or public intellectuals like that which is ongoing over whether or not to use the military option
against Irans nuclear program, or the debate surrounding the 2009 surge of troops in Afghanistan. But the AirSea Battle plan has far more
expensive and dangerous implications. The imagined result of ASB is the ability to end a conflict with China in much the same way the United
States ended WWII: The U.S. military defeats China and dictates the surrender terms. This is a drastic change from Cold War approaches,
where nuclear-scale conflict was carefully avoided. The plan scares the heck out of many military figures. AirSea Battle is
demonizing China, James Cartwright, the former vice-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned last year. Thats not in
anybodys interest. A Marine Corps assessment warned that the concept is preposterously expensive to build in
peace time and, if used as intended, would cause incalculable human and economic destruction, in good
part because it makes escalation to nuclear war far more likely. And the Chinese have responded in kind: If the U.S.
military develops AirSea Battle to deal with the *Peoples Liberation Army+, Col. Gauyue Fan warned, the PLA will be forced to develop anti-
AirSea Battle. And that is now taking place. Soon after assuming power last year, Mr. Xi abandoned his predecessors
commitment to peaceful rise, took direct command of the Central Military Commission and
commanded the military to focus on real combat and fighting and winning wars. As Jeremy Page of The
Wall Street Journal noted recently, Mr. Xi has rehabilitated a group of ultra-hawkish generals and military
advisers who have advocated a military strategy based on preparing for direct confrontation with the
United States. He has particularly embraced Col. Liu Mingfu, whose calls for direct China-U.S. military competition had led his books to be
banned, but are now back on the bookstore shelves in droves. Also widely published now is air force Col. Dai Xu, who wrote last year, according
to Reuters, that Chinas neighbours are running dogs of the United States in Asia and we only need to kill one, and it will immediately bring
the others to heel.


Brink
Sino-American Relations are on the brink, infringements on SOI push it over.
Rudd 13 (Kevin, Australian politician who has been the Prime Minister of Australia and the Leader of
the Labor Party since 27 June 2013. He was previously Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010, and Labor
Leader from 2006 to 2010. He is the first former Prime Minister to return to the office since Robert
Menzies in 1949, and only the second Labor Prime Minister to do so, A subtle defrosting in Chinas
chilly war with America, THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2013, June 10, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/594776d2-d1ba-11e2-9336-00144feab7de.html#axzz2ZJU1aaCD)

In Beijing analysts still struggle to define the precise state of the China-US relationship. As one said to me
recently: Bu shi rezhan, bu shi lengzhan; er shi liangzhan. Or, in the Queens English: Its not a hot war, its not a cold war;
its more like a chilly war. The problem for leaders, diplomats and analysts is that the relationship
defies simple definition. Variants range from strategic engagement, strategic co-operation and
strategic competition to China as a responsible global stakeholder. The problem with these ideas is that they
mean very little to the Chinese. The phrase that hits home in both capitals these days is strategic trust deficit a gap between
China and the US which, if left unchecked, could destabilise the entire Asia-Pacific region. Such a
deficit is potentially disastrous for both parties. We see it in the world of cyber espionage and cyber
warfare; in escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas, where hundreds of naval and air
assets are deployed; in escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula; and in the UN Security Council
stalemate over Syria. That is why the working summit between presidents Barack Obama of the US and Xi Jinping of China at the
weekend was so important. There had been no high-level political mechanism for the two sides to manage
these and other apparently intractable challenges facing the regional and global order. With this summit,
with more to follow, we at last have the capacity to build such a mechanism. The fact is, unless the Chinese president himself
(simultaneously chairman of the Central Military Commission and general secretary of the Communist
party) engages personally in negotiations with his US counterpart, Chinas political system is geared to
the defence of the status quo. In the US, the secretaries both of state and defence are able to make
some strategic calls in negotiations. But their Chinese counterparts are not even among the 250 most
senior officials in the party hierarchy. Only the president, in consultation with the other six members
of the Politburo Standing Committee, can make the genuinely big calls. Despite opposition in both capitals, both
presidents decided to depart from the diplomatic conventions that have governed relations for the past 40 years and convened a working
summit, free of the pomp normally associated with state visits. This is a success in its own right. More importantly, both camps are privately
delighted by the tone, depth and content of this first engagement, with neither expecting a laundry list of deliverables. Nobody present saw this
as the cyber summit described in the US media. So, what are the outcomes? First, the agreement to establish a regular military-to-military
dialogue is critical. It could contribute to rules of the road on cyber security; crisis management for the Korean peninsula; the management of
incidents at sea and in the air as well as creating a mechanism to develop basic confidence and security-building measures for the region.
Second, the summit represented the first systematic engagement and calibration between the two nations on the future of North Korea,
including their reported public commitment to prevent Pyongyang acquiring nuclear weapons. Third, there was agreement on climate change,
perhaps reflecting the start of a commitment to make the global rules-based order more effective. No one should expect Chinese policy to
change quickly. Much could go wrong. But, without a programme of working bilateral summitry, there is little prospect of getting much of
strategic importance right. After 20 years of drift in the relationship following the elimination of the Soviet threat, which for the previous 20
years provided the underlying rationale for co-operation this meeting could mark the start of a new period of detente. We were headed
towards strategic competition or worse. We may now have the capacity to build sufficient trust in the relationship, creating a framework to
manage the growing complexity of bilateral, regional and global challenges the nations face. It could even lead to what Mr Xi himself described
as a new model of great power relations for the future, one that does not mindlessly replicate the bloody history of the rise and fall of great
powers in centuries past.


Africa Mpx
US-China Cooperation Key to Saving the African Economy, Infrastructure, Society and
Politics
He 13 (Wenping, a senior fellow with the Chahar Institute and a professor and director of the African
Studies Section of the Institute of West Asian & African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS)., An Important Step Forward: China-US Cooperation in Africa, China-United States Exchange
Foundation, July 17, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/an-important-step-forward-
china-us-cooperation-in-africa/)

In the past few months, Africa has welcomed two leaders from the first and the second biggest
economies in the world. After Chinese President Xi Jinping visited South Africa, Tanzania and the
Republic of Congo in late March, US President Barack Obama also visited Senegal, South Africa and
Tanzania in late June. And, whether by coincidence or by careful arrangement, the two leaders visited exactly the same
number of African countries with exactly the same combination of English-speaking and French-speaking citizenry. This all reflects a high degree
of consistency. People are wondering whether it is because great minds thin alike, or whether Obama's goal in Africa
is to counter China. As a matter of fact, the common feature of the two leaders visits is that both China and
the US have realized the great development potential of the African continent. However the difference is that
China realized this potential and the historic chance for strengthening China-Africa ties much earlier
than that of the US. Actually, Africa has been high on Chinas diplomatic agenda in the most recent
decade. As earlier as 2000, China established the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Along with the release of the first White
Paper on Chinas Africa Policy in January 2006 and the first China-Africa Summit in early November 2006, which brought more than 40 African
heads of state to Beijing, Chinese high-level officials including President Xi Jinping, his predecessor Hu Jintao, former Premier Wen Jiabao, other
cabinet members and members of the Political Bureau have all been frequent visitors to Africa. As a result, trade between China and
Africa has soared in the last decade, reaching a record high of over $200 billion in 2011 from a mere $
10.5 billion in 2000, leading China to surpass the United States and to become Africas biggest trading
partner since 2009. On the contrary, the US has long regarded Africa as a hopeless continent full of problems
such as conflict, disease and famine,. Being the very first African-American President in the US and having Kenyan family roots,
President Obama seems to have had no time for Africa during his first term in office, and spent only 20 hours in Ghana in 2009, which resulted
in deep disappointment and dissatisfaction throughout Africa. Partly due to his election campaigns need for wooing African-American voters
for his second term, and the intention to pacify the increasing criticism of losing Africa, and perhaps also due to avoid being labeled as an
African-American President who unfortunately has had "the least interest in Africa", President Obama unveiled a new strategy towards sub-
Saharan Africa in June 2012. The new strategy sets forth four strategic objectives in Africa, namely: strengthening democratic institutions,
spurring economic growth and strengthening trade and investment, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and
development. The U.S. now believes that Africas economies are among the fastest growing in the world, with technological change sweeping
across the continent and offering tremendous opportunities in banking, medicine, politics, and business. With the change in mindset about
Africas rise and the motivation of catching up with Chinas pace in Africa, President Obama recently announced a $7 billion power initiative
over five years to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa, and also pledged to host a US-Africa Summit next year in the United States. To
a large extent, the US new focus on Africas infrastructure and establishment of a US-Africa Summit have been inspired by the FOCAC and
Chinas extensive engagement in Africas infrastructure industry. Clearly, the US and Chinas approach of engaging with
Africa is indeed quite different, but Obamas characterization of US interactions with Africa including
goals of social and political development, whereas China more narrowly focuses on commercial
benefits is false. Actually, it is no need to mention that one of the focus of Obamas trip in Africa was to appeal and push
American enterprises to do business in Africa and to firmly grasp the potential of Africas rising. As
for Chinas engagement in Africa, it is certainly too simple and too one-sided to say that China-Africa
relations is mainly for commercial benefits. Apart from building many infrastructure projects such as
dams, ports, railways and stadiums, China has also engaged in education and health areas, such as
providing scholarships, technical training and malaria treatment. And even the economic interaction
has also laid a solid foundation for social and political development. However, it should be pointed out that the US
and China do have a big difference in military engagement and security interactions,. To uphold and abide by
its non-interference policy, Chinas involvement in Africas security issues has long been limited to taking part in the UN multi-national
peacekeeping forces for missions in Africa, rather than setting up military bases and taking military actions like the US has been doing on the
Continent. Since the US established the US Africa Command in 2007, it has accelerated its pace of gathering information, setting up military and
drone bases and directly participating in attacking extremist forces and terrorism in Africa. This has generated unease and
worries from African countries and African people. It is also worthwhile to point out that Obamas
speech about China and other emerging countries entry into Africa is quite encouraging and can be
seen as an important step forward for future US-China cooperation in Africa. This is quite unlike his former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who made accusations against China's so-called "new colonialism" during her visit to Zambia in June 2011, and
then criticized Chinas development and investment model in Africa as extracting value rather than adding value. President Obama made
clear during his Africa trip that he sees no threat by the growing trade and investment in Africa by emerging economies such as China, India,
Brazil and Turkey, etc. In Obamas words, I dont feel threatened by it (Chinas entry in Africa). I feel its a
good thing. The more investment in Africa, the more the worlds least-developed continent can be
integrated into the global economy.

Laundry List Mpx

US China relations are key to solve extinction conflict, economic collapse, and
multiple trans-national threats become inevitable without cooperation
Cohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting
firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R.
Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as
chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership,
creating the largest insurance company in history, Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to
have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral
arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the
most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the
foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad
framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to
address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change,
nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most
constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no
major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future
trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns
many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic
competitordeliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and
international political influence alike analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic,
international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social
stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a
counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power
in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest
in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a
competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to
strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward
the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about
their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective
domestic contexts. Both parties must recognizeand acceptthat the other will pursue a foreign policy
approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly
transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from
China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust
particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger
an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either
containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a
broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the
United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS
Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is
not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic
pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of
building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in
ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the
global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not
been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political
differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent
economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two
countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed
effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement ofand cooperation betweenthe
United States and China. The United States and Chinathe worlds first- and third-largest economies
are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial
crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth,
has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions
between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more
clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated
foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holderby farof U.S. government debt. Former
treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created
by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to
purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and
recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing
that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as
a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared
interestand central rolethat both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly.
Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are
now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest
emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of
energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global
solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's
reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse
for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter,
must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an
area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine
qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy
means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency
and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also
provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic
navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent
interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive
development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries
want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in
the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and
counterterrorism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and
global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security
Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis
management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korean peninsula, Iran, or
Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation
and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-
to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to
cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China.
Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use
its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics
program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.-
China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATO-
China cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to
address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an
observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made
curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the
Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and
meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington
and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two
large powers with vastly dilferent histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have
challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the
U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the
U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gainedand much to be lost in terms of trust and respect
by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation
when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate
intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the
ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require
this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global
interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible
cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional
mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the
toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events,
such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3
reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough
problems is the premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power, as
articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her
confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our
disposaldiplomatic, economic, military, political and culturalpicking the right tool, or combination of
tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart
Power is neither hard nor softit is the skillful combination of bothIt is an approach that underscores
the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all
levels... .5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership
on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by
promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation
that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and
Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their
cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.


War Mpx

China war escalates draws in other countries
Hunkovic, American Military University, 09 *Lee J, 2009, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible
Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America,
http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a
third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a
conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other
countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant
members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and
Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if
China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that
will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose
actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.


Warming Mpx
US-China Cooperation Key to Environment
Cohen 9 (William S., The World Depends on U.S.-China Cooperation, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.,
U.S. defense secretary from 1997-2001, is chairman of The Cohen Group, a global business consulting
firm., April 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html)

Recent events confirm that we're living in a new world of disorder. North Korea tested a missile that could reach the U.S., and is threatening to
resume its nuclear-weapons program; the Taliban is using drug money to destabilize Afghanistan and turn that country back into a terrorist safe
haven; the financial crisis has sparked a global recession; and unchecked greenhouse gas emissions are transforming the
global climate. These disparate challenges share one thing in common: They cannot be addressed successfully without
cooperation between the U.S. and China. The most immediate opportunity for cooperation is in
confronting the international financial crisis. China currently holds $2 trillion worth of largely U.S.
dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves, and it is by far the world's largest holder of U.S.
government debt. As the Obama administration increases that debt to finance its economic stimulus plan, China will almost certainly be
called upon to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments. China also has an interest in working with the U.S. to ensure those
efforts succeed, because it depends on economic growth in the U.S. (still its largest single trading partner) to ensure stability at home. There is a
compelling need to create a new dialogue on finance and economics. This conversation began with President Barack Obama and Chinese
President Hu Jintao's discussions at the G-20 summit this month in London. Meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders have been dubbed the
"G-2" by some to reflect the crucial role of economic negotiations between our two countries. This first meeting between the two men, and the
agreement reached by world leaders at the close of the summit, mark a positive beginning to the effort to harmonize our financial management
and banking regulatory practices, and explore ways to expand bilateral trade opportunities in areas such as energy and environmental
technologies. The U.S. and China are the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. This means
that our nations have the opportunity, and the primary responsibility, for shaping the global response
to climate change. To date, both sides have used each other as an excuse for inaction. This must end.
The Obama administration has made it clear that it will work hard on energy and environmental
issues within our bilateral relations. China and the U.S. together have the power to set the de facto
global standard for energy efficiency and emissions control. To do so, we should jointly promote the
development and transfer of clean energy technology between our countries, initiate bilateral
projects on energy and climate issues, and develop common principles to drive the multilateral
negotiations on a new international climate-change agreement.


Impact Turn Shield
A2: Democracy
No democratic reformanti-US sentiment, legislative gridlock, and systematic abuse.
Dibbert 11 [t aylor Dibbert earned a BA in political science from the University of Georgia and a Master of International Affairs degree from
Columbia Universitys School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) Democratic Speed Bumps in Latin America
http://fpif.org/democratic_speed_bumps_in_latin_america/ Dec 9 2011]//BMitch
After a decade of growing popularity, democracy has hit a slump in Latin America. A recent Latinobarmetro poll cited by The
Economist in late October underscores this point. In all but three Latin American countries, fewer people than last
year believe that democracy is preferable to any other type of government. In the cases of Guatemala, Honduras,
and Mexico, the drop in support for democracy is significant. The 2009 removal of democratically elected Manuel Zelaya and
the post-coup human rights abuses of the government of Porfirio Lobo are obvious indicators that Honduras is on the wrong track. Dozens
of political murders have taken place in Honduras, and there has been little outrage from Washington.
Additionally, Novembers presidential elections in Nicaragua and Guatemala (and recent polling on Mexicos 2012 election)
reinforce the notion that many in the region have grown skeptical about democratic governance.
Reasons to be Skeptical Many reasons could explain this change in perceptions. Increased crime particularly
around the flow of illegal drugs is perhaps the most obvious factor. Latin Americans want law and order
and are willing to overlook an administrations democratic lapses to achieve domestic security. As people get wealthier, the
Latinobarmetro poll suggests, they expect more and better government services. This craving is understandable, although
the highly inefficient tax regimes in the region make this difficult to achieve. Large informal economies
and numerous loopholes or exemptions to current tax collection systems pose challenges that most politicians have been
unwilling to address. For example, Mexicos rate of tax collection is the worst of any country in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). But Guatemalas is even worse; it was only 10.5 percent of GDP last year. The average rate in Latin
America is about 14 percent of GDP. Legislative inertia is also a factor. Since the end of military dictatorships in
Latin America, many countries have been plagued by frustrating legislative gridlock. The truth is that people in
Latin America care very little about parties and congresses, and expect even less from them, according to
a Brookings Institution analysis. Global financial crises have also not helped. In terms of economic prosperity, Latin
America remains the most unequal region in the world. During these crises, the poor and lower-middle
classes prioritize meeting their daily needs. If their ability to make ends meet declines, they tend to blame the
ruling parties and give in to the temptation to simply throw the bums out and bring in new leaders,
regardless of their stances on human rights, transparency, good governance, or the rule of law. At a time when electorates view their
leaders as weak and ineffectual, those who promise a strong hand become more attractive. Backward Steps in Nicaragua, Guatemala During
his campaign for a third term as president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega repeatedly reassured voters that he was a strong, experienced leader
who knew how to get things done. To a certain extent, he is right: Nicaragua has a history of economic volatility, but the
situation has remained relatively stable under Ortegas recent stewardship. His anti-poverty programs and
subsidies, partly a result of generous Venezuelan loans, also helped persuade voters. Nevertheless, from banished term limits to
alleged corruption, and from a judiciary stacked with Ortega loyalists to convincing evidence of electoral fraud (which was not even necessary),
Ortega is already well on his way to bringing Nicaragua back to the authoritarianism that the country is all too
familiar with. In 2006, Ortega was instrumental in changing Nicaraguan electoral law to lower the threshold for a first-round presidential victory
from 45 percent to either 40 percent of votes cast or 35 percent, as long as there is at least a five-point difference between the first- and
second-place candidates. In the 2006 presidential election, Daniel Ortega captured 38 percent of the vote, thereby precluding a run-off that
many analysts believehe would have lost. Ortega accepted electoral defeat back in 1990, although Nicaragua has remained, at best, a fledgling
democracy since then. Nicaraguans were again reminded of Ortegas perennial presence on the Nicaraguan political scene in 1999 with the
implementation ofel Pacto, or the Pact, an agreement reached between Ortega and then-President Arnoldo Alemn of the Partido Liberal
Constitutional. Although the two leaders were not close at the time, their two parties held almost all the power in the countrys National
Assembly. This pact shielded both leaders from criminal prosecution and consolidated power in the judiciary and the Supreme Electoral
Council. (This agreement is still in place, even though it has now become clear that Ortega has gotten more out of the deal than Alemn.)
Alemn still did get a 20-year prison sentence for numerous charges of corruption in 2003. In 2009, Nicaraguas Supreme Court exonerated
Alemn; his conviction was conveniently overturned. Transparency International recently honored Alemn in their list of The Worlds Ten
Most Corrupt Leaders in recent history. The 2009 Nicaraguan Supreme Court ruling that exempted Ortega from only serving two presidential
terms sent a strong message that good governance in Nicaragua was waning. Under the Nicaraguan constitution, presidents
are not allowed to run for consecutive terms and are supposed to respect a two-term limit. But because Mr. Ortega essentially controlled the
Supreme Court, its judges ruled that the previous laws constituted human rights violations and should not apply to him. Legally speaking,
Ortega could be president for the rest of his life. Nicaraguas institutions were never particularly strong, but as its extremely politicized court
makes clear, they are undoubtedly weakening under Ortegas watch. Due to rampant fraud committed by Ortegas Sandinista party in 2008
municipal elections, the EU and the United Statessuspended aid. In Guatemala, meanwhile, the incoming administration of
Otto Perz promises to be astep backwards in terms of human rights. Perz held a number of high
positions in the Guatemalan military during Latin Americas bloodiest civil war. Many voters were too young to
remember the massacres in the countrys western highlands, most of which occurred during the early 1980s. Crime
statistics in Guatemala are atrocious, and security was voters foremost concern throughout the campaign. Guatemala has one
of the worlds highest homicide rates. In 2010, there were more than 40 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, rising to an astounding 110 per
100,000 in the capital. To put this in perspective, the homicide rate in the United States is less than five per 100,000. Guatemalas neighbor
Mexico, which is in the throes of a bloody drug war, has a homicide rate of about 14 per 100,000. With a pitiful prosecution rate hovering
around 2 or 3 percent, Guatemalan voters are desperate for a solution to what they consider their most pressing problem. Perzs
campaign slogan of mano dura or the strong hand promised to crack down on violent crime and
pursue offenders relentlessly. Security concerns dominated the presidential campaign, as runner-up Manuel Baldizn
also put an anti-crime message at the top of his agenda. Once in office, Perz will likely involve the military in police matters, reversing a trend
toward civilian control. Feckless Governance in Mexico Mexicans, meanwhile, have grown tired of the feckless
governance the country has experienced since its democratic breakthrough in 2000. Nowhere is the
lack of compromise or legitimate negotiation more obvious than in Mexicos federal legislature. Under
Partido Accin Nacional (PAN) leadership, legislative gridlock has plagued Mexican political life for the
past decade. President Felipe Caldern has fared slightly better than former President Vicente Fox, although frustration among the Mexican
citizenry remains. Voters have finally gotten a taste of multiparty democracy and discovered how bittersweet it is. A recent report published by
Human Rights Watch, which documents widespread abuses by state security personnel and even judicial actors, has shown how damaging
President Calderns misguided war on drugs has been for ordinary Mexican citizens. Calderns egregious mismanagement of Mexican
security policy has exacerbated citizens growing exasperation, and rightfully so. Systematic and widespread abuses by state
security personnel under the auspices of PAN democracy would make anyone question whether
democracy has developed in Mexico over the past decade. Certainly, the media environment has improved since 2000,
and the countrys judicial system is more relevant and unbiased than it was under the rule of the long-serving Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI). Nevertheless, much of the political power in Mexico has moved from the federal executive to the countrys various
governorships and, perhaps most tellingly, to Congress and key players within Mexicos three big political parties. During the 70 years of PRI
authoritarianism, political actors from disparate groups did not need to work together. Mexican politicians are still learning how to accomplish
this. Calderons drug war has undoubtedly failed, but more fundamentally, Mexican citizens simply do not trust the countrys existing
institutions, of which political parties would probably top the list. For next years presidential election, the PRI candidate Enrique Pea Nieto, a
former governor of the state of Mexico, is the current frontrunner. As in Guatemala, many votersare too young to remember the authoritarian
past and the PRIs connection to it. In a 2010 Latinbarometro survey that included 18 Latin American nations, Mexicans were more apathetic
about democracy than anyone else. Nothing would indicate that things have changed since then. A recent UN study revealed that 36 percent of
households were victims of crime last year, a year that witnessed around 22 million common crimes. This is not entirely drug-related
violence; criminal activities are more pervasive than that. There is no evidence to suggest that these statistics will improve between now and
next Julys presidential election. Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala may be bellwethers for a regional shift away from democracy, or
they may simply be exceptions. The counter-examples of Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Panama suggest that democracy is not completely on
the decline in the region. Nevertheless, challenges from crime to legislative gridlock are likely to persist in the
region, and these challenges will put pressure on what are still fragile democracies. U.S. Foreign Policy vis--vis
Latin America There was a real and not unfounded hope that the administration of George W. Bush would make a
concerted effort to engage with Latin Americas political leaders. But after 9/11, the region fell to the
bottom of U.S. foreign policy priorities. The Obama administration has not done much better. Plan Colombia and
the Mrida initiative, which deal largely with security issues and fighting an unwinnable drug war, do not constitute a coherent grand strategy.
More recently, U.S. policymakers have again been reminded of the tight links between energy security and
national security. This provides another reason to strengthen U.S.-Latin American ties, especially since
Chinas influence in Latin America will only grow over the coming decades. In 2009, China became Brazils biggest trading
partner. Placing a greater emphasis on human rights and respect for civil liberties is crucial. Washingtons lackluster response to
post-coup violence in Honduras only encourages further democratic backsliding elsewhere. Revisiting
comprehensive immigration reform would be another good place to start. The devastating effects of the 40-year war on drugs are related to
current violence in Central America. And yet, there is little to suggest that anyone in Washington is willing to reexamine U.S. drug policy. As
the United States shifts its focus to East Asia, reengagement with Latin America will probably be a
gradual process. U.S. policymakers must approach the region with more nuanced strategies. Latin America
is not a monolithic entity, where a certain set of policy goals in one country will be relevant or entirely applicable to another. In spite of many
similarities, Mexico is not Guatemala. Andean nations should not just be lumped together in the same policy category. Although there are no
easy answers, appreciating the specific context of each country will be essential. Strengthening relationships must go beyond
military or security-related bonds. Right now, American foreign policy in the region is unacceptable,
counterproductive, and will likely presage a continued rise in authoritarianism. Latin America is not the Cold
War hot spot it once was, but it is a region that still merits attention. Diplomacy on the cheap usually produces
undesirable outcomes. The perpetuation of current U.S. policy will be no exception.
A2: Cyber Attacks
China and U.S. cooperating over cybersecurity now
VOA News 13 *VOA News, Asian Security Forum Addresses Cyber Attacks, South China Sea
http://www.voanews.com/content/asian-security-forum-addresses-cyber-attacks-south-china-
sea/1673025.html May 31]//BMitch
Defense officials from the Asia Pacific region have begun an annual security forum with talks focusing on
cyber security, maritime territorial disputes and North Korea's nuclear program. U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said he
will address cyber security Saturday in his speech to the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in Singapore. He told reporters on
the plane to Singapore that the issue will also likely come up in a brief meeting with Chinese delegates
on the sidelines of the conference. Recent U.S. reports said that Chinese computer hackers have stolen
data from dozens of Pentagon weapons programs and other defense technologies. "There's only one way to deal
with these issues and that's straight up," said Hagel. "We intend to use all these venues, and that closer
cooperation and closer venue-building to hopefully get us in a position where we can get some better
understanding, closer understanding of what these rules of the road are." Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said in a speech
Friday that Southeast Asian nations need to find unity on the issue of the energy-rich South China Sea. He said any conflict could disrupt the
region's economy and he urged all countries to agree on a code of conduct. "Maritime security and safety, as well as the freedom of navigation,
have indeed caused deep concern to the international community," said the prime minister. China claims almost all of the South China Sea,
which may be rich in oil and natural gas. Parts of the sea are also claimed by Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and
territorial disputes in the waters are common.

U.S. China cooperating to solve cyber security now
Nusca 7/10 *Andrew Nusca, China, U.S. pledge to improve cybersecurity cooperation
http://www.zdnet.com/china-u-s-pledge-to-improve-cybersecurity-cooperation-7000017898/ July 10
2013]//BMitch
The United States and China have only just begun their fifth annual session on bilateral matters both
political and economic, but talk to improve cooperation on cybersecurity is already progressingeven as
former U.S. government contractor Edward Snowden remains at large aftermaking relevations about U.S. electronic surveillance activities.
Xinhua, China's state news agency, reported today that discussion for the U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue, or S&ED, has been "candid" and with the aim to enhance "mutual trust" and reduce
"mutual suspicion." The overall sentiment seems positive, Reuters notes in its own report on the summit, which takes place
this week in Washington, D.C. There was widespread concern leading up to the meeting, held annually in alternating locations since 2009, that
the ongoing Snowden affair would overshadow positive talks between the world's two largest economies. "For many Chinese, it is
bizarre that how Washington can continue to pose as the biggest cyber espionage victim and demand
others behave well after former U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden revealed that U.S. spy
agencies hacked deep into China and other countries' computer networks, including those of
government, military, research, educational and business organizations," Yang Qingchuan wrote in recent
commentary for Xinhua. But the tone this week has been optimistic, if a little cautious, China Daily notes, even
as both countries engage in and defend cyber spying activities that aggravate the other. The attitude
is a likely extension of the unprecedented, rather informal meeting between U.S. president Barack
Obama and China president Xi Jinping in California last month. China vice-premier Wang Yang, China state councilor Yang Jiechi,
U.S. secretary of state John Kerry and U.S. secretary of treasury Jack Lew are co-chairs for the event; U.S. vice president Joe Biden delivered the
opening address. "We don't have to agree on everything," Biden reportedly said during his address. "We have to trust."
A2: U.S. China War
China rise specifically in the context of Latin America will be peaceful
Hsiang 09 *Antonio C. Hsiang Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than
Challenges http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem November]//BMitch
China has been rising in Latin America since the twenty-first century for two reasons. The first is the relative
decline in the economic and political pre-eminence of the United States after its brief moment of unchallenged
power at the end of the cold warThe second factor is that many Latin American countries have become more
self-confident and bent on asserting their diplomatic independence.14 As the United States comparative
position erodes and China gets more powerful, some realists predict that, The result of these
developments will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. But for G. John Ikenberry,
professor at Princeton University, The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition.
The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an
international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states
confrontedTodays Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join.15 Similarly, Fareed Zakaria also
argues that, the greater the openness of the global system is, the better the prospects for trade, commerce, contact, pluralism and liberty. Any
strategy that is likely to succeed in todays world will be one that has the active support and participation of many countriesthere are many
good signs in the world today. The most significant rising powerChinadoes not seem to seek to overturn the
established order (as have many newly rising powers in the past) but rather to succeed within it.16 There are encouraging
signs that the U.S. leadership shares Zakarias optimism that the interconnectivity of the global system serves a tempering function to Chinas
increasing power. It fact, as early as September 21, 2005, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick called on China to act as a
responsible stakeholder in global affairs. Later, when hosting Chinese President Hu Jintao in Washington in April 2006, former President Bush
said, The United States and China are two nations divided by a vast ocean yet connected through a global economy that has created
opportunity for both peoples. The United States welcomes the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous, and that supports
international institutions.17 Since then, China has tried to play the role of a responsible stakeholder in global
affairs, particularly in Latin America. On the international level, Chinas rising levels of wealth and education,
improvement of property rights and the establishment of the rule of law greatly contribute to the
global political and economic development. For Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, the fact that autocracies such
as China are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point
toward integration and accommodation in the future. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means
that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rule-based economic system . . . In the case of
China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in
importing states.18 While some argue that a globally-ascending China is a revisionist power seeking important
changes in the international system, most agree that China seeks the desired change in a patient, prudent, and
peaceful fashion. Americans who deal in foreign affairs especially appreciate the fact that Chinese strategic thinking has
moved away from notions of a global class conflict and violent revolution. Instead, today's China emphasizes a
peaceful rising in global influence while seeking a harmonious world. Former Secretary of State Zbigniew
Brzezinski asserts that the Chinese emphasis on harmony can serve as a useful point of departure for U.S.-
Chinese relations during the Obama presidency. Thus, it is a task that President-elect Barack Obama who is a conciliator at heart
should find congenial, and which President Hu Jintao who devised the concept of a harmonious world should welcome. It is a mission
worthy of the two countries with the most extraordinary potential for shaping our collective future.19 In Latin America, Chinas
engagements have been mostly politically neutral. Despite its disagreements with the United States about many issues,
Beijing has adopted a low-key approach and managed to avoid any public confrontation with the
United States in the Western Hemisphere.20 Nevertheless, China's growing clout is hard to miss. At the APEC summit in
2008, all eyes were on Hu Jintao as he declared that China now wants to show it is a responsible stakeholder in the region, according to Dan
Erikson, a specialist in ChinaLatin American relations from the Inter-American Dialogue.21 Compared with Russias involvement in Latin
America, which includes holding joint military exercises with Venezuela and selling arms to the region, Chinas engagement has
been decidedly dovish. Although the neo-conservatives loudly worry about Chinas close relations with
Venezuela, *the+ oil interest actually plays a rather limited role in SinoVenezuelan ties in the foreseeable
future.22 This is because while China is obviously keen to enter into oil agreements with Venezuela, Beijing has
shown no intention to be drawn into any tensions between Hugo Chavez and the U.S. government

China isnt threatening in Latin America
Xiaoxia 13 [Wang Xiaoxia () April 27, 2013 Economic Observer Online In Americas Backyard:
China in Latin America http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml]//BMitch
Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in Latin America in a
number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil, copper and
soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum was created that included the participation of
several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin Americas second
biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation agreements
with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy. According to the latest statistics of
the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of
8.18 percent. This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin Americas single
dominant trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion. Some prominent Chinese
have condemned the United States' high-profile Return to Asia strategy, with its intention of containing
China's front door. Shouldnt the United States, which put forward the Monroe Doctrine two centuries ago, also question
how China is quietly arriving in Americas backyard? An American Blind Spot? In their book America's Blind Spot: Chavez,
Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J. Economides avoid the usual patter of linking South Americas "China factor" with some sordid
conspiracy theory. Instead, they investigate Latin Americas subtle choice between China and the United States, attributing Washington's
weakened influence in the region to its failure in foreign policy and economic development, while China rises on the back of globalization. Since
1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and declared its sphere of influence to Europeans, it has maintained the unique position
of the United States in the Americas. Military intervention has always served as the most important tool for the United States. Especially after
the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used military means largely without restraint.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external challenges such as the threat of global terrorism. Latin Americas
strategic significance has quickly slipped to a secondary and more local ranking. The United States has shifted its focus in Latin America to
specific issues such as illegal immigration and drug smuggling. The realism that ran through Americas foreign policy during the Cold War has
gradually transformed towards idealism, which in consequence weakens its influence in Latin America. Under the doctrine of realism,
America broke any illusion of moral constraint in its foreign interventions; the protection of American
interests was its pragmatic principle. Washington didnt care that some Latin American countries were
dictatorial or that they violated human rights, as long as their leaders firmly stood on the side of the
anti-Communist camp. Since adopting idealism, America considers that whatever is best for itself is
also best for the rest of the world. Its foreign policy is aimed at maintaining democracy, human rights
and a free market economy around the world. America began to demand that its former dictatorial allies quit their
attachment to power and carry out a transition to democracy. Since 1989, the U.S. has pushed Latin American countries -
many facing a severe debt crisis - to accept the Washington Consensus oriented by market economy theory. The
ultimate goal set by this theory may not be a problem. However, it did not pull Latin America out of the quagmire of its
lost decade of the 1980s. In the 1990s, Latin America suffered another severe economic downturn,
which exacerbated the division between the rich and the poor, leading to serious social problems. The idealism exported by the
United States intensified the existing contradictions in Latin American society, and eventually led to
the downfall of most of the brutal totalitarian military governments. China as a New Favorite Initially, Chinas
activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in
infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries
and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has
gradually become a problem that plagues China; and its exchanges with Latin America thus are
endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most
powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-
largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security.
Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for
China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links
of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and
Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and
American scholars, China's current practice isnt much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that
China doesnt care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries.
All China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is
exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of
certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States. The
global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United
States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-for-
assets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it
to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence?
Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer.
China's involvement in Latin America doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings
benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that
it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil
production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood; and to a
certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is
not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American
economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that
the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

No U.S. China war- our interests are aligned- Xi visit proves
Zhang and Shi 13 [Yuhan Zhang is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a former
researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Lin Shi is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a former consultant at the World Bank.
Conflict between China and the US is not inevitable http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/13/conflict-between-china-and-the-us-is-not-
inevitable/]//BMitch
President Xi Jinpings official visit to the United States in February 2012 as Chinas then vice president suggests that
conflict between the two states is not inevitable. This goes against the ideas of American offensive
realists, who have publicly argued that conflict is an unavoidable consequence of the will to survive, which requires large
states to maximise power and pursue hegemony in their own regions. But Xis visit saw China and the United States reach
consensus on a number of important issues. They agreed to prioritise shared interests and mutual
respect as a means of ushering in an era of winwin cooperation between China and the United States. Xis visit had
three main goals: first, to strengthen trust between the two powers through an official visit; second, to familiarise
American leaders with the basic political, economic, ideological and diplomatic style of Chinas next
leader; and, third, to consolidate SinoUS trade relations. The timing of Xis visit coincided with the 40th anniversary of
President Nixons visit to China and the publication of the SinoUS joint communiqus, which played a critical role in normalising relations
between the two states. Upon his arrival, Xi met with a number of former secretaries, including former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and
Madeleine Albright and former secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson. Xi also met with many policy makers from the current administration,
includingPresident Barack Obama. His visit laid a good foundation for the positive development of China-US political and economic relations for
at least the next decade. There are two key reasons for this. The first is that the visit successfully delivered the message that
China is willing to engage in political communication and economic cooperation with the United
States. During meetings with current and former politicians, business people and the media, Xi repeatedly stressed the
importance of cooperation and friendship between China and the United States. This message is
necessary to reduce the possibility of future strategic misunderstandings, especially because the
United States, as a representative Western capitalist power, has been seen as ideologically prejudiced
against China since the Cold War. It is also timely because Chinas rapid economic growth in the past
decades has arguably aroused envy and fear in the United States and some European countries, which
have been suffering from the consequences of the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis.
These anxieties have hardly been assuaged by statements from a growing pool of commentators who predict that China will soon equal the
United States in economic power, and will eventually supplant its hegemony. But this prediction fails to account for the philosophical grounding
of Chinese leaders, which indicates that China has neither the intention nor the capacity to challenge Americas hegemony. As Mao Zedong
pointed out in the early 1960s, We *China+ are a socialist country. We do not invade other countries, not in 100 years or 1000 years. Maos
successors have consistently reiterated this principle and repeated many times that China will never seek hegemony. Xis visit served as another
reminder that Chinas and Americas interests are in many ways aligned, and that there is considerable
scope for the largest advanced economy and the largest emerging economy in the world to establish a
new type of partnership. Secondly, Xis visit helped to further China-US trade and economic relations. In
recent years, as part of Chinas going out strategy, more and more state-owned enterprises and private companies in China have engaged in
mergers and acquisitions activities in North America and Europe, with the intention of absorbing Western advanced technologies and
management techniques. After Xis visit to the US, hundreds of accompanied Chinese entrepreneurs have now moved closer to possessing an
accurate understanding of local policies and the investment environment in America. This deepening of China-US relations will encourage more
Chinese enterprises to invest in the United States. High-tech, clean energy and manufacturing industries are bound to become new hotbeds of
bilateral cooperation in the next few years. The trade orders signed in Iowa and California by Xis team also included preferential agricultural
policies for American farmers, which have been welcomed and endorsed by the federal government, state governments and the American
public. Admittedly, the 2012 US presidential election campaign saw candidates from both the Democratic and the Republican parties score
political points by criticising many of Chinas policies, including its exchange rate and trade policies. But, overall, Xis visit indicated
that the future of China-US relations under his presidency will be shaped by cooperation, despite the
intrusion of domestic politics.
No SOI Good Turn
No negative impact to China influence
Xiaoxia 13 (Wang, staff writer and economic observer at Worldcrunch. In Americas Backyard: Chinas Rising Influence in Latin
America. Worldcrunch. 6 May 2013 http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-
america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States,
but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with
Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing
countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but
they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these
countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug
trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a
multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American
economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that
the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

China doesnt pose a threat
Hanna, 2012 (Don, Managing director of Global Liquid Markets Research at Fortress Investment Group
Does China represent an economic and political threat to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere?
January 11, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254)

Chinas emergence as a global economic force, surpassing in many ways the political influence the country wielded in the
1950s and 1960s, is a development with profound and multifaceted implications for the Western
Hemisphereimplications that arent sensibly encapsulated in terms like threat or opportunity. The
important issue for the people of the Western Hemisphere is to understand the nature of those implications and to respond in a fashion that
magnifies the gains for the region from Chinas astonishing emergence. Demonizing (or sanctifying) China is not a sensible
response. One crucial aspect to understand about Chinas emergence is that it is not an emergence,
but a reemergence. Prior to Europes industrial revolution, global income was distributed largely on the basis of population because
technologyand hence labor productivitydidnt differ much. Chinas reemergence, then, owes much to its ability to put
in place policies that have allowed it to catch up with frontiers of technology and improved
productivity. Learning which elements of Chinas success can be replicated should be a welcome spur to development in
the Western Hemisphere . Another crucial aspect of China is its sheer sizewith all the demands that creates on resources and the
environment. Higher terms of trade for commoditiesa boon to the regions commodity producersowe much to the surge in Chinas
economy. At the same time, Chinas surging greenhouse gas emissions, among the highest in the world, highlight the urgency of a coherent,
global program to control such emissions. Chinas sheer size, though, makes it more likely that the country will realize that its own actions will
matter in solving this global problem. The Western Hemisphere needs to contribute to the fashioning of global
institutions that can accommodate Chinas reemergence, providing an opportunity for China to share
in the burdens of global macroeconomic, political and environmental stability that come with its
resurgence.


A2: Heg Turn
Chinese regional presence doesn't challenge US regional security or hegemony
Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good
Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)

Since the granting of port concessions in Panama to the Hong-Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa in 1999, Chinese military
engagement with Latin America has been one of the most broadly discussed, but misunderstood, dimensions of PRC activities
in the region.2 The PRCs military initiatives in Latin America are arguably not the largest or most strategi-
cally significant part of its rapidly expanding interac- tions with the region. Nor do they visibly threaten the
United States or undermine pro-Western regimes in the same fashion as Soviet military engagement
with Latin America during the Cold War. The initiatives, however, are significant and growing, and continue to be a key to the
evaluation by U.S. decisionmakers as to whether the Chinese presence in Latin America constitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.
China will not harm regional US interests
Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good
Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)

In general, as this section has suggested, the course taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin America in
the medium or long term is likely to dif- fer significantly from that witnessed with respect to Soviet military
activities in the region during the Cold War. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain from overtly
provocative activities, such as the establish- ment of bases with a significant Chinese presence, overt
military assistance to groups trying to overthrow a regime, unilateral military intervention in the
region in a contested leadership situation, or participation in anti-US military alliances.

A2: LA SOI Causes War
China wont go to war with the US rise is peaceful
Jenkins, 10 - Professor of International Development at the University of East Anglia (Rhys, Chinas
Global Expansion and Latin America, Cambridge Journals, 2010,
http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)//KG
Chinas main objectives in Latin America are to obtain secure sources of raw materials and market
access for its manufactured goods. It therefore has an interest in continuing economic and political
stability in the region, and would not want to undermine this through a confrontation with the United
States. Populist nationalism in Latin America, although historically directed against the United States,
could also adversely aect Chinese interests in the region. The Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, for
example, expressed concerns over the implications for his countrys oil interests of institutional
uncertainties created by the revision of the countrys constitution and bilateral investment
agreements.66 Another factor that inuences Chinas policy towards the region is a recognition that its
relationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America
or any individual Latin American country, both economically and politically.67 As a result, Chinas
policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological . Far from allying itself
strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinese government has
consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wing military regimes in the past and
democratically elected governments of dierent political hues more recently. China has not been keen
to be identied closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by President Chavez in Venezuela and has
given more attention to its relations with countries with which it has important economic links, such as
Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of developing relationships with countries that
will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which may not
remain in power.


Poverty, Environment, Terrorism
China Influence solves poverty, environment, violence, and terrorism
Weiwei 12 (Zhang, Chinese professor of international relations at Fudan University, and a senior
research fellow at the Chunqiu Institute. He was a senior fellow at the Centre for Asian Studies,
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and a visiting professor at the Geneva
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, The rise of China's political soft power, September
4
th
, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm)
For all of the above questions, China's soft power has been a guiding light. "Soft power" does not only include cultural items like
martial arts and Chinese food, but also political soft power, political values and China's governance model. As China plays an increasingly
significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The
world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus
far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore
brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-
dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of
resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in
poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast,
China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which
enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be
helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting
democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global
security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese
system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root
causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is
intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their
own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The
Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect
other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why
few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its
"self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most
obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse
gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant
lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental
ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its
unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating
poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its
citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not
only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the
rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist
developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to
surprise the world.



China Econ

Chinese influence key to secure Latin American resources key to growth.
Lettieri 5. [Michael, research associate, "Bush goes to Beijing, China goes to Latin America" Council on Hemispheric Affairs -- November 14
-- www.coha.org/bush-goes-to-beijing-china-goes-to-latin-america/]

Latin Americas Strategic Importance to China As Chinas economy has boomed, racking up continuous growth
rates of 9%, and its population has become increasingly urbanized, the countrys need for raw materials has skyrocketed.
The need was exacerbated by the decision to become a fully motorized consumer economy, meaning that in short order China would require in
the order of twice of its present level of consumption of petroleum. It is relevant to note that today China is the third largest manufacturer of
automobiles in the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that according to the Washington Post, Beijing has estimated that by 2020 the country
would need 600 million tons of crude oil annually. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in a report in Februarys issue of Poder magazine,
China has displaced the United States as the worlds largest consumer of most industrial raw materials,
including copper, aluminum, nickel, platinum, and iron ore. An Embarrassment of Riches Latin America offers in abundance
many of those key resources now coveted by China, and its history and experience of serving as a raw-
goods-exporting economic enclave for the industrialized metropolis be it Spain, the U.K. or the U.S., has been at different stages
of its history further enhances the regions appeal to Beijing. In its eagerness to secure access to the Latin
American resources it so prizes, the PRC has skillfully wielded its economic soft power to convince
regional governments to amicably open up their countries to Chinese penetrations. Not that much persuasion
was necessary, considering the desire of countries like Brazil to find an outside foreign partner capable of counterbalancing the U.S.

Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse, war over Taiwan and CCP collapse
Lewis 8. [Dan, Research Director Economic Research Council, The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse, World Finance, 5/13,
http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]

In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the worlds largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the
brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned China Hands rejected Changs thesis outright. In a very real
sense, they were of course right. Chinas expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After
notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two
Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly
engaged in agriculture. The latter which we in the West hear very little about are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not
necessarily spell an impending cataclysm after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For
many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but
not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of
Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise fuelled not
only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of
their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the Citys most accurate and
respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations
such as the UK. Quite simply, Chinas undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and
keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward
revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease Chinas rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly
depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt
servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in
Chinas economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep Chinas society stable ie to
manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the
minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the
massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real
discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesnt end there. That
will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at
least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions so far. But when multi-ethnic communist
countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that
they dont become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. Theres a very real chance that
China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union chaos, civil unrest and internecine war.
In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by
going to war with Taiwan whom America is pledged to defend.

CCP collapse Goes nuclear and draws in the US.
Fisher 11 (Max, Associate Editor at the Atlantic, Editor of the International Channel, 5 Most Likely Ways the US and China Could Spark
Accidental Nuclear War)
(4) China or India occupies disputed territory. In 1962, China seized a disputed district called Tawang along its border with India. Since then,
China hasn't shown much interest in using military force to invade disputed territory. But Indian politics have become
increasingly nationalist and its leaders insecure about the rising Chinese power. India's decades-long
territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir -- which came very close to sparking nuclear war in the 1990s -- means
that India is extremely sensitive about its borders. It's not hard to foresee an erratic Indian politician
or a twitchy general trying to preempt some imagined Chinese invasion of a disputed territory. If that
happens, China's response could easily escalate the stand-off, whether intentionally or not. India, like China, not yet
clarified precisely when it will and will not consider using nuclear weapons. The U.S., a close ally of India, would probably be
compelled to step in -- as it has between India and Pakistan. But that might add to the volatility and the ways
things could spiral out of control.Photo: Indian army Brahmos missile launcher passes on a flotilla towards the India Gate
memorial during rehearsal for the Republic Day parade in New Delhi.
Strong Chinese growth key to solve Asian stability, North Korea, prolif, and terrorism.
Krawitz 10. *Howard M., Visiting Senior Fellow @ NDU, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Chinas trade opening and implications for
regional stability The Peoples Liberation Army and China in Transition National Defense University Press --
http://www.scribd.com/doc/3099389/the-peoples-liberation-army-and-china-in-transition]

A strong services sector, and the millions of jobs it will create, would not only support a real middle class but also slow
growth in Chinas chronically unemployed underclass, a worrisome source of destabilizing social pres- sure. China must
place over 10 million new workers into the economy every year. It must also find jobs for an estimated 150 million unemployed migrants, a
number expected to swell by at least 5 to 6 million a year. Again, domestic stability is the issue. Domestic stability in China
benefits America. Comfortable, prosperous Chinese citizens are more likely to share concerns similar to those Americans have and be
more willing to cooperate on the range of issues relating to such concerns. For example, China already shows increased interest
in working with U.S. officials and private experts on environmental problems (for example, pollution, hazardous
waste, and transportation), drug trafficking, medicine, and public health. These are now issues of real concern for Chinese citizens in more
prosperous areas of the country. They are also issues that transcend borders and have the potential to draw China into the international arena
as a nation with a stake in making cooperation work. Dialogue on matters of mutual interest promotes communication, increased cooperation,
and, ultimately, trust. A wealthy, stable China can serve U.S. regional security interests. A China that risks
tangible loss from aggressive and confrontational behavior should be less likely to favor precipitous
action and conflict. It should be more likely to be interested in preserving regional peace and stability,
more open to consulting with Pacific Rim neighbors, and more willing to cooperate on regional security issues, strategies,
and disputes. Speaking from a vantage point of growing economic strength and military capability would
give Beijing the respect, prestige, and diplomatic stature it craves, making it easier for China to see itself as a player
whose opinion is given serious weight by peers. This could calm Chinese fears of being marginalized or contained,
making it easier for China to find common cause with the United States, Japan, and others in the
region in maintaining calm and promoting dialogue on Korean Peninsula security issues, combating
international terrorism and piracy, and perhaps even becoming more involved in curbing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.


AT No CCP collapse

Econ decline Causes CCP collapse.
Cheng 9. *Li, research director and senior fellow at the Brookings Institutions John L. Thornton China Center, "China's Team of Rivals"
Foreign Policy -- March 1 -- www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/16/china_s_team_of_rivals]

The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Partys leadership in Beijing, are worried. What
was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall. Exports, critical to Chinas searing
economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of
2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the countrys unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese
stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, is a test of our ability to control a complex situation,
and also a test of our partys governing ability.With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks
vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the partys legitimacy has relied upon its ability
to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth
rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest
could erupt. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer Chinas massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them
through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped
to handle an economic crisis of this magnitudeand survive the political challenges it will bring. This year marks the 60th anniversary
of the Peoples Republic, and the ruling party is no longer led by one strongman, like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.
Instead, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, Chinas most powerful body, are run by two informal coalitions that
compete against each other for power, influence, and control over policy. Competition in the Communist Party is, of course, nothing new. But the jockeying
today is no longer a zero-sum game in which a winner takes all. It is worth remembering that when Jiang Zemin handed the
reins to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002, it marked the first time in the republics history that the transfer of power didnt involve bloodshed or purges. Whats
more, Hu was not a protg of Jiangs; they belonged to competing factions. To borrow a phrase popular in Washington these days, post-Deng China
has been run by a team of rivals. This internal competition was enshrined as party practice a little more than a year ago. In October 2007,
President Hu surprised many China watchers by abandoning the partys normally straightforward succession procedure and
designating not one but two heirs apparent. The Central Committee named Xi Jinping and Li Keqiangtwo very different
leaders in their early 50sto the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, where the rulers of China are groomed. The future roles of these two
men, who will essentially share power after the next party congress meets in 2012, have since been refined: Xi will be the candidate to succeed the
president, and Li will succeed Premier Wen Jiabao. The two rising stars share little in terms of family background, political association,
leadership skills, and policy orientation. But they are each heavily involved in shaping economic policyand they are expected to lead the two
competing coalitions that will be relied upon to craft Chinas political and economic trajectory in the
next decade and beyond.

AT No CCP Lashout

nuclear war.
Yee and Storey 2. [Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist University
and Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and
Reality, p. 5+

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC,
resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring
countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional
stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of
its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid
industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central governments ability to
govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese
refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a
collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of Chinas neighbours. A
fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario nuclear weapons falling into the
hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also
pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.


Biological and chemical lashout.
Rexing 5. (San Epoch Times International August 3
rd
-- http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life
. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with
seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The speech, free of all disguises, lets the public see
the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate
attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who
demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who
blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCPs
bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and
gamble with their lives.

China-India war.
Cohen 2. (Stephen, Senior Fellow Brookings Institution, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South Asia: An Unknowable Future, May,
http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/speeches/cohens20020501.pdf)

A similar argument may be made with respect to China. China is a country that has had its share of upheavals in the past. While there is no expectation today of
renewed internal turmoil, it is important to remember that closed authoritarian societies are subject to deep crisis in moments of sudden change. The
breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the turmoil that has ravaged many members of the former communist bloc are examples of what could happen to
China. A severe economic crisis, rebellions in Tibet and Xinjiang, a reborn democracy movement and a party torn by factions could be the ingredients of an unstable
situation. A vulnerable Chinese leadership determined to bolster its shaky position by an aggressive policy toward India or the United States or both
might become involved in a major crisis with India, perhaps engage in nuclear saber-rattling. That would encourage India to adopt a stronger
nuclear posture, possibly with American assistance.

I/L Aerospace, Biotech, Nuke power

Chinese Sphere of Influence is key to aerospace, biotech, and nuclear power.
Wise 09 (Carol, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, 2009, China in Latin America: The
Whats and Wherefores, http://es.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/19/es.kht015.full)//DR. H

At the same time, as Chinas commercial and political relationship with the countries in the region continues
to grow, so will the influence of Chinese communities, businesses, and organizations now present in
Latin America. Here, a good deal of diplomatic footwork remains to be done on both sides. Ellis cites the numerous conflicts between
Chinese oil companies and indigenous groups, Ecuador being a prime example; the Argentine truck drivers strike against Chinese shop owners
in 2006 is cited as further evidence of a troublesome trend underway in the region. The question of Chinas ability to continue treading lightly
with the United States is another potential problem. Chinas improvement of its military capabilities through the
acquisition of new technology is now a reality, as is the PRCs willingness to form partnerships with
various Latin American countries in this realm. This development is likely to be met with increased uneasiness
in the United States, as is Chinas propensity to increase technology cooperation in areas such as aerospace,
biotechnology, and nuclear power.

ensures regional security and prevents regional conflict
Erickson 4 - Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University.
(Andrew, Seizing the Highest High Ground: Chinas Aerospace Development and its Larger Implications February 21,
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/IGSCwp003.pdf)

Beijings aerospace focus is normal for a rising great power. All states seek security; potential great powers
seek security through aerospace. Countries of significant size, population, and development level naturally compete for great
power status: contingent on regional domination, it confers significant security. Regional domination hinges
on military superiority, especially capacity to determine the nature of conflict and to deter it before it
occurs (e.g. satellite detection of enemy military deployment followed by threats of sanctions if troops
were not withdrawn). Military capacity and societal support for governmental grand strategy demand economic growth. Dual use
potential of most technology unites military and economic sectors. Therefore, both current and aspiring great powers strive to seize the
technological high ground.

Conflict in Asia escalates to nuclear war extinction
Landay 2000
National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Top Administration Officials Warn Stakes for U.S. Are
High in Asian Conflicts, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, Lexis

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are
spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the
global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons,
and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and
diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe.
Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile, said Bates Gill, director
of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. We see the
convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized
security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the regions
tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asias
capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea
attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two
could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international
nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources
indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600
billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.



Bio tech

Solves bioterror.
Zhao et al 06 China National Center for Biotechnology Development (Qinghua, Qing Li, Yihong Hu, Hongguang Wang, 2006,
Biotechnology and bioeconomy in China, pdf)//DR. H

It will be important to establish and perfect the technical system to meet an emergency for the defense
against bioterrorism and the prevention and treatment of the major epidemic diseases, ensuring peoples
health and social stability; to develop the vaccines and medications directed against the major bioterrorist
factors is the utmost goal. Breakthrough is made in monitoring and detecting biotechniques with
rigorous monitoring network and standard protocols and laboratories founded. The physical protection and
equipment reaches the international advanced level.
Breakthrough is made in the surveillance, warning and defense techniques of foreign invading organisms
to contain them efficiently.
The evaluation and monitoring techniques of the safety of transgenic plants and their products are standardized and applied to provide
technical support for guaranteeing the safety of transgenic plants.
Advanced bio-safety laboratories (P3, P4) and standardization of the administration procedures and criteria, providing the
bases for R&D of the prevention and treatment of the major infectious diseases, and of defense against
bioterrorism have to be established.
The code of life ethics for biotherapy stem cell research and cloning techniques, bringing the research,
development and application of BT into the legal system has to be established and perfected.

Extinction and rapid dissimination9 hour timeframe - linear risk
Discovery 09 Chandra: Published over 350 peer-reviewed journals, Director of the Cardiff Centre for Astrobiology, former professor at
multiple prestigious universities Award-winning source of credible, unbiased, and easy-to-understand explanations of how the world actually
works (How Stuff Works, February 19, 2009, 10 Ways the World Might End: A Monster Plague, http://videos.howstuffworks.com/science/10-
ways-the-world-will-end-videos-playlist.htm)//DR. H

[Narrator:] Conventional science holds the deadly viruses that typically originate in other species, and then
jump to humans. Some scientists believe the biggest threat from plague could come from outer space.
*Dr. Chandra Wickramisinghe:+ Looking at thethe pattern of diseases and the how they extract the earth, I would say that every new strain of
virus, new subtype of virus, it has a space connotation to it.
[Narrator:] If Chandra is right, it is possible an asteroid could one day deliver a deadly new strain of plague.
[Dr. Chandra Wickramisinghe:] There is the possibility that sometime in the future, there will be a strain of virus
or bacteria that we have not encountered throughout evolution history that could cause absolute
devastation.
[Narrator:] A killer plague from outer space isnt the only concern. Deadly new bioweapons are also being
developed in the barges around the world. Fringe cults, and apocalyptic madmen could right now be
developing such bioweapons. As deadly as atomic bombs, and far cheaper to produce, infection with a
few particles could mean a slow, agonizing death. It might only take one moment of madness from an
absent minded buffet to release such a deadly new strain of plague. Once out of the lab, this grotesque
killer would quickly begin to spread.
[Guest] Anywhere in the world, infection is on our doorstep, or moving around the world, within nine hours, that virus could
arrive here in London, or anywhere else.
[Narrator:] No one will be safe, as the deadly invisible assassin will swiftly bring entire cities to a standstill.
*Guest+ Theres two features, of actually meeting your cad. And what we ask is, how long is the incubation period. Thats the time between the
time you get infected, and the time you show symptoms. And the other thing we look for is whats called its reproductive number, and its
reproductive number is basically how many people are going to be infected by one person with that virus. If the reproductive number
is high, and the incubation period is short, then youve got a problem on your hands.
[Narrator:] This monster plague, will bring death on an unprecedented scale, economies will collapse, the
medical system will be unable to cope, no one will be spared a terrible, ugly death.
Aerospace

Weak Chinese aerospace industry increases their use of ballistic missiles.
Stokes 10 - Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute., 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran
(Mark, May 20, Chinas Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities US China Economic and Review Commission)//DR.
H

So with that in mind in terms of some of the reasons why they're problematic, why is the PRC relying upon ballistic and land
attack cruise missiles? Well, the first reason has to do with the relative shortcomings of the aviation
industry. This does not mean that the aviation industry and the PLA Air Force are not modernizing. They are. But in a relative sense, under
a program where they've emphasized nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and satellites, aviation
industry in the past has not had this much emphasis as a space and missile industry. When you say
aerospace industry, of course, in China, they're neatly divided between aviation and space and missile.
But it also offers an inexpensive means, a relatively inexpensive means, to be able to achieve their
operational objectives. That's the second reason.


That causes nuclear war.
Stokes 10 - Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute., 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran
(Mark, May 20, Chinas Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities US China Economic and Review Commission)//DR.
H

The centrality of theater ballistic and ground launch cruise missiles in PRC political and military strategy
is problematic. Filling the vacuum created by the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty, the PRC has
relied on theater missiles to compensate for shortcomings in its conventional air forces. In addition to
modernizing existing short range (SRBM) variants, China is expanding its medium range ballistic and ground launch
cruise missile infrastructure. The conventional theater missile build-up has the potential to create
strategic competitions that increase the risks of conflict in the future. China's successes in
fielding advanced ballistic and land attack cruise missiles also dilutes international efforts to stem
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
Nuke Power

Chinese nuclear powers key to energy security.
Lyons et al. 9 ((*Blythe J. Lyons, John R. Lyman, Mihaela Carstei, and General Richard L. Lawson (USAF), United States-China
Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security, Atlantic Council, 3-4/3-6 2009,
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf, Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic
Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center

Both the U.S. and China are pursuing activities to develop advanced nuclear power reactor technology. The 2005 Energy Policy Act created a
program for the U.S. at the Idaho National Laboratory to demonstrate a next generation light water reactors. China intends to
develop an indigenous advanced nuclear reactor based on the technology being transferred by the
Consortium. Both the U.S. and China are pursuing R&D on high temperature gas reactors that can be used for both electricity production as well as hydrogen production due to its high temperatures. The latter programoffers a significant opportunity for collaboration between the U.S. and China. Looking to
the future, advanced fuel cycle technologies will be needed. Given the difficulty of establishing waste repositories, fuel cycle technologies that can minimize the volume and heat load of the waste forms will be at a premium. Increasing proliferation resistance and maximizing the energy from uranium will also drive their development. GIF and GNEP programs specifically address these concerns. Specifically, the Chinese dialogue participants commented that there is a significant need for R&D on advanced fuels that can be remotely fabricated (regardless whether China
chooses between an open or closed fuel cycle). It also calls for the development of advanced recycling technologies (through the GIF program activities) with cost effectiveness in mind. There are a number of major challenges facing Gen IV R&D programs and opportuniti es for international cooperation, including: Complexity of the technologies: As the complexity of the technology increases, the difficulty of achieving success increases. Innovative R&Dis very time-consuming, requires huge amounts of capital, as well as demonstration facilities. Fuel cycle and resource
requirements: Several Gen IV reactor systems will require a closed fuel cycle foundation, which is not uniformly supported by all key policy makers in the U.S. system. While each country will choose its preferred fuel cycle option on the basis of many factors, economics will be particularly important. (Many Dialogue participants discussed the need to factor ways to make advanced technologies more affordable into the R&Ddecision-making process.) The economics of reprocessing, a key element of an advanced closed fuel cycle technology, is sensitive to high plant
throughput. Regional or international centers that provide either sensitive services, or cradle to grave services, could take advantage of the economies of scale that will be needed for the advanced fuel cycles to be competitive. Intellectual property: International, as well as national, laws and practices are needed to protect intellectual property. This becoming an even more important issue as a result of multinational collaboration on RD&D. 4 .4 Regardng Commercal Deployment of Small-Scale Nuclear Reactors While most of the Dialogue was devoted to issues related to
the deployment of large-scale nuclear power plants, recent advancements towards the commercialization of smallscale nuclear power plants was alsoreviewed. There are several potential opportunities for advanced, small, modular reactor technologies to be used in both distributed and gridconnected applications. Such facilities are seen as increasing the flexibility and security of electricity grids. Some note that the smaller-scale designs might provide terrorists with less attractive targets than large-scale nuclear facilities. Small sized reactors also have several uses in
addition to base load electric supply, for example, in providing site power for remote oil and gas production or high demand applications like desalinat ion. In addition, they could provide emergency backup to critical facilities in the event of an attack on the electric grid, such as secure/on-site power plant at military sites or for critical industrial complexes. Additional factors driving the small -sized reactor market include potential bottlenecks in the supply chain for large reactors and the difficulties obtaining a largequalified workforce to build and operate a large reactor.
Another intriguing possibility is to utilize self-contained, easily moved small nuclear power plants in less developed countries. In many developing countries, 1000 MWe plus size reactors are simply not compatible with countries transmission grids. Billions of people currently live without access to electricity and without adequate water supplies. The utilization of distributed nuclear power could provide a major newpower option in many less devel oped countries. There are various proposals for various types of small-sized reactors that have potential applications in
developed and developing countries alike. As noted in section 3.2, the Chinese are interested in commercial application of small modular pebble bed reactors. The Hyperion Power Module, based on reactor technology developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in NewMexico, is a sealed, 27 MWe reactor using uranium hydride fuel, which can be delivered on the back of a flat-bed truck at a cost currently estimated (by the reactor developer) at $25 million per unit beginning in 2014. The Babcock & Wilcox Company reports t hat it has provided nuclear power plants for
U.S. government applications and maintains the industrial capability to offer modular reactors in the 100 MWe range to commercial entities. It was noted that since China and the U.S. have an Agreement for Cooperation and as required by U.S. law, the DOE 810 technology transfer approvals 17 , B&Wand China could cooperate on further commercial development and marketing of such reactors. Some liability issues would, however, have to be resolved first. NuScale Power is also interested in commercializing this type of technology. It is in the process of commercializing
a modular, scalable 40 MWe light water reactor plant. It features a combined containment vessel and reactor system, and an integrated turbine-generator set. It is scalable in that as many as one to 24 units could be tied together within a single facility, with the ability to take out one unit at a time for servicing. NuScale make use of testing facilities at the Oregon State University to benchmark vendor and NRC safety evaluation models and is seeking certification by the NRC. T hroughout the dialogue, participants called for ways to accelerate commercial nuclear power
cooperation between the U.S. and China on a government-togovernment level and throughout the commercial sector. Given the importance of developing nuclear trade between the two countries, and the necessity of ensuring safe and reliable plant operations, pragmatic and integrated cooperation is needed. In addition, global acceptance of nuclear power over the long termwill depend upon viable solutions to nuclear waste and the creation of (even more) proliferation resistant technologies. Both China and the U.S. have the capability of leading in the creation of
solutions to these issues. Specific recommendations coming from the dialogue include: 1 . As it becomes more clear that nuclear power will be an important part of Chinas and the U.S.s energy portfolio throughout this century and well into the next, so too does the need for adequate planni ng. To make the right decisions, energy policy makers need to expand their horizons to consider the longer term, i.e., past 2050, and what fuel cycle R&Dmust be initiated now. 2 . This dialogue represented a good first step to bring together some of the key players in the U.S. and
Chinese nuclear sectors. At a future meeting, the Dialogue could be enhanced by broadening participation. For example, the meetings should include Chinese counterparts to attending U.S. organizations, a diverse range of Chinese utilities, other U.S. reactor design vendors and representatives fromU.S. national laboratories The U.S. government should continue to promote U.S.Sino cooperation, especially in the nuclear area. Such cooperation would be supportive of the ongoing efforts to expanded cooperation on fossil fuel and climate change efforts that will not only
benefit each country, but also developing countries such as India and Indonesia. 4 . The U.S. nuclear industry is mature; many lessons have been learned with regard to how to structure a robust commercial program. China could benefit from the
U.S.s experience to create viable utilities, vendors, a worldclass regulator as well as supporting
universities and institutes. 5 . Commercial nuclear power deployment is a truly global endeavor demanding absolute quality assurance without compromise. There were several suggestions as to how it can be fostered: Increased engineering and construction cooperation by sharingbest practices, utilizing 3D and 4D design techniques, better information management (taking advantage of communications
devices such as blackberries), and adopting standardized barcodes. Assisting with the cultivation of Chinas human resources by increasing opportunities for U.S. experts to do on-site training in China as well as for Chinese workers to come to the U.S. for training at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and utility facilities to witness U.S. best policy and practices. Developing a mindset of management and operational excellence by collaboration with organizations such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO.) The Chinese might best profit from the
WANO experience by all Chinese organizations participating in the same WANO center. Steps are needed by the Chinese government to raise the profile of the profession and encouragethe universities to improve the number and quality of their degree-programs. The industry must continue to coordinate with the universities regarding their needs. China should be encouraged to implement establishment of independent testing labs as is now apparently authorized under the auspices of the Institute of New and Nuclear Energy Technology. 6 . The U.S. NRC should continue
to aid Chinas National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) in the development of its regulatory system and training of regulators. A follow-on dialogue should focus on obtaining more information to how China plans to ramp up its regulatory structure to meet the demands of a rapid deployment of commercial nuclear power across the spectrumof reactors it is currently planning. 7 . As the Chinese nuclear power industry matures, there will be opportunities for Chinese companies to provide services such as uprating, refueling, maintenance and outage control services.
Efforts to establish such cooperation should be initiated in the near term. 8 . To improve the commercial nuclear plant suppl y chain, China should consider establishing a qualified supplier list. In the process, Chinese companies fabricating components need better training with regard to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standards code. 9 . Commercial entities in both the U.S. and China can take advantage of their competitive edges for mutual benefit. The U.S. has technical competitive edges and China has geographic edges vis--vis the developing
market for nuclear power. U.S. and Chinese companies can jointly exploit these competitive edges to develop the South East Asian markets. 10 . One of the roadblocks to the development of cooperative opportunities is the U.S. visa issuance system. The Atlantic Council was encouraged to ask the U.S. Department of State to improve its processing of visa applications to significantly shorten the time needed for Chinese nationals involved in nuclear power to obtain a visa for travel to the U.S. Consider, for example, that France provides a dedicated consulate. It is important
to recognize that U.S. authorities must take into consideration the security of nuclear facilities but that a better balance can be reached. This is a problem that can be solved. 11 . There is an opportunity for international cooperation on the development of a nuclear waste repository based on the experience the U.S. has already gained through 10 years of operation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) facility and through its Yucca Mountain site characterization and licensing activities. 12 . Chinas 10 MWe High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) scheduled to be in
operation by November 2013 in Shandong Province, could serve as an international experimental facility. The currently operati ng test pebble bed reactor has provided an opportunity for international collaboration. 13 . Cooperation on the development of advanced fuel cycle technologies, already underway in U.S.-China working groups, will provide significant opportunities to share rather than duplicate knowledge and funding. Generation IV (Gen IV) international collaboration on R&D is necessary and beneficial for all participants to share costs, facilities and experience.
Specific fuel cycle R&D opportunities proposed by the State Nuclear Power Technology corporation (SNPTC) include the following: Advanced fuel, such as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, and metal fuel; Transmutation technology, such as fast reactor and accelerator driven systems; Reprocessing technologies, such as MOX spent fuel reprocessing, dry processing, on-site recycle; and, Repository design technology. 14 . The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) will provide a good framework to deal with intellectual property issues. If prototype or demonstration plants were to be
built under the aegis of the GIF, it could also provide experience in dealing with legal and regulatory issues. Issues such as design ownership, who would build the facility, cost sharing would have to be addressed. As countries have vested interests in certain types of technologies, resolution of such issues may be difficult. 15 . The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): The U.S., which led the way in establishing the international collaborative effort to develop proli feration-resistant technologies and institutions, should take advantage of its leadership position to nurture
and expand GNEPs international activities. As in GIF, there are advantages to sharing technical expertise and pooling financial resources. GNEP i s already in place and the Obama Administration can take advantageof the years of effort it took to set up the framework for international collaboration while adapting GNEP goals to current realities and domestic nuclear development policies. Consistency in U.S. nuclear energy policies, especially in relation to international efforts, is crucial to foster global acceptance of a safe, secure and sustainable nuclear power. The time for
debate about the winners and losers in the supply of energy is over. Nuclear energy is needed more than ever as a non-carbon emitting
source of electric supply and it can play a role in providing a secure, sustainable, affordable energy
supply. The bottom line is that both the U.S. and China need a diversified energy production platform
and technology portfolio, including a vibrant nuclear industry. Given the necessity of using all the forms of energy at our
disposal while transitioning to a de-carbonized portfolio relying increasingly on renewables, integrated solutions are needed. Recognizing that
this is not an either-or world, cooperation on nuclear energy can lead to expanded cooperation on other energy
programs such as clean coal technology and renewable energy R&D. As the scientists and engineers begin to work
together on nuclear programs, both will find ways to start other joint efforts. Together the U.S. and China have
the ability to set the standards for worlds upcoming climate negotiations. With 2 billion people in the world suffering from a lack of energy and
facing increasing shortages of adequate water supplies, developed countries are in a position to spread the benefits of electricity around the
globe. To do this, every available source of electric supply must be deployed, and the U.S. and China, who will have the
worlds two largest nuclear power programs in approximately 20 years, and who may also be the worlds top two economies, will be able to
lead the way This Dialogue provided a very good information base and an excellent platform to help the U.S. and China to work together to
bring the benefits of nuclear energy to our nations and to the others in this world suffering from a lack of the basics for life. The U.S. and China
are the worlds largest energy consumersand the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gasses. Both countries must increase
their use of nuclear power to help meet energy demands in a carbon-constrained environment. Relevant
government agencies and key stakeholders must educate their publics about the parameters involved in producing a diverse energy supply in
order to understand the worth of sacrifices that will be needed. Cooperation between the U.S. and China will be mutually beneficial. It is to the
U.S.s benefit that China designs and operates a safe nuclear power program. China is a significant market for the U.S. nuclear industry and
provides an opportunity to maintain its manufacturing capabilities until its first new U.S. orders get underway. U.S. industry presence in China
also increases relationships and communications thus improving U.S. security. The unprecedented transfer of nuclear technology to the Chinese
will, in turn, help them develop clean sources of electricity sorely needed to address the fast growing needs of its economy and public. As
Chinese capabilities grow, the nuclear supply chain is reinforced, supporting further opportunities for U.S. companies to expand reactor sales
abroad. American and Chinese companies together can take advantage of their mutual competitive edges in technology and geography to
expand into new markets. Cooperation and leadership are key and complimentary components in the U.S.s
and Chinas efforts to ensure nuclear powers contribution to meeting energy demand. Cooperation on
technology development, human resources, security and safety will form the basis for their leadership
on the world stage. Their combined actions will matter greatly in providing a quality environment
with adequate energy supplies. The world is watching! The Chinese participants signaled their desire to
improve both government-to-government cooperation and commercial sector ties. It appears that the U.S.
government is equally interested in working with China to tackle the overarching challenges of developing a safe and secure commercial
nuclear fuel cycle. By supporting and participating in this Dialogue, U.S. industry and government participants have demonstrated their
commitment to dealing with the challenges to realize the burgeoning nuclear trade between the two countries.

Solves multiple scenarios for war.
Richardson 12 (Michael Richardson, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, 6-7-12,
*Thirst for energy driving China's foreign policy, Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120607mr.html] E. Liu

SINGAPORE The United States and China, the world's top users of energy, are heading in opposite directions. It is a trend that has major
geostrategic implications for the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. is more certain that most of its future oil and gas will be produced at home. It is
becoming less reliant on imported oil and natural gas as it ramps up domestic output and consumes fewer liquid fuels because of falling
demand and energy saving advances, particularly in transport and industry. Meanwhile, China is becoming ever more dependent
on oil and gas shipped or piped into the country, mainly from faraway sources of supply that are often in politically
volatile parts of world, including the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. As a result, Beijing's sense of
insecurity about future energy supplies is rising. China is modernizing its armed forces not just to reclaim Taiwan
by military means if necessary. China wants to protect its maritime trade routes and secure access to offshore energy,
mineral and fisheries resources in nearby seas, including the East China Sea where it faces conflicting claims to
jurisdiction from Japan and the South China Sea, where its claims to jurisdiction are contested by the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia and Brunei. China also wants to enhance its security by establishing an
offshore zone of influence that it will be able dominate, instead of the U.S. and regional allies. Despite America's recently declared strategic
"pivot" to Asia, its relative power and influence is declining. This is unlikely to change even if China's growth slows somewhat. As America gains
energy security in a time of cost-cutting, it will have less incentive to continue expensive military protection of maritime supply lines in
increasingly contested areas such as the seas off China's coast, the oil and gas-rich Persian Gulf, and around the Middle East and Africa,
prompting China to extend its own military reach into the Indian Ocean, through which so much of its imported oil
and gas comes. This will heighten tensions with India. Stephen Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government has projected the outcome of U.S.-China economic, military and energy trends in this way: "If
China is like all previous great powers, including the U.S., its definition of 'vital' interests will grow as its power increases and it will try
to use its growing muscle to protect an expanding sphere of influence. "Given its dependence on raw-
material imports (especially energy) and export-led growth, prudent Chinese leaders will want to make sure that no
one is in a position to deny them access to the resources and markets on which their future prosperity and political stability
depend. "This situation will encourage Beijing to challenge the current U.S. role in Asia. Over time, Beijing will try to convince
other Asian states to abandon ties with America, and Washington will almost certainly resist these efforts. An intense security
competition will follow." The most recent sign of this regional struggle for supremacy is in the South
China Sea where China and the Philippines, an ally of the U.S., have been at loggerheads for nearly two months over ownership and control
of Scarborough Shoal, a reef and fishing ground that is far closer to the Philippines than to China. Such disputes can be contained. Or they can
lead to China prevailing over weaker, less determined opponents. Or they can result in armed conflict. If the U.S. or its ally
Japan became involved, there could be a wider war that would destabilize Asia. Is there a way for
China to emulate the U.S. and become substantially less dependent on foreign oil and gas? Until 1993, China
produced enough crude oil to meet its needs. But as growth surged, oil imports rose. China now imports 55 percent of its oil consumption, a
ratio that is set to increase. Natural gas, the least polluting of fossil fuels, is on a similar trend line. By 2020, China's gas imports by pipeline and
sea will make up nearly 33 percent of demand, up from around 20 percent now and none in early 2006, when China cease to be self-sufficient
in gas.

China war

A war with china is likely in the short term. Causes massive death tolls.

Goldstein 13
[Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of
Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania,
First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations, International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 49-89]

Sino-American crises that could erupt in the near future, while China remains militarily outclassed by
the United States, present distinctive dangers. The preceding analysis offers some reassurance that the interaction of
conventional and nuclear capabilities would limit the degree of instability. Because it is so difficult to fully eliminate the adversarys ability to
use military force to generate a shared risk of catastrophe, the incentives that can make striking first so tempting in a conventional world are
diminished. But because instability in a nuclear world could result in disaster, even a small chance that the
parties would initiate the use of force is troubling. During a crisis, the desire to achieve a favorable
outcome will provide incentives to manipulate risk and may encourage the use of force if only to
signal resolve as each side seeks the upper hand. This suggests that the most worrisome possibility is a
crisis in which the United States and China fail to grasp each others view about the importance of its
interests at stake. If one side believes that its stronger interests ensure that it will be more resolute, it could be tempted to signal
resolve through the limited use of conventional force to manipulate risk. Because the risk being manipulated is ultimately the genuine risk of
escalation to a nuclear exchange, this should be sufcient reason for scholars to provide policymakers with a better understanding of the
current prospects for such dangerous instability in U.S.-China crises. Concerns raised by the possibility that China could one day grow strong
enough to become a true peer competitor facing the United States have received much attention. Although clearly important, that is a
discussion about the distant future. In the meantime, greater attention needs to be paid to the immediate danger of instability in the kinds of
crises that could ensnare the United States and China while China is still relatively weak. Ironically, perhaps, whatever new
security challenges a much stronger China could one day pose, the end of Chinas currently profound
military weakness would at least mitigate the key near-term problem identified herethe potential
for crisis instability exacerbated by asymmetry in Sino-American power. But before any such major
shift in power occurs, there is a real, if limited, possibility that a mismanaged Sino-American crisis will
render all speculation about the long term tragically moot.


US-China conflict escalates to Nuclear catastrophe

Goldstein 13
[Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of
Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania,
First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations, International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 49-89]

In a crisis, the U.S. and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either side could decide that the
risk of escalation introduced by conventional, space, or cyberattacks was worth running . Even though
no stake in a crisis would be high enough for either the United States or China to choose an unrestrained nuclear exchange, some stakes
might be high enough for either one to choose to initiate military actions that elevate the risk of
escalation to such a disastrous outcome.88 As discussed above, both China and the United States have important interests over
which they could find themselves locked in a warthreatening crisis in the Western Pacic. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese and U.S.
statements about the handling of persistent disputes in the South China Sea, for example, suggests that both sides attach a high and perhaps
increasing value to their stakes in this region. Whether that value is high enough to contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that
cannot be answered in advance. The most worrisome source of instability, however, is clearthe temptation to
use nonnuclear strikes as a way to gain bargaining leverage, even if doing so generates an unknowable
risk of nuclear catastrophe that both China and the United States will have incentives to manipulate.


Recent cyber attacks indicate possibility of war is high

Feldman 13
[Noah Feldman, constitutional and international law professor at Harvard University, The Coming Cool War With China, Bloomberg,
6/02/2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html]

Someone steals your most sensitive secrets. Then, planning a face-to-face meeting, he says he wants to develop a new type of relationship
with you. At what point, exactly, would you start thinking he was planning to drink your milkshake? Ahead of the first summit
meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China on June 7, the two
nations are on the brink of geopolitical conflict. As its officials acknowledge, China is a classic rising power,
poised to challenge U.S. dominance. In historical terms, the sole global superpower never gives up without a fight. Chinas
peaceful rise was a useful slogan, while it lasted, for Chinas leaders. Americas peaceful decline will get no one elected, whether Democrat
or Republican. Geopolitics is almost always a zero-sum game. If China can copy or work around U.S. missile defenses, fighter jets and drones,
the U.S.s global position will be eroded -- and the gains will go directly to China. At the same time, trade between the two rivals remains
robust. Last week, Henan-based Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd. agreed to buy the U.S. pork-processing giant Smithfield Foods Inc. (SFD)
for $4.7 billion. This could be the single-largest Chinese acquisition of a U.S. company, and it is reason for enthusiasm. Mutual ownership of
significant corporate assets across borders doesnt miraculously guarantee peace, nor can it make conflict disappear overnight. But it gives both
sides the incentive to manage geopolitical conflict, and not let it overtake the tremendous mutual benefits created by trade. Entwined
Economies The juxtaposition of rising tensions over cyber-attacks and the pork cooperation perfectly
captures the paradoxical state of Chinese-U.S. relations -- and explains why officials on both sides are
struggling to come up with a new conceptual framework to understand the change. Never before has a rising
power been so economically interdependent with the nation challenging it. The ties go beyond the U.S.s 25 percent market share for Chinese
exports or Chinas holdings of 8 percent of the outstanding U.S. national debt. They include about 200,000 Chinese studying in the U.S. and
perhaps 80,000 Americans living and working in China. The combination of geopolitical competition and economic
interdependence sets the terms for the struggle that wont be a new Cold War so much as a Cool War.
If the Soviet Union and the U.S. avoided all-out conflict because of mutually assured nuclear destruction, the relations between China and the
U.S. today could be defined by the threat of mutually assured economic destruction. The economic costs of violent conflict would be
incalculably large. As a practical matter, however, we mustnt assume that economic interdependence precludes
the possibility of old-fashioned violence. On the positive side, China is urging North Korea to re-engage with the six-party talks
and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula -- a sign that the government in Beijing realizes that its unruly ally could do significant damage to
regional stability. On the negative side, North Korea seems perfectly content to ignore its mentors directives. As we learned during the Cold
War, proxies dont always behave the way their would-be masters want them to. It is far from clear that the Americans and the Soviets wanted
their allies in the Middle East to go to war in 1967, 1973 or 1981.


Affirmative

General
Uniqueness
Non-unique: China not projected to gain influence in Latin America
Azpuru and Zechmeister 13 (Dinorah, associate professor of political science at Wichita State University and a member of the
Scientific Support Group of the AmericasBarometer. Elizabeth, associate professor of political science and Associate Director of the Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. Latin Americans Perception of the United States and China. 24 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.americasquarterly.org/latin-americans-perceptions-united-states-and-china

The U.S. profile in the region remains comparatively strong in general, particularly among countries geographically close to the United States.
But what is the Latin American publics expectation of future U.S. influence? Figure 3 presents, on the left,
responses to a question asking which country currently has the most influence in the region. Forty percent selected the United
States. But the right of the figure shows that only 30 percent of respondents believe the U.S. will be the dominant power in the future.
Interestingly, the difference in response rates in regard to Chinas current and future influence is only
marginal (3.5 percentage points), which indicates that important segments of the public perceive
other Latin American countries (e.g., Brazil) and non-Latin American countries (e.g., Japan) as likely
contenders for key influence in the future.

Non-unique- US has comparatively more influence- public opinion proves

Dyer 7-18-13
Reporter for Tico Times, citing statistics from the Pew Research Center
Zachary U.S. image remains favorable across Latin America http://www.ticotimes.net/More-
news/News-Briefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013

U.S. public image is especially strong in El Salvador (79 percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68 percent)
and Mexico (66 percent). Brazilians and Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike in their favorable
view of the United States. Argentina remains the Latin American country with the lowest approval of
the U.S., coming in at 41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of Argentines
surveyed did not have a favorable view of the superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over
the 16 percent approval rating recorded in 2007. Costa Rica was not surveyed for this report. Young
college-educated people in particular reported a favorable view of the U.S. In Argentina, for example,
people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus only 32 percent approval for
people older than 50. Latin America is no longer the United States backyard, but the U.S. remains
more influential than China in the region. All countries surveyed except Venezuela opined that the
United States had a great deal or fair amount of influence over their country and their economy
compared to China.
Non-unique Chinas trade with Latin America is a quarter of the U.S.s and not with
topic countries
O'Neil, 12 (Shannon K., Senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a
nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, Chinas Economic Role in Latin
America, Council of Foreign Relations, October 26, 2012, Online,
http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/, accessed 7/17/13) PE
There is much talk of Chinas escalating economic influence in Latin America. But its worth looking at
what has (and hasnt) actually happened in the three main ways that China interacts with the regions
economies: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and loans (from state-owned banks). Trade is the
most visible and important connection. Over the last several years, goods flowing back and forth have
increased some 30 percent per year, bringing todays total to roughly US$250 billion. This trade leans in
Chinas favor, with a deficit (nearly all with Mexico) of nearly US$100 billion [dollars]. While sizable
numbers, this is still just a quarter of Latin Americas trade with the United States. And it appears to be
leveling off, suggesting that China wont overtake the United States as the regions primary trading
partner anytime soon. This trade is also quite concentrated. Exports to China come primarily from
Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina, and are mainly raw materials (copper, iron ore, lead, tin, soya, and
sugar). Of the goods China sends east nearly half go to Mexicoa mix of consumer goods and capital
goods (equipment for production). Trade with China has expanded dramatically over the past decade.
But it is worth remembering that it both started from a low base and is unevenly distributedaffecting
a few countries significantly and others very little.
Non-unique Despite gains in China/Latin America trade, the U.S. is still far more
involved in regional trade
Malln, 13 (two BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern
Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of Journalism, Latin
America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US?, International Business
Times, June 28 2013 9:53 PM, Online, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-
what-does-mean-us-1317981, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from
$13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin
American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. Chinas
share of the regions trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12
percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its
commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade,
adding up to $560 billion [dollars] in 2008. Notably, though, Americas trade participation in Latin
America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already
surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil.

Obamas recent tour proves non-unique the U.S. isnt done yet
American University, 13 (Jun 10, 2013, U.S.-China: Competing over Central America and the
Caribbean?, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, Online,
http://aulablog.net/2013/06/10/u-s-china-competing-over-central-america-and-the-caribbean/,
accessed 7/18/13) PE
The recent visits to Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean by Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S.
President Obama (and Vice President Biden to Trinidad and Tobago) suggest a handoff from
Washington to Beijing of the role as the regions sugar-daddy, but not a strategic shift in influence. The
presidents visits were similar in their innocuous itineraries. Both got pompous welcomes; met with
real citizens (Xi ate empanaditas de chiverre with a coffee farmer); and praised the bilateral
relationships. Both held sub-regional summits Obama in San Jos and Xi in Port of Spain. Both
repackaged ongoing or recently negotiated projects as new accords. Obama pledged another $150
million [dollars] a year for funding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), part of the
strategy started under President Bush to counter the drug trade and related threats. Xi got headlines in
Costa Rica for providing more than $1.5 billion for refinery and road projects and to purchase
replacement taxis and buses from Chinese manufacturers. Significantly, China is also building Costa
Ricas new National Police Academy the sort of project Washington used to thrive on.

China ignoring Cuba and Venezuela

Economist 6-6-13
Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? Jun 6th 2013
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3

XI JINPING'S first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June
6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and
Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao
did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation,
Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to
Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as
Cuba and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have
been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to
come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?
US perception in LA higher than China now perceived as better for engagement
Dyer July 18, 2013
Zachary The University of Texas at Austin M.A., Latin American Studies, Energy Policy Activities and
Societies: Institute for Latin American Studies Student Association, President (2011) U.S. image remains
favorable across Latin America Tico Times Thursday, http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-
Briefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013 SCTM
The United States' public image greatly improved in Brazil and Mexico in the last year, and many surveyed
said that U.S. ties were still more important than those with China. US-Chinese influence Latin American
respondents said that the United States exerted greater influence over their countries than the Chinese but viewed Chinese acts more
positively. Courtesy Pew Research Center Recent allegations that the United States National Security Agency may have
been spying on several Latin American countries has done little to improve the U.S.s image abroad, but a
new report from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project shows that Uncle Sam has retained a favorable public
image across the region. U.S. public image is especially strong in El Salvador (79 percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68 percent) and
Mexico (66 percent). Brazilians and Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike in their favorable view of the United States. Argentina remains
the Latin American country with the lowest approval of the U.S., coming in at 41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of
Argentines surveyed did not have a favorable view of the superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over the 16 percent approval
rating recorded in 2007. Costa Rica was not surveyed for this report. Young college-educated people in particular reported a favorable view
of the U.S. In Argentina, for example, people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus only 32 percent approval for
people older than 50. Latin America is no longer the United States backyard, but the U.S. remains more influential than China
in the region. All countries surveyed except Venezuela opined that the United States had a great
deal or fair amount of influence over their country and their economy compared to China. While the
U.S. may have more impact, respondents said that Chinas influence was seen more positively than the United States. Venezuela, Argentina,
Chile and Bolivia were among those that saw Chinese influence in a rosy light. During Chinese President Xi Jingpings visit to Costa Rica in June,
both countries leaders signed nearly $2 billion in trade and infrastructure projects, including the scuttled Mon refinery expansion project.
Since Costa Rica switched its recognition to mainland China over Taiwan in 2007, the worlds second-largest economy has gifted the country a
new $100 million stadium and $25 million towards the construction of a National Police academy. Popularity contests aside, most Latin
Americans surveyed said that the U.S. was the more important country to have strong ties with.
Research for the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey was based on telephone and face-to-face interviews under the supervision of the
Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Click here for a full breakdown of method by country.

US maintains influence Culture and economic advantages

Ben-Ami 6-5-13
Former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for
Peace
Is the US Losing Latin America? By Shlomo Ben-Ami
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-
shlomo-ben-ami

It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this
seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as Americas backyard; on the
contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to
capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America and elsewhere as well. It is true that US
attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on
his global war on terror. His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well,
at least in his first term. At the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American
leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US
to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to
do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying
arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It
is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond
Americas sway. China is now Latin Americas second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap
with the US. India is showing keen interest in the regions energy industry, and has signed export
agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in
Venezuela. Similarly, in 2008, Russias then-President Dmitri Medvedev identified the US war on terror
as an opportunity to create strategic partnerships with rising powers such as Brazil, and with the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a Venezuelan-inspired bloc opposed to US designs in the
region. The energy giant Gazprom and the countrys military industries have spearheaded the Kremlins
effort to demonstrate Russias ability to influence Americas neighborhood a direct response to
perceived American meddling in Russias own near abroad, particularly Georgia and Ukraine. Yet it
would be a mistake to regard Latin Americas broadening international relations as marking the end of
US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence
can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe
otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century. A continent
once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible
economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to
foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was
able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only encouraged these changes,
but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and
South America, the USs fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is Americas second-largest foreign
market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94% over the past
six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%. And the US continues to be the largest foreign
investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable,
and increasingly prosperous neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy
one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as
Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on
Irans nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other
countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obamas
recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever.
President Sebastian Piera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other
things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New
Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected
in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon
after. Language and culture matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos influence in the US,
it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let
alone Iran. Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US
influence in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic
vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better
positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these
advantages in its immediate vicinity.
Chinese unsatisfied with Venezuelan investment- backing out now

Hearn 3-12-13
quoting Tom ODonnell, an oil analyst who teaches at the New School University and writes an oil-
industry blog, the Global Barrel
Venezuelan oil a risky investment for China Monday, March 12, 2012 By Kelly Hearn
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/12/venezuelan-oil-a-risky-investment-for-
china/?page=all

The Chinese have not gotten the kind of preferential access they want [to the tar sands], and my
sources tell me they are extremely unhappy , said Mr. ODonnell. In 2010, CNPC signed a deal to help
Venezuela develop a major Orinoco oil field known as Junin 4, which includes the construction of a
facility to convert heavy oil to a lighter crude that could be shipped to a refinery in Guangdong, China.
Although the contract was signed in December 2010, not one barrel of oil has yet been produced,
much less upgraded, said Gustavo Coronel, a former PDVSA board member. So far, nothing much
seems to be happening, except for the arrival of a large group of Chinese staff to the CNPCs Caracas
office, he added, referring to the Venezuelan capital, Caracas. Apart from money, there seems to be
little that China can offer Venezuela in the oil industry, he said, adding that a culture gap will make
working with China very difficult for Venezuelan oil people, who were mostly trained in the U.S. Erica
Downs, a former energy analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency now with the Brookings Institution in
Washington, said the Junin-4 project could be key to Chinas future in Venezuela. If all that happens,
China will be in a position to take substantial volumes of Venezuelan oil, she said. The problem is that
the project hasnt gotten off the ground. Ms. Downs said Venezuela is far from living up to Mr.
Chavezs export goals for Beijing and that PDVSAs claims of sending 410,000 barrels a day do not
match Chinese customs data, which show 322,000 barrels per day of crude and fuel oil imported from
Venezuela last year. Although Venezuelas oil exports to China have grown along with the volume of
oil-backed loans extended by China Development Bank to Caracas, the delivered volumes still fall short
of Chavezs goal of eventually shipping 1 million barrels per day to China, she said. Critics of the loans
say Mr. Chavez is using the so-called China fund as his personal piggy bank. The Chinese also seem to
be increasingly wary. Internal PDVSA documents released by a Venezuelan congressman show that the
Chinese balked at a $110 billion loan request by Mr. Chavez in 2010, after PDVSA officials failed to
account fully for where the money would go.

No future investment- China frustrated with Venezuela

Nagel 2-12-13
Professor of Economics at the Universidad de los Andes in Santiago, Chile and co-editor of the blog
Caracas Chronicles
Venezuela's Devaluation has China written all over it Posted By Juan Nagel Tuesday, February 12,
2013 - 10:06 AM
http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/12/venezuela_s_devaluation_has_china_written_al
l_over_it

By devaluing, the government is lowering the budget deficit, which still lies at a hefty 5.3 percent of
GDP, according to estimations by the Bank of America. Narrowing the gap between the official and black
market exchange rate lessens the incentive to engage in arbitrage instead of importing goods, which
may ameliorate the scarcity problem. However, the move will prove costly. This measure alone means
Venezuelan real wages have fallen, in terms of dollars, and inflation is sure to shoot up. One is left
wondering what other options the government had but failed to enact. This is where the Chinese angle
comes in. In the last few weeks, reports have surfaced that the Chinese, the main underwriters of last
years enormous fiscal deficit, are growing frustrated with their Venezuelan counterpart; they are in no
mood to continue lending to the government, and felt that Venezuela sacrificed productive
investments for cheap pre-electoral spending. In spite of this, reports surfaced that Venezuela is asking
China for more cash.

U.S. strategy deters Chinese political influence

Rotberg 09
Professor in governance and foreign affairs and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict
Prevention, and Conflict Resolution at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Obtained his doctorate at Oxford University
China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence Edited by Robert I. Rotberg published by Brookings
Institution Press Oct. 1, 2009 Page 59

There are few constraining forces that could stop China from asserting its influence. In contrast, the
United States can and still will claim Latin America as its traditional sphere of influence, and it has
explicitly warned Beijing that Chinas presence in the Western Hemisphere should not harm U.S.
interests. This may partially explain the low-key style and nonpolitical nature of Chinas
involvement in Latin America.

Balance Thumper

Non-unique Chinese engagement isnt perceived as balanced doesnt increase
relations
Myers, 12 (Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, China's engagement with Latin America: More
of the same?, Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online,
http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latin-
america-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PE
I would argue, however, that deepening cooperation between China and Latin America is not
indicative of a balancing of relations or of genuinely horizontal engagement. In many cases, the
cooperation itself is limited, or is merely a short-term effort to secure access to new technologies or
scientific methods. In other cases, cooperative engagement should be thought of not as a leveling of
the playing field, but as an element of Chinas ever-evolving economic statecraft. Chinas cooperative
endeavors in Latin America and elsewhere are often seen as intervention in the affairs of Chinas
commercial actors to ensure a degree of mutual benefit in overseas dealings. Mutual benefit, a
guiding principle of Chinas external engagement philosophy, is thought to secure access to and postive
relationships with countries and markets in the region.
Plus, Chinese academic literature proves
Myers, 12 (Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, China's engagement with Latin America: More
of the same?, Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online,
http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latin-
america-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PE
Chinas academic literature on Latin America further illuminates its dominant view toward Latin
America. Of the existing Chinese-language literature on the China-Latin America relationship, the vast
majority seeks to derive jiaoxun or lessons from Latin Americas failed experiments in economic and
social development. These lessons frequently are taught in Chinas top universities, where students
encounter numerous charts documenting Chinas and Latin Americas divergent paths toward
economic development. The economic demise of Latin America often linked to import substitution
and/or failed neo-liberal policy -- is explained alongside Chinas post-1979 growth miracle. Only one
widely-published Chinese-language article looks to Latin America (and Brazil, in particular) for a viable
development model. The article,lingyizhongjueqi, or Another kind of rise, considers Brazils
approaches to dealing with rampant inflation and social inequality over the past three decades,
suggesting that China might benefit from similar reforms.



Thumper
Sino-Latin American relations face challenges in future
Dominguez 06 (Jorge I., Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico, vice provost of
international affairs, special advisor for international studies to the dean of the faculty of arts and
sciences, and chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard
University, Chinas Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American
Dialogue, June, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf)

Chinese academics also call attention to four problems in Sino-Latin American relations, though they stress
that the reasons for convergence outweigh those for divergence. First, there is increased industrial competition,
especially in textiles, where China has been hit by large anti-dumping duties. One reason for its insistence in
being recognized as a market economy is to limit the imposition of such penalties. Second, China supports regional
integration in Latin America and with the United States but worries about the use of trade barriers
against outside countries such as China. Third, there are few cultural contacts between China and
Latin America and few of each others peoples speak the others language; both sides suffer from information
deficits regarding the other. Finally, Chinese academics fear that Taiwan may make diplomatic gains.



Link Answers
Alt cause- external countries have strong influence

Ellis 12
Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research
focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran
The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? R. Evan Ellis From Inter-
American Dialogue May 2012

Interdependencies among the United States, the PRC and Latin America call attention to the importance
for each to consider how engagement with one partner will impact, and will be interpreted by, the
other. However, as noted in previous sections, there are several key things that this interdependence
does not imply. First, it does not imply that the China-Latin America-US triangle should be assumed to
be the most important relationship binding these actors (even though it may be true in some cases).
Russia, Iran, India and the European Union, among others, have important relationships in the region,
including a role in the dynamics of the China-USLatin America triangle itself. India, for example, may be
a useful US partner in certain parts of Latin Americasuch as the English-speaking Caribbean, Mexico,
Colombia, Chile, Brazil and the Southern Coneas the United States addresses Chinas engagement with
those countries. Similarly, it may be better at times to view individual Latin American countries in
terms of interactions and tradeoffs among a multiplicity of external partnersamong them the United
States, China, India, Russia and the European Unionrather than thinking first of a triangle involving
the region, the PRC and the United States. In addition, many of the effects of the interactions between
two sides of the triangle, particularly the United States and the PRC, go far beyond the triangle itself.
Some are best characterized as global in nature, rather than just influencing Latin America. Indeed, the
ripples produced by US-China dynamics on international markets, currency relationships and financial
transactions, among others, often produce effects in Asia or Europe that eclipse those felt in Latin
America.

No trade-off- joint influence is constructive

Ellis 12
Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research
focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran
The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? R. Evan Ellis From Inter-
American Dialogue May 2012

Still, there are interactions for which dialogue that simultaneously involves the PRC, the United States
and Latin America is constructive. Among these are discussions of loans and infrastructure projects
that ultimately impact all three parties. Because of this, Chinese participation in institutions such as
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which it formally joined in February 2009, is a positive
development. However, it is positive to the extent that such participation is not perceived as pressuring
countries that do not embrace diplomatic recognition of the PRC but still find themselves with PRC-
supervised loans through the PRCs role in the Fund for Special Operations.43 PRC participation in such
institutions may be particularly valuable if future Chinese lending to Latin America can be channeled
through them, reinforcing important norms such as transparency and financial accountability by the
recipient countries

US involvement is constructive to Chinas economy

Ellis 12
Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research
focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran
The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? R. Evan Ellis From Inter-
American Dialogue May 2012


In a more diffuse fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and
Latin America, US consumption and business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America enables the
region to purchase Chinese products. At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to the United
States from the region may include goods sourced in China by Latin American manufacturers. At the
personal level, some of the corporate earnings and salaries from these companies naturally go to the
purchase of goods from the PRC, among other sources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally
considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion in remittances sent annually to
families in Latin America by immigrants living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase
of Chinese goods in the region

Triangularity oversimplifies LA relations

Ellis 12
Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research
focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran
The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? R. Evan Ellis From Inter-
American Dialogue May 2012

As with any paradigm for simplifying and organizing thinking about a complex reality, the triangular
characterization is incomplete. Such simplification is a common, and perhaps necessary, part of the
analytical process. The more serious problem with the paradigm, however, is that the nature of that
simplification conceals some of the most important and most consequential behaviors for
understanding the dynamics of Chinas increasing engagement with the Western Hemisphere. Like the
triangle itself, these flaws take on an interrelated form: N The triangle masks other important actors
that must be considered in the dynamic. N The triangle incorrectly encourages a view of Latin America
as a unitary actor. N At its core, the triangle is a subtly neocolonialist way of approaching Latin America
and its external relations. Other actors The triangle concept downplays the importance of other actors
whose interaction with the United States, China and Latin America are also important. These include
India, Russia, Iran and Europe. While the triangle does not exclude these other actors per se, the focus
on the interaction among China, the United States and Latin America tends to conceal how other
states, as well as non-state actors, play key roles in that dynamic. For example, the sometimes
competing, sometimes complementary balance in Brazils relationships with India and China, played out
in the Brazil-Russia-IndiaChina (BRICS) and India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forums, is arguably as relevant
to Brazils foreign policy as is its relationship with the United States. Similarly, although much of the
foreign policy of the Chvez regime is defined in terms of its opposition to US imperialism, Venezuelas
reliance on Russian arms, Chinese money and its anti-US alliance with Iran occupy roughly equal
importance. With respect to Argentina, when the PRC ceased taking in that nations exports of soy oil,
India stepped up its purchases, helping to save Argentina from a much more significant economic
problem and, in the process, weakening the PRCs ability to pressure the Argentine government. In
states that were Soviet clients during the Cold War, such as Cuba and Nicaragua, the importance of
Russia as a partner arguably rivals, or exceeds, that of China. While the triangle concept conceals other
actors that play a fundamental part of the dynamic in the hemisphere, it is important to understand that
Latin American nations themselves generally do not define their external relations principally in terms of
a triangle involving the United States and China. Indeed, while both China and the United States are
important external referents for the region, Latin American countries and actors increasingly look
toward the world in terms of a plurality of actual and potential partners, including Russia, India, the
European Union and Iran. The importance of those partners varies according to context (political
alliances versus economic partnerships versus military sales, etc.). The importance also varies according
to which Latin American country is doing the looking.

Chinas engagement is strictly commercial- doesnt spill over to diplomacy

Arnson et al 11
Quoting Nelson Cunningham, President and a co-founder of McLarty Associates, special advisor to
President Clinton on Western Hemisphere and trade matters, and previously was general counsel to
then-Senator Joseph Biden
China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle Edited by Cynthia J. Arnson and Jeffrey
Davidow January 2011
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt.pdf

Nelson Cunningham of McLarty Associates argued that from a strategic perspective, Chinas interests
appear to be purely commercial. This is distinct from Russias ideologically-based military and
diplomatic alliance with the government of Venezuela, described by Cunningham as aimed at
balancing U.S. influence in the region. Latin American countries may have initially pursued the Chinese
market to serve as a strategic counterweight to the regions historical commercial and political
dependence on the United States. Yet the relationship has not necessarily fulfilled these expectations.
For example, popular accusations have been leveled against Brazilian President Lula da Silva that
China took advantage of him through both the commercial arrangements between the two countries
and in negotiations over Chinas accession to the WTO.
No link Latin America will be controlled by neither the U.S. or China
Valencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, US
and China: The Fight for Latin America, World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Both the United States and China use infrastructure investment, diplomacy, and trade as leverage, but
Latin America wants to be seen as a socioeconomic partner, not a subordinate. The Pacific Alliance, for
example, hopes to become a powerful bloc that can stand up to the worlds two super powers.
Comprised of Colombia, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and possibly soon Panama, the Pacific Alliance
is a new economic bloc that seeks economic integration oriented toward Asia-Pacific markets.
Additionally, the Pacific Alliance can become a springboard for other Latin American nations with a
Pacific shore to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free-trade agreement among Asia-
Pacific, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Canada, and the United States. Being part of the Pacific Alliance is
significant, because for countries like Costa Rica, it would otherwise be an unlikely candidate for the
TPP. Taken together, the Pacific Alliances GDP totals $3 trillion, making it easier to integrate itself to the
TPP and for it to fight for better terms. The United States will still hold the lions share of the TPP with
an economy that hovers around $13 trillionbut an alliance worth $3 trillion will give it more leverage
than it would otherwise have. The battle for influence in Latin America may have the effect of pushing
the countries closer together, allowing them to stand up to both the United States and China.
No link Brazil is key
Ben-Ami, 13 (Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin
America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-but-
us-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PE
This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy - one that recognises the diverse interests
of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world
stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclear program mediated by Brazil
and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to
promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show.
Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Pinera of Chile visited the
White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an
ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada,
and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice
President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after.

No competition for Latin America, China wont challenge US
Global Times 2013 (Global Times-Agencies; daily Chinese newspaper focusing on global issues;
China, US not competing over Latin America: expert; The Global Times; 5-31-2013;
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Ueh3dNKyDMU)
Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson
Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play
to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders
chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence
in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain
area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that
it is a good thing for Latin America.

US faces more challenges in obtaining influence
Reuters 13 (The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America. Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.) http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW
The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington
confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823
Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy which muddies its approach to trade and investment.
Washingtons domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions
that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words as has happened before. China,
meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost
exclusively on commercial terms there.


US will struggle to keep up with China financial struggles
Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey Mallen, covers Latin America for the International Business Times, Patricia holds two BAs from Universidad
Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of
Journalism. Latin Lovers: China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase Influence And Trade In Latin America, Caribbean. International Business
Times 30 May 2013. Web.) http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-lovers-china-us-both-vying-increase-influence-trade-latin-america-caribbean-
1284839 EW
China's designs on Latin America have long been apparent, with imports to the Asian giant surging
from $3.9 billion in 2000 to $86 billion in 2011, as calculated by the Inter-American Development Bank. Now, China
seeks to start buying massive amounts of soy beans, copper and iron ore from Latin nations, reports the
South China Morning Post. The U.S., on the other hand, which has had deep involvement in many Latin
American nations for the past two centuries, has nonetheless been less than consistent in its recent
trade policies, said Boston University economist Kevin Gallagher, who has written about China's incursions in the region. The onus is
on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer, but thats not so easy because it doesnt
have the deep pockets like it used to, he told Bloomberg.

Chinese industries beating out the US
Ellis 13 (Evan Ellis, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an analyst of Latin American economic,
political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with China and other extraregional actors. U.S.-China
Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America. The Manzella Report 7 June 2013. Web.)
http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-as-chinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america EW
Similarly, the willingness of Chinese companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in
Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise
displace undesired Western corporations. Indeed, so long as ALBA governments have not taken action
against Chinese business interests, the PRCs indifference to their political systems has cleared the
way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, including the suppression of press freedoms and the
prosecution of dissidents. Beyond ALBA, Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across
the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to
remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sells
75 percent of its output to the PRC.

Chinese relations with Latin American are neither a threat nor zero-sum multiple
warrants
Jiang 11 (Jiang Shixue is a professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Vice President of
Chinese Association of Latin American Studies. The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations, China
& US Focus, November 3, 2011, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-in-
sino-latin-american-relations/)

The U.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded. First, both China and Latin America have been
opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-South collaboration. As a matter
of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and
development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United
States. Second, it is well-known that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two
decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth. As a
result, China is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with.
Third, Chinas relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be
used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to
challenge American influence. Fourth, Chinas cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is
not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue. Chinas first policy paper on Latin America, published in
November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and
defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides,
as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced. Moreover, Chinas military relations with Latin America are undertaken according to the
following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each
other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to U.S. national
interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally, China does not wish to be used as a card against the
United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American
relations. It is encouraging to see that in the U.S. there are other voices commenting about Sino-Latin American relations. For instance,
Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, also said, Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more
lackluster *economic+ performance. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
in June 2008, Daniel P. Erikson, then a senior researcher at the Inter-American Dialogue, pointed out that while Chinas expansion into Latin
America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business sectors, it is important to note that trade is not a zero sum
game. To the extent that Chinas involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and well-
being in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood. Erikson added, Chinas engagement in
Latin America is not yet a major concern for the United States, and there are few signs of any real frictions between
the two countries on that score. So, President Monroe does not need to roll over in his grave.

No trade-off; China treading carefully, values US too much
Jenkins 10 (Rhys, Professor of Development Economics, University of East Anglia, research focus on
development in Latin America, MA from University of Cambridge, Doctorate of Philosophy from the
University of Sussex, Chinas Global Expansion and Latin America, Cambridge University Press,
http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)

Another factor that inuences Chinas policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship
with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America or any
individual Latin American country, both economically and politically. 67 As a result, Chinas policy towards the
region has been pragmatic rather than ideological. Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist
governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations
with both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of dierent
political hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identied closely with the anti-US rhetoric
adopted by President Chavez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with
which it has important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of
developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which
may not remain in power.

Uniqueness overwhelms the link Chinese military engagement guarantees strong
ties this is their author
Ellis, 12 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external
actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, ChinaLatin America Military Engagement, API International,
February 2012, page 2, Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-
2/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed 7/19/13) PE
For the PRC, military engagement is one tool, among many, for building political good-will and
leverage in a country, in order to make it more likely that the regime will not oppose the entry of
Chinese products or act against its investments. Military activities are useful in this context because
the armed forces remain an important political actor in most Latin American countries, although
thinking of the military as a political instrument is also consistent with both Chinese communist and
pre-communist philosophy. Knowing and being on good terms with the military leadership of a Latin
American country helps the Chinese to understand the overall political dynamic of that country,
anticipate actions that could be taken against PRC commercial interests, influence the political
leadership through military friends where necessary, and anticipate or avoid actions that could be
taken by the armed forces in the political arena that could impact Chinese interests.



Link Turn
Chinese soft-power benefits from US economic engagement multiple warrants
Ellis 12 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics
and is an Associate Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.
The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? Inter-American Dialogue,
May 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf)

In economic terms, the attractiveness of the US market and trade agreements between the United States and Latin
American countries condition where in the region Chinese investors calculate it profitable to go. Chinese
auto companies and other manufacturers investing in the Mexican maquiladora sector, for example, have been motivated in part by interest in
exporting Chinese firms products to the US market under provisions of NAFTA.22 The possibility of countries in Latin America
serving as export platforms for Chinese goods into the United States has also been mentioned in the
context of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and in the process of negotiating and securing approval for the Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).23 In a more diffuse fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and Latin
America, US consumption and business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America enables the region
to purchase Chinese products. At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to the United States from the region may include
goods sourced in China by Latin American manufacturers. At the personal level, some of the corporate earnings and salaries from these
companies naturally go to the purchase of goods from the PRC, among other sources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally
considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion in remittances sent annually to families in Latin America by immigrants
living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase of Chinese goods in the region. The ability of the United States to serve as a
market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the regions receptivity toward
the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin
America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources.25 The 2007-2009 global
financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the
perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and
investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has
occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which
Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention also has been given to India and other emerging
markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran.


A2: Zero Sum
U.S. and Chinese influence arent zero sum recent visits prove
GT, 13 (Global Times-Agencies, China, US not competing over Latin America: expert, 2013-5-31
1:13:01 , Online, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UebisNJtN2w, accessed 7/17/13)
PE
Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming
at promoting China's cooperation with the region. Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and
Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and
Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe
Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media
reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between
the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both the US and China
deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last
week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their
respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to
visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the
area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain
area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining
that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their
respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries,
and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said. China has
embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level
visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack
Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.

Influence not zero-sum, competition for influence normal
Zhou 11
(Jianghou Zhou, Associate Professor of Asian Languages and Cultures, PhD, Baylor University US-China Rivalry Still a mismatch
April 14, 2011 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD14Ad01.html)

China's soft power does not hurt global interests .
There is a view that soft power is becoming more important to a country's comprehensive power in
international society, while hard power is becoming somewhat less important. [13] Since the 1990s, China has
achieved impressive gains in using soft power through implementing its "smiling" foreign policy, providing scholarships for foreign students in Chinese studies,
financially aiding many countries, playing critical roles in many international organizations and meetings, and hosting the Summer Olympic Games in 2008. Joshua
Kurlantzick believes one of reasons for China's success is that China is using soft power to appeal to other countries and position itself as a model of social and
economic success. As a result, China is winning friends and influencing people around the world almost as fast as the United States is doing the opposite. Chinese
government spending on education is still low. In addition, overwhelming evidence suggests that Chinese traditional culture is waning on the mainland. The
CCP has recently attempted to revive Confucianism to help in developing harmonious society, but the
result of this effort is uncertain. It will take a long time for the West to accept Chinese culture. While China's trade surplus exceeded $21 billion in 2010, its
cultural trade deficit is growing. According to a China Daily report in 2006, the ratio of China's imports of cultural
products to its exports was 10:1, and is believed to be much higher today. This reflects that the
influence of Chinese culture in the West is very limited. More importantly, the CCP has not solved the puzzle of how to integrate its
political system, one of the most important aspects of soft power, into the current mainstream of the global order. The US is worried about
China's expansion in Africa and Latin America. In fact, China's policies toward Africa and Latin America
obviously are more economically driven than cultural or political. The relationship between the two
countries in Latin America and Africa in particular is not zero-sum. China is acting similarly in Europe, the Chinese
government has promised to help helping Spain and other European Union countries deal with their financial crisis and to regain market confidence. Ideologically
and politically, the world today is still pretty much dominated by Western ideas and values. Most of the accepted "cosmopolitan values" originated in the West,
such as human rights and democracy. According to Joseph Nye, despite China's efforts to enhance its soft power, the US remains dominant in all soft power
categories. In terms of soft power influence, China is still no match for the US. And there is no telling how and when China will catch up with, let alone surpass, the
US in this regard. Non-democratic China can peacefully co-exist with US. Generally, Western societies view the political system in China as
directly contradicting the core values of the West and see no fundamental way for the two sides to co-exist, because they assume that a democratic government
would inevitably runs in conflict with a non-democratic one. However, this is a misconception. A democratic government does not necessarily make peace with
another democratic one. For example, there are many conflicts between the US and other democracies. On the other hand, a democracy could make friends with a
non-democracy, such as the US and Saudi Arabia. So there is no reason why US could not co-exist with China, non-democratic as it may be for the time being. To be
sure, different nations have different national interests; and every nation puts its national interests as top priority. Conflicts of interest between
different nations are very normal.

The U.S. doesnt crowd out China countries became dependent on China without
having to push the U.S. out
Castaneda, 11 (Sebastian, graduate student at the University of Hong Kong and a contributor to
Foreign Policy in Focus, South America awake to risks of China ties, Asia Times, Apr 21, 2011, Online,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD21Ad01.html, accessed 7/19/13) PE
In the wake of US President Barack Obama's recent tour of Latin America, media reports and
commentators claimed that China has been economically outmuscling the United States in the region.
The reality, however, is that Beijing's economic presence has not come at the expense of the United
States. Although Washington still maintains an overwhelming edge, its influence is decreasing. This
decline will be exacerbated by Obama's focus on boosting US exports to the region rather than
importing more of Latin America's manufactured goods. True, China has become a key trading partner in
Latin America during the last decade. Sino-Latin American trade has risen from US$12 billion in 2000 to
more than $140 billion today (though the region's trade deficit also rose from $950 million to $32 billion
in 2009). Nevertheless, China's relations with Latin America need qualifying. In 2008, 90% of the
region's exports to China originated in four South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru).
The disparity of trade with China explains to some extent the different growth patterns within
subregions in Latin America. In 2010, Central America's economy grew by 4.9% while South America's
expanded by 6.6%. The current trade dynamic between China and South America is becoming a
relationship of economic dependence that benefits Beijing. China is the largest export market for Brazil
and Chile, and comes in second with Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Most exports consist of
commodities such as iron ore, copper, copper ores and concentrates, and soya derivatives. In turn, up to
92% of Latin America's manufactured exports compete directly or indirectly with China's products,
which ultimately results in deindustrialization for Latin America. In 2010, Brazil lost approximately
70,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector and $10 billion in income.

Economics is not zero-sum
Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED
STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association,
2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

In Chinas and Indias Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributorsWorld Bank economists and
consultants, including renowned specialists in international tradecome down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is
not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely
accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce
mutually beneficial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the
security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum
game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin
America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and
indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative
advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in
turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices). Some of the empirical methods used in Chinas and Indias Challenge to Latin
America are nevertheless imperfect: trade data are somewhat outdated and insufficiently disaggregated to drill down to the level of particular
products; there are possibly problems of endogeneity bias and reverse causality (as noted in the footnotes to page 32); and some trade models
employ dangerously simplifying assumptions. However, the evidence is overwhelming that a burgeoning Chinese
economy has given Latin America a measurable boost.

Lack of cultural influence causes decrease of soft power and not zero sum
Nye 2012 (Joseph S. Nye Jr; University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and
author of The Future of Power; Why China Is Weak on Soft Power; New York Times; 1-17-12;
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/why-china-is-weak-on-soft-power.html?_r=0)
As Han Han, a novelist and popular blogger, argued in December, the restriction on cultural activities
makes it impossible for China to influence literature and cinema on a global basis or for us culturati to
raise our heads up proud. The development of soft power need not be a zero sum game. All countries
can gain from finding attraction in one anothers cultures. But for China to succeed, it will need to
unleash the talents of its civil society. Unfortunately, that does not seem about to happen soon.

China and US not competing for Latin America
China Media 13 (China, US not competing over Latin America: expert. China Media 31 May 2013. Web.)
http://www.chinamedia.com/2013/05/31/china-us-not-competing-over-latin-america-expert/ EW
While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some
media reports described dueling visits by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the competition between the
worlds two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display. Both the US and China deny they are competing
with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries
can carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages. Tao Wenzhao, a
fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two
leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the
area.

China doesnt want to compete with the United States
Carlson 13 (Benjamin Carlson, GlobalPosts senior correspondent covering China. Chinese insider: Chinas rise is not Americas
demise. Global Post 25 January 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130124/china-japan-
tensions-Senkaku-Islands-conflict-zone-ruan-zongze EW
Online, nationalism is even more strident. One Chinese web user mocked the Japanese dogs *who+ once again go to their
daddy for support. In Japan, commenters joked Now that the US is really involved, China is scared out of its mind, according to a translation
by Tea Leaf Nation, an online magazine about China. Remarking on the United States, Ruan said Beijing has no reason
or desire for conflict with America. "We do not want a zero-sum game," he said. "We dont want to say
that Chinas rise is the demise of the United States.



Soft Power Low
No Chinese Soft Power- Only an illusion quickly shattered by repression
Minas 2010 (Stephen, Master of International Relations from the London School of Economics, research associate with the Foreign
Policy Centre, London, The Hard Truth About Chinas Soft Power November 24, 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/41252.html)

The recently finished Shanghai World Expo was Chinas second coming out party, so-called, in three years. Like the Beijing Olympics before it, it
went off without a hitch. Like the Olympics, it was widely declared a success. And it was. As an expo a big, public event. But some had
grander hopes for the Expo namely, that it would showcase Chinas soft power. Prior to the Expo opening,
Jin Canrong of Renmin Universitys School of International Studies predicted: The message will remain one of how China's rise is characterised
by soft power. The Expo is a very safe way for *the government+ to show China's soft power, concurred Ding Xueling of the Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology. As it happened, the events that swirled around the Expos closing weeks
showcased something quite else: Why China doesnt have much soft power and why the West,
broadly defined, still has it in spades. Harvard Universitys Joseph Nye coined the term soft power. He defines it as the ability
to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than using the carrots and sticks of payment or coercion. For nations,
according to Nye, soft power rests on culture, values and policies. It is therefore difficult to
manufacture. Which brings us to Chinas problem. Take Shanghai itself the city not the Expo site. It is a
tableau of Western soft power. Young men while away evenings in Western bars, playing not majiang but pool.
Young women self-consciously answer Hello when their phone rings, before launching into Chinese. Expensively dressed Chinese drink at the
French-themed Bar Rouge, perched high above the grand, colonial-era Bund. During Halloween, skeletons, vampires and witches lurch merrily
out of the darkness. The release of the iPad prompted scenes of public jubilation. And those people wearing Manchester United and Liverpool
football shirts are not expats but locals. Its to the great credit of Shanghais government and people that the citys Western heritage has been
preserved and enhanced. It gives Shanghai much of its character and marks it out from the megacities rising up around it. But Western
soft power undoubtedly remains on show in mainland Chinas greatest city. East of the Huangpu River, at the
main Expo site, the limits of Chinas commitment to even pursue a soft power strategy eventually became
clear. In September the Japanese government detained a Chinese fishing captain and a heated row over the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku
islands flared up. Among its various responses, China revoked an invitation to 1,000 Japanese youths issued by
Premier Wen Jiabao to visit the Expo. If the Expo was meant to showcase Chinas soft power, the
cancelled invitation did the exact opposite. The young Japanese were finally re-invited after Japan released the Chinese
fisherman. Even more telling is that, as the Expo came to an end, the standout soft power play came not from
China but from the Nobel Committee. It awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace to Liu Xiaobo, a jailed critic
of Chinas government. President Barack Obama reacted by urging China to release his fellow Nobel Laureate as soon as possible.
Political reform *in China+ has not kept pace, the president said. The basic human rights of every man, woman and child must be respected.
This was a pure exercise in soft power. The Nobel Committee cannot coerce. It can only attract. It does so through its prestige
and through the common recognition that it stands for certain principles. What happened next? A media blackout punctuated by
official criticism of Liu and the Nobel Committee. A celebratory dinner abruptly broken up, with Lius friends and comrades
hauled off to the slammer. The newly minted Nobel Laureates wife put under house arrest, her phone line cut. And now, reports of Lius
supporters prevented from leaving the country. Behaviour like this throttles the development of Chinese soft power
values, culture and policies that can attract. And the Nobel reaction is hardly an isolated event. China
is still a nation where typing any of the forbidden words into a search engine causes the internet to
reset (The site could be temporarily unavailable or too busy, Firefox artlessly suggests). And yet China has a lively Twitter conversation
evidence for the truism that bad laws tend to be flouted and invite derision and contempt. Chinas leadership did not want the Nobel
Committees criticism. In 2008, it did not want Kevin Rudds. Australias then prime minister addressed students at Chinas top university,
Peking. Speaking in excellent Chinese, Rudd presented himself as a zhengyou, which Rudd defined as a friend who offers unflinching advice.
Rudd raised the significant human rights problem in Tibet and urged China to do more on climate change. Of course, no nation wants foreign
criticism. But ignoring it is not always the best course. Jerome Cohen, another zhengyou and the doyen of Chinese law studies at New York
University, puts it bluntly: Until the party leaders are persuaded to *embrace+ the rule of law, China will not have soft power. Some will
disagree that China lacks soft power. They might point to Chinas increasing influence in emerging economies. And its true, governments and
businesses in Africa, South America and all parts of Asia are trading with China in increasing volumes. But how many of their elites
would consider sending their kids to university in China ahead of the US or Europe? How many of their
workers dream of migrating to China to start a new life? How many of their consumers watch Chinese
TV shows and use iconic Chinese brands every day? How many nations are influenced by China through attraction not
payment or coercion? China has a long way to go before it develops soft power assets that can significantly augment
its foreign policy. But the good news for China is that the biggest obstacles are not inherent but a matter of choice.

China soft power in rapid decline now all around the world
Shambaugh 13
David, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and
a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of ''China Goes Global: The Partial
Power.''Falling Out of Love With China The New York Times March 19, 2013 Lexis SCTM

Washington NOW that China is becoming a world power, it is beginning to recognize the importance of its global
image and the need to enhance its ''soft power.'' It is tracking public opinion polls worldwide and investing huge amounts into
expanding its global cultural footprint, ''external propaganda work'' and public diplomacy. Unfortunately for China, that's not
enough. While pockets of positive views regarding China can be found around the world, public opinion surveys
from the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project and the BBC reveal that China's image ranges between mixed
and poor. And the negative view is expanding: for almost a decade, European public opinion toward China has been the
most negative in the world, but that is now matched in America and Asia. There are likewise increasing
signs of strain with Russia: on the surface, there is considerable harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lie
lingering historical suspicions, growing trade frictions, problems stemming from Russia's military sales to China,
immigration controversies and nascent strategic competition in Central Asia. China's reputation has also
deteriorated in the Middle East and among the Arab League due to the country's support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well
as its persecution of Muslim minorities in far western China, a policy that has also sullied its image in Central Asia. Even in Africa -- where
relations remain positive on the whole -- China's image has deteriorated over the past three years as a result of the
flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, its rapacious extraction of oil and other raw materials, aid projects that seem to benefit
Chinese construction companies as much as recipient countries and support for unsavory governments. A similar downturn is
apparent in Latin America for the same reasons. Finally, China's most important relationship -- with the United States -- is
also troubled. It is now a combination of tight interdependence, occasional cooperation, growing competition and deepening distrust.

Alt cause to soft power Chinese support for dictators
Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)

The lack of meaningful political reform, coupled with Beijing's friendship with dictators in the
developing world, creates a legitimacy problem. As Nye has pointed out, states most likely to project
soft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which now
emphasise liberalism, pluralism and autonomy.76 Beijing seems to express few qualms about cutting
political and economic deals with corrupt and even brutal, dictators. In July 2005, Beijing lavished
honours on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (a disciple of the 'Beijing Consensus'), at a time when
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke of Mugabe's 'catastrophic injustice' in implementing his urban
eviction programme.77 Beijing's close economic and political ties with such regimes help keep
dictatorships afloat and blunt international pressures for any meaningful economic and political
change. In 2004, China also helped deflect US and other Western efforts to take tougher steps against
Sudan, which supplies nearly 5% of China's oil but has a notorious human-rights record, especially in its
Darfur region.78 China's close economic and political relations with Iran will also come under greater
scrutiny as the international community seeks to stem Tehran's nuclear ambitions. In justifying its
activities in Africa, the Chinese government insists 'business is business'.79 Yet coddling dictators can
antagonise democratic oppositions and may bode ill for sustaining Beijing's influence in those
countries. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, for example, has made it
clear that if it came to power it would not honour any loan repayments or deals signed by Mugabe.80 To
the extent that soft power rests on legitimacy, China must also take growing international
commitment to human rights into account or else undermine its international standing at a time it is
trying to portray a more benign image. Not coincidentally the only three countries with a plurality
viewing Chinese influence as negative (Germany the United States and Poland) are liberal democracies.
Moreover, legitimacy concerns undermine China's claim to moral high ground even at a time of overall
decline in US soft power.81 In a Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2005, more than 12% of the people
queried in West European countries see the United States as the major power most likely to come to the
aid of people threatened by genocide. No more than 3% said they would turn to China.82

Internet Censorship blocks Chinas Soft Power
Keck 2013 (Zachary Keck; assistant director of The Diplomat, international current affairs for Asia-
Pacific region; Destined to Fail: Chinas Soft Power Push; The Diplomat; 1-7-13;
http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/4/)

Yet even as China inaugurated its first organization dedicated to enhancing Beijings soft power, a
number of disparate events in China were illustrating why the CCPs charm offensive is doomed to fail.
For example, in recent weeks the Chinese government has redoubled its efforts to censor the internet.
After social media users in China exposed a series of scandals involving low-level government officials,
the CCP adopted new regulations that require internet service providers to quickly delete illegal posts
and turn over the evidence to government officials. Additionally, after trying to require citizens to use
their real names on social media sites like Weibo, the new regulations require citizens to use their real
identities when signing up with an internet provider. More secretly, according to many inside China,
authorities have been strengthening the great firewall to prevent users from employing various
methods in order to gain access to a growing number of sites that are banned.



Soft Power Fails
China doesnt understand soft power well enough to use it effectively its social not
governmental
Nye 13
JOSEPH S. NYE Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University What China
and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power Foreign Policy APRIL 29, 2013
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_po
wer?page=0,1 SCTM

In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of dollars
on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the
institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures.
But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of China's
influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and
South Korea. Even China's soft-power triumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long
after the last international athletes had departed, China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its
soft power gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu
Xiaobo and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost
from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message. China and Russia make the
mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today's world, information is not
scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda
is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little
international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft
power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons
whom it thinks might have global appeal." But soft power doesn't work that way. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it,
it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders. The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can
gain from finding each other attractive. But for China and Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in
their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, that is not about
to happen soon.

Too many cultural and economic differences this is their author
Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics,
Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online,
http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE
The growth and exercise of soft power by the Peoples Republic of China have limits that are important
to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to
U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap
between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each others culture and language, a lack
of understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within
Latin America generally. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas,
from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and
beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings, which contribute
to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most
significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant
portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even
fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although Chinese-
language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning
Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the
two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding
Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutessuch as the China Academy of Social
Sciences, which currently has the worlds largest Latin America studies programand truly multinational
Chinese corporationssuch as Hong Kongbased Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas
Shipping, Huawei, and ZTEthe general knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and
government functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated
programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of
Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived
as not one of usa reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly
integrated, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such
distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from
cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese
are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their
expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor
corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers
harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In the arena of ChinaLatin America
military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such
programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in
exchange programs in the United States are not.
Economic leverage doesnt translate into soft power
Pew, 13 (Pew Research Center, Americas Global Image Remains More Positive than Chinas, Global
Attitudes Project, Online, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-
more-positive-than-chinas/, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Publics around the world believe the global balance of power is shifting. Chinas economic power is on
the rise, and many think it will eventually supplant the United States as the worlds dominant
superpower. However, Chinas increasing power has not led to more positive ratings for the Peoples
Republic. Overall, the U.S. enjoys a stronger global image than China. Across the nations surveyed, a
median of 63% express a favorable opinion of the U.S., compared with 50% for China. Globally, people
are more likely to consider the U.S. a partner to their country than to see China in this way, although
relatively few think of either nation as an enemy. America is also seen as somewhat more willing than
China to consider other countries interests. Still, both of these world powers are widely viewed as
acting unilaterally in international affairs.

Chinese culture projection doesnt help their position in Latin America
Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics,
Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online,
http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Despite PRC marketing efforts, by contrast to the global impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is
arguably one of the PRCs weakest levers of soft power in Latin America, with interest in Chinese
culture arguably reflecting, more than driving, Chinas influence in the region. Although some Chinese
culture is reaching the Latin American mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally
limited and superficial, sometimes based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in
those countries. Such perceptions are often mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a
sense of mystery regarding Chinese culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from the perceived
differentness of that culture and commercial competition from Chinese products.

Sino-Latin America relations fail; Cultural and language barriers, poor corporate
citizenship by Chinese
Ellis 2011 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and an author and researcher on topic of Latin Americas
relations with external actors, Ph.D in Political Science, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case
Study, National Defense University Press, January, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-
latin-america.html)

The growth and exercise of soft power by the People's Republic of China have limits that are
important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to U.S. soft power.
Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap between the
two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each other's culture and language, a lack of
understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin
America generally. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences
limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business
and administrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC
has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin
America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in
English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although
the number is growing.16 Although Chinese-language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time
required for learning Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the
growth of ties between the two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of
Chinese knowledge regarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutessuch as the China Academy of Social
Sciences, which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies programand truly multinational Chinese corporationssuch as Hong
Kongbased Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTEthe general knowledge of the region among
Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and
sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps most importantly, despite the
best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too
frequently perceived as "not one of us"a reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain
only partly integrated, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often
translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin
American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive and
manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship
and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving
the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining
poor relations with the local community. In the arena of ChinaLatin America military exchanges, it is
interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly
stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United
States are not.

China Soft power is infective and fails
DeLisle 2010 (Jacques deLisle is the director of the Asia Program at FPRI, the Stephen A. Cozen
Professor of Law and professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania. Soft Power in a Hard
Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy
https://www.fpri.org/docs/delisle.chinataiwan_1.pdf) SJH

In much of the developing world, the apparent love affair with China likely remains shallow and fragile. The
ambiguous and much-debated China Model or Beijing Consensus is only supercially understood and disappointments that would accompany
attempted implementation have not yet been encountered. The embrace of China may prove little more than an implicit quid pro quo for
diplomatic support, modest development assistance and foreign investment. These are not the most pure or robust forms of softpower. In
some cases and on some accounts, they do not even count as soft power. With Chinas growing economic presenceconcentrated in extractive
industries, low-end service sectors, and manufactured exportscome looming and already-materializing risks to Chinas image in Africa, Latin
America and elsewhere. Complaints of labor abuses, neocolonialism, environmental degradation and
hollowing out of labor-intensive local economic sectors have already begun to surface. Nearer Chinas
periphery, economic integrationdriven bandwagoning with China is easily exaggerated. As more careful analyses have pointed
out, East and Southeast Asian states are wary of China, remain more attracted to U.S. values than PRC
ones, and have combined growing links to China with recommitments to ties with the United States through strategies that can be
variouslyif not wholly satisfactorilycharacterized as balancing, double-bandwagoning or hedging.64 Throughout much of the non-Western
world, seeming Sinophilia is to some extent super-cial and self-indulgent tweaking of a sole superpower that is seen as havingbeen on a binge
of neglect and abuse. According to major global public opinion surveys and inuential Chinese scholars own estimates, China has scored only
limited successes and still badly trails the United States in soft power.65 Second, as we have seen, Chinas soft power resources
are plagued by internal contradictions. To build and emphasize some dimensions is to undermine others. Playing up residual
communism can narrow the relevance and appeal of the China Model. Trumpeting strong commitments to sovereignty can raise doubts
especially when Taiwan is the issue or when Beijing backs pariah regimesabout Beijings claims to be a benevolent, peace-seeking and
responsible power. And so on. Third, key types of Chinese soft power resources remain thin. As many analysts at
home and abroad have noted, Chinas political institutions and ofcial values do not enjoy broad
appeal, nor does Chinas record on socialequity, the environment, international human rights and
other matters.66 The international relevance, content and even existence of a China Model for development are as much foci of debate
as they are rich sources of soft power that can alter foreigners attitudes and preferences in ways that serve Chinese interests. Chinas soft
power remains heavily statist, lacking the popular culture, commercial and civil society dimensions
that provide much of the might of American soft power.67A slowing of Chinas growth rate or rise in its perceived
collateral costs is far from unimaginable and would dim the luster of the China Model. Even continued success could sap soft
power as a more prosperous China would become, like Taiwan, seemingly less relevant to the
developing world. Fourth, China may suffer from a particularly pronounced case of the general
problem that soft power resources can be difcult to deploy, especially to achieve afrmative (as
opposed to defensive) policy aims. The attractive force of a China Model of development or vigorous
defenses of sovereignty or traditional Chinese culture do not translate neatly or more than very
indirectly into support in the international system for likely PRC policy agendas that go beyond
defusing fears of a rising China.68 Many of Chinas high-prole soft power-building international
activities have been pro-status quo (for example, supporting a state-centric international system and
a relatively liberal international economic order and largely accepting thenDeputy Secretary of State
Zoellicks call on China to be a responsible stakeholder) or have served values that are more like the
United States than the PRCs (in the case of humanitarian and democracy-promotion agendas
associated with UN peacekeeping operations and other PRC moves to engage with the international
human rights regime).69 Seemingly more revisionist efforts (mostly on economic issues and especially
with the advent of the 2008 global nancial crisis) so far have been, variously, rhetorical, vague,
tentative and not very inuential. Especially in the closing years of the twenty-rst centurys rst decade, China has given
reason to doubt its will or ability to stick to a line that will maximize its soft power. Some of what
Beijing says and does is bad for Chinas soft-power inuence with key international constituencies.
Examples include: newly haughty (if, on the merits, plausible) lectures about the shortcomings of
American-style capitalism and Washingtons regulatory regime; proud and sometimes strident
nationalism at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and in response to perceived provocations from alleged
foreign-backed separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang; high-prole actions against pro-democracy, pro-
human rights and pro-civil liberties elements; declarations that Western-style democracy is not
appropriate for China; and prominent statements implying or asserting that theworld needs to learn
to deal with China on Chinese terms.


Entanglement Mpx Turn
Turn Chinese involvement in Latin America means they get drawn in to Latin
America conflicts means Sino/U.S. war
Ellis, 12 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external
actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, ChinaLatin America Military Engagement, API International,
February 2012, page 4, Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-
2/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed 7/19/13) PE
Chinese decision-makers, as others around the world, recognize the implications of the emergence of
the PRC as a principal global actor, including the possibility that it may have to one day fight a major
war involving not only Asia, but other theaters of operations in which it has interests, or where it might
wish to hold its would-be adversary at risk. While there is nothing to suggest that the PRC desires or
anticipates such a struggle in the short term, it is reasonable to anticipate that its military strategic
thinkers are preparing for the possibility. To this end, Chinas military ties in Latin America afford
geographically-specific benefits, such as collecting intelligence on the operation of US forces, creating
diversionary crises or conducting disruption operations in close proximity to the United States.

A2: China modeled Mpxs
China is only a trading partner, not a model nations dont follow its policies
Ford 11
Peter is The Christian Science Monitors Beijing Bureau Chief and was educated in England and
graduated from Durham University with an honors degree in Politics and Sociology The rise of an
economic superpower: What does China want? The Christian Science Monitor November 5, 2011 Lexis
SCTM

With the United States it's cultural and political - the two countries share many interests that China doesn't," such as the promotion of human
rights, democracy, and transparent governance, he adds. Indeed, for a government that says it is generally content with the current world
order, Beijing is on unusually good terms with regimes cast out by that order, such as those ruling Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Burma (Myanmar),
and Zimbabwe. "By making friends with dictators, China challenges the [global] democratic system and works at
cross purposes to the international mainstream," complains Mao Yushi, a well-known reformer who has mentored many of
China's leading economists. This does not inspire confidence in Western capitals but is less of an issue in developing countries, whose own
experience with Western governments - under their rule or trading with them - has often left them feeling seriously hard done by. China
has fewer opportunities to exert international political influence commensurate with its economic clout. That's
partly because few governments around the world, and even fewer electorates, regard China's repressive,
authoritarian one-party system as a model to be admired or imitated, regardless of its economic
achievements. Though China's readiness "to voice different opinions from the only country in the world that has had a say up until now
... is attractive to other nations," says Gong Wenxiang, a professor at Peking University's Journalism School. "I can't see people being happy with
a very strong power often supporting dictators. That is not a positive image." "China is a power in terms of its
resources, but it's not a power in terms of its appeal," adds David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy program at
George Washington University. Deficient in soft power, "it's not a model, not a magnet others want to follow." Nor
does Beijing show much sign at the moment of seeking to push any particular model of governance or
political mind-set, which is music to the ears of men like Mr. Mende, the Congolese communications minister. "We don't believe in that
trend of Western powers mixing with internal affairs of countries," he says. "We don't like people giving us orders. China is more about
respecting the self-determination of their partner." That hands-off approach also steers the country clear of alliances that might enmesh
Beijing in the costly defense of other people's interests. Even those Pakistani officials who would like to play Beijing off against Washington
recall that not once has Beijing stepped in to help Pakistan in any of its wars with India, all of which Pakistan lost. "China wants to
make the deals but not to shoulder responsibilities," says Zhu, the Peking University international relations scholar. "We
are far from ready, psychologically, to make ourselves a dependable power." The government's recent white paper acknowledged as much:
"For China, the most populous developing country, to run itself well is the most important fulfillment of its international responsibility."
Recent events in Libya illustrate how far China is from playing a creative international diplomatic role. Throughout the crisis, Beijing was a
passive, reactive bystander, going along with Western intervention. But, focused on protecting its oil interests above all else, it was the last
major power to recognize the new Libyan government. That cautious attitude was on display again last week in China's reluctance to contribute
as heavily to the eurozone's bailout fund as European leaders had hoped it would. China was not, after all, going to save the world. "China's
diplomacy is cost-benefit-oriented, not dealing in terms of global public goods," argues Professor Shambaugh.
"It's a very self-interested country, looking after themselves." One result of that attitude? "China is rising, but we are a lonely rising
power," says Zhu. "The US has alliances; no one is an ally of China's."


A2: US China Relations Mpx
Other Asian player put pressure on US, China to maintain relations for sake of their
own dependencies
Fingar 11 (Thomas, inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute
for International Studies at Stanford University, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council,
former Research director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Ph.D. in Political Science
from Stanford University, Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United
States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations, Maureen and Mike
Mansfield Foundation,
http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/pubs/pub_pdfs/One%20Step%20Fingar.pdf)

The United States and China have an additional incentive to cooperate and avoid antagonistic
behavior in Northeast Asia, namely, the strong desire of others in the region to escape having to make
either/or choices about alignment. Other states want to maintain good relations with both and to avoid jeopardizing the
dependent dimensions of their relationships with both China and the U.S. Thus, for example, Japan and the ROK do not want
to put their economic dependence on China at risk by having to side with the U.S. against China. They
also want to avoid jeopardizing the security benefits they derive from U.S. extended deterrence by
having to tilt toward China in order to protect their economic stakes. Moreover, in a region where balance of power
thinking is endemic, all prefer the benefits they think they derive from their relationships with both of the
major players. This is strikingly different than the situation during the Cold War when all willingly practiced what Mao described as
leaning to one side. No one wants to draw a line through the region with adversaries grouped on either side. Preferences of and
pressure from others in the region will reinforce already strong desires in Washington and Beijing to
avoid confrontation.


A2: Heg Mpx
Theres no internal link to heg their argument relies on outdated views of
international relations
Ben-Ami, 13 (Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin
America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-but-
us-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international relations as marking the
end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American
influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy.
To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century.

A2: US-Sino War Mpx
No US-Sino war
Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED
STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association,
2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)


Some realists posit that conflict, even of a violent nature, is unavoidable between rising and declining powers,
citing as examples the twentieth century wars between Germany and the Allied powers, and between China and Japan. The transfer of
dominance from Great Britain to the United States was more peaceful but facilitated by common political institutions and similar visions of the
desirable international order, and by a demographic overlap that is largely absent from U.S.-China relations. Jack S. Levy argues that
traditional power-transition theorists speak of a single, hierarchical, international system and neglect key issues in
global regional interactions. Specifically, he asks, Will China compromise core strategic interests of the United States at the regional
level, including in the Western Hemisphere? The simple fact of geographic distance eases the dangers that China
might pose to the interests of the United States or, for that matter, of Latin America. Further, as the liberal institutionalist G.
John Ikenberry suggests: The United States is a different type of hegemonic power than past leading states
and the order it has built is different than the orders of the past. It is a wider and deeper political order than the
orders of the past. In this more optimistic view, China will surely seek a greater voice in global institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund and the World Trade Organization; but so long as the reigning powers are flexible and accommodate
legitimate Chinese interests, tensions stemming from Chinas rise can be managed, and China can be
integrated into the existing world system as a responsible stakeholder, in the words of former U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. Ultimately, human agency matters: How will individual leaders in Beijing, Washington, Braslia, and other
Latin American and world capitals interpret their own long-term interests, and how will they reconcile them with the interests of others? Will
they imagine zero-sum games and thereby deepen the challenges to security inherent in an anarchic international system, or will they seek to
avoid mutually destructive conflicts by adjusting to new power relations and by strengthening consensual international norms?


China SOI Bad
Democracy-Taiwan
Chinese influence in Latin America spreads alternative to democracy and prevents
Taiwan recognition.
Follath 10 (Erich, Der Spiegel writer, Chinas Soft Power is a Threat to the West July 29, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/chinas-soft-power-threat-united-
states/story?id=11277294#.UdGkavlwex4)//MM

'21st-Century Economic Weapon'
Beijing recently imposed strict export quotas on rare earths, resources that are indispensable in high technology, where they are essential to
the operation of hybrid vehicles, high-performance magnets and computer hard drives. Some 95 percent of metals such as lanthanum,
neodymium and promethium are mined in the People's Republic, giving Beijing a virtual monopoly on these resources. It clearly has no
intention of exporting these metals without demanding substantially higher export tariffs. In fact, China apparently wants to prohibit exports of
some rare earths completely, starting in 2015. Concerned observers in Japan have described the valuable resources are a "21st-century
economic weapon." The Chinese have dismissed protests from Washington and Brussels with the audacious claim that World Trade
Organization (WTO) rules allow a country to protect its own natural resources.
China, a WTO member itself, is now playing a cat-and-mouse game with the organization. Despite several warnings, Beijing still has not signed
the Agreement on Government Procurement, and it continues to strongly favor domestic suppliers over their foreign competitors in
government purchasing. To secure a government contract in China, an international company has to reveal sensitive data as part of
impenetrable licensing procedures and even agree to transfer its technology to the Chinese -- often relinquishing its patent rights in the
process.
China, for its part, is waging a vehement campaign in the WTO to be granted the privileged status of a "market economy." If it succeeds, it will
be largely spared inconvenient anti-dumping procedures in the future. But do China's Communist Party leaders seriously believe that the rest of
the world will actually reward them for their dubious trading practices?
The answer is yes, and they have good reason to be optimistic. When it comes to diplomacy, Beijing knows how to win. Whether it's at
the The Chinese have paid particular attention to nations with large oil and natural gas reserves, such as Venezuela, Kazakhstan and
Nigeria, but they also cultivate relations with third-tier countries -- countries that the West tends
to ignore but that have voting rights in international bodies like anyone else. Beijing has forgiven
billions in loans to African nations and pampered them with infrastructure projects. It has generally tied its assistance
merely to two conditions that are relatively painless for the countries in question, namely
that they have no official relations with Taiwan and that they support the People's Republic
in international organizations.
What Beijing is not demanding of these countries is even more telling. Unlike Washington, London or
Berlin, the Chinese do not tie their development aid to any conditions relating to good governance.
While the West punishes authoritarian behavior by withholding funds (and, in some cases, indirectly threatens "regime change"), Beijing
has no scruples about pampering the world's dictators by building them palaces and highways to their
weekend villas -- and assuring them territorial integrity, no matter what human rights violations they
are found guilty of.
Opportunity, Not Problem
China has friendly relations with some of the world's most problematic countries, including failed states and countries on the brink of failure
such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Myanmar and Yemen. "For the West, failed states are a problem. For China, they're an opportunity," writes
American expert Stefan Halper in the magazine Foreign Policy, referring to these countries as "Beijing's coalition of the willing."
The diplomatic weapon is having its intended effect. Already, the pro-Chinese voting bloc led by African nations has
managed to obstruct progress in the WTO. Meanwhile in the United Nations, the People's Republic's influence is clear: Within the last decade,
support for Chinese positions on human rights issues has risen from 50 percent to well over 70
percent.
Washington, in turn, is no longer even included in certain key groups. The United States was not invited to take part in the East Asia Summit,
and it was denied the observer status it had sought in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a sort of anti-NATO under China's de facto
leadership that includes Russia and most of the Central Asian countries. Iran, on the other hand, was.
A Model Worth Emulating
Of course, none of this means that the West has already lost the battle for influence in Africa, Latin
America and Asia. While Beijing cozies up to dictators, an approach the West cannot and should not take,
America and Europe can compete, and even excel, in another area: by offering the ideal model of a
democracy worth emulating.
There has been much speculation in recent months that developing countries could be increasingly
eyeing China's blend of a market economy and Leninism, economic diversity and strict one-party
control as an attractive alternative to democracy. The United States engages too little in self-reflection while the Europeans
are too involved with themselves, and both make themselves less attractive as a result, says former Singaporean diplomat and political science
professor Kishore Mahbubani. He believes that China's momentum is ultimately unstoppable. Many people in the West who have always
viewed trade unions as disruptive and given little heed to human rights violations agree with him.
But even though the People's Republic may have become more attractive for some authoritarian rulers, only a few see it as a model. Beijing has
already installed more than 500 Confucius Institutes around the world, in hopes of promoting what it views as China's cultural superiority. One
of the results of a 10-fold increase in scholarships at Chinese universities is that almost twice as many Indonesians are now studying in China as
in the United States.
But whether it's Harvard, high-tech cell phones or Hollywood, people in many parts of the world still see the West as the home of everything
desirable. Besides, many who flirt with Chinese-style dirigisme see it only as a transitional phase that makes sense from an economic point of
view, and that ultimately -- as in South Korea, for example -- leads to a democracy with functioning institutions.
More Forceful Approach Required
What no one in Asia, Latin America or Africa wants is another messianic US president in the vein of George
W. Bush, who believed that he could forcefully impose the American model on other countries. Many
people in developing countries can easily distinguish between pompous arrogance and healthy self-confidence. And especially in
China, people tend to regard an excessive willingness to compromise as a weakness, and the stubborn
adherence to one's own positions as a strength.
Chancellor Angela Merkel, the woman at the helm of the world's former top exporting nation, ought to take a much more forceful approach to
dealing with the leaders of the current export champion than she did during her recent visit to Beijing. She ought to point out that Germany has
to draw the line somewhere: for instance, that it will not support China's bid for preferential status in the WTO as long as Beijing violates its
rules. She should also make clear that Germany will not condone the ongoing industrial espionage activities of Chinese agents in German high-
tech centers, the continued illegal copying of patents and the fleecing of German small and mid-sized companies in China.
When China asks for the lifting of visa restrictions, Germany should ask the Chinese what it can expect in return. And Berlin needs not be
concerned that China could react to such criticism by no longer doing business with Germany. The People's Republic acts out of self-interest
and needs the West about as much as the West needs China. Besides, the Chinese are used to playing hardball.
Ironically, Taiwan serves as a prime example of how to deal with Beijing. In a SPIEGEL interview 15 years ago, then Prime Minister Lien Chan
complained to me that the People's Republic was cutting the ground from under Taipei's feet. He said that, although only 30 nations recognized
Taiwan at the time, that would change. But it didn't. In fact, the total is now only 23 nations.
Nevertheless, Taiwan's new leadership is taking a pragmatic approach and, realizing that it cannot win against China, has decided to embrace
the mainland Chinese. After tough negotiations, the Taiwanese are now making deals with their big brother. In a trade agreement signed in late
June, Taiwan achieved a reduction in Chinese tariffs on $13.8 billion (10.6 billion) worth of goods it sells to China each year, while Beijing came
away from the trade deal with a reduction of tariffs on only $2.9 billion of the goods it exports to Taiwan.
"We did not make any compromises when it comes to our independence, and we achieved a favorable agreement," says Wu-lien Wei, Taiwan's
representative in Berlin. Perhaps one needs to be Chinese in order to avoid being ripped off by Beijing.
Chinese influence trades off with US influence. That undermines democracy and
Taiwan recognition
CRSLC 08 (Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, Chinas Foreign Policy and Soft Power In South America, Asia, and Africa April
2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN25 OVERVIEW Chinas growing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean is a fairly new phenomenon
that has developed over the past several years. Beginning in April 2001 with President Jiang Zemins 13- day tour of Latin America, a succession
of senior Chinese officials have visited Latin American countries to court regional governments, while Latin American leaders also have been
frequent visitors in Beijing. Chinas primary interest in the region appears to be to gain greater access to needed resourcessuch as various
ores, soybeans, copper, iron and steel, and oilthrough increased trade and investment. It is also likely that Beijings additional goal is to
isolate Taiwan by luring the 12 Latin American and Caribbean nations still maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan to shift their diplomatic
recognition to China. While Chinas economic linkages with Latin America have grown, the U.S. advantage of geographical proximity means that
the PRC presence is likely to remain dwarfed by U.S. trade with and investment in the region. Moreover, although many Latin American
countries welcome Chinese investment, some have viewed China as an economic threat, and are concerned that both their domestic industries
and their U.S. export markets will be overwhelmed by Chinese competition. Nevertheless, some analysts maintain that Beijings
growing role in the region may have longer-term implications for U.S. regional interests and influence.
DIPLOMACY Bilateral Relations and Competition With Taiwan Of the 33 independent countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region,
China currently has official diplomatic relations with 21, while the remaining 12 nations maintain
relations with Taiwan (see Table 1). For ideological reasons, Communist Cuba was the first nation in the region to
recognize China back in 1960, while Chile under Socialist President Salvador Allende was the second in
1970. Mexico established relations with China in 1972, and most South America nations did so in the
1970s and 1980s, including Argentina and Brazil, which were run by military dictatorships at the time.
In addition to Cuba, nine other Caribbean nations have diplomatic relations with the PRC, five of which have
had relations since the 1970s. Over the years, China has signed a variety of bilateral partnership agreements with several countries
in the region in order to strengthen relations. The most politically significant of these are known as strategic partnership agreements. To
date, China has signed such agreements with Brazil (1993), Venezuela (2001), Mexico (2003), and Argentina
(2004). Additional cooperative partnership or friendly and cooperative partnership agreements
have been signed with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Peru.26 In the 1980s, China began
to augment its expertise on Latin America through agreements for Chinese officials to travel to the region to study Spanish, and through the
development of think tanks such as the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the
Department of Studies about Latin America of the Chinese Communist Party.27 For many of the regions nations, particularly in the Caribbean
and Central America, there has been a political dynamic in Chinas expanding economic linkages and foreign assistance. China, with
some success, has been trying to woo countries away from recognizing Taiwan. Taiwans official
relations in the region now include five Central American countries, six in the Caribbean, and one in
South America. For decades, Taiwan was a consistent provider of financial assistance and investment
in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to nurture its remaining official relationships, a policy
often referred to as checkbook or dollar diplomacy. But Taipei now is hard- pressed to compete
against the growing economic and diplomatic clout of China, which in recent years has stepped up its
own version of checkbook diplomacy. Since 2004, three countries in the region have switched their
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC: Dominica in March 2004, Grenada in January 2005,
and most recently, Costa Rica in June 2007. Dominica severed relations with Taiwan in 2004 after Beijing trumped Taiwans $9
million in assistance with a pledge of $122 million in assistance to the tiny country over six years.28 Grenada switched its recognition to China in
the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan that devastated the island in September 2004 and destroyed a new cricket stadium that Taiwan had helped
build. Disappointed about Taiwans response after the hurricane, Grenadian Prime Minister visited China and received support for the
rebuilding of the cricket stadium, with workers supplied by China, as well as other grants, support for the agricultural sector, and scholarships.
Most recently, Costa Rica under President Oscar Arias switched diplomatic recognition to China in June 2007 in large part because of growing
trade relations in recent years and the prospect for increased Chinese trade and investment. China is now Costa Ricas second largest trading
partner, after the United States, and the two countries are considering a free trade agreement. Chinas overtures in the Caribbean experienced
a setback in May 2007 when St. Lucia switched its diplomatic recognition back to Taiwan after ten years of recognizing the PRC. The diplomatic
switch was related to the ouster of Prime Minister Kenny Anthonys St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) from power in December 2006, and the election
of a new government led by the United Workers Party (UWP). (In 1997, the ruling SLP government under Anthony had orchestrated a
diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China.) Taiwans promises of assistance to the new UWP government in 2007 includes support for public
health, education (including the provision of computers and scholarships), and development of the agricultural sector. Regional Organizations
Despite the setback with St. Lucia, the PRCs ability to develop and expand contacts with Taiwans friends in the region has been facilitated by a
decision by the Organization of American States (OAS) in May 2004 to accept China as a formal permanent observer in the OAS. The OAS has 35
members, including the United States and all 12 of the regions countries currently conferring diplomatic relations on Taiwan. Some 60
countries worldwide are OAS permanent observers, but Beijing has strongly objected to Taiwans efforts to seek observer status. In addition to
the OAS, China has participated in several other regional organizations. Dating back to 1975, China has often sent its observers to the annual
meetings of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the organization set up in the
aftermath of the 1967 signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in the region. The PRC has been an observer since 1994 to
the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), a 12-member regional organization focusing on trade integration and the goal of a common
market. China is a member of the East Asia-Latin American Cooperation Forum (FOCALAE), an organization first established in 2001 that brings
together ministers and officials from 33 countries from the two regions for strengthening cooperation in such areas as education, science and
technology, and culture. The PRC also is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that annually brings together leaders
of 21 Pacific rim na tions (including Taiwan as Chinese Taipei) as well as the Latin American nations of Chile, Mexico, and Peru. More recently,
in March 2007, China signed an agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to formalize talks on the PRCs request to become
an IDB member. The bank has launched an internal discussion on whether to accept China as a member. If accepted, China would join Japan
and Korea to become the third Asian country to join the IDB. China is already a member of the Caribbean Development Bank based in Barbados.
China has also helped support UN peacekeeping operations in the region through its contribution of a special police peacekeeping contingent
of 125 personnel as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) that began in 2004. This marked Beijings first
deployment of forces ever in the Western Hemisphere. MINUSTAHs mission, which was due to expire in mid-October 20007, was extended for
another year until October 2008. In 2005, China reportedly put pressure on Haiti to switch its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC as
a condition for supporting the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission, but Haiti has retained its relations with Taiwan.29 Analysis For now,
it appears that China and Taiwan will continue to battle for diplomatic recognition, using the prospect
of increased aid, trade, and investment to sway the decisions of the remaining dozen nations
recognizing Taiwan. Some observers maintain that key countries to watch include the Central American countries of Nicaragua and
Panama, the Caribbean nation of the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay, the sole South American nation that continues to recognize Taiwan.30
In the aftermath of Costa Ricas June 2007 decision to switch diplomatic partners, Chinese officials predicted a domino effect in which other
countries would switch their recognition to China, but Taiwan launched an initiative in the region in order to counter Chinas attempts to tempt
additional countries to switch sides that appears to have been successful in the short term. Nevertheless, over the long run, Chinas
sheer economic size and power bodes well for its ability to entice Taiwans remaining 12 allies in Latin
America and the Caribbean to switch diplomatic sides. Beyond competition with Taiwan, Chinas diplomatic efforts in the
larger countries of the region appear to be geared at strengthening relations and expanding cooperation with nations that have potential
resources and investment opportunities that could help feed Chinas resource needs and expanding economy. These diplomatic overtures in
Latin America also satisfy Chinas efforts to foster relations with other developing countries worldwide and its promotion of South-South
cooperation. A 2006 study by the Inter-American Dialogue examined the 19912003 UN voting records of several major Latin American
countriesArgentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuelaand concluded that the increased Chinese trade with the region in recent years has
had no discernable effect on the voting behavior of these nations. The study also looked at several countries having diplomatic relations with
TaiwanCosta Rica (before it switched diplomatic relations to the PRC), Panama, and Paraguayand found little difference in voting
coincidence with China between countries that recognize China and those that recognize Taiwan. Cuba, for political reasons, stands out as the
Latin American country with a high voting coincidence with China, although increases in economic linkages do not appear to have had an
impact on Cubas voting behavior.31 While countries in the region that recognize Taiwan often speak out in favor of its inclusion at the UN and
its various agencies, this is not always the case. During a vote in 2007 on Taiwans membership in the World Health
Organization (WHO), Panama and Nicaragua both abstained, while Costa Rica, which recognized Taiwan
at the time, voted against its membership.32

Democracy

China promotes market-authoritarianism at the expense of US democracy
Efthymiou 12 (Pavlos, reading for a PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of
Cambridge. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge and a BSc in
Politics with Economics from the University of Bath, Chinese Soft Power: Sources and Implications for
the US December 21, 2012, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/12/chinese-soft-power-sources-
andimplications-for-the-us/)//MM

Chinas rise, fuelled by more than three decades of miraculous levels of economic growth, has equipped Beijing with an
impressive and quite unique set of powers (Lampton, 2007). Economic power is at the heart of all other aspects of
Chinese power. It has enabled investment in the rapid modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) (Tkacik,
2007), as well as related asymmetric capabilities (Shirk, 2008:194) as cyberwarfare (Fritz, 2008) and advanced military space
technology (Logan, 2007). Moreover, it has allowed Beijing to maximize its security through deals advancing Chinas energy security and
securing key raw materials. These issues, and their implications for US security interests, are extensively studied in Washington (e.g. Waldron,
2005; Ridley, 2005; Office of the SoD 2009, 2010). Apart from economic realpolitik, as in the form of securing resources and capacity for
economic warfare[1] (Segal, 2004:169-170), Chinas economic growth, has also energized Beijings soft power. Soft
power, coined by Nye in 1990, can be broadly defined as non-coercive, co-optive power- the power of attraction. The attractiveness of a state is
affected by its culture, history, membership and role in international institutions, as well as its economic performance and stature (Nye,
1990:167). Other crucial sources of soft power are political ideology and diplomacy (Gill and Huang, 2006:17). Chinas economic power is the
key motor behind its mounting soft power. This paper focuses on Chinas soft power, with a view to delve deeper into the latters impact on the
US and its interests. It begins with an analysis of the sources and complex structure of Chinas soft power. Subsequently, it assesses how the US
may be affected by Beijings co-optive power, with an emphasis on both direct and indirect aspects of that influence. It looks at Chinas
ideational influence in its near abroad, the MENA region and Latin America to shed light how Beijings influence may affect American interests.
It closes with an analysis of Chinas augmenting soft power in multilateral settings, and how this may on occasions marginalize US influence.
America remains the most powerful state in the international system. No country in the world has more global interests than the US. Chinas
growing soft power affects American interests around the world therefore, a thorough assessment of this process is imperative. II. The Sources
of Chinese Soft Power: Economic Performance, an Alternative Development Model and a Unique Culture Economic Performance The
preeminent source of Chinas attractiveness is its economic performance. The ability to maintain close to 10 percent growth for over three
decades (Kaplan, 2010:22), enjoy substantial stability and lift 300 million people out of poverty[2], together constitute an unprecedented
achievement (Ramo, 2004:10-11). Beijing has realized these achievements following a novel, unconventional, non-western development path.
Underlying driver behind the Chinese development model is innovation. The continuation of the Chinese miracle depends greatly on incessant
innovation, which cuts time-to-reform and is the only cure for the problems of change (ibid.:15). Innovation increases the density in the
Chinese society, which in turn decisively boosts economic growth (ibid.:13-16). Cultural values, as national pride of culture may also increase
density (ibid.:33); the CCP recognises and uses this accordingly. Economic and Political Ideology Beijing has embraced many of the
key tenants of capitalism and is largely a market economy (McKinnon, 2010:504), with a Chinese twist, that
Halper (2010:10) calls state capitalism or market-authoritarianism. The CCP largely controls key business sectors, owns firms of
strategic importance, and restricts political liberties with a view to ensuring stability (Halper, 2010:30). The Chinese way to economic growth
and development is increasingly emulated around the world. The illiberal nature of Chinese market-authoritarianism
means developed democracies are unlikely to be lured and show any keenness to emulate this model
(Nye, 2006:9). Reversely, growth and development, without western democracy[3] seems a particularly luring
package to various illiberal regimes across the developing world, and especially in Africa and the
Middle East (Gill and Huang, 2006:20). The ideology of self-determination and the inviolability of sovereignty
which Beijing puts forth simultaneously, further attract those illiberal states which are worried in the
light of a more interventionist West*4+ (Halper, 2010:31). The Beijing Consensus The Beijing Consensus (BJC) is a
concept / theory, first discussed by Ramo (2004) and further developed by Halper (2010), which draws together the different
aspects of Chinese soft power, delineates the powerful links between economic and soft power, and
explains Chinas muscle. Ramo (2004:11-12) explains the three central theorems of the BJC: a) the key to development is bleeding-
edge innovation to create change that moves faster than the problems change creates; b) fundamental need to shift developments focus to
individuals, their quality-of-life with sustainability and equality as priorities; c) a security doctrine which stresses self-determination, through
the use of leverage and asymmetry. Halper (2010:32) explains that deliberately or not: Beijing is inadvertently promoting a
most troublesome export: the example of the China model. While many Americans see the BJC as a challenge, an
increasing number of nations, especially those tired of others interfering see Beijing and the BJC as a great opportunity (Vogel, 2006:16).

Latin America will emulate the Confucian globalismshared histories and political
ideals
Cesarin 07 (Sergio, Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires, The
Relationship between China and
Latin America: Realities and Trends, Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, Wilson
Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)//MM
SOFT POWER During the last decade, China has successfully pursued an aggressive image-building policy.
Confucian globalism, the purported existence of a harmonious society, and the image of China as a
multicultural country have proved to be useful rhetorical tools to gain support for Chinas emerging
economic and political global status. Political discourse and the governments promulgation of the idea of Chinas peaceful
rising try to counter negative perceptions about its military empowerment and growing international political inuence. China has been
successful in shaping a reputation as a responsible world leader. As a result of high prole diplomacy, China is now
perceived as a constructive power committed to the maintenance of international peace and stability.4 In LAC, public
opinion of China is positive. When Chinese leaders speak out about their aims and goals in the region, they utilize concepts like
growth, mutual benets, non-interference in internal affairs and, most importantly, development. To Latin American reformers, progressives,
and left-leaning political leaders, these precepts sound much better than the free trade policies or neoliberal trade approaches linked with
hemispheric NorthSouth economic asymmetries and high social costs. One must remember that an essential element of
Latin American political culture is the refrain of political utopia. Intellectuals, leftist political forces,
and social actors nd this notion congenial, in contrast to the pragmatic views coming from the North
and perceived as part of a negative agenda. Chinese discourse engenders a sense of an altruistic,
revolutionary model. Political doctrine also provides a framework for understanding Chinas use of
diplomatic terms such as friendship, cooperation, and mutual benet in order to shape a positive
agenda on both sides. For instance, recent attempts to recast state-private sector relationships in LAC are
similar to Chinas state capitalism model in which the statenot the marketmaintains high
regulatory power over the economy. Leadership style is another point of mutual identication. Chinas
fourth generation political leaderships social and economic prioritiessuch as welfare needs, income redistribution, social stability,
environmental sustainability, and anti-corruption campaignsare similar to the main goals pursued by Latin American political leaders in their
respective nations. For China, ofcial and non-ofcial diplomacy are two sides of the same coin, as evidenced by the relationship between China
and Latin American political parties. The Chinese Communist Party (ChCP) has historical relations with traditional Latin American parties such as
the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Mexico), the Justicialista party (Argentina), the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Peru), and
the Frente Sandinista de Liberacin Nacional (Nicaragua). These countrys political experiences provide a good
empirical model for transitional ruling parties like ChCP in discussing the role that it will play in the
coming decades. Given new social conditions in China, ChCPs self-characterization as a progressive
party (so denominated by President Hu) also provides common ground for an inter-party dialogue with Latin
Americas left-oriented political forces in order to improve southsouth relationships, reach
consensus on international issues, facilitate contacts between younger leaders, and promote mutual
political afnities.

US soft power key to spread of Democracy
Lagon 11 (Mark P.Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, International Relations and Security Chair
at Georgetown Universitys Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-large to Combat Trafficking in
Persons at the US Department of State, The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama World Affairs
Journal, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, http://www.cfr.org/world/value-
values-soft-power-under-obama/p26212)//MM

The Obama presidency has regularly avoided asserting meaningful soft power, particularly in its relations with
three countriesIran, Russia, and Egyptwhere it might have made a difference not only for those countries but
for American interests as well. His reaction to the challenges these countries have posed to the US suggest that it is not soft power
itself that Obama doubts, but Americas moral standing to project it.
Perhaps the most striking example of a lost opportunity to use moral soft power was in Iran. In March 2009, President Obama made an appeal
in a video to Iran for a new beginning of diplomatic engagement. In April 2009, he said in an address in Prague that in trying to stem Irans
nuclear arms efforts, his administration would seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Two months later
questions arose about President Ahmadinejad claiming victory over Mir Hussein Moussavi in the presidential election on June 12th. Within
three days, there were large demonstrations in Tehran, Rasht, Orumiyeh, Zahedan, and Tabriz.
As Iranians took to the streets, Obama had to choose whether to associate the US with the protestors or preserve what he appeared to believe
was a possible channel of dialogue with Ahmadinejad on Irans nuclear program. For several days, the American president deliberately refused
to embrace the Green Movement swelling in Irans streets to protest a stolen electionreaching up to three million in Tehran alone.
Temporizing, he said, It is up to Iranians to make decisions about who Irans leaders will be. We respect Iranian sovereignty and want to avoid
the United States being the issue inside of Iran.
But it was inevitable that the US would be scapegoated by Iranian leaders for meddling, even if it chose moral inaction. As Council on Foreign
Relations President Richard Haass wrote in Newsweek seven months later: I am a card-carrying realist on the grounds that ousting regimes and
replacing them with something better is easier said than done. . . . Critics will say promoting regime change will encourage Iranian authorities to
tar the opposition as pawns of the West. But the regime is already doing so. Outsiders should act to strengthen the opposition and to deepen
rifts among the rulers. This process is underway . . . . Even a realist should recognize that its an opportunity not to be missed.
Eventually, probably as a result of the influence of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose opposition to Irans leadership she established as a
senator, administration policy became more forthright. A year after the protests began, the president signed into law targeted sanctions on the
Revolutionary Guard. Yet failing to clearly side with Ahmadinejads opponents in 2009 represented a serious loss of US credibility. It also failed
to encourage the moral change that Obama had appeared to invoke during his campaign. Soft power and its ability to strengthen the protest
movement was squandered.
Early and active US backing for a more unified opposition might have buoyed and strengthened the Green opposition and helped it to better
take advantage of subsequent divisions in the regime: parliamentarians petitioning to investigate payoffs to millions of people to vote for
Ahmadinejad, friction between Ahmadinejad and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and efforts by the Revolutionary Guard to assert
prevalence over politics.
By supporting the opposition in Iran through soft power, the administration would not only have associated the US with the aspirations of the
people in the streets of Tehran but also advanced the objective of dislodging a potentially nuclear rogue state.
It is particularly ironic that Obama policy toward Russia should have eschewed the projection of soft power given that the NSCs senior director
for Russia and Eurasia, Michael McFaul, is the administration official most closely identified in his career with the cause of democracy
promotion. In Advancing Democracy Abroad , published just last year, he writes, The American president must continue to
speak out in support of democracy and human rights. Shying away from the d word . . . would send a
terrible signal to the activists around the world fighting for human rights and democratic change. . . .
American diplomats must not check their values at the door. In the book, McFaul offers an ambitious vision linking
values to stability for Russia and Eurasia: In Eurasia, a democratic Russia could become a force for regional stability . . . not unlike the role that
Russia played in the beginning of the 1990s. A democratic Russia seeking once again to integrate into Western institutions also would
cooperate more closely with the United States and Europe on international security issues.
But in its haste to hit the reset button on bilateral relations, the Obama White House ignored McFauls counsel. Instead of approaching the
Russians with a set of firm moral expectations, the administration has courted President Medvedev as a counterweight to Putinism (missing the
fact that rather than a countervailing force, Medvedev was, as noted in a US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, Robin to Putins Batman).
As events would show, Medvedev offered no real obstacle to Putins resumption of the presidency after a hiatus as prime minister to satisfy
term limit laws. Nor, for that matter, is there any significant difference in policy between the Medvedev era and that which preceded it in terms
of issues such as the occupation of Georgian territory, internal corruption, or silencing remaining independent media or business figures.
Instead of establishing a foundation of clear principles in his reset of relations with the Putin regime, President Obama has seen relations with
Russia in terms of a larger picture of strategic arms control. He believes proliferators like Iran and North Korea can be restrained if the major
nuclear powers reduce their stockpiles, in fealty to the premises of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Hence, the New START Treaty
was his singular focus with Russia and the grounds for his appeasement of Putinism. He seems never to have considered asserting a soft power
that would have signaled to Russian opposition figures like Boris Nemtsovbadly beaten in December 2010 after flying home from speaking in
the USthat the US places little trust in bargains with leaders shredding the rule of law in their daily governance.
The Russian security state has chosen to cooperate with the US in a few areas it has concluded are in its own interest. It allowed passage of a
watered-down UN Security Council resolution 1929, imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, and cancelled plans to sell the S-300 air
defense system to the Ahmadinejad regime. It has also cooperated on counterterrorism and US military access to Afghanistan. Yet would the
United States have been unable to secure this discrete cooperation without checking our values at the door, in Michael McFauls phrase?
The United States has achieved no cooperation from Russian leaders on issues such as the rule of law and an end to systematic intimidation and
the arrests of opposition, press, and business figures, and indeed threats to American businesses private property rights and safety. Leaders of
the Solidarity opposition movement continue to be detained, environmental nonprofits continue to be raided for trumped-up tax and software
piracy irregularities, lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in detention, and journalist Oleg Kashin was, like Boris Nemtsov, beaten.
There is no evidence of concerted bilateral pressure by the Obama administration to protest Russian unwillingness to protect freedoms for its
citizens. The lack of linkage between realist hard-power issues (such as nonproliferation) and domestic
values (such as the rule of law) has limited rather than increased US influence with Russia. The Carnegie
Endowments Matthew Rojansky and James Collins rightly conclude: If the United States erects an impenetrable wall between bilateral
cooperation and Russias domestic politics, the Kremlin will simply conclude Washington is willing to give ground on transparency, democracy,
and rule of law in order to gain Russian cooperation on nonproliferation, Afghanistan, and other challenges. Indeed, in June 2011, the
undeterred Russian regime barred Nemtsovs Peoples Freedom Party from running in the December 2011 parliamentary elections.
President Obama has selected Michael McFaul to be his ambassador to Russia. Sadly, dispatching the first non-diplomat in that role in three
decades, not to mention a man whose vision of a just Russian policy for the US is at odds with the administrations own practice, is unlikely to
dislodge this values-free approach.
US Soft power required for leverage to encourage liberalization.
Lagon 11 (Mark P.Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, International Relations and Security Chair
at Georgetown Universitys Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-large to Combat Trafficking in
Persons at the US Department of State, The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama World Affairs
Journal, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, http://www.cfr.org/world/value-
values-soft-power-under-obama/p26212)//MM

Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military expeditions, and the rise of China, India, Brazil,
and other new players on the international scene, the United States still has an unrivaled ability to confront
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, financial instability, pandemic disease, mass atrocity, or tyranny.
Although far from omnipotent, the United States is still, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it, the indispensible nation.
Soft power is crucial to sustaining and best leveraging this role as catalyst.
That President Obama should have excluded it from his vision of Americas foreign policy assets
particularly in the key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egyptsuggests that he feels the country has so declined, not only in
real power but in the power of example, that it lacks the moral authority to project soft power. In the
1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a crisis due to economic stagnation, and
reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar world, dressing up prescriptions for
policy as descriptions of immutable reality. In the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for US foreign policy.
Applying it, President Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear balance of terror with defensive
technologies, pushed allies in the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the
Philippines) to liberalize for their own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in
Poland and Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be torn downover Foggy Bottom
objections. This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the demise of the USSR and
the Warsaw Pact.
For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft power. His May 20, 2011, speech on
the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on 1967 borders as the basis for
Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy in the Middle East. Further, those words failed to
explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrains, backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical
support for popular forces casting aside other ones.
To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft power is to be
China. Even France, with its long commitment to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and implementer of humanitarian
intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the American president has no problem with France combining hard
and soft power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss.


Pink tide
Absent US involvementresurgence of pink tide
Gindin and Weld 07 (Jonah, freelance writer and researcher, Kirsten, PhD student in Latin American history
at Yale University, Spotlighting U.S. Soft-Power in Latin America Jan 15 2007,
https://nacla.org/news/spotlighting-us-soft-power-latin-america)//MM


While the U.S imperial presence has emerged as a more or less acknowledged fact of the 21st century, popular references to U.S. power often
gloss over a complex, amorphous system of organization and domination.1 What debate and discussion of empire there is in the United States
has been almost entirely confined to its most pronounced, military expressions.
Yet in terms of the actual administration and continuation of the current global order, the military occupation of foreign
territories is looking more and more like an Achilles heel. And while the Bush Administration is clearly not averse to
deploying hard power, it has also expanded key civil and political mechanismssoft powerin order to safeguard U.S.
interests worldwide.
The promotion of democracy, for example, emerged as a central expression of U.S. soft power during the Reagan Administration. In 1983,
Reagan launched the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), with the mandate to foster the infrastructure of democracy around the
world. I just decided that this nation, with its heritage of Yankee traders, ought to do a little selling of the principles of democracy, Reagan
explained in a speech at the Endowments inauguration.2 Since then, the NED and other democracy-promoting governmental and
nongovernmental institutions have intervened successfully on behalf of democracyactually a very particular form of low-intensity
democracy chained to pro-market economicsin countries from Nicaragua to the Philippines, Ukraine to Haiti, overturning unfriendly
authoritarian governments (many of which the United States had previously supported) and replacing them with handpicked pro-market
allies.
Over the past 20 years, the Yankee traders at the NED and elsewhere have expanded democracy promotion into a multibillion-dollar global
industry. As President George W. Bush correctly pointed out to members of the International Republican Institute (IRI, a key U.S. democracy-
promoting institution) last year, the business of promoting democratic change is a growth industry.3
Like many other industries in the United States and Europeand despite passionate rhetoric praising the efficiency of unregulated markets
the democracy business is highly subsidized. In 1980, the United States and the European Union each spent $20 million on democracy-related
foreign aid. By 2001, this had risen to $571 million and $392 million, respectively. In 2006 the United States is projected to spend $2 billion on
democracy assistance, while in 2003the latest figures availablethe EU spent $3.5 billion.4
By combining cooptation, coercion and deep pockets, groups like the NED and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have at
times allied themselves with antidemocratic elites, and at other times capitalized on movements and individuals that were genuinely dedicated
to democratizing their countries, setting the parameters of the debate by positioning a particular definition of pro-market representative
democracy as the only antiauthoritarian option. U.S. and European organizations have disbursed massive amounts
of money, funding some groups and projects while ignoring others, favoring those who share their
general ideological conceptions while isolating those that do not. There is very little transparency involved in the
process. Thanks to serious limitations in freedom-of-information legislation in the United States and elsewhere, curious parties have trouble
tracing grants that are often passed along a chain of sub-grantees. Accurate information about which groups receive funding and why is
extremely hard to come by.
Of course, First World governments clearly have a large stake in the spread of a particular kind of
democracy. Thats because, as a former assistant secretary of defense suggests in a recent book for the Council on Foreign Relations,
contrary to what some believe, democracy and capitalism do not spread inexorably on their own.5 The
statement could, perhaps, be restated to say, capitalist democracy does not spread inexorably on its
own.
In Latin America, however, a new generation of left and center-left leaders is challenging U.S. power in
the region and experimenting with home-grown alternatives to the Washington Consensus of
restrictive democracies and elite-based economics. These movements are articulating more expansive conceptions
of both economic and political life, demanding (and in some cases practicing) the democratization of both, as Zander Navarro
notes in these pages.
This cresting pink tide has already radically turned around Venezuela and Bolivia, with Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay and Brazil cautiously moving in similar directions. And more than any other single year, 2006 brought
this hemispheric political shift into focus, with 10 presidential elections in the regionall of which included credible challenges
to U.S. interests. Most of these left and quasi-left leaders (and the national interests they represent) are actually quite compatible with
capitalist democracy on their own. But the leftward shift represents not just the election of cooptable
presidents, but the radicalization of the citizens who voted for them.
The 2006 electoral cycle, then, seemed a tremendously charged moment in two key respects. The year promised intriguing and dramatic
changes in Latin Americas political climate, with progressive movements mounting strong and successful challenges in a number of the regions
most critical elections. On the flip side, however, Latin Americas shift to the left was widely interpreted as a threat by the Bush Administration.
Considering the volatilityand the stakesof this political moment, we felt that some serious debate and discussion about
pro-democracy interventions were in order.

Methodology prodict
Prefer our methodology
Gindin and Weld 07 (Jonah, freelance writer and researcher, Kirsten, PhD student in Latin American history
at Yale University, Spotlighting U.S. Soft-Power in Latin America Jan 15 2007,
https://nacla.org/news/spotlighting-us-soft-power-latin-america)//MM

Our interest in these issues, and our awareness that they would likely never make it into the mainstream media, spurred us to organize an
academic conference in order to generate a more serious and theoretical discussion about U.S. democracy promotion in the context of Latin
Americas leftward turn. With questions and criticisms of our own, we sought to create a space in which both
proponents and dissenters could address certain questions: What is the link, if one exists, between
U.S. political policies and U.S. economic policies toward Latin America? Why has the U.S. policy of
democracy promotion provoked criticism from certain Latin American leaders, civil society groups and
general publics? Is critics use of the term intervention misplaced in this discussion, or not? What
sorts of social and political movements does democracy promotion encourage, and which does it
discourage or ignore? And, finally, does the recent rise to power of leaders whose views diverge from
the Washington Consensus stand as a measure of democracy promotions failure, or of its success?
We wanted to hold a debate, but one in which marginalized (but by no means marginal) critical positions were fairly represented; for this
reason, we gave the event the provocative title In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Electoral Intervention in the Americas. The idea was to bring
democracy promoters and their critics together; we hoped that instead of both sides speaking into the wind, they could actually speak to
each other. It seemed simple enough on paper.
But dragging representatives from the various ends of this highly polarized debate into a room together turned out to be no mean feat. The
leading critics of democracy promotion, some of them already our friends and colleagues, were relatively easy to enlist; the practitioners and
proponents of democracy promotion, however, were more difficult to convince. In several confidential conversations with individuals we had
asked to be panelists (and who declined), we were accused of setting up an ideological trap, of being inflammatory, of inviting critics whose
published works were supposedly sheer fantasy with no commitment to the truth and informed that the presence of certain of our more
critical colleagues had significantly chilled the response of the Washington community to what otherwise might have been a well-received
i.e., moderateevent.
As organizers, we genuinely sought to begin a high-level and public discussion that, as far as we could
tell, wasnt taking place in Washingtons boardrooms. It was frustrating, yet telling, to discover the extent to which certain
sectors were uninterested in having that discussion, and to see the ways in which the very idea of a trenchant debate was dismissively labeled a
trap. The democracy promoters who did agree to come represented their positions with grace and aplomb, and engaged in an honest and
direct interchange of ideas with their opponents. But the road to that interchange was, unfortunately, paved with rejection letters from other
members of the Washington community.
The conference took place at Yale Universityhardly the worlds most subversive locationin April 2006, and once we were finally able to get
everyone into the auditorium together, the discussion was extremely lively. Panelists debated the very meaning of
democracy, the long history of U.S. interventions in Latin America, the issue of American credibility on
the world stage, the implications of the 2006 electoral cycle in the hemisphere, and more. Because of
the depth of the conversation and its timeliness, NACLAwhose Contributing Editor Fred Rosen
participated in the conference as a moderatorgraciously invited us to share this discussion by
devoting this Report to our special forum on democracy promotion.
This Report, In the Name of Democracy, features seven of our conference panelistsGreg Grandin, Jorge I. Domnguez, William I. Robinson,
Michael Coppedge, Zander Navarro, Bryant Garth and Hctor Mondragnwho agreed to rework their panel presentations into short essays
for this issue. Grandin and Domnguez establish a historical context for the debates, while Robinson and Coppedges incisive, and competing,
analyses of the contested definitions of terms such as democracy, intervention and polyarchy establish a theoretical context for the
contributors broader discussions. These broader discussions address the failure of the Washington Consensus to protect economic rights in
Latin America; the United States low credibility when it comes to promoting democracy; the role of local Latin American elites in inviting U.S.
political and economic collaboration; the mechanics by which democracy promotion is actually conducted; and the need for socially responsive
forms of democratic governance that respond to the stated desires of Latin American publics.
In our continuing efforts to make these discussions public and open, we hope that policy makers and critics from across the political spectrum
will become increasingly motivated to participate and to engage one anothers ideas, not only within Washington but also across the North-
South divide. The very nature of the democratic ideal demands that any efforts in the name of democracy, whatever ones definition of the
term, take place in the open air, with the full light of scrutiny upon them.

Taiwan recognition
China influence prevents recognition of Taiwan in Latin American countries.
Hilton 13 (Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent
newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for
environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, China in Latin America:
Hegemonic Challenge? NOREFNorwegian Peace-building Resource Centre,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb
c054aad9.pdf)//MM
Introduction Ever since President James Monroes 1823 declaration that European powers must respect the
western hemisphere as the U.S. sphere of influence, the United States has been the dominant
economic, political and military power in Latin America. As such, it has faced a series of challengers, from Nazi Germany
to the Soviet Union and Japan. In the last two decades, the rise of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has been
reshaping the politics and economics of the region. How far has the PRC become the new hegemonic challenger? China has
not sought a strategic confrontation with the United States in Latin America, as the USSR did in the Cold War. However, against the
background of U.S.China rivalry and potential confrontation over such issues as Taiwan, this could
change in the future. In the meantime, Chinas economic weight offers its Latin American partners a
new freedom to defy U.S. interests, should they choose to. China plays three major roles in Latin America: as
an insatiable consumer of commodities; as an exporter of cheap manufactured goods; and as a lender
and investor. The regions importance to a rising China is underpinned by its resources: Latin America has the worlds largest reserves of
silver, at 49% of the global total, copper, at 44%, and tin, at 33%. It also has at least 16% of the global oil reserves and the largest quantity of
arable land in the world. China plays a flexible hand in different countries, within the framework of a regional strategy. Although Chinas policy
papers treat Latin America as a region, this does not get in the way of Chinas ability to work with local differences in pursuit of its objectives: in
Venezuela, for instance, China offers large loans in exchange for oil, whereas in Peru it favours direct investment in the mining sector. One of
Chinas political objectives is to further the OneChina policy, which states that diplomatic relations
with the PRC require a country to break official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan), as
discussed, for example, in Chinas Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025. htm).
More than half of the countries in the world that still recognise the ROC are in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Costa Ricas recognition of the PRC in 2007 was followed by the Chinese purchase of
US$300 million in Costa Rican bonds, an investment of $74 million in a football stadium in the capital
and, in 2012, a free trade agreement. Similar packages are on offer, no doubt, for other nations willing to switch. China has tried
to foster good relations around the world to facilitate its smooth ascendancy to great power status. In Latin America, this creates a delicate
balance between national interests and the desire to avoid prematurely antagonising the United States. China sees Asia as its own
sphere of influence, and the Obama administrations pivot a rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy
towards Asia has raised hackles in Beijing. The PRC, until now, has been willing to tread carefully in
the U.S. backyard, promoting soft power but playing down specific political challenges to the U.S., including from its Latin American
partners. Resource exports Chinas primary resources imports are largely concentrated in four countries: Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru,
which together account for 90% of the regions exports to China. Agricultural products make up 30% of those exports, according to the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), with about 65% in minerals and resources. for Chinas trade partners, the
risks are resource dependency, currency overvaluation and the possibility that other sectors of their economies will become uncompetitive. It
also renders them highly vulnerable to price and demand fluctuations, whilst tethering them to unsustainable commodity-led growth with the
associated negative environmental impacts. few partner countries are investing sufficiently in economic, social or environmental protection to
offset these risks. Chile is the only nation in Latin America that has used its revenues to create a sovereign wealth fund. Chiles Pension Reserve
fund and its Economic and Social Stabilization fund have total assets of more than $21 billion, the latter supporting the national budget when
copper prices are low. Chinas dependency on relatively few regional suppliers also carries risks for China. The total of soy and iron exports from
Latin America to China represent more than half of Chinas imports of these commodities, offering the producer countries the potential to act
as a bloc, were they so inclined.

PRC changes diplomatic postures towards Taiwan in Latin America
Ellis 11 (R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study
NDU Press, 1
st
quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM

Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important issue of
political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that
diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Although the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC,
China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such investments and market access difficult for those
countries that do not recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opportunities that diplomatically recognizing the
PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007,
for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of
$300 million in government bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion
joint venture to expand the country's petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to
Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese generosity was directed
toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available
if they too were to change their diplomatic posture.13
Although the PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the use of economic incentives to competitively "bid" for diplomatic
recognition, since Costa Rica's switch, the allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of interest in changing
diplomatic posture by Panamanian president Richard Martenelli, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, and Salvadoran
president Maricio Fuenesalthough all did so prior to assuming office.


Latin America is key factor in Taiwan international legitimacy
HE 07 (LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University,
Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin,
Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America April 2007,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM

Latin America has been a major battleground of the foreign policy war between China and Taiwan
over international legitimacy, recognition, and status. Chinas quest to recover what it calls the
province of Taiwan is one of the top issues on its foreign policy agenda. Its strategy against Taiwan has been both
bilateral and global. Bilaterally, China has used a mix of economic diplomacy and military and political moves to keep Taiwan from claiming
independence. Globally, Chinas strategy has focused on developing an international united front designed
to marginalize Taiwan. Fearing Taiwans push for international recognition will lead to its declaration of independence, Beijing is
determined to contain Taiwan in every corner of the world, especially in Central America and the
Caribbean, the stronghold of Taiwan. Of the 23 countries that recognize Taiwan, twelve are in Latin
America and the Caribbean. If these states were to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the
damage to Taiwans political condence and its claims of legitimacy as a state would be seriously
undermined. Taiwan has 23 million people and well protected territory. Yet, of the United Nations 193 member states,
only 23 recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. According to then-prime minister of Taiwan Yu Shyi-kun in 2002, Taiwans
allies in Latin America and the Caribbean have helped us a lot and therefore we consider this an area
of maximum diplomatic importance.2 Under such circumstances, the strategic competition between China
and Taiwan has been intensied in a region far away from Asia.

Beijing-Taipei competition over status in Latin America
HE 07 (LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University,
Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin,
Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America April 2007,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM

COMPETITION One of the main goals of Taiwans foreign policy is to maintain full diplomatic relations
wherever possible. To achieve this goal, Taiwans government has been promoting trade and investment,
offering economic assistance and increasing international agreements. Twenty years ago, Taiwan sold more goods to Latin America than
mainland China did. Yet today, Taiwans trade with the region is lagging far behind that of China. In order to
reinforce diplomatic relations and take advantage of Central American countries close economic ties with the United States under the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), Taiwan has been embracing free trade agreements (FTAs) with the nations in the region. So far,
Taiwan has achieved some limited success. Three countries have entered into FTAs with Taiwan. All three are Taiwans diplomatic partners in
Central AmericaPanama, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Taiwan is also in FTA negotiations with Honduras and El Salvador, another two of its 23
diplomatic allies. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Taipei want to sign an FTA with Paraguay, the only ally of Taipei in South America. China is a
relatively new player to Latin America. Both its trade and investment have soared there since the late
1990s. Sino-Latin American trade reached $50 billion in 2005, with China emerging as the regions
third largest trading partner. China is also investing more in Latin America than any region outside
Asia. In addition, since 2004 China has deployed peacekeeping forces in Haiti. China has participated in peacekeeping missions in many parts
of the world, but has never sent combat troops as peacekeepers.3 It should be noted that Haiti does not have diplomatic ties with the PRC.
Beijing-Taipei competition for recognition demands a greater share of nancial resources. Huge amounts of
Chinese aid to Latin American countries have often prompted Taiwanese offers of even greater aid in an attempt to compete directly with
China and to offset Chinese inuence. Beijing states that China has provided Caribbean countries with economic assistance without any
preconditions. Nonetheless, all these recipient nations maintain full diplomatic relations with the PRC. With its middle class increasing, China
has become the worlds fastest growing tourism source nation in the world. To further relations with the region, Beijing is also working to
encourage its citizens to tour Latin America. Six Latin American nations have gained Approved Destination Status (ADS) from the Chinese
government, with Cuba being the rst one in 2003. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile followed in 2004, and Mexico and Peru in 2005. In the
Caribbean, China has listed Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, Dominica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and
Jamaica as tourist destinations. For years, Taiwan dened itself as free China, the democratic counterpart to
Communist China. As China liberalizes and increases its integration with the global economy, the
contrast is not quite as sharp as before. Meanwhile, there are signicant changes in Chinese foreign policy. With the end of the
Cold War, Beijing is concerned with exporting goods and services rather than exporting revolution. As a result, promoting regional economic
development and stability have become one of the major policy goals of Beijing in Latin America. As David M. Lampton, director of China
Studies at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies observed, although other nations generally do not wish to
emulate Chinas political sys-tem, its combination of high-speed economic growth and apparent stability is a development path that appeals to
many.4


Growing Chinese influence in the region trades-off with diplomatic support of Taiwan
HE 07 (LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University,
Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin,
Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America April 2007,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM

IMPLICATIONS Indeed, the increased prole of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in Latin America and its
partnerships with Latin American countries have a number of implications. The Chinese presence has increased
pressure on Taiwan to maintain its formal diplomatic presence in Latin America. Given that Latin American states now seek to play an increased
role in the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, they are inclined to seek a closer relationship
with the PRC, one of the permanent ve in the UN Security Council. The PRC has major resource interests in Latin America, and the region
could help China mitigate its severe shortage of energy. Chinese active pursuit of energy in the region has political implications as well.
According to Taiwanese professor of international trade Antonio Hsiang, Chinas expanding energy purchases in South
America will have a negative impact on Taiwans relations with its diplomatic allies.5
For instance, Paraguay, a member of the South American Common Market (Mercosur), is surrounded by other member countries of Mercosur,
including Brazil and Argentina, all of whom have diplomatic relations with China. Argentina acknowledged it had teamed up with Brazil to try to
force Paraguay into switching its diplomatic allegiance from Taipei to Beijing.6Latin America has found the rivalry between
China and Taiwan benecial; it has been able to obtain loans, credits, trade concessions, and
investments from both the PRC and Taiwan as it has attempted to play one against the other. The
growing inuence of the PRC could lead to tension with the United States, given that Latin America is
a region where many countries heavily depend on the United States for trade and investment. At the
same time, deep-rooted anti-U.S. feeling persists. Chinas growing dependency on imported oil and gas has put it at odds with U.S. foreign
policy in countries such as Venezuela. As China turns into a growth engine, a growing number of countries are beneting from its tremendous
economic development, and are reluctant to antagonize Beijing. Latin Americans themselves have no problem viewing investments by and
trade with Asian powers such as China and Taiwan in their countries as a counterbalance to the United States. With the Western powers caring
little about poor countries, some in Latin America have begun to see China and Taiwan as potential trade allies and partners, as well as
providers of economic opportunities. Latin America has found the rivalry between China and Taiwan benecial; it has been able to obtain loans,
credits, trade concessions and investments from both the PRC and Taiwan as it has attempted to play one against the other. Chinas rapid
economic growth and its huge potential market have contributed to greater willingness in Latin America to explore alternative arrangements.
China might have a confrontation with the United States in some places in the world, but denitely not in Latin America, a region long
considered the backyard of the United States. Beijing has approached many international issues more from a pragmatic than a principled
standpoint. Chinese foreign policy has shown dramatic changes that underscore Beijings putting a priority on economic growth and on
assuming a larger role in regional and global affairs. Beijing has tried to t into the U.S.-dominant international system as a responsible
stakeholder, as suggested by then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in September 2005. In the Western Hemisphere, China has
begun to participate in multilateral for a where the United State has heretofore played a prominent role, such as the Organization of American
States (OAS). In Chinas backyard, the United States has played a critical role over the issue of political/ security interactions across the Taiwan
Strait. From Beijings perspective, Washington could help maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, Beijing
worries that in the diplomatic rivalry between Taiwan and China, Washington still favors Taiwan and
prevents China from developing full diplomatic relations with Latin American countries. In addition, Beijing
believes that Washington has a hidden agenda to prevent China from becoming a full member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Chinas growing inuence in the region may compel Washington to pay greater attention to Latin
American and Caribbean leaders when they complain about the neglect from Washington. PROSPECTS The
struggle between Taiwan and China for international recognition is likely to intensify this year, because this the year China will host the
Olympics and the year Taiwan might make major moves toward statehood or state-like status. Taiwan has competed and will compete well
with the PRC over a small number of countries on its aid program list, utilizing a large amount of foreign reserves and an increasing number of
FTAs. For Taiwan, Latin America is crucial due to the fact that slightly more than half of the countries
with which Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations are in this area. For the PRC, Latin America has become
increasingly important, but still it is regarded as a region of relatively low priority for the pursuit of its grand strategy. Latin America and the
Caribbean represented 3.5 percent of Chinas total foreign trade in 2004, and this percentage has remained consistent over the years. China has
moved cautiously from a radical to a more pragmatic approach to achieve its goals in Latin America, and is expanding in the region quietly and
cautiously. Without any doubt, China will certainly assume an increasingly important role in Latin America. However, China is still a long way
from threatening or even really competing with the inuence of the United States in Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8
billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than Sino-Latin America trade. The
struggle between Taiwan and China for international recognition is likely to intensify this year, because this is the year China will host the
Olympics and the year Taiwan might make major moves toward statehood or state-like status. In the future, Chinas growing
involvement could have serious political and military implications. At present, the most important dimension in the
relations between China and Latin America is no doubt economic. China will continue leveraging its economic clout in the
region to support its political preferences, pressing countries to fall in line regarding its top foreign
policy priority: its claims over Taiwan. Over the long run, due to Chinas growing economic might and
soft power, as well as the changing dynamics of Latin American domestic politics, it might become
increasingly difcult for Taiwan to compete with the PRC in Latin America.

Chinese checkbook diplomacy prevents Taiwan recognition
CRSLC 08 (Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, Chinas Foreign Policy and Soft Power In South America, Asia, and Africa April
2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM


FOREIGN ASSISTANCE The exact level of Chinas foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean is uncertain, but reportedly the region
receives about 10% of Chinas foreign aid worldwide, far behind assistance that China reportedly provides to Asia and Africa.54 Aid to the
region appears to focus on bilateral assistance rather than through regional or multilateral
institutions, with the objectives of strengthening diplomatic relations and isolating Taiwan.55 Particularly
in the Caribbean and Central America, China has used assistance in recent years as part of its checkbook
diplomacy to entice countries in the region to switch their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, while
a number of countries in the region have been adept at playing the two countries against each other
in order to maximize financial benefits. As noted above, Chinese assistance to Dominica and Grenada was instrumental in those
countries deciding to switch diplomatic recognition. Costa Rica was also rumored to have been offered substantial assistance, although Costa
Rican officials maintain the prospect of increase trade and investment was the primary rationale for the switch. In preparation for the Cricket
World Cup 2007 played in the Caribbean, China provided assistance and workers to build cricket stadiums in Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada,
Jamaica, and even St. Lucia, which subsequently switched its diplomatic recognition back to Taiwan. China also had built a cricket stadium in
Dominica in 2004. China also has provided assistance for housing, education (including scholarships as well as the construction of schools),
health (including the construction of hospitals), and other infrastructure such as railways and highways. In recent years, China also has provided
additional types of assistance to the region, including disaster assistance, debt forgiveness, and concessional loans. In the aftermath of such
natural disasters as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes, China often has responded with assistance. For example, China provided hurricane
reconstruction assistance to Grenada in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan in 2004. In August 2007, China provided support to Peru in the
aftermath of a devastating earthquake in the southern part of that country. While most of Chinas debt forgiveness has been for low-income
African countries, China announced in July 2007 that it would write off over $15 million in debt owed by Guyana, one of the poorest countries
in the hemisphere.56 In terms of concessional loans, Chinas Export-Import Bank provided a $12 million loan to Jamaica in the water sector in
2000. In addition to Jamaica, China has signed concessional loan framework agreements with three other countries in the region Suriname,
Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago.57 In September 2007, China announced that it woul d provide about $530 million in favorable loans over
three years to Chinese companies investing in the Caribbean.58 In early November 2007, China and Venezuela agreed to establish a joint
development fund (with a $4 billion contribution from China and a $2 billion contribution from Venezuela) that would be used to finance loans
for infrastructure, energy, and social projects in both nations.59 China also has increased student and educational exchanges with the region. In
2006, it established the first Confucius Institute in the region, in Mexico City, with the goal of promoting Chinese language and culture. While
the lack of data on Chinese foreign assistance going to the region makes it impossible to compare Chinese and U.S. assistance levels, it is safe to
assume that U.S. assistance is far greater. Looking at 2005 statistics comparing foreign assistance levels from developed countries to Latin
America and the Caribbean, the United States was by far the single largest bilateral donor to the region, accounting for 29% of the $4.6 billion
in bilateral assistance.60




taiwan impact
Chinese influence in Latin America sparks a Taiwan war
Ferguson 12
Robbie Ferguson, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, 7-23-2012, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.e-
ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/
In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that
China provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan, *55+ the reality is that the use of
force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official
relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the
country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domnguez suggests that the PRC
has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan), *56+ the legitimacy of this claim has to be
brought into question for example in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its
appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan. *57+ This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect
pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, Chinas experience with one-party rule has taught it the
importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the
PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998
the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwans diplomatic allies in Latin America,
[58] further isolating the ROC. The effect on American interests Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in
Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the
Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not
be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the
West. As Chinas economic and political position in the world improves vis--vis both America and
Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer
withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

Taiwan war escalates and goes nuclear
Lowther 13
William Lowther, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS many of them are
familiar with its work 3-16-2013, Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report, Taipei Times,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a
new academic report concludes. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and
China, says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS Project
on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a
policy to prevent Taiwans independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come
to Taiwans defense. Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of
engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible , complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait
military capabilities and persistent political disagreements, the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the
US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia. The report also
quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a
Taiwan crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation, Betts wrote in a
separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear
weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific
region.

US draw-in

War in Taiwan draws in the US and causes extinction
Hunkovic 9 (Lee J., Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. The Chinese-Taiwanese
Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America
2009, http://www.lamp-method.org/ecommons/hunkovic.pdf)
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear
conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such
a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn
into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in
which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex
Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive
expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an
international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and
the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be
economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose
actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Asian intervention
Tit for tat expansions of influence leads to retaliatory tensions.
Hilton 13 (Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent
newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for
environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, China in Latin America:
Hegemonic Challenge? NOREFNorwegian Peace-building Resource Centre,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb
c054aad9.pdf)//MM

U.S. reaction The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, has reacted calmly to date to Chinas increasing presence in Latin
America. In a striking acknowledgement of Chinas importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for mutual
transparency through the U.S. China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintaos visit to
Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded Chinas standing
in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to Chinas action in troublesome countries such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for
instance, when Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lend its support. Although China
eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign. The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also diminished fears of Chinese
competition for the regions energy resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan and Ecuadorian markets, and Chinas success in
locking up the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports less than 50% of its oil to the
U.S., down from 80% in the past. There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of
Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about Chinas still modest military
sales to the region. Examples of these sales include Venezuelas 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters from
China. Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy circles to the China threat.
Regardless of whether there is any real threat to the U.S., key decision-makers have not reacted. Chinas presence in Latin
America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable
future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far
sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In the context of the Obama administrations pivot to Asia, however, and the latent, long-term
strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential for increasing competition for influence
in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the South China or East China
Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, the traditional Latin
American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

Chinese presence deters US intervention in Asia
Kurlanzick 06 (Joshua, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of
Charm
Offensive: How Chinas Soft Power is Transforming the World (Yale University Press, 2007), Chinas
Latin Leap Forward, Portions of this article are drawn from South of the Border: Chinas Strategic
Engagement in Latin America and Its Implications for the United States,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/latin_leap.pdf)//MM

In fall 2004, the president of China, Hu Jintao, embarked upon a trip to Latin America that sometimes seemed more a coronation than a
diplomatic offensive. In Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Argentina, Hu was received with the highest honors of a state guest, while local legislators
battled to hold receptions for him and for the delegation of Chinese businesses searching for new investments in the region. Latin
businesspeople hosted Hu at barbeques and welcomed him into their factories. Latin leaders recognized China as a market economy, one of
Beijings major goals, and lavished praise on Hu, with the Brazilian president, Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, announcing, We want a partnership that
integrates our economies and serves as a paradigm for South-South cooperation. Hu also delivered concrete signs of Chinas growing
relationship with Latin America. The Chinese leader signed $30 billion worth of new investment deals, upgraded bilateral trade ties with Brazil
and announced an all-weather strategic partnership with the Latin giant, and signed some 400 agreements with Latin American nations on a
range of topics. Shortly after Hus trip, Chinese vice president Zeng Qinghong led his own entourage of Chinese officials and business leaders to
Latin America, where they signed a new deal on oil and gas exploration with Caracas and offered Venezuela $700 million in credits. Hus grand
tour of Latin America surprised many U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders, who have long considered the region the United States natural
sphere of influence, and who have not contended with another external competitor in the region in decades. An article published in Foreign
Affairs wondered if Washington was losing Latin America. A Senate aide told the New York Times, Theyre taking advantage of it. Theyre
taking advantage of the fact that we dont care as much as we should about Latin America. Congress convened hearings to examine Chinas
presence in the Western Hemisphere, and the White House instituted a dialogue with China to explore the two powers aims in the region.
Behind Chinas Offensive In truth, neither the accolades for Hu nor the fears of Chinas presence in the Western Hemisphere accurately capture
the current state of Beijings dynamic new engagement with Latin America. China clearly has a strategy designed to increase its influence in
developing regionsSoutheast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin Americabecause Beijing believes it can wield greater influence there than
in developed nations in Northeast Asia, Europe, and the United States. China has enjoyed considerable success in achieving its initial goals in
Latin America, which include revamping Beijings global image, isolating Taiwan, and securing access to commodities, among other targets. At
this point, China has made few difficult demands on countries in Latin America, so, for now, nations in the region get a free ride from Chinas
involvement, benefiting from aid, investment, and diplomacy without having to make significant sacrifices to win Beijings favor. Yet, as China
expands its presence in Latin America, many of its policies could risk a backlash, lessening its ability to threaten U.S. interests in the region. Until
the past decade, Chinese relations with Latin America were extremely limited, and Latin America generally was a low foreign policy priority.
Chinas history of fomenting ideological revolution in the developing world alienated conservative governments in Latin America. After 1949,
Taiwan developed close links with, and established aid pipelines to, countries in the Western Hemisphere. Even Cuba, a fraternal communist
country, was not close to Beijing. Though Cuba was the first Latin nation to recognize Communist China, Cuban leaders criticized Chinese
policies at a public rally in 1965, and later complained about Chinas move towards capitalist economics, with Fidel Castro memorably
describing Deng Xiaoping as a numbskull. Havana and Beijing did not reestablish full ties until 1989. Chinas leaders also felt little domestic
pressure for a more outward-looking foreign policy. Still recovering from the Maoist era and focused on internal economic reforms, many
Chinese questioned Chinas ability to become a regional power or even a global actor. A poll taken by the research organization Horizon Group
in 1995 asked Chinese citizens their views of the most prominent countries in the world; one-third ranked the United States most prominent,
with only 13 percent choosing China. Making relations tougher for China, Beijing was not a major aid donor and did not participate in Latin
Americas multilateral institutions. Until the late 1990s, Chinas economy had little need for Latin American exports, which were largely
commodities. In 1975, Sino-Latin American trade totaled only $476 million; even 15 years later, total twoway trade totaled less than $3 billion.
By 2001, some of the impediments to Chinese influence in Latin America had begun to disappear. Between the late 1970s and 2001, Beijing
abandoned its support for communist insurgencies, established diplomatic relations with more than ten Latin nations, and opened its economy
to the point that it began to require significant commodities imports. In 2003, China became the worlds second-largest importer of oil, after
the United States, and the International Energy Agency estimates that China will import as many as 6.9 million barrels of oil per day by 2020,
making it by far the largest consumer. Furthermore, as economic growth, state-sponsored nationalism, the initial outreach of Chinese
businesses, and the spread of higher education in China created a worldlier, more confident citizenry, its population put pressure on the
leadership for a more proactive foreign policy. Concurrently, Chinas leadership itself was becoming more engaged with the world, as the
generation of leaders around Deng, many of whom had never studied outside China, passed from the scene. In 2001, Jiang Zemin embarked
upon the most ambitious Latin American trip undertaken by any Chinese leader. Jiangs trip was followed by a series of high-level visits to Latin
America. Defense Minister Chi Haotian met with the Colombian and Venezuelan armed forces, and National Peoples Congress chairman Li
Peng traveled to Uruguay, Argentina, and Cuba. At the same time, the Bush administration, which had come into office vowing to pay greater
attention to Latin America, assigned the region a low priority after 9/11 and then further alienated many Latin American nations by appearing
to tacitly support a 2002 coup attempt against Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, a populist but elected leader. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one
recent Zogby International poll of Latin American opinion leaders found that some 80 percent viewed President Bush unfavorably, and when
Bush visited Argentina in November 2005 to attend a trade summit, tens of thousands of protesters greeted him. Chinas Goals and Strategies
Since 2001, Chinas goals, strategies, and tools of influence in Latin America have come into clearer focus. As in its relations with developing
regions like Southeast Asia, China has several obvious goals. China wants to ensure its access to the regions oil, gas, copper, iron, and other
important resources. Unlike most Western energy companies, which operate independently from the state and rely on global markets to set
prices, many Chinese firms retain close ties to the government, which distrusts global energy markets. Chinese leaders fear that, in a conflict
with the United States, Washington might be able to cut off international supply lanes or pressure American allies not to supply China.
Consequently, Chinese firms search for equity stakes in oil overseas and try to secure the entire supply chain in critical industries, according
to one observer. 1 In other words, China wants to control the entire process, from oil field to tanker. And Latin America is the current center of
Chinas global strategy. China also clearly seeks to diminish Taiwans formal and informal ties to Latin America, a region where Taiwan still
retains formal links with Panama, Paraguay, and Guatemala, among others. In addition, China wants nations that already
recognize Beijing to not only adhere to the One China policy but also to prevent Taiwanese officials
from participating in nongovernmental regional forums like the Organization of American States.
China also may wish to prevent governments from entering into bilateral free trade deals with the
island. Beijing also intends to promote itself as a benign, cooperative presenceas a different, more accommodating external power than
the United States. If China is perceived as a benign actor, as a nation that does not threaten the region
economically or militarily, it will be easier for Beijing to expand trade, boost its diplomatic offensive,
and even broaden military-military cooperation such as selling arms, securing strategic shipping lanes,
and developing joint training programs with nations like Venezuela. Ultimately, Beijing might even be
able to use its engagement with the region to diminish U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, or at
least pressure Washington to commit more resources to the hemisphere resources that might otherwise be deployed in
Beijings backyard, Southeast and Northeast Asia. The Win-Win Strategies China has adopted several strategies. First, its
leaders enunciate a doctrine of win-win relations, highlighting that even as China rises to great power status it will not interfere or meddle in
other countries internal affairsa sharp contrast with the United States, which has a history of interventions in Latin America. Instead, Chinese
leaders insist, Beijing will listen to other countries needs and craft responses accordingly. During the 2004 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
summit in Chile (APEC includes several Latin American nations), President Bush focused on counterterrorism cooperation and WMD
proliferation. China focused on new investment in Latin America, generating favorable media coverage.2 Chinas win-win rhetoric also
capitalizes on the fact that elites and publics in newly democratic nations in the region, like Mexico, often resent U.S. criticism of their human
rights records. When these countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes, pressure on human rights resonated favorably with democrats. But
today some of the same democrats resent Washingtons censure, which they see as demeaning and failing to recognize their nations progress.
In Mexico, when U.S. officials criticized authorities for alleged use of torture,3 Beijing responded by initiating a discussion on human rights,
implicitly designed to portray both China and Mexico as unfair targets of American criticism. As part of this strategy, Chinese leaders emphasize
their empathetic understanding of issues confronting developing nations. In Brazil, Hu announced that China would always stay on the side of
the developing countries, and Hu then met with the leaders of Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa in an attempt to build a broader alliance
of leading developing countries.4 Lower-ranking officials constantly echo this message. In an address, National Peoples Congress vice chairman
Cheng Siwei said, both *China and Latin America+ belong to the developing world and have identical or similar views on many issues. Chinese
officials also have cultivated close relations with Brazil at the World Trade Organization, positioning the two countries as champions of the
developing world at the 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun. Additionally, Chinese leaders portray their own country as a model of statedirected
economic development that has delivered two decades of powerful growth. This can resonate in Latin America, where the neoliberal economic
model touted by international financial institutionsthe model known as The Washington Consensusfailed to deliver broad economic
growth during the 1990s. Indeed, in a poll of the region taken in 2002, a mere 35 percent of Latin Americans said the state should allow the
private sector to control economic activity, suggesting the level of frustration with neoliberal economics. Populist, state-centered, often
antiAmerican movements burst into the forward in Venezuela, Bolivia, and other countries. Another study showed that support for democracy
was declining sharply, with more than 50 percent of Latin Americans agreeing with the statement, I wouldnt mind if a non-democratic
government came to power if it could solve economic problems sentiment that could prove consistent with Chinas model of an economic
opening combined with political control.5 Chinas strategy also includes a focus on nations in the region whose bilateral relationships with
Washington are strained. This is most obvious in Venezuela, but it is also noticeable in Ecuador, where in December 2004after Washington
cut off military assistance when Quito would not agree to exempt U.S. soldiers from prosecution at the International Criminal CourtChina
invited Ecuadorian officials to Beijing and offered a pledge of new military assistance.6 Similarly, after the left-wing populist Evo Morales won
the presidency in Bolivia late last year and Washington responded by proposing cuts in aid, China invited Morales to Beijing. There, he
proclaimed China an ideological ally and asked it to help Bolivia develop its reserves of natural gas.7 China also has become what one
observer called a born-again multilateralist. Though its older leaders viewed multilateral organizations as limiting Chinas power, the
generation under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao takes the opposite viewthey see joining multilateral groups as a way to reduce fears of China.
Consequently, they have enthusiastically embraced regional multilateral groups, from the Organization of American States (where China is now
an observer) to the Inter-American Development Bank (where China has applied for donor status). It does not hurt that, as Washington has paid
less attention to regional multilateralism, Beijings participation has made it look better by comparison. As China has upgraded its strategy
towards Latin America, it has honed specific tools of influence as well. Chinas aid to Latin America, almost nonexistent ten years ago, now tops
$700 million per year, according to an analysis by the National Defense University. Beijing adds to its aid by forgiving or rolling over Latin
American debts, as it did with some $1 billion worth of Cuban debt. Much of this assistance goes towards infrastructure, such as railways in
Jamaica and Argentina.8 Some of this construction would benefit Chinese firms involved in extractive industries, but it also would address a
critical need in a region contending with crumbling roads and ports. Chinas aid also targets nations in the region where Taiwan has traditionally
been an aid donor. In Dominica, formerly an ally of Taipei, the prime minister reportedly requested nearly $60 million in aid from Taiwan in
2004. When Taiwan provided Dominica with $9 million, China responded by offering the former British West Indian colony roughly twice as
much, and Dominica switched recognition.9 Taiwan may offer a new package of $250 million in aid to Latin America, but it cannot match
Chinas largesse, especially as Beijings currency reserves continue to grow.10 Along with aid, Beijing has encouraged its own companies in
strategic industries to invest in Latin America. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
selected some 30 top Chinese companies to take the lead in overseas investment. As they look overseas, these national champions enjoy
benefits that will help them compete, including low-interest funding from Chinese banks primarily controlled by the government. In 2004, for
example, the consulting group Accenture reported that China Development Bank provided Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei with a
$10 billion low-cost loan to help it develop internationally competitive mobile phone sales. Beijing appears to be actively pressuring state-linked
oil and gas firms to increase acquisitions overseas. In interviews with CLSA Asia Pacific Markets, a leading research company in China, state-
owned resources firms acknowledged that Beijing had been pressuring them to invest abroad, though they insisted that their own management
made the final decisions. Indeed, nearly 53 percent of Chinas investment abroad in 2004 was concentrated in extractive industries.11 Owing to
this focus on resources, commodity-rich Latin America received more Chinese investment in 2004 than any other region of the world.12 Since
overall net foreign investment in Latin America had been falling, this Chinese investment is even more important. Chinas embrace of free trade
also burnishes its image. Some potential deals, like one with Mercosur, the South American free-trade bloc, will not be as comprehensive as any
agreements signed by the United States, but Beijing can present itself as a faster-moving trade partner than Washington. And, being first to sign
trade agreements with the most developed countries in a region, like Chile, serves a useful purpose. Since Chile is already open to foreign
competition, it will not be drastically impacted by an FTA, allowing China to combat the impression that a trade deal means being flooded with
cheap Chinese goods. China advertises its increased aid, investment, and trade agreements through effective public diplomacy, such as the
promotion of Chinese language and cultural studies. Across Latin America, China is likely to establish Confucius Institutes, language and culture
schools paid for by Beijing and set up at local universities. The results are evident: the number of Argentines studying Chinese reportedly tripled
in 2005, and the new Mandarin program at the University of Buenos Aires has enrolled more than 1,000 students in two years.13 The new
public diplomacy also includes setting up networks of informal summits and meetings, either in China or in Latin America, designed to bring
together Chinese and Latin American opinion leaders. These summits allow China to subtly emphasize its role as a potential business partner
and as a counterbalance to U.S. influence. These informal summits include the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum,
initiated by Beijing and attended last year by nearly 1,000 officials from China and the Caribbean, the Latin America-China Friendship Societies,
and other forums.14 Chinas formal diplomacy backstops this public diplomacy. For upwards of 15 years, Beijing has begun to retire older, more
ideological diplomats, replacing them with a younger generation. As one recent case study found, beginning in the 1980s, Beijing began to
upgrade the quality of its diplomats in the Western Hemisphere. It sent 110 young Chinese officials to a university in Mexico to learn Spanish. It
improved the capacity of its own think tanks focusing on Latin America, rewarding specialists and ensuring that better research was available on
the Western Hemisphere. And China kept its Latin America specialists focused on the region, so that someone like Jiang Yuande, Chinas
ambassador to Brazil in 2006, already had a 30-year tour around the Portuguese-speaking world in countries like Angola and Cape Verde.15
Measuring Chinas Progress For now, Chinas strategies and tools of influence appear to be working. Beijing has
successfully decreased Taiwans formal and informal relationships in Latin America. In addition to convincing
Dominica and Grenada to switch recognition, China has opened commercial relations with Guatemala, often the first
step towards switching recognition.16 China also has opened a commercial office in Haiti, another Taiwanese ally, and
kept Taiwan from obtaining observer status at the Organization of American States17; Haiti, Panama,
and the Dominican Republic no longer support Taiwans presence in the United Nations.18 Within a
decade, Taiwan may well have no formal allies in Latin America. Beijing also has boosted trade ties.
Trade volumes between China and the hemisphere have grown from only $200 million in 1975 to roughly $50 billion in 2005, though the United
States accounts for more than 40 percent of Latin American exports.19 The tide is turning, however: Argentinas exports to China rose by more
than 40 percent between 1998 and 2004; Venezuelas exports to China over that same period grew by more than 19 percent; and Colombias
exports grew by nearly 10 percent.20 China still lags far behind U.S. trade with the region, howeverthe United States normally accounts for
half of total Latin American trade, while China is less than 5 percent. The United States annual investment in Latin America ordinarily tops $30
billion; Chinas total investment is still less than $5 billion.21 Meanwhile, Chinese firms seem to be succeeding in their strategy of amassing
resources. In Venezuela, the regions major oil producer, China National Petroleum Corporation has established a joint venture with Petroleos
de Venezuela, the state oil companyonce a relatively well-governed firm but now headed by Chavez loyalists. Ultimately, Chinese firms may
operate as many as 15 oil fields in Venezuela.22 In Peru, an arm of China National Petroleum Corporation has purchased a stake in Pluspetrol,
which has oil fields along the Ecuadorian border.23 Chinese firms also have expressed interest in upgrading Perus pipeline infrastructure, to
better bring oil to Pacific ports.24 Perhaps most important, Beijing has convinced much of Latin America that it can be a benign and
constructive actor, a drastic change from regional perceptions of China only 15 years ago, when it was either not on radar screens or was
viewed by many as a rising threat. Limited polling suggests that most of the hemisphere enjoys a generally positive view of China. Even in
Mexico, whose export sectors compete directly with China and whose press has highlighted the negative impact of Chinas economic growth on
Mexican textiles and other industries, a comprehensive opinion survey taken in 2004 shows that Mexicans worry about Chinese economic
competition but that the development of China as a world power rank*s+ at the bottom of the list of threats that Mexicans consider critical.25
This sentiment potentially boosts Beijings influence. In democratic nations, leaders can move closer to China, since public sentiment supports
better relations, including, potentially, closer military ties. In less democratic nations, like Venezuela, where a small
circle of elites make decisions, Chinas appeal serves the same function, allowing them to build
consensus on warmer relations with Beijing.

Heg

Chinas presence in Latin America counters US hegemony
Dowd 12 (Alan W., senior fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes The
Dowd Report, a monthly review of international events and their impact on U.S. national security,
Countering Chinas Reach in Latin America , February 10
th
, 2012, ASCF,
http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas //EH)


The JFQ study adds that China has an important and growing presence in the regions military institutions.
Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, send officers to professional military education courses in
the PRC. In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell sophisticated hardwaresuch as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.
The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms are likely to leverage their experience and a
growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary
consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training
infrastructures that support those products. Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new
security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work here than Chinas
thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as
Washington has trade and military ties in Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and
military ties in Americas neighborhood.

Anti-Americanism
Chinese model in Latin America strengthens anti-democratic and anti-US movements
CRSLC 08 (Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, Chinas Foreign Policy and Soft Power In South America, Asia, and Africa April
2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Chinas increasing linkages with Latin America and the Caribbean
prompted growing concerns in Congress about Chinas intentions in the region beginning in 2005. House and Senate subcommittees held
hearings that year on Chinas role in Latin America, while the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, established by Congress,
held hearings on Chinas global expansion, including in the Western Hemisphere. A flurry of other research studies emerged on the issue,
examining a range of issues related to Chinas growing involvement in the region. In congressional testimony and other statements, Bush
Administration officials have downplayed concerns about potential threats to the United States emanating from Chinas engagement with Latin
American nations, although they have maintained that the United States needs to be watchful of Chinas actions in the hemisphere. In April
2005 testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Roger Noriega stated that Chinas influence in the region is minimal today, and that while Chinas presence in the hemisphere is growing, it
is safe to say the United States has been and will continue to be the long-term partner of preference. 61 At the same hearing, then Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs Rogelio Pardo-Maurer testified that there was no evidence that Chinese
military activities in the Western Hemisphere, including arms sales, pose a direct conventional threat to the United States. Nevertheless, both
officials cautioned that the United States needed to be aware of Chinas actions in the region. Noriega maintained that the United States would
continue to monitor Chinas outreach to Latin America, just as it monitors Chinas outreach around the world. Pardo-Maurer
maintained that the United States needs to be alert to rapidly advancing Chinese capabilities,
particularly in the field of intelligence, communications, and cyber warfare, and their possible
application in the region. U.S. officials have suggested that Chinese engagement with Latin America could lead to increased U.S.-
Chinese cooperation. At a September 2005 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemi sphere Affairs Charles Shapiro maintained that Chinas engagement with the region could lead to increased cooperation
between China, the United States, and other Latin American and Caribbean governments on matters affecting regional stability, especially
terrorism, transnational crime, and counternarcotics. 62 In April 2006, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas
Shannon visited Beijing as part of the first U.S. consultations with China on Latin America. Prior to the trip, Shannon acknowledged
that China is an increasingly important player in Latin America, and that it was important for the
two countries to understand what each other is up to in the region. He maintained that the United
States sees the region as having achieved a consensus about democracy, free markets and protecting
the security of the democratic state, and that the U.S. interest is to make certain that China
respects this larger consensus. 63 Shannon described the consultations as constructive and positive, with China assuring the
United States that it has no plans to seek greater influence in the region beyond expanding trade.64 After several years of increased Chinese
engagement with Latin America, most observers have concluded that Chinas economic involvement with the region has not posed a threat to
U.S. policy or U.S. interests in the region. In terms of economic, political, and cultural linkages, the United States has remained predominant in
the region. U.S. trade and investment in Latin America dwarfs that of China, while the future growth potential of such Chinese economic
linkages with the region is constrained by the advantages conferred by U.S. geographic proximity to Latin America. Moreover, migration
patterns to the United States from the region give the United States greater cultural ties and longer-term economic importance to the region
than China could ever have. For example, remittance flows from the United States to the region amounted to $60 billion in 2006a sum
greater than both foreign aid and portfolio investment flows to the region, with remittances making a significant contribution to the economies
of several Caribbean and Central American nations. In its policy toward Latin America, China has been careful not to antagonize the United
States in the region, and appears to understand that the United States is sensitive to involvement in its neighborhood. China has taken a low-
key approach toward the region, focusing on trade and investment opportunities that help contribute to its own economic development and
managing to avoid public confrontation with the United States.65 Even Chinese relations with Venezuela are focused on oil resources rather
than ideological rapport. China reportedly does not want to become a pawn in a dispute between Venezuela and the United States.66
Moreover, China reportedly has concerns that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavezs efforts at spreading his populist agenda to other countries
in the region could unleash instability and ultimately be detrimental to Chinese trade and investment interests in the region.67
Nevertheless, other observers contend that China poses a potential threat to U.S. influence and
interests in the region. First, some maintain that by presenting an alternative political and economic
modelrapid economic growth and modernization alongside political authoritarianismthe PRC
undermines the U.S. agenda to advance political reform, human rights and free trade in the region.68
According to this view, the Chinese model could help strengthen anti-democratic and anti-U.S. political
leaders and actors in some countries. Second, according to some analysts, Chinas regional presence ultimately could have
significant strategic implications for the United States in the event of a possible military conflict with China. In this scenario, China could use its
human and commercial infrastructure in the region to disrupt and distract the United States in the hemisphere. According to this
view, Chinas increased presence in the region could also provide the country with new opportunities
to collect intelligence data against U.S. forces operating in the region.69
China presence allows for the survival of anti-Americanism
Hilton 13 (Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent
newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for
environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, China in Latin America:
Hegemonic Challenge? NOREFNorwegian Peace-building Resource Centre,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb
c054aad9.pdf)//MM

Loans-for-oil deals, in which loans are tied to oil-export agreements, have accounted for over half of Chinas loans to the region since 2006 and
91% of them have gone to Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil (http://ase.tufts. edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChinesefinanceLatinAmerica.
pdf).Venezuela has negotiated four such loans, totalling $32 billion, since 2008. Brazil signed one for $10 billion in 2009 to fund an offshore oil
project using Chinese inputs. Ecuador signed a $1 billion loan-for-oil agreement in 2009 and a second one in 2010. In July 2011, it added a third
for $2 billion. The sales are contractually agreed, but the price paid follows the market. Chinese loans to Latin America indicate that China funds
different projects from its Western counterparts or the international financial institutions (IfIs). Whereas Western and IfI loans cover a range of
governmental, social and environmental purposes, Chinese banks focus 87% of their loans on the energy, mining, infrastructure, transport and
housing sectors. The benefits to China are that better infrastructure can facilitate the exports of resources, as well as providing contracts for
Chinese companies. Between 2005 and 2011, the Chinese lent $33.7 billion for housing and infrastructure projects, compared with $4.4 billion
from the Inter-American Development Bank and nothing from the World Bank, which favoured lending in microfinance, antipoverty and health
programmes. President Hugo Chvez, amongst others, has praised the fact that Chinese money comes with few strings
attached. Some governments are tempted by the lack of stringent environmental, labour or social requirements; others are
attracted to China for political reasons. Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia prefer to avoid World Bank loans
because they dislike the economic liberalism of the institutions and the supervision that comes with
the money. Mexico, Colombia and Peru continue to borrow from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for projects in
which the requirement to purchase from China, or give contracts to Chinese companies, would be inappropriate or burdensome. China, despite
relatively high interest rates, serves as the lender of last resort for Ecuador and Argentina, which face international funding difficulties arising
from their respective defaults in 20089 and 2001.
The availability of Chinese funds changes the Latin American political and social landscape in a
number of ways. The Pacific nations of Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico seek Chinese money for
market reasons unconnected with a political project, since these countries are building societies that
are more consonant with U.S. than Chinese values. In other cases, however, the availability of Chinese
funds signals a loss of political leverage for the United States and permits the survival of anti-U.S.
governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance that wish to pursue more radical
political and social models. China, however, has exercised caution at times in its readiness to deploy lending. In November 2004,
when Argentinas President Kirchner secretly requested Chinese support to pay off Argentinas debt to the International Monetary fund (IMf),
China refused, apparently to avoid a direct challenge to U.S. influence.

Latin America perceives China as a geopolitical alternative to US
Ellis 11 (R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study
NDU Press, 1
st
quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM

Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the United States and Western Institutions. China's historical status as a
"leader of the developing world" positions it as the natural ally of the new generation of Latin
American populist leaders, such as Hugo Chvez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing
after being elected president, for example, Morales proclaimed himself to be a "great admirer of Mao," while Chvez has exclaimed that Mao
and South American revolutionary icon Simn Bolvar would have been "great friends." While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese
investments and commodity purchases, the position of the PRC as a geopolitical "alternative" to the United
States shapes the way that they court the Chinese.
In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with the anti-U.S. activities or rhetoric of these
regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship with the United States and the West. Nonetheless, the relationship
cannot avoid some flavor of the relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client
states during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China to purchase K8 combat aircraft, for example,
after the United States blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.11


China bolsters authoritarian leaders
Kurlanzick 06 (Joshua, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of
Charm
Offensive: How Chinas Soft Power is Transforming the World (Yale University Press, 2007), Chinas
Latin Leap Forward, Portions of this article are drawn from South of the Border: Chinas Strategic
Engagement in Latin America and Its Implications for the United States,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/latin_leap.pdf)//MM
How Much of a Threat? Despite Chinas successful engagement with Latin America, its growing presence in the region does not necessarily yet
threaten U.S. interests. Thus far, there are few signs that Beijing seeks to directly challenge Washingtons
substantial military relationship with Latin America. On his trip to Latin America in 2004, Hu Jintao did not visit Colombia,
perhaps because he did not want to be seen meddling with the closest U.S. ally in South America. Some of Chinas relations in the region could
benefit Washington. Chinas growing economic relationship with Latin America may prompt Beijing to take a stronger interest in regional
security and thus share important regional burdens with the United States. Indeed, as China becomes more influential, it could help mediate
conflicts, as it has done with North Korea in Northeast Asia. It also may play a larger role in peacekeeping operations, as China has already
begun to do in Haiti. In addition, as China absorbs more of Latin Americas resources, it will provide funds for Latin governments to pay off their
external debts, reducing the possibility of further financial instability in the region, potentially diminishing the flow of Latin Americas economic
migrants. Despite its initial gains, though, China could founder, as Latin Americans learn more about its strategies. Less than two years after
China and Brazils courtship, strains have developed in Beijings relationship with the largest nation in South America as a flood of Chinese
imports has not been matched by Chinese consumption of Brazilian goods. Other Latin American nations echo the same complaint. Argentina
has imposed new non-tariff barriers on categories of Chinese imports.26 Moreover, many opinion leaders perceive Beijing as an unfair
competitor, due to Chinese labor practices, dumping, undervaluing its currency, and state support for certain industries.27 Some states, such as
Ecuador, already fear that while China provides a welcome alternative to the United States, developing close links with Chinese oil and gas firms
will leave them completely reliant on Chinese investment.28 This fear of domination may be one reason why Ecuador is weighing a slowdown
on approving Chinese investments in Ecuadorian petroleum.29 Latin American companies also fear that Chinese firms will sign joint ventures
and then force them to work as subcontractors and not as partners, as China National Petroleum Company allegedly has done with the
Ecuadorian firm Dygoil.30 Eventually, Beijing could end up looking little different to Latin Americans than the old colonial powers, who mined
and dug up the region, doing nothing to improve the capacity of locals. If Chinese investment focuses on extractive industries and adds little to
the skills of the local workforce, the region could become trapped in a pattern of mercantilism with China, in which it sells natural resources to
buy higher-value manufactured goods, without developing a cadre of local-country managers for Chinese firms. Latin American leaders and
publics also recognize that Chinas supposed dedication to developing nations is not always trustworthy, and that Chinas economic model may
prove no more effective than the neoliberal model. Chinas own socioeconomic inequalities have exposed some of the failings of Sino-style
development. Some scholars even express concerns about the Latin Americanization of Chinai.e. that China is becoming as economically
unequal as Latin America.31 Chinas push could eventually constitute a threat to U.S. political, security, and economic interests. Chinas focus
on energy could complicate U.S. access to resources. Global reserves of cheaply obtainable oil are decreasing rapidly, and Latin American
importsparticularly from Venezuelaare among the nearest and cheapest for the United States. Since reserves in most of Latin America are
projected to begin declining by the end of this decade, these imports will become even more crucial to U.S. energy needs.32 Venezuela has not
only threatened to cut off all U.S. shipments but also has said that it plans to boost exports to China from the current 140,000 barrels of crude
oil per day to 500,000 barrels.33 Even as Venezuela increases shipments to China, U.S. demand for oil is unlikely to decreaseforecasts suggest
imports could rise by as much as 60 percent in the next 20 years. Growing U.S. demand, combined with a shift in Venezuelan exports, could
force Washington to become vastly more dependent on Middle Eastern oil.34 This has obvious security consequences.35 Furthermore, as it has
done in Asia, China could use its cooperative agreements in Latin America as building blocks for more
substantial strategic partnerships that resemble formal alliances. These alliances ultimately could be
used to counter U.S. regional interests. In Central Asia, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was
dismissed for years as a talk shop. But China used it to build closer ties with Central Asia and to promote regional support for a reduction in U.S.
military bases. Worse, if Beijings influence undermines democratization in Latin America, it could bolster
authoritarian leaders in the region. Finding another major source of economic assistance and diplomatic
support might allow actors like Chavez more freedom to undermine U.S. counter-narcotics and
counterterrorism initiatives in, for example, Colombia. The best way for Washington to guard against these
possibilities, however, is not to inflate the Chinese threat but to re-engage with Latin America, rebuilding a
comprehensive relationship with this regionnot only with a few key allies like Colombia. Chinas success in the Western
Hemisphere derives in good part from failed U.S. policies, such as an overemphasis on counterterrorism and overreliance on a small number of
conservative leaders to make policy in the region. Such a renewed relationship could begin by addressing what Latin America scholar Julia Sweig
calls the 80/20 problem, in which Washington relies on elites20 percent of the populationto understand entire countries. Interacting with
the other 80 percent of populations, including more contacts with non-governmental organizations, political activists, advocates for the poor,
and religious leaders, would foster deeper ties. Washington also could re-emphasize core U.S. strengths. When Latin Americans
perceive the United States as helping them achieve a free, rights-oriented system, Americas appeal in
the region surges. As Sweig writes, during the 1990s Washington often set forth a positive agenda in Latin America by backing civil
societies recovering from years of war and promoting democracy. Latin America welcomed the new approach...the message from the North
was largely positive, inclusive, and respectful, Sweig notes.36 If Washington returned to that approach, Chinas leap
forward would surely slow down.


US-sino conflict
China presence in Latin America leads to US-China conflict
Ellis 5 (R. Evan, expert who focuses on defense transformation and Latin American security issues, U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, June 2005,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf an associate with Booz, Allen &
Hamilton, Inc.)//MM

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY It is not necessary to postulate Chinese troops and bases
in Latin America in order to conclude that an expanded Chinese presence in the region has enormous
consequences for U.S. national security, and as such, warrants serious examination. During the past century, the U.S. military
was deeply engaged in the politics of Asia, consistent with the view that such global engagement made our own hemisphere more secure. In
the present century, by contrast, the United States repeatedly will be forced to choose how much Chinese
engagement in our own hemisphere we can afford to ignore on the grounds that it does not
constitute an immediate threat.
In general, the Chinese presence in Latin America reects signicant erosion in the relative power and
geopolitical position of the United States, and the advent of a new century in which the United States is preoccupied about Chinese
adventurism in the Americas, balancing out traditional Chinese concerns about the U.S. presence in Asia. The dynamics and potential
consequences of these trends range from economic damage to the United States to the potential for signicant crises which, if
mismanaged, could bring about direct conict between the United States and China in this hemisphere.
Some of the most immediate consequences of the current Chinese engagement in Latin America involve the economic security of the United
States and the livelihood of U.S. citizens. To the extent that Latin American countries sign free trade agreements both with China and with the
United States, American markets will become increasingly open to duty free Chinese productssomething that China has never been able to
obtain through direct negotiations with the United States.129 The free trade accord that Chile has negotiated with the United States, for
example, in combination with the one that Chile is currently negotiating with China, raises the possibility that Chile (or other Latin American
nations pursuing similar agreements) could be used as a pass through, country, by which Chinese goods were sold without tariffs to U.S.
markets. Although the U.S.-led initiative for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is currently experiencing difculties, its achievement
would compound U.S. vulnerability to this Chinese competition.

Increasing Chinese influence triggers realpolitik response from US
Watson 07 (Cynthia A., Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, U.S. Responses to Chinas Growing
Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere Enter the Dragon? Chinas
Presence in Latin America, Wilson Center,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)//MM
CONCLUSIONS Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for
Washington over the past ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more
economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the
newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijings increased involvement in Latin America reects the unanticipated consequence of getting what
the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around
the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in
other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than
those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin The basis to Beijings involvement in this region is largely the opening
left by Latin Americas virtual despair and utter frustration with the lack of ability to get Washington to engage in this region. CONCLUSIONS
Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the
past ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and
trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many
ways, Beijings increased involvement in Latin America reects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China.
But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a
peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For
cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the
Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin AmericaU.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the
world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin Americas experiences and those of China are even
vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a
genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S.
leadership. The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism:
economic growth is a net benet for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benet from the greater
Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against
political philosophies, leading to trade conicts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view
based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad
for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased
frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signicant, probably more than the PRC bargained
for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will
seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and
other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk
the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall
concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States. With U.S. interests directed
elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington
raising too great a ruckus. At the same time, Washingtons ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests
directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without
Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijings best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to
be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial,
highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the
tortoise and hare applies here, where Chinas biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than
showing up repeatedly in the rock star role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry
about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its
Latin American neighbors. Washington should not blame Beijing for moving into an area made attractive because of historic and current
absence of consistent U.S. policies.

Yes esc
US-China war over Latin America escalates globally.
Fergusson 12 (Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.e-
ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H

We have detailed Chinas growing challenge to US dominance in Latin America, dealing for the most part in economic terms, but some
believe that Chinas economic challenge inevitably gives rise to a simultaneous military threat. [97]
Denny Roy suggests that:
If China fulfils its expected potential, it will soon be a power in the class of 19th century Britain, the
Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Pacific War Japan, and 20th century America. Each of those countries used its
superior power to establish some form of hegemony to protect and promote its interests. There is no convincing reason to think
China as a great power will depart from this pattern. [98]
This is a central tenet of the China threat, that a rising power will seek to borrow a phrase its place in the
sun at the expense of global stability. The history of the world suggests that prosperity and advancement
will naturally strengthen Chinas military power something that worries the United States. *99+
The U.S is worried because in our current unipolarity, global stability is intrinsically linked to the
permanence of the hegemon. The Director of the Asian Studies Centre at the Heritage Foundation, Peter Brookes, has been quoted
as saying that Chinas grand strategy was to gather as many friends and allies as possible to counter U.S
dominance in the region [100] in an attempt to balance against US power. [101] The idea that China is
trying to create an anti-U.S coalition is a frequently cited one, as many pundits think that Chinas aim is undermining the
United States around the world and raising China to a position of dominant international political and
military power. [102] This point of view is held by a vocal minority who choose to interpret Chinese actions as designed against the
United States.
Military build up and U.S concerns
The U.S is concerned with the potential for China to attain a forward base from which to disrupt key
U.S interests. The Commander of the Southern Command General Bantz J. Craddock told a hearing of the House Armed Service
Committee that:
The PRCs growing dependence on the global economy and the necessity of protecting access to food, energy, raw materials and export
markets has forced a shift in their military strategy. The PRCs 2004 Defence Strategy White Paper departs from the past and promotes a
power-projection military, capable of securing strategic shipping lanes and protecting its growing economic interests abroad. [103]
The key idea here is that China might begin to exert itself and the U.S may find that it is not the only player in
the Latin American equation. To give you an idea of how alien and disturbing a concept this is to the U.S, the Western
hemisphere is not even considered a part of the game board in grand strategy analyst Zbigniew
Brzezinskis The Grand Chessboard [104].


Laundry list
Chinese influence in the region leads to cyber-attacks, trafficking, arms sales, and
cranks US-Latin American relations.
GIGA FOCUS 13 (German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Leibniz-Institut fur Globale und Regionale
Studien, The Dragon in the Backyard: US Visions of Chinas Relations toward Latin America 2013,
http://www.giga-
hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf)//MM

In the future, however, there might be concerns with regard to rapidly advancing Chinese capabilities,
particularly in the elds of intelligence, communications, and cyber warfare, and their possible
application in the region. In general, there have been some concerns that China has been using
surveillance facilities in Cuba to intercept US radio and telephone transmissions and to practice cyber
espionage. During the rst cycle of debate about Chinas presence in Latin America, the Taiwan factor was an important topic given that
(at that time) the region (including the Caribbean) contained 12 of the 25 countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Therefore, it was speculated that China would try to lure away Latin American countries and, as a result, negatively aect Taiwans
international status. This topic later received less attention in the United States because China only achieved some limited success that is,
Costa Rica ceased to recognize Taiwan and also suered setbacks with regard to small Caribbean islands. Today, 11 of the 23 countries that
maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan are still located in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The second cycle of US concern regarding the dragon in the backyard started at the beginning of this
decade. The US economy had been debilitated by the nancial crisis of 20072008, while Chinese trade with Latin America was still growing
at high rates. Between 2000 and 2011, US participation in Latin American exports and imports went down from 59.7 percent to 39.6 percent
and from 50.4 percent to 30.1 percent, respectively. During the same period, Chinese participation in Latin American exports and imports grew
from 1.1 percent to 8.9 percent and 1.8 percent to 13.8 percent, respectively. In Brazil (a key country), China overtook the United States as the
most important trade partner. In 2011, China was the rst or second most important destination for exports in 7 out of 18 Latin American
countries (CEPAL 2012). Moreover, trade with China was increasingly supplemented by Chinese investment and Chinese credits. As Gallagher et
al (2012: 27) found, China has committed approximately 75 billion USD in loans to Latin American countries since 2005. Chinas loan
commitments of 37 billion USD in 2010 were more than those of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the US Ex-Im Bank
combined for that year. In 2009, China also joined the Inter-American Development Bank. China lends money to countries such as Ecuador,
Venezuela and Argentina, which have problems borrowing money in the global nancial market. Chinese banks do not attach political
conditionality to their loans. However, they do generally tie their loans to the purchase of Chinese goods. Around two-thirds of Chinese loans
combined a loan agreement with an oil sale agreement (oil for loans). Chinese loans are also used for infrastructure projects.
Dierent Types of Challenges for the United States Taking a broader look at the current perceptions of the challenges that Chinas activities in
Latin America present to US interests, one can dierentiate between economic, military, and geopolitical
challenges, on the one hand, and direct and indirect challenges as well as normal challenges and
challenges in extraordinary situations, on the other hand. However, in recent documents and declarations, the US
governments reaction to Chinas growing presence has generally been quite muted. In their Key Strategic
Issue List for 2012/2013, the US Army War College lists ve issues for the Western Hemisphere (Strategic Studies Institute 2012); one of which
is the need to assess the strategic implications of increased Chinese engagement in Latin America. In contrast, the 2012 and 2013 briengs of
the Congressional Research Service on Key Issues for Congress in Latin America and the Caribbean do not mention China. Moreover, in an
October 2011 hearing before the Committee on Foreign A airs of the House of Representatives on Emerging Threats and Security in the
Western Hemisphere, China was not a very prominent topic being mentioned only twice. Responding to one representatives questions as to
whether Chinas activities in the Western Hemisphere were considered a serious emerging threat, Philip Goldberg, head of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, answered that there were some economic challenges and some minor diplomatic challenges related to the fact that
both China and Brazil are involved in the BRICS group. However, Chinas weapon sales to the region are not seen as a
major security problem.
From a broader perspective, however, the delivery of Chinese military equipment to Latin America and Chinese-
Latin American military cooperation are seen with mixed emotions. China has increased personnel
exchanges and institutional contacts with Latin American militaries and has participated with the
military police in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since 2004. Much more important from the US point of view are
military sales to Latin America starting with unsophisticated items such as personal equipment and military clothing, and moving up to more
sophisticated military equipment such as aircraft (ghters and transport) and radar and telecommunication systems (also for civilian use).
Chinas main clients have been Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia (Ellis 2011a). On the one hand, Chinas donations or
sales of military equipment at relatively low prices were perceived as a contribution to the ability of poor governments in the region to assert
control over national territory and to confront drug tracking. On the other hand, the willingness of China to sell low-cost arms to countries in
conict with the US, such as Venezuela, undercuts the ability of the United States to impose sanctions or controls on the arms purchases of
such countries (Ellis 2011a, 2012). However, only in an extreme case of open hostility between the United States
and China would Chinas military cooperation with and weapon sales to Latin America become a
genuine security threat to the United States. In such a context, China would be able to create diversionary
crises or conduct disruption operations in close proximity to the United States for example, by trying
to close o strategic choke points such as the Panama Canal (Ellis 2011a) or using the presence of Chinese logistic
companies in major Latin American ports. But for the moment, as one specialist argues (Ellis 2011a: 9), nothing in the public discourse of the
Chinese leadership, policy papers, or debates suggests that Latin America is considered in the short term as a base for military operations.
Nevertheless, the US expectation is that Chinese military engagement with Latin America is likely to be a growing and enduring part of the
regional dynamic (Ellis 2011a: 46). There are some minor concerns with regard to the expansion of ties
between organized crime in China and Latin America, especially with regard to tracking (of humans,
narcotics/precursor chemicals, contraband and arms) and money laundering (Ellis 2012b). But these
developments are not blamed on the Chinese government. In general, US and Chinese cooperation in chemical control and counternarcotic
operations is evaluated as positive. In a 2011 congressional hearing, Daniel L. Glaser, assistant secretary for Terrorist Financing at the
Department of Treasury, denied there was any Chinese activity in the region that would raise illicit-nancing concerns and argued that
cooperating with China will be part of the solution for the problem (U.S. House of Representatives 2011). There have also been criticisms that
Washington has been overly complacent with regard to the geo-economic implications of Chinas entrance into the Americas and the loss of
markets due to Chinese advances in trade and investment (Farnsworth 2012). However, other analysts see Chinese investments in Latin
America as having had a limited impact on US interests. Sullivan (2013), for instance, points out that the United States remains the single largest
trading partner for many Latin American countries and that US trade with the region (800 billion USD) was more than three times the amount
of Chinas in 2012. While the purchase of goods from China has, to some degree, displaced Latin American purchases of products from US
companies, Ellis (2012a: 5) makes the point that in many cases US-registered companies actually produce part or all of their products in the
PRC or they source components there, increasing the competitiveness of those goods as they sell them to Latin America and other markets.
Nonetheless, deepening economic relations between China and Latin American countries may have an
indirect, negative impact on US-Latin American relations (Ellis 2012a; Farnsworth 2012) by undermining the
ability of the United States to pursue its agenda in the region. These growing relations with China send the signal to
Latin American governments that economic development can be achieved without adhering to Western proscriptions. Regimes hostile
to the United States can turn their backs on Western lending institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank. Thus, countries could sidestep the negative consequences of actions
deemed hostile to the interests of the United States and US companies for example, defaulting on
loans or nationalizing industries, amongst other things.

Latin American instability
US soft power in Latin America ensures stability
OHanlon and Petraeus 4/30 (Michael E., Director of Research, Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign
Policy, Center for 21
st
Century Security and Intelligence and Gen. David, former director of the CIA,
FundDont CutU.S. Soft Power Brookings Institute, April 30, 2013,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/04/30-us-soft-power-ohanlon-petraeus)//MM

The presidents budget proposal is now on the streets of Washington, D.C. Currently, it would protect funding for the State Department and the
Agency for International Development and related activities from further cuts. The combined annual budget for development aid, security aid
and diplomacy has averaged close to $60 billion over the past half decade. That is now slated to decline to about $50 billion, partly due to
reduced war-related costs. But this amount could come under intense scrutiny. Moreover, if there is no grand bargain between the president
and the Congress, sequestration could force reductions of a further 10 percent.
Such an outcome would be bad for our nations security. As each of us has testified on Capitol Hill in past years Americas ability to
protect itself and advance its global interests often depends as much on its softer power as it does
on our nations armed forces. For example, though Latin American countries were themselves primarily
responsible for their progress, the headway many of them made in stabilizing their countries in recent
years has been a big plus for American security, too and American aid had a role in that progress.
That is part of why we have supported a budget deal that would repeal sequestration and achieve most further deficit reduction through
savings in entitlement spending with similar increases in revenue generation. Implicit in our approach was the thinking that
lawmakers should avoid the temptation to gut foreign aid just because it generally lacks a strong constituency in the
United States.
Americas spending on development and diplomacy and security aid the so-called 150 account has strengthened under Presidents George
W. Bush and Barack Obama. That has been a positive and long overdue development. Funds for diplomacy and development were starved in
much of the 1990s. Some of the reductions in that earlier period were warranted, admittedly, as aid then was not always as productive as it
might have been.
Today, we are arguably doing a good deal better. Various forms of development assistance and aid have, in fact, produced impressive results on
a host of fronts in recent years. The Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a major initiative of Presidents Bush and Bill Clinton and now
President Obama, has played a significant role in helping to turn the tide against the HIV/AIDS epidemic even if more work remains to be
done. Development assistance has also helped more than 600 million people move out of extreme poverty, achieving one of the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals several years before the 2015 target date.
Moreover, as John Podesta has recently written, in this century alone, aid has helped reduce the global childhood
mortality rate by one-third impressive, even if only halfway toward the U.N. goal for 2015. The maternal mortality rate
has been reduced by almost half, as well. And progress has been seen in other sectors such as
agriculture, energy and other realms, including many in the combat zones where each of us spent
considerable time in the past decade.
America deserves considerable credit for much of this progress, as the U.S. is the worlds largest aid contributor, at roughly $30 billion in 2012.
The United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan round out the rest of the top five donors, each providing from $10 billion to $15 billion a year.
But relative to our economys size, America does not do more than its fair share; it provides just 0.19 percent of gross domestic product in
development aid, similar to Japans level but less than half that of the three big European donors listed above, and less than a third the U.N.
goal of 0.7 percent of GDP. Private donations improve our net national position somewhat, but only to an extent. The State Department budget
is still less than 5 percent of the militarys and the number of Foreign Service officers worldwide is less than half the number of soldiers in a
single Army division.
Given our military contributions to international stability and the global economic growth that results
from that stability in various areas, American foreign aid doesnt need to grow substantially. But it should not be
cut further. Consider some of the ideas we might want to consider in the years ahead. These should not be unconditional offers of help but
would require the right kind of cooperation from key nations abroad whose future stability is central to our own security:
A possible deal to help Egypt revive economic growth and service its debt after a two-year economic downturn following its Arab Spring; this
would be contingent on President Mohamed Morsi respecting the Egyptian constitution and helping us with Middle East peace;
A possible proposal to help Pakistan reinvigorate its energy sector, which currently holds back the countrys growth and compromises its quality
of life; this would be contingent on Pakistan contributing more to security in the region and to pursuing reforms that reduce disincentives for
significant private initiatives in the energy arena;
A major push with other donors to help countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo reform and strengthen their security forces;
Aid for transitional governments in Libya, Yemen and Mali, and perhaps someday Syria, to get on their feet so they can stabilize, develop
security forces, police their own territories and prevent terrorists from establishing sanctuaries;
Ongoing help in future years for Afghanistans government provided that it takes steps toward better governance and a sound election in 2014.
This agenda need not break the bank; even taken together, development aid and assistance and these initiatives would not remotely add up to
another Marshall Plan. But this discussion suggests that our security will be improved by sustaining foreign aid in the years ahead rather than by
making further cuts.

Iran
US key to check Iranian influence
Southern Pulse 2/6 (professional services firm
deeply rooted in the field, with a network of
investigators that operates across the Americas, Iran: Expanding its sphere of influence in Latin
America Open Briefingthe civil society intelligence agency, February 6, 2013,
http://www.openbriefing.org/regionaldesks/americas/iran-sphere-of-influence-in-latin-america/)//MM

Background
State-sponsored terrorism and a covert nuclear weapons program placed Iran on international pariah status. Both the U.S. and the E.U. enacted
stringent sanctions, so that neither permits trade with Iran except in very limited circumstances, requiring a waiver. Iran seeks to counter the
effects of isolation by finding new allies and deepening state-to-state relationships with the few countries it counts as an ally.
Recognizing Tehrans growing influence in its backyard, President Barack Obama signed the Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 on 28 December 2012. The bill calls for a comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Irans
growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere. The legislation tasks various U.S. agencies with deterring the threat posed
by Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGCs Quds Force, and Hezbollah by collaborating with regional partners.
The number of potential anti-Iran allies is waning: since his election in 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has opened six additional
embassies in the region for a total of eleven Iranian embassies in Latin America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the same time, trade between Iran and Latin America has more than tripled to around US$4
billion. After a steady four-year climb, the Brazil-Iran trade balance reached US$2.6 billion in 2011. Exports from Argentina to Iran, its second-
largest trade partner in Latin America, grew from US$84 million in 2008 to US$1.2 billion in 2011.
Not surprisingly, one of Irans strongest relationships in the region is with fellow anti-imperialist Hugo
Chvez in Venezuela. The friendship between Chvez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin
America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaraguaall staunch Chvez
supporters.
In November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Brazilian President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, who later defended Irans right to pursue a nuclear
program. In 2010 Lula proposed a fuel-swap deal; those talks stalled. Yet Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota believes there is
an opportunity to revive negotiations with Iran for a fuel contract in 2013, though the Dilma Rousseff administration decidedly keeps Iran at a
distance.
In 2013 Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon
sectors throughout Latin America, a form of export but also a means of integrating Iranians into the
Western Hemisphere. Chvez and his Bolivarian allies have issued hundreds of passports or national ID cards to Iranian citizens. On 31
January 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcastings (IRIB) launched HispanTV, a 24-hour international Spanish-language HD channel. Apart
from such public overtures, Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal
organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region.
More recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence:
On 21 January 2013, German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the
bag of Tahmasb Mazaher, Irans former Central Bank Director. Mazaher failed to declare the funds, so German
authorities confiscated the check while they investigate.
On 27 January 2013, Argentina announced plans to establish a joint truth commission with Iran to investigate the 1994 car bombing of the
Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Iran allegedly directed the attack, perpetrated by Hezbollah, though the Iranian
government has not cooperated in investigations. Argentina requested the arrest of the current Minister of Defense for Iran, Ahmad Vahidi,
and five other Iranians for their participation in the AMIA bombing in 2007.
Commentary
Although Iranian influence on a certain segment of Latin America, namely the Bolivarian Alliance (Alianza
Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Amrica, or ALBA), its burgeoning prominence in the politics of non-ALBA
Latin states should worry the U.S. In 2009 the Argentine delegation walked out on Ahmadinejads speech at the U.N. In 2011, they
sat and listened as he verbally attacked Western powers.
In the eyes of the United States, the Countering Iran Act is grounded in the precedents of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the Roosevelt
Corollary (1904). Both axioms invoke the United States right to intervene in the event that a non-
hemispheric actor disrupts regional peace and safety. That precept justified action against Soviet
communism in Latin America during the Cold War, though since the 1990s, Washingtons perennial
preoccupation with other areas of focus across the world significantly diluted any remnant soft power
threat the Monroe Doctrine may pose in Latin America in 2013.
For its part, an Iranian military commander already predicted the failure of the Countering Iran Act,
noting the legislation will not deter Iran from continuing to engage Latin America. For both Iran and
its ALBA allies, U.S. annoyance is a motivating factor to move forward with cooperation, not a
deterrence. So far in 2013, Iran is gaining ground as support for the U.S. and E.U. erodes.



Enviro

Chinese engagement threatens environmentally sensitive areas Plus, Chinese
standards arent adequate
Gallagher, 13 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese
dragon, The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's
iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In
areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights
and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades. In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually
operate under a set of environmental guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when
at China's stage of development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century
standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when
environmental concerns are at an all-time high.


Cuba
Non-Unique
Non-unique The U.S. increased agricultural and medical exports to Cuba should
have triggered the link
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H. , author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States, The Cuban
Research Institute at Florida International University, June 2009, online,
http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf, accessed 7/16/13) PE
As U.S. firms weather the recession and adapt to a global economic environment skeptical of short-term
investments, partnerships with Cuba could offer some stable and constructive solutions. In March 2009
the Obama administration approved wider legal channels for U.S. agricultural and medical exports to
Cuba under the Omnibus Appropriations Measure (P.L. 111-8), providing a foundation for future
industrial engagement. Likely next steps could include the authorization of trade in farm equipment,
medical apparatus, and telecommunications products, niches that have already benefited from Chinese
trade credits. Such steps would permit U.S. firms to compete and collaborate with Chinese
counterparts in Cuba, and as indicated by several recent legislative proposals in Congress, would
advance U.S. strategic interests if extended to the oil sector.

Non-unique Chinas influence with Cuba and Venezuals is low snubs in recent visits
H.T., 13 (Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?, Jun 6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Xi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June
6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and
Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao
did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation,
Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa
Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba
and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have
been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to
come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?
The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting
questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist
government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of
having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always
mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he
had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by
Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week
that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad. However, as our
story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the
destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing
that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business
relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of
investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National
Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient
of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica
may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin
America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron,
oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with
its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been
frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten
times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have
raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as
Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements
with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat
to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over
issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is
broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela,
deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay
relevant.


A2: Cuba Models China
Cuba wont use the Chinese model its too wary of foreign control
Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 168-168, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE
Cuban leaders have rejected the notion that they intend to follow a China model of development. A
historically accrued wariness of excessive foreign influence has long coloured the character of the
islands international engagement, and relations with China appear to be no exception. Spanish
colonialism in the nineteenth century, along with US domination in the first half of the twentieth century
and Soviet micromanagement in the second half each provoked strong nationalistic responses. Cuba
learned from the Cold War that it was poorly served by Soviet-style centralised bureaucratic structures,
an admission made by Fidel Castro himself (1988). In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the Cuban
government began to experiment with decentralisation, manifested in the constitutional reforms of
1992, which facilitated the division of Havana into 93 (subsequently 105) Popular Councils, and the
passage of Decree Law 143, which allowed local management of Havanas historic centre, the countrys
most dynamic economic zone. While the revitalisation of Old Havana under the Office of the Historian
of the City was a considerable success, the broader push for decentralisation exhibited more ambivalent
results. The liberalisation of resources and the devolution of executive capacities did not keep pace with
local plans, and overly China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba 169 rigid structures of
monitoring and compliance diminished local creativity (Fernndez Soriano 1999).

A2: Oil Link
Chinese drilling co-op with Cuba is a myth
Politico, 06-12-08, Politico Live, Report: No Chinese offshore drilling near Cuba,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/thecrypt/0608/Report_Chinese_arent_drilling_near_Cuba.html
The GOP is in the midst of a coordinated effort to slam Democrats for a seemingly outrageous
contradiction: While Democratswith the help of Florida Republicansblock oil drilling off the Florida
shore, China is doing just that a mere 60 miles off the coast of Cuba. Vice President Dick Cheney, House
Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Minority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) have all raised the specter
of Chinese drilling off Cubas coast. In a recent speech, Cheney quoted a column by George Will, who
wrote last week that "drilling is under way 60 miles off Florida. The drilling is being done by China, in
cooperation with Cuba, which is drilling closer to South Florida than U.S. companies are." The truth of
that claim, however, is seriously in doubt. Democrats today pointed to a February 29, 2008
Congressional Research Service that found *w+hile there has been some concern about Chinas
potential involvement in offshore deepwater oil projects, to date its involvement in Cubas oil sector
has been focused on onshore oil extraction in Pinar del Rio province through its state-run China
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). Sen. Mel Martinez, a Florida Republican, took to the
Senate floor Wednesday and called the alleged Cuba drilling akin to urban legend.

A2: Embargo Link
Theres no link ending the embargo doesnt mean increased trade with the U.S.
Suchlicki, 13 (Jaime, Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American
Studies, University of Miami, author of multiple books on Cuba and Mexico, What If...the U.S. Ended
the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo?, An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project, Issue
185, February 26, 2013, Online, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue185.htm, accessed
7/18/13) PE
If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are
significant implications. Trade - All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba has
very little credit and is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits
to Cuban enterprises. There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans. - Cuba is not likely to buy a
substantial amount of products in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred
million dollars of food in the U.S. That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in
any other country and it is not likely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and
Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S. - Cuba has very little to sell in the U.S. Nickel, one
of Cuba's major exports, is controlled by the Canadians and exported primarily to Canada. Cuba has
decimated its sugar industry and there is no appetite in the U.S. for more sugar. Cigars and rum are
important Cuban exports. Yet, cigar production is mostly committed to the European market. Cuban
rum could become an important export, competing with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean rums.

China supports the plan

UN 11
United Nations General Assembly Department of Public Information
News and Media Division New York Sixty-sixth General Assembly Plenary 41st & 42nd Meetings (AM &
PM)SPEAKERS DENOUNCE CUBAN EMBARGO AS SAD ECHO OF FAILED COLD WAR POLITICS; GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, FOR TWENTIETH YEAR, DEMANDS LIFTING OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

DIEGO LIMERES (Argentina), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 developing countries and China,
noted that last years announcement by the United States on the relaxation of travel restrictions and
transfer of remittances had given hope that steps were being taken in the right direction. But a year
later, it was clear that those measures had had only limited effect and that the embargo was still in
place. Largely unchanged, it continued to impose severe economic and financial restrictions on Cuba
that negatively impacted the well-being of its people. Further, it frustrated efforts towards achieving the
Millennium Development Goals. The embargo against Cuba contravened the fundamental norms of
international law, international humanitarian law, the United Nations Charter and the norms and
principles governing peaceful relations among States, violating the principles of the sovereign equality of
States and of non-intervention and non-interference in each others domestic affairs, as the Group of 77
and China had pointed out many times before. At the second South-South Summit in Doha in 2005, the
Group had rejected the imposition of laws and regulations with extraterritorial impact and all other
forms of coercive economic measures, including unilateral sanctions against developing countries.
Recalling that last year a large majority - 187 Member States - had voted in favour of the draft
resolution presented by Cuba, he said that the Group of 77 and China fully supported the current text
calling for an end to the embargo and urged all Member States to do so.


Mexico
Non-Unique
China will have less influence in Mexico unhealthy trade partnership
Funaro 13 (Kaitlin Funaro is a GlobalPost breaking news writer. Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin America.
Global Post 3 June 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-battles-us-
influence-latin-ame EW
Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position China
as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a three-
day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to discuss their economic
ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to
exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has
been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for
Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the
healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal."



Venezuela
Uniqueness
Non-unique Chinas influence with Cuba and Venezuals is low snubs in recent visits
H.T., 13 (Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?, Jun 6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Xi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June
6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and
Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao
did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation,
Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa
Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba
and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have
been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to
come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?
The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting
questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist
government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of
having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always
mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he
had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by
Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week
that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad. However, as our
story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the
destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing
that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business
relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of
investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National
Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient
of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica
may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin
America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron,
oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with
its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been
frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten
times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have
raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as
Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements
with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat
to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over
issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is
broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela,
deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay
relevant.

Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil has been modest at best
Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED
STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association,
2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

China also has an obvious interest in Venezuelan oil, and Chvez has visited China six times in his drive
to win Chinese investment and energy purchases, and thereby create a soft balance to U.S. power. Yet
by all accounts (i.e., Ellis and Halper), Beijing has been cautious in building relations with the volatile
Venezuelan caudillo. Chinese investment in Venezuelas energy sector remains modest, and its
purchases of Venezuelan crude continue to fall well below the ambitious goals set by Chvez. As Luisa
Palacios points out in her essay in Chinas Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, there are technical
obstacles: Venezuelan heavy crude is incompatible with existing Chinese refineries, whereas
geographic proximity to the United States makes it the more natural market for Venezuelan oil: travel
time by tanker to the U.S. Gulf Coast is only five days, compared to forty days to reach China. Moreover,
there is some evidence that China wants to avoid becoming embroiled in Venezuela-U.S. tensions and
considers the confrontational Chvez something of a risky bet. Overall, Palacios concludes that,
although Chinese natural resource companies are slowly gaining a foothold in Latin America as part of
their global drive to diversify their energy portfolios, the region is not poised to become a significant
supplier of oil to China.

Relations Unsustainable
China-Venezuelan relations failure inevitable without Chavez.
Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, Perspective on the Future of China-Venezuela Relations, Inter-
American Dialogue, March 22, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3266)

According to Matt Ferchen, however, the strength of the China-Venezuela strategic partnership will likely be
tested in the coming years. China is unprepared for the possibility of significant political and economic
instability in Venezuela, he added, and is fearful of losing its preferred status in a post-Chvez
government. Ferchen agreed that economic complementarity exists between China and Venezuela, and will play
a role in future engagement, but suggested that the extent of future cooperation between China and Venezuela
will depend upon economic and political developments in the South American nation. Andrs Rojas Jimnez
explained that Chinas loans have done little to strengthen Venezuelas economy. Following the creation
of the China-Venezuela Joint Fund, oil exports to China jumped from 95,000 bpd in 2007 to 460,000 bpd in 2012. But
Venezuelas external debt also increased considerably. In 2012, Chinese loans accounted for 25
percent of Venezuelas total external debt. Venezuela is also increasingly dependent upon oil exports
for economic growth; exports of non-traditional goods are at the same levels as a decade ago. PdVSA, furthermore, has
consistently fallen short of the eventual 800,000 bpd promised to China. Chinese entities recently
criticized Venezuela for delays on certain projects, including some in the Orinoco.