Who ls the Subject of the Rights of Man7

Jacques Rancire
The South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 103, Number 2/3, Spring/Summer
2004, pp. 297-310 (Article)
Published by Duke University Press
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Indiana University Libraries (4 Jun 2014 08:02 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/saq/summary/v103/103.2ranciere.html
Jacques Rancire
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?
As we know, the question iaised ly ny title
took on a new cogency duiing the last ten yeais
ol the twentieth centuiy. The Rights ol Man oi
Hunan Rights had ust leen ieuvenated in the
seventies and eighties ly the dissident nove-
nents in the Soviet Union and Eastein Euiope
a ieuvenation that was all the noie signicant
as the loinalisn ol those iights had leen one
ol the ist taigets ol the young Maix, so that
the collapse ol the Soviet Enpiie could appeai
as theii ievenge. Altei this collapse, they would
appeai as the chaitei ol the iiiesistille nove-
nent leading to a peacelul posthistoiical woild
wheie glolal denociacy would natch the glolal
naiket ol lileial econony.
As is well known, things did not exactly go that
way. In the lollowing yeais, the new landscape
ol hunanity, lieed lion utopian totalitaiianisn,
lecane the stage ol new outluists ol ethnic con-
icts and slaughteis, ieligious lundanentalisns,
oi iacial and xenopholic novenents. The tei-
iitoiy ol posthistoiical and peacelul hunanity
pioved to le the teiiitoiy ol new guies ol the
Inhunan. And the Rights ol Man tuined out to
le the iights ol the iightless, ol the populations
hunted out ol theii hones and land and thieat-
The South Atlantic Quarterly o:z[, Spiing[Sunnei zooq.
Copyiight _ zooq ly Duke Univeisity Piess.
298 Jacques Rancire
ened ly ethnic slaughtei. They appeaied noie and noie as the iights ol
the victins, the iights ol those who weie unalle to enact any iights oi even
any clain in theii nane, so that eventually theii iights had to le upheld
ly otheis, at the cost ol shatteiing the edice ol Inteinational Rights, in
the nane ol a new iight to hunanitaiian inteileiencewhich ultinately
loiled down to the iight to invasion.
Anewsuspicionthus aiose: What lies lehind this stiange shilt lionMan
to Hunanity and lion Hunanity to the Hunanitaiian? The actual sulect
ol these Rights ol Man lecane Hunan Rights. Is theie not a lias in the
statenent ol such iights? It was olviously inpossille to ievive the Maix-
ist ciitique. But anothei loin ol suspicion could le ievived: the suspicion
that the nan ol the Rights ol Man was a neie alstiaction lecause the
only ieal iights weie the iights ol citizens, the iights attached to a national
connunity as such.
That polenical statenent had ist leen nade ly Ednund Buike against
the Fiench Revolution.
1
And it had leen ievived in a signicant way ly
Hannah Aiendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism included a chaptei devoted
to the Peiplexities ol the Rights ol Man. In that chaptei, Aiendt equated
the alstiactedness ol Mens Rights with the conciete situation ol those
populations ol ielugees that had own all ovei Euiope altei the Fiist Woild
Wai. These populations have leen depiived ol theii iights ly the veiy lact
that they weie only nen, that they had no national connunity to ensuie
those iights. Aiendt lound theie the lody tting the alstiactedness ol the
iights and she stated the paiadox as lollows: the Rights ol Man aie the iights
ol those who aie only hunan leings, who have no noie piopeity lelt than
the piopeity ol leing hunan. Put anothei way, they aie the iights ol those
who have no iights, the neie deiision ol iight.
2
The equation itsell was nade possille ly Aiendts view ol the political
spheie as a specic spheie, sepaiated lion the iealn ol necessity. Alstiact
lile neant depiived lile. It neant piivate lile, a lile entiapped in its
idiocy, as opposed to the lile ol pullic action, speech, and appeaiance. This
ciitique ol alstiact iights actually was a ciitique ol denociacy. It iested
on the assunption that nodein denociacy had leen wasted lion the veiy
leginning ly the pity ol the ievolutionaiies loi the pooi people, ly the
conlusion ol two lieedons: political lieedon, opposed to donination, and
social lieedon, opposed to necessity. In hei view, the Rights ol Man weie
not an ideal lantasy ol ievolutionaiy dieaneis, as Buike had put it. They
weie the paiadoxical iights ol the piivate, pooi, unpoliticized individual.
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 299
This analysis, aiticulated noie than lty yeais ago, seens tailoi-nade,
lty yeais latei, to t the new peiplexities ol the Rights ol Man on the
hunanitaiian stage. Now we nust pay close attention to what allows it to
t. It is the conceptualization ly Hannah Aiendt ol a ceitain state ol excep-
tion. In a stiiking passage lionthe chaptei on the peiplexities ol the Rights
ol Man, she wiites the lollowing alout the iightless: Theii plight is not that
they aie not equal leloie the law, lut that no law exists loi then, not that
they aie oppiessed, lut that nolody wants to oppiess then.
3
Theie is sonething extiaoidinaiy in the statenent nolody wants to
oppiess then and in its plainly contenptuous tone. It is as il these people
weie guilty ol not even leing alle to le oppiessed, not even woithy ol leing
oppiessed. I think that we nust le awaie ol what is at stake in this state-
nent ol a situation and status that would le leyond oppiession, leyond
any account in teins ol conict and iepiession, oi law and violence. As a
nattei ol lact, theie weie people who wanted to oppiess then and laws to
do this. The conceptualization ol a state leyond oppiession is nuch noie
a consequence ol Aiendts iigid opposition letween the iealn ol the politi-
cal and the iealn ol piivate lilewhat she calls in the sane chaptei the
daik lackgiound ol neie givenness.
4
It is inkeeping withhei aichipolitical
position. But paiadoxically this position did piovide a liane ol desciiption
and a line ol aigunentation that latei would piove quite eective loi depo-
liticizing natteis ol powei and iepiession and setting then in a spheie ol
exceptionality that is no longei political, in an anthiopological spheie ol
saciality situated leyond the ieach ol political dissensus.
This oveituining ol an aichipolitical statenent into a depoliticizing ap-
pioach is, in ny view, one ol the nost signicant leatuies ol thought that
was liought to the loie in the contenpoiaiy discussion alout the Rights
ol Man, the Inhunan, and the ciines against hunanity. The oveituin is
nost cleaily illustiated ly Gioigio Aganlens theoiization ol liopolitics,
notally in Homo Sacer.
5
Aganlen tiansloins Aiendts equationoi paia-
doxthiough a seiies ol sulstitutions that equate it, ist, with Foucaults
theoiy ol liopowei, and, second, with Cail Schnitts theoiy ol the state ol
exception.
In a ist step, his aigunent ielies on the Aiendtian opposition ol two
lives, anoppositionpiedicated onthe distinctionletweentwo Gieek woids:
zoe, which neans laie physiological lile, and bios, which neans loin
ol lile, and notally the bios politikos: the lile ol gieat actions and nolle
woids. In hei view, the Rights ol Man and nodein denociacy iested on
300 Jacques Rancire
the conlusion ol those two lileswhich ultinately neant the ieduction ol
bios to sheei zoe. Aganlenequated hei ciitique withFoucaults polenics on
sexual lileiation. In The Will to Know and Society Must Be Defended, Fou-
cault aigues that the so-called sexual lileiation and liee speech alout sex
aie in lact eects ol a powei nachine that uiges people to speak alout sex.
They aie eects ol a new loin ol powei that is no longei the old soveieign
powei ol Lile and Death ovei the sulects, lut a positive powei ol contiol
ovei liological lile. Accoiding to Foucault, even ethnic cleansing and the
Holocaust aie pait ol a positive liopolitical piogian noie than ievivals
ol the soveieign iight to kill.
6
Thiough the liopolitical conceptualization, what, in Aiendt, was the
aw ol nodein denociacy lecones in Aganlen the positivity ol a loin
ol powei. It lecones the conplicity ol denociacy, viewed as the nass-
individualistic concein with individual lile, with technologies ol powei
holding sway ovei liological lile as such.
Fionthis point on, Aganlen takes things a step luithei. While Foucault
opposed nodein liopowei to old soveieignty, Aganlen natches then ly
equating Foucaults contiol ovei lile with Cail Schnitts state ol excep-
tion.
7
Schnitt had posited the state ol exception as the piinciple ol politi-
cal authoiity. The soveieign powei is the powei that decides on the state
ol exception in which noinal legality is suspended. This ultinately neans
that law hinges on a powei ol decision that is itsell out ol law. Aganlen
identies the state ol exception with the powei ol decision ovei lile. What
is coiielated with the exceptionality ol soveieign powei is the exception of
life. It is lile as laie oi naked lile, which, accoiding to Aganlen, neans lile
captuied in a zone ol indisceinilility, ol indistinction letween zoe and bios,
letween natuial and hunan lile.
In such a way, theie is no noie opposition letween soveieign powei and
liopowei. Soveieign powei is the sane as liopowei. Noi is theie any oppo-
sition letween alsolute state powei and the Rights ol Man. The Rights ol
Man nake natuial lile appeai as the souice and the leaiei ol iights. They
nake liith appeai as the piinciple ol soveieignty. The equation would still
have leen hidden at that tine ly the identication ol liithoi nativity
with nationality, that is, with the guie ol the citizen. The ow ol ielugees
in the twentieth centuiy would have split up that identity and nade the
nakedness ol laie lile, stiipped ol the veil ol nationality, appeai as the seciet
ol the Rights ol Man. The piogians ol ethnic cleansing and exteinination
would then appeai as a iadical attenpt to diaw the lull consequences ol
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 301
this splitting. This neans that the seciet ol denociacythe seciet ol nod-
ein poweican now show up at the loiegiound. Now state powei has con-
cietely to do with laie lile. Baie lile is no longei the lile ol the sulect that
it would iepiess. Noi is it the lile ol the eneny that it would have to kill. It
is, Aganlen says, a sacied lilea lile taken within a state ol exception,
a lile leyond oppiession.
8
It is a lile letween lile and death that can le
identied with the lile ol the condenned nan oi the lile ol a peison in a
state ol cona.
In his analysis ol the Holocaust, Aganlen enphasizes the continuity
letween two things: scientic expeiinentation on lile unwoithy to leing
lived, that is, on alnoinal, nentally handicapped, oi condenned peisons,
and the planned exteinination ol the ]ews, posited as a population expeii-
nentally ieduced to the condition ol laie lile.
9
Theieloie the Nazi laws sus-
pending the constitutional aiticles guaianteeing lieedonol associationand
expiession can le thought as the plain nanilestation ol the state ol excep-
tion, which is the hidden seciet ol nodein powei. Coiiespondingly, the
Holocaust appeais as the hidden tiuth ol the Rights ol Manthat is, the
status ol laie, undieientiated lile, which is the coiielate ol liopowei. The
canp can le put as the nonos ol nodeinity and sulsune undei one and
the sane notion the canps ol ielugees, the zones wheie illegal nigiants
aie paiked ly national authoiities, oi the Nazi death canps.
In such a way, the coiielation ol soveieign powei and laie lile takes place
wheie political conicts can le located. The canp is the space ol the also-
lute inpossilility ol deciding letween lact and law, iule and application,
exception and iule.
10
In this space, the executionei and the victin, the
Geinan lody and the ]ewish lody, appeai as two paits ol the sane lio-
political lody. Any kind ol clain to iights oi any stiuggle enacting iights
is thus tiapped lion the veiy outset in the neie polaiity ol laie lile and
state ol exception. That polaiity appeais as a soit ol ontological destiny: each
ol us would le in the situation ol the ielugee in a canp. Any dieience
giows laint letween denociacy and totalitaiianisn and any political piac-
tice pioves to le alieady ensnaied in the liopolitical tiap.
Aganlens viewol the canp as the nonos ol nodeinity nay seenveiy
lai lionAiendts viewol political action. Neveitheless, I would assune that
the iadical suspension ol politics in the exception ol laie lile is the ulti-
nate consequence ol Aiendts aichipolitical position, ol hei attenpt to pie-
seive the political lion the contanination ol piivate, social, apolitical lile.
This attenpt depopulates the political stage ly sweeping aside its always-
302 Jacques Rancire
anliguous actois. As a iesult, the political exception is ultinately incoipo-
iated in state powei, standing in liont ol laie lilean opposition that the
next step loiwaid tuins into a conplenentaiity. The will to pieseive the
iealn ol puie politics ultinately nakes it vanish in the sheei ielation ol
state powei and individual lile. Politics thus is equated with powei, a powei
that is incieasingly taken as an oveiwhelning histoiico-ontological destiny
lion which only a God is likely to save us.
Il we want to get out ol this ontological tiap, we have to ieset the question
ol the Rights ol Mannoie piecisely, the question ol theii sulectwhich
is the sulect ol politics as well. This neans setting the question ol what
politics is on a dieient looting. In oidei to do this, let us have a closei look
at the Aiendtian aigunent alout the Rights ol Man and ol the Citizen, an
aigunent that Aganlen lasically endoises. She nakes then a quandaiy,
which can le put as lollows: eithei the iights ol the citizen aie the iights ol
nanlut the iights ol nan aie the iights ol the unpoliticized peison, they
aie the iights ol those who have no iights, which anounts to nothingoi
the iights ol nan aie the iights ol the citizen, the iights attached to the lact
ol leing a citizen ol such oi such constitutional state. This neans that they
aie the iights ol those who have iights, which anounts to a tautology.
11
Eithei the iights ol those who have no iights oi the iights ol those who
have iights. Eithei a void oi a tautology, and, in loth cases, a deceptive tiick,
such is the lock that she luilds. It woiks out only at the cost ol sweeping
aside the thiid assunption that would escape the quandaiy. Theie is indeed
a thiid assunption, which I would put as lollows: the Rights ol Man aie the
iights ol those who have not the iights that they have and have the iights
that they have not.
Let us to tiy to nake sense ol the sentenceoi develop the equation. It is
cleai that the equation cannot le iesolved ly the identication ol a single x.
The Rights ol Man aie not the iights ol a single sulect that would le at
once the souice and the leaiei ol the iights and would only use the iights
that she oi he possesses. Il this was the case, indeed, it would le easy to
piove, as Aiendt does, that such a sulect does not exist. But the ielation ol
the sulect to his oi hei iights is a little noie conplicated and entangled.
It is enacted thiough a doulle negation. The sulect ol iights is the sulect,
oi noie accuiately the piocess ol sulectivization, that liidges the inteival
letween two loins ol the existence ol those iights.
Two loins ol existence. Fiist, they aie wiitten iights. They aie insciip-
tions ol the connunity as liee and equal. As such, they aie not only the
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 303
piedicates ol a nonexisting leing. Even though actual situations ol iight-
lessness nay give then the lie, they aie not only an alstiact ideal, situated
lai lion the givens ol the situation. They aie also pait ol the conguiation
ol the given. What is given is not only a situation ol inequality. It is also an
insciiption, a loin ol visilility ol equality.
Second, the Rights ol Man aie the iights ol those who nake sonething ol
that insciiption, who decide not only to use theii iights lut also to luild
such and such a case loi the veiication ol the powei ol the insciiption. It
is not only a nattei ol checking whethei the ieality conins oi denies the
iights. The point is alout what conrmation oi denial neans. Man and citi-
zen do not designate collections ol individuals. Man and citizen aie politi-
cal sulects. Political sulects aie not denite collectivities. They aie sui-
plus nanes, nanes that set out a question oi a dispute (litige) alout who is
included intheii count. Coiiespondingly, freedomand equality aie not piedi-
cates lelonging to denite sulects. Political piedicates aie openpiedicates:
they open up a dispute alout what they exactly entail and whon they con-
cein in which cases.
The Declaiationol Rights states that all nenaie loinliee and equal. Now
the question aiises: What is the spheie ol inplenentation ol these piedi-
cates? Il you answei, as Aiendt does, that it is the spheie ol citizenship, the
spheie ol political lile, sepaiated lion the spheie ol piivate lile, you soit
out the piollen in advance. The point is, piecisely, wheie do you diaw the
line sepaiating one lile lionthe othei? Politics is alout that loidei. It is the
activity that liings it lack into question. This point was cleaily nade dui-
ing the Fiench Revolution ly a ievolutionaiy wonan, Olynpe de Gouges,
in hei lanous statenent that il wonen aie entitled to go to the scaold,
they aie entitled to go to the assenlly.
The point was piecisely that equal-loin wonen weie not equal citizens.
They could neithei vote noi le elected. The ieason loi the piesciiption was,
as usual, that they could not t the puiity ol political lile. They allegedly
lelonged to piivate, donestic lile. And the connongood ol the connunity
had to le kept apait lionthe activities, leelings, and inteiests ol piivate lile.
Olynpe de Gouges aigunentation piecisely showed that the loidei sepa-
iating laie lile and political lile could not le so cleaily diawn. Theie was at
least one point wheie laie lile pioved to le political: theie weie wonen
sentenced to death, as enenies ol the ievolution. Il they could lose theii
laie lile out ol a pullic udgnent lased on political ieasons, this neant
that eventheii laie liletheii lile dooned to deathwas political. Il, undei
304 Jacques Rancire
the guillotine, they weie as equal, so to speak, as nen, they had the iight
to the whole ol equality, including equal paiticipation to political lile.
Ol couise the deduction could not le endoisedit could not even le
heardly the lawnakeis. Neveitheless, it could le enacted in the piocess
ol a wiong, in the constiuction ol a dissensus. A dissensus is not a conict
ol inteiests, opinions, oi values, it is a division put in the connon sense:
a dispute alout what is given, alout the liane within which we see sone-
thing as given. Wonen could nake a twolold denonstiation. They could
denonstiate that they weie depiived ol the iights that they had, thanks to
the Declaiation ol Rights. And they could denonstiate, thiough theii pul-
lic action, that they had the iights that the constitution denied to then, that
they could enact those iights. So they could act as sulects ol the Rights ol
Man in the piecise sense that I have nentioned. They acted as sulects that
did not have the iights that they had and had the iights that they had not.
This is what I call a dissensus: putting two woilds in one and the sane
woild. A political sulect, as I undeistand it, is a capacity loi staging such
scenes ol dissensus. It appeais thus that man is not the void teinopposed to
the actual iights ol the citizen. It has a positive content that is the disnissal
ol any dieience letween those who live in such oi such spheie ol exis-
tence, letween those who aie oi aie not qualied loi political lile. The veiy
dieience letween nan and citizen is not a sign ol disunction pioving that
the iights aie eithei void oi tautological. It is the opening ol an inteival loi
political sulectivization. Political nanes aie litigious nanes, nanes whose
extensionand conpiehensionaie unceitainand which openloi that ieason
the space ol a test oi veiication. Political sulects luild such cases ol veii-
cation. They put to test the powei ol political nanes, theii extension and
conpiehension. They not only conliont the insciiptions ol iights to situa-
tions ol denial, they put togethei the woild wheie those iights aie valid and
the woild wheie they aie not. They put togethei a ielation ol inclusion and
a ielation ol exclusion.
The geneiic nane ol the sulects who stage such cases ol veiication is
the nane ol the denos, the nane ol the people. At the end ol Homo Sacer,
Aganlen enphasizes what he calls the constant anliguity ol the people
that is at once the nane ol the political lody and the nane ol the lowei
classes. He sees in this anliguity the naik ol the coiielation letween laie
lile and soveieignty.
12
But the denosoi the peopledoes not nean the
lowei classes. Noi does it nean laie lile. Denociacy is not the powei ol the
pooi. It is the powei ol those who have no qualicationloi exeicising powei.
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 305
In the thiid look ol Laws, Plato lists all the qualications that aie oi clain
to le souices ol legitinate authoiity.
13
Such aie the poweis ol the nasteis
ovei the slaves, ol the old ovei the young, ol the leained people ovei the
ignoiant people, and so on. But, at the end ol the list, theie is an anonaly,
a qualication loi powei that he calls iionically Gods choice, neaning ly
that neie chance: the powei gained ly diawing lots, the nane ol which is
denociacy. Denociacy is the powei ol those who have no specic quali-
cation loi iuling, except the lact ol having no qualication. As I inteipiet
it, the denosthe political sulect as suchhas to le identied with the
totality nade ly those who have no qualication. I called it the count ol
the uncountedoi the pait ol those who have no pait. It does not nean
the population ol the pooi, it neans a supplenentaiy pait, an enpty pait
that sepaiates the political connunity lion the count ol the paits ol the
population.
Aganlen s aigunent is in line with the classical opposition letween the
illusion ol soveieignty and its ieal content. As a iesult, he nisses the logic
ol political sulectivization. Political sulects aie suiplus sulects. They
insciile the count ol the uncounted as a supplenent. Politics does not sepa-
iate a specic spheie ol political lile lion the othei spheies. It sepaiates
the whole ol the connunity lion itsell. It opposes two counts ol count-
ing it. You can count the connunity as the sun ol its paitsol its gioups
and ol the qualications that each ol then leais. I call this way ol counting
police. You can count a supplenent to the sun, a pait ol those who have no
pait, which sepaiates the connunity lion its paits, places, lunctions, and
qualications. This is politics, which is not a spheie lut a piocess.
The Rights ol Man aie the iights ol the denos, conceived as the geneiic
nane ol the political sulects who enactin specic scenes ol dissensus
the paiadoxical qualication ol this supplenent. This piocess disappeais
when you assign those iights to one and the sane sulect. Theie is no nan
ol the Rights ol Man, lut theie is no need loi such a nan. The stiength ol
those iights lies in the lack-and-loith novenent letween the ist insciip-
tion ol the iight and the dissensual stage on which it is put to test. This
is why the sulects ol the Soviet constitution could nake ieleience to the
Rights ol Man against the laws that denied theii eectivity. This is also why
today the citizens ol states iuled ly a ieligious law oi ly the neie aili-
tiaiiness ol theii goveinnents, and even the clandestine innigiants in the
zones ol tiansit ol oui countiies oi the populations in the canps ol ielu-
gees, can invoke then. These iights aie theiis when they can do sonething
306 Jacques Rancire
with then to constiuct a dissensus against the denial ol iights they suei.
And theie aie always people anong then who do it. It is only il you pie-
suppose that the iights belong to denite oi peinanent sulects that you
nust state, as Aiendt did, that the only ieal iights aie the iights given to
the citizens ol a nation ly theii lelonging to that nation, and guaianteed
ly the piotection ol theii state. Il you do this, ol couise, you nust deny
the ieality ol the stiuggles led outside ol the liane ol the national consti-
tutional state and assune that the situation ol the neiely hunan peison
depiived ol national iights is the inplenentation ol the alstiactedness ol
those iights. The conclusion is in lact a vicious ciicle. It neiely ieasseits
the division letween those who aie woithy oi not woithy ol doing politics
that was piesupposed at the veiy leginning.
But the identication ol the sulect ol the Rights ol Man with the sul-
ect depiived ol any iight is not only the vicious ciicle ol a theoiy, it is also
the iesult ol an eective ieconguiation ol the political eld, ol an actual
piocess ol depoliticization. This piocess is what is known ly the nane ol
consensus. Consensus neans nuch noie than the ieasonalle idea and piac-
tice ol settling political conicts ly loins ol negotiation and agieenent,
and ly allotting to each paity the lest shaie conpatille with the inteiests
ol othei paities. It neans the attenpt to get iid ol politics ly ousting the
suiplus sulects and ieplacing thenwith ieal paitneis, social gioups, iden-
tity gioups, and so on. Coiiespondingly, conicts aie tuined into piollens
that have to le soited out ly leained expeitise and a negotiated adustnent
ol inteiests. Consensus neans closing the spaces ol dissensus ly plugging
the inteivals and patching ovei the possille gaps letween appeaiance and
ieality oi law and lact.
In this way, the alstiact and litigious Rights ol Man and ol the citizen
aie tentatively tuined into ieal iights, lelonging to ieal gioups, attached to
theii identity and to the iecognition ol theii place in the glolal population.
Theieloie the political dissensus alout the pait-taking inthe connonol the
connunity is loiled down to a distiilution within which each pait ol the
social lody would oltain the lest shaie that it can oltain. In this logic, posi-
tive laws and iights nust cling incieasingly to the diveisity ol social gioups
and to the speed ol the changes in social lile and individual ways ol leing.
The ain ol consensual piactice is the identity ol law and lact. The law has
to lecone identical to the natuial lile ol society. To put it in othei teins,
consensus is the ieduction ol denociacy to the way ol lile ol a society, to its
ethosneaning ly this woid loth the alode ol a gioup and its lilestyle.
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 307
As a consequence, the political space, which was shaped in the veiy gap
letween the alstiact liteialness ol the iights and the polenic alout theii
veiication, tuins out to dininish noie and noie eveiy day. Ultinately,
those iights appeai actually enpty. They seen to le ol no use. And when
they aie ol no use, you do the sane as chaiitalle peisons do with theii old
clothes. You give then to the pooi. Those iights that appeai to le useless
in theii place aie sent alioad, along with nedicine and clothes, to people
depiived ol nedicine, clothes, and iights. It is in this way, as the iesult ol
this piocess, that the Rights ol Man lecone the iights ol those who have no
iights, the iights ol laie hunan leings sulected to inhunan iepiession
and inhunan conditions ol existence. They lecone hunanitaiian iights,
the iights ol those who cannot enact then, the victins ol the alsolute denial
ol iight. Foi all this, they aie not void. Political nanes and political places
nevei lecone neiely void. The void is lled ly sonelody oi sonething
else. The Rights ol Man do not lecone void ly leconing the iights ol those
who cannot actualize then. Il they aie not tiuly theii iights, they can
lecone the iights ol otheis.
The Rights ol the Othei is the title ol an essay wiitten ly ]ean-Fianois
Lyotaid, oiiginally a papei given within the auspices ol the Oxford Lectures
on the Rights of Man, oiganized in ly Annesty Inteinational.
14
The
thene ol the iights ol the othei has to le undeistood as an answei to the
question, What do Hunan Rights nean in the context ol the hunanitaiian
situation? It is pait ol an attenpt to iethink iights ly ist iethinking Wrong.
The issue ol iethinking Wiong incieasingly took the ooi altei the collapse
ol the Soviet Enpiie and the disappointing outcones ol what was supposed
to le the last step to univeisal denociacy. In the context ol the new out-
luists ol iacial oi ieligious hatied and violence, it was no longei possille to
assign ciines against hunanity to specic ideologies. The ciines ol dead
totalitaiian iegines had to le iethought: they weie said to le not so nuch
the specic eects ol peiveise ideologies and outlaw iegines as the nani-
lestations ol an innite wionga wiong that could no longei le conceptu-
alized within the opposition ol denociacy and antidenociacy, ol legitinate
state oi lawless state, lut whichappeaied as analsolute evil, anunthinkalle
and uniedeenalle evil.
Lyotaids conceptualization ol the Inhunan is one ol the nost signi-
cant exanples ol that alsolutization. Lyotaid did in lact split the idea ol the
inhunan. In his view, the loins ol iepiession and ciuelty, oi the situations
ol distiess that we call inhunan, aie the consequences ol oui letiayal ol
308 Jacques Rancire
anothei Inhunan, what we could call a good Inhunan. That Inhunan is
Otheiness as such. It is the pait in us that we do not contiol. It nay le
liith and inlancy. It nay le the Unconscious. It nay le the Law. It nay
le God. The Inhunan is the iiieducille otheiness, the pait ol the Untan-
alle ol which the hunan leing is, as Lyotaid says, the hostage oi the slave.
Alsolute evil legins with the attenpt to tane the Untanalle, to deny the
situation ol the hostage, to disniss oui dependency on the powei ol the
Inhunan, in oidei to luild a woild that we could nastei entiiely.
15
Such a diean ol alsolute lieedon would have leen the diean ol the
Enlightennent and ol Revolutionaiy enancipation. It would still le at woik
in contenpoiaiy dieans ol peilect connunication and tianspaiency. But
only the Nazi Holocaust would have lully ievealed and achieved the coie
ol the diean: exteininating the people whose veiy nission is to leai wit-
ness to the situation ol hostage, to oley the law ol Otheiness, the law ol an
invisille and unnanalle God. Ciines against hunanity appeai then as
ciines of hunanity, the ciines iesulting lion the aination ol a hunan
lieedondenying its dependency upon the Untanalle. The iights that nust
le held as a iesponse to the hunanitaiian lack ol iights aie the iights
ol the Othei, the iights ol the Inhunan. Foi instance, in Lyotaids view,
the iight to speak nust le identied with the duty ol announcing sone-
thing new.
16
But the new that nust le announced is nothing lut the
innenoiial powei ol the Othei and oui own incapacity to lulll the duty
ol announcing it. The oledience to the iights ol the Othei sweeps aside the
heteiogeneity ol political dissensus to the lenet ol a noie iadical heteio-
geneity. As in Aganlen, this neans innitizing the wiong, sulstituting loi
the piocessing ol a political wiong a soit ol ontological destiny that allows
only iesistance. Now this iesistance is no nanilestation ol lieedon. On
the contiaiy, iesistance neans laithlulness to the law ol Otheiness, which
iules out any diean ol hunan enancipation.
This is the philosophical way ol undeistanding the iights ol the Othei.
But theie is a less sophisticated and noie tiivial undeistanding ol then: il
those who suei inhunaniepiessionaie unalle to enact the HunanRights
that aie theii last iecouise, then sonelody else has to inheiit theii iights
in oidei to enact then in theii place. This is what is called the iight to
hunanitaiian inteileiencea iight that sone nations assune to the sup-
posed lenet ol victinized populations, and veiy olten against the advice
ol the hunanitaiian oiganizations thenselves. The iight to hunanitaiian
inteileience night le desciiled as a soit ol ietuin to sendei: the disused
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 309
iights that had leen sent to the iightless aie sent lack to the sendeis. But
this lack and loith novenent is not a null tiansaction. It gives a newuse to
the disused iightsa new use that achieves on the woild stage what con-
sensus achieves on national stages: the eiasuie ol the loundaiy letween
law and lact, law and lawlessness. The hunan iights that aie sent lack aie
now the iights ol the absolute victin. The alsolute victin is the victin ol
an alsolute evil. Theieloie the iights that cone lack to the sendeiwho
is now the avengeiaie akin to a powei ol innite ustice against the Axis
ol Evil.
The expiession innite ustice was disnissed ly the U.S. goveinnent
a lew days altei having leen put loiwaid as an inappiopiiate tein. But I
think that it was laiily appiopiiate. An innite ustice is not only a ustice
that disnisses the piinciples ol Inteinational Law, piohiliting inteileience
in the inteinal aaiis ol anothei state, it is a ustice which eiases all the
distinctions that used to dene the eld ol ustice in geneial: the distinc-
tions letween law and lact, legal punishnent and piivate ietaliation, us-
tice, police, and wai. All those distinctions aie loiled downto a sheei ethical
conict letween Good and Evil.
Ethics is indeed on oui agendas. Sone people see it as a ietuin to sone
lounding spiiit ol the connunity, sustaining positive laws and political
agency. I take a laiily dieient view ol this new ieign ol ethics. It neans to
ne the eiasuie ol all legal distinctions and the closuie ol all political intei-
vals ol dissensus. Both aie eiased in the innite conict ol Good and Evil.
The ethical tiend is in lact the state ol exception. But this state ol excep-
tion is no conpletion ol any essence ol the political, as it is in Aganlen.
Instead it is the iesult ol the eiasuie ol the political in the couple ol con-
sensual policy and hunanitaiian police. The theoiy ol the state ol excep-
tion, ust as the theoiy ol the iights ol the othei, tuins this iesult into an
anthiopological oi ontological destiny. They tiace it lack to the inescapalle
pienatuiation ol the hunan aninal. I think that we had iathei leave the
ontological destiny ol the hunananinal aside il we want to undeistand who
is the sulect ol the Rights ol Man and to iethink politics today, even il out
ol its veiy lack.
Notes
Ednund Buike, Reections on the Revolution in France, ed. ]. G. A. Pocock (Indianapolis:
Hacket, 8;).
z HannahAiendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism(NewYoik: Haicouit Biace, ), z;8.
310 Jacques Rancire
Aiendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, z.
q Ilid., z;.
Gioigio Aganlen, Homo Sacer (Stanloid: Stanloid Univeisity Piess, 8).
6 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume : An Introduction [The Will to Know|, tians.
Roleit Huiley (New Yoik: Pantheon, ;8) and Society Must Be Defended, tians. David
Macey (New Yoik: Picadoi, zoo).
; Cail Schnitt, Politische Theologie (Beilin: Dunckei and Hunllot, zz).
8 Aganlen, Homo Sacer.
Ilid.
o Ilid.
Aiendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, zq.
z Aganlen, Homo Sacer.
Plato, Laws, tians. Tievoi ]. Saundeis (Middlesex: Penguin, ;o), lk. , ;.
q ]ean-Fianois Lyotaid, The Otheis Rights, inOnHumanRights, ed. S. Shute andS. Hui-
ley (NewYoik: Basic Books, q). This essay was oiiginally piesented as a papei within
the auspices ol the Oxloid Lectuies on the Rights ol Man, oiganized in ly Annesty
Inteinational.
Lyotaid, The Otheis Rights, 6.
6 Ilid.