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Answers of Managerial Economics Homework #2

Chapter 5~Chapter 9

1.Using figre 5.! as a "asis# constrct a series of for figres to show the effect of an
increase in the $eman$ for tanker ser%ice on the market price when &a' $eman$ is
e(tremel) inelastic# &"' $eman$ is e(tremel) elastic# &c' sppl) is e(tremel) inelastic#
an$ &$' sppl) is e(tremel) elastic.
Answer*
2.+n$str) researchers ,.-. .lato pre$icte$ that# "etween 2//!0/1# oil prices wol$
fall ") 52# pro$ction of oil ") 3.EC an$ the former -o%iet Union wol$ increase#
an$ $eli%eries of new tankers wol$ e(cee$ scrappage of ol$er %essels. &-orce*
Platou Report 2004# www.plato.com'.
a. Using sita"le $iagrams# e(plain how each of the following wol$ affect
the market for tanker ser%ices* &i' a fall in oil prices4 &ii' an increase in
pro$ction ") 3.EC an$ the former -o%iet Union4 &iii' new tanker
$eli%eries4 an$ &i%' scrappage of ol$er %essels.
". -ppose that the net effect is to increase tanker rates. +llstrate the net
effect on a single $iagram. E(plain the impact on the 5antit) of tanker
ser%ices se$.
c. +n actalit)# oil prices increase$ ") 252 "etween 2//! an$ 2//1 an$
3.EC an$ the former -o%iet Union pro$ction increase$ ") a"ot 1/2.
Mo$if) )or anal)ses in &a' for these changes.
Answer*
&a' 6all in oil price wol$ re$ce the operating costs of tankers# an$ hence#
increase the sppl) of tanker ser%ices. +ncrease in oil pro$ction wol$
increase the $eman$ for tanker ser%ices. 7ew tanker $eli%eries wol$ increase
the sppl) of tanker ser%ices# while scrappage wol$ re$ce the sppl).
&"' .lease refer to $iagram "elow. 8antit) of tanker ser%ices se$ col$ "e
higher or lower# $epen$ing on the elasticities of $eman$ an$ sppl).
&c' +n actalit)# oil prices increase$ rather than fell. 9he net impact on the sppl)
is am"igos* it $epen$s on which effect is larger 0 the increase in oil prices
on the cost of tanker operations or the net increase in the tanker capacit). 9he
re%ise$ figre is as follows*
!.+n 2//2# +ra5:s ;irkk region e(porte$ /.50/.< million "arrels of cr$e oil per $a)
&mp$' ") pipeline to the 9rkish port of Ce)han. 6ollowing the U.-.=le$ coalition
attack against +ra5# the pipeline was sa"otage$ an$ ;irkk oil e(ports were $isrpte$.
,efineries in western Erope switche$ to ")ing oil from the Urals in ,ssia# which
pro$ce oil that is chemicall) similar to ;irkk. Urals oil is shippe$ to western
Erope ") tanker from the >lack -ea throgh the >ospors an$ ?ar$anelles.
Howe%er# ") earl) 2//1# the srge in Eropean $eman$ an$ congestion in the
>ospors an$ ?ar$anelles ha$ lifte$ spot tanker rates to @!9#/// per $a) &-orce*
A>ospors 9anker Congestion 9hreatens -hortage of 3il#B Financial Times# Canar)
12# 2//1'.
a. Using sita"le $eman$ an$ sppl) cr%es# illstrate the short=rn effects of
pipeline $isrption on the tanker ser%ices market.
". Using )or $iagram for &a'# illstrate the long=rn effects of the pipeline
$isrption.
c. Dhen political con$itions in +ra5 are restore$ to normal# e(ports ")
pipeline will resme# an$ the $eman$ for tanker ser%ices will fall. Dith
lower charter rates# the owner of a tanker mst $eci$e whether to contine
operating# temporaril) la) p# or scrap the %essel. E(plain how the owner
shol$ choose among these alternati%es.
Answer*
&a' .ipeline $isrption increase$ the $eman$ for tanker ser%ices.
&"' +n the long rn# the price wol$ "e higher than the original e5ili"rim# "t
lower than @!9#/// per $a). 9he 5antit) of tanker ser%ices wol$ "e higher
than in the short rn e5ili"rim# an$ in trn# higher than in the original
e5ili"rim.
&c' 9he choice "etween operating an$ la)ing p is a short rn $ecision. +f the
short rn rate is "elow the a%erage %aria"le cost# the owner shol$ la) p the
tanker. 9he choice "etween operating an$ scrapping is a long rn $ecision. +f
the long rn rate is "elow the a%erage cost# the owner shol$ scrap the tanker.
1.9)pical real=estate "roker* E+n California# the seller alwa)s pa)s the "rokerFs
commission# so# ")ers get "rokerage ser%ices free.E
M>A* E+f the cstom were for the ")er to pa) the commission# then wol$
sellers get "rokerage ser%ices freeGE
,eal=estate "roker# clearl) losing patience* E9hat is a prel) h)pothetical scenario#
"t if that sitation were to arise# )es# + gess )oFre right.E
a. Assme that each seller pa)s a "rokersF commission of H1<#///. 9hen# the
sppl) of hoses incl$es the cost of "rokerage. +llstrate the market
e5ili"rim with a price of H!1/#/// per hose an$ sale of 2//#/// hoses
a )ear.
b. 7ow sppose that ")ers rather than sellers pa) the H1<#/// commission.
Using )or figre# illstrate the following* &i' shift the sppl) cr%e $own
") H1<#/// since sellers $o not pa) the commission# an$ &ii' shift the
$eman$ cr%e $own ") H1<#/// since ")ers now pa) the commission.
c. Compare the market e5ili"ria of &a' an$ &"' in terms of &i' the net price
recei%e$ ") sellers# an$ &ii' the net price pai$ ") ")ers. &7et prices are
net of "rokerage commission# if an)'.
Answer*
9he net price wol$ not "e affecte$ for either ")er or seller.
5.E=commerce is pre$icte$ to re$ce the cost of interme$iar) ser%ices sch as those of
tra%el agencies# real=estate "rokers# an$ in%estment a$%isors. Consi$er the market for
air tra%el. -ppose that# with con%entional tra%el agencies# the market e5ili"rim
price is H!// per ticket# incl$ing a H15 interme$iation cost. 9he 5antit) "oght is 2
million tickets a )ear. Dith e=commerce# howe%er# the interme$iation cost falls to H2
per ticket.
a. Using sita"le $eman$ an$ sppl) cr%es# illstrate the original
e5ili"rim with con%entional tra%el agencies. ,epresent the
interme$iation cost ") shifting the sppl) cr%e.
". +llstrate the new e5ili"rim with e=commerce.
c. Dhat factors $etermine the e(tent to which consmers will "enefit from e=
commerceG E(plain )or answer with $eman$ an$ sppl) cr%es.
Answer*
+n the market for air tra%el# the $eman$ arises from "siness an$ leisre tra%elers
while airlines pro%i$e the sppl).
&a' 9he H15 interme$iation cost shifts p the sppl) cr%e an$ the e5ili"rim is
at m with a price of H!// an$ 5antit) of 2 million tickets per )ear.
&"' Dith e=commerce# the cost of interme$iation falls to H2# an$ the new
e5ili"rim is at n# with a lower price an$ larger 5antit).
&c' 9he elasticities of $eman$ an$ sppl) with respect to price.
I.8antas operates a fleet of o%er 1// >oeing Jet aircraft. Commercial passenger Jets
mst "e operate$ ") a pilot an$ co=pilot. Man) Jets carr) cargo in their E"elliesE#
n$er the passenger seating areas. Consi$er each of the following costs. +$entif)
which are Joint costs of passenger an$ "ell) cargo ser%ices# which are fi(e$ costs of
passenger ser%ice# an$ which are "oth.
a. Cockpit personnel* All Jets# large an$ small# re5ire a pilot an$ co=pilot.
>ell) cargo ser%ice re5ires no a$$itional officers in the cockpit.
". Airport lan$ing fees* -ome airports charge lan$ing fees ") weight of the
aircraft# while others le%) a fi(e$ fee# regar$less of weight.
c. 6el* Karger aircraft an$ those carr)ing hea%ier loa$s will consme
relati%el) more fel.
Answer*
&a' Coint cost# an$ also a fi(e$ cost.
&"' +f the lan$ing fee %aries with weight# then it is not Joint or fi(e$. +f a Jet
carries an a$$itional 1// pon$s of cargo# the airline mst pa) a$$itional
fees. -imilarl)# if the Jet carries an a$$itional passenger. +f the lan$ing fee
is fi(e$# then it is a Joint cost an$ a fi(e$ cost.
&c' 7either a Joint cost# nor a fi(e$ cost. +f a Jet carries an a$$itional 1// pon$s
of cargo# the airline mst spen$ more on fel. -imilarl)# if the Jet carries an
a$$itional passenger.
L.+n April 199I# the -ingapore 9echnologies Mrop ac5ire$ $isk=$ri%e manfactrer
Micropolis for -H</ million. Micropolis was hit ") a se%ere $owntrn in the $isk
$ri%e in$str)# an$ $espite -H55/ million in loans# the compan) ha$ to "e li5i$ate$
in late 199L. Ki5i$ators estimate$ the market %ale of Micropolis:s assets to "e -HLI
million as compare$ with their -H2L1 million "ook %ale. 9a"le L.11 lists the
estimates for %arios categories of assets.
a. Dhich of the following "est $escri"es the $ifference "etween "ook %ale
an$ estimate$ realiNa"le %ale* &i' snk cost# &ii' opportnit) cost# &iii'
fi(e$ costG E(plain )or answer.
". ?efine Aspecificit)B as the ratio of "ook %ale less estimate$ realiNa"le
%ale to "ook %ale# in percentage terms. Calclate the specificit) of &i'
in%entories an$ work=in=progress# &ii' pro$ction e5ipment# an$ &iii'
factor).
c. E(plain the relation "etween snk costs an$ specificit).
$. E(plain wh) Micropolis:s in%entories an$ work=in=progress an$
pro$ction e5ipment ha%e a higher specificit) than the factor).
9a"le. Micropolis* Assets# ?ecem"er 199L &-H million'
>ook %ale Estimate$
realiNa"le %ale
-pecificit)
&2'
+n%entories an$ work=in=
progress
1!/ 1! 9/
.ro$ction e5ipment !1 1 <<
6actor) L/ 15 !I
3ther items 1/ 11
9otal 2L1 LI
Answer*
&a' -nk cost. 9here is no wa) to sell the assets for their "ook %ale. 9he
$ifference "etween the "ook an$ realiNa"le %ale cannot "e a%oi$e$.
&"' -ee 9a"le L.11# last colmn.
&c' 9he higher is $egree to which the cost of an asset is snk# the higher is its
specificit).
&$' +n%entories an$ work=in=progress ma) "e 5ite specific to Micropolis in the
sense that other manfactrers cannot easil) integrate them into their
pro$ction processes. >) contrast# the factor) might "e easil) con%erte$ into
other ses.
<.9a"le <.2 $escri"es the $eman$ an$ costs for -olar .harmaceticalFs Mamma=1 $rg.
-ppose that the costs ha%e "een change$ to a fi(e$ cost of HL5 million# an$ a
constant marginal cost of H5/ per nit. 9he $eman$ remains the same.
a. .repare a new ta"le of re%enes an$ costs accor$ing to the new $ata.
". Dhat is the profit=ma(imiNing price an$ pro$ction scaleG
c. At that pro$ction scale# what are the marginal re%ene an$ the marginal
costG
Answer*
&a' Mo$ifie$ %ersion of 9a"le <.2.
.rice -ales 9otal Marginal 9otal Marginal .rofit
,e%ene re%ene cost cost
&H' &H' &H' &H' &H' &H'
2// /./ / L5 =L5
19/ /.2 !< 19/ <5 5/ =1L
1</ /.1 L2 1L/ 95 5/ =2!
1L/ /.I 1/2 15/ 1/5 5/ =!
1I/ /.< 12< 1!/ 115 5/ 1!
15/ 1./ 15/ 11/ 125 5/ 25
11/ 1.2 1I< 9/ 1!5 5/ !!
1!/ 1.1 1<2 L/ 115 5/ !L
12/ 1.I 192 5/ 155 5/ !L
11/ 1.< 19< !/ 1I5 5/ !!
1// 2./ 2// 1/ 1L5 5/ 25
9/ 2.2 19< =1/ 1<5 5/ 1!
7ote* -ales# total re%ene# total cost# an$ profit in millions
(b) 9wo prices )iel$ the same ma(imm profit of H!L million a )ear. 3ne of the
profit=ma(imiNing prices is H12/ per nit# an$ the correspon$ing scale is 1.I
million nits per )ear. Comment* +f we anal)Ne$ the $eman$ in greater
$etail with price increments of H5# we wol$ $etermine that the actal profit=
ma(imiNing price is H125# which )iel$s a profit of H!L.5 million a )ear.
(c) At that scale# the marginal re%ene O marginal cost O H5/ per nit.
9.Hong ;ong ?irector=Meneral of 9elecommnications Anthon) Dong e(presse$
concern a"ot the effect of license actions on the price of telecommnications*
A9here:s goo$ an$ "a$ in actioning off spectrm P it ma) raise costs for telecoms
pro%i$ersB &A9elecoms chief sees frther fall in long=$istance tariffsB# South China
Morning Post# ?ecem"er !1# 1999# >siness 1.'
a.9)picall)# licenses are transfera"le# "t the one=time license fee# once pai$# is not
refn$a"le. 6rom an operational stan$point# how $oes the cost of a license $epen$ on
the price# if an)# that the owner pai$ for itG
".How $oes the one=time license fee affect the marginal cost of pro%i$ing
telecommnications ser%iceG How $oes it affect the profit=ma(imiNing scale of
operationsG
c.-ppose that the one=time license fee is change$ to an annal charge "ase$ on the
telecommnications pro%i$er:s re%ene. How wol$ the new polic) affect the ser%ice
pro%i$er:s profit=ma(imiNing scale of operationsG
Answer*
&a' 9he cost of a license $epen$s on the pre%ailing market price of licenses#
which ma) ha%e little or no relation to the price that the owner pai$ for it at
an earlier time.
&"' 9he one=time license fee is a fi(e$ cost with respect to the scale of operations
an$ $oes not affect the marginal cost. Hence it $oes not affect the profit=
ma(imiNing scale of operations.
&c' 9he annal charge "ase$ on the telecommnications pro%i$er:s re%ene
wol$ raise the pro%i$er:s marginal cost# an$ hence re$ce the profit=
ma(imiNing scale.
1/.,eferring to figre 9.1# sppose that Mercr) Airlines: marginal re%ene an$
$eman$ cr%es cross the marginal cost cr%e at 5antities of !#/// an$ I#/// seats
a week# respecti%el). All other $ata remain the same.
a. Calclate the profit n$er policies of &i' niform pricing# an$
&ii' complete price $iscrimination.
". -ppose that Mercr) implements complete price $iscrimination. E(plain
wh) it shol$ sell p to the 5antit) where the ")er:s marginal "enefit
e5als Mercr):s marginal cost.
c. E(plain wh) Mercr):s profit is higher with complete price $iscrimination
than with niform pricing.
Answer*
&a' 9he "est wa) to answer this 5estion starts from a $iagram.

4000
p
800
3000 6000
quantity (seats per week)
0
&i' Un$er niform pricing# the profit=ma(imiNing 5antit) is where M,OMC
or 8O!///. ,eferring to the figre# at that 8# the price p on the $eman$
cr%e mst "e halfwa) "etween <// an$ 1///. Hence# p O 2#1//
$irhams# an$ profit O &2#1// = <//' ( !/// O 5#<//#/// $irhams.
&ii' Un$er complete price $iscrimination# the seller shol$ sell the 5antit)
where M> O MC. ,eferring to the 6igre# that 5antit) is 8 O I///.
9hen# total re%ene is the area n$er the $eman$ cr%e p to 8 O I///#
hence 9, O Q&1///R<//'S2T ( I/// O 11#1//#/// $irhams. 7ow total
cost# 9C O <// ( I/// O 1#<//#/// $irhams# hence the profit O
11#1//#/// 0 1#<//#/// O 9#I//#/// $irhams.
&"' Mercr) ma(imiNes its profit ") pro$cing the 5antit) where the ")er:s
marginal "enefit e5als Mercr):s marginal cost. +f it sol$ a larger 5antit)#
so that the marginal "enefit is less than the marginal cost# then its profit
wol$ "e lower. >) contrast# if it sol$ a smaller 5antit)# it col$ increase
profit ") selling more.
&c' Complete price $iscrimination )iel$s more profit than niform pricing
"ecase it e(tracts a higher price from e(isting ")ers an$ e(ten$s sales to
new ")ers who wol$ not "e ser%e$ n$er niform pricing.
11.Microsoft offers special $isconts to st$ents. 3ther p"lishers ha%e $e%elope$
special Est$entE e$itions of their software with fewer featres than the reglar
packages.
a. Dh) $o p"lishers offer $isconts to st$entsG
". Dhat is the prpose of $e%eloping less powerfl Est$entE e$itionsG
c. -hol$ software p"lishers also offer $isconts to senior citiNens or
$e%elop Esenior citiNenE e$itionsG
Answer*
&a' -t$ent $eman$ is relati%el) more elastic than that of the a%erage software
ser for se%eral reasons* the) ha%e relati%el) lower income an$ st$ents ma)
ha%e more opportnit) to an$ less inhi"ition a"ot cop)ing software.
-t$ents can "e $irectl) segmente$ throgh st$ent +?s. Accor$ingl)#
software p"lishers can se $irect segment $iscrimination. 9hen# the) shol$
set a lower price to st$ents.
&"' 3ne pro"lem with $iscrimination is that potential sers of the high=price item
sch as "sinesses might prchase software from st$ents. -oftware
p"lishers can $eter this ar"itrage ") targeting less powerfl e$itions at
st$ents.
&c' 9he answer $epen$s on whether the $eman$ of senior citiNens for software is
more or less elastic relati%e to the a%erage ser. +f the $eman$ is more
elastic# then the p"lisher shol$ engage in price $iscrimination.
12.+n 2//1# U.-. consmer pro$cts manfactrers $istri"te$ 2L.51< "illion
copons# with a face %ale of o%er H2</ "illion# of which a mere 1.22 were
re$eeme$ ") consmers. Dh) $o manfactrers spen$ millions of $ollars to
$istri"te copons when the re$emption rate is so lowG Dh) $on:t the)
manfactrers $irectl) ct the wholesale prices of the pro$cts# which wol$ "e
mch cheaper to a$ministerG
a. -ome sa) that retailers wol$ a"sor" a $irect wholesale price ct instea$ of
passing it on to consmers. 9he) arge that# ") contrast# retailers cannot
a"sor" the %ale of copons. -ppose that the retail sector is perfectl)
competiti%e. Compare the $eman$=sppl) e5ili"rim in the retail market
with &i' a wholesale price ct of 5/ cents an$ &ii' wi$esprea$ $istri"tion
of 5/=cent copons. 6or this part# )o shol$ appl) the anal)sis of ta(
inci$ence from chapter I# treating a price ct or copon like a negati%e ta(#
an$ ma) assme that all consmers se copons.
". Dol$ there "e an) $ifference "etween the wholesale price ct an$ sing
copons if the retailer were a monopol)G &Contine to treat a price ct or
copon like a negati%e ta(# an$ assme that all consmers se copons.'
c. E(plain how copons ma) "e se$ to $iscriminate among consmers on
price. Compare this e(planation to the argment that retailers wol$
a"sor" a wholesale price ct.
Answer*
&a' Competiti%e retail market &i' 9he 5/=cent wholesale price ct will shift
$own the retail sppl) cr%e ") 5/ cents &increase the sppl)'# reslting in a
lower retail price an$ larger 5antit). ,eferring to the 6igre# the original
e5ili"rim is at a. 9he new e5ili"rim is at c# with price .: an$ 5antit) 8.
How mch the retail price falls will $epen$ on the price elasticities of
$eman$ an$ sppl). &ii' 9he issance of copons will affect the $eman$ si$e.
Assming that all consmers se 5/=cent copons# this will shift the retail
$eman$ p ") 5/ cents &increase the $eman$'# reslting in a higher retail
price an$ larger 5antit). ,eferring to the 6igre# the original e5ili"rim is
at a. 9he new e5ili"rim is at "# with price .:: an$ 5antit) 8. 9he net
price to the consmer is .:: = 5/ O .:. Comparing &i' an$ &ii'# the final
e5ili"rim in the retail market will "e the same == the new 5antit) of sales
an$ the net price to the consmer will "e the same.
&"' Monopol) retail in$str) &i' 9hen# a wholesale price ct wol$ re$ce the
monopol):s marginal cost ") 5/ cents. 9he monopol) wol$ ma(imiNe
profit at the sales 5antit) where the &nchange$' M, O the new MC. 9he
new price is .: an$ the sales are 8:. &ii' Assming all consmers se the 5/=
cent copons# then the copons wol$ shift the retail $eman$ p ") 5/ cents.
9his wol$ shift p the monopol):s M, ") 5/ cents also. 9he monopol)
wol$ ma(imiNe profit at the sales 5antit) where the new M, O the
&nchange$' MC. 9he new price is .:: an$ the sales are 8:. 9he net price to
the consmer is .:: = 5/ O .:. 9he figre shows the impact on the retail
market will "e the same == the new 5antit) of sales an$ the net price to the
consmer will "e the same. Hence# there is no $ifference "etween the
wholesale price ct an$ sing copons.

sales
0
p
Q
p
p
50 cents
original marg. cost
Q
marginal cost ater
w!olesale price cut

cents per unit
&c' +n realit)# not all consmers se copons. Assming that consmers with
more elastic $eman$ are more likel) to se copons# the retailer can se
copons to target a $iscont &an$ hence a lower price' at the consmer
segment with the more elastic $eman$. 9his is a case of in$irect segment
$iscrimination.

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