What Is The Logical Form of Probability Attribution in QM

What Is the Logical Form of Probability Assignment in Quantum Mechanics?
Author(s): John F. Halpin

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 36-60
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
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WHAT IS THE LOGICAL FORM OF PROBABILITY
ASSIGNMENT IN QUANTUM MECHANICS?*
JOHN F. HALPINt
Department of Philosophy
Oakland University
The nature of quantum mechanical probability has often seemed mysterious.
To shed some light on this topic, the present paper analyzes the logical form of
probability assignment in quantum mechanics. To begin the paper, I set out and
criticize several attempts to analyze the form. I go on to propose a new forn
which utilizes a novel, probabilistic conditional and argue that this proposal is,
overall, the best rendering of the quantum mechanical probability assignments.
Finally, quantum mechanics aside, the discussion here has consequences for
counterfactual logic, conditional probability, and epistemic probability.
Most of the interesting and difficult interpretive issues in quantum me-
chanics (QM) are closely tied to that theory's probabilistic nature: QM,
rather than making unequivocal/deterministic predictions, assigns prob-
abilities to the possible results of observation or measurement. For this
reason QM is said to be an indeterministic theory. However, the prob-
ability assignments of QM, and in fact, probabilities in general, are philo-
sophically vexing. Indeed, the question of the nature of quantum me-
chanical probability assignments constitutes a significant part of the problem
of interpreting QM. That question is to be pursued in this paper. As I see
it, this question of quantum mechanical probability assignment has two
parts:
What sort of interpretation should we give to probability as it occurs
in QM?
What is the logical form of the probability assignments of QM?
The first of these questions is the fundamental one. It is the traditional
question asking, for example, are quantum mechanical probabilities de-
grees of belief? relative frequencies? propensities? or perhaps something
nonclassical? An answer will explain the meaning of "probability" as
used within QM. But the second question is also of importance; as we
*Received February 1988; revised January 1989.
tI want to thank Arthur
Fine,
Alan
Nelson,
two
anonymous
referees for
Philosophy of
Science, and, especially, Paul Teller for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. These
were extremely valuable. Research for this paper was supported by a Faculty Research
Grant from Oakland University.
Philosophy of Science, 58 (1991) pp. 36-60.
Copyright X 1991 by the Philosophy
of Science Association.
36
LOGICAL FORM OF PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENT 37
will see, it is in some ways a preliminary to the first of these questions.
And, as well, this question of logical form is surprisingly difficult.
The main emphasis of this paper is the second question. The goal here
is to see how best to think about the probability assignments of QM to
make the best sense of these assignments. So here I attempt to analyze,
or, in case of vagueness, explicate, the logical form of quantum me-
chanical probability attributions. To begin, I set out and criticize several
attempts to analyze the form. I go on to propose a new form which utilizes
a novel, probabilistic conditional and argue that this proposal is, overall,
the best rendering of the quantum mechanical probability assignments.
Finally, quantum mechanics aside, the discussion here has consequences
for counterfactual logic, conditional probability, and epistemic proba-
bility.
1. Introduction. I have claimed that the question of the logical form of
quantum mechanical probability assignments is difficult. To begin to see
the difficulty, consider a quantum mechanical example. A particle, say
an electron, is assigned a state description or "wave function", If, a com-
plex valued function defined on 3-space. According to the quantum the-
ory, a certain function of f,
I112-
W*f
= the complex conjugate of
If times If, gives the probability density for that particle's position.
Roughly, this means that the electron is most likely to be found in regions
where
1I12
is large. The straightforward or naive reading of such a claim
is that, for all regions V of space, the integral over V of 11,12 gives the
probability that the electron is in V.
But, in general, there is a difficulty with this straightforward rendering:
on the received view of QM, that is, the Copenhagen interpretation, the
electron is typically not in any region V, at least not in any small region
V. According to this view, it is, with a few exceptions, only when a
position measurement is made that a particle can be said to occupy a
specific region of space. Moreover, the same is said about all interesting
physical quantities: such quantities typically have no values until mea-
sured.' Now, it would be wrong to assign nonzero probability to some-
thing which is certainly false. So, assuming
the received view of QM,
because a typical electron certainly is not in V before measurement, it
cannot have a nonzero probability of being in V before measurement.
Hence, the straightforward reading of quantum mechanical probability
ascription-as assigning probabilities that a particle possesses a position
(or other) value-cannot on the received view be true in general, for
example, cannot be true before measurement. The received view has gar-
1QM assigns probabilities not only for the physical quantity position, but also assigns
probabilities for the values of other physical quantities, for example, angular momentum.
38 JOHN F. HALPIN
nered impressive support in the last twenty years through the work of
John Bell and others.2 This leads one to ask: If, for example, quantum
mechanical position probabilities are not probabilities (in the-straightfor-
ward, naive sense) that a particle has a position, what are they?
In a standard QM textbook, Eugen Merzbacher notes that
I
12
"is pro-
portional to the probability that upon a measurement of its position the
particle will be found in [a] given volume element" (1970, 36). But this
remark leaves unclear the notion of probability-upon-measurement. In an-
other standard text Albert Messiah writes:
. . .since the wave function . . . has a certain spatial extension one
cannot attribute to a quantum particle a precise position; one can only
define the probability of finding the particle in a given region of space
when one carries out a measurement of position. (1976, 117, Messiah's
emphasis)
Later he makes a more general statement:
One . . . abandons the fundamental postulate of Classical Physics,
according to which all the various quantities belonging to a system
take on well-defined values at each instant of time. One can only
determine for each of these variables a statistical distribution of val-
ues, which is the probability law of the results of measurement in
the eventuality that such a measurement is performed. (1976, 294,
Messiah's emphasis)
I take it that Messiah's eventualities may be hypothetical or counterfactual
eventualities, and that the probability assignments "upon" measurement
or "in the eventuality that a measurement is performed" are probabilities
given the (possibly counterfactual) assumption that a measurement is per-
formed. (The "probability law" assigns probabilities even in the absence
of actual measurement.)
So, at least on the standard view, quantum mechanical probabilities are
2Bell's (1965) argument shows that the hypothesis that all physical quantities have values
leads to statistical predictions different from those of QM. (Bell assumes a statistical lo-
cality condition, that measurement results are statistically independent of what measure-
ments are made at distant locations, plus he in effect makes an idealization about mea-
surements, that measurement devices are perfectly efficient and accurate, in order to derive
the conflict with QM.) Now, the quantum mechanical statistics are confirmed in the lab-
oratory, hence the hypothesis that all physical quantities have values is often taken to be
proven false. However, Arthur Fine and others have shown that reasonable possessed value
models exist (models which respect the observed quantum mechanical statistics) as long
as detector inefficiencies can be assumed. But even if Fine's models are correct, we cannot
read the quantum mechanical probability attributions as being about possessed values. On
Fine's models, the possessed values are not distributed in accordance with the quantum
mechanical statistics, (Bell's theorem assures this). Only the observed values are so dis-
tributed. See Fine (1982) for some possessed value models.
in some way conditional on a measurement. But how so? There have
been a number of attempts to say exactly what this means. In what fol-
lows, I try to show that the extant proposals are all problematic.
2. A Survey of Proposals. As we have seen, the probability assign-
ments of QM are conditional upon the occurrence of a hypothetical or
counterfactual measurement. Now, the resources for clearly formulating
conditional assertions are at hand. First, mathematicians have developed
the notion of a conditional probability, Pr(A/B), read "the probability of
A given that B", and defined as P(A&B)/P(B) where P, a probability
measure,3 gives the unconditional probabilities. Also, logicians have de-
veloped the semantics for counterfactual conditionals. Take an example:
If the Earth's mass were larger, its gravitational attraction would be
greater.
This is to be analyzed as follows: Under certain (counterfactual) circum-
stances in which the antecedent holds, the consequent is also true. Such
counterfactual situations are usually spelled out in terms of possible worlds.
Possible world semantics are still controversial, but as a provisional def-
inition we may take the following. (An A-world is defined to be a possible
world at which A is true.)
(0) A > B is true at a world w if and only if B is true at the A-worlds
most similar4 to w.
On this analysis, the above counterfactual about the Earth is presumably
true because the worlds most similar to ours which contain a more mas-
sive Earth will obey the law of gravitation and hence will involve greater
gravitational attraction.
Three facts about conditionals will be of interest here. First, on the
theory of conditionals just sketched, A >
(B&C) is equivalent to (A
>
B)&(A
>
C): A >
(B&C) is true at world w iff (B&C) is true at the A-
worlds most similar to w iff both B and C are true at the A-worlds most
similar to w iff both A > B and A > C are true at w. Secondly, Modus
3A probability measure, P, is defined so that 0 ' P(A) ' 1, P(A V -A) = 1, and P(A
V B) = P(A) + P(B) if P(A&B) = 0. Furthermore, the domain of definition of P is to be
a Boolean algebra. Moreover, P is sometimes taken to be defined on a sigma field of
propositions, a set closed under countable disjunction and conjunction. If so, countable
additivity is assumed. However, these additional properties of a probability measure are
not pertinent to the present project.
'The notion of similarity here must be construed in the appropriate way. As I see it,
"most similar" comes to "similar enough in relevant respects". For one nice attempt to
spell out this notion see Lewis (1979). Those skeptical of the similarity theory of coun-
terfactuals should substitute the word "relevant" for "similar" in the above definition. That
change of wording helps to emphasize that much more needs to be said in order to clarify
the operative notion of this definition.
40 JOHN F. HALPIN
Ponens is a valid inference for the conditionals described: if A and A >
B are true at w, then B is true at the A-worlds most similar to w; but by
assumption w is an A-world, so it must be an A-world most similar to
itself (nothing else could be any more similar to itself!), hence B is true
at w. So B follows from A and A > B.
Finally, still assuming the theory of counterfactuals just sketched, con-
ditional excluded middle (CEM),
(A
>
B) V(A
>
-B),
can fail to be true. For example, it is plausibly false for the well-known
Bizet-Verdi case:
Either if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, they would have been
French; or if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, they would have been
Italian.
Intuitively, this claim is false because neither disjunct is true; had Bizet
and Verdi been compatriots, they might have been either French or Ital-
ian. The analysis just given seems to bear out this intuition. This is so
because there presumably are antecedent satisfying worlds most similar
to the actual world at which both men are French and some just as similar
at which both are Italian. So, assuming the usual truth functional defi-
nition of disjunction, CEM fails to be valid for the semantics of >
just
sketched.
Now, as noted, our definition of the counterfactual (0) is controversial.
Still, the consequences just derived are generally accepted. It is these
noncontroversial consequences which are most important in what follows.
However, there is one exception to my claim about the noncontroversial
nature of these consequences: Stalnaker's theory of the conditional does
validate CEM. I want to digress briefly to describe this exception and the
reason to stand by (0).
On the original similarity theory of counterfactuals, Stalnaker's (1968),
A > B is (nontrivially) true iff B is true at the A-world, s(A), most similar
to the actual. (Here s is called a selection function; intuitively s(A) is the
world or situation that would hold if A were true.) Notice that CEM is
true on this theory because either B or -B is true at the world s(A), hence
either A > B or A >
-B is true (at the actual world). However, van
Fraassen's "The End of the Stalnaker Conditional", an unpublished post-
script to van Fraassen (1982), showed that Stalnaker's (1968) theory leads
to Bell-like conflicts with experiment. (The problem arises from the treat-
ment of counterfactuals like "if a measurement of quantity q were made,
the result would be r". On Stalnaker's (1968) theory a unique measure-
ment-of-q-world is determined by the selection function, hence so is a
measurement result r. This definiteness of values, here a "counterfactual
definiteness", is what is used by Bell to derive conflicts with QM. See
footnote 2.)
Now, van Fraassen takes the problem just described to be a reason to
favor a revised theory, Stalnaker (1981). The latter account admits that
realistic contexts determine no unique selection function because there is
in general no most similar A-world. Instead, this revision presupposes the
existence of a set {sj} of selection functions all of which need to be con-
sidered in a counterfactual analysis. Stalnaker does so by utilizing su-
pervaluations over this set: a sentence of counterfactual logic is true iff
it is evaluated as true relative to each selection function. So, for example,
A > B is true iff for all selection functions
sj
in
{sj},
A > B is true relative
to si, that is, iff for all j, B is true at
sj(B).
Now, CEM is true on this
account because, as we have seen above, it is true with respect to an
arbitrary selection function s. Unfortunately, much the same thing can be
said about the result derived by van Fraassen; the conflict with experi-
mental results he derived for the original Stalnaker theory can be gen-
eralized to apply to the revised account. See Halpin (1986) for an ar-
gument showing that both versions of the theory lead to conflict with both
QM and experimental results.
I take it, then, that Stalnaker's theory in either version is not appro-
priate for the quantum mechanical context. However, the other well-known
similarity
theory of counterfactuals, David Lewis's (1973), has also seemed
suspect to many observers. On Lewis's account (put roughly) A > B is
nontrivially true iff A&B is true at some world more similar to the actual
world than is any world making A& -B true. Now, Lewis assumes that
worlds can be more and more similar to the actual world without the
existence of any unique most simnilar world. For instance, take Lewis's
example (1973, 20). Suppose that in the actual world a line is exactly 1"
long. Then a world in which the line is 1
/4"1 long will be less similar to
the actual world than is some world in which it is 1
'1/5 long. And some
world in which it is 1 /6"1 long is more similar still to the actual world
than any of the worlds in which the length is 1
1/51. And so on. (As Lewis
notes, these claims about similarity will hold only in some contexts; I
assume such a context in what follows.) Then, on Lewis's theory we can
truly say that, for any n > 0, if the line were longer than 1" in length,
then it would be shorter than
l/[n". Unintuitively, this does not leave any
length that the line might be if it were longer than 1". This sort of ob-
jection has been made many times; for example see Stalnaker (1981).
Our brief discussion so far suggests that the worlds relevant for coun-
terfactual analysis, given an antecedent A, should include more worlds
than just s(A). But, to continue the example above, a world in which the
line has length 1 /6"1, though not as similar to the actual world as other
42 JOHN F. HALPIN
worlds in which the length of the line is greater than 1", is nonetheless
a world that might occur. In some contexts, at least, it is similar enough
to the actual world to be worthy of consideration when the antecedent is
"the line is greater than 1" long". So, I suggest a compromise between
these theories which in effect takes the selection function to have a set
of worlds as values, that is, the set of worlds similar enough to the actual;
this is (0). This proposal differs from Lewis's in that we are asked to
consider a set of most similar worlds (for a given antecedent) even though
some of these are not as similar as others to the actual. And (0) differs
from Stalnaker's (1981) because on Stalnaker's theory (even as revised),
there is a kind of counterfactual definiteness; that is, relative to each se-
lection function "if a q-measurement is made, then r would result" is true
for some r (because each selection function picks out a unique q-
measurement world). This counterfactual definiteness (relativized to a se-
lection function) is sufficient to derive Bell's conflict with experiment.
(Because counterfactual definiteness holds with respect to an arbitrary
selection function s, one can also derive as true relative to s a certain
claim C about quantum experiments. Because s is arbitrary, Stalnaker's
theory takes C to be true. But C is refuted in the laboratory.) See Halpin
(1986). On the other hand, according to (0), "if a q-measurement is made,
r would result" will typically not be true for any r because in typical
quantum mechanical cases, r does not result in all of the most similar q-
measurement worlds. There is no sense in which counterfactual definite-
ness is true according to (0) because on this definition there is no inter-
mediate stage of truth value assignment at which sentences are evaluated
with respect to a single q-measurement world.
A number of authors have suggested versions of (0). Most important
for our purposes is Wessels (1981) who gives an analysis for measure-
ment counterfactuals. Her idea, basically, is that for antecedent "a mea-
surement of quantity q on system s occurs", we take the possible worlds
most similar to the actual to be just like the actual with respect to the
system's quantum mechanical state, and its possessed values. Further-
more, the influences acting upon the system in such most similar possible
worlds must be just like those acting on the actual system except for the
influences of a measurement device set to measure q. Unfortunately this
is just a schematic description. It does not give a full account of the
possible worlds and what counts as similarity. We would like to know
what values are possessed, and what influences a measurement device
has on a system in each member of the set of most similar worlds. These
questions involve controversial unknowns. A fuller account will require
a complete description of physically possible worlds, and that awaits a
solution to the quantum measurement problem. Still, Wessels's account
shows us how to begin to flesh out (0).
Finally, we are prepared to address the main business at hand: quantum
mechanical probability attribution. A number of proposals for the logical
form of quantum mechanical probability attributions have been given,
utilizing conditional probabilities and counterfactuals. To help describe
the proposals, I will use several abbreviations. Let R stand for the state-
ment that "value r results upon measurement".5 Let M stand for "quantity
q is measured" . Now, for all AP, q, r there is a p such that the following
holds: If f is the state of a system, then QM assigns a probability p to
R given that M. It is the logical form of such assignments we wish to
uncover. Suppressing mention of f and q, the Merzbacher and Messiah
version of this attribution is roughly:
(*)
R has probability p given (hypothetically) that M.
I have seen three construals of (*) advanced:
(a) Pr(R/M)
=
p,
so that the attribution is a conditional probability given that a measure-
ment has occurred,
(b) P(M > R) =
p,
so that the attribution is an assignment of a probability to a conditional,
and
(c) M > P(R) =
p,
so that the probability attribution is made only on the counterfactual as-
sumption that a measurement has occurred.
In the following sections, I will try to show that each of (a), (b), and
(c) have problems as readings of (*). I will go on to suggest an alternative
explication. But we should now ask, what features are desirable in an
explication of (*)? First, such an explication should allow the quantum
mechanical probability assumptions the best chance to be true over the
widest range of cases. This is just a principle of charity. Secondly, be-
cause this explication of (*) is meant as a preliminary to interpretation,
we do not want it to prejudge interpretive issues. That is, we should, for
the sake of generality, prefer not to saddle QM with controversial as-
sumptions. Ideally, then, an explication of (*) would not beg fundamental
questions relating to the quantum mechanical interpretation problem. Fur-
thermore, such an explication should, in so far as possible, not presup-
pose any particular metaphysics of possible worlds. As we will be dealing
with semantical issues usually discussed in the possible worlds frame-
work, this constraint will become important. In any case, the sum total
5For generality, r can be taken to be either a single real number or a range of these.
44 JOHN F. HALPIN
of this second suggestion is that for purposes of generality, the best ex-
plication of (*) will, to stay away from controversy, be neutral with re-
gard to interpretive issues. Finally, of course, a good explication will
uphold the physicist's intuitions that (*) involves probabilities given hy-
pothetical measurements.
3. Against Proposal (a). The first proposal, (a), that quantum mechan-
ical probability attributions like (*) are conditional probabilities of the
form Pr(R/M) = p, is, at first blush, perhaps the most obvious rendering.
The probabilities of QM are probabilities given the performance of a mea-
surement. Conditional probabilities of the form P(R/M), at least as usu-
ally understood, are just this. Since Kolmogoroff, such conditional prob-
abilities have standardly been defined in terms of standard unconditional
probabilities as described above: Pr(R/M)
=
P(R&M)/P(M). However,
so long as this definition of probability is maintained, a significant prob-
lem for proposal (a) exists. The argument for this claim comes from van
Fraassen and Hooker (1976) as follows.
Proposal (a) presupposes that a conditional probability is defined. For
this to be so, the probability that m is measured, P(M), must also be
defined and nonzero (for arbitrary m). Not only is this condition implau-
sible on the face of it, but for arbitrary m, it must fail. (There are sets
{mj}
of measurement types such that (i)
{mj}
is of uncountable cardinality,
(ii) no two elements of
{mj}
can be measured at once (they are incom-
patible) and yet (iii) QM makes probability assignments conditioned upon
each of the
mj.
(For example take the set
{mj}
to be defined so that
mj
is
the measurement of spin of a particle in direction j, where j ranges over
the set of all directions between 0 and 90 degrees exclusive.) Let
Mj
formalize
"mj
is measured". It is a fact of probability theory that because
of the size of the set
{mj},
not all the incompatible Mj can receive nonzero
probability. It follows that the conditional probabilities Pr(R/M) cannot
be defined for all quantum measurements m; indeed, they cannot be de-
fined for more than a countable subset of the uncountable set
{mj}.
So,
proposal (a) cannot in general allow us to make sense of the quantum
mechanical probability attributions (*) which are given for all mj.
Before rejecting (a), however, we should consider responses which may
be made to the van Fraassen-Hooker argument just given. First, someone
might object to the above argument by suggesting that not all of the un-
countable number of measurements in
{mj}
are such that they each might
be performed in practice. (In practice we have no chance of being able
to make so many discriminations for the same reason that we are not, for
an arbitrary real number s, able to measure whether or not an object is
exactly s units in length.) So, the objection continues, probability as-
signments conditioned upon any but the experiments which might be per-
formed in practice are unnecessary. Furthermore there is no reason to
believe that uncountable sets of disjoint measurements exist which are in
practice performable. This objection assumes that the quantum mechan-
ical attributions of probability given measurements not in practice per-
formable may be neglected for the project at hand. However, I would
argue that one should at least try to make sense of all probability attri-
butions of QM, even if some are not practical. Not to do so would be
out of line with our first condition on a good explication of quantum
mechanical probability assignments: that we make sense of the widest
range of cases.
The second response to the van Fraassen-Hooker argument against (a)
is to countenance nonclassical probability measures with infinitesimal
weights. According to this response, the failure of (a) is a result of the
standard unconditional probabilities assumed in the definition of condi-
tional probability. The van Fraassen-Hooker argument against (a) shows
that the probabilities
Pr(R/Mj)
=
P(R&Mj)/P(Mj)
cannot be defined in
general. This is accomplished by showing that not all the
P(Mj)'s
can
have nonzero values. But they can have nonzero values if the notion of
a probability measure P is extended to allow infinitesimal values in its
range. In that case both numerator and denominator of the definition of
Pr(R/Mj)
may have infinitesimal values, yet the fraction itself would be
a standard, finite real value. This currently popular counterproposal de-
pends on the field of nonstandard analysis. For a review of this possi-
bility, see appendix four to Skyrms (1980).
So, according to this second response, (a) can be revitalized if we as-
sign infinitesimal probabilities to the
Mj's.
But on the face of it, this
would seem implausible. Are there really probabilities that a measure-
ment will occur? One might think that there are not because said occur-
rence depends typically upon the experimenter's free choice. Still, one
may want to think of the experimenter as a complex quantum mechanical
system, so subject to probabilities. But the quantum mechanical proba-
bilities are conditional probabilities and what we need for the definition
are unconditional probabilities
P(Mj).
Finally, even if some other source
of the infinitesimal unconditional probabilities exists, it would seem that
these probabilities of measurements would sometimes be zero; actual sit-
uations would sometimes absolutely rule out the performance of a given
measurement
mj;
hence
P(Mj)
would be zero. (To take an extreme ex-
ample, consider the case of a universe which contains only a few simple
atomic systems. Because there is no measurement apparatus in such a
universe, the probability of an m-measurement occurring would be zero
for some if not all m. So, Kolmogoroff conditional probabilities are not
defined here, yet QM would still seem to apply. QM assigns a state to
the atomic systems and so assigns probabilities for measurement results
46 JOHN F. HALPIN
that could result if, per impossible, a measurement device had existed.)
Hence, it would seem that this second response to the van Fraassen-Hooker
argument, the infinitesimal probability proposal, will still not guarantee
that all quantum mechanical probabilities are defined. Moreover, if, con-
trariwise, there is some way to make the proposal work, this would re-
quire taking a stand on several controversial interpretive issues (e.g., the
assigning of unconditional probabilities to human systems) which we should
avoid. For the sake of generality and avoiding controversy, a better ex-
plication of the form of (*) is in order.
The final response to the van Fraassen-Hooker argument rejects the
Kolmogoroff definition of conditional probability. Realizing that the tra-
ditional Kolmogoroff conditional probabilities are not always defined when
we want them to be, both Karl Popper and Alfred Renyii have suggested
theories for which conditional probabilities are fundamental: by fiat they
exist, rather than by definition. (In a nutshell, these views stipulate that
conditional probabilities exist given arbitrary condition A, with A from a
set of conditions large enough to include all the incompatible Mj. Fur-
thermore, for fixed A, the values of Pr(X/A) for variable X obey the laws
of the probability calculus discussed in footnote 3.) As long as this option
is open for QM, the van Fraassen-Hooker argument is obviated because
that argument relies on the Kolmogoroff definition of conditional prob-
abilities in order to show that certain conditional probabilities are not
defined. Indeed, van Fraassen and Hooker suggest that we understand the
probabilities of QM in Popper's way. They show this to be consistent
with the quantum mechanical probabilities.
Van Fraassen and Hooker's suggestion that quantum mechanical con-
ditional probabilities are fundamental (rather than defined in terms of un-
conditional probabilities) seems right. But one should still want to give
a more substantial positive account of what these probabilities are. Van
Fraassen and Hooker suggest that the conditional probabilities are prob-
abilities of conditionals: Pr(R/M)
=
P(M
>
R). Though I have no ob-
jection to taking the probabilities of QM on the model of either Renyii
or Popper, I think van Fraassen and Hooker's explication of these as
probabilities of counterfactuals fails for two reasons. First, taking quan-
tum mechanical probabilities to be probabilities of counterfactuals has
unfortunate consequences which are developed in the next section. Also,
van Fraassen and Hooker presuppose Stalnaker's theory of the counter-
factual >. As described in the last section, this conditional would seem
inappropriate for the context of QM; see Halpin (1986) for an argument
that Stalnaker's theory leads all too easily to Bell-like conflicts with ex-
periment. So, if we are to take the probabilities of QM as fundamental,
non-Kolmogoroff conditional probabilities, then we need to say more about
just what they are. In section 6 below, I explicate the form of quantum
mechanical probability assignments in terms of a probabilistic condi-
tional. The probabilities associated with that conditional might be taken
as fundamental conditional probabilities. If so, the proposal of section 6
can be taken to underwrite (a). So, I do not want to claim that (a) is
wrong. But I will, in section 6, try to give an explication of (*) which
is more perspicuous.
4. Against Proposal (b). Let PQM(R) symbolize the probability value
assigned to QM to R given M. Now, proposal (b) states that a quantum
mechanical assignment of probability, PQM(R) = p, has logical form Pr(M
> R)
=
p. What we will show is that from (b) one can derive a weakened,
but still undesirable, version of conditional excluded middle. Assuming
(b), we have that Pr(M
>
R)
=
PQM(R). But, as well, because from QM
we have PQM(-R) = 1 - PQM(R) and PQM(R&-R) = 0, we also have
P(M > R) + P(M > -R) = 1 and P(M > (R&-R)) = 0, and so, because
A > (B&C) is equivalent to (A > B)&(A > C), P((M > R)&(M > -R))
= 0. A version of conditional excluded middle follows:
(CEM') P((M
>
R)
V
(M
>
-R))
= 1.
I take it that (CEM') is an unfortunate consequence of proposal (b).
On any interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilities, objective
or epistemic, (CEM') will not in general hold. Typically in a quantum
mechanical world it will be a clear physical fact that neither disjunct is
true. For instance, suppose an m-measurement is not performed, but that
if it were to be performed then value r might result. But also suppose
that some r' #A r might result. So if M were true, R might be true, but
also might be false. Hence it would be false to say either that if M were
true, then R would be true, or that if M were true, then -R would be
true. So the disjuncts are both false. Hence, we will not assign probability
one to the disjunction. Because proposal (b) leads one to do so, I take
this proposal to be discredited.
As we noticed in section 2, conditional excluded middle has at least
one defender, Robert Stalnaker. So a proponent of this theory would be
comfortable with the consequence (CEM') just derived and would not
take the argument to be a reductio of (b). However, as was also men-
tioned in section 2, Stalnaker's theory of the conditional leads all too
easily to conflict with experimental results (Halpin, 1986). Moreover,
even if the case against Stalnaker's theory and against CEM is not con-
vincing, it should be clear that these positions are deservedly controver-
sial. It would be unfortunate, then, to saddle QM with proposal (b) and
the resultant controversy.
48 JOHN F. HALPIN
5. Against Proposal (c). Philosophers have frequently taken proposal
(c) to be the best option for explicating the form of quantum mechanical
probability ascriptions. (For example, see Skyrms, 1982.) But there may
be a problem with (c). Consider the case in which a measurement of m
is now performed, that is, M is now true, and for which the result of
measurement, r, is immediately decided, for example, is immediately
registered in the memory of a measurement device. According to (c), in
this case P(R) = p. (This follows simply by Modus Ponens.) Do we want
to say that the probability of result r is p? Perhaps not. One might argue
that after such a measurement is performed and the result, r, is in, the
truth value of R is no longer chancy. Rather it is decidedly true. Hence
(c) is wrong here because its consequent assigns a chance <1 to R.6 Of
course, this objection depends critically on the assumption that proba-
bility is chance. So, the answer to the question of (c) may depend on the
kind of probability ascribed. For review purposes, and to get straight on
terminology, a thumbnail sketch of the interpretation of probability is in
order. I will return to the argument against (c) only at the very end of
this section.
Interpretations of probability are usually categorized as either epistemic
or objective. The main epistemic interpretation of probability character-
izes personal, or subjective, probability. As its names imply, this sort of
probability is assigned with respect to a particular individual. For such
an individual, the "personal probability that A" is defined to be that per-
son's degree of partial belief in A, a property which is measured by testing
that person's willingness to bet on A. (At least one further stipulation
goes with this interpretation: if the degrees of belief are really probabil-
ities, they must be coherent, that is, they must satisfy the probability
calculus.) Now, QM is pretty clearly not about individuals' degrees of
belief. Moreover, one can have coherent degrees of belief which disagree
with QM. At best, we might see the probability attributions as conditional
recommendations for assigning personal probabilities. Such a possibility
relies not on (c), but rather on a variant to (c) involving something other
than a counterfactual conditional, (to be discussed in section 7).
Next, turn to relative frequency interpretation and the propensity inter-
pretation, the so-called objective interpretations of probability. We will
consider variants on each. In its simplest form, the relative frequency
interpretation of probabilities claims that the probability that A holds in
a finite reference class is just the ratio of the number of A's in the class
to the number of all members. (So, for example, if the reference class is
6Physicists sometimes say that as a measurement is performed we get a "transition from
the possible to the actual". This would seem to entail that we go from a chancy situation
to one for which a measurement result is "actual" and not chancy.
taken to be flips of a coin by John Halpin on 14 May 1987-suppose
they are HHTTHTHTT-then this ratio for heads is 4/9 and the proba-
bility of H in this reference class is 4/9.) When the reference class is
countably infinite (and assumed to be ordered in a sequence), the prob-
ability cannot be defined as a ratio, but instead is defined to be the limit
of these ratios as we think of the reference class as growing sequentially.
We can make this precise: Let
A,
be the number of A's in the first n
trials. The relative frequency,
Rn,
of A's in the first n trials is defined as
An/n. Then for the case where the number of trials is finite and equal to
m, one identifies the probability of A with Rm. Where the number of trials
is countably infinite, the probability is taken to be the limit of
Rn
as n
approaches infinity.
In this simplest form of the frequency interpretation, probabilities are
defined in terms of actually occurring trials. But surely these cannot be
what QM tells us about. It is possible that quantum mechanical proba-
bilities differ from the associated ratios (or limits of ratios), just as a coin
with probability 1/2 of coming up heads, may in a class of trials come up
heads only 4 times in 9. Indeed, for the case of a finite number of trials-
and we know of no sequence of quantum mechanical trials which is not
finite-quantum mechanical probabilities, which are sometimes irra-
tional, cannot in general be given as relative frequencies; an irrational
number by definition cannot be expressed as a ratio. Similarly, even if
the reference class is infinite, and the probabilities QM assigns are the
right ones, that the limit of relative frequency will exist and be equal to
the probability assigned by QM is not guaranteed. The laws of large num-
bers only tell us that a large difference between the probability and the
limit of relative frequencies is unlikely; it is not impossible.
A hard core empiricist may want, despite these objections, to hold that
probability is just relative frequency in actual and (typically) finite ref-
erence classes. Such a proponent of the frequency view will hold that to
go beyond the extant frequency is to make an unwarranted idealization
(e.g., that there is a "virtual" ensemble to serve as infinite reference class
or that there is such a thing as propensity). This may be so; however,
our job here is to interpret QM, and that theory pretty clearly does ideal-
ize; for example, it assigns probabilities even to unmeasured quantities
such as those discussed earlier in section 3.
So, the probabilities of QM are usually thought of not as relative fre-
quencies defined over extant reference classes, but rather as the limits of
relative frequency in a "virtual" ensemble; that is, the limits that would
exist if hypothetical experimental trials (the reference class) were an in-
finite sequence. (Such a view is sometimes taken to be a sort of propen-
sity view rather than a frequency view. In any case, on this view the
quantum mechanical assignments of probability read as a variant to (c):
50 JOHN F. HALPIN
(An infinite sequence of measurement is performed) > (the relative
frequency of A in the sequence is the quantum mechanical probability
P).
This reading is no better off than the frequency view for actual infinite
reference classes: just as actual relative frequencies can differ from prob-
abilities, so can counterfactual sequences. For example, if we were to
flip a fair (probability 1/2) coin an infinite number of times, it might land
heads on exactly the even trials (one way to get relative frequency
I/2)
but also might land heads on every try (this too is a possibility). Both of
the infinite sequences just described are very unlikely to occur (if the
trials are independent) but are, nonetheless, possible. Generally, there is
no guarantee that the limit of relative frequencies will or would be equal
to the probability. Again, the laws of large numbers only tell us that a
difference is unlikely, not impossible. So, though we may expect relative
frequency in the long run to be close to the probability, we should not
identify the two.
The reasoning of the above paragraph is well-known and usually ac-
cepted by interpreters of QM. So, for the rest of this section I assume
that quantum mechanical probability is not to be given a frequency inter-
pretation. Now, probably the most popular view among philosophers is
that quantum mechanical probability is a kind of propensity I will call
"chance". On this view, probabilities are probabilities for the single case,
and are tendencies or dispositions that admit of degree. Typically, we
estimate the chance given relative frequencies as evidence and vice versa.
But chances are new sorts of theoretical entities that are not to be defined
in terms of frequency.7 We understand these theoretical entities in terms
of what QM says about probabilities and in terms of the probability cal-
culus and its theorems, together with the evidential relation to relative
frequencies. In this way propensities take their place as primitives within
a theoretical network.
I have argued that an epistemic interpretation of probability ascription
is not appropriate within proposal (c) because such an interpretation would
suggest that QM is about belief states. Furthermore, I argued that this
leaves one with some version of a propensity interpretation: as a relative
frequency account will not do here, one should take proposal (c) to be
about chance. Chance applies to the future, however, and there is no
chance or propensity for the past or present to be different from the settled
way it was or is. This is an old view that goes back at least to William
of Ockham. I think it is also a very plausible view of chance. David Lewis
puts the point this way:
7This is not to say that chance is an irreducible property of systems; it may supervene
on physical properties.
This temporal asymmetry of chance falls into place as part of our
conception of the past as 'fixed' and the future as 'open'-whatever
that may mean. The asymmetry of fixity and of chance may be pic-
tured by a tree. The single trunk is the one possible past that has any
present chance of being actual. The many branches are the many
possible futures that have some present chance of being actual. (1981,
277)
We can think of Lewis's tree structures and the fixed-open distinction in
terms of nomic possibility given the present state of the world: the pos-
sibilities that have a chance at a moment are those that are nomically
possible at that moment. Facts "about" now-say, that a coin lands heads-
are fixed and so not chancy. (It is worth noting that the sort of chance
just described need not be deeply metaphysical. For instance, Brian Skyrns
takes chance to be just a special case of subjective probability, viz. the
subjective probability conditioned upon a partition of the possible situa-
tions. On his view, if a set of propositions,
{Pj},
form the appropriate
partition of the set of all possible situations, and if
PJ
is the true member
of these, then chance A is equal to the subjective probability of A given
Pi.
As long as the partition members fully reflect the state of the world
up until a time, intuitively the present time, then chance will apply non-
trivially only to statements about the future. In this way Skyrms makes
sense of chance as described above but from a subjectivist's viewpoint.
(See Skyrms 1984, 107-109; and Skyrms 1988.)
Given our understanding of probability in (c) as chance, we can better
understand the argument against (c) given at the outset of this section.
Again, we are to consider the case for which QM assigns a probability
to result r (0
<
p < 1) given a measurement of m. And for this case we
are to assume that in fact m is now measured and immediately has result
r. So, R is not only true, but a settled fact about now; hence R is not
chancy. But proposal (c), M >
P(R)
=
p, together with the claim M (that
m is measured) implies by Modus Ponens that R is chancy, that it has a
chance p of being true. Hence, I take (c) to be wrong in the case for
which measurement result is given immediately upon measurement.
I have been describing the argument against (c) in the abstract. But it
is worth mentioning a quantum mechanical measurement which imme-
diately gives a result: spin measurement. Measuring the spin of an elec-
tron means passing the electron through a magnetic field and detecting
it (either in an upper location: spin up, or a lower location: spin down);
it is essential to QM that without detection there is no spin measurement.
(If the particle is sent through an appropriate magnetic field but is not
detected, then there is not only no record of its location up or down, but
no collapse of the wave packet and hence no measurement. Gibbons (1987,
52 JOHN F. HALPIN
esp. 102-104) has a nice discussion of this. So, once such a measurement
is performed, there is no chanciness left with regard to that measurement;
upon measurement the electron will, for example, be detected in the lower
position, spin down, and have no chance of having spin up. QM rec-
ognizes this with the collapse of the wave packet and so a collapse of
probabilities; but (c) to its detriment allows us, by Modus Ponens, to
deduce chance p not equal to 0 for "spin is up".
I have not yet considered an important variant to (c): (c")
FtM
>
(Pr(FtR)
= p) to be read "If a measurement of M were being performed which
would give result in t seconds, then the probability of result r in t seconds
is p". But by supposing only that the result is about to come in, this
variant's antecedent does not presuppose that it is already in and so set-
tled. Hence, (c") is not susceptible to the main objection brought against
(c). However, there are several other reasons to reject (c"). First, the
antecedent presupposes that a measurement begins now and will be suc-
cessfully completed in t seconds. But this presupposition itself may be
chancy. On the proposal (c") this chanciness will be reflected in the con-
sequent,
"Pr(FtR)
= p" (because FtR
can be true only if the measurement
is completed, and this completion is chancy). Now this consequence of
(c") is unfortunate; quantum mechanical probabilities are given that a
measurement does occur and so are not infested with the chanciness about
whether or not the measurement will go through. Secondly, there is a
problem with (c") because probabilities evolve with time. Even if t is
small, the probabilities for R are different at a later time. Hence (c") can
give at best an approximation to the current probabilities. And to suppose
it does even this is to make an interpretive assumption about the conti-
nuity of quantum mechanical probabilities which may be unjustified. (It
is sometimes assumed that quantum mechanical probabilities are discon-
tinuous as the measurement occurs; this has to do with the collapse of
the wave function and so of probability. Perhaps there are discontinuities
after measurement as well?) Finally, there are special problems with the
interpretation of probability and the future tense described by typical in-
deterministic tense logics. I leave these to Halpin (1989, section 3).
6. An Alternative Proposal. The preceding three sections contain crit-
icisms of several attempts to analyze quantum mechanical probability at-
tribution, that is, to specify the meaning of (*) that R has probability p
given hypothetically that M. In this section, I try to give an explication
of (*) which overcomes the problems of (a)-(c). The explication I rec-
ommend involves a seldom analyzed sort of counterfactual conditional.
To introduce this conditional, I begin with a pair of analogous forms.
Instead of saying "if A, it would be that B", something weaker is some-
times asserted: "if A, it might be that B". The latter is usually called a
"might conditional". To see how this conditional is to be analyzed, recall
the definition of the standard counterfactual: A > B is true iff B is true
at the A-worlds most similar to our world. Borrowing Stalnaker's selec-
tion function symbolism (here used as selector of sets, not individual worlds)
let the set of these most similar A-worlds be symbolized as "s(A)". So,
to say that if A were true, then B would be true is to say that B is true
in all the worlds in s(A), which is a statement of necessity. It is plausible,
then, to suggest that the might conditional be analyzed as a statement of
possibility:
"If A, then B might be true" holds iff B is true at some of the worlds
in s(A).
On this definition, the might conditional is equivalent to -(A > -B);
this identification is quite standard.
Now, the might conditional is the only variant of the counterfactual
conditional which has been given significant attention. But in English,
there are others, for example, "if A, then B would most likely be true".
In light of the above definitions, the would-most-likely conditional may
plausibly be analyzed as:
"If A, then it would most likely be that B" is true iff B is true at
"most" of the worlds in s(A).
As it stands this statement does not make clear sense; if the set s(A) does
not have a finite number of members, then "most" may not be well-
defined. One might make sense of the notion by defining a measure of
the set s(A). Then "most" could naturally be defined to apply to the sub-
sets of s(A) having measure greater than one-half. Of course the question
of which measure should be utilized in a context needs to be considered.
Such a measure needs to be determined by special features of context, if
at all.
Before moving to analyze the quantum mechanical probability attri-
butions, a clarification of the motivation for the given analyses of coun-
terfactual variants is in order. Consider the following example:
(1) If Ted Williams had (in his prime) faced today's big league pitch-
ing, he would (still) have been a 300+ hitter. (A
> B)
Statement (1) we take to mean that at the worlds most like ours in which
Williams faces pitching like that in our world now (these are the worlds
in s(A)), are all worlds in which Williams bats 300 or higher. If someone
wanted to assert only that:
ing, he might have been a 300+ hitter,
54 JOHN F. HALPIN
then, on the analysis just given, one would be saying that at some of the
worlds s(A), Williams bats at least 300. Finally, one may want to say
something stronger than (2) but weaker than (1); perhaps one holds that
Williams (like any ballplayer) might have been injured facing today's
pitching, so might have been unable to bat 300. It follows that (1) is
false. But (2), perhaps, doesn't say as much about Williams's ability as
one would like. Rather one might say:
ing, he would most likely have been a 300+ hitter.
This, I take it, means that Williams bats 300 or better at "most" of the
worlds s(A). (Note that (3) cannot plausibly be understood to mean "it is
probable that A > B" because, by hypothesis, the person asserting (3)
holds that A > B is false and so not probable. Furthermore, (3) cannot
be construed as A > (B is probable) that if Williams had faced today's
big league pitching, then it would have been probable that he was a 300+
hitter. This latter construal should seem odd, unlike the original, because
had Williams faced the pitching in question, his batting average would
not have been uncertain or chancy; it would have been more than probable
whether or not he was a 300+ hitter, that is, his average would have been
known, a settled fact.)
Finally, we can return to the question: How is (*), the statement that
R has probability p given counterfactually that M, to be interpreted? I
will try to show that if we think of (*) as a quantitative version of might
or would-most-likely conditionals, then the problems for (a)-(c) disap-
pear. My suggestion is that (*) be understood as M >P R were >P, read
"would-with-probability-p", means roughly "would in a set of measure
p". That is, where P is a probability measure on s(A), A >P B is true just
in case if b is the set of elements of s(A) at which B is true, then P(b)
-p. So, for example, where QM assigns probability that a particle be
found in region V, if measured for position, the proposal implies the fol-
lowing: a measure p of s(M), the set of most similar position measurement
worlds, have resultant value in region V. And, in general, the hypothetical
probabilities of QM are to be analyzed in terms of probability measures
on the set of m-measurement worlds that might be.
Let me try to clarify the suggestion of the last paragraph. One wants
to give truth conditions for A >P B. I will do this in terms of probability
measures PS(A), on each of the sets s(A) for arbitrary sentences A. That is,
I assume the additional structure of this set of probability measures, one
for each sentence. Now, let [B]
=
{w E s(A): B is true at w}. Then, the
truth condition goes as follows: A >P B is true just
in case [B] is mea-
surable and PS(A)[B]
=
p.
The suggestion, then, for explicating the quantum mechanical proba-
bility attributions (*) is the following:
(d)
M >P R.
Given that the probability measures, upon which (d) is based, come from
QM, it would appear that (d) involves objective probabilities, though we
will discuss an alternative in the next section. Furthermore, given the
discussion of the last section, it would seem that a frequency interpre-
tation is not appropriate here. So, finally, it would seem reasonable to
take the probabilities in (d) as chances; after all, they are theoretical en-
tities that have meaning for the single case. I take it, then, that the prob-
abilities of (d) are chances, though this is not a necessary concomitant of
the proposal. (If it were necessary, I would be begging an important in-
terpretive issue that I promised not to do in an explication of (*). For-
tunately, (d) places no restrictions on how its probability measures should
be interpreted.)
Finally, I should say how my suggestion, M >P R, for the probability
attributions of QM, fares against the sort of argument brought against (b)
and (c). First, the argument against (b) started with the quantum me-
chanical probability assignments, and concluded that a certain disjunc-
tion, (M > R) V (M > -R), has probability one, an unfortunate conse-
quence in general. Let me run through that sort of argument with (d)
assumed as the form of quantum mechanical probability attribution. I want
to show that no undesirable consequence is forthcoming.
As before, we have that PQM(R)
=
p,
PQM(-R)
= 1 -
p, and PQM(R&-R)
= 0. So, the suggestion (d) implies M >P R, M >('-PI -R, and M >0
(R&-R). By the truth definition I have just given, this amounts to: PS(M)([R])
=
P, PS(M)([-R])
=
1
-
p,
and
PS(M)([R&-R])
=
PS(M)([R]
n
[-R])
=
0. It follows from these facts that PS(M)([R] U [-R]) = PS(M)([R V -R])
= 1 + (1
-
p) = 1. So, by the truth definition for >P just given, M >1
(R V -R). This result is not a problem; indeed it is required by the se-
mantics I have given, following without the assumption of (d). Further-
more, PQM(R V -R)
= 1.
So, the argument that led (b) to a problematic conclusion leads (d) only
to a triviality. Also notice that the problem described for (c) cannot arise
with (d): Modus Ponens is not allowed for the would-with-probability-p
conditional >P, so one cannot, from M >P R and M, derive claims about
post-measurement chances. (Modus Ponens does not hold because the
probabilities described by M >P R relate to a measure over a set of pos-
sible worlds; they are not probabilities that something is true in the actual
world.) Finally, notice that because (d) involves a counterfactual condi-
tional which is to be analyzed in accordance with (0), one might worry
that (d) prejudges interpretive issues or saddles QM with unfortunate
56 JOHN F. HALPIN
metaphysical baggage and controversy over possible worlds semantics. If
(d) did so, it would, like (b) and (c), fail one of section two's tests for
a good explication of quantum mechanical probability assignment. For-
tunately, the counterfactual analysis of (0) is generic, leaving details of
a theory of counterfactuals open.
Finally, I should repeat that proposal (d) is not inextricably opposed
to (a), so long as the conditional probabilities of (a) can be taken as fun-
damental. Indeed one might identify conditional probability with the sort
of conditional chance described in (d). However, before this identification
can reasonably be discussed, one would need to go more deeply into the
analysis of counterfactuals. For example, conditional probabilities are
usually supposed to obey the product rule: Pr(A&B/C) = Pr(A/C)
Pr(B/A&C). To see if the conditional chances also obey the product rule-
that is, to evaluate the claim that if C >P (A&B), C >q A, and (A&C)
>r B, then p
=
q * r-we would need to sketch the details of how possible
world sets s(C), s(A&C), and their measures are related. This, however,
goes beyond the scope of this paper; we have set aside such interpretive
issues as the details of the analysis of counterfactuals. So, I leave a study
of the relationship of (d) to conditional probability for another occasion.
7. Epistemic Probability. In section 5, we rejected the possibility that
quantum mechanical assignments of probability are personal probabilities
because QM is clearly not about personal belief states. But we set aside
the alternative "Epistemic Probabilities" proposal that the quantum me-
chanical assignments are really prescriptions or instructions for these states.
On this view, QM indicates appropriate degrees of plausibility, that is,
quantum mechanical assignments of probability give the degrees of belief
one should have toward statements about measurement results. One way
to read these prescriptions would be a variant to (c):
(c') If an m-measurement is performed, then (one should) assign de-
gree of belief p to R.
This new proposal, (c'), is a conditional prescription. (Note that (c') like
most prescriptions can be defeated by other considerations; for example,
one should not assign personal probability p ($ 1) to R in the case in
which one looks and sees that R is true. So, (c') is perhaps objectionably
vague. Also note that one might want to rephrase (c') by dropping the
words "one should"; this would make it clear that (c') is an instruction,
that is, a command, rather than a normative claim. I prefer to leave this
vague.)
Now, there is little doubt that we do, from QM, get information per-
tinent to our personal probabilities. The proponent of chance will typi-
cally hold that chances mandate personal probabilities (in ways to be de-
scribed later in this section). But the proponent of (c') suggests rather
that chance doesn't play a role in the quantum mechanical probability
attributions (*), but that these involve only instructions (Leeds 1984). As
we have seen in section 5, (d) is perhaps most plausible if we understand
it in terms of chance. Leeds's argument, then, has the potential to cut
against (d). Indeed, let us suppose for the rest of this section that the
probabilities of (d) are chances. I will attempt first to suggest a pre-
sumption in favor of chance and of (d) over (c') in part by showing that
Leeds's arguments against chance in QM, and so against (d), are not
forceful. There is surely something of interest to (c'), a connection be-
tween QM and personal probability, even if it is not an appropriate anal-
ysis or explication of (*). Secondly, I will discuss the relation between
personal probability and the counterfactual probabilities suggested in the
last section.
Leeds gives an argument for the "incompatibility" of QM and realism
via "a skeptical attack on the notion of chance in QM" (1984, 568). He
argues that when we use QM to make statistical predictions or explana-
tions, we need only take into account the wave function from which the
appropriate probabilities can be deduced; there is no need to mention
"chance". I would argue that though this is true, it by no means excludes
chances from QM; rather the chances are implicit in the wave function
VI; they are wave function amplitudes determinable from I.
I call the probabilities determinable from VI "chances" because they fit
the standard model of chance (as described at the end of section 5): (i)
they apply to the single case; (ii) they are theoretical entities that purport
to mark objective tendencies; (iii) they satisfy the probability calculus;
that is, the probabilities for resultant values r, given that some fixed phys-
ical quantity is measured, satisfy the probability calculus; and (iv) they
are used in accordance with evidential principles including, as will be
shown, the Principal Principle, putatively the relation between chance and
subjective probability. I take it, then, that though we can dispense with
"talk of chance" in favor of mention of the VI function, this does not
mean that we have given up chance.
In this section, we should lastly try to give a better statement of the
relationship between the quantum mechanical probabilities given by (d)
and personal degrees of belief or subjective probability. We continue to
presume these probabilities are chances. For ordinary, that is, noncoun-
terfactual, chance the relation is plausibly given by what David Lewis
(1981) calls the Principal Principle. According to this principle, it is rea-
sonable for one to take personal degrees of belief to be identical with the
chances one ascribes unless there is certain evidence to defeat this iden-
tification.
On Lewis's formulation, the Principal Principle relates chances to rea-
58 JOHN F. HALPIN
sonable conditional subjective probability functions P, defined so that P(A/
B)
=
P(A&B)/P(B). For purposes of the following, take admissible evi-
dence at time t to be any statement which either is about times before t,
or is a lawful statement about chance (for example, a statement from
QM). Then the principle is the following:
(PP) If P is a reasonable subjective probability function, x is a real
number, X is the statement that the chance at t that A holds is
x, and E is both admissible at t and compatible with A, then
P(A/X&E)
=
x.
So, the Principal Principle (PP) states that the (reasonable) subjective
probability of A, given only admissible evidence plus the claim that A
has chance x, is x. The subjective probabilities in such cases mirror the
chances. As Lewis notes, it follows from (PP) that the past is not chancy.
(To see this, let A be a true statement about the past and let t be the
present time. It follows that A is admissible at t; so let E = A. It is clear,
then, that 1 = P(A/X&A)
-
P(A/X&E). But P(A/X&E) = x by (PP),
so x = 1. Hence, the chance for any past truth will be 1.) Only the future
can be chancy; that is, only statements about the future can have a chance
between 0 and 1 exclusive. (This shows that (PP) entails the view about
chance described in section 5.)
(PP) as just described applies to simple statements of unconditional
chance. But the proposal (d) for quantum mechanical probability attri-
butions involves conditional chance. Notice that even when an m-mea-
surement occurs, (d) allows no inference to interesting claims about the
chance for R. Basically, this is to say that from (d) (i.e., M >" R) and
M, no inference can validly be made to a claim that R is true with prob-
ability p. (This was intentional. Modus Ponens here would lead to post-
measurement chanciness, which, as described in section 5, is undesir-
able.) Hence (PP), as it is stated above, is not applicable to the chances
described by (d). Thus, we need a principle to relate the conditional chances
of (d) to personal degree of belief.
What sort of principle
should we have to relate conditional chance and,
in particular, (d) to subjective probabilities? Let me try to motivate an
answer. Even if M >" R does not allow inference to a statement about
unconditional chances in our world, it still indicates that the chance for
R among these M-worlds (most
similar to the actual world) is p. Given
this and M but no information about which of the M-worlds is actual,
intuitively one is justified in believing
R to degree p. For the case at hand
of quantum mechanical measurement, the relevantly similar M-worlds have
been described by Wessels (1981, part 2). On her very plausible por-
trayal, such worlds are, with respect
to the quantum mechanical system
to be measured, all alike up until the time the measurement is performed.
(The various worlds diverge only when the m-measurement apparatus is
coupled with the object system giving rise to one of the possible values.)
So, just before an m-measurement occurs no "admissible evidence" (for
example, about times before measurement) will indicate which of the rel-
evantly similar worlds is actual or change the judgement that one is jus-
tified in believing R to degree p. This can be restated as follows:
(PP') If P is a reasonable subjective probability function, E is ad-
missible at times before the measurement results in an out-
come, and p is any real number, then P(R/M&M >P R&E)
=
P.
This new form of the Principal Principle is also a tentative-pragmatic
version of Modus Ponens for conditional chances. I say "tentative" be-
cause the consequent R is to be believed only with probability p, and
"pragmatic" because the inference involved is not a semantic entailment
but describes reasonable belief in certain circumstances.
So, we do not need the vague (c') to relate QM to personal probability.
The construal (d) of quantum mechanical probability attribution will al-
low the connection with personal probabilities (without the unstated pro-
visos of (c')).
8. Concluding Remarks. I have argued above that the best sense can
be made of quantum mechanical probabilities if we understand these in
terms of >P
and (d). To do so, however, I have assumed without argu-
ment the existence of probability measures on the sets of most similar
antecedent satisfying worlds. Presumably these measures are justified, at
least in part, by the success of QM. Finally, it should be noted that QM
was not required for the definition of >P; this sort of chance may make
sense even in deterministic contexts if the appropriate measures on sets
of most similar possible worlds can be justifled. But the question of whether
or not these probability measures can be justified in contexts other than
that of QM, I leave for another occasion.
REFERENCES
Bell, J. S. (1965), "On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox", Physics 1: 195-200.
Fine, A. (1982), "Some Local Models for Correlation Experiments", Synthese 50: 279-
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Gibbons, P. (1987), Particles and Paradoxes: The Limits of Quantum Logic. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
Halpin, J. F. (1986), "Stalnaker's Conditional and Bell's Problem", Synthese 69: 325-
340.
. (1989), "Indeterminateness and the Peircean Theory of Tense", unpublished
manuscript.
Leeds, S. (1984), "Chance, Realism, Quantum Mechanics", The Journal of Philosophy
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60 JOHN F. HALPIN
Lewis, D. (1973), Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1979), "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow", Nous 13: 455-476.
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3-30.

What Is The Logical Form of Probability Attribution in QM

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