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Special Emphasis Areas Handbook

FAA Airline Transport Pilot and Type Rating


Practical Test Standards Special Emphasis Areas
(based on ATP PTS FAA-S-8081-5F with Changes 1 & 2 - July 2008)

Revision: Rev. 1.0



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PREAMBLE


This handbook will be provided to each client at the beginning of every initial, recurrent,
and upgrade course. It is the clients responsibility to study and become familiar with
the Special Emphasis Areas identified in this handbook and be able to apply them to
situations during the check or test. This handbook will be the only training given to
each client. The FAA requires each examiner to look for the correct use of these
concepts as they are considered critical to flight safety. These Special Emphasis
Areas may, or may not be specifically addressed under each task. Instead, they can be
evaluated at anytime during the check or test.



















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TABLE of CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
Positive Aircraft Control.... 5
Procedures for Positive Exchange of Flight Controls.. 7
Stall and Spin Awareness.
9
Special Use Airspace and Other Airspace Areas... 12
Collision Avoidance Procedures. 14
Wake Turbulence and Low Level Windshear Avoidance Procedures.. 15

17
Land And Hold Short Operations (LAHSO).. 20
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT).. 22
Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) and Risk Management. 24
Crew Resource Management/Single-Pilot Resource Management (CRM/SRM) to
include Automation Management...

26
Recognition of Wing Contamination to Icing...



29
Traffic Awareness, See and Avoid Concept.
35
References.
37
Runway Incursion Avoidance and Good Cockpit Discipline During Taxi Opera-
tions
Adverse Effects of Wing Contamination in Icing Conditions During Takeoff,
Cruise and Landing Phases of Flight.....

32
Icing Procedures of Information Published by the Manufacturer, within the
AFM, that is specific to the Type of Aircraft.

34



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Positive Aircraft Control

Positive aircraft control is maintained by the smooth and positive application of control
actions to achieve stabilized flight. Positive control involves:
Coordinated, smoothly-executed control inputs
Avoidance of excessive angles of attack
Control of airspeed, pitch, bank and yaw
























Positive control requires an ability to anticipate conditions that increase the risk of
losing aircraft control. Those conditions include, but are not limited to:
Wake turbulence
Windshear
Crosswind
Contaminated runways
Disengagement of an automated system





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When turbulence, wind shear, or other unexpected forces disrupt stabilized flight, a
proficient pilot promptly returns the aircraft to a stable configuration by executing
smooth, positive, and appropriate control actions.


























Loss of positive control can also be caused by unexpected disengagement of the
autopilot. Most autopilot systems are designed to disengage when the aircraft exceeds
specified operating limitations. Become thoroughly familiar with these limitations, and
with the mode indications for your autopilot. Continuously monitor your automated
systems, and be prepared to resume manual control promptly. Neglecting to monitor
these systems decreases your situational awareness. The time youll use regaining
that awareness could be critical.

When flying with the autopilot engaged, assign one pilot to actively monitor the
aircrafts actual flight path. Avoid situations in which both pilots are engaged in heads
down activity.



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Procedures for Positive Exchange of Flight Controls

Transfer of control of an aircraft should be accomplished using a standard operating
procedure that enhances the situational awareness of both crewmembers. This
involves both a physical and a mental transfer. Following well-established Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) will enhance safety by reducing the likelihood of
confusion and uncertainty.

Positive transfer is defined as a challenge and response method of communication
whereby the Pilot Flying (PF) maintains control of the aircraft until a deliberate and
specific response is received from the Pilot Monitoring (PM) indicating that he/she has
assumed control.

Prior to the physical transfer of control, an equally important mental transfer must
occur. The PF should brief the following appropriate items prior to relinquishing
control:





















The challenge and response method ensures that both pilots are actively involved in,
and aware of, the transfer of control. The use of specific phraseology prevents
ambiguity.



Pilot Flying (PF) Mental Transfer
Current clearance Altitude, Airspeed, Heading.
Navigation Where we are going ?
Level of automation
Whats engaged, what mode its in.
Fuel Status Total fuel and any abnormal fuel
Communications To whom youre talking (approach,
center).
Any abnormal conditions Give details.



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When exchanging or transferring flight controls, a verbal briefing containing the
altitude, heading, automation status, and any crossing or clearance limits (if applicable)
should be conducted between the crewmembers.

For example, Heading is two-two zero degrees, altitude is one-one thousand feet, the
autopilot is engaged, and we have a crossing restriction at STONZ of three thousand
feet, you have the controls.

In turn, the pilot receiving the controls should acknowledge the items briefed by
repeating them back along with the phase, I have the controls.

The primary purpose for the briefing is to maintain the current level of situational
awareness between the two pilots. Omitting any of the variables during the exchange
of flight controls briefing may result in the aircraft violating an air traffic control
instruction or expectation.

Several factors can contribute to a negative transfer of aircraft control, including:

Complacency
Lack of standardization
Distractions




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Stall and Spin Awareness

The following excerpt from AC 61-67C details the areas of emphasis for understanding
stall and spin awareness:
STALL/SPIN EFFECTS AND DEFINITIONS.A stall is a loss of lift and increase in drag
that occurs when an aircraft is flown at an angle of attack (AOA) greater than the angle
for maximum lift. If recovery from a stall is not effected in a timely and appropriate
manner by reducing the AOA, a secondary stall and/or a spin may result. All spins are
preceded by a stall on at least part of the wing. The angle of the relative wind is
determined primarily by the aircraft's airspeed and attitude. Other factors are
considered, such as aircraft weight, center of gravity, configuration, and the amount of
acceleration used in a turn.
Angle of Attack. AOA is the angle at which the chord line of the wing meets the
relative wind. The chord line is a straight line drawn through the profile of the wing
connecting the extremities of the leading edge and trailing edge. The AOA must be
small enough to allow attached airflow over and under the airfoil to produce lift. A
change in AOA will affect the amount of lift that is produced. Consequently, AOA is an
element of lift. An excessive AOA will disrupt the flow of air over the airfoil. If the AOA
is not reduced, a section of the airfoil will reach its critical AOA, lose lift, and stall.
Exceeding the critical AOA for a particular airfoil section will always result in a stall of
that section.
Stall travels from Stall travels from
wing tip inboard wing tip inboard Air flows perpendicular Air flows perpendicular
to wing at tips to wing at tips
Stall travels from Stall travels from
wing tip inboard wing tip inboard Air flows perpendicular Air flows perpendicular
to wing at tips to wing at tips



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Airspeed. Airspeed is controlled primarily by the elevator or longitudinal control
position for a given configuration and power. Conversely, airspeed is controlled by
power at a given configuration and AOA. If an airplane's speed is too slow, the AOA
required for level flight will be so large that the air can no longer follow the upper
curvature of the wing. The result is a separation of airflow from the wing, loss of lift, a
large increase in drag, and eventually a stall if the AOA is not reduced. The stall is the
result of excessive AOA - not insufficient airspeed. For example, at a 60 banked turn
in level coordinated flight, the load factor is 2 G's and the stall speed increases 40
percent over the straight and level stall speed. A STALL CAN OCCUR AT ANY
AIRSPEED, IN ANY ATTITUDE, AT ANY POWER SETTING.
Configuration. Flaps, landing gear, and other configuring devices can affect an
airplane's stall speed. Extension of flaps and/or landing gear in flight will increase drag.
Flap extension will generally increase the lifting ability of the wings, thus reducing the
airplane's stall speed. The effect of flaps on an airplane's stall speed can be seen by
markings on the airplane's airspeed indicator, where the lower airspeed limit of the
white arc (power-off stall speed with gear and flaps in the landing configuration) is less
than the lower airspeed limit of the green arc (power-off stall speed in the clean
configuration).
V
SO
. means the stall speed or the minimum steady flight speed in the landing
configuration.
V
S1
. means the stall speed or the minimum steady flight speed obtained in a specified
configuration.
V
A
. is the design maneuvering speed. Do not use full or abrupt control movements at
or above this speed. It is possible to exceed the airplane structural limits at or above
V
A
.
Load Factor. Load factor is the ratio of the lifting force produced by the wings to the
actual weight of the airplane and its contents. Load factors are usually expressed in
terms of "G." The aircraft's stall speed increases in proportion to the square root of the
load factor.
It should be noted that structural damage can result from the high load factors that
could be imposed on the aircraft by intentional stalls practiced above the airplane's
design maneuvering speed.
Center of Gravity (CG). The CG location has a direct effect on the effective lift and
AOA of the wing, the amount and direction of force on the tail, and the degree of

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The CG position, therefore, has a significant effect on stability and stall/spin recovery.
As the CG is moved aft, the amount of elevator deflection needed to stall the airplane
at a given load factor will be reduced. An increased AOA will be achieved with less
elevator control force. This could make the entry into inadvertent stalls easier, and
during the subsequent recovery, it would be easier to generate higher load factors due
to the reduced elevator control forces. In an airplane with an extremely aft CG, very
light back elevator control forces may lead to inadvertent stall entries and if a spin is
entered, the balance of forces on the airplane may result in a flat spin. Recovery from a
flat spin is often impossible. A forward CG location will often cause the stalling AOA to
be reached at a higher airspeed. Increased back elevator control force is generally
required with a forward CG location.
Weight. Although the distribution of weight has the most direct effect on stability,
increased gross weight can also have an effect on an aircraft's flight characteristics,
regardless of the CG position. As the weight of the airplane is increased, the stall
speed increases. The increased weight requires a higher AOA to produce additional lift
to support the weight.
Altitude and Temperature. Altitude has little or no effect on an airplane's indicated
stall speed. Thinner air at higher altitudes will result in decreased aircraft performance
and a higher true airspeed for a given indicated airspeed. Higher than standard
temperatures will also contribute to increased true airspeed for a given indicated
airspeed. However, the higher true airspeed has no effect on indicated approach or
stall speeds. The manufacturer's recommended indicated airspeeds should therefore
be maintained during the landing approach, regardless of the elevation or the density
altitude at the airport of landing.
Snow, Ice, or Frost on the Wings. Even a small accumulation of snow, ice, or frost
on an aircraft's surface can cause an increase in that aircraft's stall speed. Such
accumulation changes the shape of the wing, disrupting the smooth flow of air over the
surface and, consequently, increasing drag and decreasing lift. Flight should not be
attempted when snow, ice, or frost have accumulated on the aircraft surfaces.
Turbulence. Turbulence can cause an aircraft to stall at a significantly higher airspeed
than in stable conditions. A vertical gust or windshear can cause a sudden change in
the relative wind, and result in an abrupt increase in AOA. When flying in moderate to
severe turbulence or strong crosswinds, a higher than normal approach speed should
be maintained. In cruise flight in moderate or severe turbulence, an airspeed well
above the indicated stall speed and below maneuvering speed should be used. It
should be noted that maneuvering speed is lower at a lower weight.



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Special Use Airspace and Other Airspace Areas

Order J O 7400.8P and AC 210-5B outline the definitions of Special Use and Other
Airspace.
Special Use Airspace:
Special use airspace consists of airspace wherein activities must be confined because
of its nature and/or wherein limitations may be imposed upon aircraft operations that
are not a part of those activities.
Prohibited Areas
Designated airspace within which the flight of aircraft is prohibited without the
permission of the controlling agency. Prohibited areas are designated for security, or
other reasons of national welfare.
Restricted Areas
Airspace established to denote the existence of unusual, often invisible hazards to
aircraft such as artillery firing, aerial gunnery, or missiles, etc. Penetration of restricted
areas my be extremely hazardous to the aircraft and its occupants and is legally
prohibited. Authorization to transit restricted areas which are not in use may be
obtained from the using or controlling agencies.
Warning Areas Definition.
Areas established in international airspace to identify for pilots where military activities
occur that can be hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft. Pilots planning to penetrate
warning areas should contact the using or controlling agencies for real-time information
on the activities being conducted along their route of flight.
Military Operations Areas Definition.
Airspace established outside Positive Control Area (PCA) to separate/segregate
certain military activities from Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) traffic and to identify for
VFR traffic where these activities are conducted.
Alert Areas
Airspace which may contain a high volume of pilot training activities or an unusual type
of aerial activity, neither of which is hazardous to aircraft.
Controlled Firing Areas
Airspace wherein activities are conducted under conditions so controlled as to
eliminate hazards to non participating aircraft. Limitations are imposed on the use of
CFAs to ensure that these areas do not impact civil operations.

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Other Airspace Areas:
Temporary Flight Restrictions
Parachute J ump Aircraft Operations
Published VFR Routes
Terminal Radar Service Area (TRSA)
National Security Areas




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Collision Avoidance Procedures

Most midair collisions, and most near midair collision incidents, occur during good
weather and daylight hours. FAA Advisory Circular 90-48C, Pilots Role in Collision
Avoidance, explains pilots responsibilities for understanding and adhering to midair
collision and near-midair collision avoidance procedures.

AC 90-48C cites the following areas as warranting special attention:

See and Avoid: Maintain vigilance at all times, regardless of whether an operation is
conducted under IFR or VFR.

Visual Scanning: Remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within your
field of vision, and periodically scan the entire visual field outside your aircraft to
detect conflicting traffic.

Clearing Procedures: Before taxiing onto a runway for takeoff, scan the
approach areas for possible landing traffic by maneuvering your aircraft to
provide a clear view even if your takeoff clearance has been issued. During
climb and descent, execute gentle turns left and right to visually scan the
surrounding airspace.

Airspace, Flight Rules and Operational Equipment: Be aware of the type of
airspace in which you intend to operate, and comply with flight rules applicable
to that airspace. General rules governing the operation of aircraft within the
United States are found in FAR Part 91. Information regarding the National
Airspace System is disseminated in aeronautical charts, the AIM, and the
NOTAM system.

Effective scanning is accomplished with a series of short, regularly spaced eye
movements that bring successive areas of the sky into your central visual field. Each
movement should not exceed 10 degrees, and should be observed for at least one
second. Visual search at night depends almost entirely on your peripheral vision. If
another aircraft appears to have no relative motion, it is likely to be on a collision
course with you.

The basic AIM contains a section dealing with services available to pilots, including
information on VFR advisory services, radar traffic information services for VFR pilots,
and recommended traffic advisory practices at non-towered airports. Remember that
traffic advisories are secondary to the controllers primary duties. Request traffic
advisories when they are available, and use them to augment your visual scanning.
ATC traffic advisories do not lessen your obligation to see and avoid traffic.


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Wake Turbulence and Low Level Windshear Avoidance Procedures

Wake vortices can be encountered in flight, as well as in an airport movement area. If
you encounter wake vortex, your ability to counteract its imposed roll depends primarily
on the wingspan and counter-control responsiveness of your aircraft. The probability
of imposed roll increases when your heading is aligned with, or parallel to, the
generating aircrafts flight path.










Imposed roll is minimal, and counter-control is usually effective, when the wingspan of
the encountering aircraft extends beyond the vortex rotational field. Pilots of short
wingspan aircraft must be especially alert to vortex encounters.
The following characteristics of vortex behavior are important:
Vortices remain spaced a bit less than a wingspan apart.
Vortices drift with the wind, at altitudes greater than a wingspan above the ground.
Vortices generated by large aircraft descend at a rate of several hundred feet per
minute. The rate of descent slows in proportion to the time and distance behind
the aircraft.
Atmospheric turbulence hastens vortex breakup.
Greatest vortex strengths occur when the generating aircraft is heavy, clean and
slow.
When the vortices of a large aircraft sink close to the ground, they tend to move
laterally over the ground at speeds of 2 to 3 knots (during no-wind conditions).
During ground operations jet engine blast can cause damage and upsets, if
encountered at close range. Light aircraft should maintain adequate separation
from larger jet aircraft.
For VFR departures behind heavy aircraft, air traffic controllers are required to use
at least a two-minute separation interval, unless a pilot has requested a deviation
and has indicated acceptance of responsibility for maneuvering to avoid the wake
turbulence hazard.



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Operational Tips for Avoiding Vortex Wake
When landing behind a larger aircraft on the same runway, stay at or above that
aircrafts final approach flight path. Note the larger aircrafts touchdown point, and
land beyond it.
2. When landing behind a larger aircraft on a parallel runway closer than 2,500
feet, be alert to possible vortex drift onto your runway.
3. When landing behind a larger aircraft on an intersecting runway, cross above
the larger aircrafts flight path.
4. When landing behind a departing larger aircraft on the same runway, note that
aircrafts rotation point, and land well prior to that point.
5. When landing behind a departing larger aircraft on an intersecting runway, note
the aircrafts rotation point. If the larger aircraft rotates prior to reaching the
runway intersection, avoid flying below its flight path even if you must
abandon the approach.
6. When departing behind a larger aircraft on the same runway, rotate before
reaching the larger aircrafts rotation point. Continue to climb above the larger
aircrafts climb path until turning clear of its wake.
7. Pass over the flight path of the larger aircraft, altering course, if necessary, to
avoid the area behind and below the larger aircraft.
8. If a larger aircraft has executed a missed approach, ensure that an interval of at
least two minutes has elapsed before your takeoff or landing.
9. If you must pass under the flight path of a larger aircraft, pass under it by at
least 1,000 feet.
10. Stay to the windward side of the larger aircrafts flight path.
11. Be especially cautious if there are larger aircraft upwind from your approach or
takeoff flight path.
12. Try to visualize the location of the vortex trail behind a larger aircraft.
13. Keep alert, especially on calm days, when vortices persist longest.

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Runway Incursion Avoidance and Good Cockpit Discipline During Taxi
Operations

Two Advisory Circulars (AC 91-73 and AC 120-74) provide specific guidance on the
development of standard operating procedures for safe taxi operations. These
Advisory Circulars emphasize the importance of planning, coordination and
communication.

The FAA defines a runway incursion as:

Any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or
object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in loss of
separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or
intending to land.















Runway incursions are distinguished from surface incidents by the following
criteria:

If an aircraft is sent around within one mile of the landing threshold due to an
aircraft, vehicle or pedestrian on the runway, that is a runway incursion.

If the aircraft on final was a mile or more from the landing threshold, the event is
classified as a surface incident.

If a departing aircraft has been cleared for takeoff and is rolling down the runway
when the takeoff clearance is cancelled, that is a runway incursion.

If the takeoff roll has not commenced, the event is classified as a surface incident.


Los Angeles International (LAX)



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The FAA classifies every runway incursion as caused by either a Pilot Deviation, an
ATC Operational Error, or a Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation.

The FAA cites seven types of Pilot Surface Deviations:Takeoff without clearance
Takeoff on wrong runway or taxiway
Landing without clearance
Landing or takeoff below weather minimums
Landing on wrong runway, airport, or taxiway
Entered taxiway or runway without clearance
Careless or reckless aircraft operation

During recent years, the number of runway incursions attributed to Pilot Deviations in-
creased significantly. Several factors have contributed to this trend:

As U.S. airports have expanded, their layouts have become more complex.

Higher traffic densities have accelerated the pace of ATC operations, demanding
greater flight crew vigilance during surface operations.

The pre-takeoff tasks associated with navigation aids and flight management sys-
tems have increased flight crew workloads.

Standard operating procedures that specify workload distributions can help a flight
crew maintain their vigilance and situational awareness. These procedures apply to
both single-pilot and multi-crew aircraft:

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AC 91-73, Appendix 1: RUNWAY INCURSION PREVENTION, BEST PRACTICES
1. Read back all runway crossing and/or hold short instructions;
2. Review airport layouts as part of preflight planning and before descending to land,
and while taxiing as needed;
3. Know airport signage;
4. Review Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) for information on runway/taxiway closures
and construction areas;
5. Do not hesitate to request progressive taxi instructions from ATC when unsure of
the taxi route;
6. Check for traffic before crossing any Runway Hold Line and before entering a
taxiway;
7. Turn on aircraft lights and rotating beacon or strobe lights while taxiing;
8. When landing, clear the active runway as quickly as possible then wait for taxi
instructions before further movement;
9. Study and use proper radio phraseology as described in the Aeronautical
Information Manual in order to respond to and understand ground control
instructions;
10. Write down complex taxi instructions at unfamiliar airports.






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Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO)

AIM 4-3-11 describes Land and Hold Short Operations as:

Operations which include landing and holding short or an intersecting runway, an inter-
secting taxiway, or some other designated point on a runway other than an intersecting
runway or taxiway.

LAHSO is a management tool used by Air Traffic Control (ATC) to increase airport ca-
pacity, maintain efficiency and enhance safety. The success of this tool relies on par-
ticipation by pilots and air traffic controllers to balance the needs for system efficiency
and safety. However, as the pilot in command, you are ultimately responsible for safe
operation of the aircraft, and you are expected to decline a LAHSO clearance, if it
would compromise safety.




When considering LAHSO operations, it is important to apply appropriate policies and
procedures. Before accepting a LAHSO clearance, seek all available information con-
cerning LAHSO procedures at the destination. Use pre-flight preparations and in-flight
planning to reduce your workload and increase your situational awareness.







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Pre-flight considerations include:
Locating the Available Landing Distance (ALD) and runway slope information for
your destination.
Calculating the Required Landing Distance (RLD) for your aircraft.
Determining which LAHSO combinations at the airport are acceptable.
Retrieving and interpreting the airports rejected landing procedures.
Ensuring that MEL requirements are satisfied.
In-flight considerations include:
Verifying that LAHSO capabilities can still be met.
Ensuring weather and visibility minima are satisfactory for LAHSO.
Verifying that the designated runway is dry and is free of contamination.
Determining if windshear limits have not been violated.
Ensuring that proper LAHSO communication protocols have been followed.
Accomplishing a stabilized approach.
Touching down within accepted limits.
Maintaining heightened situational awareness, including intra-cockpit communica-
tion and traffic awareness.
Identifying the runway markings, signage and lighting associated with LAHSO.

LAHSO operations can benefit both ATC and your flight operation by assisting in eas-
ing airport congestion .



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Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) is one of the most frequent causes of fatal acci-
dents among corporate and air carrier operators.

CFIT is defined as an event in which a mechanically sound airplane is inadvertently
flown into the ground, into water, or into an obstacle. The accidents cause is attrib-
uted to flight crew error.

FAA Principal Operations Inspectors (POI's) are required to ensure that pilots in air
carrier operations receive both initial and recurrent simulator training in ground prox-
imity warning escape maneuvers.

Although the number of CFIT-related accidents has declined since the introduction of
ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) in the mid-1970s, there is a need for con-
tinued emphasis on reducing CFIT risks and avoiding CFIT accidents.

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Nearly all CFIT accidents can be attributed to the loss of vertical and/or lateral
situational awareness. Several risk factors either contribute to, or reflect, this loss of
awareness:

Incorrect or ambiguous altimeter settings, such as:
Inches of mercury versus millimeters of mercury, or millibars
Differences for transition altitude / transition level at non-U.S. airports
Descent below safe altitudes
Approach operations during below minimum weather
VFR flight during IMC conditions
Poor communication with Air Traffic Control
Flight crew complacency or distractions
Inadequate standard operating procedures
Improperly flown approaches
Failure to establish and maintain a stable approach
Failure to execute a missed approach or a rejected landing after recognizing non-
stabilized approach conditions
Poorly-managed navigation aids / automated flight management systems


Flight crews can employ several practices to reduce their CFIT risks:
Conduct pre-flight and in-flight briefings
Maintain vigilance to latent errors when using navigation aids and automated flight
management systems
Comply with route and destination familiarization procedures
Adhere to altitude awareness techniques and procedures
Perform all mandatory call-outs (especially altitude call-outs) per SOP
Know GPWS functions and related escape
maneuvers
Participate in CFIT avoidance training, especially
in recognizing potential CFIT traps



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Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM)

Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) provides a systematic approach to risk assess-
ment. It is a tool to select the best response for a given set of circumstances. Optimal
use of ADM requires effective performance of Crew Resource Management (CRM)
skills, especially in communicating with other crewmembers to maintain situational
awareness.
FlightSafety recommends the decision making process illustrated in the following dia-
gram:














This continuous-loop process includes the following steps:
Recognize the need for a decision.
Identify the problem, and define it in terms of time and risk.
Collect facts.
Identify alternative responses.
Weigh the impact of each alternative response.
Select a response.
Implement that response.
Evaluate the effects of your response.
Decision Making Process Decision Making Process
Recognize
Need
Identify
and state
problem
Collect
facts
Identify
alternatives
Weigh
impact of
alternatives
Select
response
Implement
response
Evaluate
response
Recognize
Need
Identify
and state
problem
Collect
facts
Identify
alternatives
Weigh
impact of
alternatives
Select
response
Implement
response
Evaluate
response

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The DECIDE Model is another logical approach to decision making. The six elements
in this model also present a continuous-loop decision making process.

DECIDE Model
Detect the fact that a change has occurred.
Estimate the need to counter or react to this change.
Choose a desirable outcome (in terms of success) for the flight.
Identify actions that could successfully control the change.
Do what is necessary.
Evaluate the effects of your action on countering the change.


ADM enhances conventional decision-making by considering personal attitudes. Per-
sonal attitudes are considered hazardous attitudes if they distort a flight crews aware-
ness of risks. ADM recognizes five hazardous attitudes and recommends an antidote
for each:


Hazardous Attitude Antidote
Anti-authority: Dont tell me . . . Follow the rules. They are usually
right.
Impulsiveness: Do something
quickly.
Not so fast. Think first.
Invulnerability: It wont happen to
me.
It could happen to me.
Macho: I can do it all. Taking chances is foolish.
Resignation: Whats the use? Im not helpless.
I can make a difference.



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Crew Resource Management/Single-Pilot Resource Management (CRM/ SRM)
with Automation Resource Management

Crew Resource Management involves the effective use of all available resources --
human, hardware, and information to achieve and maintain safe flight.

The attitudes and norms that contribute to ineffective crew coordination may have
developed over a crewmembers lifetime. It is unrealistic to expect a short training
program to reverse years of habits. To be maximally effective, CRM should be
embedded in every stage of training, and CRM concepts should be stressed in line
operations as well. (AC-120-51E)

Situational awareness is the most fundamental CRM concept. It involves perceptions
of the factors and conditions that affect an aircraft and a flight crew during a specific
period of time. As illustrated in the diagram below, the specific period of time that
occupies your situational awareness can include recent events (what has happened),
current conditions (whats happening now), and anticipated events (what may happen /
what you expect to happen).












Under ideal circumstances, your situational awareness remains centered, allowing
you to sample information from all three rings in this scheme. However, an
abnormal equipment condition may shift your awareness, as illustrated below:




Rev. 1.0 27
Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
Briefings can help maintain a crews situational awareness. Conduct a pre-flight
briefing to plan task assignments, to distribute workload throughout your flight, and to
clarify equipment issues. Use in-flight briefings to communicate and confirm revised
entries in your automated systems. Perform an arrival briefing to confirm your landing
clearance and taxiing instructions.

Fatigue and stress can adversely affect your reaction times, your situational
awareness, and your decision-making ability. Remain vigilant to signs of fatigue and
stress in yourself and in others. If necessary, re-distribute workload to avoid
overloading crewmembers whose capabilities are diminished by fatigue or stress.

Error management is another pivotal CRM concept. The best error management
strategy is error avoidance. If you can anticipate an error, you may be able to avoid its
occurrence. Monitoring NOTAMs, for example, may prompt you to avoid icing
conditions.

When an error cannot be avoided, you may still be able to detect and trap its
consequences. You might, for example, fly into freezing rain without warning. But if
you detect ice accumulation quickly, you may be able to fly out of the unfavorable
weather before it jeopardizes your safety.


Most aviation accidents result from a series of errors rather than from a single event.
That series of errors is known as an error chain. An inadequate pre-flight (the first
link) may result in an in-flight abnormal or emergency situation (the second link). If not
handled properly (the third link), the emergency can result in an accident.

No matter where an error chain begins, established operating procedures may help
you interrupt the chain and minimize its consequences. Abnormal and Emergency
Procedures are written specifically to provide this guidance. Departing from SOPs, on
the other hand, is a clue that you may be forging an error chain.
















Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
28 Rev. 1.0
In aviation, the term automation refers to any system of automated guidance and/or
control that is capable of altering (either directly or indirectly) the aircrafts flight path or
energy state. It implies the allocation of some flight function (otherwise performed by
the pilot) to a machine or piece of avionics equipment.

An automated flight deck consists of an integrated avionics system including a Flight
Management System (FMS), a flight guidance control system (i.e., flight director and
autopilot), and an electronic display system (EDS). It may also include autothrottles,
Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS), and Heads Up Display
(HUD). (NBAA Automated Flight Deck Training Guidelines: J une 30, 2000)

Automated systems can reduce pilot workloads and help ensure compliance with
aircraft performance limitations, specified flight levels, and airspeeds. To attain these
benefits safely, pilots must employ automated systems appropriately and monitor their
performance actively. Do not assume that an automated system will warn you of an
operating limitation in time to safely recover control.

When automation is cited as a contributing factor in an aviation accident, one of the
following elements is usually involved:
Situational Awareness: Your awareness of the aircrafts attitude or altitude can
diminish because of time spent heads down, while programming the FMS.
An FMS with a multi-function display (MFD) provides the best possible awareness
of your position. Set the range so that it is useful to the crew. Require both pilots to
verify the entered waypoints, and confirm your FMS data against printed charts.

When entering FMS changes, remember that the system may accept a change in
your approach path, even if that change cannot be flown safely from your present
altitude, airspeed and flight path.

Mode Awareness / Mode Confusion: Verify that your active autopilot mode and
flight director mode are appropriate. Mode confusion can occur if your FD is in
descent mode when it should be in altitude hold mode. This can be especially
hazardous if you need to execute an immediate altitude change. To avoid mode
confusion, periodically verify each systems active mode. Clarify and confirm your
current automation modes during every exchange of flight controls.

Task Management: Your FMS needs to be programmed, but when, and by whom?
Your flight departments standard operating procedures should specify the timing
and delegation of this task. Your SOPs should also specify Levels of Automation
for various phases of flight:

Rev. 1.0 29
Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
Recognition of Wing Contamination to Icing.
The FARs detail the restrictions for operating in icing conditions:
Sec. 91.527 - Operating in icing conditions.
(a) No pilot may take off an airplane that has --
(1) Frost, snow, or ice adhering to any propeller,
windshield, or powerplant installation or to an air-
speed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight attitude
instrument system;
(2) Snow or ice adhering to the wings or stabiliz-
ing or control surfaces; or
(3) Any frost adhering to the wings or stabilizing or control surfaces, unless that frost
has been polished to make it smooth.
(b) Except for an airplane that has ice protection provisions that meet the requirements
in section 34 of Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 23, or those for transport cate-
gory airplane type certification, no pilot may fly --
(1) Under IFR into known or forecast moderate icing conditions; or
(2) Under VFR into known light or moderate icing conditions unless the aircraft has
functioning de-icing or anti-icing equipment protecting each propeller, windshield, wing,
stabilizing or control surface, and each airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight atti-
tude instrument system.
(c) Except for an airplane that has ice protection provisions that meet the requirements
in section 34 of Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 23, or those for transport cate-
gory airplane type certification, no pilot may fly an airplane into known or forecast se-
vere icing conditions.
(d) If current weather reports and briefing information relied upon by the pilot in com-
mand indicate that the forecast icing conditions that would otherwise prohibit the flight
will not be encountered during the flight because of changed weather conditions since
the forecast, the restrictions in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section based on forecast
conditions do not apply.





Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
30 Rev. 1.0
There are four different types of deicing and anti-icing methods:
Mechanical
Broom or rope across wings
Engine pre-heat
Sun


Heater Hangar
Considered effective if the aircraft is coated with ice.
The downside is that it can be time consuming, ex-
pensive and ice melts within the hangar.



Fluid (Sprayed)
The most common technique for deicing/anti-icing of aircraft is the application of
chemical deicing/anti-icing fluids (ADF), which are composed primarily of ethylene or
propylene glycol. Temperature and weather conditions dictate the required concentra-
tion of glycol in ADF. Deicing/anti-icing fluids also contain additives, including corro-
sion inhibitors, flame retardants, wetting agents and thickeners that protect aircraft
surfaces and allow ADF to cling to the aircraft, resulting in longer holdover times (the
time between application and takeoff during which ice or snow is prevented from ad-
hering to aircraft surfaces).









Rev. 1.0 31
Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
Contractor
Utilizes vendors, fixed based operators, and other carriers and requires specific aircraft
technique required to clean the aircraft. Consult the Airplane Flight Manual for these
details.








After deicing, crews should inspect the aircraft to ensure the process has been thor-
ough and sufficient. Keep in mind it is impossible to detect minute but potentially fatal
contamination from inside the cockpit. A thin layer of clear ice can be extremely difficult
to see unless a tactile inspection is performed on the aircraft surface.










Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
32 Rev. 1.0
Adverse Effects of Wing Contamination in Icing Conditions During Takeoff,
Cruise, and Landing Phases of Flight








It is essential that pilots understand that a small, almost visually imperceptible amount
of ice distributed on an airplanes wing upper surface can have the same aerodynamic
penalties as much larger (and more visible) ice accumulations.

The only way to ensure that a surface is completely free from critical contamination is
to perform a tactile inspection. Frost from a distance can be very difficult to recognize
and is easily missed due to the white paint used on the upper wing surface of most air-
craft. It is a common misconception among pilots that if they have sufficient engine
power (thrust) available, they can simply power through any performance degradation
that might result from almost imperceptible amounts of upper wing surface ice accumu-
lation. THIS IS FALSE!
Pilots of all experience levels seem to understand that visible and substantial ice con-
tamination on a wing can cause severe aerodynamic and control penalties, but recent
accident and incident history reports indicate that many pilots do not realize that minute
amounts of ice adhering to a wing surface can result in similar penalties.
The takeoff and landing sequence are the most critical stages where ice contamination
can cause a loss of control effectiveness, subsequent aerodynamic stall, and possible
departure from controlled flight.
Undetected upper wing ice contamination has been cited as the probable cause or sole
contributing factor in a disproportionate number of takeoff accidents of non-slatted, tur-
bojet, transport-category airplanes. Two recent Challenger 604 accidents in Montrose,
Colorado and Birmingham, England respectively were due to inadequate preflight deic-
ing and anti-icing procedures, in addition to a failure to inspect the upper wing sur-
faces. Both accidents resulted in fatalities.


ENROUTE ICING RISK TABLE
Cumulus
Clouds
CUMULUS
CLOUDS
STRATIFORM
CLOUDS
RAIN AND
DRIZZLE
HIGH 0 to -20C
32 to -4F
0 to -15C
32 to 5F
0C and below
32F and below
MEDIUM -20 to -40C
-4 to -40F
-15 to -30C
5 to -22F

LOW < than -40C
<than -40F
< than -30C
<than -22F


Rev. 1.0 33
Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
Wind tunnel and flight tests conducted by NASA have shown that ice accumulations
(on the leading edge or upper surface of the wing) no thicker or rougher than a piece of
coarse sandpaper can reduce lift by 30 percent and increase drag up to 40 percent.

Non-protected surfaces, such as antennas, flap hinges, the fuselage frontal area, and
windshield wipers, are also an area that must be considered by even aircraft equipped
for flight into icing conditions. In one NASA study, results showed that close to 30 per-
cent of the total drag associated with an ice encounter remained even after all the pro-
tected surfaces were cleared.
Small accumulations an have the same results as :












Photos courtesy of NASA.



Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
34 Rev. 1.0
Icing Procedures of Information Published by the Manufacturer, within the AFM,
that is specific to the Type of Aircraft
Crewmembers should consult the aircraft Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to learn what
areas are considered critical areas for their specific aircraft type. The AFM may also
provide guidance on Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and engine usage during the deicing
process. Crewmembers should insure that all personnel conducting the deicing and
anti-icing procedures are familiar with the specific aircraft requirements. De-icing a
King Air 200 requires drastically different procedures than the deicing of a Gulfstream
550. Never assume that ground personnel are trained on your aircraft type.

Most jet operators are equipped with heated wing leading edge surfaces. It should be
noted that there are still jet aircraft in production, the Gulfstream 150 as an example,
and numerous other turboprop aircraft that utilize a deicing boot for leading edge pro-
tection. Recent studies and newer more advanced boot systems have debunked some
boot myths of the past. In particular the issue of ice bridging has been revisited in re-
cent studies. It has been determined that bridging does not occur with any modern
boots. Pilots can cycle the boots as soon as an ice accumulation is observed on most
new aircraft types. Pilots should reference their specific aircraft AFM for information on
the operation of their specific boot system.

In 2005 a Citation 560 operated by Circuit City Corporation departed controlled flight
and crashed while on approach to Pueblo Memorial Airport (PUB), Pueblo, Colorado.
The subsequent investigation determined that an in-flight icing encounter with
Supercooled Large Water Droplets (SLDs) was a contributing factor to the accident.
The report stated, The pilots were unaware that they were flying in conditions that the
plane was not certificated for because there are no reliable methods for flight crews to
differentiate, in flight, between water drop sizes that are outside the certification enve-
lope.

Pilots must recognize that even with ice detection and protection systems on board
their aircraft, they must maintain vigilance as to what icing conditions are being en-
countered. AFMs can be good sources of information for the operation of surface deice
systems. When utilizing an AFM for guidance, a complete review of the manual should
be performed. In the accident mentioned above the Citation AFM stated in one section
that the deice boots be used when the ice buildup is between to inches
thick... While in a later section it was clearly stated, When configuring for approach
and landing with any ice accretion visible on the wing leading edge, regardless of
thickness, activate the surface deice system. A complete understanding of the deice
systems is essential to the safe operation of the aircraft.

Flight experience can lead to complacency. From 1990 to 2000 there were 388 icing
related accidents in the United States. 105 of these accidents were fatal. Pilot experi-
ence seems to have been a factor, but not in preventing the accidents. In 186 (48%) of
the accidents the pilots involved had more than 1000 hours.

Rev. 1.0 35
Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
Traffic Awareness, See and Avoid Concept
" See and Avoid" Concept.
1. The flight rules prescribed in Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) set
forth the concept of "See and Avoid." This concept requires that vigilance shall be
maintained at all times, by each person operating an aircraft, regardless of whether
the operation is conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Visual Flight
Rules (VFR).
2. Pilots should also keep in mind their responsibility for continuously maintaining a
vigilant lookout regardless of the type of aircraft being flown. Remember that most
MAC accidents and reported NMAC incidents occurred during good VFR weather
conditions and during the hours of daylight.

Visual Scanning.
1. Pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within their field of vi-
sion as well as periodically scanning the entire visual field outside of their aircraft to
ensure detection of conflicting traffic. Remember that the performance capabilities
of many aircraft, in both speed and rates of climb / descent, result in high closure
rates limiting the time available for detection, decision, and evasive action
2. The probability of spotting a potential collision threat increases with the time spent
looking outside, but certain techniques may be used to increase the effectiveness
of the scan time. The human eyes tend to focus somewhere, even in a featureless
sky. In order to be most effective, the pilot should shift glances and refocus at inter-
vals. Most pilots do this in the process of scanning the instrument panel, but it is
also important to focus outside to set up the visual system for effective target acqui-
sition.
3. Pilots should also realize that their eyes may require several seconds to refocus
when switching views between items in the cockpit and distant objects. Proper
scanning requires the constant sharing of attention with other piloting tasks, thus it
is easily degraded by such psycho physiological conditions such as fatigue, bore-
dom, illness, anxiety, or preoccupation.
4. Effective scanning is accomplished with a series of short, regularly spaced eye
movements that bring successive areas of the sky into the central visual field. Each
movement should not exceed 10 degrees, and each area should be observed for at
least 1 second to enable detection. Although horizontal back and forth eye move-
ments seem preferred by most pilots, each pilot should develop a scanning pattern
that is most comfortable and then adhere to it to assure optimum scanning.



Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
36 Rev. 1.0
5. Peripheral vision can be most useful in spotting collision threats from other aircraft.
Each time a scan is stopped and the eyes are refocused, the peripheral vision
takes on more importance because it is through this element that movement is de-
tected. Apparent movement is almost always the first perception of a collision threat
and probably the most important, because it is the discovery of a threat that triggers
the events leading to proper evasive action. It is essential to remember, however,
that if another aircraft appears to have no relative motion, it is likely to be on a colli-
sion course with you. If the other aircraft shows no lateral or vertical motion, but is
increasing in size, take immediate evasive action.
6. Visual search at night depends almost entirely an peripheral vision. In order to per-
ceive a very dim lighted object in a certain direction, the pilot should not look di-
rectly at the object, but scan the area adjacent to it. Short stops, of a few seconds,
in each scan will help to detect the light and its movement.
7. Lack of brightness and color contrast in daytime and conflicting ground lights at
night increase the difficulty of detecting other aircraft (8) Pilots are reminded of the
requirement to move one's head in order to search around the physical obstruc-
tions, such as door and window posts. The doorpost can cover a considerable
amount of sky, but a small head movement may uncover an area which might be
concealing a threat.

Airspace, Flight Rules, and Operational Environment.
1. Pilots should be aware of the type of airspace in which they intend to operate in or-
der to comply with the flight rules applicable to that airspace. Aeronautical informa-
tion concerning the National Airspace System is disseminated by three methods:
aeronautical charts (primary); the Airman's Information Manual (AIM); and the No-
tices to Airmen (NOTAM) system. The general operating and flight rules governing
the operation of aircraft within the United States are contained in Part 91 of the
FAR.
2. Pilots should use currently effective aeronautical charts for the route or area in
which they intend to operate.

Rev. 1.0 37
Speci al Emphasi s Ar eas Handbook
References
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM)
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)
AC 90-42, Traffic Advisory Practices at Airports Without Operating Control Towers.
AC 90-66, Recommended Standard Traffic Patterns and Practices for Aeronautical
Operations at Airports Without Operating Control Towers.
AC 120-57, Surface Movement Guidance and Control System.
AC 120-71, Standard Operating Procedures for Flightdeck Crewmember, 8/10/00
AC 61-134, General Aviation Controlled Flight into Terrain Awareness, 4/10/3
Report No. FAA-RD-77-26, General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study.
FAA-H-8083-3, Airplane Flying Handbook.
FAA-H-8083-9, Aviation Instructors Handbook.
AC 61-67C, Stall and Spin Awareness Training, 9/25/00
FAA-S-8081-5F, Airline Transport Pilot and - Practical Test Standards for Airplane.
FAA AC 120-74A, Runway Incursion Prevention Introduction, 9/26/03 and Appendix 1,
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Template for Ground Operations and the
Prevention of Runway Incursions, 9/26/03.
AC210-5B, Military Flying Activity, 8/8/90
FAA, Order J O 7400.8P
AC 90-48C, Pilots Role in Collision Avoidance, 3/18/83
AC 91-73, Part 91 Pilot and Flight Crew Procedures During Taxi Operations and Part 135
Single-Pilot Operations, 6/18/01
AC 120-51E, Crew Resource Management Training, 1/22/04
NBAA Automated Flight Deck Training Guidelines: J une 30, 2000
AC 61-115, Positive Exchange of Flight Controls, 3/10/95
FAA Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan, April 1997
NASA
Acknowledgments to the following contributors: Victoria Benefield, Geno Cromatie, Geoff
Diener, Molly X. Gee von Holdt, Rick Goad, Bill Griffith, Shannon Forrest, Sandra Moore, Kim
Sanchez, Larry Schuman.


M0159
Revision Rev. 1.0
(based on ATP PTS FAA-S-8081-5F with Changes 1 & 2)