Rethinking Iraq: The Way Forward

By Fareed Zakaria
Newsweek
Nov. 6, 2006 issue - By 1952, the last year of his presidency, arry !ru"an reco#ni$ed
that the victory he had hoped for was no lon#er possi%le in &orea. '.(. forces were not
losin#, %ut they were not winnin#, either. )nstead they were cau#ht up in a vast, %loody
and e*pensive holdin# operation. !wo thirds of the +"erican pu%lic disapproved of the
war. !ru"an had hoped that peace talks, underway since ,uly 1951, would yield results,
%ut his tea" was ne#otiatin# under constraints. -epu%licans were ea#er to critici$e the
.e"ocrats for %ein# soft on the co""unists. /thers, even .e"ocrats, asked how they
could 0ustify the deaths of 50,000 '.(. troops without a clear win. 1any, includin# (outh
&orea2s 3resident (yn#"an -hee, had not #iven up on the drea" of a unified &orea that
would %e an ally in the war a#ainst co""unis".
!ru"an2s successor, .wi#ht 4isenhower, as a le#endary #eneral, had enor"ous freedo"
to "aneuver. e used it, endin# new "ilitary offensives, concedin# several key points to
the North &oreans and the 5hinese. By so"e accounts, he also threatened to use nuclear
weapons. /n ,uly 26, 1957, the parties to the war si#ned a peace treaty8all parties, that
is, e*cept the (outh &oreans, who %elieved the deal a"ounted to a sellout.
9or +"ericans, the &orean :ar was not a defeat8the 'nited (tates had #athered a
coalition to resist a##ression8%ut it was certainly not a victory. +fter three years of
fi#htin# and ; "illion dead, &orea re"ained divided8the North a co""unist %ulwark, the
(outh itself turnin# into a nasty dictatorship8+sia was %u%%lin# over and the dan#er of
war with the forces of international co""unis" see"ed #reater than %efore.
(o"ethin# like the close of the &orean :ar is, frankly, the %est we can hope for in )ra<
now. /ne could easily i"a#ine worse outco"es8a %lood%ath, political fra#"entation, a
tu"ultuous flood of refu#ees and a sur#e in #lo%al terrorist attacks. But with plannin#,
intelli#ence, e*ecution and luck, it is possi%le that the +"erican intervention in )ra< could
have a #ray endin#8one that is unsatisfyin# to all, %ut that prevents the worst scenarios
fro" unfoldin#, secures so"e real achieve"ents and allows the 'nited (tates to re#ain
its ener#ies and strate#ic co"pass for its %roader leadership role in the world.
1
But in order for that to happen, we have to see )ra< as it is now. Not as it once was. Not
as it could have %een. Not as we hope it will %eco"e, %ut as it is today. !here will %e
a"ple ti"e to assi#n %la"e and de%ate =what if=s. !he ur#ent task now is ahead of us.
=:e2re winnin#,= 3resident Bush said last week, and then e*plained his reasonin#> =1y
view is that the only way we lose in )ra< is if we leave %efore the 0o% is done.= !hat
circular definition of success rese"%les so "uch of the ad"inistration2s )ra< policy, one
that see"s al"ost deter"ined not to look at the country itself. )ra<, in this view, is a
state of "ind. )f we lose faith, we lose. But there is a real country out there. +nd it is one
in which events are increasin#ly "ovin# %eyond our control.
)n point of fact8and it is a sad fact, %ut a fact nonetheless8+"erica is not winnin# in
)ra<, which "eans that it is losin#. )ra< has fallen apart %oth as a nation and as a state.
)ts capital and lands containin# al"ost 50 percent of the population re"ain deeply
insecure and pla#ued %y risin# internal divisions. 1uch of the south, which is so"ewhat
sta%le, is su%0ect to #an#sterish, theocratic and thorou#hly corrupt local #overn"ents. !o
reco#ni$e this reality does not "ean that there is no hope for the years to co"e. !here is
8%ut hope is not a policy.
,ournalists have a weakness for declarin# this "o"ent or that one as =critical.= But today,
"ore than three years into the +"erican-led invasion of )ra<, there is little <uestion that
we stand at, well, a critical "o"ent. !he policy we are pursuin#8"aintainin# 1;;,000
'.(. troops in )ra< and hopin# that thin#s i"prove8is not sustaina%le either in )ra< or in
+"erica. 3resident Bush has three tools at his disposal that he can ?theoretically@ apply
to the "ission at hand8"ore troops, "oney and ti"e. +t this point, none of these will
"ake "uch difference.
But the way out of this stale"ate is not to pack up and #o ho"e. !hat will surely result in
a %lood%ath or worse. !he 'nited (tates "ust redefine its "ission, reduce and redeploy
its forces and fashion a less intrusive involve"ent with )ra<, one that %oth )ra<is and
+"ericans %elieve is productive and sustaina%le for the lon# ter".
!he "ost revealin# statistic a%out )ra< is not the spiralin# death toll %ut the
une"ploy"ent rate, which is conservatively esti"ated to %e around 70 to ;0 percent,
and has not "oved "uch in the past two years. Aiven that conditions are al"ost nor"al
in the &urdish north, that "eans the rest of the country has an une"ploy"ent rate closer
to 50 percent. :hatever we have %een doin# in )ra<, it is not translatin# into peace,
nor"alcy and 0o%s. )n parts of the (unni !rian#le, reports su##est that une"ploy"ent is
2
"ore than 60 percent. )f you think that )ra<2s tu"ult is a product of its culture, reli#ion
and history, ask yourself what the 'nited (tates would look like after three years of 50
percent une"ploy"ent. :ould there not %e civil strife in 1anhattan, .etroit, Bos +n#eles
and New /rleansC
!he root cause of )ra<i une"ploy"ent is, of course, the lack of security, which is ende"ic
in "uch of the country. )n so"e places the vacuu" has %een filled %y local forces8"ost
effectively in &urdistan %y the peshmerga. )n parts of the south, thou#h8Basra a"on#
the"8various (hia "ilitias are %attlin# each other for power. )n (unni areas, particularly
+n%ar province, for"er Baathist soldiers and a s"aller #roup of )sla"ic terrorists
continue to "ount ca"pai#ns a#ainst '.(. forces and the new )ra<i +r"y. !hey
inti"idate and kill (unni leaders who help the )ra<i #overn"ent or work with the 'nited
(tates. :henever '.(. forces scale %ack in an area, the attacks %e#in a#ain. !he violence
in )ra< is %ein# suppressed %ut not solved.
!he "ost si#nificant new reality in )ra<8in fact, the country2s definin# feature8is
sectarian violence. By any reasona%le definition, )ra< is "ired in a low-#rade civil war
%etween its (unni and (hia co""unities. 5o""unal tensions are hi#h, and risin#8
everywhere. Diolence has %een "ountin# in all areas where these co""unities are
"i*ed. 4thnic cleansin#, either forced or voluntary, is increasin# rapidly, with 765,000
people havin# fled or %een forced fro" their ho"es since last 9e%ruary2s %o"%in# of a
(hia "os<ue in (a"arra. )n Ba#hdad alone "ore than 2,600 )ra<is died in (epte"%er,
"ost of the" as a result of co""unal attacks.
Dirtually everythin# a%out )ra< today "ust now %e seen throu#h this sectarian pris".
3resident Bush says that we are %uildin# an )ra<i +r"y and police force and that as their
troops stand up, +"erica2s will %e a%le to stand down. )n fact, we are %uildin# a lar#ely
&urdish and (hia force. +s its ranks have swelled, (unnis have felt "ore threatened, not
less, and as a conse<uence have fou#ht harder. (hia "ilitias, "any of whose "e"%ers
are now enlisted in the +r"y and especially the national police, feel e"powered. !hey
have routinely rounded up #roups of (unni "en and slau#htered the" in #rueso"e
fashion. 4ven the country2s "uch-lauded elections have not proved an un"iti#ated #ood
in this conte*t. Bast .ece"%er2s vote e"powered reli#ious parties with their own "ilitias,
such as 1o<tada al-(adr2s 1ahdi +r"y, and, as a result, "ade it "ore difficult to dis%and
the".
.e"ocratic (en. ,ack -eed of -hode )sland, a for"er +r"y paratrooper and one of the
"ost intelli#ent voices on forei#n affairs in the '.(. (enate, 0ust returned fro" his ninth
3
trip to )ra<, where he saw this tension %etween politics and pro#ress. (i* "onths a#o, he
noted, the (unni town of !all +far, near the (yrian %order, had %een held up as an
e*a"ple of the success of :ashin#ton2s new =clear, hold and %uild= strate#y. )nsur#ents
had taken over the town. !he !hird +r"ored 5avalry -e#i"ent had repelled the",
secured the streets and won over the local population. But the (hia-do"inated
#overn"ent in Ba#hdad had since i#nored all appeals for "oney for reconstruction ?the
=%uild= phase@, which has "eant few new 0o%s. 1any (unni areas co"plain of si"ilar
treat"ent fro" Ba#hdad. !all +far is now slidin# %ack into insta%ility. !hus a s"art
+"erican strate#y falls prey to the political realities in )ra<.
9ro" the %e#innin# of the war, the Bush ad"inistration has not wanted to think of )ra< in
these sectarian ter"s, preferrin# instead to %elieve the country was the place it hoped it
would %e8united, secular, har"onious, freedo"-lovin#. +s a result, :ashin#ton
"assively underesti"ated the challen#e it faced. By unseatin# (adda" ussein and
introducin# de"ocracy, the 'nited (tates introduced (hia-"a0ority rule to )ra<. )t also
dis%anded the +r"y, with its lar#ely (unni officer corps, fired 50,000 "ostly (unni
%ureaucrats and shut down do$ens of state-owned factories ?"any run %y (unnis@. )n
effect, the 'nited (tates destroyed %oth the old )ra<i nation and the old )ra<i state. +nd
yet it had no plan, people or resources to fill the void left %ehind.
:ith all the troops in the world, +"erica could not for#e a new national co"pact for )ra<.
!hat is a task for the )ra<i leadership. !he outlines of the deal that needs to %e "ade are
%y now o%vious. )ra< would end up a loose confederation, %ut would divide its oil revenue
so that all three re#ions were invested in the new nation. + %road a"nesty would %e
#ranted to all those who have wa#ed war, which "eans "ainly the (unni insur#ents, %ut
also "e"%ers of (hia death s<uads. Aovern"ent and state-sector 0o%s, the lar#est share
of e"ploy"ent in )ra<, would %e distri%uted to all three co""unities, which would entail
a reversal of the postinvasion pur#es that swept up, for e*a"ple, schoolteachers who
happened to %e "e"%ers of the Baath 3arty. 9inally, and perhaps "ost ur#ently, the (hia
"ilitias "ust %e dis%anded or, if that %eco"es i"possi%le, incorporated and ta"ed into
national institutions.
:hat is e<ually o%vious is that such a deal does not see" to %e at hand. !he (hia
leadership re"ains e*tre"ely resistant to any concessions to its for"er (unni overlords.
!he (hia politicians ) "et when in Ba#hdad, even the "ost ur%ane and educated, see"ed
dead set a#ainst sharin# power in any real sense. )n an interview with -euters last week,
3ri"e 1inister Nuri al-1aliki also said he %elieved that if )ra<i troops were left to their
own devices, they could esta%lish order in si* "onths in )ra<. )t is not difficult to i"a#ine
4
what he "eans> (hia would crush (unni, and that would %e that. !his notion8that
"ilitary force, rather than political acco""odation, could defeat the insur#ency8is
widely shared a"on# senior (hia leaders. +%dul +$i$ al-aki", the head of the sin#le
lar#est political party in 3arlia"ent, has "ade si"ilar state"ents in the past. :hile they
will occasionally say the ri#ht thin#s, as 1aliki did in his first week in office, their
reluctance to fund pro0ects in (unni areas, or to investi#ate death s<uads, su##ests they
have little appetite for %roader national reconciliation.
!he (unnis, for their part, see" consu"ed %y their own an#er, radicalis" and feuds.
!hey re"ain so incensed with the 'nited (tates for their loss of power that they have
%een, until recently, %lind to the reality that if not for '.(. forces, they would %e
"assacred. :hat political leadership the (unnis have is weak and does not appear to
have +ll sides in )ra< are preparin# for the day the 'nited (tates leaves. !hey are already
en#a#ed in a power stru##le for control of the post-+"erican )ra<. !he &urds have
ensured that their autono"ous re#ion is #overned essentially as a separate country with
its own ar"y. !he lar#est (hia parties want to "aintain their "ilitias to %olster their own
power %ase, independent of the state. +nd the (unnis do not want to wind down the
insur#ency, for fear that they will %e i"poverished or killed in the new )ra<. No%ody
%elieves that, after the +"ericans, this power stru##le will %e resolved with %allots. (o
they are all keepin# their %ullets.
)f the 'nited (tates were to leave )ra< to"orrow, it is virtually certain that the
%loodlettin# would spread like a virus. +"erican troops are effective at stoppin# shoot-
outs a"on# "ilitias and the worst of the sectarian killin#s. But if there is no pro#ress
toward a lastin# political resolution, all that those soldiers are doin# is keepin# the lid on
tensions that will continue to #row. !hus -a"adi is captured %y '.(. forces, which then
leave, only to have to return and retake the city a#ain. :e "i#ht %e a%le to pacify
Ba#hdad, %ut will the cal" last after the we leaveC 4ven now, those places fro" which
units have %een drawn to control the capital, like 1osul, are reportin# "any "ore
incidents of violence.
(o what should the 'nited (tates doC 9irst of all, :ashin#ton has to "ake clear to the
)ra<i leaders that its continued presence in the country at current troop levels is not
sustaina%le without so"e si#nificant "oves on their part.
)ra<i leaders "ust a%ove all decide whether they want +"erica there. 3erhaps the "ost
ur#ent need is for the" to help %uild political support for the continued deploy"ent of
'.(. forces. -i#ht now the "assive '.(. presence is allowin# )ra<2s leaders a free ride.
5
:ith the e*ception of the &urds, "any of the" play a nasty #a"e. !hey pu%licly
denounce the actions of '.(. soldiers to win popularity, and then, "ore <uietly, assent to
+"erica2s continued involve"ent. +s a result, the proportion of )ra<is who now support
attacks on '.(. troops has risen to a %reathtakin# 61 percent. !he )ra<i people2s
frustration with the occupation is lar#ely the result of its ineffectiveness, the lack of
security and 0o%s, and a%uses like +%u Ahrai%. But those past errors cannot %e undone.
)ra<is "ust also reali$e that we are where we are, and that they can have either a
country with '.(. troops or #reater chaos without.
)ra<2s 3arlia"ent should thus pu%licly ask +"erican troops to stay. )ts leaders should
e*plain to their constituents why the country needs '.(. forces. :ithout such a pu%lic
affir"ation, the +"erican presence will %eco"e politically untena%le in %oth )ra< and the
'nited (tates.
Ne*t, )ra<is "ust for#e a national co"pact. !he #overn"ent needs to "ake swift and
hi#h-profile efforts to %rin# the sectarian tensions to a close and defan# the "ilitias,
particularly the 1ahdi +r"y. !he lon#er )ra<i leaders wait, the "ore difficult it will %e for
all sides to co"pro"ise. !here are "any paths to help )ra< return to nor"alcyE 0o%s need
to %e created, electricity supplied re#ularly, "ore oil produced and e*ported. But none of
that is possi%le without a secure environ"ent, which in turn cannot %e achieved without a
political solution to )ra<2s sectarian strife.
!here is one shift that the 'nited (tates itself needs to "ake> we "ust talk to )ra<2s
nei#h%ors a%out their co""on interest in security and sta%ility in )ra<. None of these
countries8not even (yria and )ran8would %enefit fro" the %reakup of )ra<, which could
produce a flood of refu#ees and stir up their own restive "inority populations. /ur
re#ional #a"%it "i#ht well lead to nothin#. But not tryin# it, in the face of so few options,
reflects a %i$arrely insular and ideolo#ical o%stinacy.
'nfortunately, there2s a stron# possi%ility that these chan#es will not %e "ade in the ne*t
few "onths. +t that point the 'nited (tates should %e#in takin# "easures that lead to a
"uch s"aller, less intrusive presence in )ra<, #eared to a "ore li"ited set of #oals.
(tartin# in ,anuary 2006, we should stop tryin# to provide %asic security in )ra<2s cities
and villa#es. '.(. units should instead %eco"e a rapid-reaction force to secure certain
core interests.
:e can e*plain to the )ra<i leadership that such a force structure will help )ra<is take
responsi%ility for their own security. 5urrently we have 1;;,000 troops deployed in )ra<
6
at a cost of "ore than F90 %illion a year. !hat is si"ply not sustaina%le in an open-ended
way. ) would propose a force structure of 60,000 "en at a cost of F70 %illion to F75
%illion annually8a co""it"ent that could %e "aintained for several years, and that
would #ive the )ra<is ti"e to co"e to#ether, in whatever loose for" they can, as a
nation.
!rue, as we draw down, violence will increase in "any parts of the country. /ne can only
hope that will concentrate the "inds of leaders in )ra<. !he (hia #overn"ent will #et its
chance to try to fi#ht the insur#ency its way. !he (unni re%els can atte"pt to re#ain
control of the country. +nd perhaps %oth sides will co"e "ore <uickly to the conclusion
that the only way forward is a political deal. But until there is such a chan#e of heart, the
'nited (tates should stick to "ore li"ited #oals.
!he core national-security interests of the 'nited (tates in )ra< are now threefold> first,
to prevent +n%ar province fro" %ein# taken over %y Gaeda-style 0ihadist #roups that
would use it as a %ase for #lo%al terroris"E second, to ensure that the &urdish re#ion
retains its autono"yE third, to prevent or at least contain "assive sectarian violence in
)ra<, as %oth a hu"anitarian and a security issue. Bar#e-scale %loodlettin# could easily
spill over )ra<2s %orders as trau"ati$ed and ven#eful refu#ees flee to countries like )ran,
(yria and (audi +ra%ia. istorically, such population "ove"ents have caused trou%le for
decades to co"e.
!hese interests are achieva%le with fewer forces. 3resident Bush is fond of warnin#, =)f
we leave )ra<, they will follow us ho"e.= !his "akes no sense. Gaeda terrorists fro" )ra<
could have "ade their way to +"erica at any point in the last three years. )n fact, )ra<2s
%orders are "ore porous today than they have ever %een. )f a terrorist wanted to inflict
har" on '.(. civilians, he could drive across +n%ar into (yria, then hop a plane to New
Hork or :ashin#ton, ..5. .oes the president really %elieve that %ecause we2re in )ra<,
terrorists have for#otten that we2re also in +"ericaC ere2s what we really need to worry
a%out doin#>
Battle Al Qaeda. )n fact, the fi#ht in places like +n%ar is lar#ely not a 0ihadist crusade
a#ainst +"erica, %ut a (unni stru##le for control of the country. !he chances of )ra<2s
%ein# taken over %y a Gaeda-style #roup are none*istent. (o"e I5 percent of the
population ?the (hia and &urds@ are violently opposed to such a #roup. +nd polls have
consistently shown that the vast "a0ority of (unnis dislike +l Gaeda and /sa"a %in
Baden. !he real 0ihadists in )ra< are a s"all and unpopular %and that relies on terror and
violence to #ain stren#th. !hey do not have heavy weapons8tanks, ar"ored vehicles8
7
and cannot hold territory for lon#. :ere a deal %etween the (hia and the (unni to %e
si#ned, +l Gaeda would %e "ar#inali$ed within "onths. )n the "eanti"e, '.(. (pecial
9orces could harass and chase Gaeda terrorists 0ust as they do in +f#hanistan today.
Secure Kurdistan. !he )ra<i &urdish re#ion is the one una"%i#uous success story of the
)ra< war. )t is sta%le and increasin#ly prosperous. )ts politics are "ore closed and corrupt
than "ost reali$e8the place is essentially carved up into two one-party states8%ut it has
aspirations to %eco"e "ore "arket-oriented and "ore de"ocratic. 3erhaps "ost
crucially, it is a 1usli" re#ion in the +ra% world that wants to %e part of the "odern
world, not %low it up. !he si"plest way for the 'nited (tates to ensure the security of
&urdistan would %e to #ive it a security #uarantee.
!here are various proposals to redeploy '.(. forces in the re#ion. Beyond a token force,
this see"s unnecessary. !he troops would %e far fro" the pro%le" areas of )ra<. +nd
what would their "ission %eC !o stop &urdish secessionC !o #et involved in %attles
%etween &urdish separatists and the !urkish +r"yC &urdistan can %e defended <uite
easily with a political #uarantee. +nd &urdish leaders see" to reco#ni$e that, as with
!aiwan, their de facto independence depends on their not de"andin# de 0ure
independence.
Prevent a bloodbath. !his is the "ost difficult task. !he 'nited (tates will not %e a%le
to stop all sectarian fi#htin# in )ra<. )t cannot do so even today. /ur #oal "ust %e to
ensure that any such violence re"ains locali$ed and li"ited, and that national institutions
like the +r"y and police work to stop it rather than participate. !hat will re<uire so"e
a%ility to control "ove"ent alon# )ra<2s roads and hi#hways. )t will also re<uire
"onitorin# the +r"y and police. !he strate#y of pairin# )ra<i +r"y units with '.(.
advisers has worked well thus far. )ra<i forces don2t fi#ht super%ly in the presence of
+"ericans, %ut they fi#ht "uch %etter and "ore professionally. 1ost i"portant, they
tend not to co""it "a0or hu"an-ri#hts a%uses when we are around.
Draw down troops and ramp up advisers. !o preserve these interests, the 'nited
(tates should %e#in drawin# down its troop levels, startin# in ,anuary 2006. )n one year,
we should shrink fro" the current 1;;,000 to a total of 60,000 soldiers, so"e ;;,000 of
the" stationed in four super%ases outside Ba#hdad, Balad, 1osul and Nasi-riya. !his
would provide a rapid-reaction force that could intervene to secure any of the core
interests of the 'nited (tates when they are threatened. !o preserve the %asic security of
)ra< and prevent anarchy, '.(. troops "ust also act as the spine of the new )ra<i +r"y
and police force. +"erican advisers should "assively e*pand their current roles in %oth
8
or#ani$ations, #oin# fro" the current level of ;,000 +"ericans to at least 16,000,
e"%eddin# an +"erican platoon ?70 to ;0 "en@ in virtually every )ra<i fi#htin# %attalion
?600 "en@.
!his plan "i#ht not work. +nd if it does not, the 'nited (tates will confront the "ore
painful <uestion of what to do in the "idst of even #reater violence and chaos. !he
Brookin#s )nstitution2s &enneth 3ollack is already workin# on a plan to address 0ust such
a worst-case scenario, in which '.(. forces esta%lish =catch"ent %asins= alon# the
%orders of )ra< to stop "assive refu#ee flows. But there is also the possi%ility that )ra<2s
leaders will %e#in to face up to their challen#es, "ove the country toward reconciliation
and %uild up the capacities of their state. 5ivil strife tends not to #o on forever. + new
nation and a new state "i#ht well e"er#e in )ra<. But its %irth will %e a slow, #radual
process, takin# years. !he "ost effective +"erican strate#y, at this point, is one that is
sustaina%le for 0ust such a lon# haul.
!he )ra< war has had its achieve"ents. + %rutal dictator who tyranni$ed his people
?killin# a%out 500,000 of the"@, attacked his nei#h%ors and for decades sou#ht
dan#erous weapons is #one. /ne part of the country, &urdistan, is indeed turnin# into a
pro"isin# society. !he "any strains of +ra% politics are ne#otiatin# for space in )ra<,
throu#h political parties and the press, in a way that one sees nowhere else in the re#ion.
But these achieve"ents "ust now %e consolidated, or they too will %e at risk.
!he lesson of &orea, where "ore than 70,000 '.(. troops are stationed to this day, is not
that +"erica should withdraw fro" )ra< co"pletely. But to have any chance of lastin#
success, we "ust #ive up our illusions, scale %ack our a"%itions, ensure that the worst
does not happen. !hen perhaps ti"e will work for us for a chan#e.
With Michael Hastings in Baghdad 2006 Newsweek, Inc.
9