COMMENTARY

MAY 31, 2014 vol xlIX no 22 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
16
Nazimuddin Siddique (nazim10dream@gmail.
com) is pursuing a PhD in Sociology at the
Gauhati University, Guwahati.
Massacre in Assam
Explaining the Latest Round
Nazimuddin Siddique
The recent violence in the
Bodoland Territorial Area
Districts highlights the faulty
model of the BTAD, where
the minority Bodos rule over
the majority non-Bodos. The
government needs to urgently
review the BTAD model, curb the
proliferation of illegal weapons,
and ensure equal rights and
opportunities to all socio-religious
and ethnic communities in
the area.
P
ost-independence Assam has been
constantly witnessing violence in
many forms. Assam is a region
inhabited by several socio-religious com-
munities (SRCs), which include people
from various religious and ethnic tribal
groups, many of them with their own lan-
guages, writing systems, traditions, etc.
Apodictically the society in Assam has
transformed very distinctly into a noto-
riously violent society without any tan-
gible sign of abnegation. Violence has
been an inseparable part of Assams so-
cial and political development since in-
dependence (Hussain 1995). The con-
tinuous violence in western Assam since
1987 remains a major concern for the
people of this region, and beyond.
The bloodbath in areas of the Bodo land
Territorial Area Districts (BTAD), which
began on 1 May and continued for two
days, once again iterates that the model
of BTAD is a seriously faulty one, needing
rectication at the earliest. In the past
ve years, 3,500 riots have been reported
in the BTAD region (The Assam Tribune, 11
May 2014). The recent massacres started
with an attack on a local journalist, who is
also the president of the Kokrajhar Press
Club, whom the assailants considered a
supporter of the independent candidate
Hira Saraniya from Kokrajhar Lok Sabha
constituency. Fortunately, the journalist
survived the attack, although he did sustain
several injuries. The attack was carried
out a mere 5 km from Kokrajhar district
headquarters. Within two hours of the
attack, the rst massacre of this series
started in village Narasinghagaon under
Govardhana police station, Baksa district.
Heavily armed miscreants carrying AK-47
ries gunned down four villagers, severely
injuring two children. The attackers suc-
cessfully ed the scene after wreaking
havoc in the village.
Within four hours of this incident,
nine people were shot dead in Balapara
village under Kokrajhar district. Another
two were critically injured. The worst
massacre took place in Narayanguri
village of Baksa district the following
day: the bodies of 46 villagers have been
recovered so far, and many are still miss-
ing. Most of the victims are women and
children. On the days of the carnage,
Bodo youths armed with assault weap-
ons were seen moving overtly in many
places, for example, Gosaigaon, Sidli,
Bijni, and Sorbhog. Prompt and timely
action on the part of the concerned ad-
ministrations could have prevented the
bloodshed.
Narayanguri, situated on the fringe of
Manas National Park, is a small village
of about 65 families. The village is bor-
dered on its north and west by the Na-
tional Park, and on its east lies the Beki
river. On the fateful day of 2 May 2014,
at around 4 pm, the village was sur-
rounded by 30 to 40 Bodo militants.
This is normally when the menfolk visit
the daily market located on the western
banks of the river. The Beki is a deep
river, and country boats provide the only
mode of transportation from the village
to the market, and to mainland Assam.
By 4.15 pm, Bodo militants had begun
indiscriminately ring on the inhabitants
COMMENTARY
Economic & Political Weekly EPW MAY 31, 2014 vol xlIX no 22
17
of the village; additionally, they set re
to houses/huts. Villagers ed towards
the river; however, as the boat was on
the opposite shore, many were forced to
brave the swift currents in a desperate
attempt to survive. The militants report-
edly continued ring into the river, and
allegedly threw children into the water
after shooting them at point blank
range. Not a single habitation survived
the burning.
The Price of Voter Identity
A female survivor told the author:
On hearing the sound of bullets, we came out
of our homes and ran for our lives, leaving
behind everything we had ever earned. Sud-
denly, my husband remembered that he had
left behind our voter-IDs and land documents.
He returned home amidst the ring, grabbed
the land documents, but while he was at-
tempting to return, they chopped him with
Khukris and shot him dead. I survived, but
many others were killed in the same process.
1
It has been reported that the death toll
increased manifold as a result of similar
attempts to retrieve valuable docu-
ments. The villagers expressed the fear
that even if they did survive, without the
relevant papers they would be labelled
Bangladeshis.
The current condition of the BTAD
area warrants an urgent reassessment of
the model. Popularly known as Bodo-
land, BTAD consists of four districts,
namely, Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and
Udalguri. The BTAD came into being on
10 February 2003 as a memorandum of
settlement (MoS) between the Assam
government, the Union government,
and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT, a
former militant group). All three parties
signed the MoS in New Delhi, and the
Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) came
into being. It was created under the
Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and
was expected to bring sustainable peace
in western Assam.
Presently, the jurisdiction of Bodoland
extends over 3,082 villages, and the BTC
has been given legislative powers over
40 subjects. The accord provides for a
council comprising a maximum of 46
members, of which 30 will be reserved
for scheduled tribes (STs) and ve for
non-tribal communities; ve seats are
open to all communities, and six members
are to be nominated by the governor of
Assam.
2
The treaty is an existing exam-
ple of irresponsibility on the part of the
Government of India, which has given
the minority Bodos the mandate of rul-
ing over the majority non-Bodos in the
area. The political system in the BTAD is
so faulty that the non-tribal population,
which comprises about 70% of the total
population, remains politically voice-
less. The Bodo leadership remains
strongly opposed to the demand for ST
status by the Koch-Rajbanshis (The
Times of India 2002). As Nani Gopal
Mahanta (2013) argued in the columns
of this journal,
BTAD model has failed on many grounds. The
accord is unrepresentative and created an
unbridgeable gap between the Bodos and
non-Bodos, which include the Adivasis, the
Bengali Muslims, the Koch-Rajbanshis, the
Rabhas, and the Assamese, etc. The very
nature of hegemonic peace as has been
conceptualized by the Indian state is objec-
tionable. Durable peace is based on the no-
tions of fairness, justice, representation to
various stakeholders, etc. The BTC Accord
could give them nothing.
The Bodo political organisations have
always made strong territorial claims on
land, and are known for their violent
ways. In the recent violence, the ones
who suffered the most are the Muslims
and Santhals, because they are consid-
ered soft targets. needless to say, the
Muslims have emerged today as the soft-
est target for collective political violence
in India (Hussain 1995).
Immediate Causes
Violence in the BTAD areas or western
Assam is not a new phenomenon. How-
ever a few immediate factors fuelled the
present massacre. First, in the 2014 Lok
Sabha elections in Kokrajhar constituency,
all the non-Bodo organisations (compris-
ing members of different communities)
came out together and put up their own
candidate, namely, Hira Sarania (a
former United Liberation Front of Asom
member). So far, the Kokrajhar constitu-
ency has been considered a safe bastion
for the Bodoland Peoples Front (BPF)
party. It is noteworthy that the BPF
(mostly formed by ex-militants) is an
ally of the ruling Congress Party in the
state. Even though this time, sitting cab-
inet minister Chandan Brahma (a former
militant) contested from the BPF party in
the constituency, ground reports state
that non-Bodo people voted largely for
Hira Sarania. BPF leaders were dis-
turbed by thoughts of the probable de-
feat of their candidate, leading a senior
leader of the party, Pramila Rani Brah-
ma (who is also a sitting MLA), to release
a signicant press statement. In her
statement, she blamed Muslims for not
voting for the BPF party candidate; hours
later, Muslims were attacked, allegedly
under the supervision of the BPF.
Additionally, Narendra Modi, the BJP
prime ministerial candidate, had been
dividing migrants along communal lines
during his campaigns in both Assam and
West Bengal. He proclaimed that Hindu
migrants from Bangladesh must be
accommodated and Muslims migrants
must be thrown out (The Indian Express
2014). He also threatened migrants with
deportation on 16 May, the day of the elec-
tion results, when he would become the
prime minister of the country. This state-
ment polarised the society substantially,
and might have fuelled the attacks: given
the constant, sporadic violence against
non-Bodos, this large-scale massacre,
which came hot on the heels of Narendra
Modis speech, carries much signicance.
Although the government has accused
the National Democratic Front of Bodo-
land (Sangbijit) NDFB(S) of the recent
violence, the ground reality strongly
suggests the involvement of the BPF party.
According to the villagers, a section of
Bodo forest guards, who are allegedly
ex-BLT cadre, from Manas National Park
helped the militants cross the river on a
government boat. They further state
that one forest ranger, also a Bodo, had
extended help to the militants. Bullets
and cartridges from government-issued
guns, carried by the forest guards, have
been recovered from the scene.
3
The
available at
B.N.Dey & Co. News Agent
Panbazar
Guwahati 781001
Assam
Ph: 2546979, 2547931
COMMENTARY
MAY 31, 2014 vol xlIX no 22 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
18
survivors also allege that despite their
identifying many assailants by name,
the local police have refused to register
cases against them.
The Way Forward
Endemic violence is deeply rooted in
Assamese society. The infamous Nellie
massacre of 18 February 1983 can be
cited as the worst ever, when over 3,000
people, mostly women and children,
were butchered in Nellie, situated about
70 km from Guwahati in Nagaon dis-
trict. In Hussains (1993) words:
The unprecedented and extremely brutalized
event even surpassed the intensity of the vio-
lence that was perpetrated in Sabra and Shati-
la on 1-17 September 1982. The depth of Nellie
massacre is like aphasia for us. Apodictically,
the Nellie massacre is one of the largest and
severest pogroms that contemporary world
has recorded. It has only few parallels in the
post Second World War history.
Not a single culprit has been punished
for any of the large-scale massacres,
which might have encouraged miscreants
in the region further. Thus, a culture of
violence is growing in the region, espe-
cially in the BTAD. In 2012, widespread
ethnic violence had erupted across the
BTAD, shaking the whole country; and
after a lull, there came the recent massa-
cre. Apart from large-scale killings, inci-
dents like extortions, kidnapping, hu-
man rights violations, etc, takes place
frequently in the BTAD.
The possession of a huge number of
lethal illegal weapons by a sizeable
section of Bodo miscreants in the area is
one of the most important reasons for
this volatile situation.
4
Conscating these
illegal arms is a necessity to ensure a non-
violent BTAD, and will go a long way to
bring about sustainable peace. Frequent
bandhs have gravely handicapped the
region, keeping it from economic and
educational development.
With the election results of 16 May
relegating the BPF candidate to third
place, there is uncertainty about how
events will pan out. There remains the
strong possibility of another series of
massacres, which the government must
foresee and initiate stern action to prevent.
As the BTAD has failed on many fronts,
especially with regard to equal rights for all
ethnic and religious groups, it is impera-
tive that the government correct this faulty
model at the earliest. The BTAD model
must be reviewed, and equal rights and
opportunities assured to all communities,
that is, Bodos, Santhals, Muslims, Koch-
Rajbanshis, Bengali Hindus, Nepalis and
Assamese Hindus. Otherwise, peace will
remain a mirage for the people of BTAD
and of Assam.
Notes
1 The author interviewed the women on 3 May
2014 at Bhangarpar Bazar (near Narayanguri
on the eastern bank of the Beki river) in Baksa
district, where all the survivors had taken
shelter after the massacre.
2 MoS 2003 was signed between representatives
of the union government, the Assam govern-
ment and a BLT delegation.
3 The author interviewed the survivors of the vil-
lage on 3 May 2014 at Bhangarpar Bazar (near
Narayanguri on the eastern bank of the Beki
river) in Baksa district, where they had taken
temporary shelter after the massacre.
4 In interviews, villagers across the BTAD have
alleged the same to the author.
References
Hussain, Monirul (1993): The Assam Movement:
Class, Ideology and Identity (New Delhi: Manak
Publications Pvt Ltd).
(1995): Ethnicity, Communalism and State
Barpeta Massacre, Economic & Political Weekly,
20 May.
The Indian Express (2014): Hindu Migrants from
Bangladesh Must be Accommodated: Narendra
Modi, 22 February.
Mahanta, N Gopal (2013): Politics of Space and
Violence in Bodoland, Economic & Political
Weekly, 8 June.
The Times of India (2002): ABSU Opposes Gogoi
Move on Tribal Status, 6 July.