CASE FACTS ISSUE HELD KEY TAKE-

AWAY
SECTION 8: Term of Office of Local Officials
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years, and no such official shall
serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
BORJA, JR.
VS COMELEC
- Respondent Jose Capco, Jr. was elected
vice-mayor of Pateros.
- He then became mayor, by operation of
law, upon the death of incumbent mayor
Cesar Borja.
- He ran and was elected for 2 consecutive
terms as mayor. On March 1998, Cacpo filed
his COC for mayoralty again.
- Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., also a
candidate for mayor, sought the
disqualification of Capco and contended
that Capco already served as mayor for 3
consecutive terms, including his succession
to Cesar Borjas mayoralty by operation of
law; thus, he is ineligible to serve for
another term.
W/N Capcos
succession to the office
of the mayor by
operation of law and
service of the
remaining term is
already considered as
one term in applying
the consecutive 3-term
limit for local officials,
hence, making him
ineligible to serve for
another term.
- No, Capco is still eligible to serve for
another term as mayor, because his
succession to Cesar Borjas mayoralty is not
considered as one term in applying the
consecutive 3-term limit to local officials.
- The fundamental principle of representative
democracy is that people should be allowed
to choose those whom they want to govern
them. To bar the election of a local official
because he has already served 3 terms,
although the 1
st
was a result of succession by
operation of law and not election, would
amount to violation of this principle.
- For disqualification to apply, an individual
must:
a) have been elected for 3 consecutive terms
in an elective local office
b) have served in the same position for the
same number of consecutive and full terms
CONSECUTI
VE 3-TERM
LIMIT OF
LOCAL
OFFICIALS
DAVID VS
COMELEC
- Petitioner Liga ng mga Brgy. Quezon City
Chapter assailed the constitutionality of RA
7160 or the Local Autonomy Code,
specifying the term of barangay officials to 3
years.
- Petitioner contended that by excluding
barangay officials whose term shall be
determined by law from the general
provision fixing the term of elective local
officials at 3 years, the Constitution
implicitly prohibits the Congress from
W/N the Constitution,
by excluding the term
of barangay officials
from the general
provision of 3-year
term for elective local
officials, prohibits the
Congress from
legislating a 3-year
term for barangay
officials.
- No, the Constitution did not expressly
prohibit Congress from fixing any term of
office for barangay officials. Sec. 8, Art. 10 of
the Constitution provided that the term of all
elective local officials shall be limited to 3
yeas, except that of barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law.
- It merely left the determination of such
term of barangay officials to the Congress
without specific limitations or prohibitions.
TERM OF
BARANGAY
OFFICIALS
legislating a 3-year term for such officers.
SECTION 9: Sectoral Representation
Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law.
SUPANGAN,
JR. VS
SANTOS
- Petitioners attacked the authority of the
Secretary of Local Government to designate
or appoint members/sectoral
representatives to the local legislative
bodies.
- Petitioners argued the following:
a) the designations and appointments made
by the respondent Secretary was unlawful
and unconstitutional, in the light of Sec. 9,
Art. 10 of the Constitution, because there
was no enabling law yet to implement such
provision.
b) only the President has the power to
appoint and cannot be delegated to the
Secretary of Local Government.
c) assuming the Secretary has the
appointing power over sectoral
representatives, the
designations/appointments were null and
void because it did not comply with the
manner prescribed by the same law.
d) the appointees are not qualified.
W/N Secretary Santos
of Local Government
has the authority to
designate or appoint
members/sectoral
representatives to the
local legislative bodies.
- Yes, because Sec. 9 of Art. 10 of the
Constitution commands that all legislative
bodies of local governments must have
sectoral representatives among its members,
and the appointment or designation of
individuals thereto must be done in
accordance with provisions of law, whether
that law exists or is yet to be passed.
- In this case, that law already exists in B.P.
Blg. 337, particularly Sec. 146 & 173, and it is
neither inconsistent with the Constitution,
repealed, amended or revoked.
- Also, the Secretary of Local Government
may, by authority of the President inform the
sectoral representatives of their
appointments.
- However, the designations made by
Secretary Santos were null and void, since
there was no basis for the
designations/appointments, because the
manner prescribed in BP Blg 337 was not
followed, which is the requirement that the
Sanggunian should determine first that the
Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in
their particular city or municipality are of
sufficient number to warrant representation.
- VALID APPOINTMENT OF SECTORAL
REPRESENTATIVES:
a) appointees must belong to the sector
which he represents
b) prior consultation and determination of
the Sanggunian that the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular
APPOINTM
ENT OF
SECTORAL
REPRESENT
ATIVES
city or municipality are sufficient in number
as to warrant representation.
SECTION 10: Creation, Division, Merger, etc. of Local Government Units
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
TAN VS
COMELEC
- Petitioners, who are residents in various
cities and municipalities of Negros
Occidental, filed a case for Prohibition to
stop the COMELEC from conducting a
plebiscite pursuant to the law separating
the Island of Negros, and creating another
province to be named as Negros Del Norte.
- The plebiscite was only confined to the
inhabitants of Negros Del Norte.
- Petitioners contend that BP Blg. 885 is
unconstitutional and inconsistent with the
Local Government Code, because Sec. 3 of
Art. 11 contemplates a plebiscite that would
be held in the unit/s affected by the
creation of the new province as a result of
the consequent division of and substantial
alteration of the boundaries of Negros
Occidental, but BP Blg. 885 provides that
the plebiscite shall be conducted in the
proposed new province which are the areas
affected.
- Therefore, the petitioners contended that
the remaining areas of Negros Occidental
should have been allowed to participate in
the said plebiscite.
W/N the inhabitants in
of the territory of
Negors Occidental
should have been
allowed to participate
in the plebiscite,
regarding the creation
of the province of
Negros Del Norte.
- Yes, Negros Occidental should have been
allowed to participate in the plebiscite,
because the Constitution provides that the
approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite of the unit/s affected should be
first met whenever a province is created,
divided or merge and there is substantial
alteration of the boundaries.
- Since the boundaries of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be
substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order to create
Negros Del Norte, then the 2 political units
would be affected, thus, these political
units should both participate in the
plebiscite.
- The Court, however, did not direct the
conduct of a new plebiscite, since it did
not find any legal basis to do so, because
of the constitutional infirmity of BP Blg
885 and also the creation of Negros Del
Norte was not according to the criteria
established in Local Government Code.
The factual and legal basis for the creation
of such new province, which should justify
the holding of another plebiscite, does not
exist.
PARENT
PROVINCE
AND NEW
PROVINCE
INVOLVED IN
A PLEBISCITE
PADILLA, JR.
VS COMELEC
- COMELEC promulgated a resolution
pursuant to RA 7155, providing for the
creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-
W/N the COMELEC
committed GADELEJ in
promulgating its
- No, the COMELEC did not commit
GADELEJ. - Yes, the plebiscite, which
rejected the creation of the proposed
PARENT
MUNICIPALITY
AND NEW
Lupa in Camarines Norte to be composed of
several barangays, where a plebiscite would
also be held.
- In the plebiscite held throughout the
Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes
favored its creation while 3,439 votes
against it.
- The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers
declared the rejection of the creation of the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
- Petitioner, as the Governor of Camarines
Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite and
prays that a new plebiscite be held,
contending that the plebiscite should have
only included 12 barangays comprising the
new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, and
excluding the remaining areas of the mother
unit of Municipality of Labo, Camarines
Norte.
resolution, and
consequently, W/N the
plebiscite conducted in
the areas comprising
the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa of Camarines
Norte and the
remaining areas of the
mother Municipality of
Labo is valid.
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.
- Both the mother Municipality of Labo
and the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of
the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa should participate in the plebiscite,
since both of these political units would be
affected.
MUNICIAPLITY
INVOLVED IN
A PLEBISCITE
LEAGUE OF
CITIES VS
COMELEC
- RA 9009 was passed, increasing the
income requirement from P20M to P100M
for municipalities to become cities.
- But the respondent 16 LGUs who had
pending cityhood bills in Congress, prior to
the enactment of RA 9009, were exempted
from this law, as provided for in their
respective cityhood laws, because they
already met the criteria prescribed in the
former law.
- Petitioners contend that the cityhood laws
providing for the exemption of the
respondent LGUs from the income standard
provided in the amendatory RA 9009 violate
the Constitution, since the petitioners
theorizes that the criteria for creating cities
must be written only in LGC and not in other
W/N the Cityhood Laws
is unconstitutional for
violating:
a) Sec. 10 of Art. 10,
that criteria for creating
cities must be
contained only in LGC
b) equal protection
clause

a) No, because the only reason why the
Constitution used the clause in
accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code is to
emphasize that it is the Congress alone
which can impose the criteria, but it does
not mean that Congress cannot enact
statutes containing such criteria. The
exemption from RA 9009 provided for in
the cityhood laws of the respondent LGUs
is valid.

b) No, there is a valid classification that
justified the exemption of the respondent
LGUs.
CITYHOOD
LAWS
statutes.
- Petitioners also argue that the cityhood
laws, by granting respondent LGUs
exemption from the P100M income
requirement, is a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
SECTION 11: Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions
The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component
cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
MMDA VS
BEL-AIR
VILLAGE
ASSOC.
- Petitioner MMDA is a government agency
tasked with the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila.
- Respondent Bel-Air Village Association Inc.,
who is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village.
- Respondent received from MMDA a notice
requesting respondent to open Neptune St.
to public vehicular traffic starting Jan. 2,
1996 and also informing that the perimeter
wall separating the subdivision from
Kalayaan Ave. would be demolished.
- The Court of Appeals ruled that the
MMDA has no authority to order the
opening of the Neptune St. & the
demolition of the perimeter walls, because
the authority is lodged to the City Council of
Makati.
- MMDA claims that it has authority to open
Neptune St. because it is an agent of the
state endowed with police power in the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila,
including traffic management.
W/N the MMDA has
the authority to order
Bel-Air Village Assoc.
the opening of the
Neptune St. to public
pursuant to its
regulatory and police
powers.

W/N the passage of an
ordinance is a
requirement before the
MMDA may order the
opening of the Neptune
St. to the public.
a) No, MMDA has no authority, because
there is nothing in its charter that grants it
police and legislative (ordinance-making)
powers.
- Also, although Metro Manila Commission
(MMC) is the precedent of MMDA, MMDA
is different from MMC, because MMC was
the central government of Metro Manila,
who had police and legislative powers.
However, MMDA is not a political unit or a
special metropolitan political subdivision
of government. It is only a special
development authority, tasked to deliver
basic services in Metro Manila, such as the
following:
1) development planning
2) transport and traffic management
3) solid waste disposal
4) flood control and sewerage
5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning and shelter services
6) health and sanitation, urban protection
and pollution control
7) public safety
MMDA AS
SPECIAL DEVT
AUTHORITY
SECTION 12: Classification of Cities
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose characters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not
be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
ABELLA VS
COMELEC
- Since the petitioner failed in her
contention that Adelina Larrazabal is a
resident and registered voter of Kananga
Leyte, the petitioner poses an alternative
position that her being a registered voter in
Ormoc City was no impediment to her
candidacy for the position of governor in
Leyte.
- petitioner submits that while a Component
city whose charter prohibits its voters from
participating in the elections for provincial
office, is indeed independent of the
province, such independence cannot be
equated with a highly urbanized city; rather
it is limited to the administrative supervision
aspect, and that said voters are not likewise
prohibited from running for the provincial
offices.
W/N component cities
whose charters
prohibits their voters
from participating in
the elections for
provincial office can be
equated to highly
urbanized cities.

W/N the said voters of
such component cities
can run for provincial
offices.
Yes, the component cities like Ormoc City
whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials are
treated like highly urbanized citie,s which
are outside the supervision of the province
to which they are geographically attached.
This independence from the province
carries with it the prohibition to their
voters from voting and being voted for the
provincial elective offices.
COMPONENT
CITIES THAT
PROHIBIT
THEIR VOTERS
FROM VOTING
PROVINCIAL
ELECTIVE
OFFICES
SECTION 13: Local Government Units Grouping
Local Government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to
them in accordance with law.

SECTION 14: Regional Development Councils
The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of
the units in the region.
CORDILLERA
BROAD
COALITION
VS COA

SECTION 15: Autonomous Regions
There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographic
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

SECTION 16: Presidents General Supervision over Autonomous Regions
The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

SECTION 17: Powers not Granted to Autonomous Regions
All powers, functions and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the national
government.

SECTION 18: Organic Act
The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic Act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic act shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this constition and national law.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
ABBAS VS
COMELEC
- A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,
was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao"
(Organic Act).
- These consolidated petitions pray that the
Court:
(1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting
the plebiscite
(2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional.
- The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by
petitioners may generally be categorized
into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates
W/N RA 6734 is
unconstitutional and if
it violates the Tripoli
Agreement.

The petition has no merit and the law is
constitutional.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a
provision in the Organic Act makes the
creation of an autonomous region
absolute, such that even if only two
provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the
favorable votes were obtained. there is a
specific provision in the Transitory
Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act,
which incorporates substantially the same
requirements embodied in the
Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take

the Constitution
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734
conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
effect when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of
Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than ninety (90)
days or later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the approval of this Act:
Provided, That only the provinces and
cities voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite
do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain the
existing administrative determination,
merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No
6734, the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when
approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and
only those provinces and cities where a
majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein
such a majority is not attained shall not be
included in the autonomous region. It may
be that even if an autonomous region is
created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in
Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734
shall be included therein. The single
plebiscite contemplated by the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will
therefore be determinative of (1) whether
there shall be an autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces
and cities, among those enumerated in
R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

2. The question has been raised as to what
this majority means. Does it refer to a
majority of the total votes cast in the
plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a
majority in each of the constituent units,
or both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The
creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous
region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will
readily be seen that the creation of the
autonomous region is made to depend,
not on the total majority vote in the
plebiscite, but on the will of the majority
in each of the constituent units and the
proviso underscores this.

3. Petitioner avers that not all of the
thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
included in the Organic Act, possess such
concurrence in historical and cultural
heritage and other relevant
characteristics. By including areas, which
do not strictly share the same
characteristic as the others, petitioner
claims that Congress has expanded the
scope of the autonomous region which the
constitution itself has prescribed to be
limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The
Constitution lays down the standards by
which Congress shall determine which
areas should constitute the autonomous
region. Guided by these constitutional
criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of
the areas that share common attributes is
within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the
wisdom of the law.

4. Both petitions also question the validity
of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it
violates the constitutional guarantee on
free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5].
The objection centers on a provision in the
Organic Act which mandates that should
there be any conflict between the Muslim
Code and the Tribal Code on the one had,
and the national law on the other hand,
the Shari'ah courts created under the
same Act should apply national law.
Petitioners maintain that the islamic law
(Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which
makes it part of divine law. Thus it may
not be subjected to any "man-made"
national law. Petitioner Abbas supports
this objection by enumerating possible
instances of conflict between provisions of
the Muslim Code and national law,
wherein an application of national law
might be offensive to a Muslim's religious
convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy
between real litigants exists. There are no
conflicting claims involving the application
of national law resulting in an alleged
violation of religious freedom. This being
so, the Court in this case may not be called
upon to resolve what is merely a perceived
potential conflict between the provisions
the Muslim Code and national law.

5. According to petitioners, said provision
grants the President the power to merge
regions, a power which is not conferred by
the Constitution upon the President.
While the power to merge administrative
regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local
governments. There is no conflict between
the power of the President to merge
administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a
plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger
expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to
administrative regions.

6. Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. Based on
the grounds raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6734, the Court finds that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of these two petitions is,
therefore, inevitable.


CORDILLERA
REGIONAL
ASSEMBLY
VS COMELEC
- Petitioners prayed that the Court declare
the COMELEC resolution, memorandum of
Sec. of Justice, Exe. Sec., RA 6861 null and
void and prohibit and restrain the
respondents from implementing the same.
- Petitioners maintain that there can be no
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only 1
province as the Constitution and RA 6766
require that said Region be composed of
more than 1 constituent unit.
W/N the province of
Ifugao, being the only
province which voted
favorably for the
creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous
Region can, alone,
legally and validly
constitute such Region.
- No, the sole province of Ifugao cannot
validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, because the term
region, used in its ordinary sense means
2 or more provinces.
1 PROVINCE
CANNOT
CONSTITUTE
AUTONOMOU
S REGION
LEONOR VS
CORDILLERA
BODONG
ADMINISTR
ATION
- The plebiscite for the purpose of creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and
cities of the Cordillera region, except the province of Ifugao, hence, the CAR did not push through.
- So, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under EO 220, the indigenous and special courts for the
indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region and the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army, as a regional
police force or a regional command of the AFP.
- Since the CAR did not come into existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or
special court.
- So the Maeng Tribal Court existed under the customs of the indigenous cultural community, but they do not form
part of the judicial system of the Philippines, thus, have no judicial power.
- Like the pangkats or conciliation panels in barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal
objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to settle and compromise.
INDIGENOUS
COURTS OF
CORDILLERA
REGION NOT
PART OF
JUDICIAL
SYSTEM
SECTION 19: Congress shall Pass the Organic Act
The 1
st
Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within 18 months from the time of organization of both houses, pass the organic acts for the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

SECTION 20: Legislative Powers of Autonomous Regions
Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
1) administrative organization
2) creation of sources of revenue
3) ancestral domains and natural resources
4) personal, family and property relations
5) regional, urban and rural planning development
6) economic, social and tourism development
7) educational policies
8) preservation and development of the cultural heritage
9) such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region
PANDI VS
COURT OF
APPEALS
- An ordinary statute, whether general or special, cannot amend an organic act that provides for an autonomus
region which udner the Constitution may only be created, and therefore changed, through a plebiscite called for the
purpose.
- Since the RA 9054 (Organic Act of 2001) took effect on August 14, 2001, which incorporates the Peace Agreement
entered into between the National Government and the MNLF, the Organic Act of 2201 is a completely new
autonomy act for Muslim Mindanao since it totally replaced the Organic Act of 1989. It is not an ordinary
amendment but a total substitution since the Organic Act of 2001 is as comprehensive as the Organic Act of 1989.
ORDINARY
STATUES
CANNOT
AMEND
ORGANIC
ACTS
SECTION 21: Peace & Order; Defense & Security
The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the national
government.

ARTICLE 11: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 2: IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, CONCOM MEMBERS & OMBUDSMAN
FRANCISCO,
ET. AL VS
HOUSE
SPEAKER,
ET. AL
- 12
th
Congress of House of Representatives
(HOR) approved & adopted Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings in 2001, replacing
the previous House Impeachment Rules of 11
th

Congress.
- HOR issued a Resolution directing Committee
on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of
legislation regarding the disbursements and
expenditures of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) by SC Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
- June 2, 2003: Pres. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against CJ Davide and 7
Associate Justices for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other
high crimes and submitted it to House
Committee on Justice (HCJ).
1) W/N the power of
judicial review
extends to
impeachment
proceedings.

2) W/N the 2
nd

impeachment
complaint was filed in
accordance to Sec.
3(4), Art. 11 of the
Constitution,
regarding the 1/3 vote
of all HOR members in
filing an impeachment
complaint.
1) YES, because this Court has the
power and duty of judicial review over
justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.

2) NO, because the resolution of
impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution is not the endorsement of
1/3 of all HOR members; it must be the
signature and verification as
complainants of at least 1/3 of all HOR
members. However, the Court still
proceeded to the case and considered
the more substantive issues.

3) not discussed in casebook

- Oct. 13, 2003: HCJ ruled that the 1
st

impeachment complaint was sufficient in form
but dismissed it on Oct. 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.
- 4 mos. & 3 weeks after the filing of the 1
st

impeachment complaint or on Oct. 23, 2003, the
day after the 1
st
complaint was dismissed, the
2
nd
impeachment complaint against Davide was
filed by Representatives Teodoro Jr. &
Fuentebella, with a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least
1/3 of all the members of HOR.

- Petitioners filed a case in Court, contending
that the filing of 2
nd
impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5 of Art. 11
that no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than
once in 1 year.

- Respondent HOR argues that:
a) while at least 81 members of HOR signed a
resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the
same did not satisfy the requisites for the
application of Sec. 3(4), because the verified
complaint/resolution of impeachment was not
filed by at least 1/3 of all HOR members; and
that the verified complaint must be filed and not
merely endorsed by 1/3 of all HOR members.

b) the 1-year prohibition on the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
officials was not violated as the impeachment
complaint against CJ Davide & 7 Associate
Justices were not initiated, and the HOR, as a
collective body, has yet to act on it.

3) W/N the legislative
inquiry by HCJ into the
Judicial Devt Fund is
unconstitutional for
infringing the fiscal
autonomy of the
judiciary.

4) W/N Sec. 16 & 17
of the 12
th
Congress
Rules on
Impeachment are
unconstitutional for
violating Sec. 3, Art.
11 of Constitution,
regarding when
initiation of
impeachment
proceedings occur.

5) W/N the 2
nd

impeachment
complaint is barred
under Sec. 3(5), Art. 9
of Constitution.



4) YES, because under the Rules on
Impeachment of the Congress,
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated if:
a) HCJ finds that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance; or
b) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of HCJ that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is
insufficient in substance; or
c) by the filing/endorsement before the
Sec. Gen of HOR of a verified
complaint/resolution of impeachment
by at least 1/3 of all HOR members.

However, under the Constitution,
initiation of impeachment proceedings
takes place by the act of filing a verified
complaint and referral to the HCJ for
action. Therefore, Sec. 16 & 17 of Rules
on Impeachment are unconstitutional.

Impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by
the Senate.
Impeachment proceeding takes place
in several steps:
1) filing of a verified complaint
(initiation of impeachment proceeding)
2) processing of the complaint by HCJ
3) resolution must be forwarded to the
House for further processing
4) HOR either affirms or overrides the
resolution of the HCJ by a vote of 1/3 of
c) only HOR has the power to make and
interpret its rules governing impeachment.
all members

If at least 1/3 of HOR members upholds
the complaint, Articles of Impeachment
are prepared and transmitted to the
Senate, and it is at this point that an
impeachment case is initiated (as
opposed to initiation of impeachment
proceeding).

Also, as regards the argument of
respondent HOR that only HOR has the
power to make its rules on
impeachment, its rules must still not
contravene the Constitution.

5) YES. Since the 1
st
impeachment
complaint by the former Pres. Estrada
against the CJ Davide and 7 Associate
Justices was filed on June 2, 2003,
referred to HCJ on Aug. 5, 2003, and
that the 2
nd
impeachment complaint of
Representatives Teodoro Jr. &
Fuenteballa was filed on Oct. 23, 2003,
then the 2
nd
impeachment complaint
violated the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against same officer within
1 year.

Case Facts Issue Held Key take away
Section 1: The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Section 2: The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
San Juan v. Civil
Service
Commission
By executive order 112, the
authority to appoint a provincial
budget officer (PBO) had been
given to the secretary of DBM
upon recommendation of the
local executive concerned

The person recommended by the
provincial governor of Rizal did
not possess the necessary
qualifications

Budget secretary then appointed
somebody else of his own choice

W/N the appointment
done by the DBM
secretary without the
recommendation of the
governor is valid
NO, if the recommendee of the
local executive is not qualified,
the secretary must ask for new
recommendees with the
necessary eligibility.

There are factors about life in a
local community about which
central government is NOT the
best judge (provincial budgets
are prepared at a local level)

When the CSC interpreted the
recommending power of the
provincial governor as purely
directory, it went against the
letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on
local autonomy
Recommendation of local executive
concernedly not purely directory
but mandatory.

NOTE: autonomy and
decentralization are NOT the same.

Autonomy either
decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power
1) decentralization of
administration central
government delegates
administrative powers to political
subdivisions
2) decentralization of power-
abdication of political power in
favor of LGUs declared to be
autonomous
Laguna Lake
Development
Authority v. Court
of Appeals
Tons of garbage are dumped
everyday in Taal Estate, Caloocan
city

Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) filed a case
against the Caloocan city for
appropriate disposition CA
rules LLDA has no authority to
issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Caloocan

City govt of Caloocan: as a local
government, it is within their
power to determine the effects of
the operation of the dumpsite
(territorial jurisdiction)
W/N the LLDA has
jurisdiction over a city
govt authorized
dumpsite in Camarin,
Caloocan
YES

General rule: adjudication of
pollution cases pertains to the
Pollution Adjufication Board,
except when special law
provides for another forum.
LLDA is a specialized
administrative agency
authorized by special laws to
protect Rizal Laguna, San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, QC and Caloocan
with regard to provisions for
environmental control.

LLDA, by virtue of its special
character, is mandated to pass
upon and approve or
Specific power of LLDA prevails
over general power of Local
governments

1
LLDA is required to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de bay region without previous clearance from the authority.

LLDA: as an administrative
agency which was granted
regulatory and adjudicatory
powers by RA 4850
1
, PD 813,
and EO 297, it is invested with
the power to issue a cease and
desist order.
disapprove all plans/projects
proposed by the local
governments.

Dumpsite project was
undertaken without clearance
from LLDA
Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties
PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro
city and leased and leased a
portion of the building of Pryce
Properties.
The government of CDO
contended that under its
authority to prohibit gambling,
the city could prevent PAGCOR
form operating a casino in the
city. It enacted ordinances
number 3353 (prohibiting the
issuance of business permit for
the operation of casino) and
3375-93 (prohibiting the
operation of casino)

PAGCOR however, had authority
under PD1869 to centralize and
regulate ALL games of chance
under the territorial jurisdiction
of the Philippines.
W/N the city government
of Cagayan de oro could
curtail PAGCORs
authority to operate a
Casino in the city
NO

The ordinance prohibiting the
issuance of a business permit to,
and cancelling any business
permit of any establishment
allowing its premises to be used
as a casino, and the ordinance
prohibiting the operation of a
casino, were declared invalid for
being contrary to PD 1869
(Charter of PAGCOR) which has
the character and force of a
statute. Ordinances should not
contravene a statute.

Municipal governments are only
agents of the national
government and local councils
exercise delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by
Congress. The delegate cannot
be superior than the principal.
Local governments have certain
powers given by the Constitution
which may not be curtailed by the
national government, but local
governments may not pass
ordinances contrary to statute.
Phil. Petroleum
Corp v. Mun. of
Pililla
PC 26-3 suspended the effectivity
of local tax ordinances imposing
tax on business under the local
tax code with regard to
retailers/wholesalers of
petroleum products subject to
the specific tax imposed by the
W/N petitioner PPC
whose oil products are
subject to specific tax
under NIRC, is still liable
to pay (a) tax on business
and (b) storage fees
pursuant to Provincial
YES

PD 426 amended the local tax
code and is deemed to have
repealed provincial circular 26-
73 when no exemptions were
given to retailers/wholesalers
Administrative regulations must be
in harmony with the provisions of
the law
National Internal Revenue Code.
PD 426 further amended the
local tax code.
Circular 6-77; and
mayors permit and
sanitary inspection fee
unto respondent
municipality of Pililla,
Rizal based on municipal
order 1.
of petroleum products.

Administrative regulations must
be in harmony with provisions
of the law. In case of
discrepancy between the basic
law and an IRR, the law prevails.

The exercise by local
governments of the power to tax
is ordained by the present
constitution and to allow the
continuous effectivity of the
prohibition in PC 26-73 will
restrict their power to tax by
administrative issuances.
Dadole et.al v.
COA
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges
of Mandaue city started receiving
monthly allowances of P1,260
each through the yearly
appropriation ordinances
enacted by the Sangguniang
Panglunsod. In 1991, Mandaue
City increased to P1500.

In 1994, DBM release Local
Budge Circular 55 stating that
allowances should not exceed
1,000 in provinces and 700 in
municipalities.
COA issued a notice of
disallowance on the ground of
LBC 55
W/N local budget
circular 55 can render
inoperative the power of
the legislative body of a
city by setting a limit to
the allowance for judges
No

DBM LBC 55 is null and void
1991 Local Government Code
does not prescribe a limit to the
allowance. By virtue of his/ her
power of supervision, the
President can only interfere in
the affairs and activities of a
local government unit if it has
acted contrary to law.

Commission on Audit may not
reduce the allowance given to
judges by local governments.

The local government code
authorizes local governments to
give allowance to judges and
decide how much this should be.

COA failed to prove that
Mandaue city use the IRA
budget for the additional
allowances of the judges
President exercise not power of
control but power of supervision
over local government units
John Hay Peoples
Alternative
Coalition v. Victor
Lim
Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 420, Series of
1994, Creating and Designating
a Portion of the Area Covered by
the Former Camp John Hay as the
John Hay Special Economic Zone
Pursuant to Republic Act No.
7227

RA 7227: granted Subic SEZ
incentives such tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of
businesses from local and
national taxes
And gave authority to the
President to create through
executive proclamation, subject
to the concurrence of the local
government units directly
affected, other Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) in Clark
(Pampanga), Wallace Air Station
(La Union), and Camp John Hay
(Baguio)

Petitioners argue that the
president has no authority to
subject the John Hay SEZ to the
governance of Bases Conversion
and Development Authority
(BCDA) and it diminishes the city
governments power over its
jurisdiction. Hence, it gives the
president power of control
instead of power of supervision.

W/N proclamation 420 is
constitutional by
providing for national
and local tax exemption
within and granting other
economic incentives to
the John Hay Special
Economic Zone.

W/N proclamation is
constitutional for limiting
or interfering with the
local autonomy of Baguio
City
NO

Under section 12 of RA 7227, it
is only the Subic SEZ which was
granted by congress with tax
exemption. There is no express
extension of he exemption to
other SEZs.

NO
The rights of ownership and
administration vested in BCDA
over Camp John Hay is subject
to certain limitations provided
by law. The designation of BCBA
merely emphasizes the role it
has been granted.

The delineation and declaration
of a portion of the area covered
by Camp John hay as a SEZ was
well within the powers of the
president to do my means of a
proclamation. The requisite of a
prior concurrence of the city
government has been given by a
resolution of the sanggunian.
A law granting tax exemption must
have the concurrence of a majority
of all members of Congress

BCDA- merely holding and
administration
Leynes v. COA Petitioner judge Tomas Leynes
was formerly assigned to the
Municipality of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro as presiding judge of
W/N the municipality of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
can validly provide RATA
to its municipal judge, in
YES

Under section 447 of the Local
government code, provincial,
Circular must conform to the law it
seeks to implement and should not
modify or amend it.

the MTC. His salary and
representation and
transportation allowance (RATA)
were drawn from the budget of
the SC and in addition, he
received a monthly allowance of
P944 from the municipality of
Naujan

COA opposed the grant of the
municipal allowance on the
ground that under section 3 of
DBMs Local Budget Circular 53,
LGUs are prohibited from
granting allowances to judges
whenever such allowances are
(1) also granted by the national
government or (2) similar to the
allowances granted by the
national government
addition to that provided
by the Supreme Court
city and municipal governments
may grant allowances to judges
as long as their finances allow.

Though LBC 53 is considered as
a valid exercise of the
presidents power of general
supervision, section 3 is invalid.
DBM shall not provide a limit
when the law does not provide.
A circular must conform to the
law it seeks to implement and
should not modify or amend it.
If the local government code does
not provide a limit, the DBM should
not.
Batangas CATV v.
Batangas City
Marcos issued PD 1512
terminating all franchises,
permits or certificates for the
operation of CATV system
previously granted by local
governments

Today, pursuant to section 3 of
EO 436, only persons,
associations, partnerships,
corporations or cooperatives
granted a provisional authority
or certificate of authority by the
NTC may install, operate and
maintain a cable television
system service within an area
W/N municipalities have
the power to grant CATV
franchise
NO

In the absence of constitutional
or legislative authorization,
municipalities have no power to
grant franchise.

Protection of constitutional
provisions does not extend to
franchises granted by a
municipality in excess of its
powers.
In the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization,
municipalities have no power to
grant franchise.

NOTE: LGUs merely form part of
whole. When the drafters of the
1987 constitution enunciated the
policy of ensuring autonomy of
local governments, it was never its
intention to create intra-sovereign
political subdivisions independent
of a single sovereign state,
Section 3: The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating o the organization and operation of the local government units.
Sanchez v. BP 337 was the local government W/N Sec 3, art X of the NO, nothing in sec 3 article X of BP 337 remained in effect until the
COMELEC code existing prior to the
adoption of the 1987
constitution and the enactment
of the 1991 Local Government
Code.

Section 59, BP 337 states that:
the COMELEC shall conduct and
supervise the process of and
election on recall
constitution which calls
for an effective system of
recall repealed Sec 59 of
BP 337.
the constitution repealed BP
337. The constitution merely
provides that the local
government code to be enacted
by congress shall be more
responsive than BP 337. Until
the new local government code
is enacted, BP 337 shall take
effect.
enactment of LGC of 1991.
Garcia v.
COMELEC
Section 70 of the LCG authorizes
provinces, cities, legislative
districts and municipalities to
have a preparatory recall
assembly authorized to initiate
the recall of an elective official.

Petitioners sought to annul the
resolution of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly of Bataan
initiating recall proceedings
against their governor, Enrique
T. Garcia.

The first time the local
government officials constituted
themselves into a PRA, they
issued Resolution No. 1 as formal
initiation of the recall
proceedings. Enrique held that
the right to recall does not
extend merely to the prerogative
of the electorate to confirm or
withdraw their confidence in the
official sought to be recalled
through special election. Such
prerogative necessarily includes
the sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a
recall proceeding or not.
W/N the people have the
sole and exclusive right
to initiate recall
proceedings
NO

There is nothing in the
Constitution that suggests that
the power to initiate recall
proceedings is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the
people. Congress was given the
power to choose the mechanism
of recall without limit as to
the number of modes and with
the requisite only that the same
be effectiveand it has in its
wisdom provided for one that
can be initiated by either a
preparatory recall assembly or
the people themselves. Indeed,
there is no great difference
between the two, as recall
proceedings initiated by the
recall assembly is also initiation
by the people, albeit done
indirectly through their
representatives.
The constitution did not provide for
any mode of initiating recall
elections. Neither did it prohibit the
adoption of multiple modes of
initiating recall elections.

What the constitution simply
required is that the mechanisms of
recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by congress, should be
effective.
Section 4: The president of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope
of their prescribed powers and functions.
Drilon vs Mayor
Lim
Lim assails the constitutionality
of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code which
authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review the
constitutionality of legality of a
tax ordinanceand if warranted,
to revoke it on either or both
grounds.

The Secretary of Justice on
appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer
declared Ordinance No.
7794(Manila Revenue Code) null
and void for non-compliance
with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and
for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretarys
resolution and sustained the
ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of
the LGC as unconstitutional
because it vests on the Secretary
the power of control over LGUs
in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the
Constitution.

W/N Section 187 of the
Local Government Code
which authorizes the
Secretary of Justice to
pass judgment on the
constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances
or revenue measures is
an exercise of power of
control and therefore,
invalid.
NO

Section 187 is VALID for it
authorizes the petitioner to
review only the
constitutionality or legality of
tax ordinance. What he found
only was that it was illegal. That
act is not control but
supervision. Even if he can set
aside a tax ordinance, he cannot
substitute his own judgment for
that of the local government
unit.

Control lays down the rules in
the doing of act and if not
followed order the act undone
or re-done. Supervision sees to
it that the rules are followed.

Two grounds of declaring
Manila Revenue Code null and
void (1) inclusion of certain
ultra vires provisions (2) non-
compliance with prescribed
procedure in its enactment but
were followed.

Sec 187 is valid for the sec. of
justice does not dictate what the
law should be but merely ensures
that the ordinance is in accordance
with law.
Even if he can set aside a tax
ordinance, he cannot substitute his
own judgment for that of the local
government unit.
Section 5: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
Manila
Electric vs
Province of
Laguna
MERALCO was granted a franchise by
several municipal councils and the
National Electrification
Administration to operate an electric
light and power service in the Laguna.
Whether or not the
imposition of franchise
tax under the provincial
ordinance is violative of
the non-impairment
No. There is no violation of the
non-impairment clause for the
same must yield to the inherent
power of the state (taxation).
The provincial ordinance is
Tax power of local governments
must be deemed to exist although
Congress may provide statutory
limitations and guidelines.

Upon enactment of Local Government
Code, the provincial government
issued ordinance imposing franchise
tax. MERALCO paid under protest and
later claims for refund because of the
duplicity with Section 1 of P.D. No.
551. This was denied by governor
Joey Lina relying on a more recent
law (the local government code).
MERALCO filed with the RTC a
complaint for refund, but was
dismissed.
clause of the Constitution
and of P.D. 551.
valid and constitutional.

The Local Government Code of
1991 has incorporated and
adopted, by and large, the
provisions of the now repealed
Local Tax Code. The 1991 Code
explicitly authorizes provincial
governments, notwithstanding
any exemption granted by any
law or other special law, . . . (to)
impose a tax on businesses
enjoying a franchise.

The tax power must be deemed
to exist although congress may
provide statutory limits and
guidelines. This is to safeguard
the viability and self sufficiency
of local governments by directly
granting them general and
broad tax powers.
NPC vs
Cabanatuan
City
City of Cabanatuan filed a collection
suit against NAPOCOR, a government-
owned and controlled corporation
demanding that the latter pay the
assessed franchise tax due, plus
surcharge and interest. It alleged that
NAPOCORs exemption from local
taxes has already been withdrawn by
the Local Government Code.
NAPOCOR submitted that it is not
liable to pay an annual franchise
because the citys taxing power is
limited to private entities that are
engaged in trade or occupation for
profit, and that the NAPOCOR Charter,
being a valid exercise of police power,
should prevail over the LGC.
Whether NAPOCOR is
liable to pay annual
franchise tax to the City
of Cabanatuan.

YES

The power to tax is no longer
vested exclusively on Congress;
local legislative bodies are now
given direct authority to levy
taxes, fees and other charges.
Although as a general rule, LGUs
cannot impose taxes, fees or
charges of any kind on the
National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities,
this rule now admits of an
exception, i.e., when specific
provisions of the LGC authorize
the LGUs to impose taxes, fees
or charges on the
aforementioned entities.
Nothing prevents Congress from
Local legislative bodies are now
given direct authority to levy taxes,
fees and other charges.

LGUs can now impose taxes, fees or
charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, when specific
provisions of the LGC authorize the
LGUs to impose taxes, fees or
charges on the aforementioned
entities.
decreeing that even
instrumentalities or agencies of
the government performing
governmental functions may be
subject to tax.

NAPOCOR is covered by the
franchise tax because it
exercises a franchise in the
second sense and it is exercising
its rights or privileges under
this franchise within the
territory of the City.
Petron
Corporation
vs Mayor
Tiango
Petron maintains a depot or bulk
plant in Navotas Fishport Complex.
Through the said depot, it sells diesel
fuels to the vessels used in
commercial fishing in and around
Manila Bay.

Later, Petron received a letter from
the office of Mayor Tiangco assessing
it for business taxes in the amount of
6.2M covering 1997-2001 pursuant to
the Navotas Revenue Code.

A protest was filed by Petron arguing
that under the IRR of the NIRC, it is
exempt from local business tax. Also,
an opinion was rendered by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance
providing for that sales of petroleum
fuels are NOT subject to local
taxation. Letter protest was denied
and a final demand to pay was sent to
Petron.
Petron filed a complaint for
cancellation of assessment with TRO
before the RTC. RTC dismissed the
complaint.
W/N the municipality of
Navotas may impose a
business tax on Petron
NO

The language of Section 133(h)
of the LGC makes plain that the
prohibition with respect to
petroleum products extends not
only to excise taxes thereon, but
all "taxes, feesand charges."
While local government units
are authorized to burden all
such other class of goods with
"taxes, fees and charges,"
excepting excise taxes, a specific
prohibition is imposed barring
the levying of any other type of
taxes with respect to petroleum
products.


Congress has the constitutional
authority to impose limitations on
power to tax of LGUs

Example: business tax for
petroleum products
Section 6: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes, which shall be automatically released to them.




Pimintel vs
Aguirre
Then President Ramos issued AO 372
Adoption of Economy Measures in
Government for FY 1998 which
requires LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25% for their
authorized regular appropriations of
non-personal services. Subsequently,
succeeding President Estrada issued
AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372
reducing to 5% the amount of the
internal revenues allotment (IRA) to
be withheld from the LGUs.
Contentions arises the directive to
withhold 10% of this IRA is in
contravention of Section 286 of the
Local Government Code and of
Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution, providing the automatic
release of its share in the national
income revenue.
Whether or not, the
Presidents power to
exercise general
supervision over local
governments are valid
under Section 1 and 4 of
AO 372, directing LGUs to
reduce their
expenditures and
withholds 10% of their
IRA, respectively.
Yes, the Presidents power to
exercise general supervision
over LGUs is valid because
Section 1 of AO 372 is merely
directive and has been issued by
the President in consistent with
his power to supervise LGUs;

Section 4 is unconstitutional for
it is mandated by the
Constitution and the Local
Government Code, that it is a
basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy to automatically
release the shares of the LGUs in
the national internal revenue,
and the withholding of 10% of
the LGUs IRA contravenes with
the law.

Local fiscal autonomy requires
automatic release of the LGUs
share in national taxes