In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche presents us a negative evaluation of Socrates

rationalism, classifying it as an extension of human decadence, and not a solution for the
degeneration it experiences. This degeneration is perceived to present itself through the
problem of the takeover of drives, instincts, and excess. The techniue taken by philosophers
to address this degeneration is !hat Nietzsche labels as "morality of betterment,# !hich he
sees as a deceit. I disagree !ith his vie! of morality and the role it plays on individuals,
since he assumes that our instincts are the best guide for behavior and that follo!ing them
!ill lead to the most desirable outcomes.
$laiming that the Socratic and $hristian morality is a "morality of betterment,# and
that it is a misunderstanding, Nietzsche means that it is a misunderstanding of the problem of
decadence. The morality of betterment aims at helping us reach virtue, truth, and happiness,
by restricting our instincts through reason. %ccording to Nietzsche, these defenders of the
morality of betterment fail to realize that reasoning is &ust an extension of instincts' Socrates
and those philosophers follo!ing him !ere not rational by free choice (p. )*+,. %nd they
nevertheless pose themselves as the "truth# by !hich the rest of humans should abide, !hich
Nietzsche illustrates in the first point of How the True World Finally Became a Fiction ("I,
-lato, am the truth,# p. )./,.
Through reason, the morality of betterment assumes the existence of a truth, and a
distorted experience of it by humans through appearances. This division of the !orld
bet!een a real, true, better, and moral, and an apparent one is seen by Nietzsche as a "sign of
decadence,# a "symptom of declining life# (p. )./,. It is a negation of life as it is, it looks at
life !ith resentment. The existence of a real !orld disables us from being able to take life as
it is, to en&oy it. Nietzsche believes that this reasoning is only restricting our lives through a
series of norms. Instead of saving men from falling into decadence, this morality of
betterment leads to it. It asks man to act not according to his instincts, but through reason.
%nd it is this !ay of acting !hat leads to sickness0!e are concerned !ith rationality, not
!ith life itself. 1ur instincts are suppressed by this reasoning, by morality' a truth !hich,
admittedly by $hristians and 2ant, !e cannot attain (p. )./,.
Nietzsche defends his opinion on the "morality of betterment# by attacking reasoning
and the idea of a 3od, and by explaining !hy the concept of a real !orld is not a plausible
one. 4e starts by explaining ho! it is that by believing in the "I# posed by reason, !e are
forced to believe in the "being,# and !e pro&ect our belief in the "being# of things outside of
ourselves. 5y having these different entities, !e find ourselves looking for their creator. %nd
it is at this moment that !e fall in the trap of "3od.# 1nce !e have accepted 3od, !e can be
easily deceived into the !orld of "ought.# It is at this moment !hen Nietzsche talks about the
differentiation bet!een the real and the apparent !orld that $hristians and philosophers
defend. Nietzsche argues that since !e cannot have kno!ledge about the real !orld, then !e
cannot be making con&ectures about it, even less act upon these con&ectures. 6hy !orry then
about something that !e cannot have access to7 6e do not have access to it because it does
not exist, this real !orld is based on the alleged apparent !orld. 5y arguing for the existence
of the real !orld, !e are suppressing !hat is in us, !e are suppressing our instincts for the
sake of a fantasy of !hat ought8to8be.
To sum Nietzsches vie! up' reason constrains our !ay of existence by going against
instincts. 5y eliminating the idea of morality, or a "real# !orld, !e see our circumstances as
definitive, and !e are enabled to accept them. %nd by accepting them, !e stop !ishing for a
ghost that does not exist, !e are freed from this ghost. %nd it is at this point that humans are
enabled to reach happiness.
4o! could you escape from a system that is so infiltrated in society, of a system that
starts shaping your thinking from the moment you are born, until you die7 I found
Nietzsches escape fascinating0he identified the disease that !as meant to be the rescuer of
men, even !ith the disadvantage of having gro!n !ith it. Nietzsche !ent even further by
finding an escape from it' although !e cannot be guided by an artificial morality anymore, he
reminded us of our instincts. 5ut &ust as he sa! a fascinating and repulsive side of Socrates
reasoning, I also found that in his fascinating "escape# of reason, reasons for repulsiveness.
9eading Nietzsches !ork one might find oneself liberated from an oppression that
!as not even kno!n of. This oppression of !hat ought8to8be fades, !e can en&oy !hat8is
no!. There is no good or !rong, there only "is.# The road that used to be thought of as
leading to happiness, reason, has been closed to a ne! road !ithin the reach of all of us, the
road of instincts. Nietzsche claims, "as long as life is ascending, happiness is the same as
instinct.# 5ut ho! are !e to evaluate the ascendance of life7 % contradiction to his above
claim !as issued by Nietzsche himself !hen he said that the "value of life cannot be
assessed.# If it is instinct that leads us to go back to caveman manners, and if !e can still
have happiness, is life still ascending7 :or !e can find happiness in dogs and pigs, but this
happiness is by no means comparable to that of men. "1h, but then that cannot be true
happiness, because life is not ascending,# Nietzsche might reply, but if !e cannot make
&udgments about the value of life, !hat po!er does he has to claim that life is ascending or
descending7 It is through this condition that Socratic reason makes its !ay into Nietzsches
!ork. 5y saying, "if life is ascending,# one ackno!ledges the existence of an ought8to8be,
and not only that, it is the &udgment of life from !hich Nietzsche !arned us.
There is an ought8to8be !orld, then; 6e cannot trust our instincts, for they are a road
that leads to an unkno!n destination. <orality is still alive, !e can still count on it as the
rescuer from unhappiness. 5ut ho! close I came to disregard it; This is !hat I find the
repulsiveness of Nietzsche to be' he invents a state of slavery for men, and then seduces our
intellect !ith a freedom from it. This freedom is a distortion on the la!s that apply to our
existence, and &ust as it happens to the insane believing to be birds &umping off a cliff, acting
as if these la!s did not exist !ill eventually lead to our ends, to a true decadence.
5y believing in reason, !e have the option again of believing in language, and of
3od. 6e can no! talk about la!s that apply to all existence. %lthough no! !e are stuck
!ith the problem that Nietzsche has pointed for us, a problem that reasoning and morality
leads us to, namely our inability to accept life as it is, and therefore to reach happiness. %re
!e then back again to a suppression of instincts, to the re&ection of our circumstances and a
desire for the real !orld7 I am relieved to say yes; I am relieved to kno! that !hoever killed
unnecessarily committed an unacceptable act in accordance to the real and moral !orld. I am
relieved to kno! that my existence is not only a snapshot !ithout connection to the past and
the future03od is alive; 4ope for improvement is unburied. =nlike Nietzsche, I do not
believe this hope could keep someone from being happy !ith their circumstances0these
circumstances in the apparent !orld can still be accepted, &ust as Nietzsche asks for the
acceptance of the only one !orld he talks about. The difference is, I do not have to
artificially make myself accept actions that affect me &ust because of the fact that they are a
product of instinct. <orality relieves me of that burden.