LTD TO DIGEST 1

ST
& 2
ND
SYLLABUS
DENR et. al VS. YAP et al
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay
Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President
Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with
the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section
3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-
claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to
judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that,
PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to
the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG
sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this
Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as
public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,
such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the
1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had
never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions.
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute,
or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable
and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa
were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of
the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do
so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or
implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact
that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.
Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of
fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land
as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive
of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.
At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look
into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from
public forest to alienable agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does
not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they
possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial
investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of
right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements.
They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into
other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent,
subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There
is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.

EN BANC
September 30, 1984 132 SCRA 514
REPUBLIC vs. CA
DECISION
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are
accretion to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their
registration in the names of the private respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco
Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three lots
adjacent to their fishpond property and particularly described as follows:
Lot 1-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of
plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines
4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina Santiago; on
the E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-
111877). ... containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN
(33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 2-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by property
of Rafael Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4,
by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along line 4-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot
1, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453)
SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 3-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by
property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-
131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1 of
plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and
on the NW., along line 6-1, by property of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...
On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau
of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for
registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only
with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding
that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ?
WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are accretions to the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they
belong to the owner of said property. The Court, therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2
situated in the barrio of Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described in plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying technical
descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and
residing at 3662 Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to
Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial, married
to Juan Imperial, residing at Pasay Road, Dasmari?as Village, Makati, Rizal; and Mario C.
Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St., Dasmari?as Village, Makati,
Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of
the lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ?
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan nang
walang bayad.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this
Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.
(97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of
fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil
Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their
dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to
speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible
sedimentation by the waters of the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acu?a to the
effect that: ?
xxx xxx xxx
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry almost at the level
of the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the lots, for about
two (2) arms length the land was still dry up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a
new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was
transferred to the new Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were then
converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the
Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of accretion
without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was
complete.
We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion
covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no
evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through
the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation
of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land
came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness
of the private respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose husband was first
cousin of their father noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in
1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so,
their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in
the years before 1939. However, the witness testified that in that year, she observed an
increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was telling
the truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits
were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the
current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching
upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually
by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private
respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side
of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the
river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited
by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of
his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may
prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land
caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the
private respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for
reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters
of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private
respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such alleged
alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question were not
included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the
Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to
1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it
had supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas
could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred
their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim as
accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the
Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names
of the private respondents is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds
to their original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-38185, 144 SCRA 292 , September 24, 1986
HILARIO RAMIREZ and VALENTINA BONIFACIO, petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, FRANCISCA MEDINA, MATILDE MARTIN, EMILIO MARTIN, DELFIN GUINTO,
TEOFILO GUINTO, PRUDENCIO GUINTO and MARGARITA GUINTO, respondents.
Castro, Makalintal, Mendoza & Associates for petitioner.
Flores, Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo Law Office for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of
the then Court of First instance of Rizal rendered in the petition for review of the decree of
registration issued in Land Registration Case No. N-2597, L.R.C. Record No. N-17939.
On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an
application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas Rizal. After notice and
publication nobody appeared to oppose the application. An order of general default was issued
and the court allowed the petitioners to present evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter,
the petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase
from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding
contract of sale was lost and no copy or record of the same was available.
On January 30, 1960, the court ordered the issuance of the decree of registration and
consequently: Original Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was issued
in the petitioners names.
On March 30, 1960, the private respondents Francisca Medina, Basilio Martin, Matilde Martin,
Delfin Guinto, Teofilo Guinto, Prudencio Guinto and Margarita Guinto, petitioners' nephews and
nieces, filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. The private
respondents based their claim to the land on the following allegations: that they are the legal
heirs of the deceased Agapita Bonifacio who died intestate on March 11, 1936; that Valentina
Bonifacio is a sister of the deceased Agapita Bonifacio, they being the children of one Gregoria
Pascual; that Gregoria Pascual previously owned the land in question as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 6611 of Las Pinas Rizal issued on December 8, 1920; that Agapita Bonifacio
acquired the property in question by purchase from Gregoria Pascual for which reason Tax
Declaration No. 8777 was issued in her name on May 21, 1928; that Gregoria Pascual during her
lifetime, from 1916, possessed the said property in the concept of owner, publicly and
uninterruptedly, which possession was continued by Agapita Bonifacio in 1928; that in 1938
respondents obtained a loan of P400.00 from the petitioners which they secured with a
mortgage on the land in question by way of antichresis; that for this reason, Tax Declaration No.
8777 was cancelled and substituted by Tax Declaration Nos. 9522 and 2385 issued in the names
of the petitioners; that, thereafter, the petitioners began paying taxes on the land; that after
several attempts to redeem the land were refused by the petitioners, the respondents filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 272-R for the
recovery of the possession and ownership of the said property; that when they learned of the
issuance of the certificate of title to the land in the petitioners' names, they also filed the instant
petition for review. The previous complaint, Civil Case No. 272-R, was subsequently dismissed
on a joint petition filed by the parties after they agreed to have the determination of the
question of ownership resolved in the registration proceedings.
In their answer, the spouses Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition, they based
their claim to the land on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on April 15, 1937 and April 23,
1937 which they allegedly found accidentally in March 1960.
After trial, the court found that deeds of sale spurious. It further found that the respondents
took possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938,
mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00.
It was agreed that the respondents could not redeem the property within a period of five years
and that the petitioners would take possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay the land
taxes thereon. The written agreement was kept by the petitioners as creditors. The trial court
appreciated the fact of the petitioners' failure, despite formal request, to produce the document
in court in favor of the respondents. Finding the claims of the herein respondents sustained by
the evidence, it ordered the reconveyance of the property in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against applicants as
follows:
1) Setting aside its decision dated December 28, 1959 insofar as it found and declared
applicants to be the owners of the parcel of land described in Exhibits A, B and C and insofar as
it ordered the registration thereof in their names;
2) Declaring the petitioners, all Filipinos, all of legal age, and all residents of Ligas Bacoor,
Cavite, to be the true and absolute owners pro indiviso of the said parcel of land described in
Exhibits A, B and C in the following proportions:
a. Francisca Medina, married to Tomas de Leon, one-third (1/3) thereof;
b. Emilio Martin, married to Dolores Antonio, and Matilde Martin, married to Federico Torres,
one-third (1/3) thereof-,
c. Teofilo Guinto, married to Rocila de la Cruz, Delfin Guinto, married to Gregoria Pamaran,
Prudencio Guinto, married to Ana Guinto, and Margarita Guinto, married to Felix Calacala one-
third (1/3) thereof;
3) Ordering the registration of the said parcel of land described in Exhibits A, B and C in the
names of petitioners;
4) Setting aside its order for the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of applicants
dated January 30, 1959, and ordering the issuance of the decree of registration in the names of
petitioners;
5) Cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names
of applicants and the issuance in lieu thereof of another original certificate of title in the names
of petitioners in the proportion of their ownership of the property as stated in paragraph 2
above;
6) Ordering applicants to pay P3,000.00 to petitioners as and for attorney's fees;
7) Ordering applicants to pay the costs of this suit.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners, the same appellate court, but with a new member, promulgated a resolution setting
aside the original decision. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondents, this
resolution was set aside and the original decision was reinstated.
The petitioners went to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari with the following
questions:
ONE- HAS THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT, THE
JURISDICTION TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO A PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECREE UNDER SEC. 38
OF ACT 496 AND TO RE-OPEN THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN THE PETITION IS ACTUALLY
ONE OF RECONVEYANCE AND NOT BASED ON ACTUAL OR EXTRINSIC FRAUD?
TWO- DOES SEC. 38 OF ACT NO. 496 APPLY ON ALL FORES (SIC) TO ORIGINAL LAND
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS HAD UNDER PARAGRAPH B, SECTION 48 OF COM. ACT NO. 141
AS AMENDED BY REP. ACT NO. 1942 WHEREIN THE LAND INVOLVED IS PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LAND?
THREE- HAS THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT, THE
POWER AND AUTHORITY TO VEST TITLE ON THE LAND INVOLVED TO HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND ORDER EVEN ITS PARTITION AMONGST THEM IN THE FACE OF THE
ADMITTED FACT THAT THE LAND IS IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS WHILE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAD NOT POSSESSED THE SAME AT ALL?
FOUR- DO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE THE LEGAL CAPACITY AND QUALIFICATION TO
ACQUIRE AND BE VESTED BY THE COURT WITH TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION?
We find the petition without merit.
The first question does not warrant favorable consideration. The issue was submitted to the
appellate court and in our opinion, correctly resolved therein. The Court of Appeals stated:
... The petition alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio willfully and
fraudulently suppressed the facts that the petitioners are the legal and rightful owners of the
ricefield in question and that they possess the said ricefield merely as antichretic creditors as
security for the loan of P400.00; that the applicants are guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation
and concealment when they declared in their application, in the case at bar, that no other
person had any claim or interest in the said land.' These we believe are sufficient allegations of
extrinsic fraud.
In the applicant's application for registration, which followed the form required by the Land
Registration Act, the applicants alleged that 'to the best of our knowledge and belief, there is no
mortgage or incumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any other person
having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or
expectancy.' This allegation is false and made in bad faith, for, as We have found, the applicants
are not the owners of the land sought to be registered and they are in possession thereof only as
antichretic creditors.
The averments in the petition for review of the decree of registration constitute specific and not
mere general allegations of actual and extrinsic fraud. Competent proof to support these
allegations was adduced. We find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the two courts
below.
The petitioners in this case did not merely omit a statement of the respondents' interest in the
land. They positively attested to the absence of any adverse claim therein. This is clear
misrepresentation. The omission and concealment, knowingly and intentionally made, of an act
or of a fact which the law requires to be performed or recorded is fraud, when such omission or
concealment secures a benefit to the prejudice of a third person (Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 497).
In the case of Libundan v. Palma Gil (45 SCRA 17), this Court held:
The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties, deprived of land or any interest therein,
through fraud in the registration proceedings, the opportunity to review the decree is to insure
fair and honest dealing in the registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment, upon the
ground of fraud, would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts
upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic
fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a
case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.' But intrinsic fraud takes
the form of 'acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments
or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair
and just determination of the case.
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a
deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are, or in applying
for and obtaining adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he
knows had not been alloted to him in the partition, or in intentionally concealing facts, and
conniving with the land inspector to include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream, or
in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims, or in deliberately failing to notify the
party entitled to notice, or in inducing him not to oppose an application, or in misrepresenting
about the indentity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw
his opposition. In all these examples the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his
case, The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
The second question assigned as an error must also be resolved against the petitioners.
Section 122 of Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the
United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed
to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing
the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such
instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances,
whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner's
duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from
the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority
to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act, registration shall be
made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. The fees for
registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue of the certificate and
owner's duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act.
The law is clear. We can apply it to the facts without need for judicial interpretation. Once the
deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance of public land is registered with the Register of Deeds
and the corresponding certificate and owner's duplicate title is issued, such land is deemed
registered land. It is brought within the scope and operation of the Land Registration Law. This
is the doctrine laid down by this Court in a long line of cases. (See Heirs of Deogracias Ramos v.
Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 293; Lahora v. Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346; Ramirez v. Court of
Appeals, 30 SCRA 297; Director of Lands v. Jugado 2 SCRA 32; Nelayan v. Nelayan, 109 Phil.
183; Republic v. Heirs of Carle 105 Phil. 1227; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; Manolo v.
Lukban, 48 Phil. 973). The land in this case having been registered and covered by an original
certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, it is within the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. Thus, the decree of registration granted by the lower court in favor of the
petitioners may be reviewed on the ground of actual and extrinsic fraud pursuant to Section 38
of the same Act.
There is likewise no merit in the third assigned error. While there was an admission that the
petitioners have been in actual possession of the disputed land since 1938, it was made to show
and prove the fact that the petitioners are only antichretic creditors. The respondents never
admitted that they have not possessed the land at all. On the contrary, they alleged that they
and their predecessors-in-interest namely Gregoria Pascual and Agapita Bonifacio have been in
possession of the land since time immemorial and that the petitioners were placed in possession
of the land pursuant to a contract of antichresis.
The court below found that the petitioners are merely antichretic creditors. This finding and its
factual bases were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On the basis of the evidence supporting
this conclusion, this finding is binding on us as it is not our duty to weigh evidence on this point
all over again. This court has on several occasions held that the antichretic creditor cannot
ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor (Trillana v.
Manansala, et al., 96 Phil. 865; Valencia v. Acala, 42 Phil. 177; Barreto v. Barreto, 3 Phil. 234).
The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owner but mere holders placed in
possession of the land by its owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring
dominion (See Art. 540, Civil Code).
The fourth issue raised by the petitioners is answered by a referral to the detailed factual
findings and conclusions of the trial court. Ten pages of the record on appeal (Record on Appeal,
CA-G.R. No. 40425-R, pp. 56-66) state in convincing detail the portion of the trial court's
decision which support its conclusion that Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio are not the
owners of the disputed land and have no registrable right over it and that the respondents
herein have established their ownership by a strong preponderance of evidence. The
respondents were declared the true and real owners and entitled to registration in their names.
The final resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. We see no
reversible error in this finding.
The argument of laches is explained and countered by the close relationship of the parties and
the nature of a contract of antichresis. The private respondents are nephews and nieces, with
their spouses, of the petitioners. Moreover, there is evidence to show that long before the filing
of the cases, there had been attempts to recover the property.
In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to affirm the appellate court's decision. We note,
however, that in spite of the finding of an existing contract of antichresis between the parties,
the two courts below did not order the payment of the principal amount of mortgage. Under
Article 2136 of the Civil Code, the debtor cannot reacquire the enjoyment of the immovable
without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with a modification that the
respondents are ordered to pay the petitioners the amount of P 400.00 as principal for the
contract of antichresis, the fruits obtained from the possession of the land having been applied
to the interests on the loan.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.