Self executing/Non self executing Provisions

The Filipino First Policy

(Sec.10(2), Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila
Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending
the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos; to all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carry with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

However, respondent argues that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement
of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . .
Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which
business may be done." Also that Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony as cited in the
first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Sec.10 (2) of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
2. Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision
of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held:
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command
the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of
government. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of
the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.

The Manila Hotel or 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the
sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. The Manila Hotel is a piece of heritage, worthy
to be made a part of the national patrimony. The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It
is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to
be enforced; so must it be enforced. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the
duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for purpose.

Self executing/Non self executing Provisions
Sovereignty; Generally accepted principles of International Law

TANADA, ET. AL vs. ANGARA, ET.AL
Gr. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

FACTS:
Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGOs, as petitioners,
filed a petition before the Supreme Court, to decide the validity of the action of the President of the
Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos, and the Senate in ratifying the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement and
its three (3) annexes, due to grave abuse of discretion on the part therein. The petitioners believe that this will
be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the Filipino First policy.

ISSUES:
1. Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? Otherwise stated, does the petition involve a
political question over which the court has no jurisdiction?
2. Do the provisions of the WTO agreement and its three (3) annexes contravene section 19, Article II,
and sections 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Philippine Constitution?
3. Do the provisions of the said agreement and its annexes limit, restrict, or impair the exercise of
legislative power by congress?
4. Do said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exxercise of judicial power by this court in
promulgating rules of evidence?
5. Was the concurrence of the senate in the WTO Agreement and its annexes sufficient and/or valid,
considering that it did not include the Final Act, Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services?

HELD:
1. The petition raises justiciable controversy in seeking to nullify the act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravenes the Constitution. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. Its
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
2. The WTO provisions do not contravene with our Constitution. The charter provisions in the
Constitution are not self-executing, rather, just declaration of principles which are not ready for
enforcement through the courts and only serve as guides by the judiciary in their exercise of judicial
review, and as an aid by the legislatures in its enactment of laws. Constitution does not rule out
foreign competition. It also favors consumers, and not industries or enterprises. Lastly, Constitution
was designed to meet future events and contingencies.
3. International treaties and agreements like this, by their inherent nature really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. Nations by their voluntary act, may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits derived from that treaty or agreement.
4. WTO Agreement provisions in article 34 of TRIPS, does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our
judicial system.
5. A Final Act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is a summary of the proceedings over several years,
therefore, need not to be ratified. The assailed Senate resolution no.97 expressed concurrence in
exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories namely, concurrence of the senate in the WTO
Agreement. The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for
ratification.

This court will not review the wisdom of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO.
Hence, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.


OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 1010183, July 30, 1993

FACTS:
The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic
of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that
is the country's virgin tropical forests." This instant petition was filed to seek for the cancelation of
allexisting timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license constitutes a misappropriation or impairment of
the natural resource property and violates their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec.
16, 1987 Constitution) and the protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

HELD:
1. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

2. The Court does not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law
(Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution).

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not underthe Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. EO 192 and Admin Code of 1987 define the powers and functions of DENR, under whose authority
and office the complaint falls. The petitioners right to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENRs duty
to protect and advance the said right. The petitioners personality to sue in behalf of their own as well as the future
generations behalf can only be based on the concept of intergenerational esponsibility insofar as the said right is
concerned.

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police Power Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was
then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos
even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid
exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also
an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in
the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Isagani Cruz vs DENR

Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the
ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated
again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA
law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Held:1. The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the
lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian (Antonio H. Noblejas, Land
Titles and Deeds, p. 5 [1986]; These grants were better known as repartimientos and encomiendas. Repartimientos
were handouts to the military as fitting reward for their services to the Spanish crown. The encomiendas were given
to Spaniards to administer and develop with the right to receive and enjoy for themselves the tributes of the natives
assigned to them. Ponce, supra, p. 12, citing Benitez, History of the Philippines, pp. 125-126).Privateland titles
could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the
Crown (Narciso Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 2 [1994]). (Separate Opinion, Puno, J ., in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128, 166, En Banc [Per Curiam])

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS
A complaint was filed against the defendants Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the ACCRA lawyers, Danilo Ursua and 71
corporations by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) referred here as Republic of the
Philippines with regard to a block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) stock which were allegedly bought through
the CIIF Holding Companies and funded by the coconut levy fund passing through the Unicom Oil Mills and
directly from UCPB. The coconut levy funds were considered as government funds since this came from
contributions from the coconut farmers with the purpose of improving and stabilizing the coconut farming industry,
however these were said to be privatized under presidential directives of then Pres. Marcos. Defendant Cojuangco
Jr., being close with the Marcoses is said to have taken undue advantage of his association, influence and
connection, embarked upon different devices and schemes including the use of the ACCRA Lawyers as nominee
shareholders and the defendant corporations as fronts to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people when he misused the coconut levy fund, amounting to $150 million, to purchase 33 million shares of the
SMC through the holding companies. Hence with the allegations mentioned and with different cases and issues
which remain unresolved, the block of shares representing 20% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC remained
sequestered by the government.
During the pre-trial brief, the Sandiganbayan sought clarification from the parties, particularly the Republic, on their
respective positions, but at the end it found the clarifications "inadequately" enlightening. To resolve various
pending motions and pleadings, Sandiganbayan lifted and declared the Writs of Sequestration null and void.
Despite the lifting of the writs of sequestration, since the Republic continues to hold a claim on the shares which is
yet to be resolved, it is hereby ordered that the following shall be annotated in the relevant corporate books of San
Miguel Corporation:
(1) any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of any of the shares of the Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.
shall be subject to the outcome of this case;

(2) the Republic through the PCGG shall be given twenty (20) days written notice by Defendants Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al. prior to any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of the shares;

(3) in the event of sale, mortgage or other disposition of the shares, by the Defendants Cojuangco, et al., the
consideration therefore, whether in cash or in kind, shall be placed in escrow with Land Bank of the Philippines,
subject to disposition only upon further orders of this Court; and

(4) any cash dividends that are declared on the shares shall be placed in escrow with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, subject to disposition only upon further orders of this Court. If in case stock dividends are declared, the
conditions on the sale, pledge, mortgage and other disposition of any of the shares as above-mentioned in conditions
1, 2 and 3, shall likewise apply.
Sandiganbayan denied both Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Modification but eventually reduced its
resolution deleting the last 2 provisions. Cojuangco, et al. filed a Motion for Authority to Sell San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) shares, praying for leave to allow the sale of SMC shares and Sandiganbayan granted the
motion. Cojuangco, et al. later rendered a complete accounting of the proceeds from the sale of the Cojuangco block
of shares of SMC stock, informing that a total amount of P 4,786,107,428.34 had been paid to the UCPB as loan
repayment.

ISSUE
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of dicretion in:
(a) in lifting the Writ of Sequestrations on the sequestered SMC shares.
(c) in deleting the last two conditions the Sandiganbayan had earlier imposed on the subject shares of stock.

RULING
Among the WOS issued, only one writ WOS 87-0218 complied with PCGG Rules and Regulations requirement that
the issuance be made by at least two Commissioners. However, even if Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218 complied
with the requirement that the same be issued by at least two Commissioners, the records fail to show that it was
issued with factual basis or with factual foundation. It is the absence of a prima facie basis for the issuance of a writ
of sequestration and not the lack of authority of two (2) Commissioners which renders the said writ void ab
initio. Thus, being the case, Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218 must be automatically lifted. Consequently, the
writs of sequestration nos. 86-0062, 86-0069, 86-0085, 86-0095, 86-0096, 86-0097 and 86-0098 must be lifted for
not having complied with the pertinent provisions of the PCGG Rules and Regulations, all of which were issued by
only one Commissioner.
Nor did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion in reducing from four to only two the conditions imposed for
the lifting of the WOS. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted with the best of intentions, being all too aware that the
claim of the Republic to the sequestered assets and properties might be prejudiced or harmed pendente lite unless the
protective conditions were annotated in the corporate books of SMC. Moreover, the issue became academic
following the Sandiganbayans promulgation of its decision dismissing the Republic's Amended Complaint, which
thereby removed the stated reason - "the Republic continues to hold a claim on the shares which is yet to be
resolved" - underlying the need for the annotation of the conditions (whether four or two).


Whether or not the Vatican is a State
Immunity from suit

HOLY SEE v. JUDGE ROSARIO
Gr. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented
in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. While private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land
consisting of 6,000 SQM (Lot 5-A) located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the
name of petitioner. The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent
to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. A dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties
was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the RTC, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila
for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to
the motion was filed by private respondent. The trial court denied the petitioners motion to dismiss; hence,
petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity
only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Vatican is a State
2. Whether or not the Holy See, represented by the Papal Nuncio, has immunity from suit

Held: In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive
dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy
See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according
to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
Consequently, the Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy
See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government
since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must
be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125
[1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity
organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the
Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic
Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the
world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an
"international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of
a state, but not with regard to private/commercial acts or acts jure gestionis. (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136
SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
concurred by the Philippine Senate on 1965. In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted
immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state. In addition, the privilege of sovereign immunity
in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against
petitioner is DISMISSED.


Self executing/Non self executing Provisions
Right to a balanced and healthful ecology
(Sec.16, Art. II, 1987 Constitution)

OPOSA v. FACTORAN, JR.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all
existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants
right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity
to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel
existing TLAs.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgment in
accordance to the prayer of the complaints
3. Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these
TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

HELD:
The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of
complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in
ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit.

The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that
right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed
or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be
granted, wholly or partially.

Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause
cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so
required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II
of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the
DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked
or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.


Civilian Supremacy Clause

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284 August 15, 2000

Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment
of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of
calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft
of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does
not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.


Academic Freedom of Institutions of Higher Learning

ISABELO, JR. v. PERPETUAL HELP COLLEGE OF RIZAL, INC
Gr. No. 103142 November 8, 1993

Facts:
Manuelito Isabelo, Jr. was enrolled at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal ("PHCR") for the degree of
Bachelor of Science in Criminology. He was elected PRO of the Supreme Student Council some time in August
1990; and later he was the hold-over PRO and acting secretary. Prior to the May 8, 1991 meeting, he was asked by
the Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would implement,
among other things, a 20% tuition fee increase for the school year 1991-1992. Manuelito refused to sign the
resolution; instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow officers. When the meeting date
arrived the student council presented their proposal regarding the tuition fee increase. However, on August 6, 1991,
PHCR announced the 20% tuition fee increase; the student council appealed to the DECS and the latter in its letter
to the president of PHCR advised that the tuition fee increase be held in abeyance pending the resolution of the
matter.
In the meantime, the CMT commandant furnished PHCR a memorandum, dated 20 August 1991, containing a list of
PHCR CMT students (Manuelito included) who were dropped during the first semester of school year 1991-1992,
with a recommendation that appropriate action be taken on said students. Manuelito then wrote a letter to the DECS
regarding his dropping from the rolls. DECS issued an order that the students dropped in the rolls be re-admitted and
allowed to attend class pending the resolution of the matter. PHCR did not comply with the directive. Hence this
recourse.

Issue/s:
whether or not PHCR's act of voiding his enrollment is proper and within the scope of academic freedom

Held:
The term "academic freedom" 15 encompassing not only "the freedom to determine . . . . on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught," but likewise "who may be admitted to study." We have
thus sanctioned its valid invocation by a school in rejecting students who are academically delinquent.

Like any other right, however, academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege
that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. The punishment of expulsion appears to us rather
disproportionate to his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course. Indeed the DECS itself is conceding to the
grant of the instant petition. The circumstances lend truth to the petitioner's claim that the private respondent has
strongly been influenced by his active participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase.


Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639
Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night
of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City
where they were signed as laborers.

A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted
the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.

Held:

The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice
was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their
domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society"
were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino
citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could
considered tantamount to slavery.
The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of
abode."Ours is a government of laws and not of men."


Calalang vs Williams
GR 47800
December 2, 1940

Social Justice as the aim of Labor Laws

CRUZ, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of
Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his
first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the
approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the
modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion
thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.

On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement
addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street
and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours
as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a
taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D.
Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public
Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

Issue:

Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people.

Held:

The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."