Chapter 4

The Uniting of Europe: Political,

Social and Economic Forces
1950- 19 5 7
Ernst B. Haas*
Community and Integration
Two major opposing trends have come to characterise international
relations at the end of the Second World War: while some twenty new
states have made their appearance since 1945, with every indication
that the process will gain even more momentum, a network of interna-
tional organisations has sprung up countering the full impact of this
mul tipl ication of sovereignties. Whether in the realm of political rela-
tions or specific funct ional tasks, whether at the universal or the
regional level, contacts and associations among governments, private
groups and individuals have been institutionalised as never before.
Whereas the trend in Africa and Asia is toward the evolution of ever
more political groupings aspiring to statehood, the process in Europe
and in the Atlantic area tends toward the limitation of sovereign inde-
pendence, the growth of more rather than less formal bonds among
national communities and perhaps towar d the substitution of a new
federal organism for the present national state.
New states may grow up as the result of the splintering of an existing
political community - or an empire - as well as from the merger of
hitherto distinct and independent entities. In both processes the evolu-
tion of 'national consciousness' is held to be the crucial factor. Loyal ty
to the established font of authority wanes as a feeling of separate iden-
tity takes po session of the group clamouring for new forms of polit-
ical organisation. Y t we know little about the constituents of this
process. While it is possible fr quently to specify the content of the
Reproduced fr om Erns t Haas (1968) The Unitillg of Europe: Political, Social and
Economic Forces 1950-1957, 2nd edn. (Stanford, CA: Sranford University Press ), chapter 1,
treproduction by the kind permission of Peter HaCls). The text has been slightl y edited, as
indicated, to fit the format of this volume. References have been changed to Harvard citarion
,ryle wherever possible. Some per ipheral footnotes have been omitted.
105
106 The Uniting of Europe
new doctrine of nationa l consciousness it is far more difficult to
explain who originates, propagates, expands and accepts it. More diffi-
cult still is the question of why the doctrine originates and why it gains
- or fails to gain - acceptance. How and why does national loyalty
tend to coincide with the territorial boundaries of the state? Is it
inherent in poli tical e olution that it must be so? Is it natural and
inevitable that India, Ghana or Belgium are characterised by a s nse of
national identity which extends to their frontiers but not beyond?
The process of development of a political community, therefore, is
but little understood in terms of the analyti cal tandards and cri teria of
observation with which the social scientist today works. While much
work is being done in the study of this process among the nascent
political enti ties in underdev loped ar as, much less attenti on has been
paid to the reverse process of comnllmity formation through imerna-
tional organisati n, among we tern industrial states. Thi is true in all
fiel ds of trans-state activity, whether intergovernmental at th level of
formal diplomacy, intergovernmental at the level of informal discus-
sion by experts, 'supranational' or federal. Each of these is a device to
arrive at collective decisions by means other than unlimited action by a
national government. Each is a means for peacefully unifyi ng diverse
groups in common action. Yet detailed data on how - if at all - cohe-
sion is obtained through these processes is lacking.
International relati ons in contemporary western Europe provide a
li ving laboratory of these processes at work. The Organisation for
European Economic Co- peration (OEEC) at the I vel of intergovern-
mental contacts, the Council of Europe as an inter-parl iamentary
forum, the system of Scandinavian co-op ration and the Western
European Union as a mixture of the two, and the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) as a quasi-federal government in two eco-
nomic sectors, pr ovide landmarks in the process of substituting collec-
tive action for decisions by governments acting in isolation. It is time
that these efforts be examined to judge if and how 'political commu-
nity' resul ts from measures of political integration'.
Basic Definitions: Political Community
The systematic study of the process of community formation through
organisations of th is type necessitates the explicit stating of an ideaJ
type appropri ate to the known institutional setting of western Europe.
Here, the exi ring national states are poli tical communi ties. While they
seem to enj oy the unquestioning 'loyalty' of their citizens - with the
exception of dedicated Commwlists as distingui hed from the mass of
Communist voters - they are by no means monolithic units. Pl uralism
of groups, values and instituti ons is the hallmark of western European
political
indicate
existenc
boundar
existing 1
to sp ak
preordau
'L ya]
must be
said to bl
and pre
authority
tions. In J
ularity of
and in pa
perceptiol
surveys (5
a conditiQ
to their
authorit >
space. In
process of
Group (
nations ur
result of d
the nati n
display th
will assum
units as we
competing
political pa
ideologies
success or I
If group
so is the e:o;
opposition
ficient degr
to civil W aJ
in this stud
process of
body of g
group conf!
for settling
can be achi
vant to the
Ernst B. Haas 107
political life. Nor, as past history and contemporary developments
indicate, are these existing states immutable entities. Belgium came into
existence in 1830; Germany federated in 1870; the bloody history of
boundary changes is well remembered by the present generation. The
existing political communities are neither so homogeneous internally as
to speak with one united voice on national or international issues nor
preordained historically as to constitute 'natural' units.
'Loyalty' was singled out as a crucial term in this definition and it
must be specified further in operational terms. A population may be
said to be loyal to a set of symbols and institutions when it habitually
and predictably over long periods obeys the injunctions of their
authority and turns to them for the satisfaction of important expecta-
tions. In part the existence of such sentiments can be tested by the reg-
ularity of popular compliance with fundamental government decisions;
and in part it is subject to verification by the kind of attitude testing of
perceptions of mutuality of aspirations made familiar by post-1945
surveys (see Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). Political community, therefore, is
a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty
to their central political institutions than to any other political
authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic
space. In this study, this condition will be the one toward which the
process of 'political integration' is supposed to lead.
Group conflict is a given and expected form of conduct in the
nations under study. French, German or Italian poLcy emerges as the
result of this conflict. Hence a larger political community, composed of
the nations now still separate and distinct, may well be expected to
display the same traits. Hence our ideal type of community formation
will assume group conflict as given on the level of the present national
units as well as in the larger community which may emerge. In fact, the
competing activities of permanently organised interest groups and of
political parties are singled out as the significant carriers of values and
ideologies whose opposition, identity or convergence determines the
success or failure of a transnational ideology.
If group conflict is one central characteristic of political community
so is the existence of a commonly accepted body of belief. Despite the
opposition of ideologies and their adherents, consensus exists to a suf-
ficient degree in the contemporary national units to preclude recourse
-to civil war and revolt. The ideal type of political community implicit
in this study assumes, therefore, that the condition toward which the
process of integration is expected to lead is one in which a sufficient
body of general consensus imposes limitations upon the violence of
group conflict. These limitations are the basic agreement on the means
for settling differences, even if consensus as to ends of political action
can be achieved only at such high levels of abstraction as to be irrele-
vant to the analysis of political conduct. Stated in constitutional terms,
---
108 The Uniting of Europe
the agreement on the means of pol itic, 1 action i equi valent to the
aim
acceptance of the doctrine of re pect for the r ule of la w. Official deci-
cen
sion , once made according to procedural rules accepted as binding by
con
all, are carried out .
ide:
For purpose of this discus ion, the beliefs common to otherwise
arr'
antagonistic groups will be labell ed the 'nationalism' of a given commu-
ill
ni ty, while the doctrines peculiar to a group will be referred t a 'ide-
m r
ology.' Nationalism is compo ed of values and claims acceptable to the
of L
great bulk of the population while also setting "t apart from th val ues
on
and claims of other political communiti es. At t he socio-cultural level of
i lal
attitudes and beliefs our political community is held togetber despite the
re [
internal strife of the constituent groups by the general acceptance of
ual
national identity, of nationalism, which manifests itself primarily in the
rnJ
consensus on the means for achievi ng agreement on policy.
can
rHo
This picture of political community diflers in some e sential respect
que
from the kindred concept of 'security communi ' propo ed by some
fit
contemporary students of nationalism and c mmunity f rma tion
n >jt
(Deutsch 1953a, 1954; van Wagenen 1952) . In both formulations, the
H
absence of violence a a means of political action among the partici-
defi
pati.ng groups is gi en a central place. Deutsch' s concept, however, does
Clat
not insist on the pr ence of a specified in "ti.tmional structure, contenti ng
i ti
itself with the consecration of non- iolent means f achievi ng social
lmil
change as t he maj or criterion differenti ating ' commun ity' from rdinary
50VI
internati nal relations. The scheme here used, by cOll tra t, makes the
beel
existence of political institutions capable of translating ideologies into
sect
law the cornerstone of t he defini tion. While the co-existence of conflict
acln
and harmony within th same social ystem can no doubt be achieved
tiOIl
without the attributes of a single statehood, the del iberate creation and
COlI
perpetuation of a new national can ciousne s can hardly be expected to
rity
come about ithout the presence of formal governm ntal institution
obe
and practices. Since the possession of su h a consciousness i considered
(De
a criterion of olitical community, the techniques for realisi ng nd main-
taining it must be posited as nece ary to the ideal type.
H
These are t he central characteristics of pl uralistic nations in contem-
a e
porary western Europe and at the same ti me the earmarks of our
wh)
model of political community. In clearly positi ng an extreme scheme,
pia
rather than an intermediate one permitting of violence-free conduct
thar
short of the attainment of statehood by t he entities under study, it i
of
intended to furnish a precise yardstick for the anal ysis of governmental
to [
and group con duct i. n western Europe in the effort to determi ne now to
act
what extent th condi tion of political community ha been or is likely
o
to be reach d.
1. I
Political community, as here defined, need not presuppo e the emer-
gence of a federal state, though this i one possibility and certainl y the
. -.

I
Ernst B. Haas 109
aim of many contemporary European statesmen and thinkers. While a
central government is essential institutionally and a collecti ve nati onal
consci oLl snesssocially,theconsti tutionalform whichwill qualifyforthe
ideal type may be t hat of a unita ry, a federal or even a confederate
arrangement. . . . Nor m,Ily the type of confederati on represented by
internati nalorgani sationsin whichonly statesaresubj ects andgovern-
ments are vested wi tha power of eto does not approach our definition
ofcommunity. A struct ure could em rge, however, in which a compul-
sory and binding judicial y tern is combined with a majoritarian leg-
islat ive devi ce, supervi ing the work of a central administration of
restricted powers but with direct jurisdiction over groups and individ-
ua ls, whi le many maj or deci ions are sti ll made atthe level of intergov-
ernmental negotiations. If in such a system governments negotiate and
compromi e so that one or several everely modify their position in the
effort to arrive at a binding common agreement of profound conse-
quence, the resulting habitual pattern ofreaching consensus could well
fit into the definition of political community, though representing
neit herthetypica lunitarynor federalcategoriesofconstitutions.
Hence the instituti onal cri teria of 'political communi ty' as here
defined combine theseparatefeatures posited byDeutsch and his asso-
ci ates. They analyse in terms oftwo types: ' malgamated' and ' plural-
istic' secur ity communit ies. The former correspond essentially to
unitaryorfedera lstates whil e th lattercompriserel ationships between
sovereign states from which the possibi li ry of recourse to force has
been banished. . . . While my definit ion wo uld excl ude 'pluralistic
security communities' of this type becau e of the absence of judicial,
admini trative and legislati ve ties and becau e ofthescarcity ofinstitu-
tiona lised relations among private groups, our concept of ' political
community' is nevertheless broader than Deutsch' s 'amalgamated secu-
rity c mmunit ' because itincl udesthepossi bil ityofa constantflow of
obedience to central decisions made by intergovernmental agencies
(Deutsch etaI1957:3-21) .
Having stated the ideal type of political community, our task is the
assessment of empirical data in an effort to determine whether and
why developments leading to the evol uti on of a community are taking
place. General estimates of the existenc or a bsence of loyalty other
than ro the nat ionalst ate do not suffice. Hence a number of indicators
of community sentim nt will be discussed here, applica ble specifically
t the study ofhow interest groups, pol itical partie and governments
actin a supranationalsetting.
Communi tysentimentwould be onsidered to fl ouri h if:
1. Interest grou ps and political parties at the national level endorse
supranational action in preference to action by their national gov-
110 The Uniting of Europe
ernment, or if they are divided among themselves on this issue.
Only the case of unanimous national opposition to supranational
action could be considered incompatible with community senti-
ment.
2. Interest groups and political parties organise beyond the national
level in order to function more effectively as decision-makers vis-a-
vis the separatenationalgovernmentsor the centralauthorityandif
theydefine their interests in terms larger than those ofthe separate
nationalstatefrom whichthey originate.
3. Interestgroups andpolitical parties, in theireffortsatsupranational
organisation, coalesce on the basis of a common ideology, sur-
passingthose prominentatthe nationalleve!'
4. Interest groups and poli tical parties, in confronting each other at
the supranational level, succeed in evolving a body of doctrine
common to all,ora newnationalism (i.e., 'supranationalism').
5. Interestgroups, political parties and governments showevidence of
accepting the rule of law in fai thfully carrying out supranational
court decisions, administrative directives and rules even when they
oppose these, instead of obstructing or ignoring such decisions;
further, whel1 opposing federalpolicy, they channel their objections
through the legal avenues provided instead of threatening or prac-
tisingsecession.
6. Governments negoti ate with one another in good faith and gener-
ally reach agreement, while notmaking themselves consistently and
invariably the spokesmen of national interestgroups; further, com-
munitysentimentwould seem to prevail ifgovernmentsgive way in
negotiations when they find themselves in a minority instead of
insistingon aformal orinformalrightofveto.
Clearly, only a collection of saints could be expected to display posi-
tively aUthese indicators of community sentiment at the outset of a
process of integration. In order to qualify as a true political commu-
nity, however, all the above indicators must be positively established
before t he condit ion defined in our scheme has been met. Given a
series of pluralistic assumptions, any establishment of sentiment con-
fined to parties alone, orto interestgroups, or togovernmentsconsid-
ered in isolation from their subjects, would fall short of the final
conditionposited.
Basic Definitions: Political Integration
Ourdefinition ofpolitical community relies notso much on 'objective
criteria' as on an assessment ofthe conduct ofgroups, individuals and
Ernst B. H aas 111
governments. On a more abstract level, the criteria si ngled out as
crucial to the definition result fr om habitual behaviour patterns: they
are not superi mposed by the observer upon the social scene. The same
rule governs the definition of the second key term used in this study,
'poli tical integration.' Conceived not as a condition but as a process,
the conceptualisation relies on the perception of interests and values by
the actors participating in the process. Integration takes place when
these perceptions fall into a certain pattern and fails to take place when
they do not. If pluralism is considered an inherent part of the ideal type
of political community, pluralistic processes of decision-making and
interest perception, naturally, are considered equally essential attrib-
utes of the process of political integration.
1
Before a firm definition or scheme can be stated, it must be recog-
nised that integration in Western Europe has thus far been essentially
confined to economic measures. Hen e it is necessary to establish the
meaning of 'economi c integration' as that term is generally used in the
nexus of European politics. Following Gehrels and Johnston (1955),
the possible general defini tion as ' the presence of important economic
links between a group of count ri es' must be rejected as too vague oper-
ationally. The development of such links can and does result from
organisations, such as OEEC, which do not pretend to represent or
aim at pol itical community. Economic aspects of integration, if rele-
vant to the evol ution of community, must possess these characteristics:
(1) agreement for gradual but complete elimination of tariffs, quotas
and exchange controls on trade among the member countries; (2)
abandonment of the right to restore trade restrictions on a unilateral
basis for the dura tion of the ag eement, regardless of difficulties that
may arise; (3) joint action to deal with problems resulting from the
removal of trade barriers within the community and to promote more
efficient utilisation of the resources of the area; (4) some degree of har-
monisation of national policies that affect price structures and the allo-
cation of resou rces (for example, social security and agricultural
programmes) and of monetary and fiscal polici es; and (5) free, or at
least freer, movement of capital and labour.
But economic integration, however defined, may be based on polit-
ical motives and frequently begets political consequences. The exis-
tence of political motives is a matter for empirical research and, in
western Europe, is clearly established. More hypothetical formulations
are required to deal with the problem of political consequences. Thus it
may be posited that economic integration unaccompanied by the
growth of central institutions and policies does not necessarily lead to
political community ince no pressure for the reformulation of expecta-
tions is exercise. Free trade, the efore, cannot be automatically equated
with political integration; nor can the interpenetration of national
markets be so considered. If economic integration merely implied the
112 The Uniting of Europe
removal of barriers to trade and fails to be accompanied by new cen-
trally made fiscal, labour, welfare and investment measures, the rela-
tion to political integration is not established. If, however, the
integration of a pecific sect ion (e.g., coal and steel), or of economics
generaUy (e.g., the ' General Common Market') goes ha nd in hand with
the gradual extension of the scope of central decision-making to take
in economic pursuits not initially ' federated', the relation to the growth
of political ommunity is clear. It must be stressed, moreover, that the
degree of 'success' achieved as measured by purely economic standards
- growth in the val ue and volume of trade, business earnings, wage
levels, etc. - is not necessarily an index of political success. Economic
dissatisfaction may go hand in hand with demands for more federal
political action. Unequal di rri bution of economic benefits may give
rise to political oppositi on wh re none existed before. Hence the
measure of political success inherent in economic integration lies in t he
demands, expect ations and loyalties of the pol itical actors affected by
the process, which do not logically and necessarily foll ow from statis-
2
tical indices of economi uccess.
The decision to proceed with integration or to oppose it rests on the
perception of interests and on the articulation of specific values on the
part of existing political actors. Rather than relying on a scheme of
integration which posits 'altruistic' or ' idealistic' motives as the condi-
tioners of conduct, it seems more reasonable - assuming the plural istic
basis of politics here used - to focus on the interests and values
defended by the maj or groups involved in the process, experience
showing that t hese are far too complex to be descri bed in such simple
terms as ' the desire for Franco- German peace' or the 'will to a Uni ted
Europe'. As t h process of integration proceeds, it is assumed that
values will undergo change, that interests will be redefined in terms of
a regional rather than a purely national orientation and that the erst-
while set of separate national group values wi ll gradually be super-
seded by a new and geographically larger set of beliefs.
The scheme, fi nally, assumes that the process of integration will
yield a new national consci ousness of the new political communi ty,
uniting the rstwhile nations which had joined. If the content of
nationalism at the level of the former nation had been posited as the
overlapping and agreement on principle of the multitude of separate
group ideologies, the same conception applies at the level of the new
community. As the beliefs and aspirations of groups undergo change
due to the necessity of working in a transnational institutional frame-
work, mergers in values and doctrine are expected to come about,
uniting groups across former frontiers. The expected overlapping of
these group aspirations is finally thought to result in an accepted body
of 'national' doctrine, in effect heralding the advent of a new nation-
alism. Implied in this development, of course, is a proportional
Ernst B. Haas 113
diminution of loyalty to and expectations from the former separate
national governments.
Shifts in the focus of loyalty need not necessarily imply the imme-
diate repudiation of the national state or government. Multiple loyal-
ties have been empiricaUy demonstrated to exist, either because no
conflict is involved between various foci or because the political actor
manages psychologically to ignore or sublimate a conflict even if it
does exist 'objectively.' In fact some psychologists suggest that attach-
ment to new foci of loyalty, such as international or supranational
organisations, may come about by a threefold process in which attach-
ments to the new centre exist side by side with continued deference to
the established foci. New loyal ties may come into existence as end
val ues, i.e., the new order is desired as an end in itself. Secondly, new
loyalties may develop merely in response to a pressure for conformity
exercised by the new centre of power. Thirdly - and most importantly
for the study of political integration in a tramework of consensus -
new loyalties are thought to grow haphazardly in their function as
intermediary means to some ultimate end, perhaps the same end also
fought for in the context of the stablished national loyalties. Groups
and individuals uncertain of their ability to realise political or eco-
nomic values in the national framewor k may thus turn to suprana-
tional agencies and procedures, without being attracted by
'Europeanism' a su h. Ifthe process of developing dual loyalties via
this mechanism continues for a suffi ciently protracted period, the new
central institutions may ultimately acquire the symbolic significance of
end values.
A process of political integration, stated in these general terms, is
susceptible of detailed invest igation only if a set of specific indicators is
provided as well. Integration being a process over time, certain iden-
tical questions can be raised for purposes of analysis at regular inter-
vals. Care must be taken that indicators of integration are designed
wi th speci fic reference to the scope of activity of the organisation
studied: the reactions of groups concerned with the production, pro-
cessing, manufacturing and marketing of coal and steel in the instance
of the ECSC.
Put in terms of questions, these indicators are proposed for a peri-
odic analysis of development toward the end of political community:
1. What is the position of key interest groups, political parties and
governments toward the proposal to integrate a given sector or to
federate, or to the t reaty formalising such a step? Can the positi on
taken be correlated with the economic expectations of the actors,
their political fears or hopes, their satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with the national poli ti cal context, their ideologies or their notion
of the national interest?
114 The Uniting of Europe
Having established the initial positions ofthese groups, the next
step in the process ofestabli shing indicators is to sort out the pat-
terns of agreement, opposition and convergence. At the nati onal
level, groupsmayfavourintegration because they agree in their def-
initionofinterests on the basi ofidentical valu s: the caseofiden-
tity ofaspirations. They may also agree on the ends of a policy of
integration,arriving at this stage, however, onthe basis ofdifferent
values and interests. This consti tutes the case of convergence of
interests. Finally, groups may oppose integration, either for iden-
tical or convergent reasons. Accurate analysis demands that we
establish cI arly the starting positions as the process gets under
way.
2. After the advent of new central insti tutions, can shifts in position
amongpolitical parties, interest groups and governments be noted?
Shifts for moreintegration as well asin opposition theretomust, of
course, be considered. Theindi catorswould includethe samerange
ofquestionsposed in theeffortto define the characteristicsofpolit-
ical community. How can shifts be correlated with the ideologies
andexpectationslistedabove? ...
However, the framework of analysis shifts in the second step.
While positions taken at the national I vel still require attention
these must be contrasted with cl aims made at the level of the new
institutions.If newpatterns ofidenti ties, convergenceoropposition
are in evidence, the effort must be made to determinewhether they
originateatthe nationalorthe 'supranational'levels.
3. Periodically, the basic question ofwhether theconditions identified
with political community have been realised must be raised. The
question can be answered in terms of the indicators for political
communitypresentedabove.
Such conclusions can be reached only on the basis of again sorting
outgroup values andpolitical demandsand structuringthemin terms
ofpoints of identity. By relating the findings back to earlier positions
defended and correlating these with political activity within the
frameworks of national government and federal institutions, more
definite conclusionswithrespecttothe impactofspecifi measures of
integration on the evolution of ideology and nationalism can be
advanced.
We can nowstate aformal d finition ofpolitical integration,as used
in our ideal type. Political integration is the process whereby political
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing
national states. The endresult ofa process ofpoli tical integration is a
newpoliticalcommunity, uperimposedover thepre-existing ones.
Ernst B. Haas 115
Before a formal anal ysis can be made, however, it is essential to
specify who the political actors are. It is as impracticable as it is unnec-
essary to have recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys,
or even to surveys of specific interested groups, such as business or
labour. It suffices to single out and define the political elites in the par-
ticipating countries, to study their reactions to integration and to assess
changes in attitude on their part. In our scheme of integration, 'elites'
are the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually partici-
pate in the making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in
government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties. They
include the officials of trade associations, the spokesmen of organised
labour, higher civil servants and active politicians.
The emphasis on elites in the study of integration derives its justifica-
tion from the bureaucratised nature of European organisations of long
standing, in which basic decisions are made by the leadership, some-
times over the opposition and usually over the indifference of the
general membership. This gives the relevant elites a manipulative role
which is of course used to place the organisation in question on record
for or against a proposed measure of integration.
A further important justification for the elite approach to the study
of integration lies in the demonstrable difference in atti tudes held at
the leadership levels of significant groups, as contrasted with the mass
membership ...
Having so far focused on the perceptions and activities of politically
significant groups and their elite , it remains to state the role assigned
to institutions and structured belief patterns in our ideal type of polit-
ical integration. Groups put forward interdependent sets of values -
ideologies - in their struggle with other groups for political promi-
nence. In a given political community, these ideologies merge and
overlap to permit the existence of a set of beliefs held by almost all citi-
zens. But since group action at all levels of political activity hinges
around action by governmental institutions, the relationship assumed
between beliefs and instituti onal conduct must be made explicit.
During the initial stages of any process of political integration, the
nationalism established in each of the participating countries is still
supreme. The decision to join in or to abstain from the proposed steps
of integration is defended in terms of national values by each interested
group. Once the institutions associated with the step of integration are
established, however, a change is likely to take place. The ideologies
defended by national groups are likely to influence - and perhaps
shape - the values and ideology of the officials manning the new insti-
tution. Certainly no effort wi ll be spared to make the attempt at
shaping. However, a reverse process of gradually penetrating national
ideologies can also be supposed to get under way. Decision-makers in
116 The Uniting of Europe
the new institutions may resist the effort to have their beliefs and poli-
cies dictated by the interested elites, and advance their own prescrip-
tion. Orthe heterogeneity oftheir origins may compel them to fas hion
doctrines and develop codes ofconductwhich represent an amalgama-
tion of various national belief systems or group values. A two-way
process is likely to result in any case: influence originating from
national sources seeking to shape 'fed ral' or 'supranational' decisions
and efforts to make nationalgroupsconductthemselves in accordance
with doctrines originati ng from the new central institutions. If per-
mitted tooperatefor any lengthoftime, the nationalgroups nowcom-
pelled to funnel their aspirations through federal institutions may also
be constrained to work withi n the ideological framework of those
organs. Eventually, the transformed doctrines will again be utilised to
infl uence the federal decision-makers, who in turn will have to react in
oneorboth oftheapproaches sketchedabove.
It is evident, therefore, thata complexpattern ofinteraction between
national ideologies on the one hand and the beliefs of the office-
holders in the central institutions on the other will come about. The
eventual changes produced at the national level will constitute one of
the indicators of the degree of integration as the process continues,
while the analysis of this interaction is one ofthe crucial pr blems of
thisstudy- andofanystudyofpolitical integration...
Notes
1 See Deutsch et al. 1957 for the use of 'objective criteria' in the discussion of community
and integration, such as thevolumeofeconomic transaction, the volume ofsocial commu-
nication and the adequacy ofthe communications nerwork to carry the 'integration load' .
These devices are developed as indicators ofthe potentiality inherent in certain communi-
ties in the effort to integrate,in Deutsch 1953a.
2 Fur a thoughtful exploration of the relation between political federalism and economic
integration ee Diebold 1955. Diebold stresses that federalism does not of itself imply a
specific economic policy leading to integration ofseparate economies. Nor is federation a
sine qua nOli for the achievement of economic integration. However, the attainment of
specific welfare standards in a larger market would almost automatically compel some
kind ofcentral action even if the initial plan ofeconomic unity did not provide for it. It is
demonstrative ofthe close link between political and economic motives in contemporary
western Europe that the draft treaty for the establishment of the European Polit.ical
Community also includeda provision for the establishmentofa General Common Market
within ten years. Laterdevelopmentssawtheshelving ofthe political scheme butthe resus-
citation ofthe economic plank with the expectation that it would lead eventually to more
politicalcentralism.