A.M. No.

1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A.
Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath.
Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a
motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by
making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted
respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976,
complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely,
Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado
[hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses,
including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of
the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-
15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and,
without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the
Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation in
Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a
contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a
residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-
15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty
percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the
Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was
already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the
Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting
the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in
connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent
against complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who
was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without
legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's
Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not
intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on
December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to
"PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to
"11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that
the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the
Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that
the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement
of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their
respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent
filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated
January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that
respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the
pendency of the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the
execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where
two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were
made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of
the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules
of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP.
Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the
IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is
respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the
case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint
against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of
Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule
139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases
pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and
disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation
has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's
claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578,
October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-
B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP
by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the
investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its
final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official
and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule
139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been
substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General
was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his
motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986,
the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p.
353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by
the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has
lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral
of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The
record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than
eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the
complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the
acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant
the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half
(1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650
sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his
legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the
abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing
the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated
the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in
any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil
Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in
litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which
states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional
Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation
is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary
action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this
oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27,
Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and
reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having
violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as
with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has
failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding
the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the
abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the
prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation
constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought
against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded,
is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the
properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land
development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill,
New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by
these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and
interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements
found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to
respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land
development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the
time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-
1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was
executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon
the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that
since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the
land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover,
the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves
as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the
complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land
development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of
ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous
conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt
respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which
is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement,
respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so
that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly
undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his
private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v.
Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document
filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the
addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T.
Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to
appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters
(SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and
complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties,
Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith
and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on
May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copyattached to the letter and to send it back
to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover,
respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to
sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973
[Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23,
1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he
knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith
Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty
as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek
to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was
committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report
and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement
between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent
Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Alfaro
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed
]
Editha
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed
]
Nestor
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed
]
C
O
N
F
O
R
M
E
Ramon
A.
Gonzal
es
[signed
]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may
not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04,
Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the
expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between
respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of
litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F.
Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case,
the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some
bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al.,
255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between
the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel
for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados
against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering
the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented
by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge
and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976
clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized
exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients
knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon
6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court
of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case
No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the
complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the
City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and
Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for
holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant.
As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor
General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass
him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that
there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned
cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above
discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the
law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in
the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to
the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892,
July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that,
considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and
circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious
misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be
circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a
member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law
imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR
No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the
condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to
Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead
of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00,
issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a
check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25
February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90)
days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had
bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and
85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987
which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case
No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case
No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent
portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the
Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude,
she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice
her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision
must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same
Rule.
SO ORDERED.
1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal
and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper
forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's
Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had
become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review
on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost
her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful
penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-
appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has
always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense
charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath
as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which
bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals
upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she
is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v.
Martinez,
2
the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the
following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions,
the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense
against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.
3
(Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section,
and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which
she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena,
4
this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to
the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law.
5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.




















A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978
FELIX LEYNES, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, Quezon, respondent.
A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978
BENJAMIN H. VIRREY, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, Quezon, respondent.

AQUINO, J :
For having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous circumstances in a house located
at the poblacion of General Nakar, Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, the municipal judge of that town,
was charged by Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey with immorality in public office (Complaint dated
October 23, 1974, p. 10, Rollo of Administrative Matter No. 809- MJ).
Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who was admitted to the bar in 1938,
started his judicial career in 1946 as a justice of the peace of Infanta, Quezon. Since 1950, he
has been functioning as the incumbent judge of General Nakar.
The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz at the parish church of Infanta on
October 24, 1955. Curiously enough, that was the date (one day after his 46th birthday) when
he suffered serious injuries in a vehicular accident at Infanta and when he was brought by plane
to Manila and admitted to the V. Luna General Hospital at six- thirty in the evening.
Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already begotten three children.
(In his personal reference sheet of September 10, 1947, he indicated that he was married with
two children named Linda and Nonong but he did not mention his wife's name. In his
information sheet for GSIS insurance dated November 9, 1960 he named his children as
Ulpiano, Evangelina and Asuncion, twelve, ten and six years old, respectively. Again, he did not
state his wife's name. See pages 7 and 58 of his personal record).
The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old Gloria Tropicales (his alleged housemaid)
is his mistress. Out of their union, two children, named Juana and Paulo, were born in 1970 and
1972 when the respondent was already a sex-agenarian. *
Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
prays for the dismissal of the immorality charge on the ground that his wife, Rosario V. Veluz
(she is named Ligaya in the marriage certificate), condoned his acts of concubinage, as shown
in her affidavit of November 21, 1974. In that affidavit, she unabashedly stated that, because
her husband's thighbone was broken in a vehicular accident in 1955, she chose Gloria
Tropicales to serve her husband, like a real wife ("upang paglingkuran ang aking asawa na ang
gagawin niyang paglilingkod ay parang tunay na asawa"). She gave the assurance that she
would not prosecute their offspring.
The respondent also presented to the Investigating Judge the affidavit dated March 5, 1976 of
complainant Virrey wherein the latter withdrew his complaint for immorality (on the condition that
he would not incur any liability) because he was convinced that Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's
mistress to take care of him (Exh. A).
Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument scheduled before the
Court en banc on December 9, 1976 made the preposterous contention that the respondent
should be exonerated because there was no evidence presented against him since the
complainant did not appear at the hearing.
Respondent and his counsel should know that since he had admitted the commission of
concubinage, that charge is conclusively established and it does not have to be proven
anymore. His admission is a confession (Sec. 2, Rule 129 and secs. 22 and 29, Rule 130, Rules
of Court).
We hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his immoral conduct. His moral
delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and warrants his removal from
office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).
A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude such as
concubinage (Secs. 2 and 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court; In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915).
If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason that requirement should be
exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable
behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency (Canon 3 of Judicial Ethics, Administrative
Order No. 162 of the Secretary of Justice, August 1, 1946. 42 O.G. 1803).
Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of his immorality, erroneously confounded or
equated the extinction of his criminal liability with his moral fitness to occupy the position of town
magistrate. While the moral stigma connected with concubinage may be tolerated in a private
person by those who are not fastifious, it is intolerable when the concubinage is committed by a
judge and even if the spouse of the judge allegedly condones the offense. (See marital
disqualification rule in section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Ordoo vs. Daquigan, L-39012,
January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270,
272-3).
A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he
labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in
defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. The absence of criminal liability
does not preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly unconventional and censurable
behavior.
Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his charge render the administrative case
moot. This Court maymotu proprio investigate a judge for his continuing, grossly immoral
conduct.
Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for acquitting Ricardo Pujeda and
Esperidion Pujeda of the charge of having assaulted his son, Juancho Leynes (Criminal Case
No. 872), adopted the charge of immorality withdrawn by Virrey.
According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives with his concubine in a house just across
the municipal hall and plaza. Leynes posed a rhetorical question: how can the inhabitants of a
town have confidence in the administration of justice by an immoral judge who himself violates
the law? (p. 326, Rollo of Administrative Matter No. 489- MJ).
In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes unnecessary to make any adjudication on
the charge of Leynes that Judge Veloso was guilty of partiality in the disposition of Criminal
Case No. 872 and the other charges of Virrey imputing to the respondent malicious delay in the
administration of justice, misconduct in office, neglect of duty and failure to hear, try and decide
Election Case No. 8.
WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the office as municipal judge. His
application for disability retirement is disapproved.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, C.J, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.















Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J .:+.wph!1
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B.
Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in
1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she
was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November
27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's
marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa,
37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December
30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than
one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan
asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his
hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and
surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment
located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda
Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber,
their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A,
B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the
family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H).
Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She
Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man
wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married
Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for
the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes,
the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were
paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at
Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he
could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal
home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with
his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for
disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the
presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of
proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married
woman separated from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly
immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour,
a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106
SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).