The Functioning of Philosophy in Aquinas

J. L. A. West
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 45, Number 3, July 2007,
pp. 383-394 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/hph.2007.0072
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Universit degli studi di Pisa (7 Mar 2014 06:36 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v045/45.3west.html
383 phi losophy i n aqui nas
Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 45, no. 3 (2007) 38394
[383]
The Functioning of
Philosophy in Aquinas
J . L . A . WE S T *
the relationship between faith and reason, and more specically between
philosophy and theology, is, of course, a central theme in the thought of Aquinas,
in addition to being a topic of perennial concern. In terms of recent scholarship,
however, attention has primarily been focused on two smaller problems within
this general issue. The rst problem concerns the extent and limits of reason in
knowing about God. To approach the issue in this way is to ask about the scope of
philosophy: how much can it know about God? The second area of interest has
been to articulate clearly the differences between philosophy and theology. Here
the standard reply is two-fold. First, philosophy starts from reason, whereas theol-
ogy starts from faith, i.e., the acceptance of sacred scripture or dogma. Second,
philosophy moves from creatures to God, whereas theology moves from God to
creatures. These questions of the scope of philosophy and its difference from
theology have been widely treated in the literature and a variety of schools of
thought have emerged, accounting for them in different ways.
However, the relation between philosophy and theology presents a further
problem that has received much less attention. This concerns the proper role of
philosophy within revealed theology itself. Here one is seeking to determine which
functions philosophy performs in the context of treating theologically a mystery of
the faith. To put the question another way, how does philosophys job-description
change when it is no longer performing its proper functions autonomously, but
rather serving as an instrument for a higher science, i.e., theology? Accordingly,
this question demands that we determine what sort of method Aquinas uses when
he discusses mysteries of the faith, and what role philosophy plays in that method.
1

* J. L. A. West is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Newman Theological College.
1
In The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (Toronto: Pontical Institute of Mediaeval Stud-
ies, 1990), Mark Jordan argues that it is anachronistic to speak of Aquinas having a method at all. He
argues that such a notion only makes sense within a modern mechanistic worldview. However, this
follows only if one has a rather restricted view of what is meant by method. As Bernard Lonergan
points out (Method In Theology [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990], xi), when one speaks of
theological method, one refers not to a list of rules that anyone could follow, but rather to a series
of intellectual operations performed by the theologian.
384 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 45: 3 j uly 2007
For the purposes of the present investigation, I am restricting my inquiry to this
last concern. While answers to the rst two problems are certainly relevant, they
do not, in themselves, solve this third problem.
Accordingly, this article aims to show how Aquinas addresses this issue. I argue
that, for Aquinas, philosophy is a necessary condition for the possibility of theol-
ogy, and that philosophy is not substantially changed by being put to use within a
theological context. This follows from the traditional notion of philosophy as the
handmaid to theology. I begin by arguing that, for Aquinas, the subalternation
of disciplines results in a reciprocal give and take between the lower science (viz.
philosophy) and the higher science (viz. theology), focusing on what philosophy
contributes to revealed theology. It is shown that this give and take between the
lower and the higher sciences is based on Aquinass distinction between what is
better known in itself and what is better known to us.
After establishing this, I argue that Thomas provides two distinct models for
understanding the relation between philosophy and theology. The rst follows
from the widely discussed metaphor of the water of philosophy being transformed
into the wine of theology. I show that the standard interpretation of this text is not
compatible with Aquinass second model for the relation between philosophy and
theology, namely the position that this is an instance of grace perfecting nature. A
closer reading of the text shows that Aquinas is attempting to shift the metaphor of
water being turned into wine from one of substantial change to one of governance,
which is more in keeping with his usual account in terms of nature and grace.
1 . s u b a l t e r n a t i o n , t h e h i e r a r c h y o f t h e
s c i e n c e s , a n d t h e o r d e r o f k n o wi n g
Aquinas deals with the relation between the disciplines through his account of
subalternation.
2
Thomists have generally identied three different forms of sub-
alternation in Aquinas. The rst is subalternation in terms of a sciences end. This
is the case where one science exists for the sake of another, as the knowledge of
bridle-making exists to serve one who practices the craft of riding.
3
The second
kind of subalternation is in terms of subject matter. This occurs when something
studied by one science is included as part of the formal subject matter studied by
another science, just as one can prove that the earth is round in both astronomy and
geometry.
4
However, we are concerned with subalternation in terms of principles.
This occurs when one science makes use of knowledge demonstrated by another
science.
5
Sciences demonstrate new knowledge on the basis of given principles.
Either these principles are self-evident or they are presupposed as conclusions
of some other science. When Thomas treats this kind of subalternation, he is
usually concerned with the case in which a lower science takes something from a
2
Summa Theologiae [S.T.], 3 vols. (Turin: Marietti, 1938), I, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2. Unless otherwise noted,
all translations in this article are my own.
3
S.T., I, q. 1, a. 5 c.
4
S.T., I, q. 1 a. 2 ad 2.
5
S.T., I, q. 1 a. 2. Two inuential accounts of this three-fold division of subalternation are to be
found in Ioannis a Sancto Thomae, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, vol. I, ed. P. Beato Reiser, O.S.B.
(Taurini: Marietti, 1930), q. 26, a. 2; and Josephus Gredt, O.S.B., Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-
Thomisticae, 2 vols. (Barcelona: Herder, 1951, 9th ed.), 226.
385 phi losophy i n aqui nas
higher science.
6
This brings up epistemological worries, since the practitioner of
the lower science does not know the principles he is using, but depends upon the
knowledge of someone else. For instance, the musician makes use of things proven
in mathematics and the optometrist makes use of what is proven in geometry.
In the case of theology, the situation is even more difcult, for the principles
are received from the science of God and the blessed. While one might imagine
a musician who bothered to acquire the knowledge of mathematics in order to
have full knowledge of his art, such an option is not open to the theologian, who
must take his principles from revelation on the basis of divine authority. Accord-
ingly, Aquinas tends to focus his attention on this case.
Nevertheless, the texts clearly indicate that subalternation actually involves a
reciprocal relation. A higher science can make use of what is proven in a lower sci-
ence as well, and this is precisely what is at work when we look to what philosophy
has to offer revealed theology. Examples of a metaphysician, for instance, making
use of a proof discovered in physics or mathematics for his own purposes are easy
to nd. Aquinas indicates that this also happens in theology, which makes use of
philosophical knowledge. Accordingly, we are faced with determining how phi-
losophy is used by the higher science of theology in treating revealed truths.
This bottom-up approach to the hierarchy of the sciences is explicitly treated
in the commentary on Boethiuss De trinitate. In discussing the use of philosophy in
divine science, an objector argues that as each science has its own principles, so a
science that proceeds from the principles of a different discipline would proceed
incorrectly. Aquinas unequivocally rejects this suggestion:
Sciences that are ordered to each other are related so that one can use the principles
of another, just as posterior sciences use the principles of a prior science, whether
they are superior or inferior. Hence, metaphysics, which is above all, uses conclu-
sions proved in the other sciences. And likewise, theology, since all other sciences
are [related] to it as ancillary and preparatory to its path of generation, although
they are of less dignity, can use the principles of all other sciences.
7
6
S.T., I, q. 1, a. 2 corp. Respondeo dicendum sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed sciendum est quod duplex
est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut
arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris
scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis noticatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam
notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae
scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra
credit principia revelata sibi a Deo. See also John F. Wippel, Aquinas and Avicenna on the Relationship
between First Philosophy and the Other Theoretical Sciences, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas
[Metaphysical Themes] (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 52.
7
S. Thomae de Aquino, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 50: Super Boetium De Trinitate [De
trin.] (Roma-Paris: Commissio Leonina-ditions Du Cerf, 1992), q. 2, a. 3 ad 7. Ad septimum dicendum,
quod scientie que habent ordinem ad inuicem hoc modo se habent quod una potest uti principiis alterius, sicut
scientie posteriores utuntur principiis scientiarum priorum, siue sit superiores siue inferiores; unde metaphisica, que
est omnibus superior, utitur his que inaliis scientiis sunt probata. Et similiter theologia, cum omnes alie scientie sint
huic quasi famulantes et preambule in uia generationis quamuis dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium
aliarum scientiarum. This view is already present as early as Aquinass Sentences Commentary: Opera Omnia
[In Sent.], vol. I, ed. R. Busa (Stuttgart, 1974), prol. q. 1, a. 1 c. Ex hoc possumus habere duas conclusiones.
Una est, quod ista scientia imperat omnibus aliis scientiis tamquam principalis: alia est, quod ipsa utitur in obse-
quium sui omnibus aliis scientiis quasi vassallis. Aquinas goes on to give the example of pharmacist whose
craft is ordered to that of the physician, since the end of pharmacy is health. For Thomas, the end of
philosophy is ordered to that of theology in this way: Ita, cum nis totius philosophiae sit infra nem theologiae,
et ordinatus ad ipsum, theologia debet omnibus aliis scientiis imperare et uti his quae in eis traduntur.
386 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 45: 3 j uly 2007
Aquinas clearly presents an account of the hierarchy of the sciences in which there
is a great deal of give and take between the higher and lower disciplines. Here the
lower sciences are at the service of the higher ones.
It is important to note that Aquinas often uses the phrases sacred doctrine and
divine science as synonyms for natural theology or metaphysics.
8
Consequently,
it is necessary to carefully attend to the context in order to determine whether
natural or revealed theology is intended where these phrases are used. In this
case, however, the objection under consideration follows from the fact that sacred
doctrine ought to proceed from the articles of faith.
9
This indicates that it is the
incorporation of philosophy into revealed theology that is being considered in
the text quoted above. In any event, the text is clearly important in showing the
reciprocal dynamic between the lower and the higher sciences generally.
One might, however, be tempted to think that this account is circular, for a
lower science takes some of its principles from a higher science, yet the higher
science also makes use of the lower one. Aquinas responds to this objection in
the context of his discussion of the relations between the speculative sciences. He
begins by distinguishing the natural order of the sciencesaccording to which divine
science (in this context, meaning metaphysics) is the rst of all sciencesfrom
their order in relation to usaccording to which we learn the other sciences before
metaphysics.
10
What is prior by nature is not what is best known to us; hence, we
need to begin with what we are able to know more effectively and then use this
knowledge in order to understand things which are more difcult for us.
Having established this distinction, Aquinas goes on to answer the objection
directly:
Yet there is not necessarily a circular argument because metaphysics presupposes
conclusions which are proved in the other sciences while it proves their principles,
since the principles that another science (such as natural philosophy) takes from rst
philosophy do not prove those things which the same rst philosopher takes from
the natural philosopher, but they [the latter] are proved through other self-evident
principles. Likewise, the rst philosopher does not prove the principles which he
hands on to the natural philosopher through the principles which he takes from
him, but these are proved through other self-evident principles; and thus there is
no circle in the denition.
11
Here the reciprocal dynamic between the various sciences avoids circularity as the
conclusions given to the higher science are not proved by means of the principles
8
De trin., q. 2, a. 2 c.
9
De trin., q. 2, a. 3 obj. 7. Sicut quelibet scientia habet principia propria, ita et sacra doctrina, scilicet articulos
dei. Also note the way Aquinas introduces the question to be treated (which, as is customary, states the po-
sition to be refuted): Uidetur quod in his que sunt dei non liceat philosophicis rationibus uti (my emphasis).
10
De trin., q. 5, a. 1 ad 9. Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamuis scientia diuina sit prima omnium scientiarum
naturaliter, tamen quoad nos alie scientie sunt priores: ut enim dicit Auicenna in principio sue Metaphisice, ordo
huius scientie est ut addiscatur post scientias naturales, in quibus sunt multa determinata quibus ista scientia
utitur . . . Cf. S.T., I, q. 2, a. 2 c.
11
De trin., q. 5, a. 1 ad 9. Nec tamen oportet quod sit circulus quia ipsa supponit ea que in aliis probantur
cum ipsa aliarum principia probet, quia principia que accipit alia scientia, scilicet naturalis, a prima philosophia,
non probant ea que item philosophus primus accipit a naturali, set probantur per alia principia per se nata; et
similiter philosophus primus non probat principia que tradit naturali per principia que ab eo accipit, set per alia
principia per se nota; et sic non est aliquis circulus in difnitione. For a detailed exegesis of this text, see
Wippel (Metaphysical Themes, 45), whose translation of this passage I have followed here.
387 phi losophy i n aqui nas
it took from that science. Rather, they must be proven through other self-evident
principles. Accordingly, this conclusion can be used by the higher science simply
on the basis of the proof given in the lower one; no new proof on the part of the
receiving science is needed.
If this doctrine gives ample evidence that a lower science can be used within a
higher one and that this procedure is not circular, it gives relatively little insight
into what motivation there might be to do this in the case of theology.
12
Why is
philosophy not only permissible, but also needed within revealed theology?
The need to understand revelation in terms of philosophythat is, in terms
of something that is better known to usis in large part a result of the relation of
subalternation amongst the sciences. In the Lectura romana in primum Sentiarum
Petri Lombardi, or Roman Commentary,
13
Aquinas explicitly ties the order of knowing
to the formal structure of the relations between subalternated sciences in a very
straightforward fashion. An objector argues:
It happens that a science that takes from another is subalternated to it. If therefore
sacred scripture
14
takes the sayings of philosophers, it is subalternated to the phi-
losophers science, which is unsuitable.
Aquinass reply masterfully connects the different aspects of this problem:
Something is called concealed in two ways, either on its own account, or on account
of us. For sometimes a subalternating science takes something from a subalternated one, namely
when it proves that which is more known with respect to itself, yet it is less known to us, through
something which is more known to us. But sometimes a subalternated science takes from a
subalternating one, namely when it proves something that is less known to us through
that which is more known in itself. But sacred scripture takes from the philosophical
sciences in the rst way.
15
In this text we nd a formal resolution of the question of the relations between
the sciences. In borrowing from a lower science, the higher science proves some-
thing that is better known in itself by means of something that is better known
to us. The unknown is explained and understood with reference to the known.
12
An important exception is the defence of philosophy in terms of nature and grace. This will
be discussed below. Also, in one text (De trin., q. 2, a. 3 c), Aquinas hints that the theologian borrows
natural analogies from philosophy, but this idea is not developed.
13
This is a recently discovered manuscript of Aquinass second attempt to comment on Peter
Lombards Sentences. The authenticity of the Roman Commentary as a work of Aquinas has been estab-
lished by Leonard E. Boyle, O.P., Alia lectura fratris Thome, Mediaeval Studies 45 (1983): 41829.
A useful summary of the contents can be found in Mark F. Johnson, Alia lectura fratris Thome: A
List of the New Texts of St. Thomas Aquinas found in Lincoln College, Oxford, MS. Lat. 95, Recherches
de thologie ancienne et mdivale 57 (1990): 3461.
14
In this context, sacra scriptura does not signify the Bible, but the writings of theologians.
15
Thomas Aquinas, Lectura romana in primum Sentiarum Petri Lombardi [Roman Commentary], ed.
L.E. Boyle, O.P. and John F. Boyle (Toronto: Pontical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2006), ms.
6ra5vb, prol. q. 4, a. 4 obj. 4 and ad 4; my emphasis. Preterea. Constat quod illa scientia que accipit ab
alia subalternatur illi a qua accipit. Si igitur sacra scriptura accipit dicta philosophorum subalternatur scientie
philosophorum, quod inconueniens. Ad ultimum dicendum quod aliquid dicitur occultum dupliciter, uel propeter
se uel propter nos. Quandoque enim scientia subalternans accipit aliquid a subalternata, quando scilicet probat
id quod est notius quoad se, nobis tamen minus notum, per aliquid quod est nobis notius. Quandoque autem sub-
alternata accipit a subalternante, quando scilicet probat aliquid quod est nobis minus notum per id quod est in se
magis notum. Sacra autem scriptura accipit a scientiis philosphicis primo modo. Note that Aquinas frequently
uses sacra scriptura, sacra doctrina, and theologia interchangeably.
388 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 45: 3 j uly 2007
Conversely, in making use of a principle from a higher science, the lower one
proves something that is less known to us by way of something that is more known
in itself. In this solution, the reciprocal nature of subalternation and the reason
for it is clearly set out.
A further reason for using philosophyone very much in keeping with the
presentation in the Roman Commentarycan be found in the Summa Theologiae.
Here Aquinas is defending the supremacy of sacred doctrine over the other sci-
ences, and an objection is presented on the grounds that, if theology makes use
of things taken from philosophy, then it would seem that philosophy is the more
noble discipline. Aquinas replies:
This science can take something from philosophical teachings, not that it needs
these, but for greater manifestation of those things that this science treats; for this
science does not receive its principles from the other sciences, but it receives them
immediately through revelation from God. And thus it does not receive anything
from the other sciences as if from superiors, but it uses them as inferiors and hand-
maids; just as master sciences make use of subordinate ones, as politics makes use
of the military. And the fact that it uses them is not on account of its defect or insufciency,
but on account of a defect of our intellect; which from those things which are known through
natural reason (from which other sciences proceed), is more easily led to those things that are
above reason, which are treated in this science.
16
Here the reason for theologys use of the lower discipline of philosophy is broached
at several levels. The rst point is that theology does not need philosophy. Rather,
it uses philosophy to make the truths it teaches more manifest. On this matter it
is important to be clear about what Aquinas means in saying that sacred doctrine
does not use philosophy ex necessitate. In particular, it is clear that he does not mean
that theologians can carry out their task without making use of philosophy at all.
Aquinas simply means that if we consider the nature of the science of theology
in itselfprescinding from the conditions of the individuals who practice the
disciplinephilosophy is not a necessity. This is to consider the discipline in the
abstract as it is dened by its formal object, without attending to the incidental
features of those who practice the discipline.
17
Nevertheless, any individual theo-
logian is limited by his state, that is, the specic existential conditions that limit
16
S.T., I, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2; my emphasis. Ad secundum dicendum quod haec scientia accipere potest aliquid
a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad maiorem manifestationem eorum quae in
hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate a Deo per revelationem.
Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis; sicut
architectonicae utuntur subministrantibus, ut civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis, non est propter
defectum vel insufcientiam eius, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri; qui ex his quae per naturalem rationem
(ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae) cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea quae sunt supra rationem, quae in
hac scientia traduntur.
17
It should be noted at this point that there is a signicant dispute over the meaning of the
phrase sacra doctrina in S.T., q. 1. The problem is that it seems to be used differently throughout the
question: in a.1, as revelation; in texts such as a. 28, to mean scholastic theology; in places, the virtue
of faith; or in a. 910 to mean the biblical texts. A useful summary of the different opinions and an
argument that the meaning is univocal throughout is found in James A. Weisheipl, The Meaning of
Sacra Doctrina in the Summa Theologiae I, q.1, Thomist 38 (1974): 4980. Weisheipl argues that sacra
doctrina does not mean academic theology, but rather revelation throughout the question. I am as-
suming that Thomas does, at least in places such as the present text, have academic theology in mind.
A case for such a view is made, contra Weisheipl, by Thomas C. OBrien, O.P., Sacra Doctrina Revisited:
The Context of Medieval Education, Thomist 41 (1977): 475509.
389 phi losophy i n aqui nas
and condition his understanding of the subject matter.
18
The relevance of this
distinction is clear if we read Aquinass claim in light of the answer to the previ-
ous objection, namely, that sacred doctrine is most certain in itself, even though
it is more difcult for us to know. Accordingly, philosophy is necessary for the
theologian, given the limitations of ones state as a wayfarer in this mortal life. Yet
we must note that this is a qualied, or hypothetical, necessity. In the case of
hypothetical necessity, a claim is not necessary in the sense that to reject it would
involve one in a contradiction. Rather, a thing is hypothetically necessary when
something is either very difcult to do, or not properly done, without it. In this
way we might say that a vehicle is necessary to travel from Toronto to Mexico City,
or that good brushes are necessary for oil painting. Likewise, theology cannot be
done appropriately or easily by human beings without philosophy.
19

Consequently, Aquinass basic theological procedure is to understand the un-
known in terms of the known. A close study of his theological practice shows that,
again and again, he turns to natural analogues in order to articulate his accounts
of the mysteries of the faith.
20
In his Sentences Commentary, Aquinas emphasizes the
points that have been made above when, in the context of a question on the Trin-
ity, he presents an article to argue that the language we apply to God is derived
from physical things:
It is most tting that divine things are designated by us from corporeal things . . .
rst and foremost on account of the highness of the subject matter, which exceeds
the capacity of our intellect. Hence, we cannot grasp the truth about divine matters
in its own manner; and thus it is necessary that it be proposed to us in our own man-
ner. But it is connatural for us to come to intelligible things from sensibles, and to
prior things through posterior ones; and thus intelligible things are proposed to us
under the gure of sensible things, in order that from those things that we know,
the mind may rise to the unknown.
21
18
The distinction between the nature of a discipline and the state of its practitioner is from
Jacques Maritain, An Essay on Christian Philosophy, trans. E.H. Flannery (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1955), 1517. Also see Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom (New York: Charles Scribners
Sons, 1940), 10001.
19
Of course, this refers to human beings in this mortal life. The blessed see God directly; conse-
quently, the need for philosophy is no longer present.
20
I am fully aware that a full proof of my claim requires a careful study of Aquinass use of phi-
losophy in theological practice. Obviously, this cannot be done in the present article. Nevertheless, it
may be useful to offer briey a few examples where Aquinas uses philosophy in this way: (1) the use
of philosophical accounts of principle and cause in the discussion of the Father as principium at S.T., I,
q. 33, a. 1 ad 1; (2) the use of Aristotles account of the mixture of elements to show the impossibility
of the monophysite claim that the two natures of Christ are united to form some new nature at S.T.,
III, q.2, a.1; and (3) the discussion of the appropriateness of the terms person, hypostasis, sub-
stance, essence, and subsistence in discussing the Trinity, although invoking theological authors,
is carried out largely in philosophical terms at S.T., I, q.29. Examples of the kind of study of Aquinass
use of philosophy in theological contexts which I think is needed can be found in my articles: The
Metaphysics of Esse in Christ, Thomist 66 (2002): 23150; Nature, Specic Difference and Degrees of
Being: Metaphysical Background to Aquinass Anti-Monophysite Arguments, in Nova et Vetera (English
Edition) 3 (2005): 3980; and Aquinas on Peter Lombard and the Metaphysical Status of Christs
Human Nature, Gregorianum (forthcoming).
21
In Sent., I, d.34, q.3, a.1 sol. Respondeo dicendum, quod convenientissimum est divina nobis simili-
tudinibus corporalibus designari . . . prima et principalis propter materiae altitudinem, quae nostri intellectus
capacitatem excedit; unde non possumus veritatem divinorum secundum modum suum capere; et ideo oportet
quod nobis secundum modum nostrum proponatur. Est autem nobis connaturale a sensibilibus in intelligibilia
venire, et a posterioribus in priora; et ideo sub gura sensibilium intelligibilia nobis proponuntur, ut ex his quae
390 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 45: 3 j uly 2007
There is no reason for restricting this motive for understanding divine matters in
light of corporeal things to natural theology. Indeed, with respect to the theological
treatment of mysteries of the faith, it is even more appropriate when the proper
limitations of such analogues are kept in mind.
Aquinas makes Aristotles adage his own: our intellect is blinded by the gran-
deur of divine truths, just as the eyes of an owl are blinded by the light of the
sun.
22
The point Aquinas is making is that sacred doctrine does not stand in need
of philosophy according to its own nature. However, as the latter part of the passage
from the Summa makes clear, theology does need philosophy if it is to be effective
in making its teaching known to the feeble human intellect. A handmaid might
be a luxury for the healthy, but it is a necessity for the invalid.
2 . t h e wa t e r i n t o wi n e mo d e l
An obvious objection to my account can be taken from Aquinass claim that the
water of philosophy is not mixed with the wine of theology; rather, its water is
turned into wine. Does not this image of the transformation of philosophy into
theology undermine the reading I have offered? I do not think so.
We must determine what sort of change is meant here. The text in question
reads:
We can say that a mixture is not said to occur when one of two things passes over into
the rule [dominium] of another, but when both are altered in their nature. Hence
those who use philosophical works in sacred doctrine by bringing them into obedience
to faith, do not mix water with wine, but they convert water into wine.
23
Scholars have focused on the nal line of this text, interpreting it as an allusion to
either the miracle of Cana or the Eucharist.
24
Yet reading the text in terms of a mi-
novimus ad incognita animus surgat. It is remarkable that, in the next article, Aquinas goes so far as to
argue that it is more appropriate to derive our analogues from things of little value than from noble
ones: In Sent., I, d.34, q.3, a. 2 sol. Respondeo dicendum, quod hanc quaestionem Dionysius, 2 cap. Caelest.
Hierarch., pertractat, et ostendit quod etiam convenientius signicantur nobis divina per creaturas viliores, quam
per nobiliores. Et primam rationem assignat, quia his magis occultantur divina, cujus occultationis necessitas dicta
est, art. praec. Secundam assignat, quia ista magis a Deo removentur et distant: et ideo cum convenientissimus
modus signicandi divina sit per negationem, convenientius istis similitudinibus utimur. Tertiam assignat ex
utilitate nostra; quia minus datur nobis occasio errandi in guris rerum vilium quam in guris rerum nobilium.
Nullus enim dubitat, Deum secundum proprietatem dici non posse aliquod vile animal; et ideo constat quod
Scriptura hujusmodi Deo secundum proprietatem non attribuit. Sed apud aliquos simplices, qui vix aliquid praeter
sensibilia suspicari possunt, de facili videretur ea quae sunt nobilissima in corporibus, proprie Deo convenire, si
de ipso dicerentur; et ideo similitudines a rebus vilioribus sumptae, ipsa qualitate rerum retrahunt animum ab
errore. Invenitur tamen etiam in nobilibus creaturis Deus signicari in Scriptura, sicut sole, et stella, et hujusmodi;
non tamen ita frequenter.
22
S.T., I, q. 1, a. 5 ad 1. Nihil prohibet id quod est certius secundum naturam, esse quoad non minus
certum, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, qui se habet ad manifestissima naturae, sicut oculus noctuae ad
lumen solis . . .
23
De trin., q. 2, a. 3 ad 5; my emphasis. Et tamen potest dici quod quando alterum duorum transit in
dominium alterius, non reputatur mixtio, set quando utrumque a sua natura alteratur; unde illi qui utuntur
philosophicis documentis in sacra doctrina redigendo in obsequium dei, non miscent aquam uino, set aquam
conuertunt in uinum.
24
Mark Jordan, Theology and Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas [Cambridge
Companion], ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 247. Jordan has been the most prolic proponent of this approach to the role of philosophy
in Aquinas. See his other articles: The Terms of the Debate over Christian Philosophy, Communio
12 (1985), 303; The Competition of Authoritative Languages and Aquinass Theological Rhetoric,
391 phi losophy i n aqui nas
raculous transformation is implausible. Aquinas discusses this metaphor elsewhere
in a way which suggests that he is referring to the much more mundane case of
adding a small amount of water to a much larger amount of wine. In such a case,
the water does not corrupt the wine; on the contrary, it is turned into wine. In the
Contra Impugnantes, Thomas responds to the same kind of objection, writing:
We do not say that something is mixed when it entirely passes over to another as is
said in book one of On Generation, but when both of the mixable things are mixed
[and] the mixture is converted into one third thing. And thus when something from
secular wisdom is joined to sacred scripture there is no mixture, but it remains pure;
but there is a mixture when something added corrupts the truth of scripture.
25
The metaphor in question in these texts is a purely natural one. There is no indica-
tion in the text itself that Thomas has anything like a miraculous transformation in
mind. Rather, he is actually attempting to move away from the image of substantial
change suggested by the objection. In fact, he denies that the two natures are altered
(alteratur), arguing instead that the water of philosophy is converted (conuerunt) by
being brought under the rule of another. Accordingly, the metaphor is transformed
from one of mixture to one of governance, which is quite in keeping with Aquinass
general account of subalternation and the hierarchy of the sciences. The point of
the metaphor is that theology and metaphysics regulate and rule all of the lower
disciplines, turning them to their own use.
26

Moreover, I think that the commentators tend to assign more importance to
this metaphor than Aquinass texts warrant. In fact, Aquinas begins his account
with a warning about the dangers of confusing gurative language with an argu-
ment.
27
Further, the image of the water of philosophy being converted to wine is
not a metaphor of Aquinass own making. The objection derives from a medieval
reading of Isaiah 1:22: Your wine is mixed with water. The Glossa indicates that
wine here means sacred doctrine, while water stands for secular learning. Yet, in
Isaiah, the reference is clearly to the corruption of Jewish piety. Nevertheless, this
text was often used to object to the use of secular learning by those who argued
that mendicant religious should not be allowed to teach, and by Augustinians who
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 4 (1994), 87; The Protreptic Structure of the Summa Contra Gentiles,
Thomist 50 (1986); Aquinas Middle Thoughts on Theology as a Scientia, in Studies in Thomistic Theol-
ogy, ed. Paul Lockey (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1996), 91112. Also see Joseph Owens,
Aristotle and Aquinas, in Cambridge Companion, 44.
25
S. Thomae de Aquino, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 41 A: Contra impugnantes (Roma:
Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1970), 12, 4, ll. 21422. Ad quartum dicendum quod quando aliquid totaliter transit
in alterum non dicitur esse mixtio, ut dicitur in I De generatione, sed quando est mixtio utrumque miscibilium
convertitur in unum tertium. Et ideo quando aliquid adiungit sacrae Scripturae de sapientia saeculari quod cedit
in dei veritatem, vinum sacrae Scripturae non est mixtum sed purum remanet; tunc autem mixtum t quando
aliquid adiungitur quod corrumpti Scripturae veritatem.
26
The notion of governance is also central to the account of the hierarchy of the philosophical
disciplines, which Aquinas routinely uses to preface his commentaries on Aristotle. See S. Thomae
Aquinatis, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Tau-
rini-Romae: Marietti, 1971, 2nd ed.), Proem.; Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 47: Sententia
libri Ethicorum (Roma: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), Proem.; and Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis
XIII P. M. edita, t. 3: In libros Aristotelis De caelo et mundo exposition (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta
S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1886), 2 vols., Proem.
27
De trin., q.2, a.3 ad 5. Ex tropicis loqutionibus non est sumenda argumentatio.
392 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 45: 3 j uly 2007
wanted to limit the inuence of secular philosophy within theology.
28
Thomass
resolution of this objection is an attempt to reinterpret the authority in light of his
own principles; it is an instance of what he calls elsewhere the pious interpreta-
tion of a difcult authority. Readings that suggest that Aquinas means philosophy
is changed into theology are arguing from a stray line taken out of context.
This reading is also supported by the fact that Thomas, following Aristotle
and Boethius, views natural theology as part of philosophy: The theology which
pertains to sacred doctrine is in a different genus from that theology which is part
of philosophy.
29
Hence Aquinas asserts that natural theology is really a part of phi-
losophy, rather than being properly theological. Such a view is entirely consistent
with the fact that this kind of theology proves the preambles of faith (e.g., the
existence of God) and not matters which can only be attained through faith (e.g.,
the Trinity and the Incarnation).
3 . t h e n a t u r e a n d g r a c e mo d e l
Rather than insisting on the image of substantial change, Thomass considered
solution is that the dynamic between philosophy and theology is a specic instance
of that between nature and grace. He speaks this way, for instance, in arguing that
sacred doctrine does not use the arguments of philosophers due to their authority,
but due to the strength of their reasons.
In defence of this point, he uses the fact that grace does not destroy nature but
perfects it as a reason to support the claim that natural reason should serve faith.
30

That this is not merely a metaphor is shown in the commentary on Boethiuss De
trinitate where Aquinas argues that philosophical proofs known through natural
reason cannot contradict what is held on faith:
The gifts of grace are added to nature in such a way that they do not destroy it, but
rather perfect it; hence too the light of faith, which is freely infused in us, does not
destroy the light of natural reason divinely implanted in us. And although the natural
light of the human mind is inadequate to reveal those things that are revealed through
faith, yet it is impossible that those things that are divinely handed on to us through
faith, could be contrary to these things that come to us through nature.
31

One could read the dictum grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it in
two ways. One alternative would be to emphasize the perfective role of grace,
interpreting the passage in line with the view that philosophy used by the theo-
logian is transformed into theology. On this reading revelation and faith perfect
philosophy by turning it into something even better. However, this does not do
justice to the ordinary meaning of the phrase in medieval theology. The Latin
28
Bonaventure, Breviloquium in Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae (Quarrachi: Ad Claras Aquas, 1882),
6, 1; and Bonaventure, Sent. in Opera Omnia S. Bonaventure, 4,1,1,34.
29
S.T., I. q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. Unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinet, differt secundum genus ab
illa theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitur.
30
S.T., I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.
31
De trin., q. 2, a. 3 c. Responsio. Dicendum, quod dona gratiarum hoc modo nature adduntur, quod eam
non tollunt set magis perciunt; unde et lumen dei, quod nobis gratis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis
rationis diuinitus nobis inditum. Et quamuis lumen naturale mentis humane sit insufciens ad manifestationem
eorum que manfestantur per dem, tamen impossibile est quod ea que per dem traduntur nobis diuinitus sunt
contraria his que sunt per naturam nobis indita.
393 phi losophy i n aqui nas
perfectus does not usually have the superlative sense of its English equivalent.
Rather, it simply means complete.
32

Moreover, this common saying is normally used to defend the need for nature
as a basis for grace to do its work. Grace does not exist independently; it is the
spiritual quality of a person. Thus, it always works within the context of the nature
of the one who receives it.
33
Consequently, the meaning of the phrase in question
is not primarily that grace improves nature, as though the nature were transformed
into something else in the process. Quite the contrary, the phrase means that grace
builds upon nature; it extends and completes it by bringing it under the direction
of something higher. In no way does grace replace nature or transform nature into
something other than what it already is. Rather, grace extends nature, allowing
it to reach an end whichalthough in principle attainablewould otherwise be
inaccessible to it. We might compare nature here to an empty house. The work
of grace is rather like the process of furnishing, renovating and decorating the
building, making it into a home. The house, in this process, is not changed into
something else; rather, while retaining its own integrity, the house is perfected in
its own order through something new.
34
Consequently, theology and revelation itself allow us to extend philosophy
by putting it to use as an instrument in new contexts and circumstances. In this
way, philosophy is used to solve theological problems that it would not have ad-
dressed otherwise. Nevertheless, the philosophical concepts and arguments are
not transformed into theological ones by this process. This would be self-defeating,
as the theologian appeals to them as an aid that is better known to us in order
to understand what is less known. If the theologian borrowed the language and
principles of philosophy but were free to invest them with new meaning, then why
appeal to philosophy at all? Would it not be better to coin new terms that would
avoid the risk of confusion with the original philosophical sense of the terms? If
the meaning of philosophical terms and doctrines were transformed in this way,
then philosophy would be rendered impotent to give the aid that it was originally
enlisted to provide.
4 . c o n c l u s i o n
The need for philosophy is apparent if the role of theologian is to amount to more
than answering questions through quotations from the scriptures and Councils.
If a theologian were to proceed that way, he would never get beyond the rst
principles of the discipline that are given in the articles of the faith.
35
Such an ap-
proach is adequate to refute error on the presumption that the audience accepts
32
For an explanation of this sense of perfectus, see S. Thomas Aquinatis, In librum beati Dionysii
De divinis nominibus expositio, ed. Ceslai Pera, O.P. (Rome: Marietti, 1950), II, 1, 114.
33
S.T., III, q. 110, a. 2 ad 2. Sed [sc. gratia] est forma accidentalis ipsius animae. Also see Karl Rah-
ner, Philosophy and Theology, Theological Investigations, vol. 6, trans. Boniface Kruger (Baltimore:
Helicon Press, 1969), 7273.
34
See Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His
Interpreters (Roma: Edizioni Universit della Santa Croce, 1999).
35
Aquinas (S.T., I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 1) explicitly rejects the notion that we ought to be limited to
scriptural terms in theology, arguing that if this were so, theology would have to be done in Hebrew
or Greek!
394 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 45: 3 j uly 2007
the authority cited. However, the theologian also has the task of explaining the
faith in order to understand it so far as possible, and to rely simply on authority
for this would be inadequate:
Some disputation belongs to the teacher in schools, not for removing error, but for
instructing students, in order that they are led to an understanding of the truth that
they believe, and then it is necessary to rely upon the foundation of truth by inves-
tigating reasons and by explaining how to speak the truth. Otherwise, if a teacher
determines a question with bare authorities, it will indeed assure the listener that it
is the case, but he will acquire no science or understanding, but will be sent away empty.
36
For this kind of deeper explanation to be possiblefor revelation to be under-
stood in a manner that is in keeping with our natural human capacitiesthe
theologian must make use of natural reason and, thus, philosophical knowledge
and argumentation. In this way the theologian appeals to something that is bet-
ter known to aid in understanding something that is less known to us. Likewise,
revelation is always received by people, and it will always be understood in terms
of the actual common, philosophical, or scientic knowledge these people have.
As Thomas himself writes: From the things which are known through natural
reason, we are more easily led to those things which are above reason which are
treated in this science.
37
36
Thomae de Aquino, Opera omnia jussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 25/1: Quaestiones de quolibet. Prface.
Quodlibet VII, VIII, IX, X, XI; t. 25/2: Quaestiones de quolibet. Quodlibet I, II, III, VI, IV, V, XII (Roma-Paris:
Commissio Leonina-ditions du Cerf, 1996), 4, q. 9, a. 3 c; my emphasis. Quedam vero disputatio est
magistralis in scolis non ad remouendum errorem, set ad instruendum auditores ut inducantur ad intellectum
ueritatis quam credunt, et tunc oportet rationibus inniti inuestigantibus ueritatis radicem, et facientibus scire
quo modo sit uerum quod dicitur. Alioquin, si nudis auctoritatibus magister questionem determinet, certicabitur
quidem auditor quod ita est, set nichil scientie uel intellectus acquiret et uacuus abscedet.
37
S.T., I, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2. Qui ex his quae per naturalem rationem (ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae) cong-
noscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea quae sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientia traduntur. Also see S.T.,
q. 1, a. 8 ad 2. I would like to thank E. J. Ashworth, Fr. Stephen Brock and the two anonymous referees
for the Journal for helpful comments on this paper. I am also grateful to John F. Boyle for sending me
his transcripts from the manuscripts of Aquinass Lectura Romana prior to the recent publication of
his edition of this text. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Philosophy Department
at the University of Waterloo, the faculty of Thomas Aquinas College, Santa Paula, CA, and to the
Canadian Philosophical Associations 2002 annual meeting in Toronto, Ontario. Participants in all
of these sessions made comments which assisted in clarifying my arguments.