RULE 65

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS

1. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE
a. CERTIORARI

i. ARAULLO vs. AQUINO, G.R. NO. 209287, JULY 1, 2014
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be
grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
About the Case:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that
[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The tenor and context of the challenges posed
by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from
programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority under Section
25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the
Government.
But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.

FACTS:
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part
of Spending Acceleration Program, explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request
for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to
ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the
funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over
appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-
disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and
from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
Services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per
zero-
based budgeting findings; and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier
released to the agencies of the National Government. The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAPs use of
savings, namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his
office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority
in the use of savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP,the DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in
the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first time,
and made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over
Congressional pork barrel an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money
to a representatives district 7 excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows: G.R.
No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No.
209164 (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on October 17, 2013; G.R. No.
209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on November 6, 2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.
In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Courts attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure
Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed
the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing
and current allotments.
In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised and joined.

ISSUES:
Under the Advisory issued on November 14, 2013, the presentations of the parties during the oral arguments were limited to the following, to wit:
Procedural Issue:
A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
Subsumed in this issue are whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.

Substantive Issues:
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution insofar as:
(a) They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government agencies as savings as the term is used in
Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b) They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and
(c) They augment discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.
D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP, NBC No.
541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in accord with the GAAs.

RULING
I. Procedural Issue:
a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature of the petitions is individually set forth hereunder, to wit:
G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco) Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
G.R. No. 209136 (Luna) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209260 (IBP) Prohibition
G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) Certiorari
G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209569 (VACC) Certiorari and Prohibition
The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of adverse claims between the parties; that
the petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result of the
adoption of
the DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal standing to sue
considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or spending
power of Congress; and that even if the petitioners had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law available to them, like assailing the regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the Commission on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts.
The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality
and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive issuances implementing the DAP.22
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the
constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or
any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the
President in violation of the principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and
NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render.
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in the
COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts
by petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court.
The respondents arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court,
Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one
of the repositories of judicial power.25 However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its
exercise of the legislative power.
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.
The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a former Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the proposed
provisions on the Judiciary, where he said:
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable
and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband
complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that
she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity.
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has,
also, another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other
words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature,
by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari
exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the Kings Bench,
commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and
speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior courts judgment
was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the
petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in
matters of law.
The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to
essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction,
however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of
Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz:
x x x x
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that
it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower
court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.32
The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or
persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal
relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari
or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the
acts of legislative and executive officials.34
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the
challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with
both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment
is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.35
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty.
We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief
Executives spending power.

b) Requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review were complied with.
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer
locus standi on each of them.
In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether
appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As
such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad and wise discretion to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
B.
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

C.
No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to
retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in
the DAP was the transfer of funds.

D.
No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within
their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were
not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings
only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings
was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal
year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings
by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

E.
No.
Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is
a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

F.
Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse
all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot
be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative)
that they have not acted in good faith.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under
the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in
violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in
the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the
revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.


ii. TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. PNB- REPUBLIC BANK, G.R. NO. 151007, JULY 17, 2006
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The writ may
be issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in cases where the tribunal has issued an order without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 29, 2001 decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53033 which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Triplex Enterprises, Inc. for lack of merit.

The case stemmed from an action for annulment of contract, mandamus and damages filed by petitioner against Leverage & Services
Group, Inc.
[2]
and respondents PNB-Republic Bank and Solid Builders, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 153. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 64941.
Petitioner sought to annul the sale of two parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City by PNB-Republic Bank to Solid Builders, Inc. and to
compel PNB-Republic Bank to award instead the sale to it as the highest bidder. Petitioners claim was rejected by PNB-Republic Bank due to the
sale of the properties to Solid Builders, Inc. After the rejection of petitioners bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate broker whose services were
engaged by petitioner for its negotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the Tagaytayproperties, obtained a legal opinion
[3]
from the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC):
xxx xxx xxx
In summary therefore, (b) the authority given to the Committee/SMCC to dispose of and approve the sale of
acquired assets under Board Resolution No. 000231-1993 is subject to Board approval if the amount is over P3 Million. The
absence therefore of the required Board approval on the sale of the subject properties to Solid Builders did not perfect the
contract to sell the subject properties; (c) it follows therefore that the Bank may now entertain other offers to purchase the
subject properties but any disposition of the subject properties must be with the prior approval of the Board of Directors of
the Bank.
[4]


During the pre-trial conference, petitioner marked the December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC as Exhibit C and offered the matter of
its existence for stipulation between the parties. Respondents admitted the existence of the opinion but manifested their disagreement with its
contents.

During trial, petitioner called Atty. Roque to testify. When Roques testimony was offered specifically with respect to the legal opinion of the
OGCC, counsels for respondents objected to its admission for being violative of the rule on attorney-client privilege between the OGCC and PNB-
Republic Bank. The trial court sustained the objection.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court a quos refusal to admit its evidence but it was denied in an order dated February
26, 1999. The order disallowed the presentation and admission in evidence of any testimony referring to the December 7, 1994 opinion of the
OGCC. The prohibition was based on the ground that the testimony was in violation of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client, i.e., the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
disallowing the presentation and admission in evidence of Roques testimony.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Certiorari is a proper remedy in the case at bar.

RULING:
The petition has no merit.
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law.
[5]
The writ may be issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion,
or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.
[6]


While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in cases where the tribunal has
issued an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling. In this connection, we quote with approval the pronouncement of the appellate court:

In this jurisdiction, there is an erroneous impression that interlocutory [orders] of trial courts on debatable legal
points may be assailed by certiorari. To correct that impression and to avoid clogging the appellate court with future certiorari
petitions it should be underscored that the office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of
jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose.
[7]


The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly
void.
[8]
Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment.
[9]
The rationale of this rule is that, when a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed.
[10]
Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a
void judgment.
[11]


When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation of
evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal.
[12]
The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of
evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in judgment,
not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during
the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.
[13]


Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the
opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial court. Furthermore, the said order
was not an error of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was erroneous, the mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the writ
of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.




b. PROHIBITION
i. DAVID vs. RIVERA, G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159. January 16, 2004
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy
which is the special civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction
or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels.
While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue
a writ of prohibition to restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it heard and decided the case
without jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be
granted where the remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.

FACTS:
Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen thousand (18,000)-square meter portion (hereafter, subject land) of Lot No. 38-B,
[1]
a five (5)-
hectare lot situated at MacArthur Highway, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, herein respondent Agustin Rivera filed on May 10, 1994 a Complaint
[2]
for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Provincial Adjudication Board
(PARAB) of San Fernando, Pampanga against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and Consolacion David.
[3]
The respondent averred that the
petitioners had been harassing him for the purpose of making him vacate the subject land although it had already been given to him sometime in
1957 by the parents of the petitioners as disturbance compensation, in consideration of his renunciation of his tenurial rights over the original
eighteen (18)-hectare farmholding.
For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint
[4]
for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and Magalang,
Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent was occupying the subject land without paying rentals therefor. The petitioners also averred that
they need the subject land for their personal use but the respondent refused to vacate it despite repeated demands.
In his Answer
[5]
to the ejectment complaint, the respondent asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the tenancy
relationship between him and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, as evidenced by the Certification
[6]
issued by the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) of Mabalacat, Pampanga. He likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over the subject land and informed the court of the
complaint he had earlier filed before the PARAB.
On January 31, 1995, or during the pendency of the ejectment case, the PARAB rendered its Decision
[7]
declaring the respondent as tenant of
the land and ordering that his peaceful possession thereof be maintained. Expectedly, the petitioners appealed the PARAB Decision to the
Department of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered its Decision
[8]
ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land. The court found that there
was a dearth of evidence supportive of the respondents claim that the land is agricultural or that it is devoted to agricultural production. Further,
it ruled that the petitioners as the registered owners have a better right to possession of the subject land.
Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period to appeal, the respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles
City a Petition
[9]
for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the nullification of the
MCTC Decision. The thrust of the petition was that the MCTC had no jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in nature.
On October 30, 1995, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order
[10]
enjoining the petitioners from enforcing the
MCTC Decision. Thereafter, it proceeded to hear the respondents application for preliminary injunction. On November 29, 1995, the RTC granted
the motion and ordered the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction upon the posting of bond in the amount of P500,000.00.
[11]

On January 30, 1996, the petitioners filed their Answer
[12]
to the Petition for prohibition in which they asserted that the MCTC could not be
divested of its jurisdiction by simply interposing the defense of tenancy. The petitioners also disputed the respondents claim that he acquired the
subject property by way of disturbance compensation for the reason that in 1956, when the property was allegedly given, the law providing for the
payment of disturbance compensation was not yet in effect. Moreover, the petitioners contended, no proof had been adduced evidencing the
conveyance of the property in favor of the respondent.
The case went to trial with the respondent as petitioner presenting his evidence in chief. However, after the respondent had rested his case,
the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
[13]
raising as grounds, inter alia: (1) that the extraordinary remedy of prohibition could not be made a
substitute for the available and speedy recourse of appeal; (2) the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Mabalacat, Pampanga was legally vested, determined
as it was by the averments of the complaint in conformity with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; hence, the decision of the ejectment court was a
legitimate and valid exercise of its jurisdiction.
On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued an Order
[14]
denying the motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the motion, which was filed after the
presentation of the plaintiffs evidence, partakes of a demurrer to evidence which under Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court,
[15]
may be
granted only upon a showing that the plaintiff has shown no right to the relief prayed for. Noting that the evidence presented by the petitioner
establishes an issue which is addressed to [the] court for resolution. . . whether or not the respondent court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case filed before it, the RTC ruled that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper. The petitioners moved for
reconsideration
[16]
but was denied in an Order
[17]
dated June 23, 1998.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
[18]
in the Court of Appeals. On September 3, 1999, the appellate court rendered
a Decision,
[19]
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for
reconsideration of its order. The appellate court ratiocinated that the order of denial is merely interlocutory and hence cannot be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In addition, it held that issues raised in the petition for prohibition were genuine and
substantial, necessitating the presentation of evidence by both parties.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of the motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it may be well to point out that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is
in the form of a demurrer to evidence filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case. Being interlocutory, an order denying
a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners should present
their evidence and if the decision of the trial judge would be adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues raised in the
demurrer.
[26]
However, it is also settled that the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[27]

Thus, the petitioners submit that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer. They insist that appeal, not
prohibition, is the proper remedy to question the judgment of the MCTC and that the question of jurisdiction is one of law which may be ruled
upon without the evidence of the parties.
We are not convinced. We uphold the Court of Appeals.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by
the MCTC. Indeed, the propriety of the recourse to the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil in view of the following considerations:
First. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the same
subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for prohibition. The MCTC manifestly
took cognizance of the case for ejectment pursuant to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
[28]
as amended. On the other hand, the
ratiocination of the DARAB, which the respondent echoes, is that the case falls squarely within its jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was connected
with, agrarian relations. The respondent also points out that his right to possess the land, as a registered tenant, was submitted for determination
before the PARAB prior to the filing of the case for ejectment.
Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. 6657
[29]
confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform
matters.
[30]
In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A
[31]
created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with
respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.
[32]
Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases falling within the
primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, which is quoted hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:
Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) under Republic Act no. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but
not be limited to cases involving the following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands
covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
. . .
g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815.
It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.
Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary
of the DAR.
h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the
MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an agrarian dispute. Agrarian dispute refers
to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
[33]
Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an
incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of
the land claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian
dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:
Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party
and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant
at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such relationship. If
the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been
lawfully terminated, or if the dispute otherwise springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then)
cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . .
[34]

As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR, through the DARAB.
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate
remedy which is the special civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court,
[35]
or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior
court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained.
[36]
The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain
the administration of justice in orderly channels.
[37]

Second. While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract from the authority of a
higher court to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it heard
and decided the case without jurisdiction.
[38]
Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by
appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.
[39]

To say, as the petitioners argue, that the MCTC Decision has already attained finality because the respondent opted to file a petition for
prohibition instead of an appeal is to sacrifice needlessly respondents right at the altar of technicalities. Should tenancy relationship be duly
proven, the respondent as a tenant should be protected in keeping with the social justice precept enshrined in the Constitution.
[40]
Also noteworthy
is the fact that the petition for prohibition was filed within the reglementary period to appeal; hence, it cannot be claimed that the same was used
as substitute for a lost appeal.
At this point, let it be stressed that we are not passing upon the propriety of the issuance of a writ of prohibition in favor of the
respondent. As we have earlier pointed out, adjudication on this matter is best left to the RTC, where the case for prohibition pends, after the
reception of the evidence of both parties.
Third. We cannot also sustain the petitioners assertion that jurisdiction is a question of law; hence, the RTC could have ruled on the matter
without the reception of the parties evidence. The very issue determinative of the question of jurisdiction is the real relationship existing
between the parties. It is necessary that evidence thereon be first presented by the parties before the question of jurisdiction may be passed
upon by the court.
It should be pointed out that the petitioners elevated to the appellate court the Order of the RTC denying their motion to dismiss by way of
demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one party to the adequacy of the evidence of his adversary to make out a
case. Otherwise stated, the party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.
[41]
In this case, the trial court
ruled that respondents evidence in support of his application for a writ of prohibition was sufficient to require the presentation of petitioners
contravening proof. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in so ruling.
The Court of Appeals is therefore correct in upholding the lower courts denial of the petitioners motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.



ii. ESQUIVEL vs. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 137237. September 17, 2002
Being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are adequate and
available. Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress.
A writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been
called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.

FACTS:
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
[1]
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolution
[2]
dated June 15, 1998 finding prima facie case against herein petitioners, and (2) the
order
[3]
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Further, in their supplemental petition,
[4]
petitioners assail the Sandiganbayan for taking
cognizance of cases without or beyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and the People of the Philippines as additional parties in this
case.
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are both residents of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but assigned
with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID), Police Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their
respective complaint-affidavits,
[5]
filed before the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third
Regional Office, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero
Esquivel,
[6]
municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal
arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2
Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua and
SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police Force of dereliction of duty.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to eat
lunch at his parents house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, LTO
Officer Diaz, and several unidentified persons accompanied them. Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service
pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then forced him to board petitioners vehicle and
brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall.
PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and
threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo
ako kinakalaban! (You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will create an accident for you. Why are you against me?) Upon reaching the municipal
hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel shoved PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to
kill him, saying Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report. (Kill him, then create a scenario and make a report.)
At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify what happened to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel likewise
threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp. Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against PO2 Eduardo. Then,
the mayor once again struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape with a handgun, while Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel was holding the latter. PO2 Eduardo
then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained his consciousness, he was told that he would be released. Prior to his release, however, he
was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said
the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact
that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.
[7]

In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other documentary
evidence.
[8]

After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon for appropriate action.
[9]

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary investigation and required petitioners and their companions to file
their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit,
[10]
petitioners and their companions denied the charges against them. Instead,
they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation. They further alleged that the gun
confiscated from PO2 Eduardo was the subject of an illegal possession of firearm complaint.
On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned resolution
[11]
recommending that both Mayor Esquivel
and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for
grave threats. The charges against the other respondents below were dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.
On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 24777
[12]
for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and
Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778
[13]
for grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the August 14, 1998 resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As
directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation
[14]
with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP).
That motion was, however, denied by the OSP in the assailed order
[15]
dated December 7, 1998. On December 11, 1998, the Ombudsman approved
the OSPs order of denial.
On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they pleaded not guilty to the charges.
With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering the
resolution and the order.
On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners motion
[16]
reiterating their plea for the issuance of a TRO directing public
respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778.
[17]


ISSUES:
(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the informations against petitioners?
(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?

RULING:
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatory evidence in their
favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in good physical condition when he left the police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija.
[18]
With
such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against him and need not be
proven in any other proceeding.
[19]

Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP, counter that petitioners raise a factual issue which is
not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate that this is the very same defense advanced by petitioners in the charges against
them and being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be threshed out in a full-blown trial.
[20]

We find the present petition without merit.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
[21]
Settled is the rule that
the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
[22]
Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate
[23]
and the courts will not interfere
in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
[24]
Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
[25]
we held that:
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding the existence of
probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the disputed
resolution and order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardos admission that he
was in good physical condition when he was released from the police headquarters.
[26]
Such admission was never brought up during the
preliminary investigation. The records show that no such averment was made in petitioners counter-affidavit
[27]
nor was there any document
purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for
reconsideration.
[28]
In his opposition to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did admit signing a document to the effect that he was in good physical
condition when he left the police station. However, the admission merely applied to the execution of said document and not to the truthfulness of
its contents. Consequently, the admission that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best addressed to the public
respondents appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and its probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As previously held, but now bears stressing:
. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the
concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.
[29]

Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayans exercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78. Petitioners
theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975.
[30]
As the positions of
municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
[31]

Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
[32]
Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,
[33]
and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,
[34]
we
already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark
Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No.
8249,
[35]
provides that it is only in cases where none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
27 or higher
[36]
that exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
[37]
Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27.
[38]
Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is
the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave
abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the
writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners favor.
For the same reason, petitioners prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied.
First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has
no legal claim.
[39]
As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law
are adequate and available.
[40]
Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the
petitioners have another and complete remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying the
issuance of the writ.
[41]
In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. They could have filed a
motion to quash the informations at the first instance but they did not. They have only themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as
they have not shown any adequate excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a motion
to quash the informations, during their much delayed arraignment,
[42]
but its denial is not a proper subject for certiorari or prohibition as
said denial is merely an interlocutory order.
[43]

Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are
sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[44]
The foundation of this rule is the respect and
consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation;
[45]
it cannot be presumed that the lower
court would not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to it.
[46]
The records show that petitioners only
raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this Court.
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty.
[47]
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
[48]
Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the exercise of
discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has been
reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it may
be.
[49]
Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available in
the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.
[50]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.


C. MANDAMUS
i. MILITANTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 107040. April 12, 2000
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
The remedy for a refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A petition formandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner. If superior administrative
officers could grant the relief prayed for, special civil actions are generally not entertained.

FACTS:
Petitioner files this petition for review of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 25429
[1]
upholding the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315.
Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,590 square meters in
Balintawak, Caloocan City. The three parcels are covered by TCT Nos. 53066-A, 53067 and 53068, all derived from TCT No. 71357 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. Twenty-four (24) squatter families live in these lots.
In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315
[2]
expropriating forty (40) hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City,
covered by TCT Nos. 70298, and 73960, and portions of TCT Nos. 71357, 2017 and 2018. Section 1 of said P.D.
The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that required the upgrading of basic facilities and services and the
disposal of the lots to their bona fide occupants in accordance with the national Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Program and
the Metro Manila Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP).
[3]
It set aside P40 million as the maximum amount of just compensation to be paid the
landowners.
[4]

The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national government, undertook the implementation of P.D. 1315 in seven (7) phases
called the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The properties covered by Phases 1 to 6 were acquired in 1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which includes
petitioners land, was not among those acquired and paid for in 1978-1979.
On September 11, 1979, Proclamation No. 1893 declared the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform Zone. Proclamation
No. 1893 was amended on May 14, 1980 by Proclamation No. 1967 which identified 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority
Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
Meanwhile, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1396 created the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and placed the NHA under the supervision of
said Department.
[5]
On February 7, 1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a quasi-judicial body attached to the DHS.
[6]

On September 24, 1981, petitioner wrote the HSRC seeking a declaration of non-coverage from the Urban Land Reform Program of the
government. On October 2, 1981, HSRC Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. issued a certificate declaring petitioners lots "outside the
declared Urban Land Reform Zone."
With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting on the request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA
General Manager, sent a letter dated October 6, 1981 to Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the families
occupying petitioners lots.
[8]

The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the possibility of amicably settling the eviction problem and/or to find out why a
clearance should be issued or not for the removal/ demolition of all the illegal structures in the said property."
[9]
The squatters did not attend the
meeting. In view of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division Manager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the
Department Manager, Resettlement Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.
[10]

On January 21, 1982, NHA General Manager Tobias granted clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures on petitioners property
within three (3) months from receipt of the order. Clearance was also granted for the relocation of the 24 families to the Sapang Palay Resettlement
Project. The clearance was addressed to Mayor Asistio.

With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting on the request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA
General Manager, sent a letter dated October 6, 1981 to Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the families
occupying petitioners lots.
[8]

The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the possibility of amicably settling the eviction problem and/or to find out why a
clearance should be issued or not for the removal/ demolition of all the illegal structures in the said property."
[9]
The squatters did not attend the
meeting. In view of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division Manager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the
Department Manager, Resettlement Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.
[10]

On January 21, 1982, NHA General Manager Tobias granted clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures on petitioners property
within three (3) months from receipt of the order. Clearance was also granted for the relocation of the 24 families to the Sapang Palay Resettlement
Project. The clearance was addressed to Mayor Asistio
The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated September 16, 1982, General Tobias inquired from Mayor Asistio whether Caloocan
City had plans of developing petitioners properties in the Bagong Barrio Project. On December 13, 1982, Mayor Asistio replied that
"considering the said properties are private in character, the City has no plans presently or in the immediate future to develop or underwrite the
development of said properties."
[12]
Jjjuris
Four (4) years later, in 1986, BBP Phase 7 was listed as among the priority projects for implementation under the governments Community Self-
Help Program.
[13]
The NHA, through General Tobias, approved an emergency fund of P2 million for the acquisition of petitioners lots. NHA started
negotiations with petitioner. In 1987, petitioner, through an authorized representative, made an initial offer of P200.00 per square meter. The
NHA made a counter-offer of P175.00 per square meter. Petitioner increased his price toP1,000.00 and later to P3,000.00. NHA General Manager
Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. informed petitioner that NHAs maximum offer was P500.00. This was rejected by petitioner, through his lawyer, in a
letter dated March 20, 1989.
[14]

On September 8, 1990, petitioner, through counsel, requested for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and relocation of the squatters.
[15]

On January 15, 1991, NHA General Manager Monico Jacob revalidated the demolition clearance and informed Mayor Asistio that the NHA was
making available enough serviced home lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement Project for the 24 families.
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement the clearance to eject the squatters on
petitioners land. At the conference of February 13, 1991, Carangdang claimed that petitioners land had already been declared
expropriated by P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Declaration as Inexistent and
Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315" against the NHA and Carangdang.
In a decision dated April 24, 1992, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that petitioner failed to overcome the
presumption of the decrees constitutionality.
[17]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied on August 31, 1992.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ANNABELLE CARANGDANG CAN BE COMPELLED TO EFFECT THE DIRECTIVE/ MEMORANDUM OF
RELOCATION/ RESETTLEMENT SUBJECTING THE SAID 24 SQUATTER FAMILIES FROM UNLAWFULLY OCCUPYING PETITIONERS SUBJECT
PROPERTY WITHOUT DECLARING P.D. 1315 AS VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
2. WHETHER OR NOT SAID P. D. 1315 AT LEAST UP TO THE EXTENT OF PETITIONERS PROPERTIES ADVERSELY AFFECTED CAN BE
DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RULING:
We deny the petition.
First. Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Section 2 of Rule 65 provides:
"Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
x x x."
[20]

Prohibition is a preventive remedy.
[21]
It seeks for a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act
perceived to be illegal.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang should be ordered to desist from relocating the squatters. What petitioner
challenges is respondent Carangdangs refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a
refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
Second. The petitioner is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus. Section 3, Rule 65 provides:
"Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of petitioner, and to
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant."
[22]
Es msc
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[23]

It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.
[24]
He
failed to discharge this burden. The records show that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent
Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property. The NHA demolition clearance issued by General
Tobias on January 21, 1982 was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The clearances revalidation by NHA General Manager
Monico Jacob was likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. A petition formandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner.
[25]
If
superior administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for, special civil actions are generally not entertained.
[26]
In the instant case,
petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time directly
addressed to respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the Government Corporate Counsel
[27]
asserts that petitioner
should have brought Carangdangs inaction to the attention of her superiors. There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicial action as
the administrative set-up could have easily corrected the alleged failure to act.
[28]
The General Manager, as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has
the power of supervision over the operations and internal affairs of NHA.
[29]
Esmm is
Third. Petitioners procedure in assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 is flawed. His principal concern is the relocation of the squatters on
his land. If he could attain this aim, petitioner himself admits in his Petition that "there may not be a need for declaring P.D. No. 1315 null and
void."
[30]
Indeed, petitioner assails P.D. No. 1315, purely out of pique against respondent Carangdang who refused to implement the demolition
order of her superior. To use petitioners own words, he has to attack the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 "to x x x break respondent
Carangdangs hypocrisy and pretension." We hold that petitioner has no privilege to assail P.D. No. 1315 as unconstitutional to serve a petty
purpose.
Moreover, the facts reveal that petitioners land is not in clear danger of expropriation. P.D. No. 1315 was issued way back in 1975. It covered 40
hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Almost all of these 40 hectares had been expropriated as early as 1979 except the 1,590 sq. m.
lot of petitioner. Considering this long lapse of time, it is doubtful if the government would still desire to expropriate petitioners lot which only
measures 1,590 sq. m. Esmso
There is another reason why petitioners lot may no longer be expropriated by government. The land sought to be expropriated under P.D. No.
1315 is defined as an area "identified as a blighted area and included in the SIR Program" which means Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program. On October 2, 1981, however, HSRC Commissioner Dizon, Jr. certified that petitioners lot is "outside the declared Urban Land Reform
Zone." With this certification, there is reason to believe that taking petitioners tiny lot of 1,590 sq. m. will serve no social purpose.
Finally, petitioner cannot blow hot and cold on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315. He did not question its constitutionality when it was
decreed in 1975. In 1987, he even negotiated with NHA for the price of his land. Implicitly but clearly, he recognized the validity of the decree. The
negotiation unfortunately fell and the government did not take any further step to expropriate his land. It was only in 1991 after respondent
Carangdang refused to eject the squatters in petitioners land that petitioner, out of pique, alleged that P.D. No. 1315 is constitutionally infirmed.
A well recognized rule in constitutional law is that estoppel may operate to prevent a party from asserting that an act is unconstitutional.
[31]

There is also merit to the cautionary words of the Solicitor General that to allow petitioners flip-flopping stance "might spawn legal and social
ramifications which cannot just be lightly ignored,"
[32]
since almost all of the 40 hectare land covered by P.D. No. 1315 had been expropriated and
awarded to the poor people of our society without their landowners challenging the validity of the decree. In his Concurring Opinion, our esteemed
colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, denigrates this warning and cites Alfonso v. Pasay City
[33]
as authority for the view that "if property is taken by the
government without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and is devoted to public use, such as a road, after many years, the property owner
may no longer bring an action for recovery of his land, but may simply demand payment of just compensation for his land."
[34]
A careful reading of
the Alfonso case, however, will show that this Court did not rule that the only remedy of an aggrieved landowner in such a situation is to "simply
demand payment of just compensation." To be sure, this Court contemplated the remedy of restoring possession to the aggrieved landowner. If it
did not order the remedy, it was only because it was no longer feasible as the lot involved had already been converted to a road. The exact ruling
states:
[35]

"As registered owner, he could bring an action to recover possession at any time because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership of land. However, said restoration of possession by the City of Pasay is neither convenient nor feasible
because it is now and has been used for road purposes. So, the only relief available is for the City of Pasay to make due
compensation, which it could and should have done years ago since 1925."
In the case at bar, the landowners concerned may not opt for the right to be paid just compensation. The process is not an easy one and may take
years especially in light of the budget difficulties of the government. We take judicial notice of the fact that the current budget deficit of the
government amounts to P8.9 billion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed.

2. DISTINHUISED FROM EACH OTHER
a. CERTIORARI

b. PROHIBITION
i. PAMANA vs. CA, G.R. No. 133033. June 15, 2005

The special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not
available as a remedy for the correction of acts performed by a sheriff during the execution process, which acts are neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial but are purely ministerial functions. Upon the other hand, prohibition is directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
[

Likewise, certiorari and prohibition differ as to purpose. For while certiorari is aimed at annulling or modifying a proceeding, prohibition is
directed at commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified in the petition.

FACTS:
On April 17, 1996, in the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna two (2) separate complaints,
[3]
both for forcible entry with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction, were filed by the petitioner against two (2) sets of defendants (now, the respondents). Docketed in the same court as
Civil Cases No. 3414 and 3424, the complaints uniformly alleged, inter alia, that petitioner is the owner and in lawful possession of parcels of land
located at barrios Bocal and Lecheria, Calamba, Laguna its ownership thereof being evidenced byTransfer Certificates of Title T-159894, T-
162413, T-159897, T-204488, and T-159898, which titles, per record, respectively covered Lot 2-B-3-D-2, Lot 2-B-3-C, Lot 8, Lot 3 and Lot 4 of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-282033; and that, sometime in 1995, respondents, by means of force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered and
occupied said parcels and built their shanties thereon.
In their answer,
[4]
respondents denied the material allegations of the complaints and averred that the lots they are in occupancy of are not
owned by the petitioner because what they are occupying are Lot 5 of TCT No. T-66140 and Lot 7 of TCT No. T-61703, both owned and registered
in the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Corporation which gave them permission to occupy the same. Respondents thus prayed
for the dismissal of the complaints for petitioners lack of cause of action against them.
The cases were heard and tried jointly by the MTC under the Rules on Summary Procedure. And, on December 10, 1996, that court
rendered a joint decision
[5]
thereon, ordering the respondents to vacate the premises in question and to pay attorneys fees and the costs.
In time, respondents went on appeal to the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna.
Initially, in a decision
[6]
dated June 4, 1997, the RTC set aside that of the MTC and ordered the remand of the cases to the latter, explaining
that the suits could not have been covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure because the defense interposed by the respondents raised the
question of ownership, reason for which the MTC should have directed petitioner to adduce in evidence its muniments of title to show that the
portion (occupied) by the [respondents] is embraced in [petitioners] property.
Later, however, on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC, in an order
[7]
dated August 22, 1997, set aside its earlier decision and
affirmed en toto the appealed MTC decision, explaining that the Rules on Summary Procedure, as amended, applies even if the issue of ownership
is involved, adding that the remedy left to respondents is to contest petitioners ownership in an appropriate forum and not in the forcible entry
case filed against them.
With neither of the contending parties taking an appeal from the aforementioned order of the RTC, said order became final and executory
and the cases ultimately remanded to the MTC. Hence, on October 10, 1997, the MTC, again on petitioners motion, issued a Writ of Execution
commanding the sheriff to cause the [respondents] to forthwith remove from said premises and to restore petitioner thereto. This was followed by
a Writ of Demolition,
[8]
ordering the sheriff to destroy and demolish respondents houses and constructions, it appearing that despite the earlier
writ, respondents refused to vacate the lot subject-matter of these cases.
On November 6, 1997, respondents went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45879, praying the appellate court to restrain the sheriff from implementing the writ of demolition,
which, according to them, the sheriff is poised to implement the next day, November 7, 1997.
Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals forthwith issued a temporary restraining order on November 7, 1997, but the same appears to
have been received by the Sheriff after the houses of the [respondents] had been destroyed, albeit respondents have remained in the premises.
[9]

As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a decision
[10]
dated January 7, 1998, set aside the MTCs Order of Execution, Writ of
Execution and Writ of Demolitioninsofar as Lots 5 and 7 covered by T.C.T. Nos. T-66140 and T-61703 are concerned, and directed petitioner and
the sheriff to desist from implementing said writs against the respondents.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
1. WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE AND ACTED FAVORABLY ON THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER OF A FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION.
2. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF CALAMBA IN CIVIL CASES NOS. 3414 AND 3424 DO NOT
INCLUDE LOTS 5 & 7 THE PREMISES OCCUPIED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
3. WHEN IT PROHIBITED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF DEMOLITION, AS PROHIBITION IS A PREVENTIVE REMEDY AND DOES
NOT LIE TO RESTRAIN AN ACT WHICH IS ALREADY FAIT ACCOMPLI.

RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners first assigned error raises a procedural question, namely, the propriety of respondents resort to the special civil action of
prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879. To petitioner, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed said petition because prohibition, under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, may only be availed of if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
contending that what the respondents should have done, which they did not, was to interpose an appeal from the RTCs order of August 22, 1997,
which affirmed en toto the earlier decision of the MTC ordering them to vacate the premises in question.
We are not persuaded.
Appeal as a remedy is available only in cases where there is an error of judgment on the part of a court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
[12]

An error of judgment is one which a court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction and which error is reviewable only by appeal.
[13]
It is,
therefore, an instance where a court having jurisdiction on the subject matter of the case renders an erroneous decision.
Here, respondents do not impute any error of judgment on the part of the MTC when it ordered them to vacate the premises in question.
Neither do they question the correctness of the RTCs order dated August 22, 1997, affirming en toto the appealed decision of the MTC. As it were,
respondents merely prayed in the petition they filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879 that a writ of prohibition be issued commanding the sheriff to cease
and desist from further enforcing the Writ of Demolition because, according to them, the properties whereon their houses stand are not among the
parcels of land involved in the ejectment suits filed against them by the petitioner. Appeal, therefore, is not the remedy they ought to have availed
of under the circumstances.
But even assuming, so petitioner argues, that no appeal was available, nonetheless, respondents should have filed with the appellate court a
petition for certiorari and not prohibition, invoking, in support thereof, our ruling in Presbiterio, et al. vs. Judge Sotero Rodas.
[14]

The Court disagrees.
To begin with, petitioners reliance on Presbiterio, et al. is misplaced.
Presbiterio involved the propriety of the trial courts order directing the execution of its judgment pending appeal unless the defendants
therein post a supersedeas bond ofP92,000.00. We there held that the proper remedy for the petitioners is certiorari, not prohibition, thus:
Upon the facts above stated, we think the proper remedy for the petitioners, if any, is certiorari to annul or modify the order of the
respondent judge for the filing of a supersedeas bond (section 1, rule 67), and not prohibition to require the respondent judge to desist
from enforcing said order.
In here, the propriety of the MTCs issuance of an Order of Execution, Writ of Execution and Writ of Demolition is beyond question, more so
that its decision of December 19, 1996 has already become final and executory. What is dubious in this case is the sheriffs act of implementing
the writs thus issued insofar as Lots 5 and 7 are concerned, which lots, so respondents maintain, are not the premises in question referred to in
the decision sought to be executed.
Besides, the special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
[15]
It is not available as a remedy for the correction of acts performed by a sheriff during the execution process, which acts are
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial but are purely ministerial functions.
[16]
Upon the other hand, prohibition is directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
[17]

Likewise, certiorari and prohibition differ as to purpose. For while certiorari is aimed at annulling or modifying a proceeding,
prohibition is directed at commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified in the
petition.
[18]

Precisely, in the petition for prohibition filed by respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879, they did not seek to annul or modify the Order of
Execution, Writ of Execution and Writ of Demolition issued by the MTC. What they there assailed was the sheriffs power and authority to
implement said writs vis--vis the lots actually occupied by them, namely, Lot No. 5 and Lot No. 7 of TCT Nos. T-66140 and T-61703, respectively,
then registered in the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Corporation. It is as regards those lots that they want the sheriff
restrained and prohibited from implementing said writs, more particularly the writ of demolition. Consequently, prohibition, not certiorari, is
the appropriate remedy for them.
We shall now address the lynchpin issue in this case. Petitioner puts the Court of Appeals to task in ruling that the MTC decision does not
include Lots No. 5 and 7, the very lots occupied by respondents.
We sustain the Court of Appeals.
Be it remembered that in the very complaints filed by the petitioner before the MTC, it is there clearly stated that the subjects thereof are its
parcels of land in Barrios Bocal and Lechirea, more specifically those covered by its TCT No. T-159894, T-162413, T-159897, T-204488 and T-
159898. As borne by the records, and this is not disputed by the petitioner, TCT No. T-159894 refers to Lot 2-B-3-D-2; TCT No. T-162413 to Lot
2-B-3-C; TCT No. T-159897 to Lot 8; TCT No. T-204488 to Lot 3; and TCT No. T-159898 to Lot 4.
When, in its decision, the MTC ordered the respondents to vacate the premises in question, said premises could be none other than the
aforementioned lots, to wit: Lot 2-B-3-D-2; Lot 2-B-3-C; Lot 8; Lot 3; and Lot 4, precisely because these are the lots respectively covered by petitioners
five (5) titles mentioned in its complaints.
Lots 5 and 7, respectively covered by TCT No. T-66140 and T-61703, in the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Corporation,
and whereon respondents built their houses, are and could not have been embraced in the phrase premises in question spoken of in the MTC
decision.
For sure, petitioner no less admits in the present petition that in the complaints it filed with the MTC, it did not list down lots 5 and 7
covered by TCT-66140 and T-61703, alleging that it was not aware that said lots were separately titled and that the same were still with the
seller.
[19]

Yet, in the process of executing the writs of execution and demolition, the sheriff proceeded to implement the same on Lots 5 and 7 which, as
above-observed, could not have been embraced in the phrase premises in question, found in the MTC decision.
In short, the sheriff went beyond the very mandate of the MTC. This, the sheriff cannot do as his duty is to strictly comply with the directive
of the court in accordance with its letter and without deviating therefrom, and to see to it that the execution is done in strict conformity with the
judgment sought to be executed. He is in no capacity to vary the judgment and deviate therefrom based on his own interpretation thereof. As
agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and
processes and implementing its order, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient
administration of justice
[20]
(Emphasis supplied).
In Wenceslao vs. Madrazo,
[21]
the Court stressed:
It is a settled rule that the sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial.
[22]
When a writ is placed in the hands of a
sheriff it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according
to its mandate. He is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter
[23]
(Emphasis supplied).
In Villareal vs. Rarama, et al.
[24]
the Court emphasized the importance of the faithful implementation of a writ of execution:
The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his
behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. Thus, when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff it is his
duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate. He is to execute the directives of the court therein strictly in accordance with the letter thereof and without any deviation therefrom
(Emphasis supplied).
To stress, Lots 5 and 7 are never included in the complaints for ejectment filed by the petitioner before the MTC. Consequently, the sheriffs
act of implementing the writs on said lots by causing the demolition of respondents houses thereat clearly constitutes a violation of his mandate,
restrainable by prohibition.
Finally, petitioner insists that the appellate court committed error when it prohibited the implementation of the Writ of Demolition even as
the sheriff has already caused the demolition of respondents houses and other constructions. To petitioner, the acts sought to be restrained are
already fait accompli, and, therefore, may no longer be abated.
Again, we disagree. It is a matter of record that the petition for prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879 was filed on November 6, 1997, while
the Writ of Demolition was scheduled for implementation only on November 7, 1997. To quote the Court of Appeals in its decision of January 7,
1998:
Thus on November 6, 1997, the defendants [referring to herein respondents] filed this petition seeking a writ of prohibition against the
respondent Sheriff, commanding him to cease and desist from further proceeding with the writ of demolition which was scheduled for
implementation on November 7, 1997 (Emphasis supplied).
Sure, petitioner would want to take exception from the above factual finding of the Court of Appeals by invoking the Sheriffs
Return,
[25]
which we quote, as follows:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Court, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna the attached herein Writ of Demolition in the above-
entitled case with the information that defendants houses and construction from plaintiffs subject premises were already demolished. Hence, the
Writ of Demolition is hereby returned Satisfied.
We observe, however, that the above quoted Sheriffs Return is dated November 25, 1997. In no way, therefore, does the same return
conclusively or at least, persuasively prove that the demolition was effected prior to respondents filing of their petition for prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner having failed to prove its point, the Court of Appeals finding must be left undisturbed. Besides, it appears undisputed
that respondents are still in occupancy of Lots 5 and 7.
In any event, insofar as Lots 5 and 7 are concerned, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it said in its resolution of March 5, 1998, thus:
xxx But granting that the order of demolition has been fully implemented, this does not alter our decision setting aside the order of execution and
writs complained of and ordering respondents to desist from further implementing the same.
[26]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.



ii. ARAULLO, id.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that
it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower
court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.
The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition
is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of
said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal
relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari
or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the
acts of legislative and executive officials.

c. MANDAMUS
i. ENRIQUEZ vs. MACADAEG, G.R. No. L-2422 September 30, 1949
But, while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error,
for this is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of Court.) It is rather a case where a
judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which would not be maintained in his court. The remedy in
such case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the present case because the order complained of, being merely of an
interlocutory nature, is not appealable.
While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict adherence to technicalities in the interest
of a speedy administration of justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss a civil action pending in his court.
The civil action in question is for the recovery of a piece of real property situated in Negros Oriental, the complaint alleging that the said property
had been bought by plaintiff at an execution sale but that, notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as supposed owner of said property,
subsequently mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank and refused to surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, whereupon, the latter
brought suit (Meliton Yburan vs. Marcelo Enriquez and The Philippine National Bank, civil case No. R-552 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu)
to have himself declared owner of said property and placed in possession thereof. Before filing their answer, the defendants in that case moved for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground, among others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of real estate situated in Negros
Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion having been denied, the defendants filed the present
petition for mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss the action.
Answering the petition, the respondent judge puts up the defense that the act sought to be ordered involves the exercise of judicial discretion and
that petitioner has another adequate remedy, which is by appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mandamus is a proper remedy.
RULING:
Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court requires that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property be commenced and tried
in the province where the property lies, while paragraph 1 (b) of Rule 8, provides that defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion to
dismiss the action when "venue is improperly laid." As the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and the recovery of possession of real
property situated in Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the action was improperly brought in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion to
dismiss was therefore proper and should have been granted.
But, while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting
that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of
Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which would not
be maintained in his court. The remedy in such case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the present case
because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not appealable.
While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict adherence to technicalities in
the interest of a speedy administration of justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.
Wherefore, let a writ of prohibition issue, enjoining the respondent judge or his successor from taking cognizance of this case unless it be to
dismiss the same in accordance with the Rules. Without costs. So ordered.


3. CERTIORARI AND APPEAL; DISTINGUISHED
a. MADRIGAL TRANSPORT vs. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS CORP., G.R. No. 156067. August 11, 2004
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the
province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher
court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.

An appeal is thus
a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the
parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and
the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment;
or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said
notice of judgment or final order.
[
A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of
the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition
for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy
expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.

FACTS:
On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 49.
[5]
Subsequently, on February 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against Respondents Lapanday
Holdings Corporation (Lapanday), Macondray and Company, Inc. (Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36.
[6]

In the latter action, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture agreement with Lapanday for the primary purpose of
operating vessels to service the shipping requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc.;
[7]
(2) that it had done so on the strength of the
representations of Lorenzo, in his capacity either as chairman of the board or as president of Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray; (3) that
Macondray had thereafter been appointed -- allegedly upon the insistence of Lapanday -- as broker, for the purpose of securing charter hire
contracts from Del Monte; (4) that pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Madrigal had purchased a vessel by obtaining a P10,000,000 bank
loan; and (5) that contrary to their representations and guarantees and despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had allegedly been unable to
deliver those Del Monte charter hire contracts.
[8]

On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court (RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner insolvent.
[9]
On March 30, 1998 and April 6, 1998,
Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective Motions to Dismiss the case pending before the RTC Branch 36.
[10]

On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action.

Applying Sections 32 and 33 of
the Insolvency Law,
[11]
the trial court opined that upon the filing by Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the latter lost the right to
institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that the exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed assignee.
[12]

On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[13]
which was later denied on July 26, 1999.
[14]
Subsequently, petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the December 16, 1998 and the July 26, 1999 Orders of the trial
court.
[15]
On September 29, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution requiring petitioner to explain why its Petition should not be dismissed outright, on
the ground that the questioned Orders should have been elevated by ordinary appeal.
[16]

On January 10, 2000, the appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant case was purely legal, the Petition could be treated
as one for review as an exception to the general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal was available.
[17]
Respondents Lapanday and
Lorenzo challenged this ruling through a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 10, 2000.
[18]
The CA heard the Motion for Reconsideration in
oral arguments on April 7, 2000.
[19]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On February 28, 2002, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision granting Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzos Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissing Madrigals Petition for Certiorari. The CA opined that an order granting a motion to dismiss was final and thus the
proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari.
[20]

Furthermore, even if the Petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, according to the
CA.
[21]
The appellate court held that the issues raised by petitioner involved pure questions of law that should be brought to the Supreme Court,
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
[22]

Hence, this Petition.
[23]


ISSUE:
What is the proper remedy? An appeal or a petition for certiorari?
RULING:
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Issue:
Remedy Against Dismissal of Complaint
The resolution of this case hinges on the proper remedy: an appeal or a petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that it correctly questioned
the trial courts Order through its Petition for Certiorari. Respondents insist that an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy. We agree with
respondents.
Appeal
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by the Rules of Court to be appealable.
[25]
The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided
in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
[26]

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial
court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the
case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the latter.
[27]

Petition for Certiorari
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65, which reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46.
[28]

A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction.
[29]

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
[30]

Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.
[31]
There is excess of jurisdiction when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority.
[32]
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
[33]

Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
[34]
In Pure Foods
Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.
[35]

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision.
[36]
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the
province of certiorari.
[37]
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
[38]

As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher
court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.
[39]
An appeal is
thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.
[40]
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the
parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and
the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
[41]

As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable.
[42]
Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action forcertiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment;
or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
[43]

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from.
[44]
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said
notice of judgment or final order.
[45]
A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or
of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
[46]
In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also
within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
[47]

On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution.
[48]
If a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
[49]

As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition
for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy
expressly available under the law.
[50]
Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
[51]

Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy
if Appeal Is Available
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
[52]
Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
[53]
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there
be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
[54]
Where an appeal is available,certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Second Issue:
CA Jurisdiction
Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, in its Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. The issue raised
there was the trial courts alleged error in dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of action. Petitioner argues that it could still institute the
Complaint, even if it had filed a Petition for Insolvency earlier.
[55]
As petitioner was challenging the trial courts interpretation of the law -- posing a
question of law -- the issue involved an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its
legitimate jurisdiction is not necessarily equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.
[56]

The instant case falls squarely with Barangay Blue Ridge A of QC v. Court of Appeals.
[57]
In that case, the trial court granted the Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. After the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA. The appellate court denied the Petition on the ground that the proper remedy was appeal. Holding that an error of
judgment should be reviewed through an ordinary appeal, this Court upheld the CA.
The Dismissal -- a Final Order
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order.
[58]
It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves
nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
[59]

Petitioner avers that Section 5 of Rule 16
[60]
bars the filing of an appeal when the dismissal is based on lack of cause of action. It adds that
Section 5 limits the remedy of appeal only to dismissals grounded on prior judgments or on the statute of limitations, or to claims that have been
extinguished or are unenforceable. We find this interpretation absurd.
The provision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute res judicata. However, such dismissals are still subject to a timely
appeal. For those based on other grounds, the complaint can be refiled. Section 5, therefore, confirms that an appeal is the remedy for the
dismissal of an action.
Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41,
[61]
petitioner further claims that it was prohibited from filing an appeal. Section 1(a) of the said Rule
prohibits the filing of an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration, because the remedy is to appeal the main decision as
petitioner could have done. In fact, under Section 9, Rule 37, the remedy against an order denying a motion for reconsideration is to appeal the
judgment or final order. Section 1(h) does not apply, because the trial courts Order did not dismiss the action without prejudice.
[62]

Exception to the Rule
Not Established by Petitioner
We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted certiorari despite the availability of appeal.
[63]
Where the exigencies of the case
are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate -- either in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a
total failure of justice could result -- a writ of certiorari may still be issued.
[64]
Petitioner cites some of these exceptions to justify the remedy it has
undertaken with the appellate court,
[65]
but these are not applicable to the present factual milieu.
Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous, its error did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner asserts that the
trial court should not have dismissed the Complaint or should have at least allowed the substitution of the assignee in petitioners stead.
[66]
These
alleged errors of judgment, however, do not constitute a despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise of power. On the contrary, petitioner availed
of certiorari because the 15-day period within which to file an appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the rule thatcertiorari is not a substitute for the
lapsed remedy of appeal.
As previously stressed, appeal -- not certiorari -- was the correct remedy to elevate the RTCs Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. The
appeal, which would have involved a pure question of law, should have been filed with the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 2 (c) of Rule 41 and
Section 2 of Rule 50,
[67]
Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the challenged Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

10. G.R. No. 149404 September 15, 2006
MA. SALVACION G. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Eight Division), ST. PAUL's COLLEGE OF MANILA, INC. and SR. NATIVIDAD DE JESUS FERRAREN,
S.P.C., respondents.
PRINCIPLES

in a petition for review (Rule 45), only errors of law may be raised. in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, only jurisdictional issues may be
raised, as when a court or tribunal has acted "without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction."

FACTS
Petitioner is professor in the respondent St. Paul's College of Manila for 22 years, verbally accepted sometime in February, 1998 a tutorial and a
summer teaching load for the summer of 1998. Then petitioner decided to leave for the United States in response to an urgent request from her
brother and sister-in-law thereat to help them take care of their children, thus necessitating a revision of her summer schedule. In a letter dated
March 31, 1998 and addressed to respondent Sister Natividad De Jesus Ferraren, president and college dean of the respondent college, the
petitioner proposed a change in her teaching schedule to accommodate her departure for abroad on April 27, 1998.
But it was only on April 26, 1998 when Sister Ferraren received a copy of said letter as attached to another letter by the petitioner dated April 25,
1998. In that letter of April 25, 1998, the petitioner apologized for not being able to seek Sister Ferraren's prior approval of change in her teaching
schedule but explained that the change had been made with the approval of her (petitioner's) department chairperson, Ms. Shirley Agatep and the
college's registrar, Ms. Lilia B. Santos.
It was only upon the belated receipt of the said April 25 letter that Sister Ferraren learned for the first time of the petitioner's plan to depart for
abroad and of her proposal to alter her summer teaching schedule. Despite her knowledge of the need for a schedule change as early as March of
1998, the petitioner never bothered to mention about it even when she signed her conformity to the summer load schedule fixed by the college and
despite an April 15, 1998 memorandum reminding all teachers to comply with their teaching schedules or risk disciplinary action.
in a memorandum dated May 19, 1998, the petitioner was required to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of said memorandum why she
should not be subjected to disciplinary action, including dismissal, for: (1) taking a leave without the explicit approval of the college dean and
president; (2) abandonment of employment; (3) fraud and willful breach of trust; (4) failure to observe contractual obligations with the school; (5)
serious misconduct or willful disobedience in connection with work; and (6) insubordination, all punishable under the College's Faculty Manual.

On June 2, 1998, the respondent college officially started the school year 1998-1999 with a seminar for all faculty members. Petitioner was neither
present thereat nor did she communicate her whereabouts. At this time, the respondent college had not yet even received any response from her to
the show-cause memorandum adverted to.

On June 10, 1998, the petitioner surfaced and came forward to personally deliver to Sister Ferraren her written compliance to the show-cause
memorandum. In it, she admitted having changed her schedule without first seeking Sister Ferraren's approval but with the explanation that she
had been constantly trying as early as March of that year to write for an approval of adjustment in her teaching schedule but to no avail. She
further explained that it was only when she ran out of time that she decided to leave her letter-request for schedule adjustment with Sister
Ferraren's secretary on April 25, 1998.
Upon handing over her aforesaid written compliance to Sister Ferraren, the petitioner verbally requested the latter to simply set it aside and
pleaded to Sister Ferraren to forgo conducting an administrative hearing on her case so as not to apprise the other teachers of the details of the
incident, and expressed her desire to merely retire instead. Sister Ferraren immediately accommodated her desire for early retirement but directed
the petitioner to reduce the same in writing to facilitate the release of her unpaid salaries and benefits as an early retiree. The petitioner told Sister
Ferraren that she would bring a written request therefor the following day. In turn, Sister Ferraren assured her of the expedient release of her
salaries and benefits. Hence, after the petitioner left, Sister Ferraren instructed the college's accounting department to compute all the salaries
and benefits due the petitioner and distributed her remaining classes to other teachers. The accounting department accordingly struck the
petitioner's name off the payroll of the college starting June 10, 1998 after computing her unpaid salaries and benefits.
The petitioner failed to submit her promised written request for early retirement despite several attempts on the part of the college to contact her
for the purpose.
The respondent college decided to hold an administrative hearing on the various charges proferred against her in the show-cause memorandum,
which charges remained pending before she optionally retired on June 10, 1998. Accordingly, formal notices dated July 9, 1998 were separately
sent to the petitioner, Ms. Agatep and Ms. Santos directing them to appear at a formal hearing on July 17, 1998 to explain their sides.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the petitioner came back and verbally informed Sister Ferraren of her intention to attend the hearing whereat
she would admit her mistake and put on record her decision to simply retire. During the hearing, however, the petitioner, in a complete turn about
of what she verbally told to Sister Ferraren, did not admit her mistake nor make of record her decision for an early retirement. Instead, she
excused herself from the hearing for allegedly feeling ill and asked for a resetting thereof in two (2) weeks, after which she left even as the hearing
committee informed her that the hearing would nonetheless proceed as to Ms. Agatep and Ms. Santos who were then ready to present their sides.
Before leaving, however, the petitioner was assured by the committee that she would be informed of the minutes of the hearing and that she may
respond in writing should she be unable to attend the next hearing. This was noted in the minutes of the July 17 hearing, which minutes were
duly sent to the petitioner on July 21, 1998, together with a notice for the next hearing date on July 30, 1998.
On July 29, 1998, or a day before the next hearing, the respondent college and Sister Ferraren received a letter from the petitioner's counsel to the
effect that his client does not intend anymore to attend any hearings. In the same letter, the counsel demanded for his client's reinstatement with
full backwages and without loss of seniority rights and benefits. The following day, the investigating committee proceeded with the hearing, and
eventually reached the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charges stated in the show-cause memorandum. Even then, the committee
recommended to allow the petitioner's early retirement and the payment of her benefits in acknowledgment of her desire to simply retire.
On October 6, 1998, the petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries against the herein
private respondents. Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the petitioner.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter. Petitioner went to the CA which affirmed the NLRC.
Petitioner then filed a petition under Rule 65.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRCs ruling?

RULING:
Petition lacks merit.
One of the requisites for the issuance of a writ for certiorari is that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a suit fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum despite
the availability of the remedy of appeal.
3
Certiorari is not and cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, where the latter remedy is available.
4
If
any, the petitioner's proper recourse would have been to elevate the assailed CA decision to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Moreover, let alone the fact that the petitioner erroneously resorted to Rule 65 when appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 was
available, the error is worse compounded by the circumstance that the petitioner did not file any motion for reconsideration with the CA prior to
the filing of the present petition. The general rule is that a previous motion for reconsideration in the court of original proceeding is necessary
before invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of a higher court. A petition for certiorari will not generally be entertained unless the public respondent
has had, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct or rectify the error imputed to him.
5

The questions raised in this recourse, be it under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, are basically one of facts. in a petition for review, only
errors of law may be raised. On the other hand, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, only jurisdictional issues may be raised, as when a court
or tribunal has acted "without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." The extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot legally be used for any other purpose. In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court
cannot correct errors of fact which the lower court or tribunal may have committed.
Hence, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, judicial review does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the NLRC
based its determinations, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether said tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. And an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as in grave abuse of discretion when it is performed in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
9

Here, there is no indication whatsoever that any grave abuse of discretion attended the proceedings below. For sure, the findings of fact were well
substantiated by the evidence presented. We see no reason to disturb such findings. Further, those findings fully support the decision reached by
the NLRC as affirmed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED.
11. G.R. No. 179895 December 18, 2008
FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
PRINCIPLE
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment.
33
It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office,
34
and
may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office
or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

FACTS

in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,
1
the Court, by Decision of July 3, 2007, enjoined Ong "from accepting an appointment to the position of
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully
completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and
correct the records of his birth and citizenship.
On July 9, 2007 Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the "amendment/ correction/ supplementation or
annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth," which was eventually approved by the court.
On September 5, 2007, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint implored respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-
haste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latters capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking paragraph
1, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution
5
in conjunction with the Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,
6
petitioner points out
that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the
citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October 1998.
The OSG by letter of September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it "cannot favorably act on [his] request for the filing of a quo warranto petition
until the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with finality."
7
Petitioner assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, aside from Ongs continuous discharge of judicial functions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the OSG acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners request for the filing of a quo warranto petition against Ong?
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion committed by Associate Justice Ong in the performance of his job in the Sandiganbayan?

RULING
Petition lacks merit
1
st
Issue:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words,
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
18

The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo
warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply
because the affected party disagrees with it.
In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are
just and valid reasons.
21
Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez,
22
the Court ruled:
Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to
abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either
with or without stipulation with the other party.
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution
of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but
always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand.
24

It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ongs citizenship in the quo
warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally
write finis to the issue as it merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

2
nd
Issue
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to
Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional.
While the petition professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of the petition.
27

Being a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed.
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally,
28
even through
mandamus
29
or a motion to annul or set aside order.
30

Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the same, dismissible.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment.
33
It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office,
34
and
may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office
or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
35

Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor,
36
reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v.
Villasin,
37
that for a quo warranto petition to be successful, theprivate person suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In
fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.
38

In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that he was never entitled to assume the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

12. G.R. No. L-6018 May 31, 1954
EMILIANO MORABE, Acting Chief, Wage Administration Service, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM BROWN, doing business under the name and style of CLOVER THEATER, respondent-appellee.
PRINCIPLE
The writ known as preliminary mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character.

FACTS
The original petition filed in the Court of First Instance alleges that the respondent had dismissed Pablo S. Afuang because in an investigation
conducted by the petitioner of charges against the respondent that the latter paid his employees beyond the time fixed in Republic Act No. 602.
The petitioner, therefore, prayed that the respondent be ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang, and that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issue for his reinstatement.
The court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Respondent Brown filed a petition asking for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Pablo S. Afuang had presented a letter asking excuse
or apology from the respondent for having taken his case to court. This motion to dismiss was, however, not acted upon, and the case was heard
and the parties presented their evidence.
On May 2, 1952, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment finding that the dismissal from the service of Pablo S. Afuang is unlawful and
violates section 13 of the Minimum Wage Law, because the fact that he testified at the investigation is not a valid ground for his dismissal from the
service. The court, however, refused to grant an order for the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang on the ground that this remedy, which it
considers as an injunction, is available only against acts about to be committed or actually being committed, and not against past acts; that
injunction is preventive in nature only; and that as the law has already been violated, the remedy now available is for the prosecution of the
employer for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law, and not for the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. It, therefore, dismissed the action, as well
as the petition for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and that which was theretofore granted was dissolved.
Petitioner then appealed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying a petition of the chief of the Wage Administration Service for
the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang by the respondent William Brown.

ISSUE
Whether or not the lower court erred in not ordering the respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang in the service.

RULING
Petition is meritorious.
It is evident that the court a quo erred in considering that mandatory injunction is preventive in nature, and may not be granted by the Court of
First Instance once the act complained of has been carried out. The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but one of mandamus,
because it seeks the performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary mandatory injunction is
also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character. In the case at bar, Pablo S. Afuang was entitled to continue in the service of
respondent, because his act is expressly provided to be no ground or reason for an employee's dismissal. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 602 states
that "it shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act, ...." Pablo S. Afuang was, therefore,
unlawfully deprived of his right or privilege to continue in the service of the respondent, because his dismissal was unlawful or illegal. Having been
deprived of such right or privilege, it is within the competence of courts to compel the respondent to admit him back to his service.

The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the respondent William Brown is hereby ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang to the position
he held prior to his dismissal. Without costs.

13. G.R. No. 8692 September 10, 1913
GODOFREDO B. HERRERA, as municipal president of Caloocan, petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO BARRETTO, judge of first instance of Rizal, and CONSTANCIO JOAQUIN, respondents.
PRINCIPLE
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not
depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

"If the court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, then it is clear that whatever mistakes has been made has been only an error
committed on the part of the trial court in exercising his judgment and applying the law to the case, rather than an excess of jurisdiction in acting
in a matter wherein he had not acquired jurisdiction to act or wherein his court has no jurisdiction of the subject in litigation. . .

FACTS
On the 1st of March, 1913, Constancio Joaquin, believing himself entitled to a license to open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of
Caloocan, and the authorities thereof refusing to issue it to him, began an action against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal president of said
municipality, the officer whose duty he claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain a mandamus compelling said official to issue such
license.
the plaintiff asked that the court issue a mandatory injunction directed to the defendant requiring him to issue a provisional license under which
the plaintiff might conduct his cockpit during the pendency of the action. The court, in pursuance of such request and upon the facts stated in the
complaint and exhibits annexed thereto, issued such order ex parte without notice of the defendant.
Herrera filed an action for certiorari against Barreto, the judge who issued the mandatory injunction relative to the provisional license referred to,
and Constancio Joaquin alleging that
said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction,
according to paragraph ( j), section 40, of the Municipal Code and article 4 of municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan (Exhibit 1 a), the
issuance of cockpit licenses in Loma and Maypajo does not pertain to the municipal president of Caloocan but to the municipal council
thereof.
in issuing the mandatory injunction ex parte without giving the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such injunction
should not be issued as required by section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The cockpit license erroneously issued in favor of Constancio Joaquin, has been annulled and cancelled by virtue of ordinance No. 8 of
the municipal council of Caloocan, which ordinance has been duly approved by the provincial board of Rizal.
That there being another action pending between the same parties, founded upon the same facts and reasons, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction of the 1st of March, 1913 (Exhibit 4), for the reason that such
injunction tends to render inefficacious and null the final decision which this honorable court will render in civil case No. 8673 (which
was filed by Antonio Bertol and Tranquilina T., windows of Angeles, against Godofredo B. Herrera and others relating to the validity of a
certain ordinance.)

ISSUE
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction

RULING
The petition lacks merit
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be
directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. It will be not be issued to cure errors in the proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of
law or of fact. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are
decision within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be, cannot be corrected by certiorari.
The Code of Civil Procedure giving Court of First Instance general jurisdiction in actions for mandamus, it goes without saying that the Court of
First Instance had jurisdiction in the present case to resolve every question arising in such an action and to decide every question presented to it
which pertained to the cause. It had already been held by this court that, while it is a power to be exercised only in extreme cases, a Court of First
Instance has power to issue a mandatory injunction to stand until the final determination of the action in which it is issued. While the issuance of
the mandatory injunction in this particular case may have been irregular and erroneous, a question concerning which we express no opinion,
nevertheless its issuance was within the jurisdiction of the court and its action is not reviewable on certiorari. It is not sufficient to say that it was
issued wrongfully and without sufficient grounds and in the absence of the other party.
It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the municipal president to issue the license, for the reason that he was not
the proper person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person, he had the right to exercise a discretion as to whom the license should be
issued. We do not believe that either of these question goes to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the fundamental questions in
a mandamus against a public officer is whether or not that officer has the right to exercise discretion in the performance of the act which the
plaintiff asks him to perform. It is one of the essential determination of the cause. To claim that the resolution of that question may deprive the
court of jurisdiction is to assert a novel proposition. It is equivalent to the contention that a court has jurisdiction if he decides right but no
jurisdiction if he decides wrong. It may be stated generally that it is never necessary to decide the fundamental questions of a cause to determine
whether the court has jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction is preliminary and never touches the merits of the case. The determination of the
fundamental questions of a cause are merely the exercise of a jurisdiction already conceded.
In the case at bar no one denies the power, authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of an action
for mandamus and to decide every question which arises in that cause and pertains thereto.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not
depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
In the case of Chase vs. Christianson (41 Cal., 253), the court said: "Here, then, was jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person and these
conditions conceded, the decision of all other question arising in the case is but the exercise of that jurisdiction and an erroneous decision of any
of these other questions could not impair the validity and binding force of the judgment when brought in question collaterally.
In the case of Utah Association vs. Budge (16 Idaho, 751), the court said: "If the court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, then
it is clear that whatever mistakes has been made has been only an error committed on the part of the trial court in exercising his judgment and
applying the law to the case, rather than an excess of jurisdiction in acting in a matter wherein he had not acquired jurisdiction to act or wherein
his court has no jurisdiction of the subject in litigation. . . . The court had the jurisdiction, power, and authority to hear and determine that
question. It accordingly did so. If the court committed an error in deciding the question thus presented, we answer that the court had jurisdiction
to commit the error."
Although certiorari may be considered a direct attack upon a judgment as distinguished from a collateral attack, nevertheless, under the laws of
these Islands the only ground for the issuance of certiorari being the failure of jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, the basis of the direct attack
upon the judgment becomes in this jurisdiction the same as for collateral attack, inasmuch as, generally speaking, a collateral attack against a
judgment is sustainable only when the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction in the court to pronounce it. Therefore the authorities relative to
the ground necessary for a successful collateral attack upon a judgment are authorities in a large sense, pertinent to a discussion as to when a
court may be held to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
In the case of Miller vs. Rowan (251 Ill., 344), the court said: "A judgment or decree is not binding upon anyone unless the court rendering the
same had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the cause. The court did have jurisdiction of the parties, and the appellant, who is
disputing the binding effect of the decree, was one of the complainants. It the court has jurisdiction, it is altogether immaterial, when the
judgment is collaterally called in question, how grossly irregular or manifestly erroneous its proceedings may have been. The judgment cannot be
regarded as a nullity, and cannot, therefore, be collaterally impeached. Such a judgment is binding on the parties and on every other court unless
reversed or annulled in a direct proceeding and is not open to collateral attack. If there is a total want of jurisdiction in a court its proceedings are
an absolute nullity and confer no right and afford no protection but will be pronounced void when collaterally drawn in question.
(Buckmaster vs. Carling, 3 Scam., 104; Swiggart vs. Harber, 1 id., 364; People vs. Seelye, 146 Ill., 189; Clark vs. People, 146 id., 348;
O'Brien vs. People, 216 id., 354; People vs. Talmadge, 194 id., 67.)"
That certiorari will lie only in case of failure of jurisdiction has been consistently held by this court. In the case of In re Prautch (1 Phil. Rep., 1 32),
the court said: "Under the provisions of the code in certiorariproceedings, it is necessary that it would appear both that the inferior court has
exceeded its jurisdiction and that there is no appeal from such court."
In the case of Baes vs. Cordero (13 Phil. Rep., 466), the court said: "And, if the jurisdiction has not been exceeded, there is not nor could there be
any legal ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, because these proceedings can only exclusively be granted to remedy abuses committed
in the exercise of a power or jurisdiction. Sections 217 and 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for such relief unequivocally and
specifically refer to the act of exceeding or going beyond the jurisdiction; and this court has repeatedly held that, in order that certiorari may issue,
it is absolutely necessary to show that the respondent has exceeded his power or jurisdiction. (In re Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; De los
Reyes vs. Roxas, 1 Phil. Rep., 625; Springer vs.Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep., 344.)"
The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other
purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary casescases in which the action of
the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result
whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be nought but a snare and a
delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded falsehood, a standing menace. It is only to avoid such results as
these that a writ of certiorari is issuable; and even here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to prosecute it.
A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching the question of certiorari and prohibition fully support the
proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, its decision of any
question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot be reviewed by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal.
The fact that another action may have been pending involving the same subject matter and even between the same parties, which was not the fact
in this case, does not touch the jurisdiction of the court to act.
The writ is denied and the proceeding is dismissed. So ordered.

14. [G.R. No. 148029. September 24, 2002]
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER CORPORATION, PERFECT DEAL CORPORATION, MARCOS
C. YUEN doing business as PERFECT BYTE COMPUTER CENTER and HON. FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, RTC-Br. 255, Las Pias City, respondents.


PRINCIPLE
A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the
court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and
subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
[12]
Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
[13]
Petitioner's rights can be more appropriately addressed in the appeal.
FACTS
On 4 December 2000 petitioner filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and the
Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence against Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen
doing business as Perfect Byte Computer Center. It alleged that defendants without authority or license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed
and/or loaded software programs owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by them to their customers in violation of its intellectual property
rights. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants from illegally reproducing, selling and
distributing unlicensed software programs. It also applied for the issuance of an ex parte order for the seizure and impounding of relevant
evidence that can be or may be found at defendants' business premises.
On 26 December 2000 the Las Pias trial court set petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order for hearing but at the same time denied its
application for an ex parte order ratiocinating that the Intellectual Property Code does not expressly allow its issuance and that, in any case, the
TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) AGREEMENT
[1]
cannot prevail over it. The court a quo also opined that petitioner's
application partook of a search and seizure order available only in criminal cases. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied
on 9 January 2001.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. petitioner submits that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of infringing
evidence. It maintains that Sec. 216.2, Part IV, of RA 8293
[2]
authorizes such order. It concedes though that while RA 8293 does not expressly
mention the provisional and ex parte nature of the remedy, nonetheless, Art. 50 of the TRIPS Agreement amply supplies the deficiency.
Petitioner allegedly resorted to the instant recourse because it had no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It automatically invoked the jurisdiction of this Court supposedly because of the importance of the issue involved. It bypassed the
Court of Appeals on the premise that it would be useless to first seek recourse thereat as the party aggrieved by the appellate court's ruling would
nonetheless elevate the matter to this Court. By then, petitioner surmised, the level of intellectual piracy would have worsened. Likewise,
petitioner presumes that direct resort to this Court is justified as the petition involves a pure question of law.


ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for certiorari is proper

RULING
Petition lacks merit.
For certiorari to lie, it must be shown that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.
[3]
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include
correction of public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon.
[4]

The petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
[5]

We find that the court below acted within its jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint for injunction and damages filed by
petitioner. Section 19, par. (8), BP Blg. 129, as amended,
[6]
provides that Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds P200,000.00. In the complaint filed before the court a quo, petitioner averred that it incurred no less than P750,000.00 in
attorney's fees, investigation and litigation expenses and another P2,000,000.00 by way of moral damages. Clearly, the above amounts fall within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.
[7]
For an abuse to be grave the power must be
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
[8]
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law.
[9]
There is grave abuse of
discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
[10]

Petitioner asserts that respondent trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying its application for the issuance of an ex
parte order. However, other than this bare allegation, petitioner failed to point out specific instances where grave abuse of discretion was allegedly
committed. It was never shown how respondent tribunal supposedly exercised its power in a despotic, capricious or whimsical manner.
Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
by certiorari. As long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.
[11]
The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to
correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include
errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all
other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment.
[12]
Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.
[13]
Petitioner's rights can be more appropriately addressed in the appeal.
Petitioner's direct resort to this Court in the guise of speedy justice was in utter disregard of the hierarchy of courts. We find no exceptional
or compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Our pronouncement in People v. Cuaresma
[14]
is most instructive -
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the
Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

15. G.R. No. 12083 November 27, 1916
NEMESIO CAMPOS, petitioner,
vs.
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, judge of first instance of Cebu, and TEODORO ALDANESE, respondents.
PRINCIPLE
the general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially considers and adjudicates
the question of its jurisdiction, and decides that the fact exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is conclusive and
cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding.
the determination of a question of fact on which its jurisdiction depends does not of itself affect the court's jurisdiction. It has power to resolve the
question of fact; and its decision is within its powers whichever was it may go. Such a finding cannot be attacked by certiorari
FACTS
The petition alleges that, upon the proclamation by the municipal board of inspectors of the municipality of Sibonga, Province of Cebu, declaring
the respondent Teodoro Aldanese elected to the position of municipal president of said municipality, the petitioner filed a protest against the
election. After the filing of the protest copies were duly made for service on the various persons receiving votes for the office of the municipal
president. The service of the notice of protest upon the respondent Teodoro Aldanese was made by delivering a copy thereof to one Isidoro
Aldanese, a brother of the respondent Teodoro Aldanese, and who, it is claimed by the petitioner, was living in the house of the respondent
Teodoro Aldanese at the time. Isidoro Aldanese acknowledged in writing on the back of the original notice of protest the fact that he had received
it. A copy of the certificate of service was attached to the petition and made a part of it as Exhibit C. Thereafter, a motion was made to the court in
which the election contest was pending for the dismissal of the proceedings on the ground that not all of the persons receiving votes for the office
of municipal president were notified as required by law and therefore the court acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings. The court, after hearing
the parties with regard to the service of the notice of protest on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese, held that, under the facts submitted, no service
of the protest had been made on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese in the manner requires by law and that, therefore, the court acquired no
jurisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed the protest.

after the court had decided the motion and had begun to dictate his order to that effect, the attorney for the petitioner, observing that the court in
its order found the existence of facts which he believed had not been proved, attempted to make an argument with respect thereto and the court
refused to hear him. It is also alleged that, after the order had been dictated, counsel for the petitioner offered to present evidence that the notice
was served in accordance with law but the court refused to hear the evidence. It is also alleged that the petitioner made a motion for a rehearing of
said motion which the court denied.
Upon this showing the petitioner contends that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the proceedings and that its action should be
annulled and set aside and that the court should be ordered to proceed with the contest.
The respondent filed a demurrer to the petition on the ground, among others, that it did not state facts sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for certiorari is proper

RULING
Petition lacks merit.
We have frequently held that the court acquires no jurisdiction of an election protest unless the protestant shows to the court that a notice of
protest has been served in the manner required by law upon all the candidates receiving votes for the office concerning which the protest was filled
and who were candidates for that office. The absence of such proof is fatal to the petitioner when the motion is dismissed on that ground.
In this case, however, no evidence was offered establishing the fact of proper service until after the order dismissing the proceedings was entered,
except the evidence referred to in the order of dismissal and the order denying the motion for a rehearing. The evidence referred to in such orders
was insufficient to establish the service. In the absence of provisions in the Election Law stating how such service should be made the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to that matter control. Section 396, paragraph 6, provides in part that, "in all other cases, to the defendant
personally, or by leaving a copy at his usual place of residence, in the hands of some person resident therein of sufficient discretion to receive the
same." As found by the trial court the evidence which it had before it at the time the motion was made and the order entered in connection
therewith did not establish service within the provisions of the section just quoted; and, accordingly, it was the duty of the court to dismiss the
proceedings (See cases cited.)

the general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially considers and adjudicates
the question of its jurisdiction, and decides that the fact exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is conclusive and
cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding.
In the case before us evidence as to the fact of service was introduced by the petitioner and the sufficiency of that evidence was challenged by the
respondent. The petitioner did not take advantage of the opportunity given him by the challenge to present other and further evidence in relation
to the service but stood squarely upon the facts already presented and accepted a decision of the court thereon. Under such circumstances there
was nothing left for the court to do except to decide the question upon the facts as they were. The court did so; and although to say so is
unnecessary to a decision of this case, we are of the opinion that its finding on the facts as they existed of record at the time was well founded.
Thereafter the court denied the motion for a rehearing and that denial cannot be held to have been made in excess of the jurisdiction of the court
or outside of its powers and authority. Even though it be conceded that the court should have given the petitioner an opportunity to present
further evidence on the question of service the fact that the court held that the petitioner had had his day in court with regard to that matter and
that he was not entitled to another opportunity at the expense of the respondent and the delay which would necessarily follow does not go to the
jurisdiction of the court and does not subject him to a revision of his orders on certiorari.
It may be added that the determination of a question of fact on which its jurisdiction depends does not of itself affect the court's jurisdiction. It has
power to resolve the question of fact; and its decision is within its powers whichever was it may go. Such a finding cannot be attacked by certiorari
The demurrer is sustained and the complaint will be dismissed on the merits, unless the petitioner within ten days files an amended complaint
stating facts sufficient to warrant the issuance of the remedy. So ordered.

16. G.R. No. L-46330 April 22, 1939
IRENEO ABAD SANTOS and JOSE V. ABAD SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF TARLAC, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and DIEGO LOCSIN, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac, respondents.
PRINCIPLE
abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS
In an action instituted by the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain parcels of land for the construction of the Capas-Murcia diversion
road, a compromise was entered into between said province and the petitioners herein for the payment to the latter of the agreed value of their
lands. The respondent judge approved the compromise in a partial decision rendered by him on September 27, 1937, and ordered the parties to
comply with the conditions therein set forth. On October 2, 1937, the provincial fiscal, in behalf of the Province of Tarlac, moved for the
reconsideration of the decision on the ground that in giving his assent to the compromise, he acted under the mistaken belief that the prices fixed
therein had been approved by the appraisal committee of the provincial government, composed of the provincial treasurer, district engineer and
provincial auditor, and that the Province of Tarlac, at the time of the compromise, had no longer any authority to expropriate the lands, because in
virtue of Executive Order No. 71, the Capas-Murcia Diversion road was declared a national highway under the authority of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. The respondent judge acceded to his motion and, setting aside it decision, ordered the reopening of the case and authorized the
substitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the Province of Tarlac as party plaintiff, in accordance with the petition of the Solicitor-
General to that effect. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the judge has the authority to reopen the case.

RULING
Yes.
Petitioners contend that the respondent judge was without power to set aside his partial decision which was founded upon a compromise duly
approved by him. It is not claimed that the judgment in question has become final. In fact, it cannot be so claimed because the fiscal's motion for
reconsideration thereof was presented five days after its rendition. Not having become final, the lower court has plenary control over it and can
modify or set it aside as law and justice require. (Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil., 257; De Fiesta vs. Llorente and Manila Railroad Co.,
25 Phil., 554, 561.)

And the fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. It stands on
the same footing as that of an ordinary judgment which may be opened or vacated on adequate grounds, such as fraud , mistake or absence of
real consent. (15 R. C. L., 645, 646; sec. 113, Act No. 190; Yboleon vs. Sison, 59 Phil., 281.)
Whether or not the grounds alleged by the provincial fiscal in his motion for reconsideration seeking relief from the effect of the compromise and
the from the judgment rendered thereon are or are not sufficient, is not a question of jurisdiction but one of judgment which we do not decide
here. No abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners, and by abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

17. G.R. No. L-13602 April 6, 1918
LEUNG BEN, plaintiff,
vs.
P. J. O'BRIEN, JAMES A OSTRAND and GEO. R. HARVEY, judges of First Instance of city of Manila,
PRINCIPLE
any irregular exercise of juridical power by a Court of First Instance, in excess of its lawful jurisdiction, is remediable by the writ of certiorari,
provided there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; and in order to make out a case for the granting of the writ it is not necessary that
the court should have acted in the matter without any jurisdiction whatever. Indeed the repeated use of expression excess of jurisdiction shows
that the lawmaker contemplated the situation where a court, having jurisdiction should irregularly transcend its authority as well as the situation
where the court is totally devoid of lawful power.
It may be observed in this connection that the word jurisdiction as used in attachment cases, has reference not only to the authority of the court
to entertain the principal action but also to its authority to issue the attachment, as dependent upon the existence of the statutory ground. (6 C.
J., 89.) This distinction between jurisdiction to issue the attachment as an ancillary remedy incident to the principal litigation is of importance; as
a court's jurisdiction over the main action may be complete, and yet it may lack authority to grant an attachment as ancillary to such action.

FACTS
An action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by P. J. O'Brien to recover the sum of P15,000 alleged to have been lost
by Leung Ben to P.J. OBrien in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games conducted during the two or three months prior to the
institution of the suit. In Leung Bens verified complaint, OBrien asked for an attachment against the property of Leung Ben on the ground that
the latter was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud his creditors. This attachment was issued, and acting under that
authority, the sheriff attached the sum of P15,000 which had been deposited by the OBrien with the International Banking Corporation. Leung
Bien filed a motion to quash the attachment, which was dismissed by the court. Hence this application for a writ ofcertiorari, the purpose of which
was to quash an attachment issued from the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.

ISSUE
(1) Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an attachment for which there is no statutory authority, can this court entertain the
present petition and grant the desired relief?

RULING
Yes.
Under section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction by the writ of certiorari over the proceedings of
Courts of First Instance, wherever said courts have exceeded their jurisdiction and there is no plaint, speedy, and adequate remedy. In the same
section, it is further declared that the proceedings in the Supreme Court in such cases hall be as prescribed for Courts of First Instance in section
217-221, inclusive, of said Code. This Supreme Court, so far as applicable, the provisions contained in those section to the same extent as if they
had been reproduced verbatim immediately after section 514. Turning to section 217, we find that, in defining the conditions under
which certiorari can be maintained in a Court of First Instance substantially the same language is used as is the same remedy can be maintained
in the Supreme Court of First Instance, substantially the same language is used as is found in section 514 relative to the conditions under which
the same remedy can be maintained in the Supreme Court, namely, when the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
In section 220 of the same Code, we have a provision relative to the final proceedings in certiorari, and herein it is stated that the court shall
determine whether the inferior tribunal has regularly pursued its authority it shall give judgment either affirming annulling, or modifying the
proceedings below, as the law requires. The expression, has not regularly pursued its authority as here used, is suggestive, and we think it should
be construed in connection with the other expressions have exceeded their jurisdiction, as used in section 514, and has exceeded their jurisdiction
as used in section 217. Taking the three together, it results in our opinion that any irregular exercise of juridical power by a Court of First
Instance, in excess of its lawful jurisdiction, is remediable by the writ of certiorari, provided there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
and in order to make out a case for the granting of the writ it is not necessary that the court should have acted in the matter without any
jurisdiction whatever. Indeed the repeated use of expression excess of jurisdiction shows that the lawmaker contemplated the situation where a
court, having jurisdiction should irregularly transcend its authority as well as the situation where the court is totally devoid of lawful power.
It may be observed in this connection that the word jurisdiction as used in attachment cases, has reference not only to the authority of the court
to entertain the principal action but also to its authority to issue the attachment, as dependent upon the existence of the statutory ground. (6 C.
J., 89.) This distinction between jurisdiction to issue the attachment as an ancillary remedy incident to the principal litigation is of importance; as
a court's jurisdiction over the main action may be complete, and yet it may lack authority to grant an attachment as ancillary to such action.
By parity of reasoning it must follow that when a court issues a writ of attachment for which there is no statutory authority, it is acting irregularly
and in excess of its jurisdiction, in the sense necessary to justify the Supreme Court in granting relief by the writ of certiorari. But it will be said
that the writ of certiorari is not available in this cae, because the petitioner is protected by the attachment bond, and that he has a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy appeal.
In our opinion the cause of action stated in the complaints in the court below is based on a contract, express or implied and is therefore of such
nature that the court had authority to issue writ of attachment. The application for the writ of certiorari must therefore be denied and the
proceedings dismissed. So ordered.
18. G.R. No. L-9698 January 6, 1915
AGAPITO NAPA, petitioner,
vs.
JOHN P. WEISSENHAGEN, acting judge of the Court of First Instance of Surigao, ET AL., respondents.
PRINCIPLE
If a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decision upon all question pertinent to the cause are decisions which its
jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.

FACTS
In February, 1913, there was begun in the justice's court of Gigaquit, Surigao, an action for the summary recovery of the possession of land under
section 80 and following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff in the case at bar being the defendant there and the defendants
Julian Larong and Hermenegildo Bayla being the plaintiffs.
The justice's court tried the cause, found in favor of the plaintiff and ordered delivery of possession. The decision was rendered on the 14th of
April, 1913, and appeal was taken therefrom on the 29th of the same month.
The cause having arrived in the Court of First Instance for determination on the appeal, a motion was made by the appellee to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that it had not been perfected within the time required by law. The court entertained this motion, granted it, and dismissed the
appeal.
The purpose of this proceeding is to obtain a writ of certiorari for the revision of the record of the court below, the revocation of the judgment
entered upon the order granting the motion to dismiss the appeal, and to set aside the whole proceeding to the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal.

ISSUE
why the writ of certiorari should not be issued upon the petition in the case.

RULING
As is seen, a mere statement of the case is sufficient to deny the relief prayed for. It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance had
jurisdiction to consider a motion to dismiss the appeal and the exercise of that jurisdiction did not result in its loss, it having been exercised in
accordance with the established forms and methods of procedure prescribed by the practice of the country. We have held in numerous case that a
writ ofcertiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
performing the acts complained of. We have also held that if a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decision upon all
question pertinent to the cause are decisions which its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected
by certiorari. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a justice's court and, therefore, had
jurisdiction to decide every question pertaining thereto. This being the case, the consideration of the motion and the dismissal of the appeal as a
consequence thereof are not acts in excess of jurisdiction. It may be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of one of the fundamental
question before it does not, except perhaps in cases involving a constitutional question, deprive it of jurisdiction whichever way it may decide.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not
depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should be distinguished
from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where
there is jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other question arising in the case is but an exercise of that
jurisdiction. (Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. Rep., 245; Gala vs. Cui, 25 Phil. Rep., 522; De Fiesta vs. Llorente, 25 Phil. Rep., 554.)
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected no longer exists. Its place is now
taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its errors can be corrected only by that method. The writ in this country
has been confined to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose. (Id.)
f the judgment of the justice's court was void, it was nevertheless appealable, although the losing party might have been able to rid himself of it by
other means. Having been appealed, it stands upon substantially the same footing in the appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned,
as any other judgment of a justice's court and the jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as full and complete as it is in any other.
It having been found that the contention of the respondents is correct, the petition is dismissed. So ordered.

RULE 65: San Pedro v. Hon. Asdala COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla (REB)
G.R. No. 164560 July 22, 2009
ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO and ALEJO DOPEO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87; HON. MANUEL
TARO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 42; and the HEIRS OF SPOUSES
APOLONIO V. DIONISIO and VALERIANA DIONISIO (namely, ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO and ELEANOR R. DIONISIO, herein represented
by ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO), Respondents.
FACTS: private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42, a Complaint

against herein petitioners and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages, with Prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value
of P32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that
they were the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property. Private respondents had allegedly been prevented from
entering, possessing and using subject property. It was further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their
alleged property was spurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute owners of the subject property; that
petitioners be ordered to surrender possession of subject property to them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered to pay
actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss
3
said complaint on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The MeTC denIED the motion to dismiss, ruling that, under BP 129, as amended, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
involving title to or possession of real property of small value.
Petitioner filed MR - DENIED.
Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. the RTC dismissed the
petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge. The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in
accordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for Accion
Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and possession of real property located in Quezon City, with an assessed value not
exceeding P50,000.00.
Petitioner filed MR - DENIED
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, insisting that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of
jurisdiction over the same. CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they should have availed
themselves of the remedy of appeal.
petitioner filed MR- DENIED
ISSUE: Whether the filing of certiorari was improper - YES
RULING: the CA, therefore, acted properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the ground that petitioners should have
resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari. Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.
The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as
provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, inPasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
10
the Court expounded as follows:
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65, because such recourse is proper only if the party
has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct
remedy.
x x x x
Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal,
especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there
be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by Petition for Certiorari was a fatal procedural error,
and the instant petition must, therefore, fail.
11

Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for review on certiorari had lapsed by the time the instant petition was filed, the assailed
CA Resolutions have attained finality.
Nevertheless, just to put the matter to rest, the Court reiterates the ruling in Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,
12
to wit:
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that
fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint forAccion Reivindicatoria.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
78978, dated September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 181642 January 29, 2009
RUFINO S. CAMUTIN, EDDIE P. CAMUTIN, GINA P. CAMUTIN, represented by NOMINARIO SARIA, as Attorney-in-fact, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. NORBERTO POTENTE, and PASCUALA POTENTE, Respondents
R E S O L U T I ON
TINGA, J.:
In a petition for review dated 18 February 2008,
1
petitioners Rufino S. Camutin, Eddie P. Camutin and Gina P. Camutin, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Nominario Saria, assail the Order dated 23 January 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 23, Trece Martires City, Cavite in
SP. Civil Action Case No. TMSCA-0010-07 dismissing the case.
2

FACTS: Petitioners were the registered owners of parcels of land covered who reside abroad, discovered upon coming back to the Philippines in 1998
that the house and warehouse of respondents Spouses Norberto and Pascuala Potente were erected on the subject lots. Thereupon, respondents
agreed to pay petitioners a P1,000.00 monthly rental starting 1 January 1998 for the use of the lots. They also agreed that should the properties be
sold, respondents would have the right of first refusal and should respondents be unable to purchase the properties, they would peacefully vacate
the premises.
However, respondents failed and refused to pay the agreed rentals. Neither were they able to purchase the lots. Consequently, petitioners sold a
portion of the lots to a third party who had it fenced.
respondents filed a complaint for partition against petitioners and the buyer of the properties before the RTC of Trece Martires City Civil Case No.
TMSCA-0023-06 . Respondents claimed they had a right over one-half of the property by virtue of the acknowledgment of rights allegedly executed
by petitioners deceased mother in 9 June 1970.
petitioners filed a complaint with the barangay to have respondents warehouse removed from the properties. During the conference on 13 October
2006, the parties agreed to wait for the outcome of the hearing on the case for partition before the RTC. After the 13 October 2006 conference, the
parties no longer appeared before the Barangay.
4

On 20 November 2006, petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents before the MTC.Respondents filed an Answer with
Motion to Enforce the Agreement entered into before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the Barangay. The Barangay Chairperson clarified that the
agreement was only to wait for the result of the RTCs 17 October 2006 hearing in the case for partition and not to wait for the termination of the
case altogether.
7

the MTC issued an Order/Writ of Execution
8
where it noted the pendency of Civil Case No. TMSCA-0023-06 before the RTC and the existence of an
"amicable settlement to await first the resolution of the Court on the said pending civil case."
9
Apparently, the MTC treated the agreement as an
amicable settlement when the agreement was only to defer the barangay case pending the hearing before the RTC on 17 October 2006. The MTC
thus ordered that the proceedings in the ejectment case be indefinitely suspended and archived subject to its revival upon the final resolution of Civil
Case No. TMSCA-0023-06. The MTC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order on 16 August 2007.
10

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss thereto, alleging that the petition for
certiorari is a prohibited pleading. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners argued that the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and that the MTC likewise erred in suspending the proceedings in the
case for unlawful detainer until the final resolution of Civil Case No. TMSCA-0023-06 before the RTC. They allege that the MTC erroneously
interpreted the barangay agreement differently from the clear testimony of the Barangay Chairperson and acted capriciously and whimsically in
ordering the case archived without basis. Consequently, it was only proper for them to file the petition for certiorari before the RTC, which should
have exercised its authority over the MTC and corrected the error that the inferior court had committed instead of dismissing their petition.
Petitioners thus prayed that the RTCs order be annulled and declared null and void.
----------------
In their Comment dated 2 June 2008, respondents point out several technical errors supposedly committed by petitioners.
12

First, petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy. Since the assailed Order dated 23 January 2008 was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, respondents argue that the correct mode of review is an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.
Second, the petition raises questions of fact, not of law, as petitioners seek a review and reexamination of the testimony of the Barangay
Chairperson.
Third, petitioners ignored the rule on the hierarchy of courts for no apparent reason.
And lastly, the petition is patently bereft of merit. Petitioners assert that the MTC has already made a finding of fact that there was an agreement
between the parties to await the resolution of the case for partition before the RTC. In ordering the stay of the proceedings in the unlawful detainer
case, the MTC merely ordered the implementation of the agreement between the parties. The dismissal by the RTC of petitioners petition for
certiorari is also in full accord with the summary rules governing cases for ejectment and unlawful detainer, respondents conclude.
In a Manifestation/Motion, respondents state that the case at bar has become moot and academic in view of the dismissal of the unlawful detainer
case filed before the MTC and on that basis seek the dismissal of the petition for review.
13
Attached to the motion is a copy of the Order/Resolution
dated 9 October 2008 issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 805,
14
where it dismissed the unlawful detainer case in view of its findings that: (1) the
legal requirement of a barangay conciliation proceeding and/or barangay certificate to file action, a condition precedent for filing the ejectment case
was not complied with, the 13 October 2006 agreement not being the legal requirement contemplated by Sec. 12, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) the fact of unilateral demolition of respondents warehouse and petitioners possession of the lots which have rendered the pending unlawful
detainer case ineffectual and futile.
Petitioners filed their Opposition to the Manifestation/Motion,
15
claiming that respondents are misleading the Court into thinking that the dismissal
of the case is already final when the truth is respondents are aware that petitioners had filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTCs Order. The MTC, gave
due course to the notice of appeal and also ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the RTC.
17

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper NO
RULING: The petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic.
Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
18
While a petition for certiorari is not allowed against any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or
ejectment case,
19
in the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs Orders cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted
to by petitioners. On the contrary, sustaining the MTCs orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the unlawful detainer case, a result contrary
to the rules objective of speedy disposition of cases. Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC because these only ordered the
indefinite suspension and archiving of the case. The case was not resolved on the merits so there is actually no decision from which petitioners can
appeal. Thus, the RTC could have validly ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading.
However, the MTCs revival of the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent dismissal thereof on the grounds aforestated have rendered the
resolution of the present petition for review superfluous and unnecessary. In their petition for review, petitioners seek the nullification of the RTCs
orders and the subsequent recall of the MTCs orders suspending the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case and archiving it. The suspension of
the unlawful detainer case has apparently been lifted and the case has been decided. There is thus no more need for the Court to decide the present
petition on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for being moot and academic. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157376 October 2, 2007
CORAZON C. SIM, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EQUITABLE PCI-BANK, respondents
*
.
FACTS: Corazon Sim filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, alleging that she was initially employed by Equitable PCI-Bank
(respondent) in 1990 as Italian Remittance Marketing Consultant to the Frankfurt Representative Office. Eventually, she was promoted to Manager
position, until September 1999, when she received a letter from Remegio David -- the Senior Officer, European Head of PCIBank, and Managing
Director of PCIB- Europe -- informing her that she was being dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged mismanagement and
misappropriation of funds.
Respondent denied any employer-employee relationship between them, and sought the dismissal of the complaint.
On September 3, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction and/or lack of merit.
1
According to the
Labor Arbiter:
It should be stressed at this juncture that the labor relations system in the Philippines has no extra-territorial jurisdiction. It is limited to
the relationship between labor and capital within the Philippines. Since complainant was hired and assigned in a foreign land, although
by a Philippine Corporation, it follows that the law that govern their relationship is the law of the place where the employment was
executed and her place of work or assignment. On this premise, the Italian law allegedly provides severance pay which was applied and
extended to herein complainant.
Hence, this case should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Assuming for the sake of argument that this Office has jurisdiction over this case, still, this Office is inclined to rule in favor of the
respondent.
Complainant, as General Manager is an employee whom the respondent company reposed its trust and confidence. In other words, she
held a position of trust. It is well-settled doctrine that the basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the
employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. (National Sugar Refineries Corporation vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 478.)
x x x
In this case, the respondent company had strong reason to believe that the complainant was guilty of the offense charged against her.
2

On appeal, NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.
3

Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
the CA
4
dismissed the petition due to petitioner's non-filing of a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC.
Petitioner filed MR- DENIED by CA
Hence, the present recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: whether or not a prior motion for reconsideration is indispensable for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA. YES
TN: petitioner failed to fall within the exception.
RULING: YES.
Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
7
A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or
resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
8
This is to give the lower
court the opportunity to correct itself.
9

There are, of course, exceptions to the foregoing rule, to wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
Petitioner, however, failed to qualify her case as among the few exceptions. In fact, the Court notes that the petition filed before the CA failed
to allege any reason why a motion for reconsideration was dispensed with by petitioner. It was only in her motion for reconsideration of the CA's
resolution of dismissal and in the petition filed in this case that petitioner justified her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC would be merely an exercise in futility and useless. But it is not for
petitioner to determine whether it is so. As stressed in Cervantes v. Court of Appeals:
It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance
with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for
reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must
show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the petition.
11
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner also contends that the issue at bench is purely a question of law, hence, an exception to the rule. A reading of the petition filed with the
CA shows otherwise. The issues raised in this case are mixed questions of fact and law. There is a question of fact when doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts, and there is a question of law where the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts.
The rule is that the Court is bound by the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, unless it is shown that grave abuse of discretion or
lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed by said quasi-judicial bodies.
Petitioner does not deny having withdrawn the amount of P3,000,000.00 lire from the bank's account. What petitioner submits is that
she used said amount for the Radio Pilipinas sa Roma radio program of the company. Respondent, however, countered that at the time
she withdrew said amount, the radio program was already off the air. Respondent is a managerial employee. Thus, loss of trust and
confidence is a valid ground for her dismissal.
In any event, since the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the petition before it for failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration with the
NLRC, and considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC's factual findings as regards the validity of petitioner's dismissal are accorded great
weight and respect and even finality when the same are supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds no compelling reason to relax the rule
on the filing of a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 169813. September 5, 2006
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO AND RENE B. GOROSPE, PETITIONERS, versus EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ROMULO NERI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, AND JOSE ABUEVA, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS

Sirs/Mesdames:
At bar is a Petition for Prohibition
[1]
seeking to prevent respondents form implementing Executive Order No. 453, creating a consultative
commission to propose the revision of the 1987 Constitution in consultation with various sectors of society.
FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 453 entitled CREATING A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION TO PROPOSE THE REVISION
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ON CONSULTATION WITH VARIOUS SECTORS OF SOCIETY. The pertinent provisions of E.O. 453 read:
WHEREAS, our present political and economic systems need structural reforms to respond to inward and global changes to make them relevant
and competitive;
WHEREAS, applying the appropriate solutions to our chronic political, economic and cultural problems depends, to a large extent, on effective and
accountable political institutions, a decentralized government that is more responsive and accountable to the people and allows them to
participate effectively in its decisions and the making of social and economic policies;
WHEREAS, Constitutional reform is a public commitment the President made in 2003-2004, subsequently incorporated in the Medium Term
Public Investment Program, 2005-2010, which she deems to be of the highest priority, as stated in her State of the Nation Address on July 25,
2005;
WHEREAS, there is a need to bring the great charter debate to the people and involve them in the study and formulation of amendments or
revisions to the 1987 Constitution,
SECTION 1. Creation and Mandate. There is hereby created a Consultative Commission which conduct consultations and studies and propose
amendments and revisions in the 1987 Constitution, principally the proposals to shift from the presidential-unitary system to a parliamentary-
federal system of government, to refocus economic policies in the Constitution to match the countrys vision for global competitiveness, and to
review economic policies which tend to hinder the countrys global competitiveness and adversely affect the peoples welfare.
For this purpose, the Consultative Commission shall review existing and new Constitutional reform proposals and hold nationwide consultations
with various sectors of society, such as farmers, fishermen, workers, students, lawyers, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic, and
other similar groups, including the different leagues of Local Government Units and members of Congress and the Judiciary.
SECTION 2. Composition. The Consultative Commission shall be composed of not more than fifty (50) members representing the national,
regional, and sectoralconstituencies, who shall be appointed by the President...... xxx
SECTION 3. Nominations. Nominations of members of the Consultative Commission may be made by concerned groups of individuals.
All nominations shall be submitted to the Office of the President not later than August 31, 2005.
SECTION 5. Organization and Proceedings. The Executive Secretary shall preside at the initial meeting until the Consultative Commission
elects a Chairman to head and preside over its meetings, conferences and other proceedings. The election of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Secretary, and other officers from among its members shall be the first order of business at the opening session.
The plenary sessions of the Consultative Commission shall be public and duly recorded.
SECTION 7. Appropriation. The initial amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of the
Consultative Commission to be sourced from available funds, subject to usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly thereafter, President Macapagal-Arroyo designated forty nine (49) persons from various sectors of society to sit as members of the
Consultative Commission.
On September 28, 2005, the Consultative Commission held its first formal meeting and elected its officers. Jose V. Abueva, former President
of the University of the Philippines, was elected Chairman. Immediately thereafter, the Consultative Commission conducted its first plenary
session.
Beginning October 10, 2005, the different committees of the Commission conducted several public hearings and consultative meetings in the
cities of Cagayan de Oro, Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Puerto Princesa, Tacloban, and Zamboanga.
On October 13, 2005, lawyers Samson S. Alcantara, Ed Vincent S. Albano, and Rene B. Gorospe, herein petitioners, filed with this Court the
instant petition for prohibition in their capacity as Filipino citizens and taxpayers. They alleged that under Article XVII of the Constitution,
President Macapagal-Arroyo has no authority to participate in the process to amend or revise the Constitution. Likewise, she has no
power to create a Consultative Commission to study and propose amendments and allocate public funds for its operations.
On October 24, 2005, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 453-A which amended Section 2 of E.O. 453 by increasing the
membership of the Consultative Commission from 50 to 55.
On December 16, 2005, the Consultative Commission submitted to the President its report recommending changes in the charter. Then the
Consultative Commission ceased to exist.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for prohibition may be given due course? NO. bec. the issue was already moot and academic.

RULING: The instant petition has been overtaken by subsequent events. The Consultative Commission is now defunct. Hence, there is
no longer any issue to be resolved by this Court. This case has become moot and academic.
A case is moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits.
[2]
As a general rule, courts of justice are constituted to pass upon substantial rights. Hence, they will not consider questions
which are moot, as the resolution of the same will have no practical use or value.
[3]

The mootness of the case is evident in the relief prayed for by the petitioners, namely, a writ of prohibition. Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the writ of prohibition is one which commands the person to whom it is directed not to do
something which he is about to do. If the thing is already done, it is obvious that the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require
an affirmative act, and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action, and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited
direction.
[4]
In other words, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain future action. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act
that is already a fait accompli.
[5]
The Consultative Commission has been dissolved. Consequently, we find no more reason to resolve the
constitutional issues raised by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition. No pronouncement as to costs.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court

G.R. No. 174788 April 11, 2013
THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Respondents.
PRINCIPLE: A Rule 65 petition for prohibition can only be aimed at judicial, quasi-judicial, and ministerial functions.
75
Since the issuance of
the LAO Order assailed was not characterized by any of the three functions, then it follows that the GSIS chose the wrong remedy. Moreover,
"where it is the Government which is being enjoined from implementing an issuance which enjoys the presumption of validity, such discretion [to
enjoin] must be exercised with utmost caution.
76

FACTS: Respondent GSIS filed a Petition for Prohibition with the CA against petitioner Special Audit Team (SAT) of the Commission on Audit
(COA) with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO) a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, and a writ of prohibition. Subsequently, GSIS also
submitted a Manifestation and Motion dated 21 July 2005 detailing the urgency of restraining the SAT. The CA issued a Resolution on 22 July
2005,directing petitioner SAT to submit the latters comment, to be treated as an answer.

Additionally, the CA granted the prayer of GSIS for the issuance of a TRO effective sixty (60) days from notice. After requiring the submission of
memoranda,

On 23 September 2005 CA grants the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of an injunction bond. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) and a Comment on the petition, after it was notified of the case, as the
SAT had been represented in the interim by one of the team members instead of the OSG.

On 9 August 2006 MR DENIED by CA

The present Petition seeks to nullify both the 23 September 2005 and the 9 August 2006 CA Resolutions and to prohibit the CA from proceeding to
decide the case.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
COA created the SAT under Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order No. 2004-093. Tasked to conduct a special audit of specific GSIS
transactions, the SAT had the avowed purpose of conducting a special audit of those transactions for the years 2000 to 2004.
10
Accordingly, the
SAT immediately initiated a conference with GSIS management and requested copies of pertinent auditable documents, which the latter initially
agreed to furnish.
11
However, due to the objection of GSIS to the actions of SAT during the conference,
12
the request went unheeded. This
prompted the latter to issue a subpoena duces tecum.

In response to the subpoena, the GSIS, through its President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, replied that while it did recognize
the authority of COA to constitute a team to conduct a special audit, that team should not be the SAT, whose members were biased,
partial, and hostile.
14
The then-COA Chairperson Guillermo N. Carague denied the request of GSIS on account of the restructuring of the
commission under COA Resolution 2002-005, which formed the basis for the SATs creation.
15
However, through a subsequent letter of Atty. Claro
B. Flores and Atty. Nelo B. Gellaco, the GSIS alleged that the SATs creation was not supported by COA Resolution 2002-005, which was without
force and effect.
The reasoning of both lawyers was based on the theory that the 1987 Constitution did not give COA the power to reorganize itself.
17
Allegedly, the
commission only had the power to define the scope of its audit and examination, as well as to promulgate rules concerning pleading and
practice.
18
Even if the COA were allowed to reorganize itself, the GSIS claimed that the subpoena required a case to have been brought to the
commission for resolution.
19

Thereafter, several GSIS officials sent COA Chairperson Carague a letter emphasizing that the special audit should be conducted by another team
and detailing how the SAT, as then constituted, prejudged the legality of several key projects of the GSIS
20
while merely relying on hearsay and
inapplicable legal standards.
21

In its Petition, the SAT claimed that due to the continued refusal of GSIS to cooperate, the team was constrained to employ "alternative audit
procedures" by gathering documents from the Office of the Auditor of GSIS, the House of Representatives, and others.
22
Meanwhile, some of the
audit observations made by the SAT appeared in the newspaper Manila Times,
23
resulting in the refusal of GSIS management to attend the SATs
exit conference.
COURT INTERVENTION
On 15 April 2005, GSIS filed with the COA itself a "Petition/Request to nullify Special Audit Report dated 29 March 2005 on selected transactions
of the GSIS for CY 2000 to 2004."
25
The GSIS also filed a Petition for Prohibition dated 18 July 2005
26
before the CA, whose Resolutions
therein led to this present Petition.
PETITIONERS SAT CLAIMS:
First, the grant of the preliminary injunction was in grave abuse of discretion because of procedural infirmities in the Petition.
27

Second, the CA had no jurisdiction to rule on the validity or correctness of the findings and recommendations of the SAT because of the doctrines
of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Additionally, judicial review over the COA is vested exclusively in the Supreme
Court.
28

Third, the SATs special audit has basis in law.
29

Respondent GSIS, on the other hand, claims that the need for an injunction was urgent, since the SATs supervisor had said that notices for
disallowance were available at the COAs Records Division.
3

RESPONDENT GSIS CLAIMS:
As to the procedural and substantial aspect, GSIS claims the following:
First, the Petition for Prohibition satisfies the legal and procedural requirements.
Second, the CA has the power to prohibit the conduct of special audit and the issuance of notices of disallowance.
32

Third, the special audit does not have statutory basis.
In support of the prohibitory writ, GSIS claims that it is only the regular auditor who can conduct such audits and issue disallowances; that it
is only the commissioner of COA who can delegate this power; and that GSIS would suffer grave and irreparable injury, should the SAT implement
the latters report.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not prohibition is the correct remedy - NO
2. Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued - NO
3. Whether or not the SAT was validly constituted - YES
RULING:
1.) PROHIBITION IS NOT THE CORRECT REMEDY.
There is an appeal or a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available.
A rule of thumb for every petition brought under Rule 65 is the unavailability of an appeal or any "plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy."
34
Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are extraordinary remedies that historically require extraordinary facts to be shown
35
in order to
correct errors of jurisdiction.
36
The law also dictates the necessary steps before an extraordinary remedy may be issued.
37
To be sure, the
availability of other remedies does not always lend itself to the impropriety of a Rule 65 petition.
38
If, for instance, the remedy is insufficient or
would be proven useless,
39
then the petition will be given due course.
40

COA itself has a mechanism for parties who are aggrieved by its actions and are seeking redress directly from the commission itself.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 reads:
Appeal from decision of auditors. Any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of any government agency in the settlement of an account or
claim may within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision appeal in writing to the Commission.
Additionally, Rule V, Section 1 of the 1997 COA Rules provides:
An aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter,
notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under
audit.
41

Rule VI, Section 1, continues the linear procedure, to wit: The party aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may appeal to the
Commission Proper.
42

This discussion of the different procedures in place clearly shows that an administrative remedy was indeed available. To allow a
premature invocation of Rule 65 would subvert these administrative provisions, unless they fall under the established exceptions to the
general rule, some of which are as follows:
1) when the question raised is purely legal;
2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;
3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
5) when the claim involved is small;
6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
8) when strong public interest is involved;
9) when the subject of the controversy is private land;
10) in quo warranto proceedings.
43

GSIS claims that its case falls within the exceptions, because (a) the SAT supervisor has threatened to issue notices of disallowance;
44
(b) GSIS did
nothing to stop the threatened issuances or the public appearances of the SAT supervisor;
45
(c) the petition/request filed with the COA has not
been acted upon as of date;
46
(d) GSIS was denied due process because SAT had acted with partiality and bias;
47
and (e) the special audit was
illegal, arbitrary, or oppressive, having been done without or in excess or in grave abuse of discretion.All of these claims are baseless.
True enough, questions of fact require evidentiary processes, the "calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the
relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations,"
54
especially "if the query requires x x x the existence or
relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual."
55
Generally, these questions of fact
cannot be decided by a petition for prohibition under Rule 65,
56
because the rule applies to jurisdictional flaws brought about by lack, excess, or
grave abuse of discretion.
57

The Petition before the CA did not present anything to show that the remedies available to the GSIS were insufficient. If the Petition itself
admitted to the existence of other remedies,
58
then the burden of proving that there was an exception was on the party seeking that exception; in
the absence of proof the Petition must be denied. This burden of proof is "the duty of a party to present such amount of evidence on the facts in
issue as the law deems necessary for the establishment of his claim."
60

The failure to fulfill the requirements of Rule 65 disallows the CA from taking due course of the Petition;
61
otherwise appeals and motions for
reconsideration would be rendered meaningless,
62
as stated time and again by this Court:
If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be
sought..
The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Moreover, courts have
accorded respect for the specialized ability of other agencies of government to deal with the issues within their respective specializations prior to
any court intervention.
64
The Court has reasoned thus:
COA was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions when it issued LAO Order No. 2004-093.
LAO Order No. 2004-093 reads as follows:
SUBJECT: SPECIAL AUDIT/INVESTIGATION ON SELECTED TRANSACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
FROM CY 2000 TO 2004.
Pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 2002-053 dated August 26, 2002, a team is hereby constituted composed of the following personnel, namely:
x x x x
who shall conduct a special audit on selected transactions for the period 2000-2004 with particular attention on the creation of subsidiaries such
as GSIS Properties, Inc., missing paintings, cash advances and allowances/benefits of the Officers and Members of the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS within a period of ten (10) working days and shall submit the appropriate report thereon within five (5) days after completion of the audit to
the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office Office of Legal Affairs who shall supervise the proper implementation of this order.
Travel and other incidental expenses that may be incurred with this assignment shall be charged against the appropriate funds of this
Commission and the Team Leaders are hereby authorized to draw a cash advance ofP1,900 to defray out of pocket expenses subject to the usual
accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
By virtue of Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 in relation to Item III.A.6 of COA Memorandum 2002-053, the team shall have the
authority to administer oaths, take testimony, summon witnesses and compel the production of documents by compulsory processes in all
matters relevant to this audit/investigation. x x x.
This was obviously not an exercise of judicial power, which is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court and such other courts as may be
established by law.
71
Neither was it an exercise of quasi-judicial power, as administrative agencies exercise it "to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law."
72
The Court has made this point clear:
In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature.
73

Yet issuing the Order was not ministerial, because it required the exercise of discretion. Ministerial acts do not require discretion or the
exercise of judgment, but only the performance of a duty pursuant to a given state of facts in the manner prescribed.
74
The Order
obviously involved discretion, in both the choice of the personnel and the powers/functions to be given them.
A Rule 65 petition for prohibition can only be aimed at judicial, quasi-judicial, and ministerial functions.
75
Since the issuance of the LAO Order
assailed was not characterized by any of the three functions, as shown supra, then it follows that the GSIS chose the wrong remedy. Moreover,
"where it is the Government which is being enjoined from implementing an issuance which enjoys the presumption of validity, such discretion [to
enjoin] must be exercised with utmost caution.
76

2.) THE WRIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED.
Writs of injunction do not perfunctorily issue from the courts.
For the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material
and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In this case,
respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said
right.
4.) THE SAT WAS VALIDLY CONSTITUTED.
in the interest of justice and in consideration of the manifest desire of both parties to have the matter dealt with in this forum, it shall rule on the
validity of the SAT, notwithstanding the procedural infirmities of the original Petition in the CA. This power is vested in this Court when so
required by the exigencies of the case.
86
The exercise of this power is especially important in this case, because the justification of GSIS for directly
seeking court intervention is based on the alleged invalidity of the SATs creation. Considering that court intervention must be put to an end, and
that the question has its roots in the powers of a constitutional commission, we rule on the merits of the case.
As previously discussed, the COA has "the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charter. x x x."
87

The Constitution further provides as follows:
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
88

The Constitution grants the COA the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, and establish the techniques and
methods therefor. Pursuant to this authority, COA Memorandum No. 2002-053 was promulgated, giving the General Counsel the authority to
deputize a special audit team, viz:
In case the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office for the sector in the Central Office finds that the transaction/event is a proper subject of special
or fraud audit, he shall recommend the creation of a special audit team for approval of the General Counsel who shall sign the office order for the
purpose. This memorandum shall constitute authority for the General Counsel to deputize the team pursuant to the provisions of Section 40 of
P.D. 1445.
89


In fine, the trial court's Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss is not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals
held, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to
comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor;
and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from service,
and there is no law or rule which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report,
hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such instance, while the trial court's order is merely interlocutory and nonappealable,
certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

------------------
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. "Purely ministerial" are acts
to be performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. While the discretion of a Constitutional Commission cannot be controlled
by mandamus . . . . the court can decide whether the duty is discretionary or ministerial . . .

On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a
discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that
the duty be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to
do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes
duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
6


G.R. No. 132248 January 19, 2000
HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent.
SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) seeks to nullify through this petition for review the
Decision of the Court of Appeals
1
dismissing the certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria for lack of merit, as well as its Resolution
dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration thereof.1wphi1.nt
FACTS: former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of
the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent
Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library which were
under her control and supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items
of historical documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of
Justice, represented the DECS Secretary in the administrative case while respondent was represented by her own private counsel.
On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical documents of the national library, to the
prejudice of the national library in particular, and the country in general." She was ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations.
On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, or on 1 October 1996, she received another resolution correcting the
typographical errors found on the first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever
action would be most appropriate to take under the circumstances."
2
Her petition was, however, denied.
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution dated September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied
in his Order of 23 October 1996. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view of the warning in the 23 October
1996 Order that the denial of the request for the production of the Investigation Committee Report was final.
3
As earlier stated, respondent did not
appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and
injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.
4

Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. In its assailed Decision of 24 November
1997 the appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Gloria's petition for lack of merit holding that
FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration of the assailed order with the
respondent judge before filing the instant petition to this Court. This constitutes a procedural infirmity . . . . SECOND. Even if the
aforesaid procedural defect were to be disregarded, the petition at hand, nevertheless, must fail. The denial of the motion to dismiss
is an option available to the respondent judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper recourse of the
aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the objection(s) raised by him in said motion to dismiss, then
proceed with the trial and, in case of adverse decision, to elevate the entire case on appeal in due course.
Secretary Gloria filed MR DENIED hence this instant petition for review.
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.
ISSUE: 1.) whether the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
YES
2.) Whether petitioners certiorari could be entertained even if the required MR was not availed prior to its filing? Gen. NO. however this case,
fall within the exception.
3.) Whether petitioner DECS Secretary has ministerial duty to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report? - NO
RULING:
. The order only confused petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors which would be the proper subject of her motion for reconsideration.
Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for
the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and
specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed
errors on its act or order. However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of the
lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of the Rules; as in this case, a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower court directly on certiorari.
5

On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to
fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that
the duty be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do
or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties.
It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
6

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation
Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is
not entitled to the writ prayed for.
Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service.
7
By her failure to do so,
nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose now to compel petitioner to
furnish her with a copy of the investigation report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On
the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon
8
that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her
during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
Respondent's assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what action would be appropriate to take under the
circumstances,"
9
hardly merits consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal communication
between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any other
person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary. As correctly ruled by Secretary Gloria in his Order of 2 October 1996
Respondent's (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the
Decision itself . . . . [t]he report is an internal communication between the Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and,
therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and used the same in making his own determination of the facts and
applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the Decision he may make.
The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part although not controlling of the basis for the
decision. Only when the party adversely affected by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service Commission
may all the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. In the latter appellate tribunal, the
respondent's counsel may be allowed to read and/or be given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and
exhaustive appellant's Brief Memorandum.
More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient
findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondent's removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report,
should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her
access to the investigation report.
In fine, the trial court's Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss is not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the
provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and,
respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there
is no law or rule which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report, hence her
petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such instance, while the trial court's order is merely interlocutory and non-
appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 24 November 1997 sustaining the trial court's denial of petitioner's
motion to dismiss, as well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition
for mandamus filed by respondent before the court a quo to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report is
DISMISSED for want of cause of action.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., REP. ETTA ROSALES, PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, TASK FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY
DISAPPEARANCES, BIANCA HACINTHA R. ROQUE, HARRISON JACOB R. ROQUE, AHMED PAGLINAWAN, RON P. SALO,
*
LEAVIDES G.
DOMINGO, EDGARDO CARLO VISTAN, NOEL VILLAROMAN, CELESTE CEMBRANO, LIZA ABIERA, JAIME ARROYO, MARWIL LLASOS,
CRISTINA ATENDIDO, ISRAFEL FAGELA, and ROMEL BAGARES, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by
HON. BLAS OPLE, Respondents.
FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence
in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court. The Statute was opened for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United
Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d AffairsEnrique A. Manalo of
the Philippine Mission to the United Nations.
3
Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs
to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence,
it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion
with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under
treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made
their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.
5

respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
6
We have held that to be given due course, a petition
for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which
unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party in the
sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.
7
The Court will exercise its
power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant suit.
ISSUE: petition for mandamus is whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of
the President. - NO
RULING: NO
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
20
Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify
it.
21
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
lightly,
22
such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ
ofmandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
23
The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
countrys sole representative with foreign nations. the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The
1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. The participation
of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a
means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not
indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in
accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own
state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an
opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made
subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the
signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process
Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without
basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions
thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By
ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by
the states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study
the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the
discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same.
, the petition is DISMISSED.


G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL
REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent.
FACTS: This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2 October 2006 of respondent
Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

The facts of the case are as follows.

two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl
Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by
respondent Judge Bay.

private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. JudgeBay granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases.

petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable
cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their
co-accused in Criminal Cases. .

2
nd
Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August
2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. - DENIED


Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus, bringing
forth this lone issue for our consideration:

ISSUE: CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY
VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION? - NO

RULING: NO

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ ofmandamus, for such writ
may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused.
[5]
However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
[6]
In other words, while a
judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informationscan be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a
certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he
had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should
have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court, seeking to compel the
trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against
petitioners we reiterated the doctrine we established that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal
of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.

Montesa, Jr.states:

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he
cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by
the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon
reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law.
[15]


In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is
improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
[24]
The trial court,
when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting
arm of the government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent
judge in the case at bar.
[25]


Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the
act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[3]


As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment
in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
[4]


we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for
trial. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED.

[G. R. No. 151992. September 18, 2002]
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, COMELEC COMMISSIONERS RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA and FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., petitioners, vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 215 and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP., respondents.

FACTS:
Congress enacted RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act of 1996, this provided for the modernization and computerization of the voters
registration list, and appropriated funds therefor. Pursuant to the said RA, COMELEC promulgated a Resolution approving the Voters Registration
and Identification Project (VRIS) which envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004 elections.

COMELEC issued invitations for bid and it was awarded to PHOTOKINA Marketing Corporation, which received the highest total weighted score
and declared winning bidder. (BID was 6.58 B Pesos). HOWEVER, RA 8760 provided that the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs
modernization project was only 1B and actual available funds under Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) was 1.2B. PHOTOKINA requested the
execution of the contract, but to no avail.

PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City a petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages (with prayer for
temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction) against the COMELEC and all its
Commissioners

PHOTOKINA alleged three causes of action: first, the deliberate refusal of the COMELEC and its Commissioners to formalize the contract
rendered nugatory the perfected contract between them; second, in announcing that the VRIS Project has been junked and that he has plans
to re-engineer the COMELECs entire modernization program, Chairman Benipayo committed grave abuse of discretion; and third, the
COMELECs failure to perform its duty under the contract has caused PHOTOKINA to incur damages since it has spent substantial time and
resources in the preparation of the bid and the draft contract.

ISSUE: May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project? - NO

RULING: NO. PHOTOKINA cannot compel COMELEC. Petition is GRANTED, RESOLUTION issued by Judge Padilla are SET ASIDE.

PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINAs bid is beyond the amount
appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in
issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405,
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.

No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations.[34] As early as 1924,
Justice Street, in Quiogue vs. Romualdez,[35] already set forth the justification of this rule, thus:

Upon the facts above stated we are of the opinion that the writ of mandamus is not the appropriate, or even an admissible remedy. It
is manifest that whatever rights the petitioner may have, upon the facts stated, are derived from her contract with the city; and no rule of law is
better settled than that mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of private contracts. x x x The petitioners remedy, if any she has, is by
an original action in the Court of First Instance to compel the city to pay the agreed price or to pay damages for the breach of contract.

Enshrined in the 1987 Constitution is the mandate that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. In the execution of government contracts the precise import of this constitutional restriction isto require the various agencies to
limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year. Complementary to the constitutional injuction are the
provisions (section 46 and 47,chapter of EO 292 or Administrative Code of 1987) which pertinent provisions read: Section 47. xxx no contract
involving the expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the
agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that
the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof xxx Quite
evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites
to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts.

The obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract. Court held in Metropolitan case that
the effect of an unqualified acceptance of theoffer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the award to the bidder
HOWEVER, such statement would be inconsequential in a government where the acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold
otherwise is toallow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate the government in an amount in excess of the appropriations
for the purpose for which the contrac twas attempted to be made. Clearly the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the entire
VRIS project. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount
appropriated by law for the project. The contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio. Proposed contract is without force
and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into. Relevance to Constitutional Law: NO MONEY PAID OUT OF THE
TREASURY EXCEPT INPURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW

26. Continuing Mandamus
a. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008
Facts:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay
constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete
plan of action for the purpose.

Issues:

a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not
cover cleaning in general.

b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:

Regional Trial Courts Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint, the Court ordered defendant-
government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for
swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.

To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and
perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the
bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and
increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of
waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and
hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking
vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with
indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances
discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is
ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the
treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the
environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.

The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other
hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a
petition for review under Rule 45.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive
departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence,
there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their
respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in
the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks
ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals,
would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the
preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is
an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically
prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in
them.

By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts
decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.

27. Clear and Defined Right
a. Manalo v. PAIC Savings Bank, G.R. No. 146531, March 18, 2005
FACTS: On July 19, 1983, S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc., represented by its president, Therese Villanueva Vargas, impleaded as a respondent,
obtained a P3,000,000.00 loan from PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank, also a respondent. As security for the loan, respondents mortgaged two (2)
lots situated in Pasay City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 6076 of the Registry of Deeds, same city.
However, respondent Vargas failed to pay the loan. Consequently, the mortgage was foreclosed and the lots were sold at public auction to
respondent bank, being the highest bidder.
On December 4, 1984, a Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent bank and eventually registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City.
On October 14, 1991 or seven years later, respondent Vargas filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, a complaint
for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure against respondent bank, docketed as Civil Case No. R-8477. In due course, the RTC
rendered a Decision dated July 22, 1993 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated October
28, 1996, affirmed the RTC Decision, sustaining the legality of the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings. The Decision of the Appellate Court
then became final and executory.
Meantime or on June 22, 1992, respondent bank filed with the RTC, Branch 112, Pasay City, a petition for issuance of a writ of possession,
docketed as Civil Case No. 9011-P. After hearing, or on April 2, 1998, the court granted the petition and issued a writ of possession.
Earlier or on December 23, 1992, respondent Vargas sold to Armando Angsico the lots for P18,000,500.00. Then on August 24, 1994,
respondent Vargas leased to Domingo R. Manalo, petitioner, a portion of the same lots consisting of 450 square meters for a period of ten (10)
years with a monthly rental of P22,500.00. Later, or on June 29, 1997, Angsico assigned and transferred to petitioner all his rights to the property
as shown by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights.
On May 7, 1998, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 231, Pasay City, a complaint for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-0868. Impleaded as defendants are respondent bank, its liquidator and/or receiver PDIC, and respondent Vargas. In his complaint,
petitioner alleged that he has legal interest in the subject lots, having initially leased a portion of the same from respondent Vargas and then
purchased the whole area from Angsico. He prayed that the trial court issue a writ of mandamus compelling respondent bank (1) to allow him to
redeem and/or repurchase the subject lots for P18,000,000.00; and (2) to release to him TCT No. 6076.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the subject property; and (2) the complaint fails to state a sufficient cause of action. Respondent bank averred that petitioner has
no legal interest in the subject lots since as early as December 4, 1985, the title thereto was consolidated in its name when respondent Vargas,
petitioners predecessor-in-interest, failed to exercise her right of redemption.
On September 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order denying respondent banks motion to dismiss the complaint. Thus, respondent bank, on
October 7, 1998, filed its answer alleging as affirmative defenses that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case.
On September 4, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of an enforceable cause of action.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dated December 21, 2000 affirming the RTC Decision and holding that
petitioners complaint failed to state a cause of action, thus:
To begin with, the present petition for Mandamus on appeal should have been outrightly dismissed considering that such extraordinary remedy
under Rule 65 is not available under the facts obtaining. Mandamus is a writ issued in order to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a contractual obligation or to compel a course of conduct,
nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. Petitioner must show a clear legal right to the thing demanded with the corresponding
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. The writ will not issue to compel anything to
which the petitioner is not entitled by law. Mandamus does not confer power nor impose duties. It simply commands to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed (Tangonan vs. Pao,137 SCRA 245 [1985]; University of San Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 230
SCRA 761 [1994]).
At bar, we cannot see any legal justification to compel PAIC Bank to accept the proposed P18,000,000.00 redemption money and to
release the subject title. This is not the idea of a ministerial duty under the law.
Essentially, the case at hand could be one for specific performance, as what the court a quo said in the first paragraph of the challenged decision.
x x x
In the case at bar, what succinctly appears on records is the indubitable fact that appellant has no cause of action against PAIC Bank. It may be
true that earlier the motion to dismiss of PAIC Bank on this point was denied by the court a quo. Yet, such resolution did not preclude the trial
court to later on declare, after trial, that indeed there was no cause of action, especially so when the defense of lack of cause of action is averred in
the answer as one of the affirmative defenses.
Under the Rules of Court, a cause of action is defined as an act of omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other which causes
the latter injury (Rebodillo vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCTA 800 [1989]). It is composed of: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and defendants
corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they relate to his person, character, property or contract; and (2) the delict or
wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the
prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged (Nicanor de Guzman, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 507 [1990]).
Here, the absence of cause of action of the appellant becomes more apparent when we consider the following:
(a) Logic and common sense dictate that one can only sell what he owns and the buyer acquires only what the seller can offer. On
June 29, 1997, when Angsico sold the lot to Manalo, Angsico was not the owner of the subject property simply because at
the time he (Angsico) purchased the same property from Vargas and/or S. Villanueva on December 23, 1992, said sellers
were no longer the lawful owners of the property. As correctly pointed out by the appellees, after the expiration of the
one (1) year redemption period and no redemption was made on December 5, 1985, PAIC Bank ipso facto became the legal
owner in fee simple of the subject lot and its improvements, being the highest bidder in the auction sale and the vendee in
the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale duly registered a year before and which entitles it to the issuance of a new certificate of
title in his name (Peoples Financing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 34 [1990]; Sumerariz vs. Development Bank of the
Philippines, 21 SCRA 1374 [1967]).
x x x
One last word, after failing to avail of the right of redemption, the mortgaged property became an acquired asset of the mortgagee PAIC Bank.
Like any ordinary property owner, PAIC Bank has the right to enjoy all the attributes of ownership, among others, to sell the property for whatever
price it may deem reasonable and in favor of whomsoever it chooses to sell it. This prerogative to enter into lawful contract constitutes one of the
liberties of the people of the State. If that right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial inferment of the liberty of the
people under the Constitution. To enter into a contract freely and without restraint is one of the liberties guaranteed to the citizens of the country
and should not be lightly interfered with. On that very same reason, courts cannot force party litigants to enter into a contract, without violating
the fundamental law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this appeal is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner failed pt establish a cause of action and that mandamus is not the correct remedy
RULING: We hold that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce petitioners alleged right of redemption. To begin with, mandamus applies
as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.
[3]
In varying language, the principle echoed and
reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain.
[4]

On December 4, 1985 or when respondent Vargas failed to exercise her right of redemption within the one (1) year redemption
period, respondent bank ipso facto became the absolute owner of the lots. Surprisingly, however, on December 23, 1992, she sold the
property for P18,000,500.00 to Angsico, who eventually transferred his rights to petitioner. Not only that, on August 24, 1994, respondent Vargas
still leased to petitioner a portion of the subject lots.
Verily, when respondent bank became the owner of the lots on December 4, 1985, respondent Vargas could no longer legally transfer, cede
and convey the property to petitioner.
Moreover, mandamus cannot be availed of as a remedy to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. In Commission on Elections vs.
Quijano-Padilla,
[5]
we held:
No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. As early as 1924,
Justice Street, in Quiogue vs. Romualdez, already set forth the justification of this rule, thus:
Upon the facts above stated we are of the opinion that the writ of mandamus is not the appropriate, or even an admissible remedy. It is manifest
that whatever rights the petitioner may have, upon the facts stated, are derived from her contract with the city; and no rule of law is better settled
than that mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of private contracts. . . . The petitioner's remedy, if any she has, is by an original action
in the Court of First Instance to compel the city to pay the agreed price or to pay damages for the breach of contract.
x x x
It was not intended to aid a plaintiff in the enforcement of a mere contract right, or to take the place of
the other remedies provided by law for the adjudication of disputed claims. Looking at the case from the
standpoint of appellant, it involves nothing more than an ordinary breach of contract. If, as contended, the appellant
had a valid contract with the school board, it also had an adequate remedy at law to recover damages for its breach;
and to permit the writ of mandamus to be used for the purpose of enforcing a mere contract right would be a
wide departure from the settled practice in respect to the character of cases in which relief by mandamus
may be obtained.
x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December 21, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60966 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

b. UP Board of Regents v. CA, G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999
UP Board of Regents VS Court of Appeals and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE
G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999

Facts:
Private respondent Ms. Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine a citizen of India enrolled doctoral program in UP CSSP Diliman QC.
She is ready for oral defense with selected panel members Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and
Isagani Medina, the last included as the deans representative.

Even though Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of her dissertation that was lifted from different sources without proper
acknowledgement, she was still allowed to continue to with her oral defense. Four (4) out five (5) give her a passing mark with condition to
incorporate the suggestion made by the panel members. Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form. Dr. Teodoro also noted that a revision should
be submitted.
On March 24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved her graduation pending the final revised copies of her dissertation.
Private respondent submitted the supposedly final revised copies although petitioners maintained that suggestions were not incorporated. She left
a copy for Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina and did not wait for their approval relying to the Dean Paz remarks during previous meeting that a majority
vote was sufficient for her to pass. The supposedly revised copies were later disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina.
Private respondent was disappointed with the administration. She charge Dr. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the
disapproval of her dissertation and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious act against her. Dean Paz attempts to exclude the
private respondent in the graduating list in a letter addressed to the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros Ibe), pending for
clarification of her charges against panel members and accusations relating to her dissertation. Unfortunately the letter did not reach on time and
the respondent was allowed to graduate. Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated
the accusations. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended for the
withdrawal of her doctorate degree.
Dean Paz formed an ad-hoc committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate and recommend to Chancellor Dr. Roman to withdraw her
doctorate degree. Private respondent was informed of the charges in a letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90 instances or portions of thesis lifted
from other sources with no proper acknowledgement. After it was unanimously approved and endorsed from the CSSP and Univ. Council the
recommendation for withdrawal was endorsed to Board of Regents who deferred its actions to study further for legal implications. Private
respondent was provided with a copy of findings and in return she also submitted her written explanation. Another meeting was scheduled to
discuss her answer.
Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends private respondent for withdrawal of her degree after establishing the facts the
there were massive lifting from published sources and the private respondent also admits herself of being guilty of plagiarism.
On the basis of the report and recommendation of the University Council, the Board of Regents send a letter to inform private
respondent that it was resolved by majority to withdraw your doctorates degree.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and damages to RTC QC. She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her
procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500, 000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages and P1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings. RTC dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts
decision and ordered to restore her doctorates degree.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering petitioners to restore doctoral degree.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondents doctoral degree cannot be recalled without violating her right to
enjoyment of intellectual property and to justice and equity.


Held/Ruling:

The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed.
1. Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private respondent was denied of due process and that she graduated
and no longer in the ambit of disciplinary powers of UP.
In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the charges, the private respondent was heard on her defense.
In fact she was informed in writing about the charges and was provided with a copy from the investigating committee. She was asked to submit her
explanation which she forwarded. Private respondent also discussed her case with the UP Chancellor and Zafaralla Committee during their
meetings. She was given the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her.
The freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court of Appeals held because the "graduation" of
such a student that is in question. The investigation began before graduation. She was able to graduate because there were many investigations
conducted before the Board finally decided that she should not have been allowed to graduate.

2. Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning by Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This
freedom includes deciding whom a university will confer degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject
to due process being followed, may cancel that degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."
It is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the
choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom
it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.



28. When and Where filed (4, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC)
a. Laguna Metts Corporation v. Caalam, et al., G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009
FACTS: Aries Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra (PRs) filed a illegal dismissal case against Laguna Metts Corp (LMC). LA decided in their favor but
the NLRC reversed the LA decision. PRs filed an MR but it was denied.

PRs counsel received the denial on MAY 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008 (the last day of the 60-D filing period of a petition for certiorari), PRs
counsel filed a motion for extension to file the petition praying for an extension of 15 days.

CA granted a non-extendible 15D period. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the resolution claiming that under the current Sec 4 of Rule 65
as amended by AM 07-7-12 dated Dec. 4 2007, extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed.

CA denied LMCs motion and said that the new rule only discouraged the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time but did not strip the
CA of its discretionary power to grant extensions in exceptional cases, in the interest of justice. Aggrieved, LMC now files this petition for certiorari
in the SC claiming GADALEJ of the CA.

ISSUE:
W/N a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari is still allowed?

RULING:
NO MORE. The amended rules explicitly deleted the last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 65 allowing for an extension of the period for not longer
than 15 days due to compelling reasons.1

As a rule an amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. If the Court intended to retain the
authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Sec 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing such authority would have been preserved. The
removal only meant that an extension is no longer allowed.




The rationale for the amendment is to essentially prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even
defeat the ends of justice.

When the CA granted the extension, it arrogated unto itself the power it did not posses, a power only the SC may exercise. Even assuming, the CA
retained the discretion to grant extension, the reasons (see footnote 3 of the case: lack of material time due to voluminous pleadings that have to
be written and numerous court appearances to be undertaken; lack of funds) of PRs counsel and PR did not qualify as compelling.
While technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest which all courts
are devoted.

Petition granted. CA decision was reversed and set aside. The petition of PR in the CA case is ordered dismissed for having been filed
out of time.

29. Material Dates Rule
a. Lapid v. Laurea, G.R. No. 139607, October 28, 2002
FACTS: Spouses Ramon Isidro P. Lapid and Gladys B. Lapid are the parents of seven-year-old Christopher B. Lapid, who was a Grade 1 pupil of
the respondent school, St. Therese of the Child Jesus, a private educational institution providing preschool and elementary education at Malabon,
Metro Manila. Private respondents Esperanza N. Prim, Norilyn A. Cruz, Flordeliza C. Santos and Macario B. Binondo are its directress, teacher-in-
charge, guidance counselor and principal, respectively.
On May 8, 1998, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against the private respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malabon,
Metro Manila, Branch 169, docketed as Civil Case No. 2839 MN.
[2]

In their complaint, the Lapid spouses averred that on November 5, 1997, Mrs. Lapid went to St. Therese and looked for Ms. Norilyn A. Cruz,
Christophers classroom teacher. The directress, Mrs. Esperanza N. Prim, prohibited her from seeing Ms. Cruz so as not to disrupt ongoing
classes. Mrs. Prim advised Mrs. Lapid to return later that day. On her return, Mrs. Lapid was surprised to see that a letter prepared by Mr.
Binondo, the school principal, was already waiting for her, apprising her of Christophers suspension for five days effective the following day or on
November 6, 1997.
Petitioners averred that their son was summarily dismissed from school sans notice and hearing. Petitioners denied any knowledge of the
alleged letters of complaint filed by the parents whose children were allegedly offended by Christopher. As a result of the strained relations
between the Lapids and the school management, Christopher was transferred to a different school immediately thereafter.
Petitioners then filed a letter-complaint with Hon. Antonio Nachura, Undersecretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports
(DECS), assailing the respondent schools refusal to admit their son in his class. Petitioners also demanded an investigation of the circumstances
leading to their sons suspension. This letter-complaint was later indorsed to the DECS Hearing Officer of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. At the
hearing, petitioners demanded a written retraction and a public apology from the school officials, copy furnished the DECS. The school officials,
however, refused. This compelled petitioners to file the present case for damages.
According to petitioners, the schools malicious imputation against their son tarnished their good name and reputation. Petitioners said Mr.
Lapid is a Bachelor of Laws graduate, a college professor, and Branch Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City;
while Mrs. Lapid is an account analyst at the Philippine Airlines Administrative Office in Makati, and both of them belonging to good and reputable
families. They prayed for moral damages in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000), exemplary damages in the amount ofP100,000, and
another P100,000 for actual and consequential damages.
In their answer, respondent school officials stated that as early as June 1997, Ms. Cruz had been sending them letters regarding
Christophers mischief in school, as evidenced by the letters dated June 20, 1997 and June 25, 1997. According to said respondents, Christopher
had committed serious infractions when he hurt not only his classmates but also his classroom teacher, Ms. Cruz, and one school employee. They
added that at one time, Christopher stabbed a classmate with a pencil, and at another time, he hit a teacher with a backpack. These incidents
were all recorded by Ms. Cruz and reported to the Guidance Counselor, Mrs. Flordeliza C. Santos.
Private respondents added in their answer that on several occasions, the parents of students offended by Christopher lodged complaints with
the school against Christopher, urging the administration to impose appropriate disciplinary action on him. After most of these incidents, averred
private respondents, Ms. Cruz had called up petitioners house to acquaint them with these complaints. Said phone calls were received, often by
Mrs. Gloria Manapat Bautista, grandmother and guardian de facto of Christopher. Private respondents lamented, however, that all their efforts to
reach the Lapid spouses personally turned out to be futile.
On November 18, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to declare respondent school as in default, which motion was denied by the trial court in
an order dated February 9, 1999.Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, but said motion was likewise denied on March 11, 1999.
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 52970.
In a resolution June 1, 1999, the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure to indicate the material date, particularly the date of
filing of motion for reconsideration with the RTC, as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98, amending Section 3 of Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
[7]

In the appellate courts view, this formal requirement is needed to ascertain whether the petition was filed within the reglementary period as
provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the same rules, also as amended by SC Circular No. 39-98.
Unfazed, on June 15, 1999, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution, but still without indicating the date as to
when their motion for reconsideration of the RTC order was filed. Hence, in its second assailed resolution
[9]
dated August 4, 1999, the appellate
court denied said motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners on the ground of formal and
procedural deficiency, i.e., the petitioners failure to state a material date in their petition for certiorari.
RULING: No. We find no reversible error in the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals because in filing a special civil action for certiorari
without indicating the requisite material date thereon, petitioners violated basic tenets of remedial law, particularly Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution was received;second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and third, the date
when notice of the denial thereof was received.
[16]
In the case before us, the petition filed with the CA failed to indicate the second date,
particularly the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration.
[17]
As explicitly stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of
the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As stated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
[18]
the
requirement is for purpose of determining the timeliness of the petition, thus:
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such
a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore,
that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The
Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration
itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. x x x (Stress supplied.)
Moreover, as reiterated in Mabuhay vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 1, 6: As a rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and executory.
We are not unmindful of exceptional cases where this Court has set aside procedural defects to correct a patent injustice. However,
concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its
failure to comply with the rules.
[19]
In the instant case, the petition was bereft of any persuasive explanation as to why petitioners Ramon and
Gladys Lapid failed to observe procedural rules properly. The record shows that through their counsel they failed not only once but twice to
indicate the material date required by law. Counsel for petitioners had all the opportunity to comply with the rules, but counsel remained
obstinate in her non-observance thereof even when she sought reconsideration of the ruling of the respondent court dismissing her clients
petition.
[20]
Such obstinacy is inconsistent with her late plea for liberality in construing the rules oncertiorari. Thus, any further delay that would
inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is one purely of petitioners own making, considering that it is an elementary
principle in law that negligence of counsel binds the client.
[21]

We find unsatisfactory the explanation of petitioners, through counsel, that they have not come across said Circular No. 39-98 at the time of
the filing of the petition in the CA.
[22]
On one hand, law practitioners and all lawyers, for that matter, should be fully conversant with the
requirements for the institution of certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, ignorantia legis non
excusat.
[23]
Ignorance in this regard encompasses not only substantive but also procedural laws.
A final note. Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as
loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and
orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized
by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
[24]

All told, no reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals for dismissing the petition for certiorari and later denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated June 1,1999 and August 4, 1999 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 52970 are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

30. Form

31. Contents

32. Parties
a. Person aggrieved
i. Concepcion, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178624, June 30, 2009

FACTS: Before us is the petition for certiorari
[1]
filed by Jose Concepcion, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02
April 2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
[2]


The petition cites and quotes the assailed rulings, then recites that on January 5, 2007, the National Citizens Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the COMELEC, docketed as SSP No. 07-
001.
[3]
The present petitioner then the incumbent Punong Barangay ofBarangay Forbes Park, Makati City was one of the signatories of the
NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the National Chairman of NAMFREL.

On the same date, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798
[4]
(Resolution 7798) that states that no barangay official shall be
appointed as member of the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major political party or any socio-civic,
religious, professional or any similar organization of which they may be members.

The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs petition for accreditation on April 2, 2007 in the assailed Resolution (April 2, 2007
Resolution), conditionally granting NAMFRELs petition in the following tenor:
[5]


Having already discussed above the reasons, both factual and legal, for the dismissal of the Verified Opposition, we find
the instant petition for accreditation as the citizens arm of the petitioner NAMFREL meritorious. Pursuant to Section 2(5),
Article IX (C) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 52(k) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, this
Commission en banc hereby resolves to accredit petitioner NAMFREL as its citizens arm in the 14 May 2007 national and local
elections, subject to its direct and immediate control and supervision.

There is, however, one important condition that must be fulfilled by the petitioner before its accreditation as citizens arm
could legally take effect. Accordingly, Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed
both as a member and overall Chairman of said organization. As correctly pointed out by the oppositor, Mr. Concepcion, being
the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, cannot be a member much more the overall chairman of the
citizens arm such as NAMFREL. This is explicitly provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 promulgated on 5 January
2007.

The ACCREDITATION herein GRANTED is further SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

1. The petitioner is hereby enjoined and encouraged by the Commission to re-organize in accordance with its own
internal rules and procedures as an independent organization, and to submit before election day a list of its responsible officers
and members, deleting therefrom the names of any previous officer or member similarly situated with Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr.
who are disqualified to be part of the citizens arm in view of the passage of COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 on 5 January 2007;

x x x x

9. This accreditation shall be deemed automatically revoked in case petitioner violates any of the provisions and
conditions set forth herein. [Italics supplied.]


Soon thereafter, NAMFREL filed a Manifestation and Request for Re-Examination that: (1) contains information regarding NAMFRELs
reorganization and its new set of officers showing that the petitioner had stepped down as National Chair and had been replaced by a new
Chair; (2) manifests NAMFRELs acceptance of the conditional grant of its petition for accreditation; and (3) includes NAMFRELs request for a
re-examination without further arguments of the April 2, 2007 Resolution as it specifically affected the petitioners membership with
NAMFREL. In this Manifestation and Request for Re-examination, NAMFREL outlined its various objections and concerns on the legality or
validity of Resolution 7798.

The COMELEC, in its Order of May 8, 2007, noted the information relating to NAMFRELs current officers, and denied the request to
examine its (COMELECs) interpretation of the April 2, 2007 Resolution prohibiting petitioners direct participation as member and National
Chairman of NAMFREL. The COMELEC reasoned out that the April 2, 2007 Resolution is clear, and NAMFREL had not presented any convincing
argument to warrant the requested examination.

NAMFREL did not question the COMELECs ruling.

THE PETITION

Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, the petitioner filed the present petition, ostensibly questioning the COMELECs
April 2, 2007 Resolution, but actually raising issues with respect to Resolution 7798.


THE OSG RESPONSE

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defends the validity of Resolution 7798 with the following arguments:

1. Resolution 7798 was issued by the COMELEC as a valid exercise of its quasi-legislative power to implement elections
laws. Hence, notice and hearing are not required for its validity. The OSG cites Section 52 (c) of the OEC empowering the COMELEC to
promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code(the OEC) or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer in relation with the settled principle [citing Central Bank v. Cloribel (44 SCRA 307 [1972])] that notice and hearing are not required
when an administrative agency exercises its quasi-legislative power,
[12]
as opposed to quasi-judicial power which requires notice and
hearing;
[13]
and

2. EO No. 94 applies to the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. While EO No. 94 may have been issued primarily for
the February 2, 1987 plebsicite, its spirit and intent find applicability and relevance to future elections. Thus, the COMELECs reliance on EO No.
94 when it issued Resolution 7798 is certainly valid and proper;

3. While the petitioner is not appointed as member of the BEI or as watcher, he nonetheless labors under a conflict of interest,
given that a COMELEC-accredited citizens arm is also entitled, under Section 180 of the OEC to appoint a watcher in every polling
place. Additionally, the fact that the petitioner is a barangay chairman and at the same time the NAMFREL Chair clearly raises questions on his
neutrality and non-partisanship; COMELEC non-partisanship may at the same time be compromised, as it is the COMELEC which accredits its
citizens arm.

The OSG in arguing that Resolution 7798 was issued pursuant to the COMELECs mandate and is not, therefore, tainted with grave
abuse of discretion also harks back at the extent of the power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution that
gives COMELEC the broad power to administer the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall
[14]
; there can hardly be any
doubt that the text and intent of the constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.


RULING:

We resolve to DISMISS the petition for blatant misuse of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

A primary consideration for us in looking at the petition is its thrust or focus. The petition mentions three legal instruments related with
the case, namely: (1) EO No. 94issued by then President Aquino; (2) COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution conditionally granting NAMFRELs
accreditation, subject to the conditions that the petitioner and similarly situated barangay officials shall not be included as members or officials of
NAMFREL; and (3) COMELEC Resolution 7798, issued pursuant to EO No. 94 and which in turn is the basis for the April 2, 2007 Resolution.

We reiterate that the present petition, by its express terms, seeks to set aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April 2007 and the
Order dated 8 May 2007 of Respondent Comelec who, in grave abuse of discretion and in gross violation of Petitioners right to due process of
law, denied Petitioners right to associate when the Respondent Comelec, as a condition of NAMFRELs accreditation as citizen arm, directed the
removal of Petitioner as overall Chairman and member. In arguing for this objective, the petitioner directs his attention at Resolution 7798, not at
the April 2, 2007 Resolution, as can be seen from the grounds summarized above. In the process, he likewise raises issues that call for the
interpretation of Resolution 7798s underlying basis EO No. 94.

Expressed in procedural terms, the petitioner now seeks to assail, in his individual capacity, a
COMELEC adjudicatory resolution (i.e., the April 2, 2007 Resolution) for its adverse effects on him when he was not a party to that case.
NAMFREL (the direct party to the case and who had accepted the COMELEC accreditation ruling), on the other hand, is not a party to the present
petition. Its non-participation is apparently explained by the position it took with respect to the April 2, 2007 Resolution; in its Manifestation and
Request for Examination, it asked for a re-examination of the April 2, 2007 Resolution, but interestingly stated that

21. NAMFREL accepts the terms of the accreditation and further manifests that it has commenced full efforts into
preparing for the performance of its duties and obligations as the Commissions citizen arm. [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, the present petition is clearly the petitioners own initiative, and NAMFREL, the direct party in the COMELECs April 2,
2007 Resolution, has absolutely no participation.

Another unusual feature of this case is the focus of the petition. While its expressed intent is to assail the COMELECs April 2,
2007 Resolution (an exercise of the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions), its focus is on the alleged defects of Resolution 7798, a regulation issued
by the COMELEC in the exercise of its rulemaking power.

The above features of the petition render it fatally defective. The first defect lies in the petitioners personality to file a petition
for certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he was not a party to, and where the direct party, NAMFREL, does
not even question the assailed resolution. It would have been another matter if NAMFREL had filed the present petition with the petitioner as
intervenor because of his personal interest in the COMELEC ruling. He could have intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in
NAMFRELs Manifestation and Request for Examination. As a last recourse, the petitioner could have expressly stated before this Court the
procedural problems he faced and asked that we suspend the rules based on the unusual circumstances he could have pointed out. None of these
actions, however, took place. Instead, the petitioner simply questioned the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution without explaining to this Court
his reason for using Rule 65 as his medium, and from there, proceeded to attack the validity of COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these
questionable circumstances, we cannot now recognize the petitioner as a party-in-interest who can directly assail the COMELECs April 2,
2007 Resolution in an original Rule 65 petition before this Court.

The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution which provides that a
decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.
[15]
This requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies to petitions for certiorari under
Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of the constitutional commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64.
[16]
Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides
that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.

An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for
certiorari under Rule 65. We had occasion to clarify and explain the aggrieved party requirement in Tang v. Court of Appeals
[17]
where we said:

Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a
"person aggrieved" by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term "person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean
that any person who feels injured by the lower courts order or decision can question the said courts disposition
via certiorari. To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations
which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who
prevailed in the lower court.
In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court,
the "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action
of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this
interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party
elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court.
Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to
the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a
non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to
the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court
via certiorari. (emphasis supplied)

More importantly, we had this to say in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit
[18]
- a case that involves
a certiorari petition, under Rule 64 in relation with Rule 65, of a ruling of the Commission on Audit (a constitutional commission like COMELEC):

The novel theory advanced by the OSG would necessarily require persons not parties to the present case the DBP
employees who are members of the Plan or the trustees of the Fund to avail ofcertiorari under Rule 65. The petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65 who
can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the court a
quo, or in this case, before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts to numerous and endless litigations. Since
DBP was the sole party in the proceedings before the COA, DBP is the proper party to avail of the remedy of certiorari.
The real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit must prosecute or defend an
action. We have held that interest means material interest, an interest in issue that the decision will affect, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

The second fatal defect lies in the petitions thrust; it opened with and professed to be an express challenge to the COMELECs
adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution, but in its arguments solely attacks and prays for the partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution 7798 issued in
the exercise of the COMELECs rule making power. This approach is fatally defective because the petition thereby converts an express challenge of
an adjudicatory resolution made without the requisite standing into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original Rule 65
petition for certiorari.

To be sure, a COMELEC adjudicatory action can be challenged on the basis of the invalidity of the law or regulation that underlies the
action. But to do this, a valid challenge to the adjudicatory action must exist; at the very least, the petitioner must have the requisite personality
to mount the legal challenge to the COMELEC adjudicatory action.
[19]
Where this basic condition is absent, the challenge is unmasked for what it
really is a direct challenge to the underlying law or regulation masquerading as a challenge to a COMELEC adjudicatory action.

What is significant in appreciating this defect in the petition is the legal reality that the petitioner was not without any viable remedy to
directly challenge Resolution 7798. A stand-alone challenge to the regulation could have been made through appropriate mediums, particularly
through a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, or through a
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the implementation of the regulation, as the petitioner might have found appropriate to his
situation. As already mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made in the course of validly contesting an adjudicatory order of the COMELEC.
Such challenge, however, cannot be made in an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

The petitioners unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading
Rule 65, given the way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in his
individual capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the
Rules of Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioners approaches constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative
reading and application of the Rules of Court, we nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the
Rules. The transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of
procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available under these same rules to achieve the petitioners objectives. For our part, we
cannot and should not in the name of liberality and the transcendental importance doctrine entertain these types of petitions. As we held in
the very recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles,
[20]
albeit from a different perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be
abused.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. Cost against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.



b. Private Respondents (5)
c. Public Respondents (5)
d. Indispensable Party

i. Golangco v. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, September 8, 2009

FACTS: C.A.-G.R. SP No. 66616 was a special civil action for certiorari commenced by the petitioner to assail the order issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 53, in Manila in Criminal Case No. 95-145703 entitled People v. Jone B. Fung, whereby the RTC declared the Prosecution to
have terminated the presentation of further evidence and required the Prosecution to file a written offer of evidence within 20 days, furnishing a
copy of the offer to the accused who in turn had to comment on the offer within 15 days from receipt.

Criminal Case No. 95-145703, a prosecution for libel initiated by the petitioner as the complainant against the respondent, was commenced in
1995. Allegedly, the respondent had issued an office memorandum dated May 10, 1995 maliciously imputing against the petitioner the
commission of bribery and had sent copies of the memorandum to the petitioners superiors in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and to other public officers and personalities not connected with the POEA, causing damage and prejudice to the petitioner.

After almost 6 years, the Prosecution had presented only two witnesses in Criminal Case No. 95-145703. On February 16, 2001, the Prosecution
requested that a subpoenaad testificandum be issued to and served on Atty. Oscar Ramos, Resident Ombudsman of the POEA, to compel him to
testify in the criminal case on February 20, 2001. The hearing of February 20, 2001 was, however, reset to May 23, 2001 due to the unavailability
of Atty. Ramos.

On May 23, 2001, the Prosecution still failed to present Atty. Ramos as its witness because no subpoena had been issued to and served on him for
the purpose. Consequently, the RTC judge issued an order terminating the Prosecutions presentation of evidence.

The petitioner assailed on certiorari in the Court of Appeals the order dated May 23, 2001, claiming that the RTC judge thereby committed grave
abuse of discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify in the May 23, 2001 hearing. He contended that his
prior request for the subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been treated as a continuing request for the subpoena considering
that the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first time.

In its decision dated September 12, 2002, the Court of Appeals rebuffed the petitioner and dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding:

Axiomatically, any request for a subpoena to a witness must indicate the date and time when the witness must appear
in court to give his or her testimony. It is on the basis of that request that the court personnel prepares the subpoena
indicating the title of the case, the date and time for the appearance of the intended witness. This is where petitioner fell into
error. His urgent request for subpoena (Annex A) failed to contain the date and time when the intended witness, Atty. Oscar
Ramos, must appear in court to testify.

Even then, granting that the subpoena issued for February 20, 2001 hearing was properly served but which hearing
was later on postponed, there is still a need to ask for a new subpoena to the same witness for the next scheduled
hearing. The court cannot be tasked to guess whether or not petitioner still intends to present the witness at the next
hearing. An intention to still present the witness necessarily requires another request for a subpoena.

Moreover, the case was last heard on January 23, 2001 prior to the February 20, 2001 hearing. Apropos, to ask for a
subpoena to his next witness on February 16, 2001, for the hearing onFebruary 20, 2001 was rather late. As the complainant
in the case, petitioner should have exercised due diligence or proper zeal in the prosecution of his case which has long been
pending for five (5) years, let alone that it was the last chance given by the court to the prosecution to the prosecution to
produce its witness on February 20, 2001 on account of its previous failure to do so.

Then, again, as correctly observed by the court a quo, from February 20, 2001 to May 23, 2001, a good three (3) months
period passed without the prosecution requesting for a subpoena for its intended witness. When the respondent court, as a
consequence, deemed the prosecution evidence terminated and required it to formally offer its evidence, it was not committing
any error nor abuse of discretion. Here, petitioner created its own predicament and should suffer from its adverse effect.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of the petitioner.

RULING: We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.

Before dealing with the petition for review, we point out the gross procedural misstep committed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the
People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective being to set aside the trial courts order dated May 23, 2001 that
concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case No. 95-145703. The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his
petition for certiorari.

The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should
have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof,
[8]
but even that he did not do. Thereby, he violated Section
35(l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), which mandates the OSG to represent the
Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party.

Although the petition for certiorari bore the conformity of the public prosecutor (i.e., Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo Formoso of Manila), that
conformity alone did not suffice. The authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and represent the People of the Philippines was
confined only to the proceedings in the trial court.


Even on the merits, the petition for review fails.

The criminal case had been pending since 1995 and the petitioner as the complainant had presented only two witnesses as of the issuance of the
assailed order. The trial court had not been wanting in giving warnings to the Prosecution on the dire consequences should the Prosecution
continue to fail to complete its evidence. The Prosecution had retained the duty to ensure that its witnesses would be present during the trial, for
its obligation to the administration of justice had been to prove its case sans vexatious and oppressive delays. Yet, the warnings of the trial court
had gone unheeded. Instead, the Prosecution would deflect the responsibility for the delays to the failure of the trial court to issue the subpoena to
its proposed witness and to cause the subpoena to be served. Such attitude of the Prosecution, which included the petitioner as the complainant,
manifested a lack of the requisite diligence required of all litigants coming to the courts to seek redress.

We find that the trial judge did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically in issuing the assailed order. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly
dismissed the petition forcertiorari. The petitioner now needs to be reminded that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy to correct a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when an appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is
not available. In this regard, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction whenever the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
[9]


Also, it does not escape our notice that the trial courts assailed order terminating the Prosecutions presentation of evidence was merely
interlocutory. This fact surely adds justification to the Court of Appeals rejection of the petition for certiorari, because it is the settled rule
that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order, but only a final judgment or order that terminates the proceedings. Certiorari will be
refused where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the
lower court. Indeed, a writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling unless the ruling is attended by grave
abuse of discretion or tainted by whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, for the function of certiorari is limited to keeping
an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieving persons from its arbitrary acts acts that courts or judges have no power or authority in
law to perform.

Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner was to proceed in the action until judgment, which, once rendered, might then be reviewed on appeal,
along with the assailed interlocutory order.
[10]
As long as the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, its alleged error committed in the exercise of
its jurisdiction amounted to nothing more than an error of judgment that was reviewable by a timely appeal, not by a special civil action
of certiorari.
[11]


WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision dated September 12, 2002 rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 66616. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner. SO
ORDERED.




33. Order to Comment (6)

34. Expediting Proceedings; injunctive relief (7, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC)

35. Proceedings after comment is filed (8, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC)

36. Service and Enforcement of order or judgment (9)

37. DOJ rulings
a. Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 164715, September 20, 2006
FACTS:
August 11, 2000, 61-year-old Ramon C. Gonzalez was driving his Nissan Cefiro car with plate no. UPW-298 along the right outermost lane of the
South-Luzon Expressway. He was on his way to Makati City and had just passed the Sucat toll gate. Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz, a Customs Collector of
the Bureau of Customs, Batangas Port, was driving his Nissan Infiniti car with plate no. CNH-338. He was in the middle lane of the South-Luzon
Expressway, between the Sucat and Bicutan Interchange, on his way to Manila from Batangas City, armed with a .38 caliber pistol and had with
him Mission Order No. 699-2000, to expire on August 21, 2000.
Alcaraz intended to use the Skyway, he signaled, and proceeded to the right-most lane which was reserved for vehicles taking the Skyway.
Gonzalez, who was on the right-most lane, was forced to swerve his car to the right to avoid colliding with Alcaraz's vehicle and nearly hit the
concrete island. Gonzalez chased after Alcaraz, opened his windows and shouted at Alcaraz, demanding to know why the latter suddenly cut into
his lane. Alcaraz retorted that he had signaled that he was swerving to the right. Gonzalez reproved Alcaraz and drove on. Upon nearing an island,
Alcaraz raised his pistol towards Gonzalez and fired twice: the first bullet hit the right front window of the vehicle and exited at the left rear door;
the second bullet hit the left rear window of Gonzalez's car.

Alcaraz hurriedly drove away from the scene, but was intercepted by the PNCC guards
at the Skyway toll gate. The guards confiscated from Alcaraz the .38 pistol with 7 live bullets and 3 empty shells.
Gonzalez reported the matter to the Paraaque City Police Station where he gave a statement to the police investigator, and filed a criminal
complaint for attempted homicide against Alcaraz.The PNP Crime Laboratory examined Gonzalez's car to determine the trajectory of the bullets.
Report No. PI-46-2000 was prepared in connection with the investigation: CONCLUSION:
The entrance bullet holes and the exit bullet hole were caused by bullets fired from right, front side of the vehicle.
Alfredo Tan Buraga, Officer-in-Charge of the Paraaque Police Station, filed a criminal complaint for attempted homicide against Alcaraz in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City.On motion of Alcaraz, the MeTC ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
Alcaraz claimed that he did not aim his gun at Gonzalez; he had no intention of hitting Gonzalez, and only wanted to scare him. At the police
station, Gonzalez identified himself as the brother of Congressman Jose Mari Gonzalez. Gonzalez insisted that Alcaraz attempted to kill him. He
denied having thrown coins at Alcaraz and that he had a gun at the time. Gonzalez pointed out that Alcaraz's allegation that he was defending
himself when he fired his gun was in effect an admission of intent to kill. Alcaraz filed a motion for reconsideration, and when it was denied, filed a
petition for review with the City Prosecutor's Office, Department of Justice.
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez issued a Resolution

granting the petition and ordering the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information.
Gonzalez failed to prove beyond reasonable that Alcaraz had intended to kill him, thus:
Evidence shows that respondent was provoked by complainant's acts of repeatedly hurling, not only invectives like "putang ina mo" with a dirty
finger sign, but also the throwing of coins that hit respondent's face and his lady passenger. The natural consequence was for respondent to
retaliate as what had transpired in the instant case. There is no dispute that respondent fired his gun. But as to whether or not he had the
intention to kill complainant is a different issue. Respondent's argument that he had no intention of hitting complainant and that his objective was
only to scare him finds merit.
The element of intent to kill not having been satisfactorily established, and considering that complainant was unscathed, a finding of probable
cause against respondent for attempted homicide is difficult to sustain.
Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Undersecretary of Justice denied on January 29, 2003.Gonzalez then filed a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA, seeking the reversal of the Justice Secretary's Resolution.
He claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his authority in finding no probable cause to charge Alcaraz with attempted homicide and for ordering
the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information. He insisted that by invoking self-defense, Alcaraz thereby admitted his intention to kill him
(Gonzalez). He claimed that Alcaraz's claim of self-defense should be ventilated during trial on the merits.
Alcaraz averred that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the petition, and that Gonzalez had no legal standing to file the petition. He insisted
that the remedy from an adverse resolution of the Justice Secretary is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, grounded on grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, not one under Rule 43 of said Rule. He averred that the
Justice Secretary is not a quasi-judicial officer under Rule 43 whose resolutions may thus be reviewed by the CA. Alcaraz likewise pointed out that
the CA was without power to substitute its own judgment for that of the Justice Secretary regarding the existence or non-existence of probable
cause to charge him with attempted homicide.
The CA ruled that the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended, was meritorious. The appellate court declared that,
based on the evidence on record, there was probable cause to file an Information for attempted homicide against Alcaraz. However, the CA failed to
resolve the issue of whether it had appellate jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On July 19, 2004, the CA resolved to deny Alcaraz's motion,

holding that his grounds and objections had already been considered and passed
upon by it in its decision.


OSG avers that the CA erred in granting the petition of respondent, since the proper remedy from an adverse resolution issued by the Secretary of
Justice is to file a petition for certiorari under Ruler 65 of the Rules of Court, not a petition under Rule 43.
Petitioner avers that conformably with the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the City Prosecutor had filed a motion to withdraw the
information in the MeTC, and the court had granted the motion per its Order dated March 7, 2003. He points out that respondent had not
appealed the said order of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy of respondent?
RULING: We agree with petitioner's contention that respondent resorted to an improper remedy when he filed a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation, the executive branch of government has full discretionary authority. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint
against the private respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the
Secretary of Justice. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.
The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises
the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such
prosecutor.

While the CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The resolution of the Justice Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993
Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeals), resolutions in preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution, except the aggrieved party, has no more remedy of appeal to file a motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution of such motion if it is denied by the said Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course
of law.
Respondent filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, assailing the resolutions of the Justice Secretary. Instead of dismissing
the petition, however, the CA gave due course to it and thereafter granted the petition, on its finding that the Justice Secretary erred in
reversing the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor which found probable cause against petitioner for attempted homicide. Patently,
the ruling of the CA is incorrect. The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
75589 are NULLIFIED.