THE PCO HAS PROVIDED A LEGAL BASIS FOR DETENTION OF THE DETAINEES.

The function of the PCO is

to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for any of the offenses covered by
Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant, its legal effect is to render the writ
unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for
continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled
or quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of public safety continues.

The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as Commander-in-
Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality
in the light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom. This must be so because the suspension
of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of which the President alone may determine as an
incident of his grave responsibility as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not
only public safety but the very life of the State, the government and duly constituted authorities. This
should be clear beyond doubt in the case of "invasion," along which "rebellion" or "insurrection" is
mentioned by the Constitution, which contingency does not present a legal question on whether there is
a violation of the right to personal liberty when any member of the invading force is captured and
detained.

The presidential responsibility is one attended with all urgency when so grave a peril to the life of the
Nation besets the country in times of the aforementioned contingencies. In the discharge of this
awesome and sacred responsibility, the President should be free from interference. The existence of
warlike conditions as are created by invasion, rebellion or insurrection, the direst of all emergencies that
can possibly confront a nation, argues, beyond dispute, against subjecting his actions in this regard to
judicial inquiry or interference from whatever source. If freedom from judicial review is conceded in the
exercise of his peacetime powers as that of appointment and of granting pardon, denominated as
political powers of the President, it should incontestably be more so with his wartime power, as it were,
to adopt any measure in dealing with situations calling for military action as in case of invasion, rebellion
or insurrection.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is one such measure. To be effective, the
occasion for its application on specific individuals should be left to the exclusive and sound judgment of
the President, at least while the exigencies of invasion, rebellion or insurrection persist, and the public
safety requires it, a matter, likewise, which should be left for the sole determination of the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's armed forces. The need for a unified command in such
contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic-as a basic military concept in the art of warfare.

LANSANG CASE REVISITED. What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang case
with a view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, a 1905 decision, and Montenegro
vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952), that the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled ruling
was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of the Court is merely to check not
to supplant the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
Judicial interference was thus held as permissible, and the test as laid down therein is not whether the
President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily. This would seem to be pure semanticism, if
We consider that with particular reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the
occasion of the grave emergency he has to deal with, which, as clearly indicated in Section 9, Art. VII of
the Constitution partakes of military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to
assume the authority to check or reverse or supplant the presidential actions. On these occasions, the
President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its government, which,
incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his
conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President,
the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the
President will not fail them.

In his separate opinion in the Lansang case, then Justice Fernando, now our learned Chief Justice, went
along with the proposition that the decision of the Executive in the exercise of his power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is his alone, and in his own language, is "ordinarily beyond the ken
of the Courts." This is so, as the Founding Fathers must have felt that in the particular situations at hand,
the Executive and the Judiciary should maintain a mutually deferential attitude. This is the very essence
of the doctrine of "political question, " as determining the justiciability of a case. The wisdom of this
concept remains well-recognized in advanced constitutional systems. To erase it from our own system
as seems to be what was done in the Lansang case, may neither be proper nor prudent. A good example
could be given in the exercise of the presidential power of pardon which is beyond judicial review,
specially under the new Constitution where the condition that it may be granted only after final
conviction has been done away with.

Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as earlier cited, affords further reason for the
reexamination of the Lansang doctrine and reversion to that of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda.

Accordingly, We hold that in times of war and similar emergency as expressly provided in the
Constitution, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which has the effect
of allowing the Executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No.
2045, including, as a necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration of the suspension of the
privilege, of the right to bail. The power could have been vested in Congress, instead of the President, as
it was so vested in the United States for which reason, when President Lincoln himself exercised the
power in 1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed the opinion that Congress alone
possessed this power under the Constitutional.,
15
Incidentally, it seems unimaginable that the judiciary
could subject the suspension, if decreed through congressional action, to the same inquiry as our
Supreme Court did with the act of the President, in the Lansang case, to determine if the Congress acted
with arbitrariness.

We further hold that under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the
exclusive prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts,
under the doctrine of "political question," as has been applied in the Baker and Castaneda cases, on any
ground, let alone its supposed violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning the
doctrine of the Lansang case. The supreme mandate received by the President from the people and his
oath to do justice to every man should be sufficient guarantee, without need of judicial overseeing,
against commission by him of an act of arbitrariness in the discharge particularly of those duties
imposed upon him for the protection of public safety which in itself includes the protection of life,
liberty and property. This Court is not possessed with the attribute of infallibility that when it reviews
the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible fault of arbitrariness, it
would not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault.

Finally, We hold that upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order against herein
petitioners, their continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released even
after the filing of charges against them in court, to depend on the President, who may order the release
of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases.

G.R. No. L-1668 March 29, 1948
PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY WORKERS' UNION (CLO), petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., respondent.
Severino P. Izon for petitioner.
DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for respondent Philippine Refining Co., Inc.
HILADO, J .:
On September 26, 1946, Case No. 32-V, Philippine Refining Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Refining
Company Worker's Union (CLO), was scheduled for hearing before the Court of Industrial Relations.
Upon that date, said court renewed its efforts to effect a temporary settlement of the case before
going on the merits of the petition. A series of conferences with both parties was held by the court,
assisted by Atty. Paciano Villavieja of the Division of Investigation. Thereafter, considering the
circumstances and facts of the case at that stage of the proceedings, the Court of Industrial
Relations came to the conclusion that, "for the welfare of everybody concerned, for the interest of the
public," and because the court might not be able to decide the case promptly, in view of the issues
involved, the striking laborers should be directed to return and resume their work in the Philippine
Refining Company on September 27, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the management of
the respondent company should accept them beginning that date; and it was so ordered by the court
(Order Annex A, dated Sept. 26, 1946).
The order contained the following injunction:
The striking laborers, pending the final determination of this case, are enjoined not to stage
any strike or walk out from their employment without authority from and without first
submitting the grievances to the Court. The Petitioning Company is likewise enjoined not to
lay-off, dismiss, discharge, or admit any new employees or laborers in its employment during
the pendency of this case, without beforehand notifying and obtaining the authority of the
Court. The controversial points involved in the petition will be heard by this Court at the
opportune time. (P. 2.)
In Case No. 32-V (7), Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Philippine Refining Company Workers' Union
(CLO), of the same court, under date of May 2, 1947, pending final determination of the case, the
petitioning company filed with the court an urgent report to the effect that a strike was declared by
the union at the plant of the company in Manila starting 7:00 o'clock in the morning of April 30, 1947.
In view of this development and of the other facts and considerations set forth in the lower court's
order of July 24, 1947 (Annex D), it ruled that the strike staged by the union or by the workers of the
company therein mentioned on April 30, 1947, "is contemptuous and illegal because it is a violation
of the law and the order of the court. Consequently, as prayed for in the said report submitted by the
company, the court authorizes the said company to hire such of the striking laborers and employees
and new labor force, as in its discretion it may see fit." And pursuant to section 6 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 103, Atty. Juan Maralit of the court was thereby designated to take charge
of the contempt proceedings and to present such action as might be warranted therein against the
party or parties who might be responsible for the violation of the law and the order of the court dated
September 26, 1946. The court dismissed the answer and counter-petition for contempt filed by the
union against the company.
The court's resolutions of August 16 and September 15, 1947, denied petitioners motions for
reconsideration of the foregoing orders, and these orders and resolutions are sought to be vacated
and reversed by the instant petition.
The crux of the instant petitioner's contention is stated in three propositions submitted in the petition
under the heading "Reasons for Allowance of the Writ," thus:
I. That the order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated September 26, 1946, enjoining the
workers not to stage a strike pending the final determination of the case, was issued without
or in excess of its jurisdiction and powers, for the same had not been issued in accordance
with section 19, Commonwealth Act 103, which is the only source of its authority, if it has
ever any such powers, in issuing such kind of orders.
II. That the said order dated September 26, 1946, which is the basis of the subsequent order
dated July 24, 1947, is null, void and invalid for it is an infringement of the constitutional
rights and liberties of the workers and is moreover repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
prohibiting involuntary servitude in any form.
III. That the order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated July 24, 1947, as well as the
resolutions of the Court denying the motions for reconsideration, are also invalid and
contrary to law for they were issued in violation of the due process clause of the constitution.
There was no legal and fair hearing made by the Court of industrial Relations on the issues
arbitrarily disposed of and decided in said order of July 24, 1947. (page 6.)
The question thus raised are substantially the same as those raised in G.R. No. L-1573, Kaisahan
ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw Mill, wherein judgment went against
the petitioning union. There the court's order for the striking workers to return to their work was made
after hearing. Likewise in the instant case. And as appears from the court's order of September 26,
1946 (Annex A), the order enjoining a strike or walk out without authority from and without first
submitting the grievances to the court, was made after hearing consisting of a series of conferences
with both parties "held by the court"; and that said injunction was required by the public interest is
categorically stated in the same order.
In our decision in G.R. No. L-1573, supra, we ruled;
. . . moreover, section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing for an order of the
court for the return of striking workers, authorizes such order, among other cases, 'when the
dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled'. The provision says: "... and if
he has already done so (struck or walked out), that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order
of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or
when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled" (Emphasis
supplied). In other words, the order to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or
settled, may be issued 'only after hearing when public interest so requires', but if in the
court's opinion the dispute can be promptly decided or settled, then it is also authorized after
hearing to issue the order: we construe the provision to mean that the very impossibility of
prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the
order for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or
paralyzation of the wheels of industry . . . .
In the order of September 26, 1946, the Court of Industrial relations, among others, based its decree
upon the ground that "the court may not be able to decide this case promptly, in view of the issues
involved".
The power conferred upon the Court of Industrial Relations by section 19 of its organic law to enjoin,
under the circumstances therein required, a strike or walk out, or to order the return of the striking
workers and to correspondingly enjoin the employer to refrain from accepting other employees,
unless with the express authority of the court, and to permit the continuation in the service of his
employees under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose, is one of the most
important virtues of this capital-labor legislation. It seems that in this respect our law has achieved
an advance not attained by the capital-labor legislation of other countries. And considering that this
progressive is evidently aimed at preventing in the public interest an undue stoppage or paralyzation
of the wheels of industry, the general welfare requires that it be upheld and enforced.
As to the contention that section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is unconstitutional, we held in
G.R. No. L-1573,Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw
Mill, supra, that it is unconstitutional. We said:
. . . It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary servitude.
An employee entering into a contract of employment after said law went into
effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19,
among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or
landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial
relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending
award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his
employment when so enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so
requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the
court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the
dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled. ..." (Emphasis supplied.) The
voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment he has a free
choice between entering into it or not with such an implied condition, negatives the
possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. . . .
Regarding the facts, this Court is not authorized to review them as found by the Court of Industrial
Relations. (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559,
section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court; National Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp.
p. 134, Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz., 1032; Pasumil Worker's Union vs.
Court of Industrial relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Supp. p. 71.)
However, Mr Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our opinion on the
constitutionality of the above statutory and reglementary provisions should it, in the future, become
necessary to decide it.
Wherefore, the orders and resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations assailed by the instant
petition are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-39115 May 26, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus. SEGIFREDO L. ACLARACION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, HON. HOSE N. LEUTERIO, COLONEL RUPERTO B. ACLE,
Chief of Police, and Lieutenant FRANCISCO CRUZ, Warden, Makati, Rizal, respondents.
AQUINO, J .:+.wph!1
Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija from October 1, 1969 to November 21, 1971. His appointment expired
on November 21, 1972 while he was working as a temporary stenographer in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Thereafter, he was employed as a stenographer in the Public Assistance and
Claims Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission, where he is now working.
After Aclaracion had ceased to be a court stenographer, the Court of Appeals required him to
transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases decided by the Gapan court which had been
appealed: Muncal vs. Eugenio, CA-G. R. No. 49711-R and Paderes vs. Domingo, CA-G. R. No.
52367-R. He failed to comply with the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. He was declared in
contempt of court.
On May 29 and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose N. Leuterio, Chairmen
of the Third and Seventh Divisions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, ordered the Chief of Police
of Makati, Rizal, to arrest Aclaracion, a resident of that municipality, and to confine him in jail until he
submits a complete transcript of his notes in the said cases.
Aclaracion was arrested on June 21, 1974 and incarcerated in the municipal jail. In a petition dated
July 12, 1974 he asked the Court of Appeals that he be not required to transcribe his notes in all the
cases tried in the Gapan court. He suggested that the testimonies in the said cases be retaken.
The Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution of August 7, 1974 ordered the release of
Aclaracion. Later, he transcribed his notes in the Muncal case. However, the warden did not release
him because of the order of arrest issued by the Seventh Division.
On August 9, 1974 Aclaracion filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus. He advanced the novel
contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes, after he ceased to be a
stenographer, would be a transgression of the rule that "no involuntary servitude in any form shall
exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14,
Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution). He was averse to being subjected "to involuntary servitude
sans compensation". He desired to be released from the obligation of transcribing his notes. (He
filed his petition in forma pauperis).
The petition was heard on August 20, 1974. It was already moot because, as already noted, the
Third Division of the Court of Appeals had ordered his release on August 7th. Another hearing was
held on September 3, 1974 in connection with the detention of Aclaracion at the instance of Justice
Leuterio. At that hearing, this Court resolved to order Aclaracion's provisional release on condition
that within twenty days thereafter he would complete the transcription of his notes in
the Paderes case in his office at the Insurance Commission, Manila.
So, he was provisionally released without prejudice to the final ruling on his contention that he could
not be compelled to transcribe his notes in the other cases because he was no longer connected
with the judiciary and because his stenotype machine notes were standard notes which could be
transcribed by stenographers trained in stenotype machine shorthand.
On September 4, 1974 Aclaracion was released from the Makati jail. Upon representations made by
the Clerk of Court of this Court with the Insurance Commissioner, the latter interposed no objection
to Aclaracion's transcription of his stenographic notes either in this Court or in his office in the
Insurance Commission.
On November 19, 1974 Aclaracion manifested that he had transcribed his notes in the Paderes case
in his office at the Insurance Commission after he was provided by the Clerk of Court of this Court
with the requisite supplies.
We have given Aclaracion's petition the attention and study which it deserves. The habeas
corpus aspect of his petition has become moot in view of his release from jail during the pendency of
his case. After much reflection, we have come to the conclusion that his request that he be relieved
from transcribing his notes in the other cases cannot be granted.
We hold that an Appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his
stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is a part
of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction
and essential to the due administration of justice (See State vs. Superior Court of Maricopa County,
5 Pac. 2d 192, 39 Ariz. 242, Note 74, 21 C. J. S. 41; 20 Am. Jur. 2d 440; Fuller vs. State, 57 So.
806, 100 Miss. 811).
The provision of section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that "upon the approval of the record on
appeal the clerk shall direct the stenographer or stenographers concerned to attach to the record of
the case five (5) copies of the transcript of the oral evidence referred to in the record on appeal"
includes stenographers who are no longer in the judiciary. (See sec. 7, Rule 122 and sec. 7, R. A.
No. 3749).
The traditional mode of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent
stenographer in contempt of court if he does not comply with the order for the transcription of his
notes and imprison him until he obeys the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court).
Another sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion,
resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he completes the transcription of his notes. This is
provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary of Justice.
In the instant case, Aclaracion transcribed his notes in the Muncal and Paderes cases while he was
an employee of the Insurance Commission. During the time that he made the transcription, he
received his salary as such employee.
We hold that he could be required to transcribe his notes in other cases, particularly in the case of
Heirs of the Late Pacita Sicioco Cruz, etc. vs. La Mallorca Pambusco, et al, CA-G. R. No. 49687-R.
The Court of Appeals, in its resolution of November 24, 1972, required him to transcribe his notes in
that case.
The same Court in its resolution of February 20, 1975 in Paterno vs. Tumibay, CA-G. R. No. 51330-
R imposed on Aclaracion a fine of one hundred fifty pesos for his failure to transcribe his notes in the
said case and warned him that he would be arrested if he failed to submit his transcript within ten
days from notice.
The same arrangement should be made by the Clerk of Court of this Court with the Insurance
Commissioner that Aclaracion should be allowed to receive his salary while making the transcription.
Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes would constitute
involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another (Hodges vs. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or
imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 961). That situation does not obtain in this case.
Also untenable is Aclaracion's argument that the imprisonment of a stenographer who had defied the
court's resolution for the transcription of the notes constitutes illegal detention. The incarceration of
the contemning stenographer is lawful because it is the direct consequence of his disobedience of a
court order. *
However, in view of the fact that Aclaracion might have acted in good faith in not complying with the
resolution of the Court of appeals in the Paterno case, due to the pendency of the instant habeas
corpus case (a fact which is inferable from his letter to this Court dated March 11, 1975), the fine of
one hundred fifty pesos imposed on him is hereby remitted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal. C.J, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t
Castro, J., concurs in the result.