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Policing and Society: An International
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Policing and Accountability in the
Netherlands: A Happy Marriage or a
Stressful Relationship?
E.R. Muller
a
a
E.M. Meijers Instituut , Witte Singel 103, Leiden, 2313, AA, The
Netherlands
Published online: 27 Oct 2010.
To cite this article: E.R. Muller (2002) Policing and Accountability in the Netherlands: A Happy
Marriage or a Stressful Relationship?, Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and
Policy, 12:4, 249-258, DOI: 10.1080/1043946022000007930
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Policing and Society, 2002, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 249258
POLICING AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
NETHERLANDS: A HAPPY MARRIAGE OR A
STRESSFUL RELATIONSHIP?
E.R. MULLER*
E.M. Meijers Instituut, Witte Singel 103, 2313 AA Leiden, The Netherlands
This article overviews the principal structural features concerning the system of police accountability in the
Netherlands. At issue is the police ability to deliver good standards in public safety, especially in the
context of local communities and small towns, after a decade of police organisational reform. The article
offers insights into the complexities for managing police accountability in the Netherlands under the current
structure. Police systems across Europe are experiencing, to varying degrees, the tendency to centralise
management functions. The Dutch case is an example of this. In the Netherlands, police reorganisation as
a result of the Police Act 1993 has had negative consequences for local accountability which are not
adequately addressed by the characteristic informalism that underpins the system. A tendency to structural
incidentalism exacerbates these weaknesses. The article concludes by calling for greater transparency in police
decision making and greater participation by external representatives of the public in order to bolster a fragile
legitimacy of the system.
Keywords: Police accountability; The Netherlands; Democracy; Rule of law; Police legitimacy
INTRODUCTION
Police accountability is a heavily debated topic in the Netherlands (see for an overview
Fijnaut et al., 1999) and it is a topic that also features prominently in policing
studies (Jones, 1995; Wintle, 1996). Many books have been written on the subject
and many conferences have been organised to discuss its implications (Fijnaut, 1979,
1983; Rosenthal et al., 1987; Fasseur, 1990; Van Helten, 1990; Reiner, 1992; Crisis
Onderzoek Team, 1994; Muller, 1994; Boek, 1995; den Boer, 1997; Koopman, 1998).
Despite the attention of academics, it remains the case that, in everyday police practice
in the Netherlands, the subject receives far less attention. How the police account for
their actions is evidently considered to be of little consequence for the police organi-
sations daily execution of policing tasks. It would seem that this subject is merely an
issue which attracts attention from academic police experts and the occasional
management cop (Punch, 1983).
This article addresses the relationship between the police performance in practice
and accountability concerning this performance (Gunther Moor et al., 1998;
*Director of the Dutch Police Academy; Director of the Crisis Research Team; Professor of Conflict
Resolution, University of Leiden. E-mail: e.muller@cot.nl.
ISSN 1043-9463 print; ISSN 1477-2728 online/02/040249-16 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/1043946022000007930
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Rosenthal et al., 1998a). In European countries there is a commonly held principle that
the justification of police performance is essential to a democratic constitutional state.
A properly controlled police organisation is a prerequisite in a balanced concept of a
constitutional state. This article aims to explain how the Dutch police view and respond
to this responsibility (Brantjes, 2001). It concludes with a number of recommendations
for improving the relationship between police practice and accountability. The article
concentrates on police accountability in the Netherlands; and draws heavily upon
Dutch literature on police accountability (see for an introduction to the Dutch police
system Elzinga et al., 1995; Michiels, 1997), but I believe the lessons are more general
ones that can, with due alteration of detail, be applied to liberal democracies elsewhere
(see for example: Sheptycki, 1999 for a comparison of the Dutch and Belgian police
systems).
It may appear at first remarkable to claim that the relations between the police, the
government, the law and parliament constitute the weakest point of the police organ-
isation (Cachet et al. 1998). It is uncontentious to say that, absent good relations
between these different parties, a police force cannot be managed and controlled effi-
ciently. However, there is a relationship be it a rather distant one between police
performance in the field and the managerial and control activities which are executed
by the most senior police officers, the mayors and the public prosecutors (Muller
and Poelert, 1999). Past experience in the Netherlands clearly shows that the corollary
of poor connectivity between the police, the government and the law can lead to serious
problems in police performance in the streets. Let us explore this contention in a little
more detail.
POLICING ISSUES IN THE NETHERLANDS
Policing in the Netherlands has been and continues to be under considerable pressure
(cf. Almelo and Wiewel, 1991). It is no exaggeration to say that the organisation
and performance of the police, the government and the law are topics of constant
debate in Dutch society in the contemporary period. In the recent past, various
incidents gave rise to media discussions and portrayals of a crisis in the constitutional
state of the Netherlands
1
. Debates about these matters in the Dutch parliament
and town councils frequently culminate in sweeping statements but scarcely quell the
controversy. Political authorities, the magistrates and others in positions of responsibil-
ity suffer the consequences of the constant flow of incidents concerning policing
in the Netherlands (cf. Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). This flow of controversy can be
understood as the problem of structural incidentalism a constant pattern of incidents
that have major consequences for the organisation and performance of the police,
the law and the government. The result of structural incidentalism is that the legitimacy
of this set of institutions is now at stake. Structural incidentalism in matters of police
performance can be traced back to fundamental questions concerning the performance
1
There have been two parliamentary inquiry commissions on the topic of policing methods; Parlementaire
Enquete Commissie Opsporingsmethoden, 1996 and Parlementaire Onderzoekscommissie Evaluatie
Onderzoeksmethoden, 1999.
250 E.R. MULLER
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of our democratic constitutional state and concerning the violation of civilians basic
rights, one of which is the right to safety.
At present the role of the Dutch police in the context of social order more generally is
undergoing a process of reconsideration. One of the most visible results of this is that
the Public Prosecutors Department has been drastically reorganised to enable it to per-
form a more effective oversight role in the future (see Schalken, 1992; Hart, 1994). This
is symptomatic of the general task that political and administrative authorities face in
finding ways of asserting their authority. Henceforth, elected representatives will be
required to demonstrate that they take their legislative and inspecting tasks in this
area of government care seriously:
The legitimacy of the police and the judiciary has come under pressure as a result of a too decisive use of
criminal investigation methods. Since the outcome of the 1995 parliamentary committee, people
express less trust in both. As far as the 1999 parliamentary committee is concerned, the police and the
judiciary have actually succeeded in realising organisational changes, as well as changes with respect
to content. Those far-reaching changes are hardly visible to the general public, however. Media and
the public opinion focus mainly on incidents that are regularly uncovered. The damage to legitimacy
will therefore last for another few years. The legitimacy of the police and of prosecutors will only increase
if they are able to keep up with the changes that have been launched. (Muller and Pieterse, 2001)
The following ten propositions summarise the current state of play in the adaptations
to the contemporary situation
2
.
1. Good standards of public safety care still ranks high on the list of public priorities
for the police. Discussions and debates concerning this issue tend to exclusively focus
on the organisation of safety care at the expense of a concern with what safety
care should entail. This leads to a gap between the publics safety requirements
(expectations) and the limited organisational conditions under which the police,
the government and the law can function. Despite diminishing indicators of crime
and criminality (as measured by a variety of statistical indicators), anxiety about
the crime problem remains widespread. This is connected with new problems
concerning the maintenance of public-order on and around football fields, in
entertainment centres and in particular town districts. These anxieties intensify
public feelings of dissatisfaction concerning lack of safety and government failure
to take effective measures against it.
2. The authority of the police, the government and the law has suffered as a
consequence. Structural incidentalism is the name given to the apparently continu-
ous problems in safety care and the concomitant series of incidents involving
problems of, or at least allegations of, police misconduct. The legitimacy of the
actions of the police, the government and the law (and even of ministers) can no
longer be taken as a given. All these parties have lost credibility (Cachet, 1990).
The public is aware of a major discrepancy between political bombast and the
actual actions taken by the police, the government and the law. Conscious of the dis-
crepancy, there seems, to the public at large, to be no end to the series of incidents
involving clashes between personal interests and public. The police, the government
and the law continually strive will have to re-convince the public of the legitimacy of
their actions.
2
These propositions are, in the main, based on the conclusions of an in-depth inquiry into the Police Act of
1993 (Rosenthal et al., 1998b).
POLICEWORK AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 251
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3. The structure of the current police organisation in the Netherlands is highly
complex. This complexity leads to flaws in the system of management. There is
insufficient dualism of authority and management. The managerial dualism is
unclear. The relations between central and local management and control are
unclear. The democratic justification system is inadequate. The various parties
operating within this faulty organisation work hard to arrive at consensus with
respect to managerial issues, but the organisation as a whole is characterised by
substantial managerial chaos. The process of arriving at managerial decisions
involves many different people. For many of those involved the amount of time
that has been spent on consultations and planning is considerable, indeed it
may even be at the point of consuming all the available institutional energy.
History will demonstrate that the present police organisation in the Netherlands is
a transitional one.
4. The democratic accountability of regional police care in the Netherlands is still
highly circumscribed. The adjustments that have been and are being made in the
administrative structure and organisation of police care in several regions
have done little to address this. The worst effect of this is that town councils
have no genuine influence on the management and control of the police. This has
considerable implications for police legitimacy at the local level that cannot be
answered by recourse to a national schema.
5. It is a paradox that the competent authorities have sufficient formal powers of
management and control at their disposal, but they do not make sufficient use of
those possibilities. These authorities consistently under-perform with respect to the
management of policing activities. Indeed, they exercise no genuine control over
the police organisation. It is a small mercy that police professionals generally
handle the latitude they are offered in a responsible way and do not attempt to
operate independently.
6. One significant aspect of the current system for local accountability is that there are
major differences in the administrative powers of the mayors of different towns
with respect to safety care. With regard to each and every aspect, the competences
accruing to the Mayor of a central town within a region are not the same as those
of small towns. These actual differences in administrative powers are at conflict
with the formal equality of the individual mayors in a regional council and lead
to discrepancies in the exercise of authority. Unevenness of formal powers in this
regard leads to inequality of outcome.
7. The fundament of Dutch policing is that consensus needs to be built and that
compromises can be formulated. However, police care in the Netherlands depends
to a significant extent on informal, personal relations. All too often police perform-
ance is the outcome of an opportunity-chemistry between the various parties
directly involved in police management. One effect of informalism is that key
individuals often prove to be more important than key functions. At times all this
may work out well, but in some cases it leads to serious problems. Informalism
means that there is an insufficiency of corrective mechanisms when things go
awry. Personal conflict between a mayor, a prosecutor and a police chief may nega-
tively influence the way in which policing in that area is conducted.
8. Policing in the Netherlands is held to account by two Ministries, that of the Interior
and of Justice. It is a matter of concern that the Ministers of the Interior and
Justice seem to have very little actual influence on safety care and often fail to exploit
252 E.R. MULLER
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the competences provided by the current Police Act. However, even if ministers
would exercise those competences with greater frequency, it is doubtful that this
would have much practical result in specific localities. It would prove very difficult
in practice to combine centralised management and control with the equally
necessary incorporation of police care on a local basis.
9. There is some evidence within the police organisation of an intensified focus on the
improvement in the content of police work. For example, currently a great deal of
attention is being given over to improving the quality of criminal investigation.
Large-scale structural reorganisation in the Dutch police during the 1990s has
been time consuming and has, to an immeasurable degree, sapped its strength.
For at least a decade, if not longer, attention has been almost exclusively focused
on the organisational implications of measures affecting the content of police
work. The institutionalisation of too many forms of consultation, inspection and
centres of expertise deflected attention from actual police work, whereas the
professionalism of the police organisation should primarily be manifested in the
quality of its work.
10. The Public Prosecution Service is also undergoing major reorganisation and this is
now beginning to pay off. The involvement of the Prosecution Service in manage-
rial issues remains limited and its members still have few opportunities to suggest
measures adapted to regional and local conditions (Foque and t Hart, 1990).
The decisions of the Board of Procurators-General allow the Public Prosecution
Service limited scope to take action on a regional basis. It is only to be hoped
that the Public Prosecution Service will be granted the peace and time required
to satisfactorily conclude its reorganisation (De Doelder, 1994).
NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES
The need for a democratically sound, effective and efficient police care is now greater
than ever. A number of normative principles associated with this increased need have
been articulated. These normative principles relate primarily to the organisation of
police care, which in turn is directly related to the content of police care. Optimally
organised police care is of great importance for both objective and subjective safety
(see Rosenthal et al., 1998b).
1. Law and Practice A first important improvement from which police care would
greatly benefit would be to narrow the gap between law in theory and law in
practice. A wide gap between the two implies a waste of administrative and organi-
sational energy. In a living constitutional state it is understandable for there to be a
healthy tension between laws and the structures and processes that are put in place
within their confines. But a prerequisite for constitutional police care is that the laws
and the regulations based on them are not too far removed from administrative
practice.
2. Disclosure Also important for good police care is that administrative decisions
are disclosed to the public, even if that may sometimes involve difficulties.
Transparency of administrative decisions is the best way of ensuring broad
involvement in administrative decision-making and is in the interest of democratic
justification.
POLICEWORK AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 253
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3. Transparency A related factor with respect to good police care is transparency
of complex structures and processes. The police organisation and police care
function in a context within which consensus, consultation and compromising are
highly valued. Of great importance with respect to ensuring transparency is an
unambiguous distribution of powers and responsibilities.
4. Prevention of Concentrations of Power Police care will benefit greatly from efforts
to prevent concentrations of power, dual positions and personal unions. Checks
and balances, including dualism of authority and balance of interests, are key
issues in the Dutch constitutional state, and hence also of great importance for
sound police operation.
5. NoAuthorityWithout Responsibility, noRresponsibilityWithout Justification Because
of their appointed powers and the means at their disposal including the possibility
of using violence the police occupy a special place in society. A strict rule holding
for all conditions, relations and forms of consultation within the police organisation
is that all powers must be coupled with responsibilities, and responsibility means
that all actions must be justified.
6. Integral Democratic Justification Something else from which police care would
greatly benefit is integral justification to a democratically elected body. Such integral
democratic justification would enhance the legitimacy of the actions of the police,
the government and the law.
7. Primacy Government Irrespective of the great importance of safety and police
care, the police organisation must act in conformity with the basic characteristics
of government and not vice versa (Hoogenboom, 1994).
ISSUES RELATING TO THE MANAGEMENT AND
CONTROL OF THE POLICE
This section provides an overview of the most important issues concerning the
evaluation of the functioning of the Police Act of 1993, which offers an insight in the
way accountability works in the Dutch police organisation (see Rosenthal et al., 1998b).
Formal and Informal
The informal, personal relations between the various parties involved in police care
are crucial. The need for good personal relations, especially between the members
of the regional triangle, is widely acknowledged. It is virtually impossible to enforce
the provisions of the Police Act if there are problems in the personal relations.
The Police Act is entirely in line with the Dutch political-administrative culture of
consultation, compromising and conflict avoidance. Many decisions relating to the
management and control of the police are taken in an informal way. Only rarely
are the formal procedures followed. The advantages of informal decision-making
are that decisions can be quickly made and that they are generally widely supported.
Disadvantages are the difficulty of controlling such decisions and their susceptibility
to changes. Of importance in this respect is the existing management culture in
particular regions.
254 E.R. MULLER
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Consultation and Decision-making
The management and control of the police are topics of discussion in many different
contexts, such as the executive committee, regional triangle, bilateral consultations,
staff meetings, district consultations, local consultations, etc. (see also Van der Hulst,
1990; Albert, 1994). As a result of the highly complicated level of these forms of
consultation, it often happens that the same subjects are being discussed at meetings
in different places, which obviously contributes to a duplication of efforts.
Increasingly, attempts are made to coordinate expectations and wishes in all the
different circuits, to avoid the risk of actual decisions being taken by a formal commit-
tee, such as the regional council. Force managers realise that giving all the parties
involved ample scope for consultation is the best way of arriving at a successful
police policy (Hoogewoning, 1993).
The many forms of consultation render decision-making a diffuse process. It is
virtually impossible to reconstruct when, and by whom, a particular decision was
taken. The formal decision-making procedures may have been followed, but the
background and reasons for the decisions often remain unclear. The main aims of
the many consultations actually prove to be coordination and implicit decision-
making. And the main purpose of the formal institutes, such as the regional council,
is then to ratify the decisions. But as all the different parties have had the opportunity
to express their wishes in the extensive consultations, the great majority of the members
of the regional council support this development. In this way, the decisions of the
regional council generate wide support. At the same time, however, this form of
decision-making means that the mayors in the regional council have virtually no
opportunity to influence decisions.
Communication Patterns and Forms of Consultation
One can distinguish a number of dominant communication patterns in the police
regions which were investigated. These communication patterns and the exchange of
information that takes place within them can be ranked according to their intensity.
The most intensive exchange of information is that between the managers and chiefs
of the force. As far as management is concerned, these are the most important
exchanges in the communication patterns. All relevant issues are ultimately discussed
in the consultations of a formal or informal nature between the chiefs and the
managers of the force. It is necessary to add that most information in the manager
chief relationship is exchanged orally. The second most important form of consultation
is that of the regional councils executive committee. In the executive committee, the
force manager, the field officer, the force chief and the mayor discuss most aspects
of police care in their region. The meetings of the executive committee usually generate
sufficient information, and often also new facts to satisfy most participants.
Of importance with respect to the local management and control of the police is
the exchange of information that takes place in the district councils. In the district
councils in particular, mayors try to take decisions concerning local police care in a
more or less inter-town context. Together with the consultations between the mayors
and the local chiefs of police, this flow of information constitutes the core of the
local communication patterns. None of the participants regard the regional council
as a single, independent source of information. The most relevant issues will already
POLICEWORK AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 255
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have been discussed via the other forms of consultation. Only for the mayors, who
play no active part in regional affairs, is the regional council an independent source
of information. Within the regional council itself, communication is often restricted
to a formal exchange of viewpoints and the formulation of decisions.
Information to Town Councils
The provision of information to the town councils is a case apart within the wider
context of information and communication. Under the terms of the Police Act, the
force managers and the mayors are obliged to pass all relevant information on to the
councils without delay. In practice, however, this is not always done. The force
managers almost always immediately forward the regional councils reports to the
town councils, but the other mayors are usually more selective in providing information
to the town councils. However, not all mayors behave in the same way in this respect.
The quality and quantity of information forwarded to the council depends to a large
extent on the mayors style of management and his/her general relationship with the
town council.
All this does not alter the fact that the town councils primarily receive the results
of formal communication patterns within their regions, optionally supplemented with
an explanation from the mayor. They get to hear virtually nothing about the reasons
for and backgrounds of the decisions. And they are therefore never fully informed
about the management and control processes in their regions. Town council members
of non-central towns rarely ask for further information on general aspects of the
regional police. They are interested in detailed information on local safety. Town
council members of central towns tend to have more interest in information on the
regional force. But it is often difficult to draw a line between information relating to
the mayors authoritative role and that relating to the force managers managerial
role. In actual fact, the councils of central towns quite regularly both formally and
factually raise statements about managerial issues concerning the regional force or
ask the force manager to justify police actions. This is the great disadvantage of the
dual role of the force manager/mayor of a central town.
Democratic Accountability
Although the way the police forces account for their actions to the town council meets
the formal statutory requirements, they only account for the broad outlines of their
policies. Police forces seldom give a detailed account (through the mayor) of the way
they conduct their policies. Town councils generally approve the reports by the
police forces without much discussion. In-depth discussions about the measures
taken and the choices made are rare.
With it comes to the management of the police forces, democratic accountability is
essentially non-existent. Mayors are seldom called to account by their town councils
for their role in the regional council. Town councils only discuss the way the mayor
exercises his/her authority in maintaining public order within the municipality.
The fact that in a few cases authority is confused with management is taken for
granted by both the mayor and the council. But if democratic accountability for the
management of the police forces is virtually non-existent, the situation with regard
to democratic accountability for the mayors authority in preserving public order is
256 E.R. MULLER
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not much better. The town councils primarily focus on their role in influencing the
development of local and regional plans.
Supralocal Accountability
Virtually none of the regional and local actors perceive any need to account for their
actions to the Minister of the Interior or to the Queens Commissioner at the level of
the provinces. They strongly emphasise the individual responsibility and autonomy
of the police regions. Interventions by the Minister of the Interior primarily concern
the implementation of general regulations, and the regions generally comply with
these regulations without too many problems. Hence, in practice the Queens
Commissioners role as the overall supervisor of police care in his municipalities
does not amount to much.
The role of the Board of Procurators-General and the Ministry of the Interior
vis-a` -vis the chief public prosecutors, is fundamentally different. There is a clear
hierarchical relationship. Chief public prosecutors make a considerable effort to put
the judicial priorities on the agenda of the regional councils and policy planning meet-
ings. The other parties involved are sometimes irritated by this approach; in their
opinion, the Public Prosecution Service pays too little attention to local issues and
focuses too much on national priorities. In some regions this has prompted a heated
debate between the regional police force mayor and the chief public prosecutor
about which interests should prevail. However, in most cases a compromise was
reached that was acceptable to both.
CONCLUSION
Three conclusions may be drawn concerning the relationship between police practice
and accountability in the Netherlands:
1. Police practice and accountability do not relate very well. In the Netherlands, in
spite of well-meant rhetoric and principles endorsed by all, accountability has
led to a situation where the policing is controlled only to a limited extent.
2. In the Netherlands, as well as in other countries, alternative forms of control are
applied, such as complaints handling schemes, planning cycles and self-evaluation.
In these forms of control, the controller is mainly the police itself. There is too
little objective control from outside the police.
3. Neither the police nor civilians seem to make an issue of accountability. Especially
in the Netherlands, the police are assumed to operate within the confines of the law.
There is no tangible wish for higher levels of accountability and disclosure.
Where do these conclusions and comments lead to? They ought to lead to a more
realistic picture of feasible forms of accountability. Formal bodies that directly
represent civilians would be the ideal instruments to control the police. This article
has shown that current forms of control are less far-reaching. That is the basis for a
realistic control concept with formal arrangements for the external control of
the police, independently and directly by civilians. A caveat is that each party
must appreciate the limits of such control. After all, police work is a job done by
professionals and full control of its performance is neither possible nor desirable.
POLICEWORK AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 257
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