1. People vs.

Invencion, 398 SCRA 592

G.R. No. 131636 March 5, 2003

FACTS: Elven Invencion, witnessed his father, accused -appellant Artemio Invencion, rape Cynthia P.
Invencion, witness' half-sister from his father Artemio. During the trial, Elven testified against Artemio.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son,
should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
16

ISSUE: WON Elven, the son of accused, is disqualified to testify against the latter

HELD: The rule on "filial privilege" refes to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like
other privileges. - As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
19
otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a
rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant.
20
The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father;
he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he
was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth."


LEE vs CA
(Case #02)

Facts:

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as
immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong,
Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel,
Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve
as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into
another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee (collectively, the
Lees other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh
children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo
Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh
was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-
year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital
records of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she
supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight.


Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry
case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma
Lee to show that she is not Kehs daughter.

Held:

Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner
Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or
other direct descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies
only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition
to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner
Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by
her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former
unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter
binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.


3. Simangan vs. People, 434 SCRA 38
G.R. No. 157984 July 8, 2004

FACTS: On the night of Feb 10, 1980, accused-appellant Moises Simangan and four others conspired to
assault and attack Ernesto Flores, inflicting upon him several wounds on his body which caused his
death. None of the witnesses presented by the prosecution personally saw the killing of Ernesto.
On appeal, the petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to adduce circumstantial evidence sufficient
to prove his guilt of the crime of homicide beyond reasonable doubt. He asserts that Sofronia and Lorna
pointed to and identified him only upon the prodding of Fernando, who told Sofronia that he (the
petitioner) had admitted to stabbing and killing the victim together with twenty of his other companions.
The petitioner contends that the testimony of Fernando is hearsay, as he had no personal knowledge that
he was one of those who killed the victim.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of witness, Fernando, of the admission made before him By Simangan
regarding the killing of Ernesto is admissible
HELD: Extrajudicial admission is an admission against personal interest, and is admissible against
petitioners. - The testimony of Fernando was offered to prove the petitioner's extrajudicial admission of
his involvement in the killing of Ernesto. Such admission is an admission against personal interest, and is
admissible against petitioner.

4. Smith Bell vs. CA, 197 SCRA 201
G.R. No. L-56294 May 20, 1991

FACTS: In the early morning of 3 May 1970at exactly 0350 hours, on the approaches to the port of
Manila near Caballo Island, a collision took place between the M/V "Don Carlos," an inter-island vessel
owned and operated by private respondent Carlos A. Go Thong and Company ("Go Thong"), and the M/S
"Yotai Maru," a merchant vessel of Japanese registry. The "Don Carlos" was then sailing south bound
leaving the port of Manila for Cebu, while the "Yotai Maru" was approaching the port of Manila, coming in
from Kobe, Japan. The bow of the "Don Carlos" rammed the portside (left side) of the "Yotai Maru"
inflicting a three (3) cm. gaping hole on her portside near Hatch No. 3, through which seawater rushed in
and flooded that hatch and her bottom tanks, damaging all the cargo stowed therein.
The consignees of the damaged cargo got paid by their insurance companies. The insurance companies
in turn, having been subrogated to the interests of the consignees of the damaged cargo, commenced
actions against private respondent Go Thong for damages sustained by the various shipments in the then
Court of First Instance of Manila.


ISSUE: WON the payment made by Yotai Maru to Go Thong by virtue of their compromise agreement is
tantamount to an admission of fault
HELD: Compromise Agreement; an offer to compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an
admission on the part of the defendant that he is legally liable, nor on the part of the plaintiff that his calim
or demand is even groundless or doubtful. - The familiar rule is that "an offer of compromise is not an
admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the
offer."
11
A compromise is an agreement between two (2) or more persons who, in order to forestall or put
an end to a law suit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, an adjustment which everyone of them
prefers to the hope of gaining more, balanced by the danger of losing more.
12
An offer to compromise
does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he is legally liable,
nor on the part of a plaintiff that his claim or demand is groundless or even doubtful, since the
compromise is arrived at precisely with a view to avoiding further controversy and saving the expenses of
litigation.
13
It is of the very nature of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically and
in contemplation of mutual concessions.
14
The above rule on compromises is anchored on public policy
of the most insistent and basic kind; that the incidence of litigation should be reduced and its duration
shortened to the maximum extent feasible.

5. PP VS. SALVADOR , 396 SCRA 298
G.R. Nos. 136870-72 January 28, 2003
FACTS: Private complainant, Myra S. Aucena, is the niece of the accused, being the daughter of his
older sister, Lydia Salvador. When her mother died, she stayed with her maternal grandmother, Priscila
Salvador, at the latter's residence at Salinungan East, San Mateo, Isabela to facilitate her studies.
On several occasions, accused appellant Wilson Salvador succeeded on raping herein private
complainant which resulted in the latters pregnancy. Myra gave birth to Cherry May on June 20, 1997 as
a result of the forced coitus.
Sisenando Aucena, the father of Myra, testified as to the efforts of relatives of the accused, to seek a
compromise agreement or settlement of the case of the accused. They first offered to give the land
supposed to be inherited by his (Sisenando's) children. They also offered to give the land that was
supposed to be inherited by Wilson Salvador. However, the relatives did not comply with their promise so
the settlement did not materialize.
ISSUE: WON the offer of compromise made by the relatives of the accused may be considered as an
admission of fault
HELD: Offer of Compromise; The offer of settlement made by the relatives of the accused further
militates against innocence of the accused.- The offer of settlement made by the relatives of the accused
to Myra's father further militates against the innocence of the accused. Indeed, an offer of compromise by
the accused in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be
compromised, may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

6. PP VS. GAUDIA, 423 SCRA 520
G.R. No. 146111 February 23, 2004
FACTS: On the afternoon of March 24, 1997, accused appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, raped Remelyn
Loyola (3 1/2 years old), at the grove of ipil-ipil trees near the victims house.
The parents of appellant offered to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that their son committed.
ISSUE: WON the offers of compromise made by the parents of the accused to witness husband may be
taken against the accused
HELD: Hearsay; Offers of Compromise; Res inter alios Acta Principle; A witness can only testify on facts
which are based on his personal knowledge and perception; Following the Principle of Res Inter Alios
Acta Alteri Nocere Non Debet, the actions of the acussed parents in offering to compromise cannot
prejudice the accused, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was
privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. - Similarly, appellants charge
that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by the
appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if
sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to
Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified
as to the alleged offer,
46
and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the
Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or
perception.
47
The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may have
been the subject of testimony
48
of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet,
49
the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to
the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the
mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these
errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.