Prof i l e

THE LEGACY OF NIKLAS

LUHMANN
Gotthard Bechmann and Ni co Stehr
l
' n some of the many and ext ensi ve obi t uari es
. published in European newspaper s and maga-
zines in 1999, Niklas Luhmann is r emember ed as
the most i mport ant social t heori st of t he 20t h cen-
tury.Yet in much of the Anglo-Saxon wor l d he is
virtually unknown among professi onal social sci-
entists. Luhmann was bor n into a middle-class fam-
ily in Liineburg, Ger many on December 8, 1927.
Fol l owi ng earl y gr aduat i on f r om hi gh school
(Not abi t ur), he was conscr i pt ed bri efl y in 1944
and t aken pri soner of war by t he Ameri can Forces.
From 1946 to 1949, he st udi ed law in Freiburg,
ent ered public administration and wor ked for t en
years as an administrative l awyer in Hanover. In
1962 he recei ved a schol arshi p to Harvard and
spent a year wi t hTal cot t Parsons. In 1968, he was
appoi nt ed professor of soci ol ogy at t he newl y
est abl i shed Uni versi t y of Bielefeld, whe r e he
wor ked until his ret i rement . Shortly before his
appoi nt ment he was asked on what subj ect he
wi shed to work at university. His reply was: "The
t heor y of moder n society. Durat i on 30 years; no
costs." He consequent l y realised exactly this theo-
retical program. At the time of his deat h in De-
cember 1998, at t he age of 70, he had publ i shed
an oeuvre of over 14,000 pr i nt ed pages.
Luhmann' s j our ney t owar d a t heor y of mod-
ern soci et y has t aken a dual appr oach: first, in t he
form of essays since t he end of t he 1960s; and
second, in t he form of monogr aphs si nce t he
1980s, dealing wi t h t he individual f unct i on sys-
t ems of society, such as law, sci ence and art.
Luhmann' s intellectual evol ut i on cul mi nat ed in
1997 wi t h t he publ i cat i on of his magnum opus
"The Society of Society."Anyone suspect i ng redun-
dancy and repetition here mi ght feel at first glance
t hat t hei r scept i ci sm is conf i r med. Thi s two-vol-
ume wor k cont ai ns no new subjects, let al one any
previ ousl y unpubl i shed appr oach. To this ext ent
it is more a compl et i on, a recapi t ul at i on, t han an
advance i nt o new territory. However, a second,
reassuri ng l ook reveals much that had not been
said bef or e- - or at least not in this way. In cont rast
to the essays, whi ch are somet i mes experi ment al
and even playful in tone, and whi ch occasionally
close on a question mark, the book format requi res
a mor e syst emat i c pr esent at i on. "The Soci et y of
Society" is t he final st one to his t heoret i cal cathe-
dral and provi des a map for, and a gui de to, t he
under st andi ng of moder n syst ems theory.
Ar ound this pri nci pal wor k are cl ust ered ear-
lier, individual analyses: "The Sci ence of Society,"
"The Economi cs of Society," "The Art of Society,"
"The Law of Society" and t he t wo pos t humous l y
publ i shed books: "The Politics of Society" and"The
Religion of Society."The i nt r oduct i on to this se-
ries of analyses t ook the form of a 674-page book
beari ng t he title"Social Syst ems: The Out l i ne of a
General Theory. "This wor k is still t he most con-
cent rat ed, abstract, and- - i f one takes the t roubl e
to wor k t hr ough i t - - al so most rewardi ng presen-
t at i on of t he t heoret i cal core.
We now have a first overall pi ct ur e at our dis-
posal. If one wi shes to do Luhmann justice, one
has t o find one' s beari ngs wi t hi n t he archi t ect ure
of his general approach. Apart from t hese systemic
studies, Luhmann also publ i shed a slightly less
vol umi nous series of soci ol ogi cal and historical-
semant i c analyses. They consi st of t he four vol-
umes of "Societal St ruct ure and Semantics" and
t he six vol umes of"Soci ol ogi cal Enl i ght enment . "
Thes e st udi es s how Luhma nn as a uni ver sal
scholar, who l ocat es his t heor y wi t hi n t he histori-
cal cont ext of enl i ght enment and Eur opean phi-
l osophy. Apart from this far-reaching research, he
also pr oduced a range of political and social analy-
ses of moder n society, comment i ng on pressi ng
publ i c pr obl ems. We ment i on onl y his books "So-
ci ol ogy of Risk,""Ecological Communi cat i on, ""The
Real i t y of t he Mass Media" and "The Pol i t i cal
THE LEGACY OF NIKLAS LUHMANN 67
Theor y of the Welfare State." In all, his wor k con-
sists of some 700 publ i cat i ons and count l ess trans-
lations into English, French, It al i an, Japanese, Rus-
sian and Chinese.
In almost all of his work, Luhmann makes ref-
er ence to t he operat i ve logic of George Spencer
Brown and radical constructivism.These are treated
in summary fashion in order to sketch the layout
and the concept ual structure of his super-social sys-
tems theory, endowed wi t h a range of met hodol ogi -
cal i nst rument s won in this way. The t heor y of
politics, soci ol ogy of religion, soci ol ogy of art, and
moral soci ol ogy are devel oped subsequently.
In our br i ef i nt el l ect ual por t r ai t of Niklas
Luhmann, we first del i berat el y focus on t he sub-
st ance of his social theory, especi al l y the ideas
f ound in his last publ i cat i on; and we refrain from
advanci ng a soci ol ogy of knowl edge per spect i ve
t hat at t empt s to come t o gri ps wi t h- - f or ex-
a mpl e - t he r el uct ance of Angl o-Saxon social sci-
ence to engage Luhmann' s not i ons as vi gorousl y
and pr omi nent l y as has been t he case not onl y in
his own country, but also in Italy, France, and many
ot her non-Engl i sh-speaki ng soci et i es. This is a
story, and a challenge, that must be left open at
this time. Second, once we have out l i ned the ma-
jor features of Luhmann' s novel syst em-t heoret i -
cal approach, we offer various critical observa-
tions and refl ect i ons.
The Characteristics of Modern Society
For Luhmann, social differentiation and syst em
format i on are the basic charact eri st i cs of moder n
society. This also means that syst ems t heor y and
t he t heor y of soci et y are mutually dependent . In
t hese terms, a soci et y is not the sum of all current
interactions, but rather a system of a higher order,
of a different type, det ermi ned by the differentia-
t i on bet ween syst em and envi r onment ; and it is
exactly this di st i nct i on whi ch is t he subj ect of
Luhmann' s t wo-vol ume The Society of Society.
Luhmann' s key message is this: soci ol ogy is ulti-
mately a t heory of society, or it is not a science. If
we look back at the history of sociology, this is by
no means self-evident. On t he cont rary, at t he start
of t he last c e nt ur y- - a nd part i cul arl y after 1945
in Ger many and el sewher e- - soci ol ogy derived its
identity by conceal i ng its relationship wi t h society.
It was mainly a t heory of social entities, wi t h such
categories as roles, interaction, intention and social
action forming the basic concept ual framework for
a soci ol ogy whi ch was i ncreasi ngl y empirical and
t heoret i cal l y inclined to fol l ow t he model of the
natural sciences, wi t h their emphasi s on causality
and t he di scover y of laws.
The concept of society, however, ret ai ned its
holistic claim; emphatically defended, for example,
by cr i t i cal t he or y and de ve l ope d by J/.irgen
Habermas into a t heor y of communi cat i ve reason.
This claim cl ashed wi t h t he under st andi ng of so-
ci ol ogy as a universal and i ndependent t heor y of
social ent i t i es. Woul d t he mai nst ream per spect i ve
wi t hi n soci ol ogy t urn soci et y i nt o a social syst em
like any other, but at t he same time an all-embrac-
ing and fundament al system? Sociology has been
unable to escape from this paradox, whi ch it has
count ered by repression and historicisation: Social
theory, and particularly critical social theory, has
largely been left to the disciplinary concer ns of
phi l osophy, whi ch is bel i eved to have t he special-
ists in holistic claims for the ultimate, fundamen-
tal structures of t hought and relationships wi t h the
world. If social scientists dealt wi t h t he t heor y of
society, t hen t hey did so typically t hrough exegesis
of the classics, as if the history of their own disci-
pline had the ability to preserve and recall claims.
Today the excl usi on of soci et y from soci ol ogy
seems to be exact i ng its revenge. Like Max Weber' s
repressed wor l d of t he gods who cel ebrat e t hei r
ret urn to t he moder n wor l d in t he form of inces-
sant confl i ct s of values, t he concept of soci et y is
ret urni ng t oday in a wi de diversity of terms, such
as "post-industrial soci et y" (Bell), "society of risk"
(Beck)," soci et y of knowl edge" (Stehr), and "post-
moder n soci et y" (Lyotard); as if one aspect of so-
ciety is capabl e of st andi ng in for t he whol e. Such
ad hoc fabri cat i on of t er mi nol ogy reveals what is
bei ng suppressed: namely, t he claim to compr e-
hend soci et y in its totality.
So what exactly does this mean for sociology,
Luhmann asks, if we wi sh to avoid the trap of naive
obj ect i vi sm, whi ch vi ews soci et y as a gi ven ob-
ject that effectively pr ecedes all scientific obser-
vation? The i mpl i cat i on of t he obj ect i ve poi nt of
vi ew woul d be t hat we have to obser ve soci et y
from a poi nt out si de of soci et y. There is no such
point. Sci ence and soci et y are bot h an expr essi on
of social reality.This is preci sel y t he poi nt wher e
classical soci ol ogy of knowl edge, for exampl e, has
br oken down. It was forced to del egat e t he ob-
servat i on of knowl edge to a hypot het i cal , free-
fl oat i ng i nt el l i gence t hat was not subj ect t o any
di st ort i on of per cept i on due to i nt erest s or ide-
ologies. More recently, a number of per spect i ves
have come to accept t he idea that t he act of cog-
ni t i on is always itself a moment in t he totality of
68 SOCIETY 9 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002
cogni t i on. Luhmann shares this appr oach- - and at
the same time pushes beyond it by argui ng that
t here cannot be an obj ect "society" accessible to
i ndependent observat i on.
As soon as we cease to regard soci et y as merel y
anot her soci ol ogi cal obj ect of research and in-
stead focus on its operat i onal si gni fi cance as a
condi t i on for t he possibility of soci ol ogi cal cog-
nition itself, t hen soci ol ogy becomes a subj ect
dealing wi t h itself in exact l y t he sense in whi ch
the subj ect mat t er of phi l osophy speaks of reflec-
tion. Luhmann transfers t he st ruct ure of t he self-
referential mode of oper at i on by t he subj ect to
t he t heor y of social syst ems. At t he same time, he
answers t he quest i on: How it is possi bl e to prac-
tice soci ol ogy as a t heor y of soci et y t hat does not
premat urel y screen out t he connect i on bet ween
t heor y and subject? This, accor di ng to Luhmann,
requi res a radical rej ect i on of epi st emol ogi cal
posi t i ons based on the di chot omy of the subject-
obj ect paradi gm. Soci ol ogy is conf r ont ed wi t h
soci et y as a subject. Luhmann t herefore argues
that this requires research into characteristics that
it has always generat ed itself. Luhmann consis-
tently posits a radically anti-humanist, non-ont o-
logical and radi cal -const ruct i vi st idea of society.
The most radical as s umpt i on of Luhmann' s
mat ure t heoret i cal appr oach is his emphasi s on
differences, mor e preci sel y on di st i nct i ons that
are no l onger seen as obj ect i ve di fferences but as
const ruct i ons. The substitution of the subject con-
cept and t he transfer of the subj ect / obj ect differ-
entiation into the distinction bet ween system and
envi r onment take Luhmann to a post-ontological
t heory of society, devel oped on a naturalistic and
empirical basis as a t heory of observation.This fun-
damental questioning of the moder n phi l osophy of
t he subj ect and t he resulting di st i nct i on bet ween
t he natural sci ences and t he humani t i es (t oget her
wi t h the associ at ed rej ect i on of a humanistic-an-
t hr opocent r i c concept for defi ni ng soci et y) have
at t ract ed a great deal of criticism, and even more
i ncompr ehensi on, of Luhmann' s appr oach.
The Geneal ogy of Luhmann's System Theory
The concept of the system is Luhmann' s essen-
tial starting point. In this respect he is except i onal
in Ger man sociology, whi ch at least si nce Max
Weber has mainly been act i on theory. Luhmann' s
pr oposal to descri be social phe nome na like in-
teractions, organi zat i ons or societies as "systems,"
possi bl y marks this cat egori cal break most em-
phatically. To t hi nk in t erms of syst ems first ira-
plies "that we are no l onger speaki ng of obj ect s,
but of di fferences and f ur t her mor e t hat differ-
ences are not concei ved as existing facts (distinc-
tions), goi ng back i nst ead to an i mperat i ve to ex-
ecut e t hem, si nce one coul d ot he r wi s e gi ve
not hi ng a name, t hus havi ng not hi ng to obser ve
and woul d t hus also not be able to cont i nue any-
thing" (Luhmann, 1997:60).
The t ext of "the social" (like all ot her t ext s) is
nei t her sel f-expl anat ory nor is it deposi t ed in dis-
cret e wr i t i ng. And it does not possess any consis-
t ent meani ng whi ch is i dent i cal wi t h itself, and
whi ch one coul d t race back to any speci fi c in-
st ance of its creation. Soci ol ogy has to l abor with-
out concei vi ng its domai n of obj ect s as a congl om-
erate of things, anal ogous to facts possessi ng a
fixed s ha pe - - whos e inter-relationship, moreover,
is ensur ed in an uni form pr i nci pl e (be it nat ure,
divine will, moral s or a t r anscendent al subj ect ).
Under t he met aphysi cal condi t i ons of t he mod-
ern, a met a- per spect i ve t hat per mi t s t he recogni -
t i on of somet hi ng resembl i ng t he nat ural as t he
invariable essence or t he totality of soci et y is no
l onger available to the observer.
Accor di ng to Luhmann' s s ys t em- t heor y ap-
pr oach, t he wor l d (as t he hor i zon of possi bl e de-
scri pt i ons) is expr essed by means of a net wor k
of cont i ngent di st i nct i ons and labels that always
have to be under st ood in cont ext . That an observer
may label this as this (and not as that) is due to a
di st i nct i on in whi ch bot h moment s , separ at ed
from each other, can onl y be under s t ood in rela-
t i on to each ot her; t he di st i nct i ve uni t s onl y pos-
sessing t hei r own i dent i t y in t he di fference to t he
other. To be able to char act er i se somet hi ng as
somet hi ng, one has to have already di st i ngui shed
it from its distinctive ot her: what deserves t o be
called true, for exampl e, is measur ed by t he dif-
ference from appearance; and t o speak of t he past
makes sense only wi t h reference to a pr esent that
can be di st i ngui shed (const i t ut i vel y) from it. Even
if it is not explicitly raised as an issue, this ot her
side of somet hi ng t er med as this or t hat is always
pr esent in ever y det er mi nat i on of speech or ges-
ture we make. It is a per manent hori zon. It is pos-
sible to change sides at any t i me and to bri ng the
di st i ngui shed moment of f or m ( appear ance for
truth, or t he pr esent for t he past ) i nt o t he focus
of at t ent i on, maki ng it t he poi nt of depar t ur e for
f ur t her deliberations. In the i nt erest of a deliber-
ate t r eat ment of self and worl d, it is i nevi t abl e
that we di st i ngui sh and label. Such oper at i ons are
t he start of all per cept i on and recogni t i on.
THE LEGACY OF NIKLAS LUHMANN 69
Why di st i nct i ons and labels in di fferent con-
texts are made in a cert ai n way and not in ot hers
is i mpossi bl e to det er mi ne from t he per spect i ve
of syst ems t heory. Di st i ngui shi ng always t akes
pl ace in a medi um of lack of f or et hought and pre-
vi ous i ndet ermi nacy, endowi ng each form wi t h
t he seal of indelible cont i ngency: in pri nci pl e one
coul d have made compl et el y different distinctions.
To speak of syst ems t hus means to establish a dif-
ference: that bet ween syst em and envi r onment .
By system, Luhmann means a chai n of event s
related to each other, or of operat i ons. In the case
of living creatures, for instance, these are physiologi-
cal processes;for psychic systems, ideas; and in rela-
tion to social relationships, communications. Systems
are formed by distinguishing themselves from an
envi ronment of such events and oper at i ons t hat
cannot be integrated into their internal structures.
In cont rast to his early ment or Tal cot t Parsons,
who defi ned syst ems by means of the pr esence
of collectively shared nor ms and value pat t erns,
Luhmann pr oceeds from a system concept shaped
in a strictly relational manner. His not i on relies
on the idea of a const i t ut i ve boundar y that per-
mits t he di st i nct i on bet ween inside and outside.
Each oper at i on of a syst em (in t he case of social
systems: each communi cat i on) ( r e) pr oduces this
boundar y by embeddi ng itself in a net wor k of
furt her operat i ons, in whi ch it at t he same time
gains its own unity/identity. Therefore, such a con-
cept of boundar y- - above all in relation to psy-
chi c and social syst ems- - i s not to be under s t ood
spatially, but rat her operat i vel y: "The boundar y of
t he system is not hi ng but t he t ype and concre-
t i on of its operat i ons whi ch individualise t he sys-
tem. It is t he form of t he syst em whos e ot her side
t hus be c ome s t he e nvi r onme nt " ( Luhma nn,
1997:76-77. ). This operat i ve under st andi ng re-
quires the insight that syst ems are unabl e to tran-
scend t hei r own boundari es.
Such a research st rat egy is due to an el emen-
tary convi ct i on of t he i mprobabi l i t y of t he emer-
gence of social order. Everyt hi ng coul d in prin-
ciple be different. From Luhmann' s perspect i ve,
soci al st r uct ur es have not hi ng sel f-evi dent to
t hem: t hey requi re per manent new social con-
st ruct i on from the vi ew of their exi st ence and of
t hei r det er mi ned shape. In cont rast to t he func-
tionalism of the Parsoni an persuasi on, Luhmann
is not commi t t ed to the pr eser vat i on of social
systems. On the contrary, t he cont i ngency and
compl exi t y of t he social is t he starting poi nt of
all of his t heoret i cal efforts.
The compl exi t y of t he desi gn of Luhmann' s
t heor y expresses itself not onl y t hr ough t he di-
versi t y of t he soci ol ogi cal issues whi ch he is able
t o tackle wi t h t he hel p of t he syst em- t heor y ap-
pr oach, but also in t he way t hat t he per spect i ves
vary in t hei r emphasi s whenever he pr esent s his
general t heoret i cal appr oach. His Social Systems
is wr i t t en pri mari l y from t he poi nt of vi ew of t he
di st i nct i on bet ween syst em and envi r onment ,
whi l e The Science of Society takes t he t heor y of
observabl e syst ems as its st art i ng poi nt , leading
to mor e epi st emol ogi cal debat es about observi ng
observat i on. If one had t o choose such a cent ral
poi nt of vi ew for The Society of Society, t he focus
woul d clearly be on the social system, in cont rast
to all social subsyst ems f or med t hr ough social
oper at i ons wi t hi n society.
T h e D i f f e r e n c e o f D i f f e r e n c e s
Luhmann di st ances hi msel f from what he calls
t he "old European" ont ol ogi cal t heoret i cal tradi-
tion, hopel essl y out moded in its pot ent i al for cap-
t uri ng moder n soci et y in all its compl exi t y. In
doi ng so, he is t ryi ng to over come t wo t housand
years of t radi t i on that, in his view, have been tran-
scended by t he pr ocess of funct i onal differentia-
t i on. He des cr i bes t he ol d Eur opean st yl e of
t hought as concer ned wi t h the i dent i fi cat i on of
t he uni t y under l yi ng diversity. Society, in t he clas-
sical view, consi st s of subj ect s of act i on whos e
f undament al uni t y is based on shari ng a c ommon
underst andi ng. Ont ol ogy refers to a wor l d exist-
ing obj ect i vel y in separat i on from t he subj ect s
aware of it, capabl e of unambi guous linguistic
represent at i on.
Against this, Luhmann sets a vi ew of a wor l d
that t emporal i zes, differentiates and decent ral i zes
all identities. Identities are product s of past events.
Uni t y is no l onger t he ultimate poi nt of reference
of t he t heory. By relativizing even t he ont ol ogi cal
scheme of exi st ence/ non- exi st ence as but one of
many observat i onal schemat a, Luhmann at t acks
the foundat i ons of powerful traditions of t hought .
The paradox, accor di ng to Luhmann, is that t he
old European t radi t i on emer ged in a soci et y that
no l onger exists today, ei t her in t er ms of t he sys-
t em of communi cat i on or in t erms of forms of
differentiation. Even so, this tradition remai ns part
and parcel of our historical heri t age, and in this
sense a part of t he cul t ure t hat is rel evant for ori-
ent at i on. It cannot di sappear because it no l onger
fits; it is const ant l y negat ed, and has to be avail-
able for this pur pose.
70 SOCIETY ~ JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002
Anot her fundament al distinction emerges here,
whi ch Luhmann uses to st ruct ure his t heory of
society: namely, the distinction bet ween social struc-
ture and semantics. It is characteristic that this dis-
tinction includes itself, is itseff a semantic distinc-
tion, and the problem is precisely to disentangle this
paradox in a fruitful way. The t heory of society is
located at t wo levels: on the semantic level it is dis-
tinguished from the old European tradition, while
on the social structural level reference is made to
evolution, differentiation and medi a devel opment .
Societies wi thout Peopl e
Luhmann i nt r oduces t hree premi ses i nt o his
analysis of soci et y that have pr oduced not onl y
vi gorous criticism but also ext ensi ve mi sunder-
standing, to t he poi nt that accusat i ons of anti-
humani st and cynical reasoni ng have been raised
against him: (1) Society does not consist of people.
Persons bel ong to the envi r onment of society. (2)
Soci et y is an aut opoi et i c syst em consi st i ng of
communi cat i on and not hi ng else. (3) Soci et y can
onl y be adequat el y under s t ood as wor l d society.
Banishing peopl e to t he envi r onment of soci-
ety compl et es the decent ral i zat i on of t he human-
ist cosmol ogy. Having been evi ct ed from t he cen-
t er of t he uni verse in t he Renai ssance, depri ved
of its uni que origin by bei ng pl aced in t he con-
text of evol ut i on by Darwin, and st ri pped of au-
t onomy and self-control by Freud, t hat humani t y
shoul d now be freed from t he bonds of soci et y
by Luhmann appears to be a consi st ent ext ensi on
of this t rend. Whereas the classical Eur opean tra-
dition, wi t h its di st i nct i on bet ween humans and
animals, ascri bed sense, reason, will, consci ous-
ness and feelings to humans, t he i nexorabl e sepa-
ration of ment al and social syst ems that Luhmann
subst i t ut es for h o mo s oci al i s makes it clear that
soci et y is a distinct emer gi ng or der sui generis,
whi ch cannot be descri bed in ant hr opol ogi cal
terms. Society does not have t he char act er of a
s ubj ect - - even in t he emphat i c t r anscendent al
sense, as a condi t i on of the possibility of ultimate
underl yi ng ideas or mechani sms of human quali-
ties. It is not an address for human appeal s for
act i on, and cert ai nl y not a venue for cl ai mi ng
equality and justice in the name of an aut onomous
subject. Society is the ul t i mat el y attainable com-
muni cat i ve r educt i on t hat divides t he i ndet ermi -
nat e from what is det ermi nabl e, or pr ocessabl e
from unpr ocessabl e complexity.
In a detailed analysis Luhmann t races t he in-
creasi ng di st i nct i on bet ween t he individual and
society. Onl y aft er a cl ear separat i on has been
made bet ween soci et y and humani t y is it possi bl e
to see what bel ongs to soci et y and what has to
be al l ocat ed to humani t y. Thi s opens up t he pos-
sibility of r esear ch i nt o humani t y, human con-
sciousness and t he funct i oni ng of the human mi nd
on t he basis of empi ri cal -nat ural measur ement .
The thesis of t he separat i on of social syst ems (or
syst ems of soci et y) and physical syst ems makes
it possi bl e t o under st and clearly t he rel at i onshi ps
bet ween soci et y and humani t y and fol l ow t hem
over t hei r hi st ori cal course. Both are in this sense
aut opoi et i c syst ems, one oper at i ng on t he basis
of consci ousness and t he ot her on t he basis of
communi cat i on. But what is society?
Society, in an initial appr oxi mat i on, is t he com-
pr ehensi ve social syst em, i ncl udi ng ever yt hi ng
that is social, and aware of not hi ng social out si de
itself. However, ever yt hi ng t hat is social is identi-
fied as communi cat i on. Communi cat i on"i s a genu-
inely social (and t he onl y jointly social) operation.
It is genuinely social in that it presupposes a major-
ity of collaborating systems of consci ousness while
(for this very reason) it cannot be assigned as a unity
to any individual consciousness." Conversely, it is also
true that anything practising communi cat i on is a
society. This i nvol ves far-reaching definitions.
Soci et y as Communi cat i on
First, communi cat i on is a reality s ui g e n e r i s
that can no l onger be at t ri but ed to somet hi ng else.
Second, communi cat i on is t he mechani sm that
const i t ut es soci et y as an aut opoi et i c syst em and
pr ocesses it in t hese t er ms. The negat i on of com-
muni cat i on is itself communi cat i on, and hence t he
expr essi on of society. Third, if communi cat i on
means aut opoi et i c r epr oduct i on, this means t hat
soci et y is a self-substitutive or der that can onl y
change in itself and t hr ough itself. Communi ca-
tion becomes t he basic st ruct ure of society, wher e
t he r el at i onshi p be t we e n c ommuni c a t i on and
soci et y is ci rcul ar: no communi cat i on wi t hout
society, no soci et y wi t hout communi cat i on. But
what is communi cat i on? Or is it no l onger pos-
sible t o pose such quest i ons in a post - ont ol ogi cal
period?
The si mpl est answer is t hat communi cat i on is
an oper at i on in preci sel y t he sense t hat a distinc-
t i on is made. Communi cat i ve acts say not hi ng
about t he wor l d, and c ommuni c a t i on r ef l ect s
not hi ng about t he worl d, whi ch is not r ef l ect ed
by communi cat i on but rat her classified by it. The
pur pose of communi cat i on is to create di fferences
THE LEGACY OF NIKLAS LUHMANN 71
t h a t c a n t h e n b e a t t a c h e d t o f u r t h e r c o mmu n i c a -
t i o n , f o r mi n g a n d s t a b i l i s i n g s y s t e m b o u n d a r i e s .
But e v e n c o mmu n i c a t i o n i t s e l f i s n o t o r i g i n a l , n o
u l t i ma t e e l e me n t , b u t a s y n t h e s i s o f p r o c e s s i n g
s e l e c t i o n s wh i c h L u h ma n n d e s i g n a t e s i n f o r ma -
t i on, t r a n s mi s s i o n a n d c o mp r e h e n s i o n . T h e s e t h r e e
d i s c r i mi n a t o r y o p e r a t i o n s a r e b i n a r y i n s t r u c t u r e .
I n f o r ma t i o n i s s e l e c t e d f r o m s h a r e d me a n i n g ,
a r e s e r v o i r f r o m wh i c h t h i n g s a r e s e l e c t e d as r el -
e v a n t f o r t r a n s mi s s i o n o r f o r g e t t i n g . C o mp l e t i n g
t h e a c t o f c o mmu n i c a t i o n i s a ma t t e r o f d e c i d i n g
wh a t i s r e p r e s e n t e d o r a c c e p t e d o r r e j e c t e d , n o t
u n d e r s t o o d . T r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e s o c i a l s y s t e m, i t
c o u l d b e s a i d t h a t i n f o r ma t i o n c a n b e s e e n as e x-
t e r n a l r e f e r e n c e , t r a n s mi s s i o n as s e l f - r e f e r e n c e a n d
c o mp r e h e n s i o n as a c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e t r a n s f e r o f
t h e me a n i n g i n f u r t h e r c o mmu n i c a t i o n . T h e s yn-
t h e s i s o f t h e s e t h r e e s e l e c t i o n s i s a s e l f - r e f e r e n -
t i al , c l o s e d e v e n t . T h i s e n a b l e s L u h ma n n t o ma k e
c l e a r t h e s e l f - c o n s t i t u t i o n o f wh a t i s s oc i a l . I f wh a t
i s s o c i a l i s n o t h i n g mo r e t h a n c o mmu n i c a t i o n , t hi s
a l s o i mp l i e s t h a t i t c o n s i s t s o f t h i s a u t o p o i e t i c
p r o c e s s wh i c h h a s i t s o wn i n h e r e n t d y n a mi c . T h e
e n v i r o n me n t i s t h e n o n l y a s t i mu l u s , n o t a r e a l
s o u r c e o f i n f o r ma t i o n . C o mp r e h e n s i o n a c c o r d -
i n g l y me a n s a n o t a r b i t r a r y n e t wo r k i n g o f c o m-
mu n i c a t i v e e v e n t s b y t h e s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l c o mmu -
n i c a t i o n p r o c e s s . R e p e a t e d d i s c u s s i o n f o r ms
i d e n t i t i e s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e b o u n d a r i e s .
Soc i e t y, o r wh a t h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n u n d e r -
s t o o d as s o c i e t y i n s o c i o l o g y , i s n o w l i b e r a t e d f r o m
al l s u b s t a n t i a l d e t e r mi n a t i o n s . I t i s n o t a mo r a l
uni t y, n o t b a s e d o n c o n s e n s u s o r a n y r a t i o n a l i n-
t e g r a t i o n ( o f wh a t e v e r k i n d ) ; i t i s f o r me d s o l e l y
b y o n g o i n g c o mmu n i c a t i o n . Ac c o r d i n g l y i t ma k e s
n o s e n s e t o t a l k o f s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n s as e c o n o my /
s o c i e t y o r s c i e n c e / s o c i e t y , s i n c e p o l i t i c s , e c o n o m-
i cs , a n d l a w c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d as s o me t h i n g
o u t s i d e a n d s e p a r a t e f r o m s o c i e t y , b u t a r e a c t s o f
s o c i e t y i n t h e i r c o mmu n i c a t i v e o p e r a t i o n s . Fo r
Lu h ma n n , s o c i e t y t h e r e f o r e c o n s i s t s o f t h e t o t a l -
i t y o f t h o s e o p e r a t i o n s , wh i c h d o n o t ma k e a di s -
t i n c t i o n b y v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y ma k e a
d i s t i n c t i o n . T h i s r e l e g a t e s t o s e c o n d a r y t h e o r e t i -
c a l s t a t u s al l a s s u mp t i o n s a b o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
p r o g r e s s , r a t i o n a l i t y a n d o t h e r g o a l s .
Soci ety as World Soci ety
I n hi s t h i r d d e t e r mi n a t i o n o f s o c i e t y - - n a me l y ,
t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f s o c i e t y a s wo r l d s o c i e t y - -
L u h ma n n a g a i n d e l i b e r a t e l y p l a c e s h i ms e l f i n c o n -
t r a s t t o t h e o l d E u r o p e a n t r a d i t i o n . He a v o i d s a
t e r r i t o r i a l d e f i n i t i o n o f s o c i e t y t h a t i d e n t i f i e s t h e
b o u n d a r i e s o f s o c i e t y wi t h t h e f r o n t i e r s o f n a t i o n
s t a t e s . Gl o b a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s , a n d t h e d i s s o l u -
t i o n o f t e mp o r a l a n d s p a t i a l c o n s t r a i n t s b y mo d -
e r n i n f o r ma t i o n a n d t r a n s p o r t t e c h n o l o g i e s , a r e
s t e a d i l y d e p r i v i n g a t e r r i t o r i a l l y l i mi t e d d e f i n i t i o n
o f s o c i e t y o f i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y . T h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o n -
c e p t s o f a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m o r a t r a n s n a t i o n a l
s o c i e t y f ai l , b e c a u s e f or al l t h e c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n -
t i a t i o n t h e y s t r e s s , t h e y d o n o t a r r i v e at a u n i t y o f
t h e r e s u l t i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d h e n c e a r e u n a b l e
t o e x p l a i n t h e " i n t e r " o r "t r ans . " I n s t e a d o f b e i n g a
s u c c e s s o r t o t h e t r a d i t i o n o f t h e societas civilis
f i nder t h e y me r e l y d e s c r i b e t h e g r o wi n g d i v e r -
si t y, t h e c o mp l e x i t y a n d t h e g r o wt h i n a v a i l a b l e
o p t i o n s . I f t h e wo r l d i s n o l o n g e r u n d e r s t o o d as
t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f al l v i s i b l e a n d d i r e c t o b j e c t s , as
t h e aggregatio corporum, wh a t i s l e f t o f t h e c o m-
mo n s e n s e t h a t ma k e s i t p o s s i b l e t o s p e a k o f a
wo r l d s o c i e t y ?
L u h ma n n b a s e s hi s c o n c e p t i o n o n a n e s s e n -
t i a l l y c o mmo n p l a c e o b s e r v a t i o n . T h e f i n a l e x p l o -
r a t i o n o f t h e e a r t h , a n d p e r h a p s t h e e x p l o r a t i o n
o f s p a c e , h a s ma d e i t e v i d e n t t h a t t h e wo r l d i s a
c l o s e d , c o mmu n i c a t i v e c o mp l e x . I n p r i n c i p l e , a n y
p o i n t o n t h e g l o b e i s a c c e s s i b l e t o c o mmu n i c a -
t i o n , d e s p i t e al l t h e t e c h n i c a l , p o l i t i c a l o r g e o -
g r a p h i c a l o b s t a c l e s . Wo r l d s o c i e t y i s t h e s e l f -
e v e n t u a t i o n o f t h e wo r l d i n c o mmu n i c a t i o n .
T h i s d e f i n i t i o n a c q u i r e s p l a u s i b i l i t y i f we i n-
c l u d e t h e v i t a l f u t u r e f o c u s o f mo d e r n s o c i e t y
wi t h i n o u r v i e w. Hi s t o r i c a l l y , t h e r e ma y b e a
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t we e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l t e r r i t o r i e s ,
b u t o n e t h i n g t h e y a l l s h a r e n o w i s t h a t t h e
f u t u r e c a n o n l y b e r e g a r d e d a s a u n i t y . " Wo r l d "
t h e n me a n s e x a c t l y t h i s r e f e r e n c e i n t h e c o m-
mu n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e o f t h e f u l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d
f u n c t i o n a l s y s t e ms , s o t h a t " wo r l d " as t h e t o t a l
h o r i z o n o f s e n s o r y e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t a n a g g r e -
g a t e , b u t r a t h e r a c o r r e l a t e , o f t h e c o mmu n i c a t i v e
o p e r a t i o n s o c c u r r i n g i n i t .
E p i s t e mo l o g i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h i s s h i f t h a s f ar -
r e a c h i n g i mp l i c a t i o n s . S o c i e t y i s o n l y o b s e r v a b l e
wi t h i n i t s e l f , a n d c a n b e r e g a r d e d as a u n i t y i n
d i f f e r e n t wa y s wi t h o u t b e i n g a bl e , t h r o u g h d e c o m-
p o s i t i o n , t o a r r i v e at a " g e n u i n e " j o i n t l y o b s e r v -
a b l e wo r l d . We wi l l a l wa y s e n d u p wi t h n e w di s -
t i n c t i o n s , wi t h c o n s t r u c t i o n s . F o r L u h ma n n t h e
s o c i a l - s t r u c t u r a l l o c a t i o n o f t h e t h e o r y o f o b s e r -
v a t i o n i s s e c o n d a r y . S e c o n d - o r d e r o b s e r v a t i o n
me a n s l o c a t i n g a n o b s e r v e r i n t h e wo r l d wh o
o b s e r v e s o t h e r s a n d g e n e r a t i n g t h e v a r i o u s ve r -
s i o n s o f t h e wo r l d ( i n c l u d i n g o u r o b s e r v e r ) - - a l -
t h o u g h we c a n o n l y d o s o i n o n e wo r l d .
72 SOCIETY 9 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002
T h e o r i e s o f T h e o r i e s
But how can soci et y document itself wi t hout
comi ng i nt o cont radi ct i on wi t h itself, and particu-
larly wi t hout r ecour se to t r anscendent al refer-
ences out si de itself?. In t he last chapt er of The
Society of Society, under t he title "Self-descrip-
tions," Luhmann deals wi t h t he i nt ri cat e relation-
ship bet ween t heor y and subject. Can t heor y ex-
pl ai n its own l ocat i on wi t hi n t he pr oces s of
society? And if it can, does it not regard soci et y to
a cert ai n ext ent from wi t hout , al t hough this is
possible wi t hi n soci et y in t he capaci t y of com-
muni cat i on? Here, we are r emi nded (not ent i rel y
i nappropri at el y) of Escher' s hand drawi ng itself,
generat i ng itself and its own i mage in t he cour se
of its own operat i on. Luhmann follows a similar
line:"Just like self-observations, sel f-descri pt i ons
(generat i on of texts) are individual oper at i ons of
the system. In fact, descri pt i ons and what is de-
scri bed are not t wo separat e obj ect s whi ch are
onl y ext ernal l y l i nked- - wi t h a self-description,
what is descri bed is always part of what it is de-
scri bi ng and it changes it simply by t he fact that
it appears and subj ect s itself to observation. "
Sociology, t hen, is always t he const r uct i on of
t he uni t y of t he syst em wi t hi n the syst em itself,
never reachi ng an end to this process. Thi s insight
pr ompt s Luhmann to avoid any concl usi ons for
his own t heor y. Al t hough t here is a part i cul arl y
close rel at i onshi p here wi t h Hegel , who also gave
the absolute a self-referential charact er by regard-
ing t he syst em as entirely sel f-referent i al --where
not hi ng can be ext ernal because ever yt hi ng ex-
ternal has become an aspect of its self-differen-
t i al - - Luhmann leaves this tradition exact l y at this
poi nt by translating it into a cyber net i c vocabu-
lary and hence over comi ng it. Nor is soci et y a
subj ect in t he ant hropol ogi cal -i nt eract i ve sense,
as Ador no still vi ewed it despi t e all his cri t i ci sm
of phi l osophy: Society is "a coagul at ed relation-
ship bet ween people. " Humani t y is not the ulti-
mat e el ement in society, nor can soci et y still be
descri bed wi t hi n t he classical cogni t i ve model of
subj ect -obj ect ; because t he self-referentiality of
soci et y itself causes this duality to collapse, since
cogni t i on seeks i nt ersubj ect i ve cert ai nt y on t he
part of the subject and presupposes stable objects.
Society is in any case not such a stable obj ect .
Critical R e f l e c t i o n s
Accordi ng to Luhmann' s appr oach, onl y radi-
cal const ruct i ve semant i cs provi de sufficient dis-
t ance to pr event succumbi ng t o t he suggest i ons
i nher ent in t radi t i onal t ermi nol ogy. Luhmann' s
t er mi nol ogy in t he t heoret i cal l y most demandi ng
part of this wor ks is devoi d of classical associa-
t i ons and c onnot a t i ons . If t he r e a di ng of
Luhmann' s studies is not be abandoned due t o
sheer resi gnat i on, frust rat i on or even anger, t hen
his t er mi nol ogy requi res consi derabl e t ol erance
from readers not familiar wi t h t he t er mi nol ogy
of syst ems theory.
Luhmann' s strict, aust ere artificial l anguage is
not due to any affect at i on but rat her to t he strin-
gency of his t heoret i cal pr ogr a m- - a nd this pro-
gram has t o keep its di st ance from t he implica-
t i ons of t he semant i cs of t radi t i onal Eur opean
social theory. In this r espect one shoul d take seri-
ously t he penul t i mat e sent ence of t he "Soci et y of
Societies," accor di ng to whi ch an adequat e mod-
ern t heor y of soci et y requi res the sacrifice of t he
mere pl easure of r ecogni t i on and t he j udgi ng of
t heor y const r uct i on on its own merits.
This does not i mpl y that readi ng Luhmann' s
t heor y is simply a struggle wi t h nomi nal const ruc-
tions and cascades of abst ract terms; in bet ween
one finds analyses of traditional Eur opean seman-
tics, in whi ch Luhmann at t empt s t o clarify why
t hey are no l onger adequat e for the structural facts
of mode r n soci et y. Agai n and agai n t her e are
poi nt ed and par adoxi cal formul at i ons, in whi ch
the fruits of t he swi t ch in t heor y f or mat i on from
first-order obser vat i on to second- or der observa-
tion are bundl ed as under a magni fyi ng glass. An
exampl e of this woul d be when Luhmann says of
memor y t hat its t rue f unct i on for soci et y consi st s
not of storage, but rat her of forget t i ng; or whe n
he concei ves of i nf or mat i on as a pr oduct of de-
cay t hat di sappears by bei ng updat ed.
Such par adoxes are mor e t han skilful plays on
wor ds : t he y pr ovi de e nt r y poi nt s t o t he
const ruct i vi st cor e of Luhmann' s soci et al theory,
whi ch consi st s of t he fact t hat all obser vat i on is
based on par adox to t he ext ent that it relies on
di st i nct i ons upon whi ch it cannot refl ect as a
uni form whol e. The uni t y of t he wor l d as t he uni t y
of society, accor di ng to Luhmann, cannot be as-
sert ed as a pr i nci pl e but simply as a pa r a dox- -
this t oo is a cons equence of t he loss of meani ng
of traditional semant i cs.
But is t he loss of meani ng of old Eur opean se-
mant i cs t rul y compel l i ng in t he face of t he four
vol umes by Luhmann on t he subj ect of "st r uct ur e
of soci et y and semant i cs"? Or, is it at least rein-
forced well by met hodol ogy? One can doubt t hat
this is so, si nce Luhmann is forced to fall back on
THE LEGACY OF NIKLAS LUHMANN 73
soci o-st ruct ural devel opment s to be able to es-
tablish t he loss of si gni fi cance of socio-political
semant i cs. Thi s circularity is pr obabl y t he weak
poi nt in Luhmann' s t heor y of society. Of course,
this did not escape Luhmann, but t he sol ut i ons
he suggest ed were not part i cul arl y consi st ent .
They st ret ch from t he admi t t ance of circularity as
an inevitable pre-requisite of t heor y f or mat i on- -
whi ch traditional European semantics were only
able to avoid by recourse to metaphysical construc-
tions, such as God, nature or r eason- - t o the claim
that semantic changes were subj ect to st ruct ural
change at consi der abl e di st ance, as a result of
whi ch semant i cs are suddenl y again in t he posi-
tion of verbally depi ct i ng facts. But is it really true
t hat social change pr ecedes cogni t i ve change, or
are t here also cases wher e t he opposi t e is true?
Luhmann analysed the change from traditional
Eur opean soci et y to moder n soci et y by usi ng
t hree di mensi ons, to each of whi ch he dedi cat es
t hree mai n chapt ers of his societal t heor y ("The
Society of Society"): first, t he social di mensi on,
whi ch Luhmann concei ves as t hat of communi -
cat i on and media, const i t ut ed onl y by t he distinc-
tion bet ween Ego and Alter (deliberately avoid-
ing the traditional European semant i cs of per son
and subject); second, t he t emporal di mensi on, in
whi ch past and fut ure are separat ed, and whi ch
Luhma nn t e r ms e vol ut i on- - de f i ni t e l y not
progress, since t here is no guiding medi um among
t he vari ous medi a and t he funct i onal differentia-
t i on of soci et y has no gui di ng system; and t hi rd
and finally, the factual di mensi on, whi ch Luhmann
compr ehends as funct i onal differentiation, and in
whi ch we are concer ned wi t h det er mi ni ng t he
syst em and t he envi r onment . These are not, how-
ever, stable distinctions, t hat whi ch const i t ut es
envi r onment dependi ng instead on t he compo-
ne nt s ys t em c onc e r ne d, on s c i e nc e or t he
economy, law or educat i on. And this also changes
duri ng t he evol ut i on of t he c ompone nt systems.
Decisive for Luhmann' s t heor y of soci et y is t he
assert i on t hat t here is no domi nance of any com-
ponent syst em in the di mensi on of funct i onal dif-
ferentiation, for i nst ance of politics; that in t he di-
mensi on of communi cat i on, no domi nant medi um
may be recognised; and furt hermore, that the lack
of guiding systems and domi nant media is the de-
finitive characteristic of moder n society.This is also
the reason why traditional European semant i cs can
no l onger adequat el y descri be a moder n society.
But is t he loss of measure due to t he conver-
sion of nor ms and values into forms of societal
communi cat i on, as descr i bed by Luhmann, really
plausible? Unfort unat el y, Luhmann at no poi nt
makes reference to Michael Walzer' s concept of
s pher es of j ust i ce: Wi t hi n t hi s c onc e pt , what
Luhmann has descr i bed as t he appr opr i at e self-
descr i pt i on of moder n soci et i es is descr i bed as
t hei r per manent l y- t o- be- achi eved nor m, as t he
measure of j ust ness t hat is per manent l y threat-
ened by t he domi nat i on of - - t o use Luhmann' s
t e r m- - c ompone nt systems.
Thi s cl oses t he ci r cl e for a maj or t rai n of
t hought , so t hat what initially appear ed a para-
dox- na me l y, that t he self is at the same time what
is di f f er ent - - emer ges as a compl et e t heor y of
soci et y t hat also i ncl udes r ef l ect i on on its own
l ocat i on in society, and regards soci et y in this
sense as a uni t y capabl e of self-modification. If
we take this strictly intra-social per spect i ve seri-
ously, accept i ng that any communi cat i on about
soci et y can onl y take pl ace wi t hi n society, t hen
t here is no l ocat i on for critical r ef l ect i on on soci-
et y ext ernal to society, wher e soci et y can be re-
garded as an obj ect . Thi s descr i pt i on of soci et y in
soci et y is no l onger based on t he concept of t he
subj ect or seen from t he st andpoi nt of t ranscen-
dental rationality. It is t he t aut ol ogi cal oper at i on
of communi cat i on itself. Soci et y is soci et y' s for-
mula for t he sel f-descri pt i on of social unity. An
emphat i c definition of soci ol ogy woul d here seek
t he uni t y of this di fference in or der to di st i ngui sh
what is actual, what is essent i al . The uni t y of soci-
et y woul d t hen be a soci et y t hat has arrived at
itself, cor r espondi ng to its ideal. Tradition has re-
ser ved t he label "enl i ght enment " for this, and
measur ed existing soci et y against this claim. So-
ci ol ogi cal expl anat i on of enl i ght enment must
abandon t hese claims, si nce this posi t i on can still
be observed, even if onl y from t he poi nt of vi ew
of second- or der obser vat i on. The cont i ngency of
t he wor l d cannot be reversed in this sense, be-
cause soci ol ogi cal t heor y bel ongs to t he ver y
t hi ng t hat it is analysing, namel y society.
The t rue meani ng of soci ol ogy woul d hence
be t hat it is set free to engage in this t ype of self-
descr i pt i on in order to modi f y t he semant i c lega-
cies of t radi t i on t o t he changed social st ruct ural
rel at i onshi ps in t he pr ocess of "re-description. "
This bri dges t he s econd maj or di st i nct i on be-
t ween semant i cs and social st r uct ur e. Moder n
society, t hr ough funct i onal differentiation, gener-
ates t he compul si on to sel f-observat i on and so
changes all t he t hemat i c el ement s. This bri ngs
pos t moder ni s m to t he poi nt wher e t he past be-
74 SOCIETY 9 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002
comes material for present descri pt i ons that cre-
ate new forms t hr ough re-descri pt i on and t hus
become self-perpetuating const ruct i ons. However,
it is not a quest i on of l ooki ng back nostalgically
on what has passed, but rat her of awareness of
semant i cs, whi ch is per manent l y r enewi ng itself.
The decisive t hi ng is t he di fference, and not t he
uni t y of an al l -seei ng obser ver . In this sense
Luhmann' s t heory is a post-ontological t heor y that
pr oceeds in an empirical and operat i onal manner,
and is still facing its pract i cal test.
At t he same time, t he quest i on remains: How
far does t he merciless deconst r uct i on of t he con-
cept of t he subj ect and its r epl acement by t he
concept of the self-referential, closed, aut opoi et i c
s ys t em- - whi ch is no l onger a special obj ect but
instead percei ved as t he di fference bet ween sys-
tem and envi r onment - - cr eat e a distance from the
old European tradition and its contradictions? Does
the emphasis on the cat egory of difference as the
key sociological concept constitute a suitable reac-
tion to the antinomies of an ultimately still anthro-
pological configuration of sociology, based on the
fundamental not i on of an unresol ved subj ect and
using humanity, its subj ect i vi t y and f r eedom as
t he ultimate decisive pri nci pl es of ori ent at i on?
Furt her di scussi on will s how how far the radi-
cal shift in t heor y from identity to di fference con-
stitutes a r epl acement for t he t radi t i on of think-
ing in t er ms of uni t y or totality. In its pl ace
Luhmann sets t he t heor y of second- or der obser-
vation, whi ch is i nt ended to eliminate all transcen-
dental premi ses and leaves as the ultimate refer-
e nc e s de s c r i pt i ons of de s c r i pt i ons and
observat i ons of observations, whi ch abolish privi-
leged st andpoi nt s and concl usi ons. In this sense
soci ol ogy organi ses itself as r esear ch. The fertil-
ity of t he pr esent t heoret i cal desi gn will have to
prove itself in t erms of how far it hel ps us to trans-
form t he traditional legacies into cont i ngenci es,
so that t hey can be reused"as a medi um for shap-
ing new forms gai ned t hr ough r econst r uct i on"
(Luhmann, 1998: 1148) . At this poi nt Luhmann
remai ns linked to t he old Eur opean t r adi t i on- -
only t he degree of di st ance is still in dispute.
Luhmann ret urns an issue to soci ol ogy t hat it
has al most forgot t en: scientific and refl ect ed dis-
cussi on of soci et y. Just as bi ol ogy and physi cs do
not depend on t hei r basic concept s alone, so so-
ci ol ogy is not just social theory. However, if it
want s to provi de i nformat i on on its foundat i ons
and its posi t i on in society, it can hardl y avoid so-
cial t heoret i cal refl ect i ons; if onl y because it is
able, by virtue of its f unct i on wi t hi n society, to
obser ve all previ ous forms of refl ect i on, such as
religion, phi l osophy and sci ence.
Luhmann' s t heor y of society, it coul d be argued,
offers a way that leads, t hr ough t he latest scien-
tific met hods and on a strictly t heoret i cal basis,
t o a ri ch t heor y of mode r n soci et y. Luhmann
opens up links for soci ol ogy wi t h ot her sci ences,
and this enabl es hi m to i nt egrat e a f l ow of new
research i nt o his t heory. Two gr oups of pr obl ems
mi ght be exami ned in f ur t her pursui t of a t heor y
of society. First, we can ask if we share Luhmann' s
descr i pt i on of t he pr obl em of pr oceedi ng consis-
t ent l y from an intra-social const i t ut i on of theory.
This will already settle a great deal. Second, we
need to revi ew his sol ut i on of regardi ng a t heor y
of soci et y as a t heor y of social systems, or replace
it by a reasonable alternative.As we are in any event
no l onger required to reach final conclusions, it is
now a mat t er of finding usable continuations, since
it is clear that even after Luhmann t here will still be
sociological and ot her descri pt i ons of society. The
question is merely whet her t hey will reach t he
l evel and degr ee of c ompl e xi t y di spl ayed in
Luhmann' s work, especially in his last monogr aph.
As Ador no sai d: "Onl y a mat ure t heor y of soci et y
can say what soci et y is." Perhaps Luhmann' s ap-
pr oach has t aken us a st ep cl oser to this.
SUGGESTED FURTHER READI NGS
Luhmann, Niklas Observat i ons on Moderni t y. Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1998.
Luhmann, Niklas Social Syst ems. Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1995.
Luhmann, Nildas Risk.'A Sociological Theory. NewYork:
Aldine de Gruytcr, 1993.
Luhmann, Niklas Essays on Sel f Reference. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1990.
Luhmann, Niklas Ecological Communi cat i on. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Got t har d B e c h ma n n is s e ni or r es ear ch as s oci at e
i n t he I ns t i t ut e f o r Technol ogy As s e s s me n t a n d Sys-
t e ms Anal y s i s i n t he Karl sruhe Research Center, Ger-
ma n y . Amo n g hi s r ecent puhl i cat i ons are Risiko mid
Gesellschaft a n d Interdisziplin~ire Risikoforschtmg
( wi t h Ger har d Banse). Ni co St ehr is prof essor emeri -
t us o f sociology,, Uni versi t y o f Al bert a, Canada a n d
a f e l l ow i n t he Ce nt e r f or Adv anc e d Cul t ural St udi es
i n Essen, Ge r many . Among hi s recent book publ i ca-
t i ons ar e The Fragility of Modern Societies: Knowl-
edge and Risk in the Informat i on Age a n d Knowl-
edge and Economic Conduct:The Social Foundations
of t he Modern Economy.
THE LEGACY OF NIKLAS LUHMANN 75
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