IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL SKIDMORE, as Trustee for the
RANDY CRAIG WOLFE TRUST,
Plaintiff
v.

LED ZEPPELIN, JAMES PATRICK
PAGE, ROBERT ANTHONY PLANT,
JOHN PAUL JONES, SUPER HYPE
PUBLISHING, INC., WARNER MUSIC
GROUP CORP.
Parent of:
WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC.,
ATLANTIC RECORDING
CORPORATION, RHINO
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY,
Defendants
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No. 14-cv-3089
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF DEFENDANTS
SUPER HYPE PUBLISHING, INC., WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORP.,
WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC., ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION
AND RHINO ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 1 of 18
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMORANDUM OF LAW .......................................................................................................... 1
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1
(a) Summary of Argument ....................................................................................................... 1
(b) Summary of Facts Relevant to this Motion ........................................................................ 2
(1) Plaintiff a Massachusetts Resident Sues on Behalf of a California Trust
of a Deceased Californian ............................................................................................. 2
(2) The Individual Defendants are British Citizens Who Wrote and Recorded
Stairway to Heaven in the United Kingdom ................................................................. 2
(3) The Warner Defendants Are Not Pennsylvania Corporations ...................................... 3
(4) Plaintiffs Claims in this Action ................................................................................... 3
II. THE ACTION IS PROPERLY DISMISSED OR TRANSFERRED ...................................... 3
(a) The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Warner Defendants ................................ 3
(1) The Standards Applicable to the Motion Challenging Personal Jurisdiction ............... 3
(2) General Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Over the Warner Defendants .............................. 4
(3) Neither Is there Specific Jurisdiction Over the Warner Defendants ............................. 5
(i) The Effects Test for Specific Jurisdiction ........................................................... 5
(ii) Pennsylvania Is Not the Focal Point of the Alleged Harm ..................................... 6
(iii) Pennsylvania Also Is Not the Focal Point of the Alleged Tortious Activity........... 6
(b) Venue Is Not Proper in this District Because the Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction
Over the Defendants ........................................................................................................... 7
(c) Alternatively, the Action Should Be Transferred to the Central District of California ...... 8
(1) The Private Interest Factors .......................................................................................... 8
(i) Plaintiffs Decision to Sue Here Is Not Important: He Is Not a Pennsylvanian
and His Counsels Residency Is Irrelevant ............................................................. 8
(ii) Defendants Preference Is to Proceed in the Central District of California .......... 9
(iii)The Claim Did Not Arise Here................................................................................ 9
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 2 of 18
ii
(iv) The Convenience of the Parties Supports Transfer ................................................ 9
(v) The Convenience of Witnesses Decidedly Favors California ................................. 9
(vi) The Relevant Books and Records Are Located in California ............................... 10
(2) The Public Interest Factors ......................................................................................... 10
(i) Most of the Public Interest Factors Are Inapplicable in this Federal Case,
Although Plaintiffs Allegations as to the Validity of Two California
Contracts Favor Transfer ..................................................................................... 10
(ii) Practical Considerations of Trying this Action in Los Angeles Favor
Transfer ................................................................................................................. 11
(iii) Relative Administrative Difficulty Cuts in Favor of Transfer .............................. 12
III. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 12
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 3 of 18
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Littoral Soc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 943 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ............................................... 8
Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Pa. 1998) .................. 7
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) .......................................................................... 4, 5
EVCO Tech. & Dev. Co., LLC v. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc.,
379 F. Supp. 2d 728 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ........................................................................................ 11
Flynn v. Hovensa, LLC, 2014 WL 3375238 (W.D. Pa. 2014) ........................................................ 5
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) ................................. 4
Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995) ..................................... 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) ................................................................... 7
Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2007) ........................................................................ 5, 6
Mitel Networks Corp. v. Facebook, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D. Del. 2013) ............................ 11
Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. D.C. 2011) ........................................... 7
Pacer Global Logistics, Inc. v. Nat'l Passenger R.R. Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 784
(E.D. Wis. 2003) ......................................................................................................................... 7
Personalized User Model LLP v. Google, Inc., 2009 WL 3460767 (D. Del. 2009) ..................... 11
Santi v. Natl Bus. Records Mgmt., LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 602 (D. N.J. 2010) .............................. 8
Smith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., 2010 WL 2270541 (E.D. Pa. 2010) ...................................... 11
Solomon v. Contl Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1973) .............................................. 8
Wilson v. TA Operating, LLC, 2014 WL 1053589 (E.D. Pa. 2014) ............................................... 8
Zokaites v. LandCellular Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D. Pa. 2006) ..................................... 12
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 4 of 18
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Statutes
28 U.S.C. 1400 ......................................................................................................................... 1, 7
28 U.S.C. 1404 ................................................................................................................... 2, 8, 13
28 U.S.C. 1406 ......................................................................................................................... 2, 1
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5322 ................................................................................................................ 3
Rules
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 .................................................................................................. 3
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 ........................................................................................ 2, 3, 7
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 5 of 18
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
(a) Summary of Argument
Defendants Super Hype Publishing, Inc., Warner Music Group Corp., Warner/Chappell
Music, Inc., Atlantic Recording Corporation and Rhino Entertainment Company (the Warner
defendants) respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss or
transfer.
Plaintiff, as the Massachusetts trustee of a California trust, asserts 43-year-old claims that
the British-authored Stairway to Heaven infringes the copyright in a musical composition written
by a deceased Californian. For multiple reasons, this case does not belong in Philadelphia.
First, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Warner defendants. Since they are
not Pennsylvania corporations, do not have their principal places of business here and are not
otherwise essentially at home here, they are not subject to general jurisdiction. See, below at 3-5.
As to specific jurisdiction, plaintiffs allegations of intentional copyright infringement trigger
this Circuits effects test. However, plaintiffs own allegations establish that Pennsylvania is
not the focal point of the alleged injuries plaintiff is not even a resident of Pennsylvania or
the focal point of the alleged tortious activity. See, below at 5-6.
Second, venue is not proper in this judicial district. Plaintiff admits that 28 U.S.C.
Section 1400(a) governs venue in this action. Complaint at 21, 163. But, venue under that
Section requires personal jurisdiction of all defendants and here the Court does not have personal
jurisdiction of any, let alone all, of them. See, below at 7-8. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1406(a), this action is properly dismissed or transferred to the District Court for the Central
District of California, Western Division, where all defendants consent to jurisdiction and venue.
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 6 of 18
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Third, alternatively, this action is properly transferred to the Central District of California
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). For example, because plaintiff is not a resident of
Pennsylvania his choice of this forum is given little or no weight; there are no non-party
witnesses in Pennsylvania and most if not all are in the Central District of California; and the
alleged claim did not even arise in this District. See, below at 8-12. This action should be
pursued, if at all, in the Central District of California, Western Division.
(b) Summary of Facts Relevant to this Motion
(1) Plaintiff a Massachusetts Resident Sues on Behalf of a California
Trust of a Deceased Californian
Plaintiff Michael Skidmore is a resident of Quincy, Massachusetts. Complaint at 12,
61. He alleges that Stairway to Heaven infringes a 1968 song by a Californian, Randy
California Wolfe, who died in 1997. Plaintiff claims to be the Trustee for the Randy Craig
Wolfe Trust (id. at 12, 60), established by Bernice C. Pearl, the mother of Randy Craig
Wolfe, as conservator of his estate by court order on February 19, 2002. Id. at 12, 62. The
Randy Wolfe conservatorship was in the California Superior Court in Ventura County,
California, and the February 19, 2002 Order that plaintiff alleges established the Trust was issued
by the California Court. See Request for Judicial Notice at 1-2 & Exhibit 1.
(2) The Individual Defendants are British Citizens Who Wrote and
Recorded Stairway to Heaven in the United Kingdom
Defendants James Patrick Page, Robert Anthony Plant and John Paul Jones, with the late
John Bonham, performed together as the band Led Zeppelin. Complaint at 12-13, 67. Plaintiff
alleges that Mr. Page and Mr. Plant wrote the musical composition Stairway to Heaven in Wales
in 1970, the band began recording it in London in 1970 and it was released to the public in 1971.
Id. at 10, 51 & 54-55.
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 7 of 18
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(3) The Warner Defendants Are Not Pennsylvania Corporations
The Warner defendants are each Delaware or New York corporations with their principal
places of business in either the Central District of California or in New York. None have offices
in this State or registered agents here, and other than one Atlantic Recording Corporation
employee who works out of his home, none have employees here. Any exploitation of Stairway
to Heaven is part of national or international efforts and not directed specifically to
Pennsylvania. Robinson Decl. at 2-3, 3-9.
(4) Plaintiffs Claims in this Action
Plaintiff asserts claims for direct, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and a
claim labeled Right of Attribution Equitable Relief Falsification of Rock n Roll History,
for the failure to acknowledge the alleged copyright infringement and credit Randy Wolfe.
Complaint at 22-27, 164-91.
II. THE ACTION IS PROPERLY DISMISSED OR TRANSFERRED
(a) The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Warner Defendants
(1) The Standards Applicable to the Motion Challenging Personal
Jurisdiction
The standards governing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) motion challenging
personal jurisdiction are discussed in the individual defendants Memorandum of Law, at pages
5-6, in support of their concurrent motion to dismiss or transfer. In summary, the Court looks to
State law to determine the scope of jurisdiction (Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)) and Pennsylvania
law allows jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States .
. . . (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5322(b)). General jurisdiction, which subjects a defendant to the
Courts power as to any claims, applies if the defendants affiliations with the State are so
continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State . . . . Specific
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 8 of 18
4
jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on an affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is
therefore subject to the States regulation. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction
over each defendant. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004).
(2) General Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Over the Warner Defendants
In support of his contention that the Warner defendants are subject to this Courts general
jurisdiction, plaintiff alleges that each of them does substantial, continuous, and systematic
business in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Complaint at 16, 111, at 17, 121, at 18,
133, at 19, 148, at 20, 156. Plaintiffs conclusory allegation is not only untrue, it is
insufficient as a matter of law to establish general jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has rejected as unacceptably grasping the argument that general
jurisdiction arises whenever a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic
course of business in a State. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-01 (2014). [T]he
inquiry . . . is not whether a foreign corporations in-forum contacts can be said to be in some
sense continuous and systematic, it is whether that corporations affiliations with the State are
so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State. 131 S.
Ct., at 2851, quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (emphasis added). The paradigm forum
where a corporation is essentially at home, is the corporations state of incorporation and
principal place of business. Daimler, 131 S. Ct. at 760. Only in an exceptional case would
general jurisdiction be available anywhere else. Id. at 761 n. 19.
Here, none of the Warner defendants are Pennsylvania corporations and none have their
principal places of business in Pennsylvania. Further, this is not the exceptional case where
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 9 of 18
5
general jurisdiction might otherwise exist: none of the Warner defendants have offices in
Pennsylvania; none of the Warner defendants have registered agents in Pennsylvania; with one
exception, none of the Warner defendants have employees in Pennsylvania; and the one
exception is Atlantic Recording Corporation, which has a single employee here. See, above at 3.
This does not even rise to the level of the contacts that Daimler held fail to establish general
jurisdiction. Daimler, 131 S. Ct. at 752, 760 (even if subsidiarys California contacts including
regional offices and other facilities in California and being the largest supplier of luxury
vehicles to the California market are imputed to parent, there would still be no basis to
subject [parent] to general jurisdiction in California); Flynn v. Hovensa, LLC, 2014 WL
3375238 at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (non-Pennsylvania corporations ownership of retail stores [in
Pennsylvania] is not enough to meet the general jurisdiction standard set forth in Daimler).
Accordingly, the Court lacks general jurisdiction over the Warner defendants.
(3) Neither Is there Specific Jurisdiction Over the Warner Defendants
(i) The Effects Test for Specific Jurisdiction
Plaintiff alleges willful copyright infringement, which is an intentional tort, and as a
result specific jurisdiction is determined under this Circuits effects test. See, individual
defendants Memo. at 7-8. Under that test, a plaintiff demonstrate[s] personal jurisdiction if he
or she shows: (1) The defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of
the harm in the forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered
by the plaintiff as a result of that tort; (3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at
the forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity. Marten
v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiff does allege an intentional tort, but he
cannot establish the two remaining requirements for specific jurisdiction under the effects test.
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 10 of 18
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(ii) Pennsylvania Is Not the Focal Point of the Alleged Harm
Plaintiff cannot establish that [he] felt the brunt of the harm in [Pennsylvania] such that
[Pennsylvania] can be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
that tort. Marten, 499 F.3d at 297. Because plaintiff and the California Trust on whose behalf
he purports to sue are not residents of Pennsylvania (see, above at 2), any harm they supposedly
suffered was not felt by them in Pennsylvania. Further, plaintiff alleges the supposed
infringements have occurred in the United States, and throughout the world. Complaint at 21,
161-62. His own allegations establish that even if the alleged harm was somehow also felt in
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania is not the focal point of that alleged harm.
Accordingly, plaintiff cannot satisfy the second requirement of the effects test and, for
that reason alone, this Court lacks specific jurisdiction of the Warner defendants.
(iii) Pennsylvania Also Is Not the Focal Point of the Alleged Tortious
Activity
Plaintiff also cannot satisfy the effects tests third requirement that [t]he defendant
expressly aimed his tortious conduct at [Pennsylvania] such that [Pennsylvania] can be said to be
the focal point of the tortious activity. Marten, 499 F.3d at 297. Plaintiff alleges that Stairway
to Heaven is the most famous rock song of all time (Complaint at 2, 6) and is exploited
nationwide and throughout the world (id. at 21, 161-62). Plaintiffs own allegations as well as
the Declarations filed with this motion confirm that Pennsylvania is not the focal point of the
alleged tortious activity. See, above at 2-3.
Accordingly, plaintiff also cannot satisfy the third requirement of the effects test and,
for that additional reason, the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over the Warner defendants.
1
1
Neither could plaintiff satisfy the traditional analysis even if it were applicable, which it is not.
See, individual defendants Memo. at 10 n. 5.
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 11 of 18
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(b) Venue Is Not Proper in this District Because the Court Lacks Personal
Jurisdiction Over the Defendants
Alternatively, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a), or transferred pursuant to that Section, because venue is
not proper here. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979) (the purpose of
statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select an
unfair or inconvenient place of trial).
Plaintiff concedes that 28 U.S.C. Section 1400(a) governs venue in this action.
Complaint at 21, 163 (Venue lies within this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1400(a)); Nu
Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 43 (D. D.C. 2011) ( 1400(a) is exclusive
basis for venue in copyright cases). Under 28 U.S.C. 1400(a) actions for copyright
infringement may be brought in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides or may
be found. Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 636, 638 (E.D. Pa.
1998). A defendant of a copyright claim may be found wherever the defendant is amenable to
personal jurisdiction. Id. Further, in order for venue to be proper in an action, it must be
proper as to all defendants . . . . Pacer Global Logistics, Inc. v. Nat'l Passenger R.R. Corp., 272
F. Supp. 2d 784, 788 (E.D. Wis. 2003).
Venue is plainly improper because the Warner defendants are not subject to personal
jurisdiction here. See, above at 3-6. The Court also lacks personal jurisdiction over the
individual defendants. While plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction over all defendants to
make venue proper here (id.), he cannot establish personal jurisdiction over any of them.
Accordingly, this action is properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) and Section
1406(a) or, in the interest of justice (id.), transferred to the Central District of California,
Western Division, where all defendants consent to jurisdiction and venue.
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 12 of 18
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(c) Alternatively, the Action Should Be Transferred to the Central District of
California Under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a)
Alternatively, this action is properly transferred to the Central District of California
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). That Section authorizes the Court, [f]or the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, [to] transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all
parties have consented. In ruling on a Section 1404(a) motion, courts consider the following
private and public interest factors.
(1) The Private Interest Factors
(i) Plaintiffs Decision to Sue Here Is Not Important: He Is Not a
Pennsylvanian and His Counsels Residency Is Irrelevant
The first private interest factor is the plaintiffs choice of forum. Jumara v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). [T]he plaintiffs choice of forum normally receives
great deference, but when a plaintiff chooses a forum other than its home forum, that choice
receives less deference. Am. Littoral Soc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 943 F. Supp. 548, 551 (E.D. Pa.
1996). Further, courts give substantially less weight to a plaintiffs forum choice when the
dispute at the heart of a lawsuit occurred almost entirely in another state. Santi v. Natl Bus.
Records Mgmt., LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607 (D. N.J. 2010).
Plaintiff resides in Massachusetts, so little or no weight can be given to his choice to file
here. That his counsel resides in the Eastern District . . . is not a factor to be considered in
evaluating a motion to transfer. Wilson v. TA Operating, LLC, 2014 WL 1053589 at *2 (E.D.
Pa. 2014), quoting Solomon v. Contl Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043, 1047 (3d Cir. 1973).
And, importantly, the alleged claim did not arise here. So, this factor tilts towards transfer.
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 13 of 18
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(ii) Defendants Preference Is to Proceed in the Central District of
California
The private interest factors also include the defendants preference as to venue
(Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879), and defendants preference is the Central District of California.
(iii) The Claim Did Not Arise Here
The next private interest factor is whether the claim arose elsewhere, . . . . Jumara, 55
F.3d 879. It did: plaintiff alleges Stairway to Heaven was composed and recorded in the United
Kingdom and is exploited everywhere. This factor weighs in favor of transfer.
(iv) The Convenience of the Parties Supports Transfer
Another private interest factor is the convenience of the parties as indicated by their
relative physical and financial condition, . . . . Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Plaintiff alleges no
physical or financial limitations on plaintiffs or the alleged Trusts ability to litigate and,
accordingly, this factor is neutral.
(v) The Convenience of Witnesses Decidedly Favors California
The private interest factors also include the convenience of the witnessesbut only to
the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora. Jumara, 55
F.3d at 879. That factor unambiguously and decidedly favors transfer to California.
There are no Pennsylvanian parties or witnesses. Anderson Decl. at 3, 7-8.
On the other hand, there are multiple California witnesses who are beyond the subpoena
power of this Court. Those witnesses include not only personnel of the Warner defendants, but
non-parties such as Lou Adler, who served as manager of the band Spirit when the allegedly-
infringed composition was written by Randy Wolfe; Jay Ferguson, another Spirit band member
and the principal writer of the bands compositions; personnel of Hollenbeck Music, which
plaintiff alleges contracted with Randy Wolfe regarding the allegedly-infringed composition;
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 14 of 18
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personnel of Irving Music, which, with Hollenbeck Music, are the publishers of the allegedly-
infringed composition; Mary Quinting, Randy Wolfes girlfriend at the time of his death, the
mother of his child, Quinn Wolfe, and a participant in the California Superior Court proceedings
that plaintiff alleges resulted in the formation of the Trust on whose behalf he sues; Quinn
Wolfe, with whom plaintiff alleges a settlement was reached; and the four or more lawyers
involved in those California Superior Court proceedings. Anderson Decl. at 3-7, 9-20.
Given the large number of California witnesses and the absence of any Pennsylvania
witnesses, this factor strongly favors transfer to the Central District of California.
(vi) The Relevant Books and Records Are Located in California
The last private factor is the location of books and records (similarly limited to the
extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum). Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.
There are no Pennsylvania books and records and most if not all of the relevant books and
records are in California, including the Warner defendants books and records, the California
Superior Courts records and the books and records of the many California witnesses. Anderson
Decl. at 3-7, 9-20; Robinson Decl. at 2, 3-8. This factor also decidedly favors transfer.
(2) The Public Interest Factors
(i) Most of the Public Interest Factors Are Inapplicable in this
Federal Case, Although Plaintiffs Allegations as to the Validity
of Two California Contracts Favor Transfer
The public interest factors include enforceability of the judgment . . . ; . . . the local
interest in deciding local controversies at home, . . . ; the public policies of the fora, . . . ; and the
familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases, . . . . Jumara, 55
F.3d at 879. With one exception, in this federal action these public interest factors [are]
inapplicable since federal laws are applied uniformly throughout the district courts. EVCO
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Tech. & Dev. Co., LLC v. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 728, 732 (E.D. Pa.
2005). The exception is that plaintiff relies on a California Trust and his allegations that its
ownership of Taurus is based on the claimed invalidity of Wolfes 1967 songwriter and
recording contracts. Complaint at 6-7, 22-33. California law governs issues as to the Trust as
well as the validity of the two contracts, which are apparently California contracts. Anderson
Decl. at 3-4, 9-11, 14-15. Thus, this factor favors transfer to the Central District of California.
(ii) Practical Considerations of Trying this Action in Los Angeles
Favor Transfer
The first of the remaining public interest factors is practical considerations that could
make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive, . . . . Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.
The practical considerations of cost and witness availability addressed in the private
factors also favor transfer for this public factor. Personalized User Model LLP v. Google, Inc.,
2009 WL 3460767 at * 1 (D. Del. 2009); Mitel Networks Corp. v. Facebook, Inc., 943 F. Supp.
2d 463, 475-76 (D. Del. 2013) (in consideration of the fact that neither party operates nor has
facilities, offices, or employees in Delaware, . . . the practical considerations of efficiency,
expense, and ease favor transfer); Smith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc., 2010 WL 2270541 at *9
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (practical considerations favor transfer since fora sit at a substantial distance
from one another and [defendants] employees would be required to travel such distances should
the case remain here). The location of books and records in the Central District also favors
transfer, even to the extent they are kept electronically. Id. at *9 (should the parties require any
hard copies of documents, it would certainly be more convenient for them to be transported to
the nearby courthouse in Oklahoma; case transferred).
Finally, this action has been before the Court for a relatively short period of time and,
thus, a transfer will not significantly disrupt the litigation or result in a waste of judicial
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resources. Id., quoting Zokaites v. LandCellular Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 824, 841 (W.D. Pa.
2006).
Accordingly, practical considerations strongly favor transferring this action to the Central
District of California.
(iii) Relative Administrative Difficulty Cuts in Favor of Transfer
The last public interest factor is the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora
resulting from court congestion. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. The Federal Court Management
Statistics establish that by most measures the Central District of California is less congested then
this District and cases move more quickly in the Central District.
In this District each District Judge has on average 515 pending cases, while in the Central
District of California each District Judge has on average only 469 cases. Here, the median time
from filing a civil action until its disposition is 8.7 months, while in the Central District it is only
5.8 months. While the median time from filing of a civil action to trial is slightly higher in the
Central District 18.6 months versus 21.1 months 21.1% of this Districts civil cases have been
pending more than three years, while only 5.8% of the Central Districts civil cases have been
pending that long. See Request for Judicial Notice at 2 & Exhibit 2.
The private and public interest factors confirm that this action filed by a non-resident
with no alleged connection to Pennsylvania against other non-residents is properly transferred
to the Central District of California, Western Division.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff cannot establish general jurisdiction over the Warner defendants none of
whom are Pennsylvania corporations or have their principal place of business here and
plaintiffs own allegations confirm that Pennsylvania is not the focal point of the alleged harm
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 17 of 18
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and not the focal point of the alleged tortious activity. Under established case law, this Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over the Warner defendants and the case is properly dismissed.
And, since venue in this action is co-extensive with personal jurisdiction, venue is not
proper here and the action is properly dismissed or transferred to the Central District of
California, West Division.
Alternatively, the action is properly transferred to the Central District under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1404(a). Neither plaintiff nor any of the other parties is a Pennsylvanian. There are no
Pennsylvania witnesses and there are multiple party and non-party witnesses in the Central
District of California, where the alleged trust on whose behalf plaintiff sues, was established by
Order of a California Court. The alleged claims did not arise in Pennsylvania. This is a
quintessential case for transfer pursuant to Section 1404(a).
The Warner defendants respectfully submit that their motion should be granted and the
action dismissed or transferred to the Central District of California, Western Division, where all
defendants consent to jurisdiction and venue.
Respectfully submitted,
FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
/s/ Michael Eidel
Michael Eidel, Esquire
2000 Market Street, 20th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 918-3568
(215) 345-7507 (facsimile)
Local Counsel for Defendants
Dated: September 17, 2014
LAW OFFICES OF PETER J. ANDERSON P.C.
/s/ Peter J. Anderson
Peter J. Anderson, Esquire
100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2010
Santa Monica, CA 90401
(310) 260-6030
(310) 260-6040 (facsimile)
Attorney for the Warner Defendants
Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Case 2:14-cv-03089-JS Document 27-2 Filed 09/17/14 Page 18 of 18
General Information
Court United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania; United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania
Nature of Suit Property Rights - Copyrights[820]
Docket Number 2:14-cv-03089
SKIDMORE v. ZEPPELIN et al, Docket No. 2:14-cv-03089 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2014), Court Docket
2014 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service
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