Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Public Relations Review
Institutionalizing public relations: A case study of Chinese government
crisis communication on the 2008 Sichuan earthquake
Ni Chen

Department of Media & Communication, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 15 May 2009
Accepted 15 May 2009
Keywords:
Chinese government public relations
Institutionalization of public relations
Crisis communication and management
a b s t r a c t
Research is needed on the institutionalization of public relations as a strategic-
management function. Howand why public relations ought to be institutionalized certainly
remains highly debatable. This study, thus, engages the current debate on the necessity and
advantages of the institutionalization of public relation by taking on Chinese government
crisis communication in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake as a test case.
This studyemploys bothqualitative andquantitative methods, consistinglargelyof online
and textual research, convenient and condential telephone interviews, content analysis of
government communicationmaterials, andintercept surveys inBeijing (Chinas capital city)
and Chengdu (the provincial capital of the Sichuan Province where the earthquake hits).
The study nds that the institutionalization of government public relations in China has
visible results, especially, in the areas of crisis communication and management, as well as
stakeholder-relationship building. Within the Chinese context, it suggests, institutional-
ization of the government public relations tends to render legitimacy to public relations
practice andempower the practitioners by according PRpractice a strategic functiontoward
the achievement of public-institution effectiveness. Although a preliminary analysis, this
study supports the argument on the necessity and advantages for PR practice becoming
institutionalized.
2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
On May 12, 2008, the world was shocked by a devastating earthquake in Wenchuan County of Chinas Sichuan Province.
Measured 7.8 onthe Richter scale and centering 10kmbelowthe surface, it caused huge humanand property losses, affecting
46.24 million people in 417 counties, 4656 townships and 47,789 villages, with a total disaster zone of 440,000km
2
. And
13,685 aftershocks were detected, with ve measuring above 6.0 (China Daily, May 13, 2008). Up to June 24, 2008, the death
toll was expected to exceed 80,000; 7.79 million houses collapsed with another 24.59 million damaged. The quake cut off 16
major arteries and six railways and paralyzed the power supply as well as telecom and water supply in large areas. Quake-
triggered landslides blocked rivers and formed 35 quake lakes, endangering hundreds of thousands of peoples lives (Press
Conference of SCIO, 2008).
This natural disaster bore all the characteristics of a crisis: suddenness, high level of uncertainty and time compression
(Lerbinger, 1997). As it hit, the Chinese government image was at stake; and its accountability was put to the test. Beijing
was compelled to deal with such critical issues as information provision, openness, speed, ease of availability, credibility,
condence building, and image/reputation retaining.

Tel.: +852 3442 8655.

E-mail address: nichen@cityu.edu.hk.
0363-8111/$ see front matter 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.05.010
188 N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198
With its economic system in transition, Chinas government is said to have begun incorporating government public
relations into its routine practice (Chen, 2003) a step toward public relations becoming institutionalized. How, then, did the
government handle crisis communication? Howdid these efforts reect the impact of the institutionalization of government
PR in China? What implications can one derive from this case, suggesting the necessity to institutionalize public relations
practice?
2. Literature review & research questions
Research, Grunig (Grunig, 2007) recently proposed, is needed on the institutionalization of public relations as a
strategic-management, bridging function rather than its common practice as a symbolic or buffering function (Yi, 2005).
How and why PR ought to be institutionalized remains highly debatable. Coombs and Holladay (2008) pointed out that
one refrain that appears throughout the public relations literature is the need for institutionalizing public relations with
the dominant coalition. The issue became so salient that it was set as the 2008 annual conference theme by Europrera
(European Public Relations Education & Research Association) Congress.
Zucker (1987) dened institutionalization as a long-termprocess of infusing rule-like values and procedures into orga-
nizations, industries, or societies so that they endure, regardless of particular situations or individual philosophies of main
actors. Speakers at the EUPRERA Congress deemed institutionalization of public relations as a reection of PRs inuence on
the organizational strategic decision processes, with, for instance, directors of PR departments becoming members of boards
in organizations (http://euprera.ning.com).
Studies on institutionalization tend to regard public relations either as a buffering activity (Yi, 2005) used by orga-
nizations to protect themselves from changes, or a bridging activity used by organizations to evolve through building
relations with stakeholders. However, all commentators appear to emphasize a need for public relations to be built into the
management structure, and PR people to enter the organizations dominant coalition, which makes key organizational
decisions (Grunig, 1992). To this end, public relations must be seen as an institution that is able to construct institutional
facts in addition to carry out its discursive function (Eir-Gomes, 2008). Therefore, arguments over the institutionaliza-
tion zero in on two issues: rst, the necessity to legitimize the practice of public relations; and second, the importance of
empowering PR practitioners to play strategic roles.
Some (Debreceny, 2008) argue that institutionalization helps PR practice get regularized. Once incorporated into existing
norms and values as well as recognized internally, the institutionalizing process will bring about certain advantages. These
may include: rst, an empowered position within organizations that enables PR people to play an important role in strategic
decision-making process; second, skepticism on the legitimacy of PR practice can be minimized; third, PR people could
avoid getting into a tug of war ghting for resources needed to get their jobs done; and fourth, public relations could be
practiced in a more coherent and consistent way. With such coherence, public relations will become a generally accepted
practice a crucial step toward recognition as a profession, contributing to the effectiveness of organizational achieve-
ments. In light of these arguments, Falconi (2008) urges leaders in the eld to understand and accelerate the process of
institutionalization.
Others (Grunig, 1992; Wakeeld, 2008) raiseddoubts about the needfor PRto be institutionalized. Without sucha change,
Nielsen (2006) believes, public relations can still benet from a coming together around a shared set of values that speak
about what we believe our responsibilities are and what we hold as important about what we do. With institutionalization,
critics claim, PR entities and practice will be made too rigid, leading to resistance to changes; and creativities be constrained.
To them, when people are described as having become institutionalized, it means they conform to the norms of a large
institution, which can never be a good thing (Bailey, 2008).
Still others take a middle ground by focusing on what to institutionalize and what not to. General Theory (Selznick, 1996)
assumes that to institutionalize is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand; thus, entities
are most adaptive if institutionalized around values rather technical processes. Scott (1987) agrees that the PR practice will
become too rigid if techniques and procedures get institutionalized; but values and culture can and should be.
How to institutionalize PR is also approached from different perspectives. Macnamara (1992) and Noble (1999) pointed
out that evaluation is a key factor as it demonstrates the effectiveness of public relations and the contribution it makes to
the achievement of organizational goals. This, in turn, may help top management see PRs true value and accept its strategic
role (Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002). That view point is supported by Romentis study (2008). In an online survey of 318 of
Italys largest companies, he found that evaluation facilitates the process of PRbecoming institutionalized, especially, when
public relations is proven to help achieve an organizations long-term goals and is linked with organizational objectives.
The institutionalizing efforts, Coombs and Holladay (2008) reasoned, could be tied to some specic organizational tasks
such as, corporate social responsibility (CSP), since public relations is uniquely well suited to leading CSR efforts. This
requires that public relations be a part of management; and thereby, add valuable knowledge to decisions that shape the CSR
policies and practices. Reciprocally, PRs roles in leading CSR efforts obtains recognition throughout the organization for PR
to be integrated into the overall strategic vision. Schultz and Wehmeier (2008) also saw a need for institutionalization of
CSR.
Steyn and Niemann (2008) believed that the institutionalization of public relations can adopt the enterprise strategy
(Ansoff, 1977; Digman, 1990; Freeman, 1984; Hemphill, 1996; Judge&Hema, 1994; Stead&Stead, 2000). It has beensuggested
that, to gain a sustainable comparative advantage within an organization, the focus ought to be placed on acquisition of a
N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198 189
management position which allows public relations to play important strategic roles. When this happens, public relations
can be viewed as a strategic asset, helping to create trust between organizations and their relevant stakeholders (Mancini,
2003; Rolando, 2004; Rovinetti, 2000).
Granted a powerful process, the institutionalization of public relations is only beginning to turn into reality (Invernizzi,
2008). In Europe, Steyn (2008) discovered, the technical aspect of PRpractice is more or less institutionalized; the managerial
aspect, partly so; and strategic aspect, barely so. Though put in charge of making communication-related decisions, most PR
people remain outside of dominant coalitions, still having little chance to participate in strategic planning. Another study,
European Communication Monitor 2008 conducted in 37 European countries, with 1524 completed questionnaires
revealed similar ndings (Zerfass, 2008). In America, the research on institutionalizing public relations is limited; and
the PR practice is far from being institutionalized (Wakeeld, 2008). There is even an indication that PR practice may be
abandoning its bridging role in response to the rise of mega marketing. As such, PR falls into a supporting role. CEOs may
just as readily turn to someone other than their chief PR ofcer for advice and counsel that would normally fall within the
public relations spectrum (Wakeeld, 2008).
Interestingly, recent studies showthat in China, governmental PR has been, to some extent, institutionalized (Chen, 2003;
Zhang & Zhang, 2008). Accepting it as a valuable tool for information dissemination, image/reputation building, and also
as a substitute for propaganda, the Chinese government has established public relations as a government function, with
information department set up at all levels (central, provincial, city, and county), independent budgets allocated, and
practices and procedures regularized. The Chinese government PR has thus, been accorded legitimacy. More specically,
one aspect of government PR practice. The crisis communication stands out as the mostly institutionalized sector.
Engaging the current debate on the necessity and advantages of public relations becoming institutionalized, this study
hence, serves as a test case for the functioning of institutionalizedChinese government crisis communicationduring the 2008
earthquake inSichuan. Ageneral researchquestionis: Did the institutionalization of Chinese government crisis communication
contribute to the effectiveness of Beijings management of the mega earthquake? And if so, how?
The notions of crisis communication have received enormous attention in the public relations literature. Scholars (Fearn-
Banks, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Lerbinger, 1997) dene a crisis as an incident with undesirable outcomes or a threat
to an organization in terms of its reputation, nancial damage, or even survival.
Crisis situations tend to suggest a dialectic challenge to any governments: risks and opportunities. When a crisis erupts,
governments imageis at stakeandits accountabilitytestedsincethegovernment is responsiblefor liferescue, damagecontrol
and rebuilding in the aftermath (Benoit, 1997). Crises may potentially lead to positive outcomes if they are successfully
communicated and managed. Strategies and tactics leading to such positive outcomes may include: creation of heroes,
accelerationof neededchanges, resolutionof latent problems, explorationof newstrategies, anddiscoveryof newcompetitive
opportunities (Meyers, 1986). As such, stakeholder relations mayalsobestrengthened; andpositivepublicitygarnered. Chaos
theorists suggest that crisis is necessary in that it helps the system purge outdated elements and creates opportunities for
newgrowth (Murphy, 1996; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002; Seeger, 2002). These assumptions indeed, t with the Chinese proverb:
crisis contains dangers ( ) as well as opportunities ( ).
Case Question 1: Did the Chinese government communicate the crisis successfully so as to explore the opportunity
for the purpose of preserving and enhancing its image and reputation? Was the communication two-way symmetrical or
asymmetric? What strategies/tactics were used? And how were the relevant decisions made?
It is imperative that an organization or government must have detailed understanding of crisis situation so as to help
to select the appropriate or most effective crisis-response strategies (Coombs & Timothy, 1999). Excellence Theory (Repper,
1992) assumes that two-way symmetrical communication is the most effective in understanding and communicating a crisis
situation. Furthermore, Fearn-Banks (2007) suggested an overall open and honest policy with stakeholders and media
usually warrants less damage. In addition, effective leadership communication both in formand content is a must (Benoit,
1995; Coombs &Timothy, 1999; Dilenschneider &Hyde, 1985; Hearit, 1995; Newsom, Turk, &Kruckeberg, 2000; Small, 1991;
Williams & Treadaway, 1992). In times of crisis, the leadership should provide as much accurate and clear communication as
quickly as possible (Sellnow, 1993), as leaders normally are in a position to set the tone and establish strong communication
value positions with stakeholders during pre- and post-crisis.
What and how to communicate are the major decisions to make. As crises create extraordinary pressure, decisions must
be made under stress and time compression, involving many actors in the political-administrative sphere, and bureau-
politics plays an important role at both strategic and operational levels (Rosenthal, Hart, & Kouzmin, 1991). In the West,
government PR experts reportedly are capable of applying various approaches to the analysis of crisis management, ranging
from quantitative-analytic efforts to political management, liberation management, and market-driven management
(Terry, 1998). With their expertise required and built into the government operating system, what analytical approaches did
Chinese government PR experts apply to develop effective communication strategies?
The rst few hours after a crisis erupts are considered golden hours since every crisis creates an information gap at
its initial stage. An organization has a better chance of affecting news coverage when it speedily lls the void not only in
describing what has happened but also in dening the crisis and framing the context in which it is judged (Lagadec, 1993).
Did the Beijing government try to dene and frame the scope and nature of the crisis during the golden hours?
Moreover, the level of cognitive uncertainty in times of crisis (Heath, Bradshaw, & Lee, 2002) is high, leading to potential
panic; and people are very attentive to any information that would help reduce that uncertainty (Driskill & Goldstein, 1986).
Perceived control, Berger (1987) argued, affects peoples uncertainty. Heath and Nathan (1991) suggested that to help the
190 N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198
public to gain knowledge is more effective than providing information, as the latter does little to allay the publics concern
over risk. Was it set as an agenda by the Chinese government to help to increase the publics perceived control over the crisis, and
thus, lower their level of uncertainly/stress?
New communication technologies, especially, the Internet, have the potential to aggravate or facilitate efforts in crisis
communication. For instance: a journalist or activist anywhere in the world can tap into corporate or governmental back-
grounds, and look for skeletons in the closet within seconds (DiNardo, 2002). As the number of Chinese Internet users has
been growing faster than ever imagined, governments at all levels have recently tried to connect with the publics via the
Internet (Chen, 2005). Did the Chinese government crisis communication team proactively employ the Internet as an effective
venue to reach out to the publics?
Every crisis is a humancrisis. Traumatic events canseverely impair trust betweencitizens andtheir government if mishan-
dled (Braverman, 2003). Any tragedy requires PR and communication experts to respond with compassion and competence
compassion to showthe emphasis placed on the human side, and competence to demonstrate the ability and willingness to
handle the crisis and its aftermath. Symbolic convergence theory postulates that through their conversations and attending
to messages they encounter, people in a crisis situation tend to build a symbolic reality that furnishes meaning, emotion,
and motive for action (Bormann, 1985). Through their interaction, members of various groups (publics) create shared social
realities that serve as fantasy themes and rhetorical visions (Cragan & Shields, 1992). As the earthquake crisis unfolded in
China, people began to die, families suffered, and communities were in shock. Did the Chinese government crisis communica-
tion teamstrive to showcompassion and competence, and to create interactive platforms whereby to facilitates meaning, emotion,
and motive for action by the government?
For crisis communicationandmanagement tobe effective, Heath(1997) stressedthat it is necessary todevelopstrong pre-
crisis relationships with stakeholders, especially the ones for whomcollaborations can be mutually benecial. In addition,
crisis management requires managers to implement standards of responsibility needed to meet key publics expectations
before the crisis. Otherwise, if stakeholder relations are not strong, these groups may withdrawtheir support during a crisis,
prolong the effects of a disaster, or intensify the threat associated with the event (Ulmer, 2001). The relational management
of crisis communication, therefore, places the organization-stakeholder relationship at the center of the public relations
practice (Broom, Casey, & Ritchey, 1997). A favorable relationship history acts as a buffer against crisis damage: stakeholders
may ignore negative implications from the crisis or unfounded speculation about causes of the crisis, or be more receptive
to the organizations interpretation of the crisis. With the leadership under Hu Jintao in control for about 5 years, the current
Chinese regime has been making efforts, with some success to build a positive government-people relationship. Thus, Case
Question 2: Did this relationship serve as the buffer against crisis damages?
3. Research methods
This case study employs both qualitative and quantitative methods, consisting largely of online and textual research,
convenience and condential telephone interviews, content analyses of media coverage and government communication
materials, and intercept surveys in Beijing and Chengdu.
The major part of the content analysis focused on press conferences held by the State Council Information Ofce (SCIO).
The SCIOwas chosen for this study because this government division, at the ministry level, is the only ofce authorized by the
Standing Committee of the CCPs Politburo and the State Council to issue and release earthquake information to publics both
in and outside of China. It has been, in fact, the sole spokesperson representing Chinas central government, responsible for
crisis communication. From May 13 through July 8, the SCIO, directed by the Central Command for Earthquake Rescuing of
the Chinese Government, held live press conferences in the afternoons on an almost daily basis. Each press conference lasted
about an hour and a half including both information-releasing and Q&A sessions. The entire content of all 30 conferences
transcribed and posted on the SCIO website, along with audio/visuals and other supplementary materials, were analyzed.
The content analysis was further supplemented by an investigation of materials such as pamphlets, news releases, handouts,
posters, etc. distributed by the SCIO. Both efforts were, in part, meant to examine how the government set the issues and
agenda; thus, managed and communicated with various publics on the earthquake crisis.
Inadditiontothe website informationaccounts, initial contacts via phone inquiries were made andacceptedfor telephone
interviews (July, 2008) with three government ofcials two working for the Press Bureau of the State Council, and the other
for the Division of Emergency Response and Management at the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Each interview lasted for about
35min. As request by the interviewees, their names are kept condential. Interviews were recorded in Chinese and later
translated into English and categorized for further analyses. In addition, several interviews were conducted to collect media
personnels view points on government communication efforts.
Moreover, intercept surveys involved interviews of 100 people in each of two cities to gauge what the general public
thought of Chinese-government efforts as well as the credibility/reputation/image of the Chinese leaders. Emphasis is also
placed on measuring the publics, perception of the effectiveness of the government crisis communication and management,
comparing the governments handling of the SARS crisis in 2003 with that of earthquakes in 2008. The surveys were done
in Beijing and Chengdu in July 2008. Beijing was selected because it is the capital city of China; and Chengdu was picked as
it is the provincial capital of the Sichuan Province where the earthquake hit. The surveys were conducted in the waiting and
rest areas at railway stations and airports in both cities to insure fairly broad representation of the entire population. Train
passengers tend to be low to medium socioeconomic status while plan passengers are higher on the scale. In addition, they
N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198 191
have drastically different demographic, psychographic and inforgraphic characteristics with the former having lower income
and education than the later. And income and education levels doubtlessly relate to life styles and mind sets. Altogether, 200
(100 at each city) intercept interviews were successfully done at the train stations (50 at each city) and airports (50 at each
city).
The study period, May 13 to July 8, included the time when issues and agenda priorities coalesced and government crisis
communication/management efforts were most evident.
4. Findings & discussion
This test case zeroes inonhowthe Chinese government managed the mega earthquake crisis and howits institutionalized
crisis communication worked. Framed around the above-raised case questions, several preliminary ndings are generated.
Finding 1: The Chinese government placed unprecedented emphasis on open, timely and direct communication with the
publics, which helped to preserve and enhance its image and reputation in a time of crisis. The communication mechanism
already built into the government system was believed to be a major contributing factor to its success.
The Chinese government reactedtothe earthquake crisis rapidly. Its crisis communicationplanwas activatedimmediately
(Interviews withSCIO, 2008). One interviewee assertedthat the topleaders understoodthat the legitimacyof the government
required themto take quick action in releasing information (Interviews with CMCA, 2008), especially as negative thoughts
over government handling of the SARS crisis in 2003 were still fresh in peoples memories.
A few hours after the earthquake erupted, the State Council designated its Information Ofce as the ONLY government
ofce to be in charge of crisis communication on behalf of the Command of the Rescue Operations (Interviews with SCIO,
2008). Moreover, the Council soon endorsed the SCIOs proposal to hold live press conferences frequently providing timely
and complete information to the public. This order was clearly understood and carried out by all participating government
agencies (Interviews with CMCA, 2008).
SCIOpress conferences wereheld, witheachlastingroughlyanhour andahalf. Almost equal amounts of timeweredevoted
to information-releasing and Q&A sessions. At its rst conference on May 13, chief spokesperson Song Weimin declared in
his opening remarks that in order to facilitate media reporting [on the crisis] in the best possible way, SCIO [together with
other government agencies] will fromnowon, release information and provide assistance in various forms.(1st Conference).
Being open, direct and helpful were made as buzz words and appeared in all of SCIO spokespersons opening remarks.
FromMay 19 on, the SCIOspokespersonbeganto release the latest updates onthe quake disaster (7thPress Conference).
Each of the 30 updates contained the latest statistics on the death toll and the numbers of wounded and missing, as well
as of those already rescued and removed to safety. Also, the latest rescue operations and efforts were reported. It was very
helpful, one reporter working for a local Shanghai newspaper recalled, not only because of the details, but also because
of the indication of information sources, mostly various government agencies, with whom we could do double checking
(Interviews with Reporters, 2008). To save more time for Q&As, the SCIOlater decided to skip the update reading at the press
conferences. Instead, the briefers sent the information in the form of news releases to invited journalists via email prior to
press conferences.
The information released at the early stage of the earthquake concerned the nature of the disaster, the extent of damages,
the options available to deal with the crisis, and actual actions undertaken by the government. As one foreign reporter
commented, never before has so much been (especially, negative news) communicated so fast to so many people by the
Chinese government (Interviews with Reporters, 2008). Making disclosures to the media openly and accurately, SCIO, thus,
functioned as a crisis media center. Through its daily updates, briengs and press conferences, it projected an image of being
open and transparent. Furthermore, the government communication team, unlike in the SARS situation, briefed the media
on top leaders activities before they took place. For instance, President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and all other top
high-ranking leaders ew to the earthquake scene to meet with the people. Their travel itineraries were released to the
media in advance; and media were invited to cover leaders activities.
These specially planned communication efforts seemed to have paid off as they left people with the impression that the
government was more open and quick than in 2003 in releasing information to publics both in and outside of China; thus,
helped to improve the governments image.
When asked what made this happen, government ofcials (Interviews with CMCA, 2008; Interviews with SCIO, 2008)
noted that four factors were essential. First, a crisis communicationmechanismhad beenestablished withinthe government,
with contingency plans in place for immediate activation. Second, crisis communication specialists were trained on what to
do in time of crisis. Third, bureaucratic procedures for internal communication were simplied, which facilitated the quick
decision making. Fourth, crisis communication leaders had direct access to the top leaders almost around the clock. As one
interviewee said, the top leaders give us the autonomy to make communication-related decisions (Interviews with SCIO,
2008), which squares with the nding in an earlier study (Chen, 2008). All these stemmed from the recent institutional
changes of government PR practices.
Finding 2. The Chinese government elected to adopt two-way asymmetrical mode in communicating with the media and
publics, aiming to take control over the agenda setting and issue framing. Different strategies and tactics were employed.
And the communication was both persuasive and manipulative in nature.
Government ofcials seem to value media relations as they understand it is essential to keep good relations with
the media, and to better use the media to its own advantages. SICO ofcials (Interviews, 2008) pointed out that crisis
192 N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198
itself was not a real threat to government credibility. Problems often stem from a lack of knowledge of media relations
in time of crisis. If we dont know what to release and how to release the information to the media, a small inci-
dent can quickly escalate to a real crisis, one ofcial commented. In their pre-crisis training, personels are urged to
consider: What shall be todays top news? What are key words we can create for the media? How can we be in con-
trol of the communication? Shall we synchronize what we say, or demand media to synchronize their pens in covering
the crisis?
In dealing with media during the earthquake crisis, the government communication used several strategies to create news
and also to shape media reporting.
First, the SCIO tried to set the tone by making ofcial statements. Only hours after the earthquake erupted, it delivered
a statement on the governments position and actions before the media had time to report based on their own sources and
judgments.
Second, the government communication team constantly directed media attention to newsworthy policies and plans
created by the government. The SCIO, for example, devoted a large part of its press conferences to the Chinese governments
ordinance for recovery and reconstruction. As it addressed the immediate concerns of those affected, this policy move was
extensively covered by the media.
Third, the government communicationteamwas attempting to develop daily key words for the media. The SCIOofcials
and invited experts met early in the morning everyday during the crisis period. One of the meeting agenda items was to
set up key words for media (Interview with SCIO, 2008). Such key words as this government is people-oriented, we are
open, direct and helpful, etc. were selected and emphasized, and thus, appeared frequently in media reporting. In doing so,
the government took the control on agenda setting. Consequently, Chinese media and even the world media devoted much
attention to those notions.
Fourth, and more noteworthy was the government communication teams efforts in projecting effective leadership both
in form and content. Recognizing the importance for the leaders to establish strong communication value positions during
the crisis, the SCIO invited government authorities to speak directly to the reporters at the news conferences. As many as
86 high-ranking government ofcials were invited. These invited ofcials represented 18 ministries, two administrations,
two ofces, two bureaus of the State Council, ve departments of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), one CCP Central
Committee, and the three most affected provinces (Sichuan, Shanxi and Gansu). Among them, six (6.9%) were ministers
and 17 (22.1%) deputy ministers along with 44 (51.1%) chiefs and deputy chiefs, plus two army generals and 11 senior
colonels. In addition, the deputy governors from each of the three most affected provinces were invited and appeared at the
conferences. With the government bureaucracy widely represented at the conferences, the SCIO seemed to have established
a political setting that the government was harmoniously devoted to rescue relief and reconstruction. Several related
observations are worth mentioning: (1) these people were carefully selected in light of the important roles that bureau-
politics played at bothstrategic and operational levels inhandling the crisis (Interviews withSCIO, 2008); (2) before speaking
to the reporters, they were introduced as having just returned from the scene of the earthquake and viewed the damage
rsthand, which accorded a certain degree of credibility to their information and judgment; and (3) the invited government
ofcials brought with themtheir communication specialists as counselors, although fewof these people were actually asked
to speak.
Fifth, in shaping the publics perception toward the government via source credibility, the SCIO purposely invited several
special ofcials whomthe public recognized as competent ones to speak. In the early stage of the crisis, First Deputy Minister
of Health, Gao Qiang, whose handling of the later period of the 2003 SARS crisis won nationwide praise was showcased at
press conferences. So was Chief of Disaster Relief andRescue of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Wang Zhengyao, who hada strong
track-record in managing natural disaster relief (1st and 3rd Conferences). Also, Commissioner of the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration, Li Rongrong, who stood out for his rigorous protection of the employees in state-owned
enterprises reform, was given the oor for the entire May 21st conference to report on state-owned enterprises participation
in rescue and reconstruction (9th Conference).
Sixth, along with the government ofcials, experts in various elds were invited to further enhance source credibility.
At the press conferences, earthquake forecasting expert, Zhang Xiaodong explained the causes of earthquakes; agricul-
tural economist, Zhang Yuxiang talked about food supplies in the affected areas; electric engineer, Gu Junyuan reported
on technical difculties in restoring power; genealogist, Yin Yueping described the formation of quake lakes and possible
ways of preventing them from ooding; and Chief Engineer of Water Resources Development, Liu Ning articulated sci-
entic measures to insure the safety of reservoirs in the region. With help from these experts, communication became
more effective as they stopped rumors and helped publics gain knowledge so as to decrease uncertainty and anxiety
levels.
Aclose examinationof other specics about the SCIOpress conferences suggests several tactics the government employed
to shape media reporting.
During the 30 press conferences, 160 journalists fromnewspapers, magazines, radios, televisions, and online media were
granted permission by the SCIOspokespersons to ask questions. Among them, 76 (47.5%) were domestic reporters, 29 (18.1%)
came from Hong Kong, and 55 (34.4%) represented overseas media. Of all the foreign correspondents, 27 (49%) were from
the US, 8 (15%) UK, 6 (11%) Turkey, 5 (9%) France, 4 (7%) Singapore, 3 (5%) Pakistan, and 2 (3%) from Germany and Japan
respectively. Altogether 267 questions were asked 132 (49.4%) by domestic reporters, 89 (33.3%) by foreign correspondents
and 46 (17.2%) by journalists from Hong Kong.
N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198 193
In analyzing the content of each press conference, the following top 10 agenda/issues (in their decending order of the
frequencies on which questions were asked) are identied since about 91% of all questions (244 out of 267) focused on these
10 issues:
Agenda/issue # of Qs raised by
domestic reporters
# of Qs. raised by Hong
Kong reporters
# of Qs. raised by
foreign correspondents
Total number of Qs.
raised
No. 1 governments timely
and persisting rescue actions
11% (n=13) 19% (n=9) 23% (n=18) 16% (n=40)
No. 2 governments
dedication and efforts
toward post-quake
reconstruction
18% (n=21) 26% (n=12) 6% (n=5) 16% (n=38)
No. 3governments attention
and plan to handle potential
dangers caused by secondary
disasters
14% (n=16) 15% (n=7) 10% (n=8) 13% (n=31)
No. 4 management of the
donated funds and materials
17% (n=20) 13% (n=6) 6% (n=5) 13% (n=31)
No. 5 massive collapse of
school/hospital buildings and
possible corruption involved
7% (n=8) 9% (n=4) 14% (n=11) 9% (n=23)
No. 6 government provision
of relief to the victims
10% (n=12) 4% (n=2) 8% (n=6) 8% (n=20)
No. 7 prevention on the
anticipated post-quake
epidemic diseases
7% (n=8) 6% (n=3) 8% (n=6) 7% (n=17)
No. 8 the earthquakes effects
on Chinas economy and, in
particular, its worsening
ination
9% (n=11) 2% (n=1) 5% (n=4) 7% (n=16)
No. 9 international rescue
assistance
0.9% (n=1) 2% (n=1) 16% (n=13) 6% (n=15)
No. 10 environmental issues
after the earthquake
6% (n=7) 4% (n=2) 5% (n=4) 5% (n=13)
Total 100% (n=117) 100% (n=47) 100% (n=80) 100% (n=244)
Note: Some reporters did get to ask follow-up questions. And those were not counted.
As noted, the number of questions permitted to be raised by domestic and Hong Kong reporters (n=164, 67.2%) greatly
exceeded those raised by foreign reporters (n=80, 33%). However, questions raised by foreign correspondents outnumbered
those raised by domestic reporters on Issues Nos. 1, 5 and 9, showing their particular interest in howthe Chinese government
would manage the crisis in its early stage, issues of corruption, and international rescue assistance.
Of the top 10 issues, the SCIO ofcial admitted that most of the issues/topics were dened in advance and [off the
record], we try to avoid other ones (Interviews with SCIO, 2008). Obviously, by setting the topics and staying focused on
these issues/topics, and also by permitting certain reporters to raise questions, the SCIOs efforts to take control over what
to say and how it shall be said achieved considerable success.
In sum, the content analysis suggests that the Chinese government adopted two-way asymmetrical communication with
the media setting the agenda but also tolerating questions which would place the government in an unfavorable spotlight.
The communication was manipulative, but also shows government PR people understood media needs. Moreover, media
relations apparently have become an essential part of institutionalized government PR practice.
Finding 3. In attempting to manage the publics perception, the government communication team tried, with moderate
effects, to dene the scope and nature of the crisis so as to enhance the publics perception that the government was in total
control of the crisis situation.
The SCIO communication, in the rst few hours after the earthquake erupted, focused not only on describing what
happened but also on dening the crisis. It was an unexpected grand-scale natural disaster, proclaimed by Guo Weimin
at the rst news conference (1st Press Conference). Meanwhile, the spokespersons stressed that Chinas geography leads
to frequent natural disasters (8th, 13th and 27th Press Conferences). Also, China is located on the edge of seismic zones
and Wenchuan, the epi center of the quake, was located in the Longmen seismic zone (referred to six times in the rst
three press conferences), thus bound to have earthquakes which would be beyond human control. With these key words
repeated numerous times and consistently throughout the crisis period they do help in dening the scope and nature of the
earthquake.
To convince the publics that the crisis was under control, The SCIOs communication emphasized the determination,
commitment and the experience the Chinese government had. At the rst conference, Director of Emergency Relief Wang
Zhengyao was loud and clear that rescuing lives at all costs was the top priority for the next 24, 48, and 72h (1st Press
Conference). He and others then constantly conveyed the message that the government was prepared for, devoted to, and
experienced in handling massive rescuing. The word experience was mentioned 23 times at the May 13th conference.
Recognizing difculties in communication and transportation, the spokesperson assured that the rescuers were equipped
194 N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198
with the needed tools (11th and 12th Press Conferences). With two conferences focusing on medical treatment and epidemic
prevention, the public health authorities were very specic on steps already undertaken and measures to be employed,
assuring that the wounded would be cared for, and the affected areas would be sanitized (3rd and 17th Press Conferences).
The restoration of power, telecommunication and road transportation were also specically addressed by representatives of
the agencies in charge (2nd and 8th Press Conferences).
Given the importance of these rescue operations, progress reports were then included in the daily updates from May 19
on. The spokespersons seized the opportunity to offer key information and refute rumors. Without being pressed, General
Ma Jian and his colleagues released information on the status of the nuclear facilities in the region, and said that the report
on the deaths of PLA paratroopers in rescue action was a rumor (6th Press Conference). Realizing the growing concerns
over quake-lakes and reservoirs, Deputy Minister of Water Resources Er Jinping offered a detailed report on how the most
dangerous quake-lake in Tangjiashan was under surveillance (15th Press Conference).
The SCIO communication also aimed to demonstrate the governments ability to handle crisis and post-crisis recon-
struction. While representatives from the Ministry of Environmental Protection clearly guaranteed the safety of the nuclear
facilities in the disaster region (13th Conference), Minister of Commerce Chen Deming assured reporters that there was
no problem with the supply of food and other daily necessities (11th Conference). Deputy Commissioner of the National
Development and ReformCommission Mu Hong pledged that reconstruction would be managed by the government scien-
tically (18th Conference). And Deputy Minister of Construction Qi Ji promised a 3-to-5 year plan for constructing houses
and apartment buildings with a high safety standard in the disaster area (23rd Conference).
When asked whether they believed that the government was in total control of the crisis situation, about 75% of those
surveyed (n=150) gave afrmative answers.
Finding 4. A large part of government crisis communication was found to aim at strengthening stakeholder relations,
seeking positive outcomes.
The most noticeable approach to this was to create new heroes. The rst group of heroes, as usual, were in the military.
Two press conferences, one on May 18 and the other on June 11, were dedicated to the armed forces. At each, Deputy Minister
of Operation of the General Staff Department, Ma Jian, served as the chief spokesperson accompanied by four and ve senior
army colonels respectively. It was highlighted that the military was fully mobilized for rescue operations which would be
timely, orderly, and effective (6th Conference), stressing the competence of the army rescue teams. More importantly, at
both conferences, the speakers described the heroic acts of the soldiers on site. Stories about individual soldiers who lost
loved ones in the quake but insisted on rescuing others rst were vividly told, stressing that soldiers were the sons and
daughters of the people (24th Conference).
The SCIO press conferences deliberately promoted the role models of the CCP cadres and members. The May 26th con-
ference specically addressing this issue, as Deputy Minister of the CCP Organization Ou Yangsong and Deputy Minister of
CCP Sichuan Provincial Organization Peng Deqiu described the core-functions of the CCP rank and le during the crisis.
Responding to the Partys call, these ordinary people acted as pioneers of the rescuing, mainstays of the community, and
loved ones of the people (16th Conference). The two ofcials also revealed that by noon of that day, CCP members donated
1.773 billion RMB as special party dues.
Moreover, overseas Chinese were depictedas heroes withtheir uniedresponse tothe crisis. Withthe June 2ndconference
specicallyaddressingthis issue, DeputyMinister of theCentral Ofceof Overseas Affairs MaRupei andtwoof his department
heads expressed deepest appreciation for the patriotic acts of all overseas Chinese, which proved that the Chinese
people worldwide are united in time of crises (21st Conference). Meanwhile, these speakers called for further assistance
with reconstruction of 100 schools and 100 hospitals in the next 35 years. In responding to concerns about donation
management, they assured the reporters that every penny of the funds would be spent on the victims.
Devoting special attention to promotion of heroes in crisis situations, one interviewee in the SCIO revealed, was an
important part of SCIOs contingency plan (Interviews with SCIO, 2008). The goal here was to instill positive thinking in
the popular mind. Such an idea was based on a pre-crisis survey of peoples reactions during crises.
Finding 5. The Chinese government crisis communication only moderately employed the Internet in its efforts to reach
out to the publics, domestic and international alike.
The government communication team seemed to understand the power of new media in crisis communication. Press
conferences, thus, were provided live online; and complete audio tapes of each press conference were made available online
for viewing and downloading. The SCIO also uploaded all transcripts of the press conferences on to its website only a few
hours after each was held along with background information provided by the government representatives at the press
conferences. Yet, several other uses of the Internet were not fully explored. For instance, the feature of interactivity was
ignored there was no specially designed link to provide interactive communication with Internet users. Also, none of the
SCIO spokespersons ventured to open his or her personal blogs. Moreover, no foreign language versions of the conference
transcripts or backgrounders were posted. Since the Internet makes the world a global village, people in other nations
would have found it useful to have at least the briengs in their native language within seconds.
There was, however, no indication of any governments communication efforts that might lead to the creation of intersub-
jectivity. Neither was any special programlaunched to create interactive platforms that might help to build intersubjectivity
that facilitates meaning, emotion, and motivation for government action.
Finding 6. The Chinese government efforts on relationship building and cultivation with the people did pay off in this time
of crisis.
N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198 195
The Chinese government under the President HuJindaoandPremier WenJiabo, has beenplacing emphasis onrelationship
building andcultivationwithits people, focusing onlearning about peoples needs so as to orient government policies toward
these needs. Over the past few years, the government has been vigorously promoting the for the people theme of the
Hu-Wen policies. The two leaders have frequently been reported to have true dialogues with ordinary Chinese people,
responding to their requests. In image-building, for the people has become a public commitment.
This already-built reputation and image were deliberately reinforced in all government crisis communication. One such
effort was to have all speakers at the news conferences refer to Hu and Wen as responsible leaders. Their names were con-
stantly mentioned and consistently associated with their presiding over the emergency meetings, giving specic instructions
on rescue, personal inspections of the disaster areas, and touching moments of their meetings with survivers, especially with
orphan children.
All communication efforts have been directed to show that Chinese government is people-oriented, which, in one way
or another, helped build a positive relationship between the government and its public. This relationship seemed to have
forged a buffer against potential damage to government image and credibility in a time of crisis. In the two intercept
surveys in Beijing and Chengdu in July 2008, 186 (93%) of those surveyed expressed strong condence in the leadership and
governments rescue and reconstruction efforts. Often mentioned comments included: (1) Hu and Wen are people oriented.
They genuinely care about us. They put peoples well-being and welfare rst; (2) They are capable of handling the crisis
and are trust worthy; and (3) So far, they have done everything possible to recue the victims and help people in need. They
act as very responsible leaders. When asked to compare the effectiveness of government crisis management of the quake
in 2008 with that of SARS in 2003, all agreed that it was 100 times more effective this time (Surveys, 2008).
Eventhe international community applaudedthe Chinese governments efforts inhandling andcommunicating about the
quake crisis. Human rights organizations that had been Chinas harshest critics acknowledged the governments impressive
response to the natural disaster. The Chinese authorities have made efforts to demonstrate their respect and concern for
human life, said Sharon Hom, Executive Director of Human Rights in China. The Chinese governments communication team
was quick to explore this good publicity. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang called his audiences attention to the fact
that the Chinese government has carried out people-centered relief efforts. Linking it with Chinas human rights record,
he stressed that this clearly shows that the Chinese government respects and protects human rights (News Conference, 27
May, 2008).
Obviously, when an organization develops strong commitment, loyalty, and trust with public in ordinary times, the
public will give that organization the benet of the doubt in a time of crisis and trouble. Cultivating a favorable relationship
with stakeholders is an essential part of public relations. It is like putting money in a favor bank. And the money saved
can help and make a difference in time of crisis. Indeed, Chinese-government communications achieved at least moderate
success in this area.
Finding 7. The Chinese governments crisis communicationwas designedtoshowcompassionandempathyfor the victims,
along with determination to helpwhich further enhanced the government image and accountability.
At the beginning of the crisis, the government communication team reached a quick consensus that all crisis com-
munication shall center on reinforcing the core-values of the Hu-Wen leadership (Interviews with SCIO, 2008), which
call for incorporating human consideration intensely in pushing for economic development. The SCIO also realized that
compassionate government responses to the quake would help.
Such an emphasis was reected in several methods the SCIO communication employed. Key words and phrases were
inserted not only in pre-prepared briengs but also in speakers answers to reporters questions at press conferences. Most
recognizable themes included: saving human lives is the rst priority (34 times), putting people rst (23 times) and
One part of the country is in trouble, all others would come to its aid (10 times), all designed to project an image that the
government was responding to the crisis with compassion.
At the May 15th conference, in responding to a question about when the government would consider giving up rescuing
lives still buried in the collapsed buildings, Deputy Ministry of Health, Gao Qiang simply replied: Never (3rd Conference).
Representatives of the Ministry of Civil Affairs repeatedly explained that the relief and special care would go to orphans,
widows, left-alone handicapped and old people rst (8th Conference). Addressing the growing request for adoption of
the orphans, Deputy Chief of the Social Welfare Department, Li Bo declared that the government would simplify all the
procedures (8th Conference).
In explaining how the government would insure that every dead body would be given a decent funeral and burial,
the speakers were very specic on procedural requirements including collecting samples for later DNA identity analysis.
Noteworthy was the fact that several female ofcials were invited to showa soft and compassionate side to the public (8th
and 30th Conferences).
While seemingly successful, SCIO crisis communication was found to fall short in some areas.
First, the SCIO seemed to fail to synchronize voices in some occasions, especially when authorities from different
government agencies disagreed on critical issues. For instance, when assessing potential risks of the quake-lakes, Deputy
Minister of Water Resources Er did not see the imminent danger these lakes would pose (15th Press Conference). In contrast,
Geologist Yin strongly believed that the lakes on soft soil were of immediate concerns (13th Press Conference).
Second, clear and succinct communication was not achieved all the time. Some government speakers packed their brief-
ings and explanations with technical jargons which would doubtless seem incomprehensible to lay people. Explaining how
to prevent dead animals from passing diseases to humans, Director of Veterinarians, Li Jingxiang wound up talking about
196 N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198
different epidemic diseases including bird-u, encephalitis B, lupomania, anthrax, lockjaw, pig streptococcus (5th Press
Conference).
Third, still an authoritarian system, Chinese government has seldom been found willing to apologize to publics. Rather it
engaged in a discourse of defense. Therefore, though the crisis communication is open and timely, it is not complete since
information relating to sensitive issues either is not volunteered or is spinned.
Several typical incidents were found: (1) At the very rst news conference onMay 13, questions were raisedabout whether
the government had forecasted the quake but decided to conceal the information. Deputy Director of the National Center for
Earthquake Supervision and Forecasting, Zhang Xiaodong denied any forecasting or concealing information. Without even
a statement of regret, he simply explained that successful forecasting of an earthquake remains a difcult task worldwide
(1st News Conference). (2) The SCIO press conferences offered no information on the death toll until rather late. When
confronted by a reporter over the numbers at the May 27th conference, chief spokesperson Guo Weimin simply refused to
answer (17th Press Conference). (3) The SCIO and government ofcials often rejected bad news. Questions on whether or
not the massive collapses of schools and hospital buildings were caused by possible corruption, and how the government
would investigate and correct the problem came up often. The rst responder, Wang Zhengyao, said that he had never
heard of any such case (1st Press Conference). Minister of Construction Jiang Weixin explained that the housing safety codes
enforced were designated only to resist earthquakes no greater than 7 on the Richter scale (4th Press Conference). (4) On
whether the delay of the international rescue teams was caused by the governments bureaucracy, Guo Weimin said no
but because of the road problems (1st Press Conference). A spokesperson fromthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang later
claimed that his agency never tried to cause the delay (22nd Press Conference).
Some of these shortcomings derive fromthe lackof technical trainingof the PRpeople; others are due tothe political, social
and cultural systems. As the government communication mechanism becoming more and more integrated, and changes in
almost all facets in Chinese society taking place, things are getting real hopeful (Interviews with SCIO, 2008).
5. Conclusion
This study shows that the strategies used and actions undertaken by the Chinese government during the Sichuan earth-
quake crisis in 2008, helped it to gain much-needed positive publicity and improved its global imagetuning the grave
danger ( ) into a rare opportunity. ( ) Building public relations into the government operating system, in part, made
it happen.
The institutionalization of government public relations in China has visible positive signs, especially, in the area of crisis
communicationandmanagement. First, the spokesperson systemhas beenwell establishedat all levels (central, provincial,
municipal and local). Second, government crisis communication is given strong institutional support in forms of regular
allocation of budgets, recruitment of expertise, and built-in procedures. Third, contingency plans have been developed and
tested prior to crises that can be immediately activated when a crisis hits. Fourth, the head of crisis communication teamhas
acquired direct access to top leaders in time of crisis, and has taken steps to become part of the dominant coalition. Fifth,
public relations has been recognized by the government as a crucial tool in assisting with relationship-building efforts with
the stakeholders; thus, a sign of the relationship- building function becoming institutionalized. Finally, Chinese leaders
seem to have recognized the strategic importance of public relations in crisis management, thus legitimizing the practice
as a core government function. Therefore, although largely at technical and procedural levels, the institutionalization of
government PR has begun to happen at the managerial level given that government PR people have autonomy needed to
make communication-related decisions.
This case has demonstrated that, partly owing to the institutionalization of government PR, Chinese government com-
munication during the earthquake crisis showed signicant changes, and indeed positive signs. First, the mode of open
communication was, for the rst time, adopted. Second, saving lives was established via government communication, for the
rst time, as the most important core-value position of all rescue actions. Third, communication specialists from both the
SCIO and other government agencies were at the front line, communicating with media and the publics directly and openly.
And fourth, PR specialists roles in setting the agenda and framing the issues helped to enhance the government credibil-
ity, image and reputation - especially at home but also moderately around the world. Fifth, conscious cultivation of a good
relationship with its people forged a buffer that helped to prevent risks and create opportunities for the government during
times of crisis. These changes are particularly meaningful when one compares this with Chinese governments handling of
the 1976s Tangshan earthquake (the one of similar scale hit and decimated the City of Tangshan, a major industry city in the
northern part of China). There were apparently widespread concealment and incredibly varied casualty gures at that time.
Also, the more progressive type of PR practice, compared to that in the 90s (Chen &Culbertson, 2001), is gaining ground in
China. Of course, there are elements of asymmetry as any organization, naturally, seeks to put its best foot forwardthoughthe
Excellence research (Grunig, 2001) suggests the mixed-motives model embodying both two-way symmetric and two-way
asymmetric approaches is optimum.
Although a preliminary analysis of how the institutionalization of public relations facilitates Chinese government crisis
communication, this study has suggested the necessity as well as advantages of PR practice becoming institutionalized. At
least in the Chinese context and with the government public relations, institutionalization tends to render legitimacy to PR
practice andempower PRpractitioners byaccordingPRpractice a strategic functioninenhancinggovernmental effectiveness.
N. Chen / Public Relations Review 35 (2009) 187198 197
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