An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be

considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold," the SC ruled.
With the ruling, the SC ordered the immediate reinstatement of Abundo to his post as
mayor and the reversion of Tarin and Cervantes to their original posts as vice mayor and
first councilor of Viga town

In its decision, the SC also listed down the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting
the consecutiveness of terms and or involuntary interruption. These are:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the Local Government
Code, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot
be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted n the application of any term limit. If the official
runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then
his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption.
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek
the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election,
had an interruption in the continuity of the official's service. For, he had become in the
interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen.
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official's continuity of service.
"4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer's
continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this
period.
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office,
his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term
of office had the protest been dismissed. The break or interruption need not be for a full
term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length
of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service.
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest
does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to
finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term
limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term.




Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.




Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end
of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is
an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the
third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any
other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is
a consecutive fourth term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate
re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in
2001.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged
the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election
protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as
null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San
Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to
disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May
1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for
one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was
duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be
counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government
officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years
until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.

Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such
officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: No local
elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections,
not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.