Article 73

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVT CORP. And ABELARDO MAGSAJO v. CA and SPOUSES CHING
February 12, 1998 (286 SCRA 272)
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing
of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused
the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on
the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA
issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: WON debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership?
HELD: If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract
falls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time
of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does
not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership
Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of
his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership.
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. petitioner
should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as surety redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.

The petitioners claim that the benefits were: employment of Ching would be prolonged, his
shares would appreciate, and it would enhance his career. However, these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from
the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.

In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that acting as surety is part
of the business or profession of the respondent-husband.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession . The court are
likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or was persuaded to act, as a
surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in
the business of suretyship or guaranty.
*We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms redounded to
the benefit of or benefited from on the one hand; and for the benefit of on the other.
They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the
Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term for the benefit of. On the other
hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that The payment of personal debts by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. As can be seen, the
terms are used interchangeably.

Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing
of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused
the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on
the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to
AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.

HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of
recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a
surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not
an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the
benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may
have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure,
appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161
of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product
or a spin off of the loan itself.

Article 87
Agapay vs. Palang
GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work
in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950.
The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone
in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay,
herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located
at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the
other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan
allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court
dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of
Erlinda Agapay.
HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the
properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by
them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual
contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and
had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed
money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20
years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US
Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not
specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such
property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the
money for the purchase price and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.

ERLINDA AGAPAY VS CARLINA PALANG
G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997
FACTS: Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted
his second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son. The couple purchased a
parcel of agricultural land and the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She also
purchased a house and lot in Binalonan, where the property was later issued in her name.
Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a complaint
against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.
Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the riceland and house and
lot allegedly bought by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the
complaint and ordered the respondents to provide for the intestate shares of the parties,
particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.
HELD: No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a
man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The marriage of
Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was
still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by
one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is
not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business
of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually contributed
money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance,
when she was only around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the
U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no
proof of the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when she
was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase
price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland,
we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the
riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.

As regards to the donation of their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of
their daughter, was also void. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an
express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties
compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so
inferred.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)March 31, 1971FACTS:
FACTS: In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only
in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue
of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name
and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that
the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not
yetspouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
HELD: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the lawis as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on
donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence
and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. The court, however, said that the
lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the
Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between
Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage

Cornelia MATABUENA (plaintiff-appellant) v Petronila CERVANTES (defendant-appellee)
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971] [G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971]

FACTS: The stipulated facts agreed upon by both the plaintiff and the defendant assisted by
their respective counsels, are
:1. The deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question;
2. Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos (referring to a transfer or gift made
during one's lifetime, as opposed to a testamentary transfer which isa gift that takes effect on
death)
in favor of defendant, Petronila Cervantes overthe parcel of land in question on February 20,
1956, which same donation wasaccepted by defendant;
3. The donation of the land to Petronila (defendant) which took effect immediatelywas made
during the common law relationship as husband and wife, they weremarried on March 28,
1962;
4. The deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962;
5. The plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearestcollateral
relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudicationexecuted by her in 1962
and had the land declared in her name and paid theestate and inheritance taxes
thereon.Cornelia (plaintiff-appellant), sister of Felix Matabuena maintains that the
donationmade by Felix to Petronila Cervantes (defendant-appellee) was void because theywere
living without the benefit of marriage (common law marriage). This is inpursuant to Article 133
of Civil Code which provides " Every donation betweenthe spouses during the marriage shall be
void. On 23 November 1965, thelower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made
before Cervantesmarriage to the donor. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to
acommon-law relationship
HELD: The lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
REVERSED. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant
as pro indiviso (for an undivided part). The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion.

RATIO: It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of it as what is written. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is
written, then such would be it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision
would not be attained. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, interpreting
a similar provision of the old Civil Code says clearly that if the policy of the law is (in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court) "to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure
and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife
without benefit of nuptials.



Article 94
BA Finance Corp vs. CA
GR 61464, May 28 1988
FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as
evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L
Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily
Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered,
purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note.
2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn
abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto
failed to pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were
guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and
interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano
Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with
the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the
properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment
which was likewise granted by the court.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.

HELD: A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said
proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the
same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the
property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own
benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family
and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his
wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be
the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto
against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued
against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages
amouting to P660,000.00.


Article 96
[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000] JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.
JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
Facts: The husband of petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. suffered stroke which
has rendered him comatose, and in line with the said illness his wife Gilda seeks to dispose
property of her husband in favor of co-petitioners daughter Glenda Jardaleza-Uy and her
husband Jose Uy. Respondent Teodoro Jardeleza which is a son of Gilda and Ernesto Jr., filed a
petition to the Iloilo RTC upon knowledge of the pending sale of his fathers real property
contending that there shall be a court-appointed guardian in administering his fathers property
while the senior Jardeleza is incapacitated to do so.
Petitioner contends that the sale of her husbands property in Lot 4291 and its improvements
are necessary as to cover costs of his hospitalization.
While the proceedings are still ongoing, petitioner has sold the said property to her co-
petitioners daughter and son-in-law. Teodoro appealed the said sale to the Court of Appeals
which has likewise reversed the order of the RTC Iloilo. Petitioner submitted an appeal via
certiorari of the decision to the Supreme Court

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who
suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and
mental faculties, and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole
powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose of a parcel of land with its
improvements.

Held: The court ruled in favor of respondent Teodoro, further specifying that petitioner only
holds the power of administration and not the power of disposition and encumbrance of
property as these powers require consent of the other spouse or court authority. Furthermore,
petitioner only sought guardianship of property and has failed to allege that Ernesto Jardaleza
Sr., would have consented on the said sale of property.





Uy vs. CA
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
FACTS: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the
latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property
and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such
necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124
of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the
Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading
on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where both
spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD: SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases
where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case,
trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and
with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole
powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a
spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must
observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not
the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial
court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.



Article 101
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz GR 19565, January 30, 1968

FACTS: Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and
begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were
engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the
separation of their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning
her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that
he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his
frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since
1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory
although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter
suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the
separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal
assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has
been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
HELD: The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support
of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have
willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband paid short visits implying more
than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has
been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant
or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and
utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.

Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz No. L-19565 30 January 1968 Castro, J.
FACTS: On 01 February 1938, Estrella and Severino married in Bacolod City. During their union,
six (6) children were born, and seven (7) parcels of land from Bacolod Cadastre and three (3)
parcels of land from Silay Cadastre were acquired. These lands were assessed at P45,429 and
P43,580, respectively. The hacienda in Silay had a net profit of P3,309.49 in 1957. Aside from
these properties, the spouses also owned a number of varied businesses and subdivisions.
On 22 July 1958, Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging that her husband had not only
abandoned her, but also mismanaged their conjugal partnership properties. According to
Estrella, since 1955, Severino had not lived in their conjugal home, but instead had lived in his
office and thereafter had been living in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez. This was
supported by notes and letters written by Nenita which Estrella found hidden in the pocket of
her husbands polo shirt and then in his iron safe thereafter. When confronted, Severino
denied of abandoning his wife and children. He reasoned that he was only living in his office to
teach a lesson to his quarrelsome and extremely jealous wife. He further averred that he never
failed to give his family financial support as evidenced by the allowance drawings of the wife in
the amounts ranging from P1000 to P1500 from the office, which was corroborated by Marcos
Ganaban, the assistant general manager of Philippine Textboard Factory.
Furthermore, Estrella insists that her husband refused and failed to inform her of the status of
their various business concerns. She further claims that such actuations are tantamount to an
abuse of administrative powers over the conjugal partnership properties. However, no
evidence from the plaintiff was presented.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute
abandonment in law and would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties?
(2) Whether the defendants failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their
business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership as to warrant a division of matrimonial assets?
HELD:
(1) NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT.
The Court held that the plaintiffs prayer that her plea for separation of conjugal partnership
properties under Articles 167 and 178 of the new Civil Code requires a presentment of real
abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Physical separation alone is
not the full meaning of the term abandonment, if the husband, despite his voluntary
departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal
partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The Court further believed that the
defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently despite his absence from
the conjugal home, as shown by the evidence on record that he continued to give support to his
family. Furthermore, the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favour as to whether
Severino kept Nenita as a concubine. Credible evidence is needed, which the plaintiff failed to
show and is negatived by her testimony that she had not seen Nenitas handwriting before.

(2) NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABUSING HIS POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION OVER
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES.
There is no evidence on the record to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets. The
refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife
of the progress of the family businesses does not constitute in abuse.

Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
FACTS: Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to
the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include
the signature of the deceased father, and because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to
the child.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against
Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.
HELD: Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child
to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his
offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative
father in the private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate
or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.

Article 105 133
Article 115
Del Mundo vs CA
Villanueva vs. IAC
BPI vs. Posadas GR No. 34583, October 22, 1931

FACTS: BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI
Manila absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him
in recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda
de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance
policy of the deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in
Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will
in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The
deceased possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal
property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal
property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by
the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate
of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the sole and
only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedents estate and attorney in fact of
the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest.
Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.
HELD: SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property,
and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a
life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the
testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they
belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these
Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon
the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first
premium.

BPI vs Posadas 56 Phil 215
FACTS: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance
policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada on January 14, 1913.
During the following five years the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the
company, and in 1918 the policy was transferred to the London branch. The record shows that
the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano on
January 16, 1914. Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed administrator of the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order dated March 24, 1928, entered by
the Court of First Instance of Manila. On July 13, 1928, the Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon
her arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on the
life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date Rosario Gelano Vda. de
Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the
deceased's estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then
returned the money to said widow. The present complaint seeks to recover from the
defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the amount of P1,209 paid by the
plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, as inheritance tax upon the sum of P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance
policy on the deceased's life, wherein his own estate was named the beneficiary.
ISSUE: WON the proceeds of a life-insurance policy is subject to inheritance tax.
HELD: By virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the proceeds of a life-
insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the
conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and
the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with
paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal
in part and conjugal in part; and (3) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former
as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance
tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is
immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.
CA decision is reversed. Defendant is ordered to return of the tax collected upon the amount
of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.


Article 116
Jocson v Ca
Wong vs. IAC GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991

FACTS: Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even
during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living
separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land
in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June
1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former
pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day
period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check
of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong
filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The
reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the
Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the
name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction
to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption,
Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through
the conjugal property.

HELD: The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal
with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage
with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is
presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive
property of the husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the family. The
writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends
only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer
for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her
husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence
submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so
far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the
debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.

Article 117
Zulueta vs Pan-American Airways
Article 118
Parayno vs Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Police power
Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989,
some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the
closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal
Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for
investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the
closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared
that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning
Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary
School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as
witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June
1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses
closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire;
3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time
especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow
of traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she
filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec
44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent
municipality was an invalid exercise of the latters police powers
HELD: The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling
station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : That the business of the
petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning
code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official
zoning code;
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party
making them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by
the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section
44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities
undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling
station.
As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police
powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA
7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare
of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second,
to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed
Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less
than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it
even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in
determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that
respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such
measurement either.
Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent
municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement
of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station
is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence,
it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the
people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project
being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire
Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the
requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location
is in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the
[HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial
Zone per the Zoning Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to
cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close
down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

JOVELLANOS vs. CA 210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164)

Facts: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement
over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom
he had three children, the petitioners.
Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom
he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil
Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the
premises.
With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of
absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title
and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated
property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and
which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that
the property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under
their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
Issue: WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES
Held: The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a
contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a
conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full
payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if
delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if
there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii,
or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan. Compliance
with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.

Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount
hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was
only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed
of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and, under the contract, Daniel
Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel
Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this
property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding
reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot.
Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on property bought on installments, where
ownership is vested during the marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal
partnership.

Article 121
Article 122