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I have two questions regarding two upcoming events next week:
1. Do you see any relationship between the recent release of Vietnam's Defense
White Paper and the upcoming visit by PM Nguyen Tan Dung to Russia (expected to
lead to stronger bilateral military), and, to a lesser extent, the visit by Defense
Minister Phung Quang Thanh to France and the United States?
The background is that Vietnam's defense budget until last year was too modest to
support the purchase of submarines and aircraft from Russia. Vietnam might
purchase weapons from Russia, possibly France and the United States, which has
eased its restrictive policies on weapons sales to Vietnam. If Vietnam were to
acquire weapons from these sources it would increase its negotiating power against
other claimants in South China Sea disputes. But the release of the defense paper a
year early might limit Vietnam's expenditure on weapons before any new purchases
can be made for the next five to six years.
ANSWER: In 2009, it is quite clear, Vietnam’s military has become more prominent
and active. A joint air‐naval command has been set up in the south. A new Law on
Militia and Self‐Defence Forces has been passed by the National Assembly.
Vietnamese leaders have indicated that the maritime militia will be armed in certain
circumstances. And Russian defence industry sources report that discussions on a
major arms package are nearing completion. Now we have the visit of Defence
Minister General Phung Quang Thanh to the United States and France plus the visit
of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to Russia.
Vietnam has published two previous defence White Papers, the first in 1998 and the
second in 2004. If the Ministry of National Defence kept to this schedule the next
White Paper should have come out in 2010. Even if a six year period is not a rigid
schedule, it is important to ask what explains the release of the third White Paper
this year?
White Papers set out a country’s assessment of the strategic environment. Clearly
developments in the South China Sea are of concern to Vietnam. The new White
Paper, and comments by vice minister of defence General Nguyen Chi Vinh, clearly
indicate that Vietnam seeks a peaceful resolution to conflicting maritime claims and
does not expect armed conflict to break out. The White Paper can be seen as part of
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larger political‐diplomatic strategy to publicize its strategic assessment to the wider
international community.
Vietnam’s White Paper marked a major step forward in transparency. It contained
figures on defence spending from 2005‐2008, both in Vietnamese dong and as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These figures are very modest. It is
unclear what was included in these calculations and what was excluded. For
example, some countries include the retirement pay to former soldiers and veterans
in their defence budget. Other countries, like China, exclude research and
development costs. Vietnam’s defence figures are extremely modest.
For the past several decades Vietnam has always linked defence spending to the
growth of its economy. The figures in the current White Paper indicate that Vietnam
spent on average 2 percent of GDP on defence spending for the period 2005‐08.
Vietnam’s economy grew so more funds were available to spend on weapons
procurement. But Vietnam was struck by the global financial crisis in 2008 and
defence spending dropped. Now Vietnam is recovering, but only gradually,
nevertheless defence spending can be expected to increase. One explanation for the
release of the White Paper at this time is that the current five‐year plan is ending
and a new five‐year plan is being drawn up. If this is the case the White Paper
provides strategic guidance for the next five years.
Ever since Russian defence industry sources revealed information about the possible
sale of Kilo‐class submarines and Su‐30 fighters to Vietnam, Vietnamese officials
have sounded a note of caution. Russia is the main supplier of military equipment to
Vietnam and outside observers will watch Prime Minister Dung’s trip to Russia with
great interest. Russia is amenable to barter agreements in which they sell military
equipment for goods such as palm oil. There is nothing in the current White Paper
that would prohibit Vietnam from making large weapon purchases from Russia. But
Vietnam has always been prudent in its weapons purchases.
Purchasing Kilo‐class submarines is another matter. They will involve huge
infrastructure and training costs not to mention weapons systems to go with them.
Vietnam will need to develop a naval doctrine to integrate these submarines into its
force structure. Purchasing six submarines as part of a single package seems very
costly. If Vietnam goes ahead, it is more likely it will proceed gradually.
2. What can Vietnam expect from military ties with the US, especially under the
circumstances of complicated ties between US and China? And, in return for that,
what kind of concessions Vietnam should make?
ANSWER: Vietnam‐United States defence ties have gradually evolved and include
agreement specifying what types of activities can occur during a planning cycle. For
example, there is an understanding setting an informal quota on the number of
defence‐related activities per month. There is also agreement limiting the number of
high‐level visits per year; and there is a limit of one US warship visit per year. All
these restrictions have been relaxed slightly in recent years.
The United States has been the initiator of proposals to step up military‐to‐military
ties. Vietnam has always proceeded slowly and cautiously. It postponed the visit by
the then Secretary of Defense William Cohen and then waited several years before
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reciprocating with the visit of the then Defence Minister General Pham Van Tra.
Vietnam would like to see a greater US contribution to dealing with the legacy of
Agent Orange.
Bilateral defence ties took a significant step forward in October 2008 with the
holding of the first political‐military dialogue in Washington convened by the US
State Department and Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
US officials have a number of proposals on the table that they are likely to revive
during General Thanh’s visit. For example, Vietnam has already agreed to participate
in International Military Education and Training (IMET) yet has limited its
involvement to English language education for military officers in the United States.
The numbers have been quite small. IMET funds have also been used to support
medical research, humanitarian cooperation and some military science and
technology exchanges. The US would like Vietnam to increase its involvement in the
large menu of programs that IMET will support. For example, the US would like to
see Vietnam accept visits by US Military Training Teams to deal with specific matters
such as aviation security.
The US would like to see Vietnam increase the number of approved naval ship visits
as, for example, when Vietnam approved the visit of the USNS Heezen a
hydrographic ship and not a warship. In addition, the US would like to see
cooperation between the militaries in such matters as meteorological and
hydrographic research. Already senior Vietnamese military officers have flown out to
an American Aircraft Carrier in the South China Sea. The US would like to see more
such visits. The US would also like to promote cooperation in search and rescue, ship
passage exercises (PASSEX), and maritime safety procedures with Vietnamese naval
vessels. The US seeks to promote joint training in these activities.
The US would like to see Vietnam take part in the Foreign Military Sales process. The
US has already explained the process involved and how to submit a Letter of Request
for Price and Availability. Vietnam could seek approval to acquire spare parts for its
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and support for getting it stock of captured US
UH‐1 (Huey) helicopters so these craft can be put back in service.
The US is encouraging Vietnam to sign an Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement to
facilitate logistics support during US naval ship visits and emergencies. This could be
expanded to include logistics support for joint exercises and training programs.
On a more strategic level the US would like to see Vietnam accept funding for its
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and Vietnamese participation in the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The former involves funding for countries that
agree to train their military for international peacekeeping. The latter seeks to
restrict the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This could prove
controversial for Vietnam as it is aimed at North Korea.
Vietnam needs to evaluate carefully each proposal made by the United States and
decide what form of cooperative activities are in Vietnam’s interest. Vietnam does
not have to make concessions in order to participate in the activities listed above. It
only has to signal its readiness to take part. Vietnam has tended to move slowly and
link progress to US contributions to “healing the wounds of war” or Agent Orange.
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Vietnam and the US might agree to delink this issue as a condition for stepped up
military cooperation.
Vietnam could also propose policy level discussions by uniformed military personnel
so as to get to know the American military, its assistance programs and nuances of
U.S. law better. The October 2008 so‐called “strategic dialogue” was led by
diplomats, Vietnam should consider direct military‐to‐military talks with the United
States. This could develop in parallel with Vietnam’s proposal for the ASEAN Defence
Ministers to meet with their dialogue partners.