The Russian Federation and Eurasias Islamic Crescent

University of Glasgow
The Russian Federation and Eurasia's Islamic Crescent

Author(s): Robert V. Barylski
Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1994), pp. 389-416
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1994, 389-416
The Russian Federation and Eurasia's
Islamic Crescent
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
AN ISLAMIC CRESCENT stretches from the shores of the Mediterranean and Black Seas
through
Central Asia into
Xinjiang province,
northwest China. In modem times it has
been divided into a northern and southern band. This division had three main results:
it blocked Russian
expansion
to the
south,
protected
the Russian state's
hegemonic
position
in the
north,
and
helped preserve
the territorial
integrity
of frontline states
such as
Turkey,
Iran,
Afghanistan
and China.
During
the
post-war period,
fortified Soviet frontiers divided the Islamic crescent
much as the 'iron curtain'
split Europe. Although
Gorbachev strove to reduce barriers
between the Soviet Union and the outside
world,
he treated the
European
and Islamic
walls
differently.
In November 1989 he
permitted
the German
populist
rebellion to
breach the Berlin wall and
accepted
German reunification. In late December 1989
another
populist
rebellion
began dismantling
Soviet-Iranian border installations that
divided the Azeri nation into two states: Soviet or northern
Azerbaijan
and Iranian or
southern
Azerbaijan.
In
January
1990 the Soviet state crushed the Azeri
popular
rebellion with
military
force and restored the border. 'Black
January'
was the
bloodiest use of force
by
the Soviet state
against
its
subjects
of the entire Gorbachev
era. In November 1992 the Russian Federation and its Central Asian allies intervened
to overthrow a
populist government
in
Tajikistan
and to restore the
Tajik-Afghan
border;
that civil war took some 25 000 lives. As one event followed
another,
the
contours of Russia's
policy
towards the Islamic crescent became visible. In the
Caucasus and Central Asia the Russian Federation would
attempt
to establish a
sphere
of influence that
generally
coincided with the domains of the Tsarist and Soviet states.
But the
coupling
would be looser than either Russian
imperialism
or Soviet adminis-
trative centralism.
The
analytical system
The Islamic
crescent,
as a
geopolitical concept,
unites a broad swathe of Eurasian
territory
that is
normally
examined in smaller units: the
Caucasus,
the Middle
East,
Central Asia and Southwest Asia. The Islamic crescent
system,
as a model of
interstate
relations,
describes a
regional,
international
system organised by
Tsarist
Russia and Great Britain and continued
by
their successors until 1979. The
system
enhanced their
ability
to defend their
respective security
interests in the
Caucasus,
the
Middle
East,
Central
Asia,
Southwest Asia and South Asia. The
system operated
as
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
two broad alliances that divided the Islamic crescent into Russian and
Anglo-Ameri-
can
spheres
of
influence,
the northern and southern bands of the Islamic crescent
respectively.
The
opposing spheres
of influence
supported regional stability by
enhancing
domestic and international order on both sides of the
long
border between
them. This article traces the
system's
evolution
during
the twentieth
century.
It
argues
that it contributed to international and domestic
stability
in the
region,
that its
disintegration
between 1978 and 1991 increased the
potential
for international and
civil
war,
and that the Russian Federation
responded by building
a new
security
system
under its
leadership
in the northern band of the Islamic crescent and
expanding
its
diplomatic
contacts in the southern band.
This
study
also examines the interaction between international and domestic
system
changes.
Because some domestic
political changes
cause
major
shifts in
regional
correlations of
forces,
prudent
statesmen maintain a keen interest in the domestic
politics
of other
sovereign
states. The
appearance
of either a
major
threat or an
opportunity may
lead to intervention in another state's domestic
politics.
The Russian
Federation's interventions in Islamic crescent
politics sparked
a classical debate about
foreign policy.
Realists tended to advocate force and authoritarian
solutions;
idealists
favoured mediation and democratisation and
argued
that
progressive
reform would
eventually produce
more stable allies than
oppressive dictatorship.
This article
maintains that Andrei
Kozyrev's foreign policy
was
neo-realist,
a
pragmatic
realism
that retained elements of the idealist
perspective.
Multinational states and the Islamic crescent
system
Traditional Eurasian autocratic states such as the
Ottoman,
Persian and Russian
empires
combined
subjects
of different
religion
and
ethnicity
under one authoritarian
political
structure. Their modem successors retained multinational features that set
state interests in territorial
integrity
and domestic
tranquility
in
opposition
to ethnic
nationalism that demanded new borders and new
sovereign
states based
upon
ethnicity.
The
minority question
was handled
differently
in the northern and southern
bands of the Islamic crescent. In the
former,
the Bolshevik revolution
promised
sovereignty
to the
peoples
and created an intricate
pattern
of ethnic states that were
held
together by
a
supranational
state,
the Union of Socialist
Republics.
In the
latter,
minorities did not achieve statehood and the
political aspirations
of
Kurds,
Azeris and
Tajiks,
for
example, represented
a latent threat to the territorial
integrity
of
Turkey,
Iraq,
Iran and
Afghanistan.
During
the Soviet
period,
the Islamic crescent's northern band was administered as
eight
union
republics:
two of Christian
heritage,
Armenia and
Georgia,
and six of
Islamic
heritage.
The latter included five of nominal Turkic ethnic
heritage-Azerbai-
jan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
and
Kazakhstan,
and one of Iranian ethnic
heritage,
Tajikistan.1
Smaller but
compact
Islamic ethnic communities were
granted
special
administrative units within
larger republics:
Crimean
Tatars,
Volga
Tatars,
Bashkirs, Daghestanis, Chechens, Ingush,
Abkhaz,
Adjars,
Ossets etc. But ethnic
settlement
patterns
were so
complex
that no effective
political
boundaries could be
designed
that
pleased
all
groups
and substantial
minority populations
found them-
selves
living
outside their
respective,
titular
ethno-political
units. The
highly
cen-
390
RUSSIA AND EURASIA'S ISLAMIC CRESCENT
tralised Soviet state
prevented major
ethnic conflicts over these boundaries. The Cold
War view that the Soviet Union strove to
homogenise
its ethnic
components
into
sovietised Russians was
only partially
correct. The Union structure both stimulated
and
suppressed
nationalist sentiments. When the Union was
formally
dissolved in
December 1991 and
replaced by
a Commonwealth of
Independent
States
(CIS),
the
northern band of the Islamic crescent
began
to divide into
eight sovereign
states with
eight
national armed forces.
By passing through
the Soviet
experience, Georgians,
Armenians, Azeris, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz
and Kazakhs achieved formal
statehood and were
recognised
as
sovereign
states
by
the international
community;
but the
minority peoples living
in the southern band of the Islamic
crescent,
in
many
cases their ethnic
kin,
did not achieve statehood.
The states in the southern band
rejected
statehood for
large
ethnic minorities. Even
the
People's Republic
of China modified the Soviet model and did not
grant
nominal
sovereignty
to
special governance
units such as
Xinjiang,
an autonomous
region
of
Islamic and Turkic
heritage.
There were more Turkic Azeris in Iran than in Soviet
Azerbaijan
and as
many Tajiks
in
Afghanistan
as in Soviet
Tajikistan.
There were
more Armenians in the Ottoman
empire
than in Tsarist Russia
prior
to the ethnic
slaughters
that
erupted during
and after World War I. Yet there was neither an
Armenian
republic
in
Turkey,
nor an Azeri
republic
in
Iran,
nor a
Tajik
republic
in
Afghanistan. Minority participation
in the
political process
was
kept
at a
relatively
low level that did not threaten the
integrity
of the multinational states in the southern
band.
If the ethnic state
principle
were
applied thoroughly,
a
general fragmentation
of the
states and the alliance
systems
in the northern and the southern bands of the Islamic
crescent would follow since
ethnic,
territorial and
religious
feuds that had been
suppressed
but not solved were embedded in the Islamic crescent's
ethnographic
substrata.
Consequently,
Russia,
Turkey
and Iran shared a common interest in
preventing
nationalist conflict that could threaten their
respective
territorial
integrity
and domestic
tranquility.
The
collapse
of Russian state
power
and the
disappearance
of the barrier line between the northern and southern bands of the Islamic crescent
would
encourage
ethnic conflict.
Great
power cooperation
and
competition
The main
dividing
line between the northern and southern bands of the Islamic
crescent was set
by imperial powers,
survived the
instability
of the Bolshevik
revolution,
and was sustained
during
the Cold War. It survived three
periods
of
testing
during
the 20th
century.
Each
period
included a
stage during
which Western
powers
and the Russian state
cooperated against
a common
threat;
but once the common
threat had
gone,
the
rivalry
resumed. Great Britain and the Soviet Union maintained
the Islamic crescent
system reasonably
well. But after World War II the
unanticipated
consequences
of Soviet-American
rivalry
transformed it into a less stable
system
of
states.
The British
organised
the Crimean wars
(along
with
Turkey
and other
European
powers)
and
subsequent
international coalitions to halt Russian
expansion
into the
Ottoman and Persian
empires. However,
when threatened
by
a common
enemy,
391
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
Britain and Russia were able to
cooperate.
The first Russo-British
understanding
developed
in
response
to the rise of a third
great power, Germany.
German efforts to
increase influence in the Near and Middle East at the
expense
of Russia and Britain
brought
the two
imperialist powers together.
In 1907 Russia and Britain drew a line
that
separated
Iran into a
northern, Russian,
and a
southern, British, sphere
of
influence.
Imperial
Great Britain and Russia also
agreed
to
keep Afghanistan
and
Tibet as neutral buffers between their
respective
Indian and Central Asian
posses-
sions. Thus the Islamic crescent
system
functioned as a colonial device to facilitate
British and Russian domination of the Islamic
peoples
within their
respective spheres
of influence.
The Bolsheviks
predicted
that British
imperialism
would seek to extend its
power
into the Caucasus and Central
Asia; however,
Bolshevik Russia and Great Britain
achieved a modus vivendi in 1921. Great Britain extended
diplomatic recognition
to
the Soviet state and the Bolsheviks
respected
the traditional
dividing
line in the
Islamic crescent and even
gave up
Tsarist concessions in Iran. In 1921 the Bolshevik
state
signed
treaties with
Turkey,
Iran and
Afghanistan
that established its southern
borders and restored the traditional
dividing
line with minor
adjustments.
The
flurry
of
revolutionary activity
that started with the Baku
congress
of the
Peoples
of the East
in 1920 subsided as the Soviet
regime
consolidated its hold on the Caucasus and
Central Asia. For 20
years
the Soviet Union and Great Britain
generally respected
the
Islamic crescent line.2
Active Russo-British
cooperation
resumed in 1941 when Great Britain and the
Soviet Union became allies
against
Nazi
Germany. They
overthrew the
government
of Iran, occupied
the
country
to
deny
Iran to
Germany,
and
opened
a critical war
supply
route from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet interior. Stalin also laid the
foundations for new Kurdish and Azeri states in his
occupation
zone. With Hitler's
defeat, the common
enemy disappeared,
and the United States followed the British
into the
strategic programme
of
containing
the Soviet Union. In 1946 President
Truman ordered Stalin to evacuate northwestern Iran, mainly
Iranian
Azerbaijan
and
Kurdistan, and
rejected
Stalin's
post-war
demands for
strategic
concessions in
Turkey, including
Soviet control over the
Bosphorus
Straits. Stalin withdrew his
armed forces and the Iranian state
liquidated
the Kurdish and Azeri
proto-states.
Reviewing
the world
maps
with Molotov after the war, Stalin took
pleasure
in his
European
and Asian
gains,
but
looking
at the Soviet frontiers with
Turkey
and Iran,
he said: 'I don't like these borders'.3
Stalin's demands on
Turkey, probes
into Iran, and the overall increase in Soviet
military power prompted
the United States and Britain to
attempt
to build a durable
anti-Soviet alliance
system
across the Islamic crescent's southern band to
protect
Western interests in the Middle East. A
necessary
first
step
was the
suppression
of
Mossadeq's
Iranian nationalist movement
through
covert
operations
in 1953. This act
gave
the
post-war,
system
a definite neocolonialist
aspect.
The
alliance was
formally
established in 1955 as the
Baghdad Pact; Turkey,
Iran and
Pakistan were the frontline states; Iraq
was to
provide strategic depth. Britain, still the
greatest
colonial
power
at the time, was the West's formal member, but the United
States was the more
powerful,
'silent'
partner.
The
Baghdad
Pact achieved neither
strategic depth
nor internal
unity
for three reasons. First, American
support
for the
392
state of Israel created tensions between the West and the Arab states and caused
American statesmen to
postpone
formal US
membership
of the
Baghdad
Pact.
Second, Turkey,
Iran and Pakistan had national interests and
foreign policy priorities
that differed from those of the Arab states.
Third,
regional
nationalists
competed
with
Western interests for control over oil and other assets such as the Suez Canal.
The Soviet Union
responded
to the
Baghdad
Pact
by cultivating relationships
with
Arab
states, Afghanistan
and India. Soviet
destabilising
activities were
prudently
directed
primarily
at countries not
bordering
on the Soviet Union. After the 1956 Suez
crisis, Iraq's position
as an Arab
ally
of Britain became untenable. In 1958
Iraq's
pro-Western regime
was
toppled
and
Iraq
withdrew from the
Baghdad
Pact,
which
became an alliance of
non-Arab,
Islamic states
supported by
Britain and the United
States. Its
headquarters
moved to
Turkey;
its name was
changed
to the Central
Treaty
Organisation (CENTO).
After 1968 Britain reduced its
military presence
East of Suez
and the United States armed Iran more
heavily
to
compensate
for Britain's force
reductions. The United States cultivated Iran as a barrier between the Soviet Union
and the Persian
Gulf,
an
intelligence gathering post,
and a
regional power capable
of
intervening
to
prevent
anti-Western
regimes
from
taking power.4
The Soviet Union
assisted
Iraq,
which became a
major purchaser
of Soviet arms and
general
modernis-
ation assistance, especially
after OPEC raised world
energy prices.
Afghanistan,
Iran and the Islamic crescent
system
Although
CENTO was an anti-Soviet alliance, it
helped
the Soviet Union
by
encouraging regime stability
in
Turkey,
Iran and Pakistan, and was
generally
successful at
preventing
these states from
making
war with their non-Soviet
neigh-
bours. As
long
as CENTO functioned and
Afghanistan
remained neutral, the Soviet
Union
enjoyed peace along
its southern borders. The first
major
disturbance of the
system
was the Marxist
coup
in
Afghanistan,
the Saur revolution of
April 1978, after
which the Soviet Union
quickly
concluded
military
and
political agreements
with the
new socialist-orientated
regime.
The second was the Islamic revolution in Iran.
The
long
view reveals two
important
trends which undermined the CENTO alliance
system. First, client states
improved
their
capacity
to
defy
the
great powers. By
arming
states and
promoting
their overall modernisation, the
great powers
nurtured
new
regional powers
that could better resist their influence.
Iraq
moved from
being
the West's first Arab CENTO member into the
top position
on the list of Soviet client
states. Later, Saddam Hussein
attempted
to make
Iraq
an
independent regional
and
world
power
in its own
right.
The
Ayatollah
Khomeini converted Iran from America's
most
important ally
on the Persian Gulf into a third force in
regional
affairs. Second,
the conflict zones moved closer to the Soviet Union's borders. At the
beginning
of the
Cold War the Arab-Israeli wars were the focal
point
for armed conflict. Towards the
end of the Cold War tensions reached and
began crossing
the Soviet border. The
dramatic
political changes
in Iran and
Afghanistan
created a
political
threat to the
Soviet Union. CENTO and the
neutrality
of
Afghanistan
had
helped preserve peace
in the northern as well as the southern bands of the Islamic crescent. The Iranian
revolution's successful defiance of the United States, under the banners of Islam and
nationalism, contributed to the rise of nationalism and Islamic revival in the Soviet
393
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
Union. The
Afghan mojahedin
rebellion's
victory
over the
decade-long
Soviet
intervention
brought
civil war to the
very gates
of Soviet Central Asia. In
February
1979 Khomeini
proclaimed
the Islamic
Republic,
denounced CENTO and
destroyed
the American
security presence
in Iran. Khomeini
sought
to
deny
the
greater
Islamic
world to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Khomeinism was a direct attack
on the semi-colonial
aspects
of the Islamic crescent
system.5
Pakistan also cancelled
its CENTO
membership
in 1979 and the alliance was dead.6
Thereafter,
instead of
controlling tight
alliance
systems,
the US and the USSR had to shift allies and to find
new balances of
power
to
compensate
for the defections of Iran and
Iraq.
The
process
included limited Soviet-American
cooperation,
which
developed gradually
from 1978
to 1990. But even as
they cooperated
the United States and the Soviet Union remained
competitors.
The West cultivated
Iraq
with a view towards
moving
Saddam Hussein's
regime
into the Western
foreign policy
orbit. When
Iraq
attacked Iran in
September 1980,
it
created
unpleasant policy
dilemmas for the Soviet Union. Moscow halted arms
shipments
to Iran and
Iraq
and
urged
both sides to return to the status
quo
ante
bellum. The Soviet Union
initially
welcomed Khomeini's revolution as an anti-West-
ern revolution and Iran's communists
supported
it.7
However,
in winter
1981-82,
when Iran's
revolutionary
forces
began scoring
victories
against Iraq
and the West
began replacing
Moscow in
Baghdad's
arms
purchasing,
Moscow resumed arms
shipments
to
Iraq.
Iran
responded by repressing
the Iranian communist
party
and
restricting
Soviet activities in Iran. The
Iran-Iraq
war ended in a stalemate in
July
1988. In
August
1990 Saddam Hussein launched a new war to make
Iraq
an
independent
world
power by seizing
Kuwait. The US
organised
a
grand
international
coalition to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw and to end his drive for nuclear and
other weapons
of mass destruction. The Soviet Union tried to
persuade
Saddam
Hussein to
comply
with UN demands but its
diplomatic
efforts ended in failure.
Rather than make war on its former client, Moscow remained neutral.
By early 1991,
when
Operation
Desert Storm was launched, the Soviet Union was a
declining power.
The Soviet defeat in
Afghanistan
contributed to the
general perception
that the
Islamic crescent was
moving
out from under
great power
control. The Carter
administration contributed to the
process by encouraging
its
regional
allies to
support
Afghanistan's
national liberation
struggle against
Soviet
occupation
forces.8 American
strategy
utilised
religious
nationalism to weaken Soviet
positions
in
Afghanistan,
an
initiative Soviet
analysts
attributed to
Zbigniew
Brzezinski.9 The American decision
to use Islam had three
purposes.
It increased tension between Khomeini's Islamic
revolution and the Soviet Union, it facilitated broad
cooperation by
states of Islamic
heritage
as diverse as Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Egypt
in the new anti-Soviet
front, and it warned Moscow that the new
jihad
need not
stop
at the Soviet Union's
borders. The
Reagan
administration
strengthened
the offensive and
provided
im-
proved weaponry
to the
mojahedin
in
Afghanistan. Following
Brezhnev's death in
November 1982, the Soviet
regime gave higher priority
to
political
efforts to end the
war. Moscow wanted
guarantees
that outside
support
for the rebellion would be
halted. The month after Gorbachev came to
power
in March 1985, Najibullah
replaced
Babrak Karmal as head of
Afghanistan's regime
and new efforts were made
to broaden its political base through appeals to religious,
ethno-national and
general
394
progressive
sentiment. A
year
later,
in
August
1986,
Gorbachev announced the first
reduction of Soviet
troop strength
in
Afghanistan:
six
regiments
were to return.
Yet,
instead of
giving
Gorbachev a
respite,
the White House
supplied Afghan
rebels with
Stinger
missiles
capable
of
downing
Soviet aircraft.10 The Chinese also demanded
Soviet retreat from
Afghanistan
and made it a condition for the normalisation of
Soviet-Chinese relations.
On 14
April
1988 the United States and the Soviet Union reached a formal
understanding
aimed at
restoring Afghanistan's
status as a buffer state in the
regional
security system.
The Soviet Union
accepted
self-determination for
Afghanistan
but
would be allowed to
provide
some
security
assistance to the
Najibullah government.
The United States
agreed
to
stop
its
military support
for the rebellion. But the United
States refused to
recognise
the
Najibullah regime's political legitimacy
and warned
that 'the US retains the
right,
consistent with its
obligations
as
guarantor,
to
provide
military
assistance to
parties
in
Afghanistan.
Should the Soviet Union exercise
restraint in
providing military
assistance to
parties
in
Afghanistan,
the US
similarly
will exercise restraint'." The United States was
willing
to
accept
continued Soviet
influence in
Afghanistan
but left the
specific
nature and level of influence
deliberately
vague
on the
public
record. After the Soviet
withdrawal,
no
great powers replaced
Moscow; Afghanistan
became an unstable buffer and a source of turbulence in the
Islamic crescent.
By rushing
to
support
the marxist
regime,
Brezhnev had
grossly
violated one of the
international
understandings
that had
helped
to
keep
reasonably
stable. Western countermeasures reversed Soviet
gains
and
Afghanistan
became a
potential bridgehead
for
mojahedin
into Soviet Central Asia. There was in the
jihad
a hint of Western
willingness
to violate the Islamic crescent
system by stimulating
national self-assertion in the Soviet Union. The breadth of international
participation
in the anti-Soviet
jihad
is
suggested by
accounts that as
many
as 15 000 to 20 000
Arabs
fought
in
Afghanistan.12 Reports
from the field warned the Kremlin that some
rebel leaders intended to
carry
the
struggle
into the Soviet Union.13 On 15
February
1989 the last Soviet combat
troops
crossed the
bridge
into the Soviet Union at
Termez, Uzbekistan,
but the memories of
Afghanistan
followed them home and
began
shaping
Soviet
thinking
about the Islamic crescent.14
Instability
in the northern band:
Azerbaijan's
'Black
January'
The
year
1989 was a
turning point
in the evolution of the Islamic crescent
system.
Significant
events took
place
in the Soviet
Union,
the first direct
challenges
to the
Soviet state's
ability
to retain the Islamic crescent's division. Domestic
political
liberalisation was
weakening
the Soviet state's
ability
to control its internal and
external borders. Armenian nationalists revived their movement to annex
parts
of
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)
and
openly challenged
the
principle
that
existing
political
borders could not be
changed
unless both states involved
agreed.
The
Armenian nationalist
struggle placed
the
principle
of self-determination for minorities
squarely
on the
political agenda
in a
regional
structure of states that would not be able
to survive if it were
implemented beyond
the
specific
case of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azeri nationalists refused to surrender
territory
to Armenia and
pointed
to a
long
395
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
history
of Azeri
deportations
from Armenia. The
Popular
Front of
Azerbaijan
demanded that its
government
either defend its territorial
integrity
or
resign.
Ethnic
conflict
produced
the domestic conditions
necessary
to oust the communist
regimes
of
both Armenia
(1990)
and
Azerbaijan (1992). Furthermore,
the
Popular
Front of
Azerbaijan began demanding
closer contacts between Soviet and Iranian
Azerbaijan
and
expanded
relations with the fraternal Turkish
people.
Soviet frontier defences
running through
the Islamic crescent were similar to
the 'iron curtain' that divided
Europe.
The
partition
of
Germany
had been
imposed
in 1945 as
part
of an overall division of
Europe
which,
in late
1989,
was
coming
to an end with the
approval
of the
major powers
concerned. The
partition
of
Azerbaijan
was
older;
Azerbaijan
had been divided between the Persian and
Tsarist
empires
in 1828. The
major regional powers
in
1990,
the Soviet
Union,
Turkey
and
Iran,
did not
support
Azeri nationalist
aspirations
to unite into one
new state of some 25 000 000
people. Nevertheless,
in December 1989 Soviet
Azeris
living
in the Soviet-Iranian border
regions began dismantling
barriers.
By
early January
1990 this
popular
rebellion
against
the Soviet and Iranian
empires
had
attained
revolutionary proportions.
After weeks of hesitation and some
complex
domestic
political preparations,
Gorbachev used Soviet
troops
to restore Soviet
control over Soviet
Azerbaijan
and its borders with Iran. The USA did not
protest
against
Soviet
suppression
of
Azerbaijan, though
it
actively discouraged
violence
against
the Baltic secessionists, indirect evidence that the USA
accepted
Moscow's
view that extremists
might
take control in
Azerbaijan
and
upset
the
regional
balance
of
power.
On 20
January
1990 Moscow
deployed overwhelming military power
in the
Azeri
capital, Baku, and installed new communist leaders who
co-opted
some of
the
popular
front's nationalist
programme, including
an effort to
expand
relations
with
Turkey
and Iran. Moscow restored order
along
the Iranian border. Soviet
state
power
was reclaimed at a cost of some 200 civilian lives
by special
Soviet
army
units. Losses would have been far
greater
had the
Popular
Front not worked
to
prevent
its
supporters
from
confronting
the Soviet
military
with armed revolt.
Martial law was
imposed
and served as the 'stable' foundation
upon
which the
new Mutalibov
government
was to build a new
'sovereign' Azerbaijan
while
remaining firmly
within the Soviet Union.15 Lt General
Dubinyak
divided Baku
into 12 martial law administrative districts and
placed
Slavic commanders at the
head of 11 of the 12.16
Although Gorbachev used communal violence between
Armenians and Azeris as one of his reasons for intervention, it had
generally stopped
before the invasion and the
majority
of urban Armenians, over 100 000
people,
had been evacuated from Baku and other cities in the
days immediately prior
to 20
January.
The
general
consensus in
Azerbaijan
was that Gorbachev had
acted in the interests of the Soviet state, not the
people
of
Azerbaijan.
The
victims were
mainly
Azeris of Islamic
heritage.
But there were several Russians
and Jews as well. At the
grand
funeral and memorial service, Sheikh-ul-Islam
Allakhshukyur Pasha-zade, the leader of the Islamic
clergy
of the Caucasus,
condemned Gorbachev and assertions that there was a
danger
to civil
society
inherent
in the revival of Islam and other
religions.
The Sheikh
castigated
Gorbachev for
using
fear of Islam as an excuse to use brute force in
Azerbaijan
and reminded
396
him of concerted efforts he and other
clergy
had made to restrain ethnic tensions.
Sheikh Ali invited Orthodox Christian and Jewish
clergy
to
join
him for the
ceremonies,
attended
by
over 1 000 000
people.
The dead were buried as
martyrs.
Their
graves
transformed a
grand park
that towers above Baku into a new
symbol
of
patriotism
and national
independence,
the Shahidlar
hiyabani.17
Gorbachev became an
odious
figure
in
Azerbaijan.
Gorbachev removed the First
Secretary,
Abdul-Rahman
Vezirov,
whom he had
appointed
in 1988. Vezirov was a Soviet
political professional
who had served in
Azerbaijan,
Pakistan and in Moscow
prior
to his
appointment
to Baku. He was neither
a
typical political
boss nor a local
nationalist;
he could not even
speak
Azeri
fluently.
He shared Gorbachev's internationalist values and
aspirations
for
political
reform but
he could not
cope effectively
with the
complex political
situation in
Azerbaijan.
Gorbachev
replaced
him with
Ayaz Mutalibov,
a
competent
Azeri economic
planner
and industrial administrator. But Gorbachev retained Viktor
Polyanichko
as Second
Secretary. Polyanichko
had been Soviet
political
adviser to the marxist
regime
in
Afghanistan
until
May 1988,
when he was
reassigned
to
Azerbaijan
to serve with
Vezirov. He was considered an
expert
on conflict in Islamic
societies,
even
though
his efforts to broaden the
political
base of the
regime
in Kabul had ended in
failure.
Evgenii
Primakov,
the senior Soviet
expert
on
politics
in the Islamic
world,
attended the Central Committee
meeting
which elected Mutalibov and
Polyanichko
on 27
January
1988.18 That same
meeting
authorised a
strategy designed
to broaden the
government's political
base
by co-opting parts
of the
Popular
Front's nationalist
programme
and
bringing
some of its members into
government.
Yet Moscow denied Mutalibov the one
thing
he needed
most,
a firm Soviet
military
commitment to
Azerbaijan's
territorial
integrity
and control over
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Gorbachev
adopted
middle
positions
that satisfied neither Armenian irredentists nor
Azerbaijani
nationalists. Moscow's
appointee, Polyanichko,
administered Karabakh
affairs.
Gorbachev's
political authority
in Armenia also
plummetted. Highly
moti-
vated Armenian Dashnak nationalists
steadily improved
their
fighting ability
and
defied Gorbachev's formal orders that
they
disband.
They
threatened him with a
second
'Afghanistan'
if he dared move
against
them. Moscow
prevented
the Soviet
military
from
taking
effective,
offensive action to halt
illegal
seizures of Soviet
military
assets
by
Armenian nationalists. In democratic elections the Armenians
ousted the Communist
Party
and formed a nationalist
government
under Levon
Ter-Petrosyan
in summer 1990. President
Ter-Petrosyan legalised
his nationalist
paramilitary
forces
by designating
them the national
guard
of the
Republic
of
Armenia. The Soviet state had lost
monopoly
control over
organised
armed force in
Armenia.19
When Gorbachev left office in December 1991 the Caucasian
region
was
politically
unstable,
with conflicts
underway
between Armenia and
Azerbaijan,
within
Georgia,
and in the border
region
between the Russian Federation and
Georgia.
Matters would
have been much worse if
Turkey
and Iran had not shown
political
and
military
restraint towards the Caucasian civil wars. Interests of state caused secular
Turkey
and Islamic Iran to
adopt
a containment
strategy
towards ethno-national extremism in
the former Soviet Union.
397
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
El'tsin's reconstruction
of
Russia's
security position
in the Islamic crescent
El'tsin's decision to disestablish the Union in December 1991
produced
a
potentially
dangerous security
crisis. The future of the unified Soviet
military system
was in
doubt. The fortified Soviet frontier that divided the Islamic crescent into northern and
southern bands was
being segmented.
Across the
long
line that had been the Soviet
Union's southern
frontier-Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
and
Kazakhstan-eight newly independent
states without
any
credible
military capacity
claimed
sovereignty
and the
right
to control their frontiers.
Soviet border forces remained at their former
posts
while the civilian
politicians
debated their eventual
disposition.
The Russian Federation
responded
to the new
geopolitical
situation
by building
a
Russian-led alliance
system
for the northern band of the Islamic crescent and
expanding diplomatic
relations with
Turkey,
Iran,
Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
May
1992 was a watershed in
post-Soviet military
and
security
affairs. Russia
began
to
recover its
position
as the dominant
military power
in the northern band of the Islamic
crescent. On 7
May
1992 the Russian Federation announced the decision to form a
Russian
Ministry
of Defence and Russian Federation Armed Forces. El'tsin had
wanted to
preserve
the unified armed forces of the Soviet Union
by transforming
them
into the unified armed forces of the Commonwealth of
Independent
States. Ukraine
refused and was
joined by Moldova, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan
and
Georgia.
Belarus
wavered. After 7
May
1992 the Soviet
military,
with the
exception
of nuclear
strategic
forces,
was
placed
under the Russian
Ministry
of
Defence,
which
pledged
to
negotiate
the distribution of
military personnel
and
physical
assets with the other 14 former
Soviet
republics.
Thus Russia would decide what went to each
republic through
a
bargaining process.
On 15
May
1992 the heads of six states
signed
a Collective
Security Treaty:
the Russian
Federation, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan and Armenia.
The
treaty
was a modest
victory
for Russian Federation
diplomacy.
It
required
the allies to come to the defence of each member if attacked from outside.
All
signatories
were
prohibited
from
entering
alliances or
agreements
aimed at
any
other member.20 The
treaty
made the Russian Federation the
guarantor
of the
traditional line between the northern and southern bands of the Islamic crescent.
Russia also concluded bilateral
agreements
on
military
and
security
affairs with each
signatory
to cover a host of
special
issues
ranging
from the transfer of
property
and
officer
training
to control and maintenance of
space
and nuclear
programme
facilities
(Kazakhstan).
Turkmenistan refused to
join
the Collective
Security Treaty.
President
Separmurad
Niyazov
considered it more
expeditious
to deal
directly
with the Russian Federation
without the cumbersome CIS alliance.
Only
Russia had the
military capability
to
defend his
country
of 3 800 000
people
and
long
borders with Iran and
Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan became known as the Kuwait of Central Asia thanks to its
large gas
and
oil
deposits
and small
population.
Turkmenistan's
population
was concentrated near
the Iranian border. It needed a
strong ally
to
prevent
a
repetition
of Kuwait's
experience
with
Iraq.
Classical realism forced Turkmenistan to seek a counterbalance
to Iran's armed forces of some 500 000 and
population
of over 50000000.
Only
398
Russia could
play
that role. It also needed assistance to maintain effective control
over the borders with
Afghanistan.
The Russian Federation and Turkmenistan concluded a
package
of
military agree-
ments in
July
1992. These
gave
Russia a
strong presence
and divided the costs in a
series of creative
arrangements. Niyazov pledged
either to
give housing
to all Russian
officers who remained in Turkmenistan or to
pay
50% of the cost of
replacement
housing
in the Russian Federation if
they
were
repatriated
after
completing
a contract
for service in Turkmenistan. He also
guaranteed
a 20%
salary supplement
above
Russian
Ministry
of Defence standards for Central Asian
hardship assignments.
Russia retained the air defence
system
installations it wanted and
special
air force
training
sites. Russian forces in Turkmenistan were to be
jointly
subordinated to
President El'tsin and
Niyazov. Niyazov began promoting
and
appointing
Russian
officers to
positions
in his armed
forces,
a
highly complex professional
situation.21
Russia took the main
responsibility
for
training
and
developing
the armed forces of
Turkmenistan but Turkmenistan could also work with other states such as
Turkey
on
military
education.22
Turkmenistan could become an
important geographical
link between Central Asia
and the Middle East. Its rich oil and
gas deposits promised
future wealth.
Niyazov's
grand
vision included new rail and
highway
links that created a moder hub for the
revival of the ancient silk route.
However, energy
flows rather than caravans of
spices
and textiles would be the main source of income. The
strong
Russian
military
presence provided
the
security
needed to make international
agreements
with
Turkey
and Iran. Turkmenistan's
Foreign Minister, Khalykberdy
Ataev commented: 'I
believe we should have
special
relations with the Russians.
They
can be counted
upon
in troubled
days
.... If it were not for the Russians, we would have
great problems
in our defence
policy'.23
The existence of
large
oil and
gas deposits
in a broad band
stretching
from the
Caspian
Sea basin into Siberia
began
to influence
regional politics
as
foreign capital
began
to make multibillion dollar commitments. As international oil concerns in-
vested in
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, corporations
and
states
began designing
and
evaluating options
for the
pipelines
and
transport
routes to
bring
new
production
to market.
They
also considered
prospects
for
long-term
political stability,
since time is
required
for
large capital
investments to mature
profitably. Strategic planners
debated the best routes for new
pipelines.
Russia
favoured
linking Caspian
basin oil to its
transport systems.
Iran offered direct routes
to Persian Gulf terminals.
Turkey
and
Azerbaijan proposed
a third route across their
territories to Turkish
ports
on the Mediterranean Sea. If the Russian Federation
retained its
position
as the
primary
defender of the Caucasus and Central Asia while
the
region
became a
major
oil and
gas producer,
Russia's international stature would
increase. If Russia failed to maintain its influence in the new oil
regions,
its relative
importance
in world affairs would decrease.24
Russia's
objective
was to remain the dominant factor in Central Asian and
Caucasian defence. In the immediate future, the Russian Federation would be the
primary supplier
of
weapons
and the main source of
military training
and assistance.
However, Russia's
grip
was not
complete
and the new
sovereign
states were able to
engage
in
military exchanges
and to receive
developmental
assistance from NATO
399
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
countries. The West was
penetrating
the northern band of the Islamic crescent. All
Central Asian and Caucasian states were admitted to the Conference on
Security
and
Cooperation
in
Europe
and the North Atlantic
Cooperation
Council. Such measures
tended to
give
the northern band of the Islamic crescent a Western
security
orientation. It
legitimised
Western
security
and
military
activities in what had been an
exclusive Russian
sphere
of influence.
On the
military plane,
Russia was still a
major power.
On the investment
plane,
Russia was a weaker
player
because
capital
was
power
and Russia was
capital-poor.
Russia was
bearing
the
greatest
costs of
policing
the Caucasus and Central Asia while
foreign
investors and local national elites
enjoyed
the
benefits;
yet
there was no
easy
way
out of the dilemma. The Russian
Foreign Minister, Kozyrev,
concluded that no
other world
power
had the
capacity
to
operate
as
effectively
as the Russian Federation
in the conflict zones of the Caucasus and Central Asia. He
argued
that
great powers
would now be
judged by
their
ability
to
prevent,
contain and settle local conflicts. He
viewed conflict resolution as the
joint responsibility
of the states in the
region
where
conflicts
developed
and of the international
community
as a whole.
Therefore,
in
addition to
urging
the Russian
people
to
support costly policies
that
protected
Russia's
security,
he asked the international
community
to
help
to
pay
for
peacekeeping
operations
on former Soviet
territory.25
On 28
September 1993,
in an address to the
General
Assembly,
he
proposed
that the United Nations assist Russia and
participate
in its efforts.
Russia was sensitive to
charges
that it was
laying
claim to a
sphere
of influence
which amounted to a revival of
imperialism; yet
Russian Federation statesmen could
not
permit
threats to Russian
security
to
develop
in the states on its
periphery.
Russia
likewise claimed the
right
to
protect
the Russian
diaspora
in the near-abroad. On 28
February
1993 El'tsin stated Russia's
position
as follows: 'Russia continues to have
a vital interest in the cessation of all armed conflicts on the
territory
of the former
USSR.
Moreover,
the world
community
is
increasingly coming
to realise our
country's special responsibility
in this matter. I believe the time has come for
authoritative international
organisations, including
the United
Nations,
to
grant
Russia
special powers
as
guarantor
of
peace
and
stability
in the
region.'
26
El'tsin and the Caucasus
Moscow instituted a
three-part strategy
for
containing
conflict and
restoring
influence
in the Caucasian
region.
The
system
had a northern
line,
a middle
zone,
and a
southern line. The northern line was the former internal Soviet
administrative-political
border between the Russian Federation and
Georgia
and
Azerbaijan.
The southern line
was the former external Soviet border with
Turkey
and Iran. The middle zone was the
territory
of
Georgia,
Armenia and
Azerbaijan.
Russia's
goal
was to make the northern
line a solid barrier
against
conflict
migration
from the Caucasus into the Russian
Federation. Its
goal
for the southern line was restoration of reliable external border
controls as the
joint responsibility
of Russia and each of the three Caucasian
republics.
Its
objective
for the middle zone was to remain the
guarantor
of its
military
security
and to
prevent
the Caucasus from
migrating politically
into another
power's
400
orbit.
Though Turkey
and Iran had armed forces of
roughly
500 000
each,
neither
state
openly challenged
Russia's traditional
position
in the Caucasus.
Moscow
began expanding military
installations in the North Caucasian
Military
District
(NCMD)
inside the Russian Federation between the Black and
Caspian
Seas
just
to the north of
Georgia
and
Azerbaijan.
The NCMD had two
major
functions. It
formed a formidable barrier
against
the northward
migration
of Caucasian ethnic and
political
extremism,
and served as a series of bases from which Russian
military
power
could be
projected
into the Black
Sea, Caucasian,
Caspian Sea,
Near Eastern,
Middle Eastern and Central Asian
regions.
The Minister of
Defence, Grachev,
stated
quite bluntly
that Russia had and would continue to have national
security
interests
in the
region.
He moved elite mobile forces from
Germany,
the Baltic and elsewhere
to the NCMD
during
1992 and 1993. He constructed new air defence
systems
there
after
withdrawing
some installations from
Azerbaijan.27
The NCMD was
becoming
a
major
element in Russia's
post-Cold
War
security system,
and a base for Russia's
new, versatile,
highly
mobile forces.
Russian
analysts predicted
that the tension zone would
migrate
from the Persian
Gulf to the Caucasian
republics
and into the southern border
regions
of Russia unless
corrective action were taken.28 As armed conflicts
erupted
in the Islamic enclaves
within the Russian Federation between the Black and
Caspian
Seas,
El'tsin sent
Federation
troops
and
political operatives
to restore control and to
promote
conflict
resolution. He selected General
Shatalin,
who was followed
by
Viktor
Polyanichko,
to administer the Chechen and
Ingush regions. (Polyanichko
was murdered there on
2
August 1993.)
El'tsin was
deeply
concerned
by
what
might
be called a Russian
domino
theory
of Islamic
fundamentalism,
and warned:
'They
are
trying
to
drag
people
into a
grand
adventure.
They
are
counting
on the fratricidal conflict's
spread
into the
neighbouring republics
of the North Caucasus in order to
pull
all of South
Russia into its orbit. This must not be
permitted'.
El'tsin was also concerned about
ethnic Russians
living
in the Islamic crescent.
They
were
leaving
the conflict areas in
large
numbers. In 1989 there were 210 000 ethnic Russians in
Grozny,
the Chechen
Republic's capital,
an
important refining centre;
by
summer 1993 the number had
fallen to
approximately
70 000.30
The case
of Georgia
Armed
struggle
in the Russian Federation's North Caucasian Islamic enclaves and
political
tension between the Russian Federation and
Georgia
were related
phenom-
ena.
Regional
destabilisation
began
after
Georgian
nationalists,
headed
by
Zviad
Gamsakhurdia,
won control of
Georgia's
national
parliament
in the elections of
October 1990. Ethnic
Georgian
nationalists
challenged
the
legitimacy
of
pro-Soviet
administrations in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia,
districts that the Soviet
system
had
granted special political
status. In December 1990 the
Georgian parliament
abolished
South Ossetia's
autonomy.
Local authorities defied the central
government
and
fought
the
Georgian
detachments sent to enforce it.31 Moscow ordered Soviet
military
forces
to
separate
the sides.
By demanding
full
independence
and
refusing
to
join
the
CIS,
Georgian
nationalists incited Ossetian and Abkhazian
separatists. By intervening
between
Georgian
and Ossetian
forces,
Moscow rendered an
important
service to the
401
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
Ossetians. After the dissolution of the Soviet state in December 1991 the Russian
Federation maintained this
posture
towards Ossetia and extended it to Abkhazia.
In summer 1992 the
Georgian
state sent a
military
unit led
by
the Minister of
Defence,
Tenghiz Kitovani,
to restore its
authority
over
Abkhazia,
which borders on
the Russian Federation and is the site of several
significant
Russian
military
installa-
tions. Vladislav
Ardzinba,
the Chairman of Abkhazia's
parliament,
ordered his
paramilitary
forces to defend Abkhazia's
rights.32
Abkhazia was able to obtain
weapons
and to increase its armed forces while the Russian
military
in and around
Abkhazia remained neutral.
Although
the Abkhazians are a
people
of Islamic
heritage,
Russia did not view their conflict with 'Christian'
Georgia
as a
religious
struggle. People
of Abkhazian Islamic ethnic
heritage
were no more than 20% of
Abkhazia's
population
of 540 000. If the
struggle
in the Caucasus had been about
religion,
'Christian' Russia would have allied itself with 'Christian'
Georgia against
the Islamic enclaves. Russia's
foreign policy
tactics were
opportunistic,
not
religious.
Russia tended to
support groups
whose
political goals
dovetailed best with Russia's
security agenda.
Georgia's
relations with the Russian
military
were
poor.
Russian Federation
troops
remained in
Georgia
in
open
defiance of the
Georgian state,
which had been
demanding
their immediate withdrawal since
September
1991. In 1992 54 Russian
military personnel
were killed in
Georgia, mostly during
armed attacks
by groups
attempting
to seize
weapons.
Some 1 500 such raids took
place
in
Georgia against
Russian
military
installations in 1992 and 1993.33 Russian
military
service in
Georgia
was
dangerous
and
unpopular,
but Russian Federation
security
interests dictated that
Russian forces remain in
Georgia
while a new
security
framework
acceptable
to both
countries was
negotiated.
Because
Georgia's
central authorities refused to
cooperate,
Russia
began making agreements
with
regional governments
in Abkhazia and
Adjaria
to maintain its critical Black Sea and Turkish border
military
installations. Russian
Defence Minister Grachev even reserved the
right
to visit his
troops
in these
regions
without
requesting permission
or
granting
notification to Edvard Shevardnadze, who
became
Georgia's president
in 1992. Grachev
bluntly explained
that Russia had,
has
and would continue to have national interests in the
region.34
Arms,
volunteers and mercenaries continued to move into Abkhazia while the
Russian
military
remained
officially
neutral. As the level of conflict escalated and the
Georgian
central
government's
forces lost
ground, pressure
to seek Russian assistance
grew.
A deal was struck in
July
1993. A ceasefire
agreement temporarily
ended the
Abkhazian conflict.
Georgia recognised special rights
for Abkhazia while Abkhazia
and the Russian Federation reaffirmed that Abkhazia was
part
of the
Georgian
state.
Georgia
was
expected
to
join
the CIS and to
sign security
accords that
granted
the
Russian
military
five
major
bases.35 In
September
the Abkhazians broke the ceasefire
and attacked
remaining Georgian
forces in
Sukhumi,
Abkhazia's
capital city
on the
Black Sea coast. Shevardnadze flew to Sukhumi to
encourage Georgians
and
appealed
to
Russia,
the United Nations and the CSCE for assistance. Shevardnadze
requested
military support
from Russia to
preserve Georgian
control over the Abkhazian
capital.
Grachev offered to
deploy
his
troops
but
only
to
separate
the two sides. Shevardnadze
demanded
Georgian
control over such
forces;
Grachev refused. On 27
September
1993 the Abkhazians defeated Shevardnadze's
loyalist
forces and he returned to
402
Tbilisi in failure. He told
reporters:
'Sukhumi could have been saved even
yesterday,
and
only
Russia could have done it-we asked Moscow for
help.
I sent a
telegram
to Moscow
saying Georgia
would
joint
the Commonwealth of
Independent
States,
which I was
against
until the last moment'. The next
day
he denounced Russia and
temporarily
retracted his offer to
join
the Commonwealth.36 It is difficult to
accept
Georgian
nationalist claims that Russia
deliberately instigated
the Abkhazian attacks
since these
jeopardised
the
Russo-Georgian rapprochement,
a
major
Russian
objective
in the Caucasus. It is more
likely
that Abkhazian leaders were
attempting
to
consolidate their control over their
capital
before the
Russo-Georgian rapprochement
could be used
by
Shevardnadze
against
them.
Shevardnadze's
pursuit
of
regional independence competed directly
with Russia's
foreign policy
interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. He had conceived of a
special
role for the 'Caucasian
geopolitical space'
in world
affairs,
a
regional
grouping
that could achieve
prosperity, security
and enhanced
independence through
cooperation.
First,
the
triangle
formed
by Georgia,
Armenia and
Azerbaijan
would
form the core. Then the North Caucasian Islamic enclaves would
join
it. The
region
would
pursue mutually
beneficial relations with the Middle
East,
the Black Sea states
and,
of
course,
Russia.37 Oil was also a factor since a Transcaucasian
pipeline
route
was a viable third alternative to Russian and Iranian
rights
of
way
for
Caspian
basin
oil. Without
peace
the Caucasian states could not
implement
a coordinated
foreign
policy designed
to enhance their
autonomy.
Without Russia's active
participation
in
pacification
and
state-building programmes,
neither
Georgian unity
nor Caucasian
peace appeared
to be attainable.
Armenia and
Azerbaijan
Armenia
actively sought
Russian
security support
and was a
founding
member of the
CIS Collective
Security Treaty.
The Russo-Armenian
relationship
revived Russia's
historical role as
protector
of Christian Armenia and use of Armenia as its forward
defence line
against Turkey.
Yet there were limitations on Russian
support
for
Armenian irredentist claims
against Azerbaijan
and
Turkey.
Russia's national inter-
ests
required
that
Azerbaijan
be
brought
into the CIS and that constructive relations
be maintained with
Turkey.
But instead of
openly pressing
for a
specific
settlement
in the Armenian war for
Karabakh,
Russia
appeared
to drift from one mediation
attempt
to another. This
pattern
favoured the better
organised
and motivated Arme-
nian nationalists. It also created
opportunities
for
Turkey,
Iran,
the CSCE and the
United Nations to
compete
with Russia in the Caucasus. Given the
large
Azeri
population
in Iran
(estimates range
from 15 000 000 to 22 000
000),
Teheran had an
interest in
preventing
a
major
war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan
since it
might
stimulate Azeri nationalism and demands that Iran
support
Islamic
Azerbaijan.
Iran
urged
restraint and mediation
upon
both sides.
Following
Armenian victories and the
Khodjali
atrocities in March
1992,
Mutali-
bov's
government
fell,
under
pressure
from mass demonstrations
organised by
the
Popular
Front. The war continued while an interim
government prepared
for
presiden-
tial elections in June 1992. Azeri nationalists blamed Russia for their defeats and
began
to
place
their
hopes
in
Turkey.
The Turkish Prime
Minister,
Suleyman
Demirel,
403
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
made his first visit to Baku in
early May
1992 and was cited in the
Azerbaijani press
as
saying: 'Today
the blood of our brothers flows in Karabakh and
you
must
remember that
Turkey
stands behind
you
and will never leave
you
alone'.38 He had
just completed
a tour of Turkic states in Central
Asia,
where he was
stimulating
Pan-Turkic sentiment and
expectations
of
support
from
Western,
secular
Turkey.
Since the United States was
promoting
the Turkish orientation as
part
of its
anti-Iranian
policy,
Azeri nationalists also
hoped
for more active Western
support
for
their national
independence
and their state's territorial
integrity.
In
mid-May
1992,
with the
presidential
elections
only
three weeks
away,
Mutalibov
attempted
to restore himself to
power through
a
parliamentary coup
that lasted
barely
two
days.
His
attempt
coincided with the CIS Tashkent
meeting
at which the
Collective
Security Treaty
would be
signed.
Armenia was
planning
to
join,
a
step
that
would
strengthen
Armenia's
position
in the Caucasian war. Mutalibov announced that
he would
bring Azerbaijan
into the CIS Collective
Security Treaty.39
But before he
could do
so,
the
Popular
Front sent mass demonstrations
marching
on the
Mejlis
and
forced Mutalibov to decide between a second
political
defeat and armed conflict in
Baku. He
resigned again.
Just
prior
to the
elections,
Armenian nationalist forces
conquered
the Lachin
district,
a land
bridge
between
Nagorno-Karabakh
and Armenia
proper.
Armenian
convoys quickly
moved
military
and
general supplies
into Karabakh and created a
military
and
political
situation which
Azerbaijan
could not
easily
reverse. Armenia
had
adopted
a
diplomatic strategy
of
promoting
the
independent Republic
of Moun-
tainous Karabakh. If Karabakh were
recognised
as an
independent state, it could then
unite with Armenia. The same
strategy
was
applied
to the Lachin district, which was
proclaimed
the
independent Republic
of Kurdistan.
Any
effort to create an
indepen-
dent Kurdish state
anywhere
in the
region
could have the most serious
consequences
for
Turkey,
Iran and
Iraq. Further, Turkey
accused Armenian nationalists of
firing
upon Nakhichevan, a
part
of
Azerbaijan
that served as a
partial
buffer between
Turkey
and Armenia. The Russo-Turkish treaties of 1921
gave Turkey
the
right
to
send
troops
into Nakhichevan to defend its
integrity.
The situation
required
that
Russia and
Turkey
consult
immediately.
The
'Republic
of Kurdistan' soon
disap-
peared
from the Armenian
strategy.
Russia and
Turkey recognised
a mutual interest
in better
regional foreign policy
coordination. At a Moscow summit in late
May 1992,
Russia and
Turkey pledged
to
open
a hot line, to
expand
consultations and to increase
trade.40
Azerbaijan
held
competitive presidential
elections and the
victory
went to Abulfaz
Elchibey,
a Pan-Turkic nationalist whose
government
would last
only
13 months.
Elchibey
alienated the strata of seasoned administrators and
politicians by replacing
Mutalibov's former communists with
Popular
Front members. He weakened Azerbai-
jan's security by pressing
for
complete
Russian
military
withdrawal from
Azerbaijan
before his
government
had sufficient time to build its own armed forces. He
estranged
the Islamic
Republic
of Iran
by openly promoting secular, republican
values and
raising
the issue of the eventual unification of northern and southern
Azerbaijan.
He
attempted
to cultivate
Turkey
as a substitute for Russia and a
sympathetic ally against
Armenian irredentism and Iranian fundamentalism; but he underestimated
Turkey's
reluctance to
compete
with Russia, sensitivity
to
charges that it was
being
drawn into
404
a new
campaign
to
destroy Armenia,
and
hesitancy
to
provoke
Iran.
Finally,
as
commander in
chief, Elchibey's
record on the Karabakh front was far worse than
Mutalibov's. In March 1993 Armenian nationalists scored a new set of victories that
dramatically improved
their
military position.
A threat to
Elchibey developed
in the
national armed
forces,
where Col. Suret
Huseinov,
a
popular
citizen-soldier and
commander,
had become the focus of
anti-Elchibey
sentiment. On 4 June 1993
Elchibey
ordered Huseinov to disarm and surrender his command of the 709th
brigade
at
Ganja. Fighting erupted
but Huseinov
emerged
victorious,
demanded
Elchibey's
resignation,
and
began
a march on Baku.
Azerbaijan's military high
command refused
to use force to
stop
Huseinov. To halt the slide towards civil
war,
Azeri
legislators
urged Elchibey
to invite
Heydar
Aliev to serve as Prime Minister. Aliev consented
and was elected
by
the
Mejlis
on 15 June 1993. On the
evening
of 18 June
1993,
Elchibey
fled the
capital
and moved to his native
village
of Keleki in the remote
province
of Nakhichevan. Parliament confirmed Aliev as
acting president
and Hu-
seinov as Prime Minister.
Aliev was the dean of Azeri
politics, having
served as head of
Azerbaijan's
KGB,
first
secretary
of the
republic's
Communist
Party,
and full member of the Politburo
and
deputy prime
minister of the Soviet Union before
being nudged
into retirement
by
Gorbachev in 1987. He returned to his native
Nakhichevan,
ran for
office,
was
elected to
parliament,
and
quickly
became its leader. As head of
Nakhichevan,
which
borders on Armenia, Turkey
and Iran, Aliev conducted a
pragmatic diplomacy
of
survival with
neighbouring
states and the
government
in Baku. While
Azerbaijan
was
under the control of Gorbachev
loyalists,
Aliev was not welcome in the halls of
power.
His
political
situation did not
improve
under the
Elchibey government
until
the
republic's
survival was at risk.41
Aliev
repudiated Elchibey's foreign policy
and
immediately began exploring ways
to
gain
Russian
support
for
Azerbaijan's
territorial
integrity
and economic revival.
Aliev concluded that
Azerbaijan
had no
practical
choice but to
cooperate
with Russia
in
security
affairs at this
juncture
in its
history.
This led to an
upsurge
in Russian
interest in mediation between Armenia and
Azerbaijan
but it did not
prevent
Armenian nationalists from
launching
final assaults. Their window of
opportunity
was
closing
as the Russo-Azeri
rapprochement
consolidated. Armenian forces took addi-
tional
territory
and
pressed
towards the Iranian border.
Refugees fleeing
ahead of the
war
began seeking
safe haven in Iran. Since Iran welcomed
Elchibey's demise,
it
pressed
Armenia to halt the Karabakh forces and moved Iranian
troops
towards the
conflict zone. It also
cooperated
with Aliev
by
not
supporting
secessionists who had
seized control over seven counties
bordering
on Iran and
proclaimed
an
independent
Talish
republic.
Aliev conferred with the Iranian
Foreign Minister, Velayati,
who flew
to Baku in
mid-August.
Several
days
later Aliev
loyalists
abolished the so-called
Talish
republic
and restored
Azerbaijan's sovereignty
in the Lenkoran
region,
a
critical
transport
link on Iran's border.42
In
September
Aliev travelled to Moscow to
negotiate directly
with El'tsin, Grachev
and
Kozyrev. Following
his return, he
proposed
that
Azerbaijan join
the CIS and its
Collective
Security Treaty.
Azerbaijan's
parliament
endorsed this
strategic
turn in
foreign policy
on 21
September
1993. Aliev vowed that under this
leadership
CIS
membership
would advance
Azerbaijan's
national interests rather than lead to a
405
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
restoration of subordination to Moscow. On 10 October 1993 Aliev took the oath of
office on the Koran and the Constitution after
having
been elected
president
with
some 98% of the
popular
vote,
an exercise that served as a national
plebiscite
on his
leadership.
Aliev's
victory improved
Russia's
position
in the Caucasus and led to a Caucasian
summit in Moscow on 8 October
1993,
only
four
days
after El'tsin consolidated his
power by defeating
the
opposition
led
by
Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rutskoi.
The Caucasian summit was a
major diplomatic victory
for Russia. The three states
recognised
that their economies could not recover from civil war unless the
integrity
of the
transport systems linking
them with one
another,
the Russian Federation and
the outside world were restored.
Aliev,
Shevardnadze and
Ter-Petrosyan agreed
to
grant
Russian
military
forces
responsibility
for
protecting
the
integrity
of the
transport
systems
in the Caucasian states
along
with
republican
national forces. Shevardnadze
also confirmed his intention to
bring Georgia
into the CIS and resolved the Russian
military
base issue.43 Russia
completed
another
major step
in the
process
of
building
its
security system
from the Black Sea to
China,
but the karabakh was continued.
Pan-Turkism vs. transcivilisational
cooperation
Elchibey's
defeat was also a
victory
for classical realism over nationalist
idealism,
specifically
Pan-Turkic nationalism. The West assumed that a
political
and
ideological
vacuum had been created in the Islamic crescent
by
the
implosion
of the communist
parties
and marxist-leninist
ideology.
It
promoted Turkey
over both Russia and Iran
as its
preferred
candidate to fill it. This was a naive notion that
ignored power
realities
and was
threatening
to Russian
long-term
interests. The idea of
uniting
the 60 000 000
people
of modem
Turkey
with the 50 000 000
people
of Turkic
origin
in the northern
band of the Islamic crescent is the Pan-Turkic ideal. But it was not realistic. The
Turkic
'diaspora'
was
spread
across vast distances and divided into
separate
states
with different state interests.
Furthermore,
most shared a common Soviet
heritage,
an
older Persian cultural
heritage,
and
political experience particular
to the Caucasus and
Central Asia.
Turkey's
lukewarm
support
for
Azerbaijan suggested
that immediate
Turkish economic and
political
interests were more
important
than ethnic
kinship.44
Turkey
lacked the economic
power required
to meet the economic needs of the
Caucasus and Central Asia.
Although
it could
provide
some
assistance,
grand capital
investment for
energy development
would have to come from other
foreign
sources
and
Turkey's
economic relations were focused on other
regions.
In 1988
figures,
Turkey's gross
domestic
product
was less than that of the German Democratic
Republic
but more than Poland's. Per
capita gross
domestic
product
was $1 382 for
Turkey,
less than the USSR's $2 015.
Turkey's
chief
trading partners
had been
Germany, Iraq
and
Italy.45
Efforts to divide the Turkic
peoples
of Central Asia and
Azerbaijan
from the
Russian Federation were detrimental to Russian national interests and to the states of
Islamic
heritage
where the
mainly
urban,
Russian-speaking population
was
deeply
entrenched in the advanced
industrial,
scientific and administrative sectors of the
respective
national economies. The
Republic
of
Turkey
could not
replace
such human
resources if a mass
migration
of Russians and other
European peoples
occurred.
406
Kazakhstan's
President,
Nursultan
Nazarbayev put
it this
way:
'Our future is
determined in the
past.
Slavs and Turks have
always
been
together'.46
A
split
between
Slav and Turk would have
destroyed Kazakhstan,
where about 50% of the
population
was of
Russo-European ethnicity.
Russian national interests
required
a transcivilisational
partnership
between the
eastern Slavic and the northern Islamic
peoples.
However,
it was natural for the
Islamic
heritage
states to
attempt
to
cooperate
to increase their
political weight
in CIS
politics.
Russians had to
renegotiate
their
relationships
with the Islamic
peoples
to
reflect the latter's enhanced status in the
post-Soviet
era. The
greatest
threat to that
partnership developed
in
Tajikistan,
a small
republic
where Iranian
Tajiks,
Turkic
Uzbeks and Slavic Russians confronted the simultaneous
unraveling
of the Islamic
crescent
system
and
political
authoritarianism.
The case
of Tajikistan
The
cycle
of
political
unrest that led to civil war
began
in
Tajikistan's capital,
Dushanbe,
in March 1992. Mass demonstrations demanded that President Rakhmon
Nabiev
resign
and hold new
parliamentary
and
legislative
elections. It was
reported
that some
opposition
factions were
arming
with assistance from
supporters
in
Afghanistan,
where the
Tajik minority
was about as
large
as the
Tajik population
of
Tajikistan.
Some
political
demonstrations in Dushanbe turned
violent,
but such urban
political
riots
appeared
controllable and the Russian
military
restored order in limited
policing operations.
preferred
reconciliation to confrontation.
In
May
1992 Central Asian and Russian leaders conferred in Tashkent and decided
that Nabiev should
expand
his
political
base
by bringing
some
opposition
leaders into
his
government.
That same CIS session
approved
the Collective
Security Treaty
linking
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan
and Armenia. The
treaty
was
supposed
to
prevent
the CIS from
degenerating
into a series of
Yugoslavias.47
After the Tashkent
meeting,
Nabiev rebuilt his cabinet and
gave
the
opposition
several
posts, including
the
ministry
of communications.
Thereafter,
diverse
political
movements had freer access to
print
and
non-print
media.48
Tajik-
istan's
political
liberalisation moved well
beyond
the limitations
imposed
in
neigh-
bouring
Uzbekistan,
Central Asia's most
populous
state.49 But instead of
waiting
for
the
president
and the
legislature
to
complete
their current
terms,
some
opposition
elements
began demanding
their
resignation.
Mass demonstrations led to new viol-
ence in the
capital.
The Russian
military
resumed its efforts to minimise conflict and
to
promote political
reconciliation.
However,
on 7
September
1992,
the
opposition
compelled
Nabiev to
resign
at
gun point,
a
blatantly
unconstitutional act carried out
in the name of democratic
change.
The victors
began transferring power
from Nabiev's
political
machine to a more
diverse, inexperienced government
headed
by
Akbarsho Iskandrov. It
gave positions
to
representatives
of
regions
and
political
movements that had been excluded from
decision
making by
the Nabiev
regime.
Political liberals in the former Soviet Union
hoped
that the new
Tajikistan
could demonstrate that Central Asia need not labour
under authoritarian
regimes.
Political conservatives warned that
political
liberalisation
could lead to
anarchy
followed
by
a
victory
for Islamic extremists
supported by
407
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
mojahedin
from
Afghanistan
and Iran.
They
feared that
Tajik
ethnic irredentism could
spark
ethnic communal violence in
Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan.50 Tajik-
istan
might
serve as a conduit to Uzbekistan for armed Uzbek and
Tajik mojahedin
from
Afghanistan.
The old
guard
condemned 'Islamo-democrats' for the destruction of civil order in
Tajikistan, though they
themselves
deliberately
undermined the
peace.
Nabiev
sup-
porters began
an
armed
struggle
from
northern
and
southern
provinces
under their
control. The
southern
operations
were commanded
by Sangak Safarov,
a former
criminal.51 He
waged
a brutal
campaign
that
destroyed
communities and sent tens of
thousands of
refugees streaming
out of his
path.
Some fled into
Afghanistan
and
increased the civil conflict's
international
dimension.
Iskandrov's
government
lacked
professional
armed
police
and
military
forces. The
opposition
obtained arms while
Iskandrov's forces were denied access to normal CIS and Russian
military supplies.
Russian Federation
troops, present
in all
key
cities,
industrial and
transport
centres,
were ordered to remain 'neutral' and to
engage
in humanitarian relief efforts while
protecting Tajikistan's strategic
infrastructure. Iskandrov received some
support
through Afghanistan
and his
opponents capitalised
on this Islamic fundamentalist
element's
presence
in their
political propaganda.
Russian
intelligence reports
confirmed that
fighters
were in
Tajikistan
and warned that more were
attempting
to
enter the
country.
Moscow had to take action.
At El'tsin's
request,
the leaders of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan gathered
in
Almaty (formerly Alma-Ata)
on 5 November 1992 under
Kozyrev's chairmanship
to chart a course of action. Their solution
required
Iskan-
drov's
resignation,
a new coalition
government,
and the restoration of
political
order.
Iskandrov's
government
was to be
replaced
in less than three weeks
by
a new
coalition State Council formed at a
rump
session of the
Supreme
Soviet that had been
elected under the Nabiev
regime.
This
plan
turned into a clear
victory
for the old
guard
and ended
Tajikistan's experiment
with
political pluralism. Kozyrev agreed
that
regime
breakdown was a
danger
to Russia and Central Asia but he continued to
advocate
political
inclusion and
compromise. Kozyrev
warned that conflict in
Tajik-
istan 'threatened the
very
existence of
Tajikistan's
statehood and that Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Russia cannot remain
passive
towards the fate of
Tajikistan'.52 Kozyrev
flew to
negotiate
with Imomali
Rakhmonov,
the civilian who
emerged
as the
primary
candidate to
replace
Iskandrov. Rakhmonov was backed
by
the Nabiev faction and its
supporters among
authoritarian Uzbekistan's
political
elite.
Without Rakhmonov's
acquiescence,
the
Almaty plan
could not be
implemented
peacefully.
But Rakhmonov refused to form a coalition
government
with the
oppo-
sition.53
Furthermore,
some of Iskandrov's
supporters
refused to surrender
power
to
an authoritarian restoration. On the eve of the final showdown
battles,
the Russian
foreign ministry
held a
press
conference in Moscow at which it stated that effective
measures would be taken to
prevent
the
'expansion
of
military-political
fires that
threaten Russia's
security'.54
Under the
protection
of Russian armed
forces,
Tajikistan's Supreme
Soviet met for
an
extraordinary
session and named Rakhmonov to lead
Tajikistan.55
Although
this
rump
session
gave
the
impending coup
a constitutional
foundation,
civil war ensued.
Russian Federation forces blocked the borders with
Afghanistan
while restorationist
408
armed forces known as the
Popular
Front
destroyed
the defenders of Iskandrov's
populist government
within
Tajikistan.
The
Popular
Front received
adequate military
supplies
and access to
transport.
It moved on Dushanbe from three sides and forced
the last detachments of the armed resistance to retreat into the Pamir mountains.
During
the civil war about 25 000
people
were killed and at least ten times that
number became
refugees.
Some 50 000 to 75 000 fled into
Afghanistan.56
As the main
warfare
ended,
Sangak
Safarov
emerged
as the
strongest figure
in the
Popular
Front
with
approximately
50 000 armed
fighters
under his command. But his
rapid
rise from
criminal to national hero would be short lived. Safarov and Faisali
Zaripov,
a second
paramilitary
leader and former
criminal,
had become too
powerful
in the course of the
civil war.
They
were both killed in March
1993,
precisely
when the new
government
was
insisting they accept
subordination to
Tajikistan's
new
Ministry
of Defence.
There was
open speculation
that their 'exit' was
necessary
to
permit
Rakhmonov's
authoritarian civilian
regime
to consolidate its
power.57
Nabiev died of a heart attack
in
April
1993.
Rakhmonov's
regime
took a
hard-line,
realist
position
towards its
political
enemies
and did not
pursue
the line of
political
reconciliation that
Kozyrev
recommended.
Rakhmonov branded the
opposition
as traitors and used extreme measures
against
its
leaders, including summary
execution
during
the civil war and its immediate after-
math.
Opposition parties
were banned.
Censorship
was
imposed
on the media. Yet
Russia
signed
new treaties of
friendship, cooperation
and mutual assistance with
Tajikistan
in
May
1993. Russia tolerated Central Asian authoritarian
regimes
because
they
maintained
political
order and
kept
their states in the Russian
regional security
system.
The
opposition
continued to mount limited armed attacks on
specific targets,
especially
border
posts
manned
by
Russian Federation
personnel.
It was rumoured
that a more substantial armed
rising
was
being prepared
in at least
eight training
camps
located in
Afghanistan.
Some
Tajik
mojahedin
called for the unification of the
Tajik
peoples
of all Central Asia within a
grand
multinational Islamic confederation.58
In
July
1993
opposition
forces attacked a Russian border unit and killed 25 border
troops,
an incident that forced El'tsin, Kozyrev,
Grachev and the
Security
Council
Secretary,
Marshal
Shaposhnikov,
to reassess the Russian Federation's Central Asian
policy.
El'tsin issued a
long
decree on the
subject.
The Russian Federation confirmed
its view that the crisis on the
Tajik-Afghan
border was a threat to the vital interests
and
security
of Russia. It warned
Afghanistan
that Russia would take all measures
necessary
to
prevent
future attacks from
Afghan territory.
It increased Russian
Federation border
troop strength
on the
Tajik-Afghan
border and Russian
military
and
security
forces within
Tajikistan.
It called for
diplomatic
work with
Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the United States and Britain to obtain
their
support
for normalisation
along
the
Tajik-Afghan
border.59 Russia sent Pri-
makov, a senior
figure
in the national
security
and
foreign policy establishment, to
Kabul and Teheran to
explore possible
solutions.
Kozyrev's analysis
of the inter-
national situation identified the need for 'a club of friends of
regional stability
that
would have to include Iran, Afghanistan
and Pakistan'. Russian
diplomacy
would
attempt
to achieve a
regional understanding
to
promote stability.60
The
dictatorship
resisted Russian
pressure
to force it to broaden its
political base,
409
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
much to
Kozyrev's chagrin.
He warned that 'Russia will not
compensate
with the
blood of its soldiers for the absence of
political
will in
Tajikistan
to reconcile
differences'.61
Georgii
Kunadze,
Kozyrev's deputy
for relations with Central Asian
states,
reiterated the official view that
pacification
would fail without
political
reconciliation and threatened that Russia
might
withdraw: 'If the
regime
cannot do
this and we become convinced that it
cannot, then,
of
course,
we must
fight,
but
only
to
bring
the Russians out of the
country.
And draw the line at that.. ..62
Kozyrev
sent
another
Deputy Foreign
Minister,
Anatolii
Adamishin,
to confer with the leaders of
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan
about
political
reconciliation. All stated that
they supported
the
principle.
But Rakhmonov refused to
share
power
with
any significant opposition figures
and
rejected proposals
that
Tajik
refugees
be
permitted
to return
freely
from
Afghanistan,
since he believed the
opposition
would use
any general amnesty
to send
fighters
and activists into the
country.63
Moscow editorials debated the
morality
and effectiveness of Russian
support
for
the authoritarian rebellion
against
Iskandrov's
government.
Liberals noted that Rus-
sian conservatives endorsed Iskandrov's defeat and
praised
the Central Asian authori-
tarian
regimes.
Liberals blamed Central Asian authoritarianism for the rise of
political
radicalism, believing suppression
led to extremism. Conservatives saw 'Islamo-
democrats' as naive and
incapable
of
successfully resisting
efforts
by
more
aggressive
Islamic and ethnic extremists to seize
power. They regarded
authoritarian
regimes
as
necessary
to
protect
Russian state
security
interests and the Russian
diaspora living
in
Central Asia.
Kozyrev's position
was a mixture of liberalism and conservatism. He
accepted
the need for
strong government
but criticised Rakhmonov's authoritarian
excesses and insisted that he seek reconciliation with the
opposition.64 Kozyrev's
threat to withdraw Russian armed forces and border
troops
from
Tajikistan
lacked
credibility, given
his statements that Russia had vital
security
interests there. Demo-
cratic Russia could neither withdraw
support
from nor
ignore
the wishes of its
authoritarian allies in Central Asia. The new authoritarians were not
simple pawns
in
the
game
for control over Central Asia.
Eastern Slavs and northern Moslems: Russia and Islamic revival
In 1992 there were some 12 000 000 citizens of Islamic
heritage
in the Russian
Federation and
nearly
800 000 in the
city
of Moscow.65 The number of Moslems in
the Russian Federation was
roughly equivalent
to the number of Russians in the six
republics
of Islamic
heritage.
Kazakhstan's
large, compactly
settled
Russian-speaking
populations
of ethnic
Russians, Ukrainians, Poles,
Germans and other
Europeans
numbered about 8 000 000. An additional 4 000 000 or so Russians were
spread
across the
remaining
five Islamic
heritage republics,
where
they
constituted from 5%
to 10% of the
population, except
in
Kyrgyzstan,
where
they
were some 20% to 25%
of the total. Since Russian
speakers
tended to be concentrated in urban areas and in
the more advanced administrative and industrial
sectors,
their functional
importance
was
greater
than their
demographic weight.
It also had a neocolonialist flavour. But
the
economic, political
and
military security
of Russian Federation and the Islamic
410
heritage republics required
a
positive working relationship
between
peoples
of
Christian Slavic and Islamic Turkic
heritage.66
During
the transition from the
unitary
Soviet state to the
Commonwealth,
the new
Russian state's
leadership
had to examine its cultural biases and to
improve
its
understanding
of the
complexities
of Islam's
relationship
to
political change
and to
incorporate
such
knowledge
into its domestic and
foreign policies.
Greater
sophistica-
tion
developed
as a result of initial mistakes.67 Communists of Islamic
heritage
generally
defended the
right
and
necessity
of Islamic cultural revival while condemn-
ing religious-nationalist
extremists in both the Islamic and Christian communities.68
Anything
that would drive a
wedge
between the Russian Federation and the
peoples
of the Islamic crescent would
damage
Russia's
geostrategic position
in Eurasia. The
El'tsin
government
took a dim view of radical
political
extremists and endorsed the
revival of
'healthy'
Islam. Since
changes
in a state's domestic
politics
such as the rise
of Islamic fundamentalism could have a
negative impact
on
stability,
Russian
foreign
policy
could not remain indifferent to the internal affairs of
sovereign
states in its
sphere
of influence.
The Russian
foreign ministry
made several authoritative statements on the
general
problem.
In November 1992 Viktor
Posuvalyuk,
head of the
ministry's department
of
African and Near Eastern Affairs, held a formal
press
conference at which he
confirmed that
respect
for Islam did not
require acceptance
of Islamic
political
extremism: '. . .
attempts
to
exploit
Islam for
political purposes
will be
decisively
rejected.
All the more so if such
activity
affects the territorial
integrity, sovereignty
and
security
of Russia'.69 In the
January
1993 issue of International
Affairs
the
Foreign Ministry published
a
policy
overview that endorsed the Islamic renaissance
and condemned radical
political
Islam: '. . we must not confuse
enlightened
Islam
with Muslim fundamentalism, which translates in
practice
into
political
extremism.
There is
every
reason to
ponder
the
advisability
of
coordinating
our
possibilities
with
the efforts of Arab
regimes trying
to
stop
the waves of fundamentalism, all the more
so since
they
are
advancing
northwards'.70
In
February
1993
Kozyrev
visited
Turkey
to discuss Russo-Turkish relations in the
larger
context of
regional political change.
It was
reported
that Russia, Turkey
and the
United States
agreed upon
the need to contain Islamic fundamentalism. The broad
regional analysis
was that Arab states were
blocking
the
export
of Iranian Islamic
fundamentalism to the south while Russia, Turkey
and the United States were
interested in
blocking
its movement to the north.71 But this did not mean that Russia
shared the US
penchant
for
non-recognition
and
boycott.
Russia continued to trade
with Iran and sold the Islamic
Republic
several submarines and nuclear reactors in
1993.72
The Islamic
Republic
of Iran, the
major proponent
of Islamic fundamentalism,
stood at the centre of the Islamic crescent, but it did not
openly promote political
destabilisation in the Russian
sphere
of influence. Iran's
position
on the war between
Azerbaijan
and Armenia was
conciliatory.
And even
though
the authoritarian resto-
ration in
Tajikistan
had
justified
itself as a reliable wall
against
Islamic extremism,
Iran
responded guardedly
and consulted with Russia about
problems
of
regional
stabilisation. The Islamic
Republic
of Iran had interests of state that
competed
with
Islamic nationalist, ideological
interests. Interests of state included correct relations
411
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
with the Russian
Federation,
which was not
participating
in the Western
boycott.
Furthermore,
Russia and Iran shared a common interest in
limiting
Pan-Turkism's
influence, given
the
large
Turkic minorities in Iran and Russia's
goal
of
maintaining
its traditional
sphere
of influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Russia's state interests would not be well served
by
the
victory
of either Pan-Turk-
ism or Islamic fundamentalism. Russia needed to
keep
its own eastern Slavic
culturalism under
control,
especially
when
reacting
to deliberate
provocative
acts of
violence
perpetrated by
radical extremists in
Tajikistan
and the North Caucasus. To
rebuild Russian influence in the Caucasus and Central
Asia,
Moscow had to discour-
age
states from
aligning
themselves with either
Turkey
or Iran. It also had to
demonstrate effective
power
and
sensitivity
as it
responded
to
regional
conflicts
within its
sphere
of influence.
Consequently,
Russian
foreign policy
could neither be
reduced to a crusade
against
Islamic fundamentalism nor a blanket condemnation of
ethnic nationalism. The touchstone would be the
political
movement's
impact upon
Russian national interests. El'tsin
put
it
bluntly
in an address to the
collegium
of the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
just prior
to the intervention in
Tajikistan:
'The sole
ideology
for Russia's
foreign policy
must be national interests. And these must be
real,
authentic
interests,
not
illusions,
not theoretical ideals'.73
Conclusion
For almost a
century
the Islamic crescent's
dual,
parallel
alliance
system
contributed
to
stability
in the
region
between the Black Sea and western China. Its central
structure was a stable border between the Russian and
Anglo-American spheres
of
influence. The southern borders of the Russian
empire
and the Soviet Union
functioned as a
stabilising
barrier line.
Afghanistan
served as a buffer state that
helped
to reduce tensions between the two alliance
systems.
The Islamic crescent
system required
two
great
powers
to maintain it. The United States succeeded Great
Britain as the Western
power primarily responsible
for the southern
band;
the Soviet
Union succeeded
Imperial
Russia as the
organiser
of the northern band.
However,
domestic
changes
in the Middle
East,
south west
Asia,
and the Soviet Union caused
the international
system
to
change.
The Iranian revolution
fragmented
the West's
(CENTO)
and
sparked
a
general
revival of Islamic
political
activity.
Khomeini evicted the United States from the core of the Islamic crescent's
southern band. The
cycle
of marxist
revolutionary coup,
civil war and defeat in
Afghanistan deprived
system
of its buffer
state,
increased
tensions between the Soviet Union and the
West,
and opened a small
bridgehead
into
Central Asia for
mojahedin.
The Soviet Union's division into 15
sovereign
states
damaged
the
political integrity
of the Islamic crescent's northern band and
spawned
local conflicts.
system's unravelling
forced Russian
policy
makers to
adapt
to a
new,
less stable environment. The Russian Federation had to chose between
a
progressive
retreat into fortress Russia and a
long, complex military
and
diplomatic
process
of
building
a
regional security system
that enhanced Russia's
security
and
prospects
for economic
development.
gave high
priority
to the
organisation
of a new
security system
in which the former
412
Soviet Union's southern borders would serve as a common forward line of defence
against
ethnic and
religious
extremism for it and the three Caucasian and five Central
Asian
republics.
These actions secured a
rudimentary
Russian
sphere
of influence
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Russian Federation also
began filling
a
vacuum left
by
the decline of American influence in the southern band of the Islamic
crescent.
The new
system
architecture was a revision of the traditional Islamic crescent
system
that had
operated during
the Tsarist and Soviet
periods.
A Russian state was
still the dominant
power
in the northern
band,
but the structural elements had
changed
in three
ways.
First,
the former Soviet
republics
had been
recognised
as
sovereign
states. Moscow's influence over them was
preponderant
but not
hegemonic.
Russia's
inability
to
impose
its
preferences rapidly
and
effectively
on the Caucasian
republics
and
Tajikistan
illustrates that
shift,
as does its need to
negotiate
the terms of its
military presence
in Turkmenistan and other states.
Second,
the
eight
frontline
republics
became involved in a matrix of North-South and East-West relations that
was
considerably
more
complex
than the Cold War's confrontational model.
Third,
Russian
diplomacy
was
negotiating
with combinations of states that the Cold War
system
would not have
permitted.
The more
powerful
states, Russia,
Turkey,
Iran and
Pakistan,
were
competing
for influence while
cooperating
to
prevent
the smaller states
from
destablising
the
region.
Their interaction was based more
upon
the
pursuit
of
pragmatic
interests of state than
ideology.
Radical Islamic fundamentalism and extreme nationalism have been offered as
enemies
against
which the
great powers
should
cooperate.
However,
given
the
Russian Federation's own
significant
Islamic
population,
the
important presence
of
Russians in the new Islamic
heritage
states,
and Russian
military
and economic
interests in the northern band of the Islamic
crescent,
Russia had to
promote
transcivilisational
cooperation.
Eastern Slavs and northern Moslems would both suffer
from an acrimonious
separation
of
peoples.
Russian Federation statesmen had to
conduct normal
diplomatic
relations with
radical,
secular and moderate Islamic
regimes
and
political
movements.
Though
Russian leaders condemned
religious
and
nationalist
extremism,
they
did not treat the Islamic
Republic
of Iran as a
rogue
state.
deepened
its
relationships
with
Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan
and
Pakistan.
Kozyrev
described the ideal international
system
for Central Asia as a 'club
of friends of
regional stability' consisting
of
Russia, Iran, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and
the five former Soviet
republics.74
The
strategy
assumed that even the Islamic
Republic
of Iran would
engage
in
politics.
Two
years
after the Soviet Union's demise and the birth of the Commonwealth of
Independent States,
the Russian Federation had achieved a dominant
military position
along
the southern frontiers of the former Soviet Union. But the trend lines
pointed
towards a more
complex
and less
orderly
Islamic
crescent,
a much looser
coupling
of
states than the
system
it
replaced.
The new
system
is
inherently
more
prone
to local
and
regional
conflict
owing
to the
larger
number of
competing
states,
the
legacy
of
incomplete developmental
tasks in those
states,
and the failure of the United States
to
support
Russian efforts more
actively.
University of
South Florida
413
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
1
may
also be defined as the
geopolitical
band inhabited
mainly by
Turkic
and Persian ethnic
groups
that
separates
the Slavic and the Arab worlds. It also
overlaps
with those
worlds and could serve as central Eurasia's link to them. The line that divided the Islamic crescent
into northern and southern bands blocked the Russian
Empire
and the Soviet Union from warm-water
ports.
2 See Yu. A.
Polyakov
& A. I.
Chugunov,
Konets basmachestva
(Moscow, 1976).
Their
research draws
upon
OGPU archives for Central Asia from the 1920s and 1930s. Enver Pasha's
Pan-Turkic rebellion ended on 4
August
1922 in a suicidal
charge
in the face of
superior
Red
Army
forces near Dushanbe. His forces had
peaked
at 20 000. The Bolshevik
revolutionary
tribunal accused
officers of
being
British
agents.
3
Attributed to Stalin
by
his
Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav
Molotov. See Feliks
Shuev,
'Sto
sorok besed s
Molotovym',
Kommunist
vooruzhennykh sil, 1991, 3,
p.
64. Stalin also
unsuccessfully
tried for oil concessions in northern Iran in
exchange
for retreat.
4
From 1972 to 1977 the Shah
kept troops
in Oman on such a mission. In 1976 Iranian forces
supported
Pakistan
against
Baluchistan secessionists
operating
in southwestern Pakistan. But the Shah
also increased economic relations with the Soviet Union and
purchased
some Soviet
weapons.
5
See The Imam's Final Discourse
(Teheran, 1983).
The Imam's testament
presents
Iran's
struggle against
both American and Soviet domination as a
principal
theme. It makes clear references
to Soviet
suppression
of Islam and Islamic
peoples.
6
By assisting
India with
military modernisation, the Soviet Union
provoked
Pakistan into a
drive for nuclear
weapons
to counterbalance India's
military superiority.
Pakistan's determination to
right
the imbalance strained relations with the US, which
attempted
to block nuclear
proliferation.
7
See Tudeh leader
Kiyanuri's comments, 'Narodnaya revolutsiya
v Irane', Kommunist, 1980,
5.
8
See
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and
Principle (New York, 1983), pp.
430-470.
9
See N.
Koval'sky, 'Kommunisty
i
veruyushchie', Kommunist, 1984, 13, p.
101.
10
Rebels sometimes fired missiles into the Soviet Union. Some landed in the
Penjikent region
during my
visit in summer 1987.
11
Official text, US Statement, 14
April
1988 and other
parts
of the
agreements
released to the
public. Agreements
on
Afghanistan.
Selected Documents, 26, April 1988; US
Department
of State.
12
Ravil Mustafin, 'Volna fundamentalizma zakhlestyvaet
arabskii mir', Krasnaya zvezda, 30
April
1993.
13 See General of the
Army,
Makhmut
Garayev,
'The
Afghan
Problem: Three Years Without
Soviet
Troops',
International
Affairs,
March 1992, pp.
15 ff.
14
Col. General Boris Gromov
reported
that 620 000 Soviet
military
had served in
Afghanistan;
546 000 had combat
experience;
and 15 000 had been killed.
Afghan
veterans Aleksandr Rutskoi and
Pavel Grachev became
prominent
in Russia's
leadership
after the
August
1991
coup.
Rutskoi led the
opposition
to El'tsin's
parliamentary coup
in
September-October
1991. See Krasnaya zvezda, 6
May
and 31 December 1992.
15
See M. T. Abasov (ed), Chernyi
Yanvar' (Baku, 1990).
16
See Lt. Gen.
Dubinyak's decrees; ibid., pp.
82-85.
17
See Sheikh Ali Pasha-zade's
public
declaration to Mikhail Gorbachev of 21
January 1990;
ibid.,
pp.
94-96.
The
report
and Mutalibov's first
speech
are to be found in Bakinskii rabochii, 27 and 28
January
1990.
19
See V. V. Bakatin's
explanation why
the
July
decrees were not enforced, Krasnaya
zvezda 22
August 1990, and the comments
by Major
General V. Safonov, who commanded the
Soviet
troops responsible
for the
Armenian-Azerbaijani
border
region; Krasnaya zvezda, 23
August
1990.
20
See
Krasnaya zvezda, 23
May 1992, for the CIS Collective
Security Treaty
text and
signatories.
21
A
military-legal expert,
Col. Viktor Kruk, describes the
organisational problems resulting
from the confrontation between Central Asian
personalistic leadership
and Soviet
military pro-
fessional standards. See his interview with
Major
Aleksandr
Krokhmalyuk, 'Turkmeniya: Pechal'nyi
moi
priyut', Armiya, 1993, 15.
22 See Lt Gen. V. Zhurbenko, 'Mesto
sluzhby, Turkmenistan', Krasnaya zvezda, 6
May
1993.
23
Cited
by Christopher
J. Panico, 'Turkmenistan Unaffected
by
Winds of Democratic
Change;'
RFE/RL Research Report, 2, 4, 1993, p.
10.
24
See
'Armenia-Azerbaijan
war: maneuvers around oil', Moscow News, 1993, 38.
25
See Andrei
Kozyrev's
editorial on Russia's role in
peacemaking,
'Mirotvorchestvo stoit
nemalo. No otkaz ot
nego
eshche dorozhe', Krasnaya zvezda, 1
September
1993.
414
26
President El'tsin's
speech
to the Civic Union of 28
February 1993,
cited
by Serge
Schmemann,
'El'tsin
Suggests
a Role for
Russia',
New York
Times,
1 March 1993.
27
See Vladimir Gavrilenko & Nikolai
Astashkin,
'Ministr
Oborony
RF v
Severno-Kavkazskom
voennom
okruge', Krasnaya zvezda,
27
February
1993.
28
See Col. V.
Simonov, 'Yug
Rossii: kriticheskii rubezh
bezopasnosti', Armiya, 1992, 22-23,
pp.
49-53.
29
'Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossii k
grazhdanam strany', Krasnaya zvezda,
5 November 1992.
30
Source: K.
Murdzhiknele, 'Chechnya:
na
sem'yu po avtomatu', Krasnaya zvezda,
27
August
1993.
31
See Darrell
Slider,
'The Politics of
Georgia's Independence',
Problems
of Communism, XL,
6, 1991,
for an excellent
analysis
of the
complex political
and ethnic causes of the conflict.
32
See Akakii Mikadze & Mikhail
Shevelev,
interview with
Ardzinba,
'Vladislav
Ardzinba,
leader of
Abkhazia',
Moscow
News, 1993,
32.
33
Vitalii Denisov & Nail'
Gafutulin,
'Poslednii reis
kapitana
Yakova
Ivanova', Krasnaya
zvezda,
22
July
1993.
34
See Vladimir Gavrilenko & Nikolai
Astakhin,
'Ministr
Oborony
RF v Sevemo-Kavkazskom
voennom
okruge', Krasnaya zvezda,
27
February
1993.
35
See Arkadii
Mikadze, 'Georgia
on the threshold of a new
war',
Moscow
News, 1993,
36. The
five bases were
Batumi, Poti, Akhalkalaki,
Tbilisi and Gudauta.
36 Edvard Shevardnadze as cited
by Serge Schmemann,
'In
Heavy
Blow to
Georgia,
Secession-
ists Seize
Key City',
New York Times, 28
September
1993.
37
Shevardnadze, interview, Bakinskii rabochii, 3
February
1993.
38
See
coverage
of Demirel's visit to Baku in the
capital's
Russian
language newspaper,
Bakinskii rabochii, 3
May
1992. He also stated that the
greater
Turkish world from
Azerbaijan
to
Kazakhstan 'had
already
become
reality'.
39
See R. V.
Barylski,
'Central Asia and the Post-Soviet Military System
in the Formative Year:
1992', Central Asia Monitor, 1992, 6, pp.
18-29.
40
See
Krasnaya zvezda, 20
May 1992, for
reports
on Kurdistan and 28
May
1992 for a
summary
of the Russo-Turkish summit's results.
41
Drawn from interviews with Aliev
by
Vladimir
Emelyanenko,
Moscow News, 1993, 18, and
Valerii Konovalov &
Georgii Ivanov-Smolensky,
4
August 1993.
42
Summer events information drawn from TURAN news service
reports
and confirmed in
personal
interviews conducted in Moscow and Baku in
July
1993.
43
Radio Moscow World Service, 8 October 1993.
44
See
Philip Robins, 'Between Sentiment and Self-Interest:
Turkey's Policy
Toward
Azerbaijan
and the Central Asian States', The Middle East Journal, 47, 4, Autumn 1993, for a
summary
of the
rise and
subsequent
correction of Pan-Turkic idealism.
45
The Economist Book
of Vital World Statistics (London, 1990).
46
Cited
by
N. Zhelnorova, 'Mirotvorets Nazarbaev', Argumenty
i
fakty, 1992, 51-52.
47
See Aleksandr Gol'ts, Krasnaya zvezda, 23
May
1992.
48
For
descriptions
of the
political parties operating
in
Tajikistan
in summer 1992, see
Shahrbanou
Tadjbakhsh,
'The
Tajik Spring
of 1992', Central Asia Monitor, 1993, 2.
49
Islam Karimov saw
relationships
between the
political
conflict in
Tajikistan
and the fractional
rivalry
in
Afghanistan where Uzbek and
Tajik groupings competed.
See
Igor Rotar, Nezavisimaya
gazeta,
16 October 1992.
50
Igor
Rotar reports
that Tajik nationalists claim that 20% of Uzbekistan's
population
is
Tajik
(3.5 million
people)
while the Uzbek state
officially reports
a much lower number, 600 000. Uzbeks
make
up
about 25% of
Tajikistan's population.
The
Ferghana valley,
where Uzbek, Tajik and
Kyrgyz
state borders meander across
complex patterns
of ethnic settlement, would
erupt
if nationalists were
permitted
to stir
passions.
See
Igor
Rotar's
analytical summary
of the
ethno-political map,
'Nations:
A Mine Laid
by
the Kremlin's
Mapmakers-The
Border Problem Could Make Central Asia
Explode'. Nezavisimaya gazeta,
25 December 1992 (CDSP, XLV, 1, 1993.
51
Safarov had been sentenced six times and had served 23
years
in
prison.
He was cited as
boasting
that he would 'rid
Tajikistan
and all of Russia of democratic rubbish'. See
Oleg Panfilov,
Nezavisimaya gazeta,
5 December 1992.
52
Kozyrev,
as cited
by
Anatolii Ladin, 'My
okazhem narodu
Tajikistana vsyu neobkodimuyu
pomoshch' ', Krasnaya zvezda, 6 November 1992.
53
See
Igor
Rotar's accounts of
Kozyrev's
views on the
Almaty meeting
and his
inability
to
convince Emomali Rakhmonov and
Sangak
Safarov to halt the civil war and to end the effort to
overthrow Iskandrov.
6 and 7 November 1992 (CDSP, XLIV, 45, 1992).
54
Reported by Ravil Mustafin, 'Est'
takaya kontseptsiya', Krasnaya zvezda, 5 November 1992.
415
ROBERT V. BARYLSKI
55
See Aleksandr
Pel'ts,
'Tadzhikistan:
chrezvychainaya sessiya parlamenta
zavershila
raboty',
Krasnaya zvezda,
4 December 1992.
56
At its
peak,
the civil war created about 500 000
temporary refugees
or 10% of the
population
of
Tajikistan.
See Ernest Thomas Greene's
report
on the work of the
Tajikistan
Humanitarian
Assistance
Team,
'Aid to
Tajikistan',
Central Asia
Monitor, 1993, 4,
and the
summary
of the Citizen
Democracy Corps hearings
on the situation in
Tajikistan
in ibid.
57
See Lt Col.
Sergei Dyshev
& Yurii
Pirogov,
'Ne
gryanet
li kanonada
posle rokovykh
vystrelov
v
Kurgan-Tyube?', Krasnaya zvezda,
3
April
1993.
58
Lt. Col.
Sergei Dyshev,
Dzhikhad
Afganskikh Modzhakhedov', Krasnaya zvezda,
17 Febru-
ary
1993.
59
See 'Ukaz
prezidenta
Rossiiskoi
Federatsii', Krasnaya zvezda,
30
July
1993.
60
Andrei
Kozyrev, 'Chego
khochet
Rossiya
v
Tadzhikistane', Izvestiya,
4
August
1993.
61
Ibid.,
also cited
by
Aleksandr Pel'ts in
'Pravitel'stvennye
voiska vedut
nastupatel'nye boi',
Krasnaya zvezda,
5
August
1993.
62
Deputy Foreign
Minister
Georgii
Kunadze,
as cited
by
Vera Kuznetsova in 'Tajikistan: the
USSR's Last War or the New Russia's First
War?', Nezavisimaya gazeta,
29
July
1993
(CDSP, XLV,
30, 1993, p. 12).
63
See Sanobar
Shermatova,
'Adamishin clarifies the situation in
Tajikistan',
Moscow
News,
1993, 32. See Leon Aron, 'In
Tajikistan
Russia
may
be
heading
towards its own Vietnam war',
Moscow News, 1993, 34. Aron
reports
that
Kozyrev inquired
about an
opposition
member suitable for
a coalition
government
and was told
by
a member of the current Tajikistan government that he had
killed him
personally.
64
See
Fayaz Galimov's conservative, realist
point
of view, Pravda, 4 November 1992 and
Mikhail Leont'ev, Segodnya,
20
July 1993, for a realist conclusion from a liberal who believes
defeating
Islamic extremism is as
important
as
blocking
fascism. The State
Security Council
Secretary,
Marshal
Evgenii Shaposhnikov,
described five different
points of view on
Tajikistan,
ranging
from evacuation of 400 000
Russian-speaking refugees
followed
by
its abandonment to direct
military
attacks
against Afghanistan
to build a new buffer zone, Itogi,
25
July 1993; Kozyrev's
emphasis
on coalition expansion
is more liberal than reliance
upon
authoritarian
dictatorship,
Izvestiya,
4
August 1993; Only
17% favoured Russia's
sending troops
to
fight
in Central Asia in an
opinion poll
taken
shortly
after the
July
1993 incident in which 25 border
troops
had been killed,
Itogi,
1
August 1993.
65
Source: V. Yarmenko, 'Fundamentalisty rvyutsya
k vlasti?', Armiya, 1993, 17; Viktor
Perevedentsev, 'What
prevents
a civilised migration
of Russians', Moscow News, 1992, 41, and A.
G. Vishnevsky, 'Demograficheskoe polozhenie Rossii', Svobodnaya mysl, 1993, 2 & 3.
66
Igor
Rotar
reported
that the Russian Federal
Migration
division recorded a mass exodus of
Russians from
Tajikistan during
the civil war, some 300 000 out of the 380 000. The exodus from
more stable
republics
such as
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was in the 4% range in 1992. See
29 April 1993.
67
Mistakes follow
patterns suggestive
of a basic
split
between eastern Slavic and northern
Islamic civilisations. El'tsin
proclaimed
the CIS with Slavic Belarus, Ukraine and Russia and then
extended it to the other
republics.
Islamic heritage republics
have
joined the Economic
Cooperation
Organisation
with
Turkey,
Iran and Pakistan. Russian
diplomacy
has to work
carefully
to
prevent
a
North/South division of Eurasia.
68
See for
example, Agababa Rzaev & G. Guseinov, 'Sushchestvuet li
ugroza islamskogo
fundamentalizma?', Vozrozhdenie, 1991, 7-8-9, pp. 65ff. Vozrozhdenie
was the successor to Kommu-
nist
Azerbaidzhana.
This is an early example
of Islamic efforts to make Russians aware of their
cultural biases.
69
Cited
by Ravil
Mustafin, 'Est' takaya kontseptsiya', Krasnaya
zvezda,
5 November 1992.
70
Igor
Melikhov,
Deputy
head of the Middle East
Department, 'Russia and the Middle
East',
International
Affairs, January 1993, p. 68.
71
See Maxim
Yusin's
report
on
Kozyrev's
visit to Ankara,
Izvestiya,
7
February 1993.
72
Rossiiskaya
gazeta, 19
January
1993; Izvestiya, 31
March and 4
May 1993.
73
El'tsin's comments to the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs senior staff were
reported in Krasnaya
zvezda, 28 October 1992.
74
Andrei
Kozyrev, 'Chego khochet Rossiya
v Tadzhikistane', Izvestiya,
4
August 1993.
416

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