G.R. No.

101251 November 5, 1992

ELISEO A. SINON, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-REORGANIZATION
APPEALS BOARD AND JUANA BANAN, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J .:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the following Resolutions of the public
respondents Civil Service Commission (the "CSC") * and Department of Agriculture
Reorganization Appeals Board (the "DARAB"), ** to wit:
1. Resolution No. 97 dated August 23, 1989, issued by respondent
DARAB which revoked petitioner's permanent appointment as
Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) and appointed, in his stead, private
respondent Juana Banan (Rollo17);
2. Resolution dated February 8, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC
affirming the aforementioned Resolution of respondent DARAB
(Rollo 22);
3. Resolution dated July 11, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC which
denied petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the respondent
Commission's Resolution dated February 8, 1991.
1

The antecedent facts are as follows:
Prior to the reorganization of the then Minister of Agriculture and Food (the "MAF"), the
private respondent Juana Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO)
of the aforesaid Minister in Region II, Cagayan, while the petitioner Eliseo Sinon occupied
the position of Fisheries Extension Specialist (FES) II in the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) in the same region.
However, the reorganization of the MAF into the Department of Agriculture (the "DA"), with
the issuance of Executive Order No. 116 dated 30 January 1987, called for the evaluation
of the following employees for twenty nine position of MAO in Region II, Cagayan. The list
as prepared by the Placement Committee included the herein petitioner Sinon but
excluded the respondent Banan:
1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20%
2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01%
3. Sebastian, Alice 74.18%
4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73%
5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50%
6. Gervacio, Agnes 69.86%
7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13%
8. Tolentino, Julian R. 67.64%
9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22%
10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00%
11. Aquino, Martina 66.94%
12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84%
13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%
14. Zareno, Bernardo 65.57%
15. Madrid, Angel S. 65.57%
16. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%
17. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
18. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
19. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42%
20. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01%
21. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07%
22. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%
23. Miguel, Jose 61.86%
24. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%
25. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%
26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%
27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%
28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67%
29. Sinon, Eliseo A. 60.66%
2

(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, respondents Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation of the
qualification of all those included in the aforementioned list made by the Placement
Committee.
On August 23, 1989, the DARAB released Resolution No. 97 in which the ranking for 29
MAO prepared by the Placement Committee was re-evaluated as follows:
1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20%
2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01%
3. Sebastian, Alice 72.18%
4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73%
5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50%
6. Gervacio, Agnes 70.04%
7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13%
8. Tolentino, Julian Jr. 67.22%
9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22%
10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00%
11. Aquino, Martina D. 66.94%
12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84%
13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%
14. Madrid, Angel 65.57%
15. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%
16. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
17. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
18. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42%
19. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01%
20. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07%
21. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%
22. Miguel, Jose L. 61.86%
23. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%
24. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%
25. Zareno, Bernardo 61.50%
26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%
27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%
28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67%
29. Banan, Juana 59.32%
2

(Emphasis supplied)
In this re-evaluation, petitioner Sinon was displaced by the respondent Banan and this
same resolution was duly approved by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture,
Carlos G. Dominguez, who also affixed his signature on the same date.
However, on August 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for Region II in
Cagayan as approved by Regional Director Gumersindo D. Lasam on the basis of the first
evaluation made by the Placement Committee.
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal docketed as Civil Service Case No. 573 on November 22,
1989 to the CSC. This appeal was granted mainly for two reasons: first, the respondent
DARAB failed to file its Comment within the period required; and second, the evaluation of
the qualification of the employees is a question of fact which the appointing authority or the
Placement Committee assisting him is in a better position to determine. Hence, the
Resolution dated 28 February 1989 of the DARAB was set aside.
4

On March 19, 1990, Banan filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which she pitted her
qualifications against Sinon for the last slot in the 29 available MAO positions. At the same
time, she pointed out that to allow the findings of the Placement Committee to supersede
the DARAB resolution which the Secretary of Agriculture had approved would be
tantamount to giving precedence to the Placement Committee over the head of the
agency.
Finally, on February 8, 1991, CSC, after reviewing the Comment filed by the DARAB which
had not been considered earlier in the Civil Service Case No. 573, the CSC granted
respondent Banan's Motion for Reconsideration and gave due course to her appointment
by the DARAB.
On March 21, 1991, Sinon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 8, 1991
Resolution which however was denied by the CSC in its assailed Resolution dated July 11,
1991.
According to the respondent CSC:
Mr. Sinon strongly argued that the findings of the Placement Committee
on the qualifications of the parties should be accorded deference and
greater weight over that of the RAB. Under the Placement Committee's
evaluation, Mr. Sinon garnered 60.66 while Ms. Juana Banan earned
57.32 after assessing the contending parties qualification in education,
relevant experience, eligibility and other factors. Following the request
of several parties for reevaluation, the RAB in their decision gave Mr.
Sinon 57.66 while Ms. Banan obtained 59.32. Seemingly the findings of
the two bodies are in conflict. Mr. Sinon argues that the findings of the
Placement Committee should prevail since it is specially mandated by
RA 6656.
We disagree. The Placement Committee's function is recommendatory in nature. The
agency's Reorganization Appeals Board was specially created by the Circular of the Office
of the President dated October 2, 1987 and conferred with authority to review appeals and
complaints of officials and employees affected by the reorganization. the decision of the
agency RAB has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is therefore controlling
in matters of and is therefore controlling in matters of appointment. Under this principle, the
decision of the DARAB in this case enjoys precedence over the Placement Committee.
5

Hence, this petition was filed with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order to enjoin the execution of the assailed resolutions.
Without giving due course to the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, the court
required the parties to file their respective Comments.
6

On 12 November 1991, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective Memoranda.
7

The main issue for Our consideration is this: whether or not the CSC committed grave
abuse discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the ring or qualification of the petitioner
Sinon.
The arguments of the petitioner can be summed up as follows:
1). In issuing the Resolution of 8 February 1991, the CSC in effect
revoked the appointment that the petitioner received as early as 30
August 1989 and which was deemed permanent by virtue of the
approval of the Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture:
2). In giving petitioner a rating of only 57.66%, 8 from his previous
rating of 60.66% and at the same time according a rating of 59.32% to
private respondent from a rating of only 57.32%, the CSC departed
from its power which is limited only to that of "review", and hence
encroached upon the power of appointment exclusively lodged in the
appointment authority;
3) In giving due course to the appointment of respondent Banan in its
Resolution of 8 February 1991, CSC was directing the appointment of a
substitute of their own choice when the power to appoint was
exclusively lodged in the appointing authority.
We rule as follows.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
9

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, We do not find any evidence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CSC when it issued Resolution dated 8 February 1991 which
in effect approved the appointment of respondent Banan over petitioner Sinon.
With the reorganization of the MAF into the DA with Executive order No. 116, it became
imperative to "protect the security of tenure of Civil Service Officers and employees in the
implementation of government reorganization". Thus, Congress passed Republic Act No.
6656.
10

It was under the same law of R.A. 6656 that the Placement Committee was created:
Section 6. In order that the best qualified and mot deserving persons
shall be appointed in any reorganization, there shall be created a
Placement Committee in each department or agency to assist the
appointing authority in the judicious selection and placement of
personnel. The Committee shall consist of two (2) members appointed
by the head of the department or agency, a representative of the
appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the
employees holding positions in the first and second levels of the career
service: Provided, that if there is a registered employee association with
a majority of the employees as members, that employee association
shall also have a representative in the Committee: Provided, Further,
that immediately upon the approval of the staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned, such staffing pattern shall be made
known to all officers and employees of the agency who shall be invited
to apply for any of the positions authorized therein. Such application
shall be considered by the committee in the placement and selection of
personnel. (Emphasis supplied).
To "assist" mean to lend an aid to,
11
or to contribute effort in the complete accomplishment
of an ultimate purpose intended to be effected by those engaged.
12

In contrast, to "recommend"
13
is to present one's advice or choice as having one's
approval or to represent or urge as advisable or expedient. It involves the Idea that another
has the final decision.
Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising
the same discretionary functions as the appointing authority in the judicious selection and
placement of personnel when the law empowered it to "assist" the appointment authority.
The same law also allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the appointments to file an
appeal with the appointing authority who shall made a decision within thirty (30) days from
the filing thereof. If the same employee is still not satisfied with the decision of the
appointing authority, he may further appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof
the CSC.
14

In the case at bar, the Circular dated October 2, 1987 of the Office of the President created
the agency Reorganization Appeals Board to address the problem of the employees
affected by the reorganizations.
The foregoing legal measures spell out the remedies of aggrieved parties which make it
impossible to give the status of finality to any appointment until all protests or oppositions
are duly heard.
Thus, while it is true that the appointment paper received by petitioner Sinon on 30 August
1989 for the position of MAO had not conferred any permanent status and was still subject
to the following conditions attached to any appointment in the civil service:
Provided that there is no pending administrative case against the
appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any
decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval
of the appointment .
15

Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the qualification filed by Banan was pending, the
petitioner cannot claim that he had been issued with a "complete" appointment. Neither is
there any point in asserting that his appointment had "cured" whatever changes was
subsequently recommended by the DARAB.
16

The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement
Committed only to find that Sinon is not qualified should no be taken as a grave abuse of
discretion.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence that the public respondent CSC had
disregarded the findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings of the
Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings were re-evaluated and the report after
such re-evaluation was submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. The
CSC affirmed the findings of the DARAB.
Because of all the foregoing circumstances, the jurisprudence cited by the petitioner Sinon
appears to be incorrect.
17

Neither do we find in the Resolution of 8 February 1991, any statement by the CSC
directing the appointment of the respondent Banan. Hence, there was no directive from the
CSC that may be misinterpreted as a usurpation of any appointing power.
18

Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as recommended by the DARAB and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, the CSC is only being consistent with the law.
Section 4 or R.A. 6656 mandates that officers and employees holding permanent
appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions in the
approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions. Also, the term incumbent
officer and the privileges generally accorded to them would more aptly refer to Banan and
not to petitioner Sinon whose appointment was never confirmed completely.
19
There is no
dispute that the position of MAO in the old staffing pattern is most comparable to the MAO
in the new staffing pattern.
Finally, the Solicitor General in behalf of the CSC correctly noted that the petitioner Sinon
had conveniently omitted the then Secretary of Agriculture who had affixed his approval on
the findings of the DARAB. Petitioner Sinon knew fully well that as head of the agency, the
Secretary of Agriculture was the appointing authority.
It must be recalled that the whole purpose of reorganization is that is it is a "process of
restructuring the bureaucracy's organizational and functional set-up, to make it more viable
in terms of the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and make it more responsive to the
needs of its public clientele as authorized by law."
20
For as long as the CSC confines itself
within the limits set out by law and does not encroach upon the prerogatives endowed to
other authorities, this Court must sustain the Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-25024. March 30, 1970. 32 SCRA 188

Teodoro C. Santiago, JR. minor, represented by his mother, Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-
appellant, vs. Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin,
Aida Camino, Luna Sarmago, Aurora Lorena, Soledad Francisco and Mr. Flor Marcelo, respondents-
appellees.


Facts: Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the
"Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at
said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the
school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca
Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the
above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and
Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation
exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer"
Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the
invalidation of the "ranking of honor students."

Issue: Whether or not there is an actual cause of action for petition for certiorari.

Ruling: No. The court held to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of
appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's
holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order
subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by precedents
as well.

May 30, 1952
G.R. No. L-4606
RAMON B. FELIPE, SR., as Chairman, Board of Judges, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, EMMA
IMPERIAL, represented by her guardian-ad-litem JUSTO V. IMPERIAL, and SOUTHERN
LUZON COLLEGE, respondents.
Ramon Felipe, Jr., and L. B. Karingal for petitioner.
Ezequiel S. Grageda and Victoriano Yamson for respondents Judge Leuterio and Emma Imperial.
Padilla and San Juan for respondent Southern Luzon College.
BENGZON, J .:
Statement of the case. The issue in the litigation is whether the courts have the authority to reverse
the award of the board of judges of an oratorical competition.
In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the board of five
judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court
of the first instance of that province to reversed that award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen
to error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the objection of the other four judges
of the contest, the court declared Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence this special civil
action challenging the court's power to modify the board's verdict.
The facts. There is no dispute about the facts:
1. On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga City. The
contestants were eight, among them Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis General, Jr.
2. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon B. Felipe, Sr. being the
Chairman.
3. After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after the judges had expressed their
votes, the Chairman publicly announced their decision awarding first price to Nestor Nosce, second
price to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro Benavides and fourth place to Luis General, Jr.
4. Four days afterwards, Emma Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the
verdict, and alleging that one of the Judges had committed a mathematical mistake, resulting in her
second place only, instead of the first, which she therefore claimed.
5. Upon refusal of the Board to amend their award, she filed a complaint in the court of first
instance.
6. At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank form wherein he give the participants
grades according to his estimate of their abilities, giving number 1 to the best, number 2 to the
second best etc., down to number 8. Then the grades were added, and the contestant receiving the
lowest number got first prize, the next second prize, etc.
7. The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10; Benevides 17, General 17, the
Board of judges having voted as follows:
Judge Nosce Imperial Buenavides General
Felipe Sr. ......... 3 1 2 4
Obias .............. 1 2 4 3
Rodriguez .......... 1 4 5 3
Prado .............. 3 2 1 3
Moll ............... 2 1 5 4

10 10 17 17
8. It appearing that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial had tied for the first place, the Chairman,
apparently with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding first honors to Nosce and second
honors to Imperial.
9. For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained blank spaces in which, after
the names of the rival orators and their respective orations, the judge could not jot down the grades
he thought the contestants deserved according to "Originality", "Timeliness", "English", "Stage
Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and "Voice". From such data he made up his vote.
10. It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin Rodriguez, one of the Judges, gave Imperial
and General the following ratings under the above headings; Imperial 19-15-15-18-14-14 Total 94-
Place 4th General 19-15-15 or 14-19-14-14 Total 95-Place 3rd.
11. Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rd place in
Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten,
with the result that she copped first place in the speaking joust.
12. Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding up Imperial's ratings; that she should have
been given a total of 95, or placed No. 3, the same as General; that he was not disposed to break the
tie between her and General and insisted that he wanted to give rank 3 to Imperial and rank 3 also to
General.
Discussion. Although it would seem anomalous for one judge to give the same rank to two
contestants, we will concede for the moment that Delfin Rodriguez could have given 3 to Imperial
to General.
However if deductions are to be made from his recorded vote (Exhibit 3) one may infer that after
the contest and before submitting his vote he decided to give General an edge over Imperial. How?
Under the caption "English" General was given by himself at first "14", later increased to "15".
Evidently because after he had added the ratings of Imperial and (erroneously) reached the sum of
94, he added the ratings of General (which were the same as Imperial with 14 under "English") and
(mistakenly) reached 94 also. So what did he also? He raised the 14 to 15 and thus gave general 95
to place him over Imperial's 94. (Mistakingly again, because with 15 General got 96 instead of 95).
But to us the important thing is Rodriguez' vote during and immediately after the affair. His vote in
Exhibit 3 definitely gave General place No. 3 and Imperial place No. 4. His calculations recorded
on Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact the Chairman did not bother to fill out the blank spaces in his
own form, and merely set down his conclusions giving one to Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc. without
specifying the ratings for "Voice", "English", "Stage Personality" etc. In other words what counted
was the vote.
Probably for the above reasons the board refused to "correct" the alleged error.
The situation then is this: Days after a contest has been conducted and the winners announced, one
of the judges confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the second place winner should
have been such as would entitle her to first place. The other judges refuse to alter their verdict. May
the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new award, reversing the decision of the board of
judges?
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in
these islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this
court have taken part in them either as contestants in their school days
[[
1
]]
, or as members of the
board of judges afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference
and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever
presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's
decision is final and unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets
of sportmanship: finally of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants
are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes
are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because their's was merely the privilege
to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until
they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in
American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some reason
for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its
assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish
a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1,
p. 1012).
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that
where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general
jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of
the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do
not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or
violation of a right. As stated before, a contestanthas no right to the prize unless and until he or she
is declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum
absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different
proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who
fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
By the way what is here in stated must not be understood as applying to those activities which the
government has chosen to regulate with the creation of the Games and Amusements Board in
Executive Order No. 392, Series 1950.
Judgment. In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so declare, that the judiciary has
no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it
would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.
Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.

LIMKETKAI VS CA
Facts: On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estate broker was given
formal authority by BPI to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. The owners of the
Philippine Remnants concurred this arrangement. Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of
petitioner company who agreed to buy the land. On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally informed
BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein petitioner. On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials,
Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to confirm the sale. Vice-President Merlin
Albano and Asst. Vice-President Aromin entertained them. The parties agreed that the lot
would be sold at P1,000.00 per square meter to be paid in cash. The authority to sell was
on a first come, first served and non-exclusive basis; there is no dispute over petitioner's
being the first comer and the buyer to be first served. Alfonso Lim then asked if it was
possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to ask
for payment on terms because in previous transactions, the same had been allowed. It
was the understanding, however, that should the term payment be disapproved, then the
price shall be paid in cash. Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay
on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full
payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused because Albano stated
that the authority to sell that particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from
his unit. The same check was tendered to BPI Vice-President Nelson Bona who also
refused to receive payment. An action for specific performance with damages was
thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI
informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS on July 14,
1989.

Issue: Whether or not such contract is covered by the statute of frauds.

Held: In the case at bench, the allegation that there was no concurrence of the offer and
the acceptance upon the cause of the contract is belied by the testimony of the very BPI
official with whom the contract was perfected. Aromin and Albano concluded the sale for
BPI. The fact that the deed of sale still had to be signed andnotarized does not mean that
no contract had already been perfected. A sale of land is valid regardless of the form it
may have been entered into. The requisite form under Article 1458 of the Civil Code is
merely for greater efficacy or convenience and the failure to comply does not affect the
validity and binding effect of the act between parties. Therefore, such contract that was
made constituted fraud and is covered by the statute of frauds. BPI should be held liable
and can be sued for damages.

Fortich vs CoronaDate: August 19, 1999
Petitioners: Hon. Carlos Fortich, Hon Rey Baula, et al Respondents: Hon. Renato Corona, Hon.
Ernesto Garilao, et al Ponente: Ynares Santiago
Facts: Concerns the MR of the courts resolution dated November 17, 1998 and motion to refer the
case to the Court en banc. In previous case, the Court voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration, as a result of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution
dated January 27, 1999 that the movants have no legal personalityto seek redress before the Court as
their motion to intervene was already denied and that the motion torefer the case to the Court en
banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited. In this motion, both respondents and intervenors
prayed that the case be referred to the case inbanc inasmuch as their earlier MR was resolved by a
vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision under the Constitution (3 votes) was not
met.
Issue: WON failure to meet the three votes justifies the referral of the case to the court en banc
Held: No
Ratio:A careful reading of the constitutional provision reveals the intention of the framers to draw
adistinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are
decidedwhile matters, which include motions, are resolved.
Otherwise put, the word decided must refer tocases; while the word resolved must refer to
matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulisWith this interpretation, it is clear that only
cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not
obtained in the resolution of a MR. Hence, the second sentence of the provision speaks only of
case and notmatter.
The reason is simple. Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If
there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it
to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the
losing party files a MR, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the
failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite
plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is
not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The
publicrespondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing
that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but
also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.


Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and
executory, still has jurisdiction over the case


Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its
powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after thejudgment has
become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of
its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the
Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.
It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have
been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes
and orders to make them comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the
TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function
under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can
be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state
of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an
exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of
the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict
do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right
than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right
to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

PEOPLE VS MATEO
Posted by kaye lee on 6:31 PM
G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7 2004 [Judicial Power]

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of
rape and to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA.
Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express
provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment or death.

RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving
offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it
does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding
an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked
absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are
convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the
recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e.,
the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had
to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the
direct mandate to review factual issues.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC,
GR No. 132922, April 21, 1998



Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.
It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it
was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the
subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to
bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television
time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and
impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure
print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time
shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles
out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in
providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so
again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to
provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to
petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day
and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs
requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.


Issues:
1. Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
2. Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property
without due process of law and without just compensation.

Held:
Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to
assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of
the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and
supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of
the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of
print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a
fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private
property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding
due notice.
Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void
and of no legal force and effect.
Issue:
WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO
Held:
All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court.
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and
are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not
wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should
not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why?
The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary.

Fabian vs. Desierto G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. Private
respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an
amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent
gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same
in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of
suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman discovered that the private respondents new counsel had been his classmate and
close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges. Petitioner
appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.


Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is valid
Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be
brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the
courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the
SC.

Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)
Posted: August 24, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Judicial Department 0
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which
have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had
been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment
into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to
the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano
Posted on December 8, 2012
Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor
Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to
a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way
amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st
Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions
are concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to
any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987
Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in
the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the
rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct &
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by
the organic law of its existence.
Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and
its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and
orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective.
There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City
Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise
any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any
study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely
deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the
poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and
limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to
legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

CSC vs DBM
FACTS:
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed a Motion for Reconsideration for
the decision rendered by the Supreme Court dated July 22, 2005. The petition was about
the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Civil Service Commission, wherein their approved
annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly be released even without
submitting the required reports. DBM posited that fiscal autonomy means preference is
terms of cash allocation is not supported by the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DBM is correct for imposing a no report no release policy?
HELD:
NO. Finally, while acknowledging the unconstitutionality of imposing a no report no release
policy on agencies clothed with fiscal autonomy x x x This is not to say that agencies
vested with fiscal autonomy have no reporting responsibility at all at DBM.


Aratuc vs. COMELEC88 SCRA 251

FACTS:
On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the BatasangPambansa were held
throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII
which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,Maguindanao, North Cotabato
and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan andCotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the
suspension of the canvass then being undertaken byRegional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City
and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107voting centers in the whole region had already been
canvassed showing partial results. ASupervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon.
Venancio S. Duque hadconducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the
alleged irregularities inthe election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the
Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan
candidates,declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken
by theKB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its
questionedresolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the
firsteight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winningcandidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
HELD:
As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, theComelec may
review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extendingits inquiry beyond
the election records of the voting centers in questions.The authority of the Commission is in
reviewing such actuations does not spring from anyappellant jurisdiction conferred by any
provisions of the law, for there is none such provisionanywhere in the election Code, but from the
plenary prerogative of direct control andsupervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section
168. And in administrative law, it is a toowell settled postulate to need any supporting citation
here, that a superior body or office havingsupervision and control over another may do directly
what the latter is supposed to do or oughtto have done.

Delos Santos v. Mallare
G.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950
Tuason, J.

Facts:

Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on
July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to
exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was
extended an ad interimappointment by the President to the same position, after which, on
June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications
directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos
refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as
Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the
position, he commenced these proceedings.

Issue:

whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for
assignment to another position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that"No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law."

Held:

Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing
all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments
in the Civil Service, except as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." Section 670 of the Revised
Administrative Code provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to
the classified service," and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not
expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671 described persons
in the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant
directors of bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other
officers of the government whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the
Philippines alone."

Three specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily
confidentialand highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at
pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None
of these exceptions obtain in the present case.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining,
nor highly technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of
the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal
trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining.
A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of its
subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City
Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557
of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the
position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is
he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree,
which is the sense in which "highly technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are
hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not
lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are
eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical
men possessing executive ability.


De Los Santos v Yatco (106 PHIL 745)
Article IX (B), Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination. (3) No officer
or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied
to government employees. (6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such
protection as may be provided by law.
Facts:
Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his
previous order for execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land
is being occupied by Fernando Mendoez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to
the petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made
shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendoez
for failure to pay as per agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to
take the land back. Defendant Mendoez moved for postponement to give both parties sufficient
time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It was settled by both
parties that Mendoez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment
the petitioner refused to abide with their agreement and now asking for a higher amount of
money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco
quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
RULING:
The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him
especially when it was improvidently issued. There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since the
defendant made an opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal agreement that
amended the compromise hence the execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The
consequent ability of the defendant to meet his obligations by securing a GSIS loan also justifies
the courts refusal to eject him from the premises by an execution.

G.R. No. L-17171 January 30, 1965
FERNANDO D. GUEVARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, respondent.
Ramon C. Fernandez for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
BENGZON, J.P., J .:
Sometime in 1954 the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a program of work and
detailed estimate for the reconstruction of the Sorsogon Central School building at
Burabod, Sorsogon. Specifications consisting of five pages were likewise prepared. The
cost of painting was left out in the detailed estimate and specifications. The papers were
submitted to the Division Engineer in Lucena, Quezon, who returned them duly approved
with an authorized appropriation of P40,000.00 "provided that painting shall be included".
Whereupon, the specification for painting was accordingly made and appended to the
specifications as page six.
In August 1954 the District Engineer advertised an invitation to bid for "furnishing of all
materials, labor and plant, for the reconstruction" project. Prospective bidders were
required to apply for issuance of plans, specifications and/or proposal book on which they
could base their price proposals. Among those who applied and were issued the plans and
specifications for the project was Fernando Guevara. Sealed bids were subsequently
opened on September 25, 1954. Fernando Guevara's bid of P37,500.00 was declared
lowest and the contract was awarded to him. On December 17, 1954, Guevara and
Casiano T. Ubalde, the latter acting for the Director of Public Works, signed the contract. In
its Article I, the complete plans and specifications were expressly made a part of the
contract. On January 31, 1955 Guevara was furnished by mail a copy of the contract with
all its appendices. Petitioner does not deny that his copy of the contract as well as the file
copy of the District Engineer contain the specifications which include painting.
Eighty-five days after the contract was signed the construction was completed. The
contract price was paid in eight monthly amortizations during the period of construction,
based upon work satisfactorily completed during the preceding month. Guevara collected
the final payment thereon.
On May 24, 1955, or eight days after completion of the project, Guevara filed with the
Director of Public Works a written claim for the payment of P4,620.00 representing cost of
painting not covered by the contract. After hearing, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications denied the claim. Two petitions for reconsideration were denied. On
appeal, the Auditor General also denied the claim. Guevara has appealed to this Court
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 327.
The issue is whether or not the contract for the reconstruction of the school building
included painting.
Guevara contends that the bidders were not aware of the inclusion of painting because the
District Engineer did not add painting to the plans and specifications furnished them prior
to the bidding.
In support of his allegation Guevara presented the affidavits of two other bidders, namely,
Francisco V. Nicolas and Amadeo Briones. Affiants stated therein that the bids they
submitted did not include painting because the specifications given them had no such
provision.1wph1.t
At the time of the hearing Amadeo Briones was already dead. The other affiant was not
presented. Under the circumstances, We entertain doubt as to the probative value of the
affidavits
1
especially because affiants, being contractors themselves, may be inclined to
favor petitioner in his claim as against the government. Affidavits are easily concocted to
suit desired ends.
We find more convincing the testimonies of Santiago P. Ojeda, Juan S. Lopez and Cesar
Gacias, senior carpenter, general foreman and clerk, respectively, in the District Engineer's
Office. Santiago P. Ojeda testified that when he prepared the original specifications he did
not include painting. Juan S. Lopez, however, declared that when the detailed estimate
and specifications were approved by the Division Engineer, he prepared the specification
for painting. Cesar Gacias testified that his duty was to distribute the specifications to
prospective bidders; that upon receiving from Juan S. Lopez the specifications in question
he sorted and checked them; that said specifications contained six pages, with the
specification for painting appearing on the sixth page; and that copies of the complete
specifications were distributed to prospective bidders Guevara, Nicolas, Jabson and
Briones. These government employees testified as to what transpired in the performance
of their duties. The presumption is that official duty has been regularly performed (Section
5[m], Rule 131, Rules of Court). No evidence has been adduced to overcome this
presumption save the affidavits of Nicolas and Briones, which, is afore-stated, are of
doubtful probative value.
Petitioner further alleges that he discovered the inclusion of painting in the specifications
only when the painting of the building was almost completed, for pre-occupied with 13
other projects, he had entrusted to his assistant, Leoncio Vasquez, the reconstruction of
the school building in question.
On the other hand, Santiago P. Ojeda, building inspector for the project, testified that
Guevara submitted to the District Engineer, as required, sample of the paints he (Guevara)
purchased. Hence, Guevara knew that painting was part of the specifications.
Furthermore, during the period of construction Guevara made several collections under the
contract, and the vouchers he presented therefor carried "painting and varnishing" as one
of the units of work rated to determine how much should be paid. Guevara's use of the
estimate of work to support the vouchers displays his knowledge and awareness during
the construction that his contract covered painting of the building.
We noted that subsequent to the filing of petitioner's claim, his assistant, Leoncio Vasquez,
while visiting the office of the District Engineer, borrowed from the official custodian, Cesar
Gacias, the specifications for the project in question. Alert and careful in the performance
of his duty, Gacias lent Vasquez the official file copy of the specifications but only after he
had checked the number of pages composing the file. After it was returned, Gacias saw
that the file was short of one page, and the one missing was precisely page 6 of the
specifications containing the provision for painting. Whereupon, he immediately confronted
Vasquez with the discrepancy and grabbed the notebook which the latter tucked under his
arm. Gacias found folded and concealed inside the notebook the missing page. Several
co-employees witnessed the shameful incident. We express our condemnation of
Vasquez's behavior.
Finally, petitioner Guevara, a civil engineer, has twenty years' experience as public works
contractor. He must have acquired first-hand knowledge of the mechanics of government
contracting as well as skill in administering construction contracts. The other 13 projects he
said he had, justify our impression. The practice of contractors, before submitting any bid
or proposal, is to verify with the office of the District Engineer the fund available for a
project, approval of the plans, specifications and program of work and other relevant and
necessary matters in prosecuting a government contract. From his experience and know-
how We can be certain that petitioner, prior to submission of his bid, called on the District
Engineer of Sorsogon to make his verification. By doing so, he would have noted the first
indorsement dated August 9, 1954 approving the detailed estimate and program of work
and requiring that painting be included. From that moment, he must have been aware that
he would bid for a construction work that included painting. In the event that Guevara
dispensed with verification, he alone should bear the consequences of his negligence.
Our finding therefore is that the contract between Fernando Guevara and the Bureau of
Public Works provided for the painting of the school building. As petitioner has been fully
paid the contract price of P37,500.00, no additional payment is due.
WHEREFORE, We hereby affirm the decision of the Auditor General, with costs against
petitioner. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 95445 August 6, 1991
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN
ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG and other teacher-members so numerous similarly
situated, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. ISIDRO CARIO in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports

Facts: September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day.
There is no question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not
conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R. No.
95590,
4
they converged at the LiwasangBonifacio in the morning whence they proceeded
to the National Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a
whole-day assembly.
Issue: Do public teachers have the right to strike?

Ruling : NO,THE MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION HAS NO
RIGHT TO STRIKE DURING CLASS HOURS.
The dissenting opinions, however, would anchor their defense of the public
school teachers on their right to petition the government for redress of grievances.


JOSEPH H. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J .:
Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC
[1]
Provident Fund Board of Trustees, filed
this petition with the Supreme Court on June 17, 1996, as an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of
the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision
[2]
of the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing
the refund of the government share in the fund to the employee-members, and the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
[3]

By Resolution No. 89-003,
[4]
the TLRC Executive Committee created a Provident Fund the
primary purpose of which was to augment the retirement benefits of the officers and employees of
TLRC. The Provident Fund also provided additional benefits
[5]
to its members, in accordance with
the policies and guidelines approved by the Board of Trustees. The Funds sources of capital were
from contributions of each member consisting of 2% of his gross monthly salary and TLRCs or the
governments counterpart share equivalent to 10% of the members gross monthly salary, earnings
of funds and others.
[6]

On June 3, 1993, Corporate Auditor Adelaida S. Flores suspended the transfer of funds from
TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991, amounting to P11,065,715.84, per Notice of
Suspension No. 93-006
[7]
. Auditor Flores held that under Par. 5.4 of Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10, Rules and Regulations issued under R.A. 6758,
[8]
fringe benefits were allowed
provided that statutory authority covered such grant of benefits. In this case, there is no law
authorizing the grant of fringe benefits to TLRC officers and employees. Furthermore, all Provident
Funds are covered by R.A. 4537,
[9]
to which TLRC may not qualify.
On September 14, 1993, the TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees issued Resolution No.
93-2-21
[10]
, discontinuing the collection of contributions for the Fund from both the TLRC and the
members. It also ordered the members personal contributions collected from March 1, 1993 until
September 15, 1993, refunded to them immediately. On September 21, 1993, the Board issued
Resolution 93-2-22
[11]
dissolving the Provident Fund and ordering the distribution of the personal
and corporate shares to the members thereof, on or before October 31, 1993.
On December 2, 1993, Corporate Auditor Flores issued Notice of Disallowance No. 93-003,
disallowing in audit the amount of P11,065,715.84, representing the governments share paid to the
TLRC Provident Fund refunded to members, covering the period 1990 to 1991, including all
amounts that may have been transferred to the Fund after 1991.
[12]

Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Board of Trustees, appealed the
disallowance to the Commission on Audit. On October 12, 1995, the Commission on Audit denied
the appeal per Decision No. 95-571.
[13]
The Commission ruled that the governments share in the
Provident Fund must be reverted to the TLRC and not be given to the employees. It held that since
the primary purpose of the Provident Fund was not realized or attained due to its discontinuance and
dissolution, then the employees were not entitled to the governments share in the Fund.
On December 7, 1995, petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit seeking a reversal of COA
Decision No. 95-571. On May 2, 1996, the Commission on Audit denied the motion for
reconsideration per Decision No. 96-236.
[14]

Hence, this petition to review the decision of the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner contends that the dissolution of the Provident Fund does not render illegal the
distribution of governments share to the members. He avers that when TLRC made its
contributions to the Provident Fund, it had divested itself of the ownership of whatever
contributions it gave. Furthermore, the money contributed to the fund became a trust fund for the
benefit of the members. Upon the dissolution of the Fund, the legal and equitable titles were merged
in the members, as beneficiaries. He asserts that the members have a vested right, not only on their
own contributions, but to the government share as well. He claims that since the Fund's
pretermination or dissolution was not due to the members' fault, then it would be unfair and greatly
prejudicial to deprive them of the government share to which they are entitled.
We are not impressed. We deny the petition.
To begin with, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of
rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party.
[15]
Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment or final
order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari
under Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the
Commission on Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by
the 1987 Constitution.
[16]
The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not
reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appealvia certiorari to this Court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
[17]
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court
under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or
decision of the Commission on Audit.
However, setting aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and treating the petition as one for
certiorari under Rule 65, we find that the Commission on Audit did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in disallowing the distribution of the government share in the aborted TLRC Provident
Fund to its members. As correctly pointed out by the COA in its decision,
[18]
the government
contributions were made on the condition that the same would be used to augment the retirement
and other benefits of the TLRC employees. Since the purpose was not attained due to the question
on the validity of the Fund, then the employees are not entitled to claim the government share
disbursed as its counterpart contribution to the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the use
of public funds outside the specific purpose for which the funds were appropriated.
There is no merit to petitioner's claim that the members of the Provident Fund acquired a
vested right over the government contributions. "A vested right is one which is absolute, complete
and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect
in itself and not dependent upon a contingency,"
[19]
As previously stated, the government
contributions were subject to the condition that the funds would be used to augment the retirement
and other fringe benefits of TLRC employees.
What is more, the Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis. Thus,
contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commission on Audit.


Guevara vs. COMELEC 104 Phil 269
Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
Facts:
Jose Guevara published in the Sunday Times an article entitled Ballot Boxes Contract Hit.
COMELEC ordered him to show just cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
COMELEC claimed that such article would undermine the exclusive constitutional function of
Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and member SixtoBrilliantes in the admin of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections
National Shipyards and Steel Corp, Acme Steel, Asiatic Steel to manufacture and supply COMELEC
ballotboxesCOMELEC cancelled contract with ACME as the latter failed to sign contract within
designated time
.Issue:
WON COMELEC had jurisdiction and authority to investigate and punish petitioner forcontempt in
connection with the alleged publication
Held: NORatio:
The controversy arose from the ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning forthe
necessary ballot boxes in connection with the elctions.
It was a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise power to punish contempt as postulated in thelaw, for
such power is inherently judicial in nature.

AZARCON VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving
business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the
formers premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR
commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and
other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a
delinquenttaxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by
accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer,surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as
custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had
made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla
surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that
Azarcons failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his
responsibility.

Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime
of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day
of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied
by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated
by BIR as a custodian of distrained property.

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayans decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified
therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged
with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have
no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in
signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take
part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized
by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent
authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained
truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a
public officer. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary
cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon
is not a public officer.

I MBONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar, J.

FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional
Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969,
the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention
shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each representative district.
On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing
Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2.
Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong
questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters
of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly.
The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4
and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its
legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art.
XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the
law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the
apportionment of delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running
for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1
of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in
the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate
thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the
petitioners.

LAMBINO VS COMELEC
Amendment vs Revision
Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition
to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per
centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least
3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars
as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI
and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These
proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of
the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC.
Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to
the parties within that case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The
proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving
that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that
the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed
amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners
merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full
text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a
proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposedamendment/s by
petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be
parliament to enact more rules.
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon
other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are
other means to resolve an issue at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the
Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735 is
adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions
already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is
sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis. See
discussion here

****RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor

MANUEL LEYSON, JR. VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. NO. 134990 (2000) Facts: D
committed a breach in his contract with P. P charged D with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombusdman. P also filed a collection case before the RTC
against D. Issue: Whether P committed forum-shopping Held: No. Forum-shopping consists of
filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent that the
present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein, i.e., violation of The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Acts, is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial
court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages.