Aya-Ay V Arpaphil PDF

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G.R. No. 155359. January 31, 2006.
*
SPOUSES PONCIANO AYA-AY, SR. and CLEMENCIA
AYA-AY, petitioners, vs. ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORP.,
and MAGNA MARINE, INC., respondents.
Labor Law; Death Compensation Benefits; Substantial
Evidence; Unless there is substantial evidence showing that (a) the
cause the employees death is reasonably connected with his work,
or, (b) the sickness or ailment for which the employee died is an
accepted occupational disease, or, (c) the employees working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he
died, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded.Under the
October 15, 1994 Contract of Employment, Aya-ay ceased to be an
employee on September 26, 1995, hence, he was no longer an
employee when he died on December 1, 1995. It is, therefore, crucial
to determine whether Aya-ay died as a result of, or in relation to,
the eye injury he suffered during the term of his employment. If the
injury is the proximate cause, or at least increased the risk, of his
death for which compensation is sought, recovery may be had for
said death. Unless there is substantial evidence showing that: (a)
the cause of Aya-ays death was reasonably connected with his
work; or (b) the sickness/ailment for which he died is an accepted
occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions increased the risk
of contracting the disease for which he died, death compensation
benefits cannot be awarded.
Same; Same; Same; If the disease the employee died of is not
listed as a compensable illness under Appendix 1 of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard
Employment Contract, it is incumbent upon the claimants to present
substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence to justify the
conclusion that the injury sustained by the employee under whom
they are claiming was sustained during the employment or that
such employment increased the risk of contracting the same; The
evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent.
Aya-ay died due to CVA or stroke, a disease not listed as a
compensable illness under Appendix 1 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract. Hence, it was incumbent on petitioners to
present substantial evidence, or such
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
283
VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 283
Aya-ay, Sr. vs. Arpaphil Shipping Corp.
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion, that the eye injury sustained by
Aya-ay during the term of his employment with respondents
caused, or increased the risk of, CVA. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial,
and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or
work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely apparent.
Same; Same; Same; Bare allegations do not suffice to discharge
the required quantum of proof of compensability.That a seaman
died several months after his repatriation for illness does not
necessarily mean that: (a) he died of the same illness; (b) his
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness
which caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless
there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise. This Court finds
that under the circumstances petitioners bare allegations do not
suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of
compensability. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations
or presumptions. The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a
positive proposition.
Same; Same; Same; Without an expert witness to evaluate and
explain how the statements contained in medical sources actually
relate to the facts surrounding the case, they are insufficient to
establish the nexus to support their claims.While petitioners
attempted to scientifically establish that Aya-ays eye injury
resulted to, or increased the risk of, CVA by resorting to a detailed
medical discus-sion lifted from medical sources and subjecting them
to their own laymans interpretation and randomly applying them
to the circumstances attendant to the case, the same fails. Without
an expert witness to evaluate and explain how the statements
contained in such medical sources actually relate to the facts
surrounding the case, they are insufficient to establish the nexus to
support their claims.
Same; Administrative Law; Quasi-Judicial Bodies; Technical
Rules of Procedure; The fact that administrative bodies are not
bound by technical rules of procedure in adjudication of cases does
not mean that basic rules on proving allegations should be entirely
dispensed withany decision based on unsubstantiated allegation
cannot stand as it will offend due process.That administrative
quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by technical rules
of procedure
284
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
in the adjudication of cases does not mean that the basic rules on
proving allegations should be entirely dispensed with. A party
alleging a critical fact must still support his allegation with
substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated
allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process. x x x the
liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to
limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As this
Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative value. More
specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC: It is true that
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of
cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a
license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan for petitioners.
Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for private
respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the
January 24, 2002 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 50576 which denied due course to the
petition for certiorari filed by spouses Ponciano, Sr. and
Clemencia Aya-ay (petitioners), a reconsideration of which
decision was denied by Resolution
2
of September 10, 2002.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
Respondent Arpaphil Shipping Corporation (Arpaphil), a
domestic manning corporation, engaged the services of
Ponciano Aya-ay, Jr. (Aya-ay) to work as seaman for
respondent
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 32-39.
2 Id., at p. 40.
285
VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 285
Magna Marine, Inc. (Magna Marine), a Greek shipping
company.
After the parties executed an 11-month Contract of
Employment
3
dated October 15, 1994 which bore the
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), Aya-ay departed on October 26,
1994 from the Philippines on board the vessel M/V Panoria.
4
On June 1, 1995, as Aya-ay was cleaning the vessels air
compressor, a sudden backflow of compressed air containing
sand and rust hit his right eye. As the vessel was then
plying near the Port of Hawaii on its way to Australia, Aya-
ay asked the vessels captain, G. Livarados, that he be
brought to a hospital for medical treatment, but the captain
advised to just relax and take it easy. His eye was washed
with salt water and treated with eye drops, and he was given
oral antibiotics.
On arrival of the vessel at the Port of Brisbane, Australia
on June 16, 1995, Aya-ay was referred to Dr. Lawrence W.
Hirst of the University of Queensland who performed a
corneal graft and vitrectomy.
In his Medical Report
5
dated June 20, 1995, Dr. Hirst
stated that Aya-ay had a large central corneal perforation
with iris prolapse which appeared to be a result of a severe
corneal infection. He concluded that there was evidence of
infection in the front of the eye although the back of the eye
was not grossly infected.
6
On examination on July 4, 1995 by Dr. John S. Ambler,
also of the University of Queensland, the doctor, in his
Medical Certificate
7
of even date, opined that Aya-ay had
been totally incapacitated for work since June 16, 1995 and
would remain to be so until August 16, 1995.
_______________
3 Id., at p. 58.
4 Id., at p. 155.
5 Id., at pp. 59-60.
6 Id., at p. 59.
7 Id., at p. 61.
286
On examination by Dr. Michael Whitby, consultant
physician for infectious diseases at Brisbane, Australia, who
was requested to be involved in the management of the
eye injury of Aya-ay, the doctor, in his letter
8
to Dr. Hirst
dated July 10, 1995, noted the details of the continued
treatment of Aya-ays eye injury and stated that he had not
made any further arrangements to follow the patient
further.
On July 5, 1995, Ponciano was repatriated to Manila.
9
In a Medical Report
10
dated September 7, 1995, Dr.
Ramon J. Ongsiako, Jr. and Dr. Carmela Ongsiako-Isabela
stated that Ponciano repaired to their clinic on August 1,
1995 for redness and blurring of vision of his right eye, and
that upon examination, they found that there was corneal
graft rejection in Aya-ays affected area. They thus
recommended a repeat corneal transplant once the
inflammation in his eye had subsided, and expenses to be
incurred therefor were, upon Aya-ays request, therein
itemized.
In a Medical Report
11
dated November 21, 1995, Dr.
Ongsiako-Isabela stated that Aya-ay was awaiting a corneal
donor and directed that in the meantime he is to be cleared
cardiopulmonary wise for surgery.
By still another Medical Report
12
dated November 27,
1996, Dr. Ongsiako-Isabela stated that:
Mr. Ponciano Aya-ay, Jr., was referred to Dr. Anthony King last
November 21, 1995 for cardiac clearance prior to corneal transplant.
At that time, he was not complaining of any symptoms refer-rable to
the heart, like chest pains, palpitations, difficulty of breathing. Past
medical history and family history was (sic) unremarkable.
His physical exam showed a normal blood pressure of 130/85,
normal cardiac rate of 62 per minute. Cardiac exam was negative
for
_______________
8
Id., at p. 174.
9
Id., at p. 16.
10
Id., at p. 175.
11
Id., at p. 176.
12
Id., at p. 70.
287
VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 287
murmurs or abnormal heart sounds. There were no rales or
wheezes. An electrocardiogram (ECG) showed sinus arrhythmia
which is a finding compatible with his age. Attached is a copy of his
ECG.
With these findings, Dr. Anthony King said that there was no
evidence of an active heart disease and granted Mr. Aya-ay cardiac
clearance for the procedure.
13
(Italics supplied)
Aya-ays corneal transplant was thus scheduled on
December 7, 1995.
14
On December 1, 1995, however, Aya-ay
died. The Certificate of Death
15
issued by Dr. Isidoro A.
Ayson, Medical Officer IV of the Caloocan Health
Department, indicates that the immediate cause of death
was cerebro-vascular accident (CVA).
Having died without issue, Aya-ays parents, herein
petitioners, claimed death benefits from herein respondents
Arpaphil and Magna Marine which claims were rejected.
Petitioners thereupon filed on August 2, 1996 an
Affidavit/Complaint
16
before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC OCW Case No. 00-
08-2327-96, praying that respondents Arpaphil and Magna
Marine be ordered to pay them death compensation benefits
in the amount of USD 50,000 under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract;
17
burial assistance in the amount of
USD 1,000; moral, actual and exemplary damages in an
amount not less than P300,000; and attorneys fees
equivalent to 10% of the total claim.
Respondents in their Answer
18
contended that since Aya-
ays contractual relationship with them had already ceased
at the time of his death, the cause of which was in no way re-
_______________
13 Ibid.
14 Id., at p. 66.
15 Id., at p. 72.
16 Records, pp. 2-6.
17 Rollo, pp. 167-172.
18 Records, pp. 11-16.
288
lated to the eye injury, they could not be held liable for any
death benefits.
After the parties had filed their respective position
papers,
19
Labor Arbiter Renell Joseph R. Dela Cruz, by
Decision
20
of July 4, 1997, ordered Arpaphil to indemnify
herein petitioners death benefits in the amount of USD
50,000 and an additional USD 1,000 as burial assistance for
the death of their son.
In granting death benefits and burial assistance to
petitioners, the Labor Arbiter held:
The death of complainants son is compensable. It is sufficient that
the risk of contracting the cause of death was set in motion or
aggravated by a work-related injury sustained during the lifetime of
their sons contract of employment.
Otherwise stated, where the primary injury is shown to have
been suffered in the course of employment, every natural
consequences (sic) that flows from the injury likewise arises out of
employment.
In the case at bar, there is a proximate connection of the primary
injury sustained by the deceased to the cause of his death. The risk
of contracting cerebro-vascular accident (CVA) is greater during
state of depression like what the deceased was suffering and
complaining before his untimely demise.
As what actually happened the deceased felt so sorry for himself
having been deprived of his only means of livelihood at the prime of
his youth and for having to think that had the master of the vessel
gave (sic) him prompt and proper medical treatment he could have
probably been saved from the misfortune that befell upon him; a
circumstance that alone should make the respondents answerable.
21
(Italics supplied)
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 30-46 and 75-83.
20 Id., at pp. 109-113.
21 Id., at pp. 112-113.
289
VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 289
On appeal, the NLRC, by Decision
22
of October 31, 1997, set
aside the July 4, 1997 Decision of the labor arbiter but
ordered respondents to pay petitioners the amount of
P20,000 for humanitarian considerations in light of the
following considerations:
It is clear from the records that the deceased seaman sustained an
injury to his right eye while on board the MV Panoria. It is equally
true that no competent evidence has been adduced by the
complainants to bolster their contention that the work-sustained
injury has a direct bearing and/or influence on the cause of death.
As the respondents have so aptly discussed, and with which We
agree, to wit:
CVA or Cerebro-Vascular Accident, or stroke, is defined in the text
Principles of Internal Medicine (International Student Edition, McGraw
Hill Book Company, New York, 1966 Ed., Chap. 204, p. 1146) as follows:
The clinical picture resulting from vascular disease is in most instances so
distinctive that the diagnosis is more readily made than any other in the realm
of neurology. The cardinal feature is the stroke, a term which connotes the
sudden and dramatic development of a focal neurologic deficit. In its severest
forms, the patient falls hemiplegic and even unconsciousan event so striking
as to deserve its own separate designation, namely, apoplexy, stroke, shock,
cerebrovascular accident. x x x.
x x x
The neurologic deficit in a stroke depends, of course, on the location of the
infarct or hemorrhage in the brain and the size of the lesion. Hemiplegia is the
classical sign of vascular disease and occurs chiefly with massive lesions of the
brainstem. In the most serious cases of hemorrhage, the patient literally falls
in his tracks, paralyzed on one side, and soon passes into deep coma and dies
within a few hours.
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 268-275.
290
CVA is classified under the broad umbrella of the term
Cerebrovascular Diseases, which is defined and the underlying
causes for which are discussed in the same above-cited text (Id., at
p. 1146) as follows:
The term cerebrovascular disease is intended here to denote any disease
in which one or more of the blood vessels of the brain are primarily
implicated in a pathologic process. By pathologic process is meant any
abnormality of the vessel wall, an occlusion by thrombus or embolus,
rupture of a vessel, a failure of cerebral flow due to a fall in blood
pressure, a change in the caliber of the lumen, altered permeability of the
vascular wall, or increased viscosity or other quality of the blood. The
pathologic process within the vessel may be described not only according
to its grosser aspectsthrombosis, embolism, rupture of a vessel, etc.
but also in terms of the more basic vascular disorders, i.e.,
hypertensive arteriosclerosis, arteritis, trauma, aneurism, developmental
malformation, etc.
Nothing therein can in any way support the complainants
submission and the Honorable Arbiters conclusion that CVA may
result from an eye injury, or from infection (which incidentally was
already corrected), or from depression. Thus, it is clear that
respondents are not liable for death benefits arising from seaman
Aya-ays death.
Be that as it may, We are of the opinion that on grounds of
humanitarian considerations, the deceased seaman having, in his
own little way, dedicated his efforts to respondents endeavors, that
the latter be ordered to grant the complainants financial assistance
in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). (Italics in
the original)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
23
of the October 31,
1997 NLRC Decision having been denied for lack of merit
by Resolution
24
of January 27, 1998, they filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Prelimi-
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 278-287.
24 Id., at p. 333.
291
VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 291
nary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
25
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 133524.
After respondents and the NLRC, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed their respective Comments,
26
this
Court referred the petition to the CA by Resolution
27
of
December 9, 1998, in view of its ruling in St. Martin Funeral
Home v. NLRC.
28
By Decision of January 24, 2002,
29
the CA denied due
course to the petition, it finding that indeed no substantial
evidence enough to establish petitioners entitlement to the
various benefits and damages claimed was presented.
Their Motion for Reconsideration
30
having been denied
by the CA by Resolution
31
of September 10, 2002, petitioners
filed the present petition for review on certiorari
32
raising
the fol-
lowing issue:
WHETHER THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO CLAIM THE
BENEFITS UNDER THE POEA CONTRACT WHICH AROSE
FROM THE DEATH OF THE SEAFARER PONCIANO AYA-AY,
JR. AND WHAT AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED FROM
THE PETITIONERS TO PROVE THEIR ENTITLEMENT
THERETO.
33
The pivotal issue for resolution is whether petitioners are
entitled to the death benefits provided for under the POEA
1.
3.
a.
c.
Standard Employment Contract.
_______________
25 CA Rollo, pp. 8-26.
26 Id., at pp. 42-58 and 98-109.
27 Id., at p. 110.
28 G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494.
29 Penned by Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo with Justices Ruben T.
Reyes and Renato C. Dacudao concurring.
30 CA Rollo, pp. 134-145.
31 Rollo, p. 40.
32 Id., at pp. 12-31.
33 Id., at p. 20.
292
Part II, Section C, Nos. 1 and 3 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All
Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels provide:
C. Compensation and Benefits
In case of death of the seaman during the term of his
Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the
Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000
and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under
the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children
at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of
payment.x x x x
The other liabilities of the employer when the seaman dies
as a result of injury or illness during the term of
employment are as follows:
The employer shall pay the deceaseds beneficiary all
outstanding obligations due the seaman under this
Contract.
x x x x
In all cases, the employer shall pay the beneficiaries of
seamen the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount
of US$1,000 for burial expenses at exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment. (Italics supplied)
In order to give effect to the aforequoted benefits, it must be
shown that the employee died during the effectivity of the contract
of employment.
34
Part I, Section H, Nos. 1 and 2(a) of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract provide:
Section H. Termination of Employment
1. The employment of the seaman shall cease on expiration of the
contract period indicated in the Crew Contract unless the Master
and the Seaman, by mutual consent, in writing, agree to an early
termination in which case the seaman is entitled to earned wages
and benefits only.
_______________
34 Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 144665, September 8,
2004, 437 SCRA 608, 617.
293
VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 293
2. The master shall have the right to discharge or sign off the
seaman at any place abroad in accordance with the terms and
conditions of this Contract and specifically for the following reasons:
a. If the seaman is incompetent, or is continuously incapacitated for the
duties for which he was employed by reason of illness or injury (Italics
supplied)
Upon mutual consent of Aya-ay and respondents, he was on
July 5, 1995 repatriated on account of his eye injury. Thus
his employment had been effectively terminated on that
particular date.
35
At all events, under the October 15, 1994 Contract of
Employment, Aya-ay ceased to be an employee on
September 26, 1995,
36
hence, he was no longer an employee
when he died on December 1, 1995.
It is, therefore, crucial to determine whether Aya-ay died
as a result of, or in relation to, the eye injury he suffered
during the term of his employment. If the injury is the
proximate cause,
37
or at least increased the risk, of his death
for
_______________
35 Id., at p. 618.
36 Part I, Section D of the POEA Standard Contract provides:
Section D. Commencement of Employment The employment relationship
between the employer on the one hand and the seaman on the other, shall
commence upon approval of this Contract and the seaman has been cleared for
travel and departure by all government authorities to his port of embarkation
overseas.
37 Belarmino v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No.
90204, May 11, 1990, 185 SCRA 304, 308 (1990) provides:
x x x proximate cause x x x is the efficient cause, which may be the most remote
of an operative chain. It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to
be distinguished from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective
cause operates, and must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage
without the intervention of an independent cause.
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in
294
which compensation is sought, recovery may be had for said
death.
38
Unless there is substantial evidence showing that: (a) the
cause of Aya-ays death was reasonably connected with his
work; or (b) the sickness/ailment for which he died is an
accepted occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he
died, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded.
39
Aya-ay died due to CVA or stroke, a disease not listed as
a compensable illness under Appendix 1 of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract.
Hence, it was incumbent on petitioners to present
substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion,
40
that the eye injury sustained by Aya-ay during
the term of his employment with respondents caused, or
increased the risk of, CVA.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.
41
The
evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely
appar-
_______________
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted x x x.
38 Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 388 Phil. 906, 914-915; 333 SCRA 236, 243
(2000).
39 Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, supra (citation omitted).
40 Reyes v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 93003,
March 3, 1992, 206 SCRA 726, 732 (citation omitted), Rodriguez v.
Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 46454, September 28,
1989, 178 SCRA 30, 33 (citations omitted).
41 Government System Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 357
Phil. 511, 531; 296 SCRA 514, 534 (1998) (citation omitted), Gelmart
Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Leogardo, No. L-70544, November 5, 1987, 155
SCRA 403, 410 (citation omitted).
295
VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 295
ent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-
aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely
apparent.
42
To buttress their position that there is a causal link
between Aya-ays eye injury and his death, petitioners
argue as follows:
If only Aya-ay, Jr. was immediately medically treated by a
competent doctor and not by the respondents Captain with, among
others, salt water, severe corneal infection (admitted and stated in
paragraph 11 of the respondents Answer) could have been
prevented. If the same was prevented, there will be no need for a
corneal graft (Annex 2, respondents Answer). If corneal graft
have (sic) been unnecessary, there will be no corneal graft
rejection and repeat corneal transplantation (Annex 4,
respondents Answer). If not because of the recommended repeat
corneal transplantation, Dr. Anthony King could not have granted
cardiac clearance. The seafarer was subjected to extreme anxiety
and depression about the thought of totally losing his right eye. His
blood pressure would not have risen and would not have suffered
from CVA or stroke. He would not have died on December 1, 1995.
Clearly, it is the negligence and fault of the respondents in taking
for granted the situation of Aya-ay, Jr. that led to his untimely
demise. The complications in his eye triggered the series of
infections and operations and other procedures on the poor seafarer.
These (sic) series of events logically presented, were (sic) more than
enough to constitute substantial evidence.
43
Refuting petitioners arguments, respondents aver that,
among other things, there is no established link between
seaman Aya-ays eye injury and the CVA that killed him;
otherwise stated, the former is not the cause of the latter.
CVA is not a natural consequence of such an injury.
That a seaman died several months after his repatriation
for illness does not necessarily mean that: (a) he died of the
same illness; (b) his working conditions increased the risk of
_______________
42 Rio v. Employees Compensation Commission, 387 Phil. 612, 619;
331 SCRA 596, 603 (2000) (citation omitted).
43 Rollo, p. 23.
296
contracting the illness which caused his death; and (c) the
death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis
to support otherwise.
44
This Court finds that under the circumstances
petitioners bare allegations do not suffice to discharge the
required quantum of proof of compensability. Awards of
compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions.
45
The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive
proposition.
46
While petitioners attempted to scientifically establish
that Aya-ays eye injury resulted to, or increased the risk of,
CVA by resorting to a detailed medical discussion lifted
from medical sources and subjecting them to their own
laymans interpretation and randomly applying them to the
circumstances attendant to the case, the same fails. Without
an expert witness to evaluate and explain how the
statements contained in such medical sources actually
relate to the facts surrounding the case, they are insufficient
to establish the nexus to support their claims.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that there is no need to
resort to the intricacies of the Rules on Evidence to establish
that the death of Aya-ay was caused by the eye injury,
citing Section 10, Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC:
Section 10. Technical rules not binding.The rules of procedure
and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process.
That administrative quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are
not bound by technical rules of procedure in the adjudica-
_______________
44 Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, supra at p. 621.
45 Kirit, Sr. v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.
48580, July 6, 1990, 187 SCRA 224, 227.
46 Rio v. Employees Compensation Commission, supra.
297
VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 297
tion of cases
47
does not mean that the basic rules on proving
allegations should be entirely dispensed with. A party
alleging a critical fact must still support his allegation with
substantial evidence. Any decision based on
unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend
due process.
48
x x x the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject
to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As this
Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative value. More
specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC:
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are
not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases.
However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.
49
While this Court commiserates with petitioners plight,
absent substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for
the grant of death benefits prayed for can be drawn, it is left
with no alternative but to deny their petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 24, 2002 and the Resolution dated
September 10, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairman), Carpio and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
_______________
47 IBM Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commision, 365 Phil.
137, 147; 305 SCRA 592, 600 (1999) (citation omitted).
48 De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 364 Phil. 91, 102; 304 SCRA 448, 459 (1999).
49 IBM Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra at
pp. 147-148; pp. 600-601 (citations omitted).
298
Philippine National Oil Company vs. National College of
Business and Arts
Notes.The death of a seaman during the term of his
employment makes the employer liable to the formers heirs
for death compensation benefits unless the employer can
successfully prove that the seamans death was caused by an
injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.
(NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 284 SCRA 239 [1998])
The captain, as the general agent of the shipowner, could
be held liable for failing to make the workplace safe. (Singa
Ship Management Phils., Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 288 SCRA 692 [1998])
o0o
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